Criminal Procedure 2017 by Le Roux-Kemp, Andra
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 1 SESS: 457 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
ANNUAL SURVEY OF
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
2017
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 2 SESS: 457 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 3 SESS: 457 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
Annual Survey
of
South African Law
2017
Published for
THE CENTRE FOR BUSINESS LAW
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA
PRETORIA
by
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 4 SESS: 468 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
Published 2019
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
First Floor, Sunclare Building, 21 Dreyer Street,
Claremont 7708
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. In terms
of the Copyright Act, No 98 of 1978, no part of this book may
be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by
any information storage and retrieval system, without permission
in writing from the publisher.
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the information
published in this work is accurate, the editors, publishers and
printers take no responsibility for any loss or damage suffered
by any person as a result of the information contained herein.
Typeset in 10 on 111⁄2 point Helvetica Light
ISBN 978 1 48513 300 1
ISSN 0376-4605
Typeset by Brian Hopking
Printed by Delta Digital
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 5 SESS: 457 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
Editorial Board 2017
FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE DE MOSENEKE, Constitutional Court
JUSTICE LV THERON, Supreme Court of Appeal
PROFESSOR CF FORSYTH, University of Cambridge
PROFESSOR G GLOVER, Rhodes University
PROFESSOR CS HUMAN, University of Stellenbosch
PROFESSOR VA LAWACK, University of the Western Cape
PROFESSOR G MARCUS, University of the Witwatersrand and
SC, Johannesburg Bar
PROFESSOR JT PRETORIUS, University of South Africa
PROFESSOR RA SHARROCK, University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Pietermaritzburg
PROFESSOR N SMIT, University of Stellenbosch
PROFESSOR CJ VISSER, University of South Africa
PROFESSOR DP VISSER, University of Cape Town (retired)
Editors
PROFESSOR N BOTHA, University of South Africa (editor-in-chief)
PROFESSOR C SCHULZE, University of South Africa
PROFESSOR J VAN WYK, University of South Africa
PROFESSOR J GELDENHUYS, University of South Africa (Chair)
Managing co-ordinating editor
MS Z MABE, University of South Africa
Assistant editors
PROFESSOR P MUNYAI, University of South Africa
MR V MADLELA, University of South Africa
v
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 6 SESS: 457 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 7 SESS: 457 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/00−prelims
PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE
STATEMENT
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JOURNAL PUBLICATION
The publication of the peer-reviewed journal Annual Survey of
South African Law contributes to the growth of knowledge.
Therefore, all participants – authors, editors, peer reviewers, and
the publisher – agree on standards of proper ethical behaviour.
The University of South Africa and Juta and Co Ltd, who are
respectively responsible for producing and publishing the jour-
nal, recognise the ethical and other responsibilities and take our
guardianship of the functions connected with the publication of
the journal very seriously.
DUTIES OF AUTHORS
The authors undertake to present an accurate and current
account of legislative and judicial developments and to provide
objective discussion. The material must contain sufficient detail
and permit others to replicate the work. Making fraudulent or
knowingly inaccurate statements is unacceptable. Work reflect-
ing editorial opinion must be acknowledged as such.
The work must be original, and where the work/words of others
have been used this must be appropriately quoted or cited.
Plagiarism in any form is unethical behaviour, and unacceptable.
Authors are not permitted, in general, to publish manuscripts.
Submitting the same manuscript to more than one journal for
publication is unethical and unacceptable, save in exceptional
circumstances where the authors have sought approval from the
editor for publication of the same material in a secondary
publication; in this case, the primary reference must be cited in
the secondary publication.
If an author discovers that his or her published work contains
an inaccuracy, he or she must promptly notify the editor, and
cooperate with the editor to excise or correct the content. If the
editor is informed of an inaccuracy by a third party, the author
must promptly retract or correct the manuscript, or prove that the
original content is correct.
DUTIES OF EDITORS
The editors of the Annual Survey of South African Law are
responsible for deciding whether chapters submitted for publica-
vii
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tion should be accepted. They may be guided by policies of the
editorial board. The editor-in-chief may confer with the other
editors in making a final determination.
The editors must ensure that contributions to the journal appear
in correct English which complies with the style guidelines
prescribed for the journal. The editors evaluate the intellectual
content of manuscripts without regard to gender, race, religious
belief, sexual orientation, citizenship, ethnic origin or the political
inclinations of the authors.
The editorial board will not disclose any information about
chapters submitted for publication to anyone other than the
corresponding author, reviewers, and the publisher as appro-
priate.
Unpublished material submitted by authors may not be used in
the editor’s own research without consent from the author. Editors
must disclose competing interests and publish corrections if the
conflicts of interest are discovered after publication. If required,
other action must be taken, such as retraction of the manuscript
and expression of concern.
The editors take responsibility to respond to ethical complaints
concerning a submitted manuscript or chapter published in the
Annual Survey of South African Law. Any reported complaint,
even if submitted years after publication, will be investigated and
appropriate measures will be taken.
DUTIES OF REVIEWERS
The objective peer review process assists the editor-in-chief in
making editorial decisions, and in improving the quality of the
chapters. Peer review is a key component of scholarly communi-
cation and ensures sound standards of research and proper
acknowledgment of sources used.
Unpublished materials contained in an unpublished manu-
script may not be used in the reviewer’s own research without the
consent of the author. Reviewers must disclose any possible
conflict of interests that may exist, and recuse themselves from
reviews in instances where such a conflict exists.
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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
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THE JUDICIARY
Fractious jibing in the Constitutional Court
Thirty years ago, this chapter discussed what it described as
‘Fractious Jibing in the Appellate Division’ (Edwin Cameron,
Gilbert Marcus & Dirk van Zyl Smit 1988 Annual Survey 500, 542).
The comment was based on remarks, astonishing at the time, by
Joubert JA for the majority, in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa
Limited v De Ornelas & another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A), [1988] 2 All
SA 393. The majority (Rabie ACJ, Joubert, Hefer and Grosskopf
JJA) held that the exceptio doli as a defence to the enforcement
of an unfair contract was a ‘superfluous defunct anachronism’
and not part of our law (605B–F, 609I–610E). Jansen JAdissented
(at 611ff). The 1988 authors (at 542) noted:
[I]n delivering the majority judgment Joubert JA (at 609G) pointedly
stated that it was to be noted that his judgment had been largely
completed and made available to his colleagues by 15 August 1987;
that of Jansen JA was made available to him only on 16 March 1988.
Mercilessly Joubert JA added, in dealing with Jansen JA’s dissent,
that various ‘basic misconceptions’ underlay it.
The 1988 authors considered these comments ‘remarkable’
referring, as they did, to the most senior judge of appeal, asking:
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‘Why wait until four months before his retirement to deliver what
must have been a humiliating stab?’ (at 542). The 1988 authors
speculated that the answer lay in rumours, then widely current in
the legal profession, that Jansen JAhad been passed over for the
Chief Justiceship because he was, in the irony-laden expression
the 1988 authors chose, ‘insufficiently strong’ (at 543). In any
event, ‘this was an unusual disclosure of appellate discord. If one
ascribes the event to a certain heartless fractiousness, history will
surely not condemn the inference’ (at 543).
Times have changed. Rightly, both profession and public
proffer less fawning deference to judges. Moreover, within the
judiciary, judgments and differences between them feature more
robust candour. Yet there remains a long tradition in South
African, and indeed in non-American Anglophone courts, of
restrained dissent and courteous collegial differences. Given
this, the comments by Joubert JA, at the time that they were
made, were remarkable. More than thirty years later, the restrained
discursive mode has, in the main, persisted. At least, until
recently.
Dissent in law is inevitable and welcome. Legal decisions are
the product of contestation and debate. The highest court usually
deals with matters that are unprecedented and do not permit
of easy answers. The dissent is the product of fidelity to the oath
of office that requires judges to ‘uphold and protect the Constitu-
tion’ and to ‘administer justice to all persons alike without fear,
favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the
law’ (Item 6 of Schedule 2 to the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution)). Acting according to one’s
conscience lies at the heart of judicial independence. And apex
courts, almost invariably stacked with necessarily opinionated,
strong-minded judges, dealing with often intractable issues, can
be expected to split, sometimes pronouncedly.
Therefore, a strongly held belief about the law, even if not
shared by other judges, may oblige a judge to dissent. However,
nothing apart from tradition and pragmatism prescribes how
judges should articulate their dissents.
The tone of dissent in the United States Supreme Court stands
out in marked contrast to the restraint that the courts in the
Commonwealth usually exercise. Differing judgments in the United
States Supreme Court are often strident, vituperative, and even
personal. The late Antonin Scalia J epitomised this. In Obergefell
v Hodges 135 SC 2584, a landmark case in which Kennedy J
2 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
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(by a bare majority of five to four) proclaimed the right of
same-sex couples to marry, Scalia J not only joined in the main
dissent by Roberts, Thomas and Alito JJ, but chose, in addition,
to pen a further separate dissent. He did so ‘to call attention to
this Court’s threat to American democracy’ (at 2626). The majority
decision, he said, lacked ‘even a thin veneer of law. Buried
beneath the mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable pas-
sages of the opinion is a candid and startling assertion: no matter
what it was the people ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment
protects those rights that the Judiciary, in its ‘reasoned judg-
ment’, thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect’ (at
2628).
This, Scalia J asserted, was ‘a naked claim to legislative –
indeed, super-legislative – power’, one ‘fundamentally at odds’
with the United States system of government. He excoriated the
majority judgment as a ‘judicial Putsch’ whose ‘hubris’ astounded
him (at 2629). Not content, he went further: ‘The opinion is
couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.
It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting opinions to
contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and
expression; it is something else for the official opinion of the court
to do so’ (at 2630). In a footnote here, he jibed at the four liberal
justices who accepted Kennedy J’s perhaps grandiosely
expressed path to marriage equality. Scalia J stated:
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion
for the court that began: ‘The Constitution promises liberty to all within
its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity’
I would hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court has descended
from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph
Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie (n22).
Comments of this sort have undeniable entertainment value –
but judges are not comics. At the highest level, they deal with
cases that affect the lives of people and the shape of democracy
fundamentally. It is scarcely conducive to trust in the judicial
system that judges should squabble in so unseemly a way.
South African judges have, in the main, shied away from this
kind of invective and rhetoric. However, strains are beginning to
appear. This is evident from a decision handed down as the year
was drawing to a close on 29 December 2017, which is reported
as Economic Freedom Fighters & others v Speaker of the
National Assembly & another 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC), 2018 (3)
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BCLR 259 (EFF 2). The subject matter was intensely political. It
concerned an attempt by all major opposition political parties to
remove then-President Jacob Zuma from office in terms of
section 89 of the Constitution. This section provides that the
National Assembly may remove the President from office by a
resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of
its members on the grounds, among other things, of ‘serious
violation of the Constitution and the law’. The Constitutional
Court’s judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the
National Assembly & others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of
the National Assembly & others 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC), 2016 (3)
SA 580 (EFF 1), delivered in March 2016, was the catalyst. That
decision upheld the Public Protector’s report and remedial action
on the upgrading of President Zuma’s private homestead in
Nkandla at taxpayers’ expense.
The Constitutional Court found that President Zuma had not
paid for certain non-security upgrades to his home, and that in so
failing he had not given effect to the Public Protector’s remedial
action. The court concluded that the President had failed to
uphold, defend, and respect the Constitution. It also faulted
Parliament for its ineffectual, evasive response. This failure was
manifest from the substantial disregard for the remedial action
the Public Protector had stipulated.
After EFF 1, attempts by opposition parties to pass motions of
no confidence in President Zuma and to have him removed in
terms of section 89 failed. Opposition parties then approached
the Constitutional Court in an effort to ensure that Parliament put
in place appropriate section 89 mechanisms to deal with motions
of impeachment. The central plank of the argument was that the
National Assembly had failed to provide mechanisms to investi-
gate the President’s conduct so as to determine whether it
amounted to an impeachable offence in terms of section 89.
The court divided seven to four. Jafta J (Cameron J, Froneman
J, Kathree-Setiloane AJ, Kollapen AJ, Mhlantla J, and Theron J
concurring) upheld the challenge and directed the National
Assembly to make rules regulating the removal of a President in
terms of section 89. Zondo DCJ (Mogoeng CJ, Madlanga J, and
Zondi AJ concurring) dissented on the premise that there were
already sufficient mechanisms to deal with impeachment.
Mogoeng CJ was not content simply to be a party to the main
dissent. He chose, in addition, to write a separate dissent. In it, he
self-consciously levelled a serious charge against his colleagues
in the majority. Referring to the majority judgment, he said that it
was
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. . . a textbook case of judicial overreach – a constitutionally impermis-
sible intrusion by the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of Parlia-
ment. The extraordinary nature and gravity of this assertion demands
that substance be provided to undergird it, particularly because
the matter is polycentric in nature and somewhat controversial (para
[223]).
Expanding, he stated:
It is at odds with the dictates of separation of powers and context-
sensitive realities to prescribe to the National Assembly to always hold
an enquiry, and to never rely only on readily available documented or
recorded evidential material, to determine the existence of a ground of
impeachment. It is just as insensitive to this doctrine to hold that
impeachment grounds must always be determined by the Assembly
before the debate and voting on a motion of impeachment could take
place and it is even more so when the consequential order then
directs the Assembly to make rules that would effectively regulate the
process as so prescribed (para [224]).
The Chief Justice’s accusation prompted a separate judgment
by Froneman J (concurred in by other members of the majority).
He stated:
But for the first paragraph of the Chief Justice’s judgment . . . I would
have been content for my concurrence to merely be noted in the usual
manner. The Chief Justice, however, characterises the . . . judgment
as a ‘textbook case of judicial overreach – a constitutionally impermis-
sible intrusion by the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of Parlia-
ment’. He himself recognises ‘the extraordinary nature and gravity of
this assertion’. It should not be left unanswered (para [279]).
Froneman J proceeded to say:
It is part of constitutional adjudication that, as in this matter, there may
be reasonable disagreement among judges as to the proper interpre-
tation and application of the Constitution. The respective merits of
opposing viewpoints should be assessed on the basis of the substan-
tive reasons advanced for them. There is nothing wrong in that
substantive debate being robust, but to attach a label to the opposing
view does nothing to further the debate (para [280]).
Froneman J did not consider ‘the different outcome’ to be
anything other than ‘a serious attempt to grapple with the
important constitutional issue at hand’. The fact that he did not
agree with the reasoning or outcome proposed by the dissent,
‘does not mean that I could consider them to have abdicated their
responsibility to ensure that the National Assembly acts in
accordance with the Constitution’ (para [281]).
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The tensions inherent in these passages did not end with the
written disposition. They spilled over when the judgment was
handed down in open court. Given the importance of the case,
this event was covered on national television. As the author of the
majority judgment, Jafta J read out a summary of it. As is usual,
dissents are also expressed during handing-down. Jafta J had in
fact summarised the dissent – but Mogoeng CJ, seemingly
vexed, interrupted him, handing him a page to read out.
This prompted an angry response from the Secretary-General
of the EFF, Godrich Gardee, MP, who stated ‘we consider his call
for his own judgment to be read in full and on record as an abuse
of power. He was visibly shaken and irritated, which left us
disturbed.’ Gardee considered it to be ‘unprecedented for such
an irritation to be displayed by the holder of the highest judicial
office who tried to impose his own judgment into record’. He
stated further that ‘we really have to look at the decorum and
conduct of the Chief Justice, he cannot be over celebrated,
otherwise we are going to have a beast and monster out of him’
(Gertrude Makhafola ‘Zuma impeachment ruling is a case of
judicial overreach – Mogoeng’ IOL News Gauteng 29 December
2017 available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/
zumaimpeachment-ruling-is-a-case-of-judicial-overreach-mogoeng-
12564010).
This saga invites three comments, about language, collegiality,
and leadership. The Chief Justice’s use of language was politi-
cally loaded. Damagingly so. The point was captured by Devenish,
who observed that ‘the use of ‘‘judicial overreach’’ by a judge in
this context appears to be unprecedented. It is usually politicians
who use the term, when they disapprove of a judgment in which
the executive or legislature has been found to have acted
unconstitutionally’ (George Devenish ‘Writing On The Wall For
Zuma To Resign’ Daily News 4 January 2018). While the Constitu-
tional Court has often said that judges should be respectful of the
constitutional separation of powers, it has never actually used
the term ‘judicial overreach’. Yet, in the lead-up to the judgment
this is a phrase that had gained some political currency and even
notoriety.
In May 2017, African National Congress (ANC) spokesperson,
Zizi Kodwa, said that the ANC was urging President Zuma to
appeal against a High Court ruling requiring him to provide the
reasons for and record of his decision to remove Finance
Minister, Pravin Gordhan, and his Deputy, Mcebesi Jonas, from
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office. This was denounced as a case of ‘judicial overreach’
(G Quintal ‘Abuse of the Courts or the Last Line of Defence?’
Business Day 12 May 2017 available at https://www.businesslive.
co.za/bd/opinion/2017-05-12-abuse-of-courts-or-the-last-line-of-
defence/). In the same month, about 1 000 ANC supporters were
reported to have marched through the streets of Durban behind a
banner displaying the rhetorical question ‘Who Runs SA, Courts
or Executive’ (Phillip de Wet ‘Judicial Overreach is Back’ Mail &
Guardian 19 May 2017 available at https://mg.co.za/article/2017-
05-19-00-judicial-overreach-is-back). The Speaker of Parliament,
Baleka Mbete, is reported to have stated that Parliament was
being taken to court for political reasons and that it was neces-
sary for the issue of judicial overreach to be resolved (Siyabonga
Mkhwanazi ‘Baleka Mbete Slams ‘‘Judicial Overreach’’ ’ IOL News
Politics 30May 2017 available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/
baleka-mbete-slams-judicial-overreach-9426544).
In levelling the accusation of judicial overreach against his
colleagues, the Chief Justice was self-consciously echoing a
potent political narrative. There was no need for him to have done
so. His attack was pure rhetoric, unfounded in the substance of
the court’s difference. As Froneman J pointed out, there was a
genuine difference of opinion about the interpretation of the
Constitution. To colour this in the way chosen by the Chief Justice
added nothing to the debate and threatened to damage the court
and the legitimacy of the majority decision.
Here lies the second point. The Chief Justice’s accusation went
beyond the mere choice of words. It was a self-consciously
serious accusation to level against colleagues with whom he
works on a daily basis. The process of judgment writing in the
Constitutional Court is cumbersome and time-consuming. Judg-
ments are exchanged, inputs are received, and the issues
extensively debated. This is precisely what occurred in EFF 2, as
the judgments reflect. Why, in the face of a biting allegation which
had caused offence, did the Chief Justice not pause to recon-
sider his language? Bader Ginsburg has written authoritatively
about this (Ruth Bader Ginsburg ‘Speaking in a judicial voice’
(1992) 67 New York University Law Review 1185). She questions
‘resort to expressions in separate opinions that generate more
heat than light’. Bader Ginsburg quotes Roscoe Pound, who
stated that it was ‘not good for public respect for courts and law
and the administration of justice’ for an appellate judge to burden
an opinion with ‘intemperate denunciation of . . . colleagues,
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violent invective, attributions of bad motives to the majority of the
court, and insinuations of incompetence, negligence, prejudice,
or obtuseness’ (at 1194; Roscoe Pound ‘Cacoethes dissentiendi:
The heated judicial dissent’ 38 ABAJ 794, 795).
The Constitutional Court is different from other appellate courts
in South Africa. Its quorum requirement, which requires that a
minimum of eight judges must sit (s 167(2) of the Constitution),
means that most judges must sit in every case. Unlike the
Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court cannot consti-
tute separate panels. The comments of the Chief Justice in his
separate dissent can do little to foster collegial relationships so
essential for the smooth running and efficiency of any court. As
Bader Ginsburg points out, ‘even in the most emotion-laden,
politically sensitive case, effective opinion writing does not require
a judge to upbraid colleagues for failing to see the light or to get it
right’ (ibid at 1197).
Finally, the Chief Justice’s behaviour can hardly do other than
diminish his role as leader. The Chief Justice is the head of the
Judiciary. He occupies a role that ought to set an example for all
judges and, indeed, society at large. The preamble to the
Constitution reflects that its adoption was intended to ‘heal the
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights’, and the
foundational values enshrined in section 1 include ‘human dignity,
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human
rights and freedoms’. This surely envisages a society in which
differences of opinion can be resolved by debate and civility. The
Chief Justice is uniquely placed to set an example for society at
large, but in this instance conspicuously omitted to do so.
Moreover, his rhetoric was unable to attract the support even of
his three fellow-dissentients. He found himself isolated, and
needlessly so.
Judicial accountability
The discussion under this heading of the 2016 Annual Survey
(at 12) began as follows:
It is scarcely comprehensible that the ‘Hlophe saga’, triggered by the
visit of the Judge President of the Western Cape High Court to the
Constitutional Court (CC) in May 2008, should remain unresolved a full
nine years later. The many events which have preceded the latest
round of litigation will be found in this chapter of the Survey annually
since that year’s volume.
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Sadly, incomprehension must yield to seemingly inevitable
reality, as the Constitutional Court justices who were the appel-
lants in the case discussed in 2016 sought to exhaust every
possible curial avenue to avoid having to participate in the
disciplinary tribunal process investigating allegations of grave
judicial misconduct against the Judge President of the Cape
High Court.
In Nkabinde & another v Judicial Service Commission & others
2017 (3) SA 119 (CC), 2016 (11) BCLR 1429, the two justices,
Nkabinde and Jaftha, sought to rescind an earlier order in which
the court refused their application for leave to appeal against the
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal which was noted last
year, and which had found against them. In the original order,
(available at http://saflii.org/images/CCT%2071-16%20Nkabinde%
20and%20another%20v%20JSC%20ORDER%2016%20May%
202016.pdf) theConstitutional Court had dismissed their application
for leave to appeal. This was done ‘in the light of the principle
regulating the position where a court is incapacitated because
of conflicts disabling its members from sitting to determine the
merits of the application, as set out in Hlophe v Premier of
the Western Cape Province, Hlophe v Freedom Under Law &
others 2012 (6) SA 13 (CC)’.
The applicant justices applied for rescission of this order in
terms of Rule 42(1)(a) of the Constitutional Court Rules. This
provision allows the Constitutional Court to rescind an order in
circumstances where it has been erroneously granted in the
absence of one of the parties affected by it. Grounds for
rescission are: (1) the court decided the matter on the basis of an
issue not raised by the parties, thereby depriving them of their
right to make representations and ultimately infringing their right
of access to courts (s 34 of the Constitution); (2) the order was
irregular in that disqualified members of the court participated in
the decision (paras [14] [15]).
The JSC and the Minister of Justice opposed the application,
relying both on the provisions of the Constitution, and the
applicable rules of the court, and on the actual factual circum-
stances of this particular case (paras [16]-[18]).
The court spent some time in its judgment reflecting both on
the process by which it deals with applications for leave to appeal
and on the precedents established in its prior consideration of
applications for rescission (paras [4]-[8]). It noted that this
‘procedure is obviously well known to the applicants, as they
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have been party to many decisions made by this court’ (para [9]).
The court spelled out in great detail exactly why at least four of its
members were disqualified from hearing the matter, as well as
noting that ‘. . . all members of the court may have been compro-
mised because of the personal relationship between colleagues
at the Court’ (para [10]). The decision was handed down,
appropriately, given the very unusual circumstances, in the name
of the court. It found that the applicants’ reliance on Rule 42(1)(a)
was wholly inappropriate given that the order was made at
the ‘Judges’ Conference’, where no applicant has a right to make
representations – this rule could be relied on only when a
decision was made in circumstances where a litigant was entitled
to be present in court, but a decision was made in their absence.
The court held that this error by the applicants was sufficient, on
its own, to dismiss the application (para [20]), but continued to
address the grounds raised.
The court rejected the applicants’ first argument regarding the
infringement of their right of access to courts. The applicants
were well aware of the court’s procedure that allows it to dismiss
applications summarily and without representations from either
party. In paragraph [22] the court lists all of the issues the
applicants would have known at the time of making the original
application for leave to appeal (eg, that the court would have
lacked a quorum) and, despite this knowledge and the precedent
in the Hlophe decision (above), the applicants chose not to
address these issues in their founding papers. The contention
that the applicants were denied an opportunity to give represen-
tations was therefore without merit (para [24]).
The court similarly rejected the argument that the order was
irregular because disqualified judges participated in the deci-
sion, citing the precedent in Hlophe. The court pointed out (para
[28]) that ten judges had already heard the applicants’ com-
plaints against the decision of the Judicial Service Commission
(JSC) to establish a Judicial Conduct Tribunal to hear the
allegations against Hlophe JP, and that this complaint had been
unanimously dismissed. It concluded its judgment with words
which aptly express the frustrations of most of those concerned
about the legitimacy of the administration of justice in this
country:
[W]e would be failing in our duty if we did not take this opportunity to
emphasise that it is in the interests of justice that the matter of the
complaint against Judge President Hlophe be dealt with and con-
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cluded without any further delay. The events that gave rise to the
complaint occurred in 2008. . .It is in the interests of justice that this
matter be brought to finality (para [29].
Might it be that these words are heeded in the near future?
Based on the many obstacles and obfuscations which have
characterised this saga thus far, one could be forgiven for not
holding one’s breath.
The second decision to be considered in this section on
judicial accountability also revolves around the conduct of Hlophe
JP. Mulaudzi v Old Mutual Life Insurance Company (South Africa)
Limited & others, National Director of Public Prosecutions &
another v Mulaudzi [2017] 3 All SA 520 (SCA), 2017 (6) SA 90 has
had a long history. In short, the applicant had invested in an Old
Mutual (OM) policy and later ceded his rights in this policy to
Nedbank. OM failed to endorse the policy to this effect. When the
policy matured, the applicant requested payment and OM,
despite the cession, paid out the money to the applicant.
OM realised the error when Nedbank requested payment of
the proceeds and the matter was reported to the police and the
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP).
This led to a series of applications brought by the various
parties involved. The NDPP obtained a provisional restraining
order over the applicant’s property in the form of a rule nisi in the
Western Cape High Court, granted by Weinkove J. The applicant
anticipated the return date and obtained the discharge of the
order by Hlophe JP. The NDPP and OM appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court of Appeal.
After Hlophe JP had discharged the order, OM obtained an
order in the Gauteng High Court, by De Vos J, that the applicant
pay to it the policy sum and, pending such payment, that he be
restrained from dealing with his investments. The applicant then
obtained leave to appeal against this decision to the Supreme
Court of Appeal but after giving notice to the Registrar of his
appeal, failed to lodge the record for eleven months with the
result that his appeal lapsed. The applicant applied for condona-
tion and reinstatement of the appeal. The applicant was subse-
quently sequestrated.
The Supreme Court of Appeal (Ponnan JA, and with him
Cachalia JA, Theron JA, Mathopo JA and Mbatha AJA) had to
deal with several issues including: the substitution of the appli-
cant in the litigation with the trustees after the sequestration of the
applicant’s estate; whether the applicant would still be allowed to
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intervene in the proceedings in his personal capacity; and
whether condonation should be granted. The court found that the
trustees were necessary parties in all of the matters before it;
it allowed the applicant to act personally in the proceedings; but
it refused condonation (paras [15]-[41]).
Of relevance is the court’s investigation into whether there was
a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Hlophe JP when
he discharged the rule nisi. The factual background against
which the NDPP and OM alleged the reasonable apprehension of
bias, is set out in paragraph [44]. Hlophe JP did not dispute these
facts, but rather the inference of an apprehension of bias.
The Supreme Court of Appeal stressed the gravity of the
allegations from the outset:
It is no small matter that one of the litigants who raises that assertion is
the NDPP. The NDPP is an officer of the court and thus no ordinary
litigant. The NDPP assured us, and it must be accepted, that the
allegation is not lightly made. In any event, the law will not lightly
suppose the possibility of bias in a judge. But, there is also the simple
fact that bias is such an insidious thing that even though a person may
in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may
unconsciously be affected by it (para [42]).
Ponnan JA reiterated the general principles in regard to the test
to be applied in determining the presence of bias in judicial
proceedings (para [48]). The court noted that it is settled law that
not only actual bias, but also the appearance of bias will
disqualify a judge from presiding. Should a judge continue to
preside, the further proceedings are a nullity. Moreover, he or she
is acting inconsistently with the Constitution. The established test
for recusal is whether ‘there is a reasonable apprehension of bias
in the mind of a reasonable litigant in possession of all of the
relevant facts, that a judicial officer might not bring an impartial
and unprejudiced mind to bear on the resolution of the dispute
before the court’ (para [48]). It is important for present purposes
to note the detailed aspects of this test:
An apprehension of bias may arise from an association or interest a
judicial officer has with or in one of the litigants or in the outcome of the
case. It may also arise from conduct or utterances by a judicial officer
prior to or during proceedings. There is as well what has been
described as ‘prejudgment’, which means that a decision may have
been made or an opinion formed, most often unfavourable, about a
person or issue before knowing or examining all the facts. In all these
situations, the judicial officer must ordinarily recuse himself or herself.
The test for recusal adopted by the Constitutional Court is whether
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there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a reasonable
litigant in possession of all the relevant facts, that a judicial officer
might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to bear on the
resolution of the dispute before the court (para [46]).
Against this background, the court then had to decide whether
Hlophe JP should have heard a matter in which the applicant
was represented by the Judge President’s personal attorney,
Barnabas Xulu. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s view was suc-
cinctly expressed as follows:
It must be accepted, I believe, that the longstanding professional
relationship between the Judge President and his personal attorney,
who has represented him in various judicial and quasi-judicial tribu-
nals since approximately 2009, and who continues to do so, in grave
disciplinary proceedings, gives rise to the reasonable apprehension
that in the light of the particular nature of that relationship, the Judge
President would not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudica-
tion of a matter brought before him by his attorney (para [50]).
The court referred in justification for this view to the Norms and
Standards for the Performance of Judicial Functions, issued by
the Chief Justice in terms of section 8 of the Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013, which require case allocation to be transparent and
open (para [50]). The court also referred to S v Dube & others
[2009] ZASCA 28, 2009 (2) SACR 99, in which it was held (para
[14]) that a judge should not sit in a matter in which the state was
represented by his wife and where the court had said that where
a judge has a relationship with a party or legal representative, the
judge must consider the degree of intimacy involved – the more
intimate the relationship, the greater the need for recusal.
The court sought support for its stance in the approach taken in
other jurisdictions (paras [51]-[58]. In the United States ofAmerica,
with a few exceptions not relevant in the present case, a judge
may not sit in a matter in which a lawyer who is currently
representing him or her also represents one of the parties. In the
United Kingdom, in Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90,
[2002] 2 All ER 353, a judge was not disqualified from acting
because the attorney representing one of the parties also drafted
and stored his will and was attending to a codicil. The court,
however, distinguished that case from the present facts because
the representation was limited and of a non-contentious and non-
litigious nature. The court also reviewed Australian and Canadian
approaches to recusal (para [58]).
The court concluded that the proper test for recusal where the
judge is currently represented by an attorney who represents a
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party to litigation before him, requires consideration of several
factors. The factors include: whether the attorney represents the
judge in his personal capacity; whether the attorney is personally
representing the judge or only a member of a firm of which
another member is representing the judge; whether the attorney
is personally representing a party to the litigation, or whether it is
another member of the firm; and the nature of the representation,
ie whether the matter is litigious and substantial (para [59]). In this
matter, the court concluded that the factors weighed heavily in
favour of a finding that it may have been inappropriate for the
Judge President to allocate the matter to himself and hear it.
This was, however, not the only ground which was relied upon
to establish the appearance of bias. This conclusion was strength-
ened by the following factors (para [60]): Hlophe JP was not one
of the duty judges, but nevertheless allocated the matter to
himself; he had dismissed OM’s application in circumstances
where he had clearly not allowed himself sufficient time to read
and properly consider the papers; he had discharged the rule
nisi granted in favour of the NDPP where he had not read the
replying affidavit filed by the NDPP; he had not referred to
the evidence in the NDPP’s replying affidavit which contradicted
the applicant’s defence; and, in this extremely complicated
matter, the reasons provided by Hlophe JP ran to only six pages,
which again raised questions as to the care with which he had
approached the case. As a result, the Supreme Court of Appeal
stated the questions as follows:
It is so that where the offending conduct sustains the inference that the
presiding judge was not open minded, impartial or fair during the
hearing, this court will intervene and grant appropriate relief, including
declaring the proceedings invalid without considering the merits.
Here, however, it was submitted that an examination of the reasons
furnished fortifies the inference that the learned Judge President was
prejudiced against Old Mutual and the NDPP and prejudged the case
against them. It is accordingly necessary to consider those reasons to
determine whether this submission is well grounded (para [61]).
The court proceeded to examine the substance of Hlophe JP’s
decision, highlighting its many flaws (paras [62]-[67]). The court
concluded that while some of the individual factors would them-
selves not have been sufficient to indicate that the NDPP and OM
had not been afforded a fair hearing, taken together there could
be no doubt that their reasonable apprehension that the Judge
President had not brought an open and impartial mind to bear on
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the matter, was justified (para [68]). Hlophe JP’s order, therefore,
was set aside and the proceedings before him were declared a
nullity. The matter was remitted to the High Court.
This is an extraordinary judgment, cast in the usual mutually
respectful language in the collegial traditions of the judicial office.
If one strips away the form, however, the substance is devastating:
there seems to be little doubt that Hlophe JP acted in a manner
which raises many questions as to his partiality. When viewed in
the context of the immediately preceding saga, as well as his
earlier questionable conduct in receipt of a monthly retainer from
an asset management company, his continued tenure in a leader-
ship role in the Judiciary is surprising, to put it mildly.
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Attorneys
The at least questionable, and sometimes corrupt, manipula-
tion of the process for claiming from the Road Accident Fund
(RAF) by attorneys for the victims of accidents, in concert with
medical experts and officials of the RAF, has become notorious
over the past twenty years, and this section of the Annual Survey
is replete with accounts of this professional misconduct.
Yet another example is to be found in the judgment of Plasket J
in Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG). The
applicant and his attorney, Rubushe, had entered into a contin-
gency fee agreement. The applicant’s claim against the RAF was
settled before proceeding to trial. Before making the settlement
an order of court, the court was obliged to peruse the contin-
gency fee agreement as well as the affidavits in terms of section
4(1) and (2) of the Contingency FeesAct 66 of 1997. Contingency
fee agreements falling foul of the Contingency Fees Act are
invalid. A court is called upon to ensure strict compliance with the
legislation in order to prevent abuse by unscrupulous legal
practitioners. In this matter, the particulars of claim were only
four pages long, as was the plea; the entire ‘bundle’ comprised
37 pages, no pre-trial conferences were held, counsel had not
been briefed, and the quality of the work done left much to be
desired.
The fee agreement in this matter provided for Rubushe to
charge 25 per cent of the total settlement or award. In this case,
that fee would have amounted to R226 000. This was grossly
disproportionate to the work done, ‘and amounts to overreaching
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on an outrageous scale’ (para [19]). Considering the poor quality
of the work, Plasket J took serious issue with Rubushe’s conduct.
The fee agreement was contrary to the provisions of section 2
of the Contingency Fees Act, which prohibits attorneys from
charging 25 per cent of damages. Rather, an attorney may
charge a fee that is higher than their usual fee subject to two
limitations: (1) the fee may not exceed twice the attorney’s usual
fee; and (2) the fee may not exceed 25 per cent of the damages
awarded. In this instance, and given that the clauses which fell
afoul of the Contingency Fees Act went to the heart of the
agreement, the provisions could not be severed and the entire
agreement was, therefore, invalid. In accordance with the legal
regime, therefore, the common law applied, which meant that
Rubushe was only entitled to a reasonable fee in relation to the
work done.
The court lamented the ongoing abuse of contingency-fee
agreements as follows:
This is yet another case in which an attorney – an officer of the court
who is supposed to act with integrity and comply with the highest
ethical standards – is guilty of an attempt to grossly overreach his
client, of rapacious and unconscionable conduct. Unfortunately, in
this jurisdiction, this is a problem that is all too common. That said,
however, it seems to me that the problems in relation to contingency
fee agreements that come to the attention of the courts are, in all
likelihood, the tip of the ice-berg . . . This is all cause for grave concern
and, if I am correct, a manifestation of endemic corruption embedded
in the attorneys’ profession (paras [27] [29]).
Plasket J ordered that a copy of his judgment be delivered to
the Cape Law Society.
Given the frequency with which cases of this nature have
appeared in recent editions of Annual Survey, this judgment once
again serves to emphasise the critical role of the superior courts
as a means of drawing attention to the gross abuse of profes-
sional authority by legal practitioners; yet one cannot but ques-
tion the efficacy of such dire warnings, given the repeated
infractions of both ethics and the law which come to light in this
way.
The critical role of the Law Society in monitoring and regulating
professional ethics is clear, yet one’s confidence in its capacity
and commitment to fulfil such an obligation can only be severely
shaken by the next case to be considered, Ex Parte Mdyogolo
2017 (1) SA 432 (ECG). The applicant had applied for admission
to the roll of attorneys in the Eastern Cape High Court. He had
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three previous criminal convictions: the first for theft of a cassette
tape; the second for robbery with aggravating circumstances
when he, armed with a semi-automatic rifle, robbed a petrol
station in Fort Beaufort in June 1994; and the third for drunken
driving. Of relevance was the conviction for robbery, which the
applicant claimed had been politically motivated. Once more,
Plasket J (and with him, Beshe J) heard the matter.
When the application first came before the court, it was
postponed sine die in order: (1) to allow the applicant an
opportunity to supplement his papers with information relating to
judgment and sentence in the robbery trial as well as his
application to the TRC for amnesty; and (2) to allow the Cape Law
Society to submit its views. In his supplementary papers, the
applicant submitted that trial records were no longer available,
being destroyed as a rule ten years after the hearing, and that he
had not pursued his application for amnesty as he had been
released on parole. He could not, therefore, furnish the court with
the outcome of this application. The Cape Law Society filed
papers ultimately endorsing the applicant’s application. In deal-
ing with the robbery conviction, the Law Society noted that the
offence was politically motivated and, given the passage of time,
it was not of the view that this precluded him from practising as an
attorney. Given the public importance of this matter, the court
requested the Eastern Cape Society of Advocates to act as
amicus curiae.
The court investigated the reasons for the robbery provided by
the applicant in his application for admission – that the robbery
was committed as part of the armed struggle. The court com-
pared this to the reasons he provided in his application for
amnesty – that the police got him drunk and used him in a
planned operation to discredit the Pan Africanist Congress, the
applicant having claimed to be a member of its armed wing.
Plasket J examined the historical context against which the
robbery was committed and concluded that by the time the
applicant took part in it on 19 June 1994, the armed struggle was
over and a democratically elected Parliament had been estab-
lished. The applicant’s crime was committed after the amnesty
cut-off date and the account of the robbery given in his amnesty
application was ‘bizarre and nonsensical’ and indicative of a
person ‘who is unwilling to take responsibility for his actions, and
of a person who is willing to fabricate a version’ for his benefit
(para [27]). Accordingly, his application for admission had to be
decided on the basis that the applicant’s explanation was false.
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In considering the law applicable in these circumstances, the
court set out the well-established principles (paras [29]-[31]). It
reiterated that the mere fact that a person has a criminal
conviction does not bar him or her from admission, but that often
the conviction will show the person to be of such a character that
he or she is ‘not worthy to be admitted to the ranks of an
honourable profession’(para [30]). In this case, the robbery
conviction; the applicant’s forfeiture of bail; the mendacious
version of events that the applicant put before the TRC; and the
untruthful justification for the robbery provided in the admission
application which was intended to mislead the Law Society and
the court, taken together indicated a lack of honesty, integrity,
and trustworthiness, which are essential qualities for a member of
the attorneys’ profession. Consequently, the application for admis-
sion was dismissed as the applicant had not discharged the onus
of establishing that he was a fit and proper person to be admitted
to practise (para [35]).
The court was very critical of the manner in which the Cape
Law Society had handled the matter, observing that whomever
considered the application could not have properly applied his or
her mind. Given that the robbery had been committed in June
1994, it should have been apparent that the applicant’s claim that
it had been politically motivated was unlikely to be true and, at the
very least, should have prompted further investigation. A duty
rests on the Law Society to develop and maintain professional
and ethical standards in the interests of both the profession and
the public (para [38]). It had clearly failed to discharge that
obligation in this instance.
Finally, in relation to professional practice, the duties and
responsibilities of a curator of a financial fund and the Financial
Services Board (the FSB) occupied the attention of the court in
Nash & another v Mostert & others 2017 (4) SA 80 (GP). Mostert
had been appointed by the FSB as a curator for the Sable
Industries Pension Fund, which had been left with no assets as a
result of theft committed against it. The High Court order setting
out Mostert’s mandate provided for ‘periodical remuneration in
accordance with the norms of the attorneys profession, as
agreed with the FSB’ (para [2]).
The FSB and Mostert had entered into a remuneration agree-
ment which provided that ‘in the circumstances, recovery of
assets . . . shall be subject to the curators’ remuneration of 16,66
per cent (exclusive of VAT) of such assets recovered’ (para [14]).
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In other words, in the event of failure to recoup the funds, the
curator would receive no remuneration. The dispute in this case,
which eventually ran to several thousand pages of documenta-
tion (para [3]), turned on the meaning to be given to these words.
Nash, who was a member of the Sable Fund and who had been
accused of the theft, instituted an application against Mostert and
the FSB arguing that the remuneration agreement was void ab
initio for non-compliance with the Contingency Fees Act.
On the issue of the validity of the remuneration agreement,
Tuchten J found (para [80]) that contingency fee agreements in
respect of non-litigious matters were against public policy for
reasons similar to those which made them problematic in respect
of litigious matters, ie, they could lead to conflicts of interest
between the duty and interests of legal practitioners.
The remuneration agreement concluded between the FSB and
Mostert was, therefore, contrary to the norms of the attorneys’
profession and invalid (para [93]). The court ordered Mostert
to provide the applicants with a statement of account of money
received or debited by him as fees. The court did not order
Mostert to repay the funds immediately as requested by the
applicants. Instead, it held that it was open to Mostert and the
FSB to conclude a valid remuneration agreement in accordance
with the original High Court order appointing Mostert, but without
remarking on the retrospectivity of the operation of such an
agreement.
The judgments canvassed in this section once again demon-
strate the great value of the superior courts in holding the
attorneys’ profession to the standards set for it in legislation, as
well as the norms which it sets for itself. Yet, there remains a
strong sense of disquiet about the frequency with which the
courts have to play their accustomed watchdog role in keeping
the profession honest. The next case to be reviewed displays
a shocking degree of abuse of power within a vital aspect of
the administration of justice, the National Prosecuting Authority
(the NPA).
Advocates
In General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Jiba & others
2017 (2) SA 122 (GP), the appellant General Council of the Bar
(GCB) brought an application to have Jiba (then deputy National
Director of Public Prosecutions, NDPP), Mrwebi (then Special
Director of Public Prosecutions), and Mzinyathi (then Director of
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Public Prosecutions for North Gauteng) removed from the roll of
advocates on the ground that they were no longer fit and proper
to practise.
The general background to this matter is notorious. The NPA
had requested the GCB to bring an application for the disbar-
ment of the respondents after judgment was handed down in
National Director of Public Prosecutions & others v Freedom
Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA), 2014 (2) SACR 107 (SCA),
[2014] 4 All SA 147 (Mdluli SCA). The complaints against the
respondents were based on their conduct in handling the matter
of Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions
& others [2013] 4 All SA 657 (GNP), 2014 (1) SA 254 (GNP)
(Mdluli HC) and Mdluli SCA, and adverse remarks made during
the course of these matters by both the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal. Other complaints and adverse remarks
had been made against Jiba in Democratic Alliance (DA) v Acting
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] ZAGPHC 242;
Zuma v DA [2014] ZASCA 101 (Spy tapes) and Booysen v Acting
NDPP 2014 (2) SACR 556 (KZD). These were review proceedings
instituted against the NPA in circumstances where several sets
of charges had been withdrawn (Mdluli and Spy tapes) and
instituted (Booysen).
The court (Legodi and Hughes JJ concurring) opened by
remarking that the ‘pre-admission character-screening of lawyers
seems not to be effective any more. Post-admission moral
development is imperative’ (para [1]), and then listed the follow-
ing as ‘the least of the qualities’ that a lawyer should possess
in order to be considered fit and proper (para [3]): (1) integrity;
(2) objectivity; (3) dignity; (4) knowledge and technical skills;
(5) capacity for hard work; (6) respect for legal order, and (7) a
sense of equality and fairness.
The test to be applied in determining whether a person remains
‘fit and proper’ to carry out his or her functions as a legal
professional is a three-part one (para [9]): (1) the court must
decide whether the conduct complained of has been established
on a preponderance of probabilities; (2) it must consider if the
person is, in the court’s discretion, not a fit and proper person to
continue to practise and, in so doing, weigh the conduct com-
plained of against the conduct expected of a fit and proper
person; and (3) the court must inquire whether the person is to be
removed from the roll or suspended for a period with the primary
consideration being the protection of the public. From paragraph
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[10] onward, the court set out the legislative and constitutional
framework within which the NPA operates, as well as the direc-
tives contained in the prosecutorial code of conduct regarding
conduct, independence, and impartiality.
In paragraphs 17–40, Legodi J dealt with several interlocutory
issues raised by Jiba, including: the failure to afford Jiba a fair
hearing; that the application and relief sought offended against
the separation of powers; and that the application was prema-
ture. The court also set out the reasons for its decision to disallow
the filing of further affidavits by Jiba, before considering and
ruling on the validity of several sets of complaints against each of
the respondents in turn, in relation to their conduct in a number
of high-profile and highly controversial prosecutorial decisions.
Complaints against Jiba in relation to the Booysen matter
(paras [41]-[67]) related to Jiba’s decision to institute charges
against Major General Booysen under the Prevention of Organ-
ised Crime Act 121 of 1998. The allegation was that Jiba had
failed to comply with the NPA’s Code of Conduct, and had made
clearly untruthful statements under oath. After considering all the
evidence, the court concluded that no case for suspension or
removal from the roll had been made out against Jiba in this
matter. Again, complaints against Jiba in relation to the Spy tapes
case were considered (paras [69]-[99]). The background is set
out in paragraphs [69]-[72]. In brief, the DA had instituted a
review of the NPA’s decision to withdraw certain criminal charges
against then President Zuma. It was Jiba’s conduct during the
course of these review proceedings, which, among other things,
led to the present application for her removal from the roll.
Allegations about Jiba’s conduct during the course of the
review proceedings, remarked on by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in its earlier judgment, included: her failure to comply with
an order granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal; adopting a
supine attitude towards directives issued by the Supreme Court
of Appeal; not taking a position as to the confidentiality of the
tapes, but rather metaphorically shrugging her shoulders; acting
disingenuously, in a manner unworthy of the office of the NDPP;
and not acting independently (para [74]). Once again, after
reviewing the evidence, the court was unable to find against Jiba
on any of these grounds.
However, complaints against all three respondents in relation
to Mdluli yielded an altogether different set of outcomes (see
paras [100]-[174]). Complaints against Jiba here included: failure
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to file a full and complete Rule 53 record, notwithstanding the
existence of an order compelling her to do so; failure to comply
with a directive from the Deputy Judge President; failure to heed
Advocate Motau SC’s advice, which she had sought; failure to
heed the advice of Advocate Halgryn SC that persisting with the
defence of the matter was akin to being on a sinking ship; failure
to disclose to the court prosecutor Breytenbach’s memorandum
and the representations for the internal review of Mrwebi’s
decision; and her failure to consider the contradictions in
Mrwebi’s evidence.
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
• in her conduct in failing to file the record, Jiba had acted
contrary to her oath as an advocate, and had ‘flouted the rules
of the game of the high position she holds’;
• in failing to comply with the DJP’s directive, her conduct was
wanting, and that she had showed no concern about the slow
pace at which the matter was proceeding and that, taken
together with the other complaints in this matter, justified her
removal from the roll;
• in responding to the complaint regarding her failure to heed
Advocate Motau’s advice, she ‘ran away’ from her responsibili-
ties both as head of the NPAand as an officer of the court, and
that her conduct in this regard had been both serious and
unprecedented – the court commented that Jiba ‘was stead-
fast in defying logic and advice for as long as her wishes were
not accommodated’;
• in her failure to heed the advice of Advocate Halgryn, Jiba had
shown that she was steadfast in her insistence that the
charges against Mdluli should be permanently withdrawn
despite the evidence against him. Jiba had acted mala fide,
had displayed an ulterior motive, and had offended against
the rule of law and the Constitution and, therefore, had to be
found no longer fit and proper;
• in her failure to take the court into her confidence regarding
the internal review, Jiba had intended deliberately to mislead
the court in her attempt to put to rest the charges against
Mdluli; and
• in her failure to consider the contradictions in Mrwebi’s
evidence, Jiba had been aware that there was no possible
defence to the dropping of the charges against Mdluli.
In conclusion, the court described Jiba’s conduct as
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. . .wanting and inconsistent with the conduct of a lawyer who should
remain on the roll of advocates. But Jiba was relentless in fighting the
case brought by FUL and directly or indirectly dismissed teams of
advocates one after the other, because she did not agree with their
advice. That was done, irrespective of the merits of the advice. By so
doing, she ceased to be a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of
advocates (para [138].
In summary, the court found that Mrwebi
• had lied regarding the timing of his decision;
• had not heeded the rules of court or the advice of Advocate
Halgryn;
• had taken a passive role in the proceedings which were
aimed at challenging his decision;
• had deliberately failed to provide a full record;
• had discussed the matter with Mzinyathi – as he was legis-
latively obliged to do – and had agreed that a decision would
not be taken without further research, but thereafter pro-
ceeded to take the decision, and that his conduct in this
regard constituted ‘a betrayal and a consultation in bad faith
by an officer of the court’, sufficiently serious to justify his
removal from the roll;
• had not been honest and candid before the court;
• had failed to heed the solid and correct advice of Advocate
Halgryn and had later attempted to distance himself from this;
and
• had withdrawn the charges against Mdluli despite the exist-
ence of prima facie evidence against him.
For all these reasons, Mrwebi had ‘clearly made himself liable
to cease to be a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of
advocates’ (para [164.1]). Legodi J made the following remarks
about the misconduct of both Jiba and Mrwebi:
I cannot believe that two officers of the court . . . who hold such high
positions in the prosecuting authority will stoop so low for the
protection and defence of one individual who has been implicated in
serious offences. . . . It is this kind of behavior that diminishes the
image of our country and its institutions, which are meant to be
impartial, independent and transparent in the exercise of their legisla-
tive powers (paras [165]ff).
As Mzinyathi did not address the court in these proceedings,
and the GCB did not insist on proceeding against him, no finding
of a failure to be a fit and proper person was made against him
(para [174]).
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This long and careful judgment, which also contains several
examples of devastating cross-examination of Mrwebi by Tren-
gove SC, gives only glimpses into the very controversial conduct
by Jiba and Mrwebi in shielding Mdluli from prosecution, appar-
ently in deference to the will of the President of the country. Their
behaviour was shockingly improper, and it is gratifying that the
High Court so convincingly found as it did. This judgment once
again highlights the value of an independent, impartial, and
courageous judiciary, committed to the values of the Constitution,
in particular, accountability, responsiveness, and openness
(s 1(d)).
It should be noted, however, that a bare majority of the Supreme
Court of Appeal surprisingly upheld the appeals of both Jiba and
Mrwebi in mid-2018: see Jiba & another v General Council of the
Bar of South Africa & another; Mrwebi v General Council of the Bar
of South Africa [2018] ZASCA 103, [2018] 3 All SA 622. This
judgment will be discussed in the 2018 Annual Survey.
Judicial appointments: JSC duty to give reasons
The Supreme Court of Appeal earlier confirmed that the Judicial
Service Commission (the JSC) is required to give reasons for its
decisions when they are taken on review (JSC v Cape Bar Council
[2012] ZASCA115, 2013 (1) SA 170). The next question to arise, in
Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission & others
2017 (1) SA367 (SCA), was whether the JSC is required to release
the transcript of its deliberations as part of the review record. The
Supreme Court of Appeal, confirming the decision of the High
Court, held that the JSC’s deliberations need not be disclosed.
Writing for a unanimous bench, Maya DP (as she then was)
concluded:
A decision-maker’s deliberations do not automatically form part of the
record of the proceedings as contemplated in rule 53. The extent of
the record must depend upon the facts of each case. In certain cases
the decision-maker may be required to produce a full record of
proceedings which includes its deliberations. But there may be cases,
such as this one, where confidentiality considerations may warrant
non-disclosure of deliberations for the reasons set out above. I agree
with the court a quo that the JSC is set apart from other administrative
bodies by its unique features which provide sufficient safeguards
against arbitrary and irrational decisions. The relief sought by HSF
would undermine its constitutional and legislative imperatives by, inter
alia, stifling the rigour and candour of the deliberations, deterring
potential applicants, harming the dignity and privacy of candidates
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who applied with the expectation of confidentiality of the deliberations
and generally hamper effective judicial selection (para [39]).
However, the decision has since been overturned by the
Constitutional Court in Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial
Service Commission [2018] ZACC 8, 2018 (4) SA1 (CC), 2018 (7)
BCLR 763 which we shall review in the 2018 Annual Survey.
THE EXECUTIVE
In the 2016 Annual Survey (37–39), we discussed the decision
in Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern
African Litigation Centre 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA), in which a full
bench of the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the government
had acted unlawfully in not arresting Omar Al Bashir, the Presi-
dent of Sudan, for trial before the International Criminal Court
(ICC). Al Bashir was present in South Africa for a meeting of the
African Union. He was later allowed to leave the Republic with
the full knowledge of the South African government. Following the
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, shortly before the
matter was to be heard in the Constitutional Court, South Africa
gave notice to withdraw from the ICC. Other African nations did
the same. At the same time, the government withdrew its applica-
tion for leave to appeal in the Constitutional Court, leaving the
Supreme Court of Appeal the final word on the Al Bashir matter.
Subsequently, the decision of the national executive to with-
draw from the ICC was itself successfully challenged in Demo-
craticAlliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
& others 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP). The full bench of the High Court
(Mojapelo DJP, Makgoka and Mothle JJ) upheld a challenge to
the purported withdrawal. The court held that section 231(2) of
the Constitution entails that South Africa can only validly withdraw
from the Rome Statute with the prior approval of Parliament and
following the repeal of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (para [51]).
At the time of writing, an appeal against the High Court
decision invalidating South Africa’s withdrawal is pending in the
Constitutional Court. The outcome of the case in the Constitu-
tional Court will be discussed in the 2018 Annual Survey.
CHAPTER 9 INSTITUTIONS
Public Protector
In the 2016 Annual Survey (19–26), we discussed the decision
of the Constitutional Court in in the ‘Nkandla case’, Economic
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Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly & others;
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly & others
[2016] ZACC 11, 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC), 2016 (3) SA 580. In
that matter, the Constitutional Court held that the Public Protec-
tor’s remedial action in terms of section 182(1)(c) of the Constitu-
tion – directing then President Jacob Zuma to pay back to the
state a portion of the costs of non-security upgrades to his private
residence – was binding. In analysing the decision, we antici-
pated that one of its consequences would be an increase in
the frequency of applications to review and set aside action
by the Public Protector. In 2017, we have already seen two such
matters.
In Minister of Home Affairs & another v Public Protector of the
Republic of South Africa & another [2017] 1 All SA 239 (GP), 2017
(2) SA 597, the Minister and Director-General of Home Affairs
sought to review and set aside a report of the Public Protector
regarding alleged misconduct by a diplomatic official in Cuba.
The official concerned allegedly had been involved in serious
traffic law violations and other incidents in Cuba, prompting the
Department to withdraw him (paras [13]-[16]). The official com-
plained to the Public Protector that his withdrawal without a
hearing was unlawful (para [16]). The Public Protector investi-
gated the complaint and granted the official remedial action
which included requiring the Director-General to pay the official
certain benefits, to investigate why proper processes had not
been followed, and to apologise to the official (para [63]).
Prinsloo J held that the decisions and actions of the Public
Protector constitute administrative action in terms of the Promo-
tion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and are subject to
review (para [47]). On the facts, the court held that the outcome
of the investigation was rationally justifiable and that the decision
and remedial action fell within the bounds of reasonableness
(para [68]). The review application, therefore, failed.
A second review application against a decision of the Public
Protector was successfully brought in South African Reserve
Bank v Public Protector & others 2017 (6) SA 198 (GP), [2017] 4
All SA 269. This matter concerned an investigation by the current
Public Protector, Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane, who suc-
ceeded Advocate Thuli Madonsela, the highly regarded Public
Protector who led the investigations into the Nkandla upgrades
and subsequent investigation into ‘state capture’. Advocate
Mkhwebane succeeded Advocate Madonsela in late 2016. One
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of her first acts was to investigate government’s alleged failure to
recover funds used in an apartheid-era Reserve Bank bailout of
Bankorp, a commercial bank. Acting in terms of section 182(1)(b)
of the Constitution, the Public Protector issued a report directing
the Special Investigating Unit to reopen investigations into these
matters, and instructing the Chairperson of the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services to take
certain steps to amend the Constitution to alter the constitutional
mandate of the Reserve Bank. The second of these remedial
actions – paragraph 7.2 – was the subject of the review applica-
tion that we consider here.
Murphy J upheld the challenge, holding that this remedial
action trenched on Parliament’s exclusive authority and violated
the doctrine of the separation of powers in section 1(c) of the
Constitution (paras [43]-[44]). The court also held that this action
encroached on the national executive’s prerogative to set
economic policy (para [45]). The court held further that the
remedial action was irrational in relation to its stated purpose of
securing socio-economic progress for the poor, because it
would, on the uncontested evidence, instead result in impoverish-
ment (paras [49]-[52]). Moreover, the superficial reasoning and
erroneous views on the Reserve Bank’s mandate contained in the
Public Protector’s answering affidavit did not bear scrutiny on any
reasonable basis (paras [56] [57]). The remedial action, there-
fore, had to be set aside for both irrationality and unreasonable-
ness (para [57]). As the Public Protector had failed to disclose
beforehand that she intended to amend the primary object of the
Reserve Bank, the remedial action also fell to be set aside on
the basis of procedural unfairness (para [58]).
The court closed with the following ringing statement:
Suffice it to say, the Public Protector’s explanation and begrudging
concession of unconstitutionality offer no defence to the charges of
illegality, irrationality and procedural unfairness. It is disconcerting
that she seems impervious to the criticism, or otherwise disinclined to
address it. This court is not unsympathetic to the difficult task of the
Public Protector. She is expected to deal with at times complex and
challenging matters with limited resources and without the benefit of
rigorous forensic techniques. It is easy to err in informal alternative
dispute-resolution processes. However, there is no getting away from
the fact that the Public Protector is the constitutionally appointed
custodian of legality and due process in the public administration. She
risks the charge of hypocrisy and incompetence if she does not hold
herself to an equal or higher standard than that to which she holds
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those subject to her writ. Adismissive and procedurally unfair approach
by the Public Protector to important matters placed before her by
prominent role players in the affairs of state will tarnish her reputation
and damage the legitimacy of the office. She would do well to reflect
more deeply on her conduct of this investigation and the criticism of
her by the Governor of the Reserve Bank and the Speaker of
Parliament (para [59]).
The comments from the court are a sharp reminder of the
importance of the institution of the Public Protector and the need
for the Constitution’s guardian of state propriety herself to be
beyond reproach.
POLICE
Case law
In Helen Suzman Foundation & another v Minister of Police &
others 2017 (1) SACR 683 (GP), an application was made to set
aside the decision of the Minister of Police to appoint Major
General Ntlemeza as the national head of the Directorate for
Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI). He argued that, in making
this appointment, the Minister had acted unlawfully and irratio-
nally, and had failed to perform a constitutional duty to protect the
independence of the DPCI.
Much of the argument focused on General Ntlemeza’s suspen-
sion of Major General Sibiya for the latter’s involvement in the
illegal rendition of Zimbabwean prisoners in 2010. General Sibiya
successfully challenged his suspension. In upholding the Sibiya
application, Matojane J made the following remarks about General
Ntlemeza:
In my view, there exists no basis in law or a fact for the third
respondent to take the drastic measure of placing applicant on
precautionary suspension. I agree with the applicant that the decision
by the third respondent was taken in bad faith and for reasons other
than those given. It is arbitrary and not rationally connected to the
purpose for which it was taken and accordingly, it is unlawful as it
violates applicant’s constitutional right to an administrative action that
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair (para [10]).
When General Ntlemeza sought leave to appeal against his
judgment, Matojane J amplified his critique as follows:
In my view, the conduct of the third respondent shows that he is
biased and dishonest. It further shows that the third respondent is
dishonest and lacks integrity and honour, he made false statements
under oath (para [11]).
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In his justification for the appointment of General Ntlemeza, the
Minister of Police stated that he had afforded General Ntlemeza
an opportunity to provide an explanation for the remarks made by
the judge. On receipt of the explanation, the Minister was
‘satisfied’ that the remarks made by the judge were ‘not findings’.
Mabuse J, on behalf of a full bench, held that the Minister was
required to show that he had carefully considered the two
judgments to which reference has been made, and any counter-
vailing representations, and was then under a duty properly
to weigh the opposing facts and arrive at a rational decision.
By contrast,
[t]he Minister’s decision not to take all these adverse factors into
account amounted to a consent by him to approve the appointment of
Major General Ntlemeza under polemic circumstances and was not a
proper approach. Accordingly the Minister must get more kicks than
halfpence. He could not have been satisfied that Major General
Ntlemeza was a fit and proper person to be appointed as the national
head of DPCI if he did not consider all the relevant factors (para [27]).
The problem which confronted the Minister was that the
judgments of Matojane J constituted ‘direct evidence that Major
General Ntlemeza lacks the requisite honesty and integrity and
consciousness to occupy the position of any public office, not to
mention an office as important as that of the national head of the
DPCI’ (para [36]). Accordingly, by not taking sufficient account
thereof, the Minister had failed properly to evaluate the judicial
remarks by Matojane J. Consequently, the Minister failed to
appreciate the serious doubt which had been cast on the fitness
and proprietary of General Ntlemeza to hold so important an
office. The appointment had to be set aside for want of rationality.
Crime statistics
On 24 October 2017 the South African Police Service released
the country’s crime statistics for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017.
During the recorded period a total of 19 016 murders were
reported, an increase from the previous year’s figure of 18 673.
The Eastern Cape reported the highest murder rate at 55,9 per
hundred thousand people; the Western Cape, as the next highest,
reported 51,7 per hundred thousand people; while the lowest
was Limpopo at 14,2 per hundred thousand people. In summary
an average of 52,1 people were murdered every day.
Sexual offences, as set out in the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters Act) 32 of 2007, include rape,
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compelled rape, sexual assault, compelled sexual assault, and
compelled self-sexual assault. In the reported year, 2016/2017, a
total of 49 606 sexual offences were recorded by the police,
which is a reduction from the 51 895 in the previous year. Some
41 503 rapes were recorded, down from 59 828 in the previous
year. The Eastern Cape had the highest rape rate at 105,3 per
hundred thousand people. In general, the rape rate decreased
from 75,5 to 71,3 per hundred thousand people. Gareth Newham,
head of the Institute of Security Studies’ Justice and Violence
Prevention Program, warned that these figures do not paint an
accurate picture. While the official statistics reflected a decline in
rape of some four per cent, Newham observes:
If police were to start treating crime victims including rape victims with
dignity and sensitivity when they come to report the crime then rape
cases would increase because everyone would come report with
good faith . . . At the moment sexual offences statistics are unreliable.
Crime stats can only give a certain proposition of crime because very
few incidents of some categories like assault and sexual offences are
reported. (As quoted in City Press 29 October 2017.)
In 2016/17 156 450 common assaults were reported, which
translates to a daily average of 428,6 people as victims of
common assault. The rate of assault decreased from 301,1 per
hundred thousand to 280,2 per hundred thousand during the
reported year.
In the reported year, 53 418 common robberies were recorded,
which is a decrease from 54110 in the previous year. On average,
146,4 common robberies were recorded every day. Robbery with
aggravating circumstances occurs when a person uses a weapon
to remove, unlawfully, intentionally, and forcibly, property belonging
to another person. During the reported year, 140 956 robberies
with aggravating circumstances were recorded, which was an
increase of 6,4 per cent from the previous year. In summary,
386,2 robberies with aggravating circumstances were recorded
each day.
A further set of crime statistics was released by the South
African Police Services in September 2018. They cover the period
April 2017 to March 2018. They paint an even more disturbing
picture of the violent nature of South African society.
The statistics refer to ‘17 community-reported serious crimes’
which are divided as follows:
30 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 31 SESS: 16 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/01−Administration
Contact crimes
(601 366 cases)
Contact related
crimes (115 361
cases)
Property related
crimes (507 975
cases)
Other serious
crimes (438 113
cases)
• Murder • Arson • Burglary at resi-
dential premises
• Other theft
• Sexual Offences • Malicious dam-
age to property
• Burglary at non-
residential pre-
mises
• Commercial
crime
• Attempted
murder
• Theft of motor
vehicle and
motor cycle
• Shoplifting
• Assault GBH • Theft out of or
from motor
vehicle
• Common
Assault
• Stock theft
• Common
Robbery
• Robbery Aggra-
vated including
the following
TRIO Crimes:
Á Carjacking
Á Robbery -
Residential
Á Robbery -
Non Resi-
dential
This bleak picture is best illustrated by the following two-year
comparison:
Murder Attempted
Murder
Robbery
with
aggra-
vating
circum-
stances
Common
Robbery
Rape Sexual
Assault
Assault
with the
intent to
inflict
grievous
bodily
harm
Common
Assault
2016/17 19 016 18 205 140 956 53 418 39 828 6 271 170 616 156 450
2017/18 20 336 18 233 138 364 50 730 40 035 6 786 167 352 156 243
Case Diff 1 320 28 −2 592 −2 688 207 515 −3 264 −207
%Change 6,9%↑ 0,2%↑ −1,8%↓ −5,0%↓ 0,5%↑ 0,2%↑ −1,9%↓ 0,1%↓
The murder rate represents the steepest increase; 57 people
are murdered every day. The following breakdown of percent-
ages of the cumulative murder rate indicates the pattern of
murder across the nine provinces:
• Eastern Cape 18,8%; Western Cape 18,3%; KwaZulu-Natal
21,5%;Gauteng 20,8%; Free State 5,2%; North West 4,7%;
Mpumalanga 4,5%; Limpopo 4,5%; and Northern Cape 1,7%.
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CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
In Naidoo v Minister of Correctional Services 2017 (2) SACR
14, [2017] 2 All SA 651 (WCC), the plaintiff instituted action
against the Minister of Correctional Services arising from injuries
suffered after being severely assaulted by a prisoner who had
recently been released on parole. The allegation was that the
prison authorities had failed to act with reasonable care and
diligence, when taking the decision to release him, given his
previous convictions, including numerous counts of theft, multiple
counts of assault, and one count of murder, as well as previous
violations of parole conditions. Before his release on parole
the prisoner had served a sentence of nine and a half years’
imprisonment for theft and assault with intent to do grievous
bodily harm and contravening the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of
1968. During sentencing, the magistrate had noted that he could
not be released on parole without the court being informed.
Further, while serving his sentence, he had been found guilty of
three offences in prison, including: conducting himself indecently
by word, act or gesture; being in possession of an unauthorised
article; and being in possession of dagga. Four months after his
release, he assaulted the plaintiff.
Section 42 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998,
provides for the establishment of a case-management committee
at a correctional facility. The function of this committee is to report
to the parole board regarding possible placement of an offender
on parole. In producing its report, the committee is mandated to
place critical information before the parole board, including a
report on the person’s mental state, the likelihood of his or her
relapsing into crime, the risk posed to the community, and
the manner in which this risk can be reduced, as well as the
assessment, results and progress concerning a correctional
sentence plan. The court found that there was no clear evidence
which enabled a decision to be taken that this prisoner had been
rehabilitated which could have justified the grant of parole. In
particular, a social worker’s report which had been made avail-
able, had not assessed whether the programmes conducted at
the prison, and which the prisoner had attended, had actually
raised any prospect of rehabilitation. The mere attendance
of such programmes was not sufficient to justify the granting of
parole. The parole board ought, in the circumstances, to have
taken reasonable steps to guard against the foreseeable harm of
his release on parole, or refused the application. Its failure was an
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act of negligence, and in breach of section 42(2) of the Act. Its
negligence was causally connected to the harm suffered by the
plaintiff, in that but for his release on parole, the plaintiff would not
have been attacked. For these reasons, the Minister was held to
be liable for damages.
In Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Walus [2017]
ZASCA 99, [2017] 4 All SA 1 (SCA), 2017 (2) SACR 473 the court
was required to determine whether the decision of the Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services not to place the respondent on
parole was irrational and unreasonable. The respondent was
convicted of the murder of the late Chris Hani. In convicting him,
the trial court found that the murder had been a calculated,
cold-blooded assassination of a defenceless victim for which the
perpetrators had shown no remorse. The respondent was initially
sentenced to death for the murder, and to five years’ imprison-
ment for the illegal possession of an illegal firearm. In 2000, the
death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
In 2015, following the hearing of an application for parole, the
Minister decided not place the respondent on parole. At that
stage, the respondent had served 21 years and six months of his
sentence. Respondent successfully applied to the High Court to
set aside the Minister’s decision. The court ordered that the
respondent be placed on parole and remitted the matter to the
Minister to impose the necessary parole conditions within four-
teen days of the granting of the order.
On appeal, Maya P held that all relevant information, including
a full record of the proceedings, the victim impact statement, and
representations which had been made by the prisoner seeking
parole, constitute ‘a substantive requirement’ in the evaluation of
an application for parole (para [17]). The court found that the
Minister had not considered Mrs Hani’s victim representations,
including that the respondent had never apologised or shown
any genuine contrition for the murder, continued to withhold the
full truth about the murder, and had failed to reveal the identities
of his co-conspirators – which he had previously threatened to
divulge to the media (para [19]). The appellant had further given
contradictory accounts of who exactly had been involved in the
crime, and refused to denounce his political beliefs which he
claimed had underpinned the murder.
None of this was brought to the attention of respondent (para
[19]). As to the argument of the Minister that the victim impact
statement would have further militated against the granting of
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parole, the court observed that it overlooks that he would have
had to consider the respondents representations as well, and that
it is unknown what impact they would have had on the decision.
And, by the same token, his decision, if the matter is remitted for
his reconsideration, cannot be a forgone conclusion. That said,
the omissions constitute a fatal procedural irregularity . . . (para
[19]).
For these reasons, the court remitted the matter back to the
Minister for a reconsideration of his decision in the light of the
victim-impact statement made by Mrs Hani, and responses to it
which may be generated by the respondent.
PRISONS
In the annual report of the Department of Correctional Services
2016/2017 the total number of prisoners as at 31 March 2017 is
reflected as follows:
Region Total number of sentenced
offenders
Total number of unsentenced
inmates
Total
number
of
inmates
Male Female Total
number
of sen-
tenced
offend-
ers
Male Female Total
number
of un-
sen-
tenced
Inmates
Eastern
Cape
14 948 321 15 269 5 083 82 5 162 20 434
Gauteng 24 848 881 25 729 10 180 375 10 555 36 284
Free
state &
Northern
Cape
18 122 298 18 420 4 971 68 5 039 23 459
KwaZulu-
Natal
21 357 496 21 853 6 163 141 6 304 28 157
Western
Cape
17 223 625 17 848 10 183 441 10 624 28 472
Limpopo,
Mpuma-
langa
and
North
West
17 778 358 18 136 6 024 88 6 112 24 248
TOTAL 114 276 2979 117 255 42 604 1 195 43 799 161 054
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The average number of sentenced defendants per category
and age group during 2016 is reflected as follows:
Average number of sentenced offenders per category per age
group during 2016/2017
Children
(younger than 18
years)
Juveniles
(18-20 years)
Youth and adults
(21 years and
older)
Total
Females Males Females Males Females Males Females/
Males
1 147 78 3 578 2 873 111 078 117 755
As at the end of March 2017, South African prisons had
119 134 bed spaces as compared to an overall prison population
161 054; a disturbing and significant picture of overcrowding.
Prisons in urban areas have the worst overcrowding rates. The
Johannesburg Correctional Centre’s Medium B is 233 per cent
full, while Pollsmoor Prison has a shortage of 2 448 beds. In its
report the Department states that 24 506 of the 25 042 prisoners
who tested positive for HIV are on anti-retroviral therapy.
Subsequent to the latest annual report from the Department of
Correctional Services, Minister Michael Masutha stated that as
of April 2018 Correctional Services had 163 140 inmates in
243 correctional facilities, comprising 45 294 remand prisoners
and 117 820 sentenced prisoners. Again, he emphasised that
this figure had to be contrasted with a 119 000 bed capacity
(IOL 17 May 2018).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
HELENA VAN COLLER*
LEGISLATION
There was no new legislation in the field of administrative law
during the period under review.
CASE LAW
During 2017, the courts were required to consider a number of
cases dealing with the definition of ‘administrative action’ as
contained in section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA). Specific aspects received judicial
attention, including decisions taken by the Public Protector and
the exclusions from the definition. Issues addressed include the
nature and content of various grounds of review, locus standi,
issues of delay, remedies, and the issue of collateral challenges
brought by organs of state. Judgments were also handed down
relating to access to information under the Promotion of Access to
InformationAct 2 of 2000 (the PAIA). The most pertinent decisions
are discussed below.
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Two cases were brought in the North Gauteng High Court
against decisions by the Public Protector (Minister of Home
Affairs v Public Protector 2017 (2) SA 597 (GP) and South African
Reserve Bank v Public Protector 2017 (6) SA 198 (GP)). In South
African Reserve Bank, a final report issued by the Public Pro-
tector set out remedial action in the form of an instruction to
Parliament to amend section 224 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), by altering the
constitutional mandate of the Reserve Bank. The report was
issued after an investigation by the Public Protector into the
alleged failure of the government to recover misappropriated
funds. The remedial action is binding and the Reserve Bank
approached the court on an urgent basis, seeking the setting
* LLB LLM (UFS) LLM (Utrecht) PGDHE (Rhodes) LLD (UJ). Associate Profes-
sor, Faculty of Law, Rhodes University.
36
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 2 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/02−Administrative−Law
aside of the remedial action. Despite the fact that the Public
Protector had conceded to the merits, and consented to all the
relief sought, the Reserve Bank nevertheless requested the court
‘to give full consideration to the issues and to satisfy itself that the
order is competent and accords with the Constitution and the law’
(para [9]). In terms of section 182(1) of the Constitution, the
Public Protector is empowered to investigate, to report, and to
take appropriate remedial action. Additional powers and func-
tions are prescribed by national legislation. This begs the ques-
tions as to whether a decision taken by the Public Protector to
take appropriate remedial action does indeed constitute ‘admin-
istrative action’. The court did not really address this issue;
instead, it appears to have assumed that the remedial action by
the Public Protector was ‘administrative action’ for purposes of
the PAJA, and proceeded to deal with the grounds of review:
The remedial action should be set aside on this ground alone in terms
of section 6(2)(a)(i) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
[footnote omitted] (‘PAJA’) on the ground that the Public Protector was
not authorised by section 182(1) of the Constitution to take such
action. However, given the importance of the matter and the interest of
the financial markets in the resolution of the questions raised, it is
necessary to consider the other grounds of review raised by all the
parties (para [42]).
In addition to relying on the PAJA’s grounds of review, the court
proceeded to state that the remedial action is also reviewable
under section 1(c) of the Constitution ‘for violating the doctrine of
the separation of powers and under section 6(2)(i) of PAJA on the
ground that it is unconstitutional’ (para [46]). According to the
court:
The remedial action therefore violates the doctrine of the separation of
powers guaranteed by section 1(c) of the Constitution. The principle
requires constitutionally established institutions to respect the con-
fines of their own powers and not to intrude into the domain of others.
An order directing Parliament to amend the Constitution and going so
far as to prescribe the wording of that amendment offends the
principle of the separation of powers mostly by seeking to fetter in
advance the legislative discretion vested in Parliament. It removes
from the members of Parliament their right and obligation to exercise
an independent judgment when voting on proposed legislation. It
potentially compels them to vote against their conscience and possi-
bly breach their oath of office. Worse still, it forces the legislature to
adopt an amendment to the Constitution which may circumvent the
constitutional procedures enacted for that purpose (para [44]).
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Murcott and Van der Westhuizen (‘Administrative Law’ (2017) 3
JQR para 2.1.2) argue that a violation of the separation of powers
principle ‘ought not to be directly invoked so as to form the basis
for an independent ground upon which to review an exercise of
public power, when PAJA is applicable’. The court, however, did
not debate whether the remedial action taken by the Public
Protector was indeed the exercise of an administrative public
power and, therefore, subject to the PAJA. Because of the unique
position of the Chapter 9 institutions in our constitutional order,
and the fact that the remedial actions were empowered by the
Constitution, an argument can be made that the remedial action
might have been classified as executive in nature and, conse-
quently, subject to the review under the constitutional principle of
legality. The court did not address this issue, but simply pro-
ceeded to review and set aside the remedial action.
In Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector a similar issue
was brought before the court. In this instance, the Minister of
Home Affairs sought the review and setting aside of a final report
produced by the Public Protector relating to the alleged conduct
of employees of the Department of Home Affairs. Contrary to the
approach taken in South African Reserve Bank, the court in
Minister of Home Affairs tackled the issue of whether or not the
decisions taken by the Public Protector amounted to ‘administra-
tive action’ as envisaged in the PAJA. The court commenced by
setting out the functions of the Public Protector with reference to
section 182 of the Constitution and the relevant sections of the
Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. Prinsloo J referred to South
African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd & others v Demo-
cratic Alliance & others 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) 552H-J, where the
court held:
Any affected person or institution aggrieved by a finding, decision or
action taken by the Public Protector might, in appropriate circum-
stances, challenge that by way of a review application (emphasis
added) (Minister of Home Affairs para [35]).
And further:
For it is well settled in our law that until a decision is set aside by a
court in proceedings for judicial review it exists in fact and it has legal
consequences and cannot simply be overlooked (Oudekraal Estates
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) . . . It
was submitted, however, that that principle applies only to the
decision of an administrative functionary or body, which the Public
Protector is not (Minister of Home Affairs para [36]).
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The judge was of the view that ‘[i]t does, however, appear, if I
understood the judgment correctly, that the learned judges of
appeal considered the decisions of the Public Protector to
amount to administrative action’ (para [36]). However, these
excerpts actually point away from administrative action, since the
reference to a ‘review application’ in the quote above, does not
necessarily mean it is a review of ‘administrative action’. Further, it
is clear that, by implication, the court deemed the Public Protec-
tor not to be an administrative functionary. This is supported by
the High Court decision in Democratic Alliance v South African
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC), in which
the court made it clear that they relied on the principle of legality
and did not answer the questions as to whether the decision was
in fact administrative action or not. According to the court:
In the present case the DA relies on the doctrine of legality. Since the
application was launched promptly after the decisions complained of,
it would make no difference whether or not we classified the impugned
decisions as ‘administrative action’ for purposes of PAJA. It suffices to
find, as I do, that the decisions involved the exercise of public power
and are in principle susceptible to review (DA v SABC para [166]).
In Minister of Home Affairs Prinsloo J then turned to the
definition of ‘administrative action’ in the PAJA. The court found
that the Public Protector is an organ of state or, at least, a juristic
person that performs a public function. With reference to Minister
of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau & others 2014 (5) SA 69
(CC), the court took the following view:
The observation of the learned Judge, at 85C–E, that ‘while adminis-
trative powers more commonly flow from legislation, PAJA’s definition
of ‘‘administrative action’’ expressly contemplates that the administra-
tive power of organs of state may derive from a number of sources,
including the Constitution’ appears to be in complete harmony with the
position of the Public Protector (para [44]).
The court was satisfied that ‘as a general proposition, the
decisions and actions of the Public Protector amount to adminis-
trative action as intended by PAJA’ (para [47]). To cover his
bases, Prinsloo J stated:
(2) If I am wrong in this conclusion, the decisions of the Public
Protector amount to something akin to administrative action, à la
SABC v the DA.
(3) Either way, the actions and decisions of the Public Protector can,
in a proper case, be challenged in terms of PAJA, as was done in
this case by the applicants. Where appropriate, there will also be
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room for a so called ‘legality review’ if it is alleged that the Public
Protector exercised powers and performed functions beyond that
conferred upon her by law (para [47]).
The court did not explain further what exactly it meant by a
review à la SABC v DA’. Moreover, it neglected properly to
consider whether the decision might have been executive in
nature and subject to the principle of legality. The court ought to
have taken this opportunity to apply the factors laid down
previously by the highest court in President of the Republic of
South Africa & others v South African Rugby Football Union &
others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). These factors include consideration of
the source of the power, the nature of the decision, and the nature
of the Public Protector as a Chapter 9 institution. Proceeding on
the assumption that the decision of the Public Protector consti-
tuted ‘administrative action’, the court was satisfied that ‘the
outcome of the Public Protector’s investigation is rationally justifi-
able and her decisions and the remedial action taken fall within
the bounds of reasonableness’ (para [68]). The court dismissed
the application.
State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Hold-
ings (Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) SA 63 (SCA) was an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal by the State Information Technology
Agency (the SITA) against a decision by the Gauteng High Court
dismissing its application to declare a decision to conclude a
contract with Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd unenforceable for lack of
compliance with public procurement requirements. After the SITA
had unlawfully cancelled a contract with Gijima for the provision
of information technology services, it concluded a further agree-
ment with Gijima which had not gone through a competitive
bidding process, as part of a settlement. When Gijima raised
concerns, the SITA assured them that it had the necessary
authority to conclude the contract. A payment dispute arose
between the parties, and during the arbitration proceedings the
SITA argued that the contract had been concluded in contraven-
tion of the public procurement system under section 217 of the
Constitution. The SITA argued that the PAJA did not apply when
an organ of state seeks to review its own decision, and that even
if the PAJAdid apply, it had a choice to proceed either by way of a
review under the PAJA, or to rely directly on the principle of
legality (para [2]). The majority in the Supreme Court of Appeal
agreed with the High Court that a decision to award a contract for
services constituted ‘administrative action’ as defined in the
PAJA. It held as follows:
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It is well established that a decision by a state entity to award a
contract for services constitutes administrative action in terms of s 1 of
PAJA. Once this is accepted, there is no good reason for immunising
administrative decisions taken by the state from review under PAJA
(para [16]).
As the PAJA does not expressly exclude the state from
instituting review proceedings, the court was satisfied that no
reasons existed why the PAJA should not apply when state
entities challenge their own decisions (paras [16] [22]). For a
thorough discussion of the minority approach taken by Bosielo
JA, see Danie Brand, Melanie Murcott & Werner van der Westhui-
zen ‘Administrative Law’ (2016) 3 JQR paragraph 2.1.1. They
argue against the approach that the SITA should be allowed to
invoke legality rather than the PAJA, and the narrow approach
advanced Bosiela JA in interpreting ‘any person’ to ‘exclude the
state and offer protection only to ‘‘private citizens’’ ’. In the light of
the Constitutional Court’s approach in Merafong and Tasima
(discussed below under ‘Remedies in relation to collateral chal-
lenges’), in which the court ruled that an organ of state was
permitted to bring a collateral challenge, and that its mere status
as an organ of state does not exclude it absolutely from a reactive
challenge, Bosielo JA’s view might not stand. Arguably, and
similarly, there should be no reason why an organ of state should
be excluded from bringing a review application under the PAJA
for the review of its own decision, solely on the basis of its status
as an organ of state. The court proceeded to review the SITA’s
decision as a final decision which had the capacity adversely to
affect Gijima’s rights. It held that its failure to follow a competitive
process could be reviewed on the basis of various provisions of
the PAJA, including that ‘it did not have the authority to contract
outside of a competitive bidding process to do so; it contravened
s 217 of the Constitution; and had also failed to comply with a
mandatory and material procedure prescribed by law’ (para
[21]). The court also applied the delay rule provided for in section
7 of the PAJA. In so doing, the court rejected the SITA’s argument
that, in bringing its review application outside of the PAJA-
prescribed 180-day rule and not applying for condonation, it
could rely on the principle of legality. The court firmly rejected this
view, and confirmed that the proper role for the principle of
legality is to act as a ‘safety-net or a measure of last resort when
the law allows no other avenues to challenge the unlawful
exercise of public power. It cannot be the first port of call or an
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alternative path to review, when PAJA applies’ (para [38]). This
approach is correct. The court concluded:
In summary, we hold that PAJA applies when an organ of state seeks
to set aside its own administrative decisions. And when PAJA does
apply, litigants and the courts are not entitled to bypass its provisions
and rely directly on the constitutional principle of legality. But even if
this case is approached as a legality review, SITA failed to place facts
before the court to overcome the hurdle of the unreasonable delay in
commencing proceedings against Gijima (para [44]).
The majority, therefore, held that the PAJA applied to review
applications instituted by organs of state, and dismissed the
appeal with costs.
South Africa National Roads Agency Ltd v Cape Town City
2017 (1) SA 468 (SCA) was an appeal from the Western Cape
High Court to review and set aside two decisions relating to a
proposal to declare parts of the national roads near Cape Town
toll roads. The South African National Roads Agency Ltd (the
SANRAL) proposed the declaration of portions of various high-
ways near Cape Town toll roads. The Minister of Transport, acting
in terms of the South African National Roads Agency Ltd and
National Roads Act 7 of 1998, approved the proposal. The High
Court started by asking the threshold question of whether the two
decision constituted ‘administrative action’ for purposes of the
PAJA. The court answered this question in the affirmative. The
High Court condoned the City’s delay and granted the applica-
tion for review. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal – despite
acknowledging that the categorisation of the various decisions
with reference to the PAJA was a ‘convenient starting point, in
addressing SANRAL’s contentions’ (para [70]) – still expressed
its reluctance to deal with the issue of the PAJA’s relevance.
Navsa AJ noted:
I am rather less sanguine concerning the nature of the Transport
Minister’s powers in making the decisions. In Grey’s Marine Hout Bay
(Pty) Ltd & others v Minister of Public Works & others [2005] ZASCA
43; 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA), Nugent JA, stated that the question as to
‘what’ constitutes administrative action – the exercise of the adminis-
trative powers of the State – has always eluded complete definition
(para [71]).
The court did touch on certain aspects pointing to the decision
being executive rather than administrative, but could have
engaged with the issue of administrative action in far greater
detail – especially as it had been raised by the parties and dealt
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with in detail by the court a quo. The Supreme Court of Appeal
stated:
Although my inclination, insofar as to whether the Minister and
SANRAL’s Board were engaged in administrative action, is the
converse of that of the court below, I do not find it necessary to
express a definitive conclusion on this question. Because the chal-
lenges to the Board’s decision and the decisions of the Transport
Minister in terms of s 27 of the Act are based on the principle of
legality, it does not, for practical purposes, matter whether condona-
tion for the delay in launching the application is approached in terms
of the provisions of PAJA or otherwise. As will be demonstrated below,
in both instances, ultimately the decision whether to condone the
delay is based on whether the interests of justice so require (para
[78]).
This approach evidences disrespect for the legislature’s role in
enacting the PAJA (Brand, Murcott & Van der Westhuizen above
para 2.1.1). The court proceeded to condone the City’s delay in
bringing the application for review and dismissed the appeal with
costs.
Specific exclusions: Judicial functions
In NCP Chlorchem (Pty) Ltd v National Energy Regulator
2017(6) SA 158 (GJ), the South Gauteng High Court scrutinised
the exercise of the dispute-resolution power of the National
Energy Regulator of South Africa (the NERSA), when it made a
ruling under the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 (the ERA).
The applicant, NCP Chlorchem (Pty) Ltd (NCP), is South Africa’s
largest producer of liquefied chlorine used for water purification.
NCP drew its electricity direct from Eskom, but was charged a
municipal retail rate by the Ekurhuleni municipality. Aggrieved,
NCP approached the NERSA to exercise its dispute-resolution
powers in terms of section 30 of the ERA. NCP requested the
NERSA to declare that it was entitled to contract directly with
Eskom for electricity at the Eskom rate. The NERSA ruled that
NCP must pay the Eskom rate together with a mark-up of 24 per
cent. NCP then approached the court seeking to review the
NERSA ruling. Of importance is the court’s analysis of the nature
of the NERSA’s dispute-resolution power. The court reviewed the
various functions with reference to section 4 of the ERA (para
[15]). The mediation and arbitration power of the NERSA is
regulated by section 30 of the ERA. Subsection 30(4) reads:
The mediation or arbitration in terms of this section is done at the
request of the parties to the dispute and no decision of the Regulator
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or the person contemplated in subsection (2), taken in the course of
the mediation process, must be regarded as a decision contemplated
in section 10(3) or (4) of the National Energy Regulator Act (para [15]).
A ‘decision’, in accordance with section 10(3), refers to proceed-
ings in the High Court for judicial review under the PAJA, and in
section 10(4) to an appeal to the High Court. On an interpretation
of these provisions, the court was of the view that mediation or
arbitration took place at the request of the parties and, therefore,
was similar to any private arbitration leaving it up to the parties to
decide whether or not to comply with the ruling. The court held:
NERSA resolves disputes between licenses and consumers or end
users by mediation and arbitration. It does so at the request of the
parties and its consequent decisions are not ‘decisions of the Energy
Regulator’ in terms of section 10 of the National Energy Regulator Act.
It does not have powers to enforce such decisions and does not
attempt to do so. Rather, like any private arbitration, it is up to the
parties themselves to comply with a ruling and, if necessary, to
enforce a ruling in their favour. It is for this reason that the exercise of
the dispute-resolution power is not administrative action that is subject
to review in terms of PAJA (para [17]).
The court relied on the dictum in Total Support Management
(Pty) Ltd & another v Diversified Health Systems (SA) (Pty) Ltd &
another 2002 (4) SA661 (SCA) paragraphs [24] and [25], where it
was held that ‘[a]rbitration does not fall within the purview of
‘‘administrative action’’; it arises through the exercise of private
rather than public powers’ (Total Support Management para
[24]):
As arbitration is a form of private adjudication the function of an
arbitrator is not administrative but judicial in nature . . . Decisions
made in the exercise of judicial functions do not amount to administra-
tive action . . . It follows in my view that a consensual arbitration is not
a species of administrative action and sec[tion] 33(1) of the Constitu-
tion has no application to a matter such as the present (Total Support
Management para [25]).
However, in paragraph [26] of Total Support, referring to the
case of Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others 1999 (3) SA
304 (LAC), the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised that ‘[t]he
position may be different in the case of statutorily imposed
arbitrations’.
In terms of the authority vested in the NERSA in terms of section
30 of the ERA, the NERSA was authorised to resolve a dispute
referred to it ‘by such means and on such terms as the Regulator
sees fit’ (para [18] of NCP Chlorchem). The court accepted that
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the NERSA had chosen to exercise its dispute resolution power
by way of arbitration in terms of legislation, and in the exercise of
a public power. On that basis, the court was willing to review it as
the exercise of public power, in terms of the principle of legality.
The court held:
Even if it is not administrative action, such a decision is subject to the
requirement, stemming from the principle of legality, that it must be
lawful and rational. The latter concept includes a duty to act fairly – a
duty that can arise independently of any statutory obligation imposing
the duty. It follows that the decision of NERSA is reviewable (para
[18]).
The exercise of the dispute-resolution power by the NERSA,
therefore, is not at all similar to a private arbitration, but a clear
ruling by an administrative body in the exercise of a public power
in terms of legislation – clearly something that in the ordinary
course should be reviewable in terms of the PAJA. If the court was
restrained by its interpretation of section 10, it should have
entertained the submission on the constitutionality of section
30(4) of the ERA. Instead, the court noted as follows:
It follows that the decision of NERSA is reviewable. In view of this
finding and EMM’s concession that the NERSA decision is, indeed,
reviewable, there is no need to consider the question of the constitu-
tionality of section 30(4) of the Electricity Regulation Act as foreshad-
owed in prayer 4 of the notice of motion (para [18]).
Allowing a review in accordance with the principle of legality,
but not administrative review in terms of the PAJA, clearly points
towards the possibility of section 30(4) being unconstitutional for
not giving effect to section 33 of the Constitution. The court
proceeded to review the decision in terms of the principle of
legality, and set it aside based on procedural unfairness in the
dispute resolution process. The court found that the lack of
consensus between NCP and the NERSA was sufficient to
constitute exceptional circumstances ‘which would justify the
court substituting its decision for that of NERSA’ (para [26]), and
declaring that Eskom was not entitled to refuse to enter into an
electricity-supply agreement with NCP (para [56]).
Specific exclusions: Executive functions
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Energy 2017 (5) SA
227 (WCC) was a challenge against certain determinations in the
procurement of nuclear power by the Minister of Energy in
accordance with section 34 of the ERA. The Minister issued two
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determinations under section 34 – one in 2013 and one in 2016 –
declaring that new electricity capacity is required to meet South
Africa’s electricity supply. Under the 2013 determination, the
energy was to be procured by the Department of Energy, whilst
the 2016 determination appointed Eskom Holdings (SOC) Ltd as
the new procurer. Earthlife Africa instituted review proceedings in
the Western Cape High Court, submitting that both the Minister’s
determination and the NERSA’s concurrence under section 34 of
the ERA, constituted administrative action for purposes of the
PAJA and were reviewable for lack of lawfulness, rationality, and
procedural fairness. The respondents submitted that neither
decision constituted administrative action and that both amounted
to ‘encased policy directives’ taken by the national executive
([para [18]). The applicants were of the view that it was unneces-
sary for the court to decide whether the decisions constituted
administrative or executive action. They argued that they consti-
tuted ‘policy’, which would in any event be subject to a rationality
review in accordance with the principle of legality. The court,
however, did answer the question, referring to the distinction
drawn in the SARFU and Ed-U-College cases (above) between
the implementation of legislation and the formulation of policy
(para [30] [31]). (See SARFU para [143] and Permanent Secre-
tary, Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v
Ed-U-College, (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) para
[18]). The court considered various factors, such as the source of
the Minister’s power, the nature of the power as one with
far-reaching consequences, and the binding effect of the power
on the NERSA. All of these factors pointed to the conclusion that
the section 34 determination by the Minister constituted ‘adminis-
trative action’ (para [32]). As for the NERSA’s concurrence, the
court had been satisfied that it met all the requirements of the
definition of ‘administrative action’ (paras [37]–[40]).
In University of the Free State v Afriforum 2017 (4) SA 283
(SCA), the university appealed against a decision of the Free
State High Court in the matter of Afriforum & another v Chairman
of the Council of the University of the Free State [2016] ZAFSHC
130 (21 July 2016). The university had adopted a new language
policy in terms of which English was to become the primary
medium of instruction at the University of the Free State (the UFS).
The applicants argued that the adoption of the new policy
contravened various grounds of review, and sought an order
setting aside the decision. The court held that the decision to
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adopt the new language policy was not rationally connected to
the facts and circumstances which informed the decision (para
[59]) and reviewed and set aside the decision. The Supreme
Court of Appeal took the correct approach by first addressing the
threshold question of whether the decision by the UFS to adopt
the language policy in fact constituted ‘administrative action’ for
purposes of the PAJA. The court noted that the applicants sought
a review of the decision to adopt the policy, an order setting it
aside as unlawful administrative action, and not to interdict the
implementation of the policy (para [15]). As the decision related
to the adoption of the policy and not the policy itself, the court
stated:
It is the UFS’s executive decision to determine its language policy that
is being attacked and not any of its administrative actions flowing from
the adoption of the policy. The impugned decision therefore does not
constitute administrative action as contemplated by PAJA (para [18]).
Clearly, the court saw the decision as the adoption of a policy
rather than its implementation:
The determination of whether an action by an organ of state is
administrative action requires an analysis of its nature and a positive
decision that it is of an administrative character. In general policy-
making lies within the realm of an organisation’s executive authority,
and the implementation or application of policy lies within its adminis-
trative domain. The more closely a decision is related to the formula-
tion – or the adoption – of policy, the more likely it is to be executive in
nature; where it is closer to the implementation of policy, this suggests
it is administrative. Administrative decisions are generally and appro-
priately subjected to a more exacting administrative standard of
review than executive decisions (para [17]).
Accordingly, the court found that the decision to adopt the
language policy did not qualify as administrative action review-
able under the PAJA. This notwithstanding, the court accepted
that taking of the decision still amounted to the exercise of a
public power, and proceeded to review it based on the principle
of legality. The court held the UFS had not misconstrued its
powers, and upheld the appeal.
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
Lawfulness: Authority
Minister of Home Affairs v Saidi 2017 (4) SA 435 (SCA) is the
sequel to the High Court application by various asylum seekers
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for the review and setting aside of a decision by the refugee
reception officer (the RRO) refusing their application for refugee
status and the extension of their permits. The RRO is empowered
by the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 to extend an asylum seeker’s
permit. The applicants had applied for refugee status, and been
granted permits. However, their application for refugee status,
and their subsequent appeals, were refused. In accordance with
section 22(3) of the RefugeesAct, the RRO ‘may, from time to time
extend the period for which a permit has been issued’. The RRO
interpreted this section to mean that the power given to her to
extend permits in terms of this section, did not endure beyond the
exhaustion of internal remedies, and when she refused the
extension, she had not taken the merits of the case into account.
The High Court made an order declaring that the RRO has the
power to extend the permits even after an applicant has exhausted
internal remedies, and that the decision to refuse the extension
falls to be reviewed and set aside. The applications were remitted
back to the RRO for consideration (para [8]). The principal issue
in the subsequent appeal was whether the Refugees Act empow-
ered the RRO to extend permits. The court also allowed a
cross-appeal to the effect that it was argued that should the court
find that the RRO was so empowered, the High Court should have
directed the RRO to extend the permits (para [10]). In relation to
the issue of authority, the court found that there was ‘nothing in
the language of s 22(3) itself which limits the power to extend
permits to the period prior to the exhaustion of the internal
remedies’ (para [12]) The court interpreted the various sections of
the Refugees Act, its purpose, and its background with reference
to various international conventions, and section 39(2) of the
Constitution which requires that statutes be interpreted ‘to pro-
mote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ (para
[27]). The court concluded that section 22(3) of the Refugees Act
‘is at least capable of the interpretation that the RRO is empow-
ered to extend permits after the internal remedies have been
exhausted’ (para [28]). As to the cross-appeal, the asylum
seekers argued that the High Court should have directed the
RRO to extend the permits as they had a ‘substantive legitimate
expectation’ that the permits would be extended, or that the court
should have substituted its decision for that of the RRO. In
relation to both, the exercise of a discretion by the RRO was
determinative in the court’s ruling. In relation to the legitimate
expectation, the court held:
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Each RRO is required to exercise her or his own discretion. To fail to
do so could clearly be impugned on review. In my view, these factors
preclude any finding that the asylum seekers proved that they had a
legitimate expectation that the permits would be extended as con-
tended for by them (paras [39] [40]).
As for the substitution order, the court viewed the discretion
conferred on the RRO in terms of section 22(3), with reference to the
word ‘may’, as a ‘true discretion’ as opposed to ‘power coupled with
a duty to use it in a certain way’ (para [42]). With reference to the
case of Trencon, and the ‘exceptional circumstances’ requirements,
the court was of the view that the High Court was correct not to
substitute its own discretion for that of the RRO (para [43]). Both the
appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed with costs.
Gees v Provincial Minister of Cultural Affairs and Sport, Western
Cape 2017 (1) SA 1 (SCA) was an appeal against a decision by
the Western Cape High Court, refusing to set aside a decision by
Heritage Western Cape (HWC) to grant a permit to the appellant
subject to various conditions. The appellant applied for a demoli-
tion order on a property he wanted to develop. As the structure on
the property was more than 60 years old, he required a demoli-
tion permit in terms of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of
1999. The permit was initially refused, but eventually granted by
the appeals tribunal, subject to various conditions. The appellant
was aggrieved by all the conditions and argued that the tribunal
had exceeded its powers and was not authorised, in terms of the
relevant sections of the Act, to impose conditions. In interpreting
these sections, the court relied on section 48(2) which conferred
a discretion on a heritage authority to issue a permit ‘subject to
such terms, conditions and restrictions or directions as may be
specified in the permit, including a condition. . .’ (para [17]). The
court interpreted ‘including’ to mean that in the exercise of its
discretion, the authority may include any appropriate condition
(para [17]). The court held:
In my view, the purpose and effect of the conditions imposed in the
present matter were clearly designed to enable HWC to fulfil its duty in
terms of the Act, ie to conserve a heritage resource. Therefore the
conditions, contrary to the appellant’s submission, were not aimed at
controlling development as such, but constituted conditions with a
conservation objective. It follows that the conditions were lawfully
imposed in terms of s 48(2) of the Act (para 29]).
The court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Lawfulness: Error in law
In Da Cruz & another v City of Cape Town & another [2017] 1All
SA 890 (WCC), 2017 (4) SA 107, the applicants, the body
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corporate and one of the owners of a unit in the Four Seasons
building in Cape Town, sought to review and set aside a decision
by the City of Cape Town (the City) to approve building plans for
the renovation of a building adjoining the Four Seasons, which
would effectively convert their existing balconies into small
courtyards. The applicants argued that in approving the plans,
the City had ignored relevant sections of the National Building
Regulations and Buildings Standards Act 103 of 1977, and that
the City had to address the reasonable expectations of notional
purchasers of apartments in the Four Seasons building – which it
had failed to do. The applicants based their application for review
on various grounds of review under section 6(2) of the PAJA,
including that the City’s decision had been materially influenced
by an error of law; was not rationally connected to the information
before the decision-maker; had been taken because relevant
considerations were not considered; and was unreasonable
(para [20]). The court proceeded to consider the scope and
purpose of the relevant sections in detail. Further, the court
highlighted the importance of contextual assessment when con-
sidering applications, and noted:
The object of harmonious and co-ordinated building development is
common to the planning and the building legislation. This highlights
the responsibility resting on a local authority, when it considers a
building plan application, to have regard not only to the compliance of
the proposed building with the technical restrictions and regulatory
prescriptions in respect of building development on the building plan
applicant’s property, but also to the contextual effect of the contem-
plated finished product. The obligation to consider the contextual
effect of the proposed building implies that the local authority must
take account of how the proposed structure would fit in with the
existing development of neighbouring properties, and, of course,
what might reasonably be anticipated to be the possible future use of
such properties (para [45]).
The court was of the view that the Building Act ‘unambiguously
imposes a duty of contextual assessment on local authorities
whenever they consider a building application’ (para [47]). This
assessment occurs in the second stage of the inquiry, after the
local authority has satisfied itself that the proposal complies with
the required restrictions which, in this case, it did. The court
concluded that the functionaries in this case had approved the
plans without considering their effect on the extant building on
the adjoining erf, and, consequently, that this mistaken view was
based on an error of law:
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The functionaries failed to consider and address the question whether
a reasonable and informed purchaser of a unit on the eighth floor of
the Four Seasons building would foresee that the regulating authority,
having approved balconies along the common boundary, would
permit the development of the adjoining erf in such a manner as to
effectively destroy the utility of the balconies as such, and with the
degree of overbearing intrusiveness that allowing a three storey solid
wall to be built up hard against them would unavoidably occasion. For
these reasons I have concluded that the applicants have established
that the approval of the second respondent’s building plan application
occurred in circumstances in which the decision-maker was materially
influenced by an error of law (ie a misapprehension of the import and
requirements of s 7(1) of the Building Act) and in which there was a
resultant failure by the decision-maker to take into account a relevant
consideration (ie whether, in the peculiar factual circumstances, the
construction of the second respondent’s building hard up against the
balconies on the eighth floor of the Four Seasons building and close to
the windows on the ninth and tenth floors in the manner required by
the provision gave rise to any of the disqualifying factors (paras [68]
[69]).
The City’s decision to approve the building plans was reviewed,
set aside, and remitted back to the City for reconsideration.
Gerstle v Cape Town City 2017 (1) SA 11 (WCC) concerned a
decision by the City of Cape Town to approve building plans in
respect of two single-storey properties situated in the front row of
a group-housing development called Mill Row. The applicants,
owners of a double-storey property in the back row of the
development, sought the review of the City’s approval of building
plans submitted by owners of two of the dwellings in the front row
to convert their buildings into double-storey structures. The
applicants argued that the City had failed to comply with section
7(1)(b)(i) of the National Building Regulations and Building
Standards Act 103 of 1977 by not complying with the applicable
zoning scheme. Further, they argued that by taking away their
access to sunlight and a view, the proposed development would
negatively affect the ‘harmonious architectural entity’ – the defini-
tion of a group-housing dwelling. The court accepted the fact that
‘what constitutes a harmonious architectural entity is a difficult
question which would ‘call for a fair amount of subjectivity’ (para
[26]). Persuaded by the specific factual context, the court stated:
[The] appellants’ case was correctly characterised as an attempt to
utilise the concept of an ‘harmonious architectural entity’ to be
extended so as to create rights to a view, to privacy and to light,
notwithstanding that none of these claims were specifically provided
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for in any of the applicable legal mechanisms which were available to
the developers and to which reference has already been made (para
[32]).
The court concluded that there were no reasons to interfere
with the City’s approach in adopting the ‘carefully considered
and justifiable’ recommendations of the building control officer
(para [37]). The court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Genesis Medical Scheme v Registrar of Medical Schemes &
another 2017 (9) BCLR 1164 (CC), 2017 (6) SA 1, was another
application for judicial review based on an error of law as a
ground of review under section 2 of the PAJA. The Registrar of
Medical Schemes rejected Genesis Medical Scheme’s financial
statements. In so doing it relied on a judgment of the High Court
in Registrar of Medical Schemes v Ledwaba NO & others [2007]
ZAGPHC 24 (Omnihealth), where the court held that personal
medical savings accounts (PMSA) funds constituted ‘trust prop-
erty’ in terms of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act
28 of 2001, and, therefore, did not fall into Omnihealth’s insolvent
estate and should be administered separately in accordance with
the FIA (Genesis paras [17] [18]). Following the decision in the
Omnihealth case, schemes were advised to comply with the
rulings handed down in that case. The Registrar then based his
rejection of Genesis’s financial statements solely on the Onmi-
health case. The financial statements incorrectly reflected its
financial position as they mistakenly reflected Genesis’s PSMA
funds as ‘assets’ and understated Genesis’s liabilities (para [8]).
The court was confronted with the issue of whether the decision in
the Omnihealth case was correct. Genesis argued that the
Omnihealth case had been decided incorrectly and, therefore,
that the Registrar’s decision stood to be reviewed and set aside
under the PAJA as following Omnihealth constituted ‘an error of
law’ which materially influenced the Registrar’s decision (para
[13]). As for whether this amounted to an error of law, Jafta J for
the minority held:
[T]he error of law relied on by Genesis must arise from the misinterpre-
tation or misapplication of the MSA provisions by the Registrar which
relate to the submission of annual financial statements. This is so
because the impugned decision was reached in the exercise of power
conferred on the Registrar alone by those provisions (para [93]).
Cameron J, writing for the majority, disagreed and stated that
this interpretation was ‘inappropriately rigid’. He noted:
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Constitutional precepts caution against adopting so rigid an approach.
By explicitly affording the right to just administrative action, the
Constitution bestows on courts the power to review every error of law,
provided of course it is ‘material’. PAJA embodies this right, in explicit
terms. There is nothing in the statute that narrows or stifles it (para
[21]).
A flexible approach is preferable. In relation to its ‘materiality’,
the court was of the view that the Registrar’s decision was not
solely influenced by the decision in Omnihealth. The majority
proceeded as follows:
Omnihealth was effectively the be-all and end-all of the Registrar’s
decision. Without Omnihealth, the Registrar would not have taken it.
The parties would never have been at odds. In lawyers’ language,
Omnihealth was ‘material’ to the disputed decision. And if Omnihealth
was wrong, that means the Registrar’s decision was wrong then – and
that it is wrong now (para [22]).
After an analysis of the various provisions of the Medical
Schemes Act, the court concluded that Omnihealth had been
incorrectly decided and a wrong approach had been taken in
defining ‘PSMA funds’. The court held that ‘[w]hen Omnihealth
tumbles, the Registrar’s decision tumbles, and with it the circu-
lars, all in one’ (para [62]). The court upheld the appeal.
Procedural fairness/rationality
In Earthlife (above), the court had to decide whether two
section 34 decisions made by the Minister of Energy and the
NERSA complied with the requirements of procedural fairness
under the PAJA. The applicant argued that neither of the deci-
sions had been preceded by public participation. Sections 9 and
10 of the ERA set out the duties of members of the energy
regulator, and the procedural requirements for decisions – similar
to sections 3 and 4 of the PAJA, which require administrative
action to be procedurally fair. According to the court, a rational
and fair decision-making process would have provided for ‘pub-
lic input so as to allow both interested and potentially affected
parties to submit their views and present relevant facts as
evidence to NERSA’ (para [45]). As there had been no public
participation, the court found the NERSA’s decision to concur in
the Minister’s determination, procedurally unfair and in contraven-
tion of section 10 of the ERA and section 4 of the PAJA. The court
held:
For these reasons, I consider that NERSA’s decision to concur in the
Minister’s proposed 2013 determination without even the most limited
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public participation process renders its decision procedurally unfair
and in breach of the provisions of s 10(1)(d) of ERA read together with
s 4 of PAJA (para [46]).
Moreover, the court noted that should the decision have been
decided on the principle of legality, it still had to meet the test for
rational decision-making. According to the court:
[The NERSA] failed to explain, for one, how it acted in the public
interest without taking any steps to ascertain the views of the public or
any interested or affected party. For these reasons I consider that
NERSA’s decision fails to satisfy the test for rationality based on
procedural grounds alone (para [50]).
The court applied the same reasoning in relation to the 2016
decision. In addition to procedural fairness, several substantive
grounds of review were raised. However, the court considered
that it would serve no purpose to consider the substantive issues
as the procedural challenges succeeded. Both determinations,
including the concurrence by the NERSA, were reviewed and set
aside.
REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES
Locus standi
Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd &
others 2017 (6) SA 621 (CC), 2017 (6) BCLR 675, is an appeal to
the Constitutional Court in respect of a tender process (see the
discussion of Westinghouse Electric Belgium SA v Eskom Hold-
ings (SOC) Ltd & another 2016 (3) SA 1 (SCA) in 2016 Annual
Survey 68 and 81). The Westinghouse case concerned a tender
process by Eskom in respect of the replacement of six generators
at the Koeberg nuclear power station. There were only two
qualified bidders involved in the tender process, the appellant,
Westinghouse Electric Belgium SA (Westinghouse), and Areva
NP (Areva). In the High Court Areva’s argument that Westing-
house lacked locus standi was rejected. In the Supreme Court of
Appeal, the court focused its attention on the tender process and
concluded that the award was unlawful and irrational and set it
aside. The Supreme Court of Appeal also dismissed Areva’s
argument on locus standi and remitted the matter back to Eskom
for reconsideration.
Areva then approached the Constitutional Court. Again it raised
the issue of locus standi. Zondo J, for the majority, focused
mainly on the procedural issue relating to standing, while
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Moseneke DCJ, for the minority, addressed both the issue of
standing and the substantive issues relating to the fairness of the
bidding process. Areva’s argument was that Westinghouse Elec-
tric Belgium SAwas not the true tenderer, but Westinghouse USA,
a multinational corporation. When Westinghouse submitted its
tender, the covering letter indicated that it was submitted on
behalf of Westinghouse USA (para [10]). The court found that ‘its
[Westinghouse SA’s] statement that it made the bid in its own
right is ‘‘plainly wrong’’. . . The own interest litigant must therefore
demonstrate that his or her interests or potential interests are
directly affected by the unlawfulness sought to be impugned’
(para [32]), and proceeded to the question of whether Westing-
house SA demonstrated a sufficient interest to satisfy the require-
ments for standing to bring the challenge. The court held:
I think not. In the present case the only thing that WEBSA said in its
founding affidavit in the High Court in support of its contention that it
has locus standi was that it was one of the two bidders and it lost the
bid to Areva. This has been shown not to be true. It also said that it and
Westinghouse USA are part of the same group of companies . . . It is
abundantly clear from the language of the final offer upon which
WEBSA relies as the offer that it made to Eskom in its own right that
that offer was submitted by WEBSA on behalf of Westinghouse USA
and not in its own right (paras [33] [34]).
The court was further of the view that Westinghouse SA and
Westinghouse USA were ‘two separate legal entities and each
one of them bears its own separate rights and incurs its own
separate obligations’ (para [37]). The court held:
When each one of the two separate legal entities acts in its own right,
no obligations or rights attach to the other simply by virtue of the fact
that they both belong to the same group of companies. This purported
defence is no defence at all in law. Just because company A belongs
to the same group of companies as company B does not give any one
of the two companies locus standi to institute court proceedings in its
own right in a matter that only directly affects the other company (para
[38]).
The court concluded that Westinghouse SA lacked locus standi
and granted Areva’s appeal. The minority was of the view that
Westinghouse had the requisite standing, both at common law
and in terms of section 38, and that ‘it is not in the interests of
justice for a court of final instance to dispose of a matter, of this
constitutional magnitude, commercial import and of high public
interest, by way of only a technical and dilatory bar as locus
standi’ (para [50]). The majority, however, took the view that
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where a litigant has failed to show standing, the court should only
consider the merits in ‘exceptional cases or where the public
interest really cries out for that’ (para [41]). The fact that both
bidders were neck-and-neck in the bid for the tender and were
both capable of doing the job, and because time was of the
essence, the court declined to enter into the merits of the
application and upheld Areva’s appeal.
Substitution
Aquila Steel (SA) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources 2017 (3)
SA 301 (GP) concerned an application for review of a decision
taken by the Minister of Mineral Resources to reject the internal
appeal launched by Aquila Steel (SA) Ltd (Aquila) against the
grant of a prospecting right to another company, and the decision
by the Minister to dismiss Aquila’s mining rights application.
Aquila requested declaratory relief in the form of a substitution
order requesting the court to substitute its own decision for that of
the Minister, based on the grounds including delay and institu-
tional bias. Aquila was the holder of prospecting right over a
number of properties and later applied for mining rights in
respect of one of these properties. Having heard nothing from the
Department, they were informed that their application had not
been considered as an earlier prospecting right had been
granted to another company. In relation to the decision to dismiss
Aquila’s mining rights, the Minister found that the fact that there
was an existing prospecting right over the same property ‘pre-
cluded the grant of the Aquila mining right. This was the only
ground upon which the Minister found that the Aquila’s applica-
tion for a mining right should not be granted’ (para [105]). The
issue before the court was whether to set aside the decision and
remit it back to the Minister, or
whether I should, as Aquila asks, substitute the decision of the court
for that of the Minister to the extent that I direct that the Minister grant
Aquila the mining right for which it applied and direct the Minister to
determine, within a specified time, appropriate conditions to which the
mining right should be subject (para [105]).
The court acknowledged that such a request raised the
important principle of separation of powers. (See 2016 Annual
Survey 81 for a discussion of Westinghouse Electric Belgium SA v
Eskom Holdings (SOC) Ltd & another 2016 (3) SA 1 (SCA) and
2015 Annual Survey 66 for a discussion of Trencon Construction
(Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd
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& another 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC), 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 in relation
to substitution orders.) In brief, Westinghouse involved a tender
process by Eskom in respect of the replacement of six generators
at the Koeberg nuclear power station. The court a quo was asked
for a substitution order, but the application was dismissed. The
appeal succeeded in the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court
referred to its own decision to award an order of remittal to a
bid-evaluation committee which had been reversed by the Con-
stitutional Court in the Trencon case. In explaining the exceptional-
circumstances test required for a substitution order, the
Constitutional Court in Trencon emphasised the need to be
mindful of judicial deference, and highlighted certain important
factors that need to be considered based on the separation of
powers doctrine. Delay, bias, or the incompetence of the admin-
istrator were mentioned as some of these factors. In Aquila, the
court confirmed this view and one of the factors relied upon by
Aquila was the existence of institutional bias. However, the court
was of the view that parts of the decision had in fact been
decided in Aquila’s favour, and noted that it would have expected
the Minister to display ‘consistent bias’ (para [108]. The court
found that although institutional bias had not been established,
there was evidence of institutional incompetence, delays, and
failure of any attempt by the Minister to provide proper reasons. It
found that the court was in as good a position as the Minister to
make the decision (para [112]). It further held:
The absence of any suggestion from the respondents in the papers in
these proceedings that there is any issue of substance which might be
raised to deny Aquila the grant of the mining right it seeks leads me to
conclude that this court is in as good a position as the Minister to make
the decision. Had the Minister, or any other respondent, advanced
facts which suggested that during any negotiations between the
Minister around appropriate conditions might result in the refusal of
the mining right, I might well have come to a different conclusion. But
no attempt at all has been made in that regard. From this it follows too
that the grant of the mining right to Aquila is, or ought to be, a foregone
conclusion (para [112]).
The court was satisfied that a case for substitution had been
established and granted the application. (For some interesting
views on the requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ as laid
down by the Constitutional Court in the case of Trencon, see
Raisa Cachalia ‘Clarifying the exceptional circumstances test in
Trencon: An opportunity missed’ (2015) VII Constitutional Court
Review 115; Lauren Kohn ‘The test for ‘‘exceptional circum-
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stances’’ where an order of substitution is sought: An analysis of
Trencon against the backdrop of the separation of powers’ (2015)
VII Constitutional Court Review 91.)
Demolition orders
Serengeti Rise Industries (Pty) Ltd & another v Aboobaker NO
& others 2017 (6) SA 581 (SCA) (Aboobaker 2) was the sequel to
Aboobaker NO & others v Serengeti Rise Body Corporate &
another 2015 (6) SA 200 (KZD) (Aboobaker 1), in which a
demolition order was handed down by the High Court. The lower
court’s decision is discussed in greater detail in H Van Coller
‘Administrative Law’ 2015 Annual Survey 57.
In Aboobaker 1, a decision had been taken by the eThekweni
Municipality (the Municipality) approving building plans to rezone
certain property. The zoning process was challenged by some of
the applicants based on the principle of legality. They contended
that the rezoning of the scheme did not qualify as ‘administrative
action’ for purposes of the PAJA. The other applicants disagreed
and claimed that the rezoning of the site constituted administrative
action under the PAJA. The court noted that the rezoning process
amounted to administrative action, and that the respondents’ con-
duct in relation to this process had been unfair. However, the court
proceeded to find that the conduct violated the principle of legality.
The Municipality’s approval of the rezoning was declared invalid
and set aside on review. In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court
avoided the question of whether the review in the High Court should
have been grounded on the PAJAor on the principle of legality, and
rather focused its attention on the demolition order granted by the
High Court. The court found the demolition order invalid for three
reasons. Firstly, although the High Court had found that the decision
was invalid and should be set aside, it had failed tomake an order to
that effect (para [12]). Secondly, the court was of the view that the
order lacked ‘certainty and clarity’, since there was no clear
description of the portion that had to be demolished in terms of the
order granted (para [13]). Finally, the High Court had failed to
exercise its discretion properly when it should have granted an
order that was ‘just and equitable’ (para [15]). The court upheld the
appeal with costs.
Collateral challenge and delay
Two judgments dealing with collateral challenges were delivered
by the Constitutional Court during this period, a mere month apart.
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The two cases were Merafong City vAnglogoldAshanti Ltd 2017 (2)
SA 211 (CC) (Merafong CC) and Department of Transport v Tasima
(Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) SA 622 (CC). The judges who wrote the minority
judgment in Merafong CC also wrote the minority judgment in
Tasima, namely Jafta J, Bosielo AJ, and Zondo J, with Mogoeng CJ
joining the minority in the Tasima case.
The concept of a collateral challenge dates back to the case of
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2004 (6)
SA 222 (SCA). It has since been the subject of various cases (see
2016 Annual Survey 77 with reference to Airports Company South
Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 2016
(1) SA 473 (GJ) and the High Court judgment in Merafong City v
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2016 (2) SA 176 (SCA)(Merafong SCA).
Merafong concerned a collateral challenge brought by an organ of
state. The High Court ruled in AngloGold’s favour and dismissed
the counter-application. It concluded that the Minister’s ruling was
valid and binding on Merafong until set aside by a court of law
(Merafong SCA para [13]). The High Court based its decision on
the fact that an organ of state could not now raise the invalidity of
the decision as a collateral challenge. Merafong brought an
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, where the court endorsed
this outcome and dismissed the appeal. The court confirmed the
view that the Minister’s ruling, even if it was unlawful, existed in fact
and had legal consequences (para [15]) and rejected Merafong’s
attempt to raise a collateral challenge. The court was of the view
that Merafong could not treat the decision as if it did not exist, and
that it was obliged to approach the court to set the Minister’s ruling
aside. Accordingly, the court ruled that Merafong had breached
the principle of legality by simply disregarding the ruling (para
[17]). It also confirmed that a collateral challenge was not available
to an organ of state against a decision of another organ of state.
Merafong appealed to the Constitutional Court.
Two important issues came before the court in Merafong CC,
namely whether the remedy of a collateral challenge was avail-
able to an organ of state (the court in Merafong SCA ruled that it
was not) and the status of such an unlawful exercise of public
power (the court in Merafong SCA was of the view that the
decision existed in fact, and an organ of state could not ignore
the decision, but must approach a court to set it aside). In relation
to the first question, the majority and minority agreed that there
was no logical reason why an organ of state should be prohibited
from raising a collateral challenge. The court explained the
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approach taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal in excluding
public authorities from raising a collateral challenge as an
approach that ‘squeezes collateral challenge into a rigid format –
one that neither doctrine nor practical reason appears to warrant’
(para [25]). The court proceeded to give an overview of collateral
challenges in the pre-Constitution era and concluded that it
showed that the law had always been approached by our courts
with a measure of flexibility (para [30]). The court was also
against a ‘rigid doctrinal limitation’ upon the viability of a collateral
challenge and held that
[w]hile reactive challenges, in the first instance, and perhaps in origin,
protect private citizens from state power, good practical sense and the
call of justice indicate that they can usefully be employed in a much
wider range of circumstances. There is no practical, or conceptual,
justification for strait-jacketing them to private citizens. It is readily
conceivable, for instance, that an organ of state may through legal
proceedings seek unjustly to subject another organ of state to a form of
coercion. Where appropriate, that other should be able to raise a
defensive or reactive challenge. Categorical exclusions should be
eschewed. A reactive challenge should be available where justice
requires it to be. That will depend, in each case, on the facts (para [55]).
The court concluded that ‘[s]ince Merafong’s status as an
organ of state does not categorically exclude it from a reactive
challenge, I would not close the court’s door in its face in these
proceedings’ (para [68]). The court decided to remit the decision
back to be decided afresh by the High Court for reasons such as
the distinctive character of Merafong’s collateral challenge, to
address the issue of delay, and to consider evidence on the issue
of a suitable remedy (paras [73]–[80]). The court upheld the
appeal in that respect and noted that
[u]nlike the Supreme Court of Appeal, I would not disqualify Merafong’s
reactive defence because it is an organ of state. Merafong must be
permitted to raise a challenge to the Minister’s decision, but on appro-
priate terms that call for it to explain properly its delay in challenging that
decision. In those circumstances, the most equitable order as to the
costs is to allow the reviewing court to determine them (para [83]).
The minority judgment supported this view and saw ‘no reason
in logic or principle that militates against the state raising a
collateral challenge where it faces a claim that it should comply
with an illegal decision’ (para [101]).
In relation to the second aspect of the validity of the unlawful
act, the majority and minority held very different views. The
majority endorsed the view of the Supreme Court Appeal that the
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decision remained valid until set aside by a competent court. The
minority, however, felt that such an act was void ab initio and of no
force, irrespective of whether the court had pronounced upon its
validity or not. Of importance were the various interpretations
given to the decision in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape
Town & others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA), [2004] 3 All SA 1
(Oudekraal), where the court laid down the general principle:
Until the Administrator’s approval (and thus also the consequences of
the approval) is set aside by a court in proceedings for judicial review
it exists in fact and it has legal consequences that cannot simply be
overlooked. The proper functioning of a modern state would be
considerably compromised if all administrative acts could be given
effect to or ignored depending upon the view the subject takes of the
validity of the act in question. No doubt it is for this reason that our law
has always recognized that even an unlawful administrative act is
capable of producing legally valid consequences for so long as the
unlawful act is not set aside (para [26]).
The majority in Merafong SCA described this ‘conundrum of
Oudekraal’ that ‘an unlawful act can produce legally effective
consequences’ as necessary and constitutionally sustainable,
because ‘unless challenged by the right challenger in the right
proceedings, an unlawful act is not void or non-existent, but
exists as a fact and may provide the basis for lawful acts pursuant
to it’ (para [36]). As Forsyth puts it, ‘some ‘‘functional voidability’’
of invalid administrative action is thus implied by section 172: an
invalid administrative act will be effective until any judicial-set
period of suspension has come to an end’ (see Merafong CC n56
with reference to Christopher Forsyth ‘The theory of the second
actor revisited’ 2006 Acta Juridica 209, 228). The court inter-
preted Oudekraal to mean:
Government cannot simply ignore an apparently binding ruling or
decision on the basis that it is invalid. The validity of the decision has to
be tested in appropriate proceedings. And the sole power to pro-
nounce that the decision is defective, and therefore invalid, lies with the
courts. Government itself has no authority to invalidate or ignore the
decision. It remains legally effective until properly set aside (para [41]).
The court appears to draw a distinction between the lawfulness
of the decision and its effectiveness. The act remained unlawful,
but can be legally effective. The court, correctly, held that a
reference to the fact that a decision that has not been properly set
aside ‘remains valid’, needs to be interpreted to mean ‘that it
remains legally effective’. Absence of challenge by the appro-
priate litigant in the correct forum at the right time does not
magically heal the administrative-law flaws in the decision. It
means that the decision continues to have effect in law until
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properly set aside (n63). The majority’s view also appears to
suggest that
Oudekraal and Kirland did not impose an absolute obligation on
private citizens to take the initiative to strike down invalid administra-
tive decisions affecting them. Both decisions recognised that there
may be occasions where an administrative decision or ruling should
be treated as invalid even though no action has been taken to strike it
down. Neither decision expressly circumscribed the circumstances in
which an administrative decision could be attacked reactively as
invalid. As important, they did not imply or entail that, unless they bring
court proceedings to challenge an administrative decision, public
authorities are obliged to accept it as valid. And neither imposed an
absolute duty of proactivity on public authorities. It all depends on the
circumstances (para [44]).
This approach might not be very helpful in the absence of a
clear indication of what these circumstances might be in which a
public body would not be expected to have instituted review
proceedings in relation to an allegedly unlawful decision. Jafta J,
for the minority, also relied on Oudekraal, but took the view that
that Oudekraal should not be seen as authority ‘for the proposi-
tion that an invalid administrative act is binding as long as it is not
set aside by a competent court. No court has the power of
converting an unconstitutional and invalid act with no legal force
into a valid act with binding effect’ (para 116]). He further stated:
An illegal administrative act is inconsistent with the Constitution and
the rule of law. The inconsistency renders it invalid, regardless of the
fact that it is not set aside, because in our constitutional order the
Constitution is supreme. In our law an unlawful act is void ab initio and
thus it can have no legal force and effect (para [130]).
This again raises the issue of the lawfulness and effectiveness
of a decision, referred to above. Mckenzie (Angus McKenzie The
development of collateral review and the status of unlawful acts in
South African law (2017) unpublished LLM dissertation, Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand 26) argues that this proposition fails to
appreciate ‘the distinction between whether an act is legally
enforceable, in the sense that a court will order compliance with
it, and whether it must be obeyed pending a review to set it
aside’. Where a public body is forced to abide by a specific
decision pending the outcome of a review application, it does not
necessarily validate the decision or render it lawful, it merely
treats the decision as valid by making it legally enforceable until a
court pronounces otherwise. The court upheld the appeal and
correctly held that Merafong’s status as organ of state should not
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preclude it from bringing a collateral challenge, but that in the
specific circumstances of the case, it was appropriate to remit
the matter back to the High Court for a determination on the
lawfulness of the Minister’s decision and what remedy should be
granted.
Tasima (above) concerned a contract concluded by a com-
pany for the provision of IT services to the Department of
Transport. The contract was unlawfully extended by an official in
the Department. The Department later acknowledged that the
extension had been unlawful for failing to comply with the
prescribed procurement processes, and subsequently refused to
meet its contractual obligations to Tasima. Tasima approached
the court for various orders, including interdictory relief and
orders compelling the Department to comply with the extended
agreement. The Department raised a collateral challenge against
the Director-General’s extension of the contract. The High Court
condoned the delay in bringing the review application and
upheld the Department’s collateral challenge. The Supreme
Court of Appeal upheld Tasima’s appeal on the basis that, as an
organ of state, the Department was precluded from raising a
collateral challenge against its own decision. The main issue
before the Constitutional Court was similar to that raised in
Merafong CC, namely, whether an organ of state may raise a
collateral challenge and the validity of the unlawful act. The court
in Tasima also dealt with the issue of delay in bringing a review
application. The approach taken by the court in Tasima in relation
to the first two issues was very similar to the court’s approach in
Merafong CC. Both the majority and minority followed Merafong
CC and held that organs of state should be permitted to bring a
collateral challenge:
Drawing on this line of reasoning, the majority judgment in Merafong
held that the Municipality was not disqualified from raising a reactive
challenge merely because it is an organ of state. The same must apply
here. It is both a logical and pragmatic consequence of the aforemen-
tioned developments in our jurisprudence to allow state organs to
challenge the lawfulness of exercises of public power by way of
reactive challenges in appropriate circumstances. I therefore agree
with the first judgment’s sentiment that the Supreme Court of Appeal
was incorrect to find that the Department was barred from bringing a
reactive challenge to the extension of the contract solely because it is
a state functionary (para [140]).
In relation to the issue of obeying the relevant court orders, the
minority was of the view that by ordering compliance with the
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invalid extension agreement, ‘the agreement was given legal
force and effect. As it appears later in this judgment, the
extension was not only unconstitutional and unlawful but was also
motivated by corruption and fraud’ (para [41]). They held that
‘[t]he violation of the Constitution, the PFMA and the Treasury
Regulations, individually and collectively, rendered the extension
in question invalid from the outset’ (para [110]). However, the
majority felt that ‘[i]t should not be taken to mean that a party is
entitled to ignore a court order enforcing a contract that is
subsequently found to be unlawful’ (para [177]). According to the
majority,
[n]either the effectiveness nor the dignity of the judiciary is protected
when an organ of state ignores a court order, let alone several. The
Department, an organ of state, had a duty, above and beyond that of
the average litigant, to comply with the court orders. The integrity of
the Constitution demanded this (para [187]).
The court further found that the extension was only challenged
after the court order had been issued and consequently, the
review had no bearing on the validity of the order. Therefore, the
‘interdict granted by Mabuse J only falls away once the counter-
application is upheld by a court. Until this point, it is binding and
enforceable’ (para [199]). The Department, therefore, had to
comply with the court orders until their counter-application had
been successful. The court took an approach very similar to that
in Merafong CC and held:
But these sentiments did not prevail in those cases. The majority
judgment in Kirland held that the Court should not decide the validity
of the decision because ‘the government respondents should have
applied to set aside the approval, by way of formal counter-
application’. In the absence of that challenge – reactive or otherwise –
the decision has legal consequences on the basis of its factual
existence. One of the central benefits of this approach was said to be
that requiring a counter application would require the state organ to
explain why it did not bring a timeous challenge. The same was
required of the Municipality in Merafong.
This position does not derogate from the principles expounded in
cases like Affordable Medicines Trust and Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers. These decisions make patent that any law or conduct that is
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsis-
tency. This includes the exercise of public power. Moreover, when
confronted with unconstitutionality, courts are bound by the Constitu-
tion to make a declaration of invalidity. No constitutional principle
allows an unlawful administrative decision to ‘morph into a valid act’.
However, for the reasons developed through a long string of this
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court’s judgments, that declaration must be made by a court. It is not
open to any other party, public or private, to annex this function. Our
Constitution confers on the courts the role of arbiter of legality.
Therefore, until a court is appropriately approached and an allegedly
unlawful exercise of public power is adjudicated upon, it has binding
effect merely because of its factual existence.
This important principle does not undermine the supremacy of the
Constitution or the doctrine of objective invalidity. In the interests of
certainty and the rule of law, it merely preserves the fascia of legal
authority until the decision is set aside by a court: the administrative
act remains legally effective, despite the fact that it may be objectively
invalid (paras [146]–[148]).
As regards the issue of delay, Merafong CC indicated that
since a court has a discretion to entertain a review, issues of
delay might be relevant to the court when it exercises its
discretion. The court highlighted that in ‘classical’ collateral
challenges, delay plays no role (para [69]). ‘The virtue of ‘‘classi-
cal’’ reactive challenges lies precisely in the fact that they provide
a defence to parties who face the enforcement of the law but who
never previously confronted it’ (para [70]). The court in Merafong
CC saw Merafong’s collateral challenge as one falling into the
category that necessitated scrutiny in regard to delay (para [72]).
This is also because there is a general duty on public bodies to
approach a court to challenge unlawful conduct as soon as is
reasonably possible. For that reason the court remitted the matter
back to the High Court. In the words of the court:
Whether under PAJA, or legality review, it was obliged to institute
proceedings to review the decision without unreasonable delay. The
rule against delay in instituting review exists for good reason: to curb
the potential prejudice that would ensue if the lawfulness of the
decision remains uncertain. Protracted delays could give rise to
calamitous effects. Not just for those who rely upon the decision but
also for the efficient functioning of the decision-making body itself.
Had Merafong instituted a review application, as it ought, the court
hearing it would have had to consider whether the delay precluded its
challenge (para 73]).
The court in Tasima highlighted the fact that when an organ of
state relies on undue delay in bringing a review application, the
reasons for the delay should be assessed by looking at whether
the delay was unreasonable and whether a court should exercise
its discretion to overlook it and nevertheless entertain the applica-
tion (para [152]). The court endorsed the approach taken by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in respect of the delay itself in that it
lacked ‘good constitutional citizenship’ (para [159]). The court
65ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 31 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/02−Administrative−Law
then had to decide whether there were good reasons to overlook
this delay. Conscious of the fact that a delay could have the
potential to prejudice the respondent, weaken the ability of a
court properly to consider the merits of the case, and undermine
the public interest in bringing finality and certainty to administra-
tive action, the court assessed the nature of the decision and the
relevant circumstances surrounding its making. Although the
court found that the extension was in violation of the Constitution
and relevant legislative provisions, it held that the Department
had not acted in bad faith in respect of the administrative action –
‘[i]ts behaviour has been muddled, but not malicious’ (para
[168]). For those reasons, the court disregarded the Depart-
ment’s undue delay in bringing the counter-application. The court
upheld the appeal and the counter-application succeeded.
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa v Swifambo Rail Agency
(Pty) Ltd 2017 (6) SA 223 (GJ) concerned an application by the
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (the PRASA) to review and
set aside its own decision to award a contract for the supply of
locomotives to Swifambo, as well as its decision to conclude the
contract. The main issue related to delay on the side of the
PRASA in bringing the review application and an appropriate
remedy in the circumstances. The application by the PRASA was
brought 793 days late, and the PRASA had to show good cause
for the delay and make out a proper case for the extension of the
180-day period. The court referred in detail to a list of explana-
tions set out by the PRASA for the delay, including aspects
relating to mismanagement, corruption, and issues of capacity.
The court expressed the following opinion:
In my view to hold state institutions too strictly to the prescribed
period, and thereby to shield the perpetrators, encourages the
commission and concealment of egregious conduct of the nature
found in this matter and would discourage prosecution by state
institutions. It would also negatively impact on the administration of
justice. There is no prejudice to the respondent if the application is
heard. The consequences of refusing to hear the application and, as a
result, allowing the invalid decision to stand will be borne by the public
at large for many future generations. In my view the hearing of the
application will advance the principle of legality and the interests of
justice. This is an appropriate case where the time period to have
brought the application is extended and should be condoned (para
[79]).
The court found that the prospect of success was ‘overwhelm-
ing’ and proceeded to highlight some of the irregularities that had
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occurred, although the merits had not been opposed by the
respondents. The next issue related to an appropriate remedy
where a contract, which has already been partially implemented,
has been concluded as a result of a corrupt tender process. The
court had to decide whether a declaration of unlawfulness was
sufficient in the circumstances, ‘in order to hold the relevant
decision makers accountable and to discourage public adminis-
trators from engaging in similar conduct’ (para [78]). Having
regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the court
acknowledged that the issue of what constituted an appropriate
remedy was ‘one of the most difficult decisions that a court must
make in review applications that are tainted with material irregu-
larities and corruption like in the present matter’ (para [88]).
Swifambo argued that it had been an innocent tenderer and the
court should decline to set the contract aside. The PRASA,
however, contended that Swifambo was no innocent tenderer as
the contract constituted fronting for purposes of the Broad-Based
Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. After examining
the facts, the court held that there was sufficient evidence before
it to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the arrangement
constituted fronting and that: ‘Swifambo under the agreement
with Vossloh was merely a token participant that received mon-
etary compensation in exchange for the use of its B-BBEE rating’
(para [95]). The court held that the only just and equitable remedy
was to set the contract aside with retrospective effect. The court,
therefore, granted the relief sought by the PRASA by reviewing
and setting aside its decision to award the contract or tender to
and then to conclude the contract with Swifambo.
Cape Town City v Aurecon SA (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 223 (CC)
concerned an appeal to the Constitutional Court by the City of
Cape Town against a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Aurecon South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City 2016 (2) SA 199
(SCA) (Aurecon SCA, reported in 2016 Annual Survey). Cape
Town City (the City) sought to review its own decision to award a
tender to Aurecon. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the
City had not launched review proceedings within a reasonable
time and that the delay ‘was inexcusable and for this reason
alone the court a quo should not have granted the application for
review’ (Aurecon SCA para [20]). The court did, however, pro-
ceed to deal briefly with the alleged irregularities, and after a
careful analysis of the facts, concluded that those irregularities
were not, in fact, irregularities. The court upheld the appeal and
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replaced the High Court’s order with one allowing Aurecon to bid
for the tender. The City was ordered to pay the costs (Aurecon
SCA para [46]). The City launched its application 352 days late
and the court had to decide whether a proper case for condona-
tion had been made. The court took into account the procedural
issues raised and the prospects of success. It concluded that
‘[t]he interests of clean governance would require judicial inter-
vention. However, this is not such a case and a weighing of
factors leans decidedly against granting condonation’ (para
[50]). The court dismissed the appeal.
Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Munici-
pality 2017 (6) SA 360 (SCA) was an appeal by Asla Construction
Pty (Ltd) (Asla) against a decision by the High Court setting aside
an engineering contract awarded to Asla by the Buffalo City
Metropolitan Municipality (the Municipality). The Municipality
failed to pay Asla for work completed in terms of their contract.
When Asla instituted provisional sentence proceedings, the
Municipality launched a counter-application, arguing that the
contract was invalid in that it failed to comply with procurement
requirements.Asla argued that the review application was brought
outside of the required time limits, but the court agreed with the
Municipality that the interests of justice required that an extension
of time be granted in light of the serious breach of procurement
regulations. Asla approached the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The issue in the Supreme Court of Appeal was whether the
High Court had correctly exercised its discretion in terms of
section 9 of the PAJA to grant an extension of time where it is in
the interest of justice to do so, and whether the Municipality was
required to make a substantive application for extension. The
court held that section 9 of the PAJA requires a substantive
application to be brought for an extension of time within which a
review application is brought; this the Municipality failed to do.
The court also found that the High Court’s discretion was based
solely on the seriousness of not complying with the procurement
processes, and in doing so the court decided the merits of the
review before considering the application for condonation (paras
[9] [10]):
This erroneous approach resulted in a failure by the court a quo to
properly consider whether the respondent had furnished ‘a full and
reasonable explanation for the delay which covers the entire duration
thereof’ (para [15]).
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The court also found that the court a quo had ignored the
possible prejudice to the appellant should the contract be set
aside, and that the prejudice to other parties and the broader
public interest should have been taken into account. The court
accordingly held that the court a quo had erred in granting the
section 9 extension, and the application for the review and setting
aside of the contract should have been refused. The appeal
succeeded.
In SANRAL (above) the Supreme Court of Appeal condoned
the City’s delay in bringing a review application. The court
highlighted the ‘interest of justice’ requirement and proceeded to
consider whether the delay was unreasonable. The City did in
fact concede that the three-year delay was unreasonable (para
[83]).The court, therefore, turned to the merits, the element of
prejudice, and the public interest. The court considered the
lawfulness of the recommendation to the Board and the various
resolutions, and concluded that the Board’s failure to make a
decision was a fundamental flaw which made it subject to judicial
scrutiny. It also recognised the element of prejudice and the
public interest. The court noted:
There is of course the considerable financial burden to be borne by
the public and the State. The public interest is a weighty factor. The
principle of legality and the constitutional principles of transparent and
accountable governance also intrude (para [108]).
The court agreed with the decision of the court below to grant
condonation (para [10]).
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
The issue of access to political party funding in My Vote Counts
NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly & others 2016 (1) SA
132 (CC) was fully discussed in the 2016 Annual Survey 86. It
concerned an application to the Constitutional Court by My Vote
Counts NPC (My Vote 1), requesting the court to compel Parlia-
ment to pass legislation that would oblige political parties to
disclose the sources of their private funding. The majority, with
reference to the principle of subsidiarity, held that the Promotion
of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (the PAIA) gives effect to
the constitutional right of access to information, and any shortcom-
ings in the legislation should be brought through challenging the
constitutional validity of the legislation itself. The minority argued
that the PAIA was the only legislation envisaged by the Constitu-
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tion to give effect to the right of access to information, and that it
has only partially fulfilled this right. The majority held that the
applicants ought to have attacked the constitutional validity of the
PAIA in the High Court, and that its failure to do so was dispositive
of the case. The application was dismissed (para [193]). My Vote
subsequently approached the Western Cape High Court in My
Vote Counts NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa 2017
(6) SA 501 (WCC) (My Vote 2), arguing that access to the private
party funding information of political parties is necessary for the
effective exercise of the right to vote under section 19 of the
Constitution. In line with the view taken by the majority of the court
in My Vote 1, the applicant argued that the PAIA was inconsistent
with the Constitution and invalid insofar as it did not allow for the
recording and disclosure of private funding information. The
applicants submitted that information about political parties’
private funding was required under section 32 of the Constitution
in order properly to exercise the right to vote and to make political
choices under section 19 of the Constitution (para [13]). With
reference to the minority decision in My Vote 1, the court
scrutinised the unique role of political parties and, in agreeing
with the minority view, held that ‘[t]he unique nature of political
parties and their influential role has a significant bearing on
whence and from whom their funds derive’ (para [28]). The court
endorsed the findings of the minority judgment in My Vote 1 and
concluded that section 32 read with section 19 required the
disclosure of private funding information, and that the information
was required ‘for the exercise of an informed right to vote’ (para
[29]).
In considering whether the PAIA did in fact allow for the
disclosure of this information, the court interpreted the relevant
sections of the PAIA, and held that the PAIAas a whole did indeed
not provide for the disclosure of the required private funding
information of political parties ((para [64]). It was consequently
not in sync with section 32 and limited both sections 32 and 19 of
the Constitution. With reference to the limitation clause, the court
held that the limitation was not justified as required by section 36
of the Constitution and declared the PAIA ‘inconsistent with the
Constitution and invalid insofar as it does not allow for the
recordal and disclosure of private funding information’ (para
[75]). The court suspended the declaration of invalidity for a
period of eighteen months to allow Parliament to make the
necessary changes that will allow for the recording and disclo-
sure of private funding information.
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In Belwana v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 2017 (6) SA
182 (ECB), two educators in the employ of the Eastern Cape
Department of Education applied for posts within the Depart-
ment. Both were unsuccessful, and after an unsuccessful request
to the Department for information and failure of their internal
appeals, they approached the court seeking an order under the
PAIA for access to information on the interview and appointment
process. Ms Belwana applied for two head of department posts
in Port Elizabeth. She was not shortlisted, and the SGB failed to
respond to her request for reasons. Through an attorney, she then
requested copies of the relevant documents pertaining to the
shortlisting process, and having received no response, lodged
an appeal. Her internal appeal was dismissed and she subse-
quently launched this application for access to the documents in
terms of the PAIA. The court rejected Belwana’s application on
the basis that she had failed to make the shortlist of candidates
and that
[t]he information which she seeks does not relate to her as a
requester. It relates to interviews from which she was excluded. It
relates to meetings where she was not the subject of discussion. It
relates to opinions about and recommendations with respect to
candidates who were interviewed and candidates who were short-
listed. She is not one of them. I can see no valid reason why the
applicant should be entitled to information regarding a process that
she was not a part of (paras [33] [34]).
In accordance with section 45 of the PAIA, the court found her
application to be ‘manifestly frivolous and vexatious’ and held that
it was reason enough to end the enquiry (para [39]).
The circumstances of the other candidate, Ms Langeveldt,
were different and distinguishable. She also applied for a vacant
post of head of department at her school in the Graaff-Reinet
district, but she had been shortlisted and interviewed, but was
not appointed in the post. After an exchange of various letters,
and when it came to Langeveldt’s attention that someone else
had been appointed to the post, she requested access to the
relevant documents. Her request for information was denied, and
her internal appeal dismissed. She approached the court for
relief. Unlike in Belwana’s case, the court did not find her
application frivolous or vexatious. It noted that the process had
been completed and a candidate had been selected, and that
Langeveldt’s application was, therefore, not premature. The court
granted Langeveldt’s request for information, but dismissed
Belwana’s appeal.
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In Mahaeeane & another v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2017] 3
All SA 458 (SCA), 2017 (6) SA 382, the appellants, former
employees of the mining company, contracted silicosis and were
medically boarded. Proceedings for the certification of a class
action were launched in the High Court to request access to
records held by a private body in terms of section 50 of the PAIA.
The applicants were unsuccessful. The court held that they were
excluded by section 7(1) of the PAIA, which provides that access
to a record is excluded if the request is brought after the
commencement of the proceedings. Moreover, the applicants
had failed to prove that the records were required for the exercise
or protection of any rights as contemplated by section 50. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal first dealt with the inquiry
under section 50 and whether the applicants had a prima facie
right to access the records. The court considered the reasons
placed before it as to why the records were required, and held
that they were not sufficient to meet the test of the records ‘being
required to exercise or protect the right relied on’ (para [17]). As
the appellants had not met the threshold test of section 50(1) of
the PAIA, the court deemed it unnecessary to deal with the issue
in terms of section 7(1) of the PAIA, and dismissed the appeal
with costs.
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ADMIRALTY LAW
HILTON STANILAND*
LEGISLATION
In 2017, the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA)
issued the following marine notices and guidance notes,
adequately described by their titles, which could be relevant to
proceedings in the Admiralty Court, the Court of Marine Enquiry,
or any court exercising criminal or civil jurisdiction: Marine Notice
6 of 2017: Lessons Learnt from Recent Casualties; Marine Notice
7 of 2017: Academic Requirements for Engineering Officers;
Marine Notice 9 of 2017: Performance Standards for Marine
Radio Equipment required by the Merchant Shipping (Radio
Installations) Regulations, 2002, amended by Notice 457 of July
2013, and the Merchant Shipping (Automatic Identification Sys-
tem) Regulations, 2004 (GNR 1291 GG 26938 5 November
2004); Marine Notice 10 of 2017: Guidelines to Crew Agreements
Inspections with particular reference to Fishing Vessels Inspec-
tions; Marine Notice 11 of 2017: Portable Ladders; Marine Notice
12 of 2017: Heeding of Marine Weather Forecasts; Marine Notice
13 of 2017: Vessels Requiring a Place of Refuge for Repairs;
Marine Notice 14 of 2017: Certificates of competence issued to
holders of the Naval Coxswains certificates; Marine Notice 16 of
2017: Issue of New Format Certificates for MM and Fishing and
Validity of All Seafarers Certificates, other than small Vessel
Certificates; Marine Notice 17 of 2017: Code of Practice for
Marine Fire Service Stations – Approved SAMFAS Stations;
Marine Notice 18 of 2017: Cyber Security; Marine Notice 19 of
2017: List of valid Marine Notices; Marine Notice 20 of 2017:
Reporting of oil spills and shipping casualties threatening pollu-
tion; Marine Notice 21 of 2017: Small Vessel Survey Fees
Charged by SAMSA External Appointed Surveyors and Safety
Officers from the following SAMSA Designated Authorised
* BA Hons LLB (Natal) LLM PhD (Southampton). Advocate of the High Court of
South Africa and Lesotho, Professor in Commercial Law, Shipping and Transport at
Queen Mary University of London, Professor Emeritus of the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, member of the Advisory Board of Directors of Seafarers’ Rights International
Centre, Adjunct Professor at the World Maritime University, former Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the South African Maritime Safety Authority, and former
visiting Professor at the University of Greenwich Maritime Institute.
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Agencies: – SADSAA, SALTBAA and SASCA; and Marine Notice
22 of 2017: Lessons learnt from Casualties: Freeing Ports and
Safe Access.
On 8 September 2017, the International Convention for the
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,
2004 (the Convention) entered into force at the international level,
with 80 parties, covering 80,94 per cent of the world’s tonnage.
Ballast water is taken onboard by ships (most of which are
designed or constructed to carry ballast water) to control their
trim, list, draught, stability, or stresses. The proper loading and
unloading of ballast water is, therefore, crucial to the safety of a
ship.
But ballast water may contain thousands of aquatic or marine
microbes, plants, and animals and can be carried to and
released in ports around the world, leading to the introduction of
new invasive marine species, often with devastating conse-
quences for local ecosystems. So, under article 2(1) of the
Convention parties undertake to give full and complete effect to
the instrument in order to prevent, minimise, and ultimately
eliminate, the transfer of harmful aquatic organisms and patho-
gens through the control and management of ballast water. And,
by virtue of article 5 of the Convention, each party undertakes
to ensure that, in ports and terminals designated by that Party where
cleaning or repair of ballast tanks occurs, adequate facilities are
provided for the reception of sediments, taking into account the
Guidelines developed by the Organization [the International Maritime
Organization]. Such reception facilities shall operate without causing
undue delay to ships and shall provide for the safe disposal of such
sediments that does not impair or damage their environment, human
health, property or resources or those of other States.
Furthermore, parties to the Convention must encourage ships
entitled to fly their flag to avoid, as far as practicable, the loading
of ballast water with potentially harmful aquatic organisms and
pathogens as well as sediments.
Although the Convention came into force for South Africa on
8 September 2017, it has not yet been implemented into the law
of the Republic. And, it must be said, South Africa is also failing to
give full and complete effect to other international legal instru-
ments of the International Maritime Organization to which it is also
a party.
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CASE LAW
ARREST OF SHIPS
In Northern Endeavour Shipping Pte Ltd v Owners of MV NYK
Isabel & another 2017 (1) SA 25 (SCA), the appeal involved a
claim for security under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act
105 of 1983 by the second respondent, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki
Kaisha trading as NYK Line (NYK), against the appellant, North-
ern Endeavour Shipping Pte Ltd (NES). In the KwaZulu-Natal
Local Division, the claim was upheld and NES ordered to provide
the security demanded by NYK in an amount of some USD 10
million within ten days of the order. Failure to provide the security
would have resulted in the deemed arrest of the NYK Isabel
(which had been obtained in order to pursue an action in rem in
respect of a maritime claim against NYK) falling away so that, in
practical terms, NES would have been unable to continue with its
action. The further facts of the case, which were unusual and
detailed, do not require to be traversed. But two of the legal
issues are of significance. They are applicable not only to the
arrest of associated ships, but also to claims for security under
the 1983 Act.
The first of these issues was whether, for the purposes of
section 3(7)(c) of the Act, a slot charter was a charter. Section
3(7)(c) states:
If at any time a ship was the subject of a charter-party the charterer or
subcharterer, as the case may be, shall for the purposes of subsection
(6) and this subsection be deemed to be the owner of the ship
concerned in respect of any relevant maritime claim for which the
charterer or subcharterer, and not the owner, is alleged to be liable.
It is trite that the provision extends to both time and voyage
charters, but does it extend to slot charters? To answer this
question, Wallis JA (who delivered the unanimous judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeal) considered the genesis and amend-
ment of the provision, article 3.4 of the International Convention
for the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships concluded in Brussels on
10 May 1952, and the leading cases under English law (The
Tychy [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11 (CA) 18-22; MSC Napoli [2009] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 246 (AC)); Australian law (Laemthong International
Lines Co Ltd v BPS Shipping [1997] 149 ALR 675 681)); Cana-
dian law (Canada Moon Shipping Co Ltd & another v Companhia
Siderurgica Paulista-Cosipa & another 2012 FCA 284 para 53);
and the law of the United States (International Marine Under-
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writers v MV Patricia S & others (2007) 713 LMLN 1). Wallis JA
then held:
[27] I do not think it desirable to approach a statute such as the Act,
which is concerned with events in the dynamic field of international
trade and shipping, on the basis that the meaning of expressions used
in the statute are fixed in stone at a point in time, and are incapable of
being adapted to accommodate new developments. When the Act
speaks of charterparties it is concerned to refer to contracts of a type
developed by and familiar to those engaged in maritime trade. It is not
concerned to restrict the category of such contracts. In other words it
requires a court to give a construction to the expression that is, so far
as possible, consistent with the commercial understanding of its
meaning.
[28] Slot charters have evolved as the container revolution in maritime
transport has evolved. They meet a perceived commercial need and
their terms are largely adapted from the established time and voyage
charters that are in daily use in maritime trade. The objection to
treating them as charters appears to be based principally on the fact
that the slot-charterer does not charter the entire vessel, but only a
part thereof. But I can perceive nothing in that fact that should operate
to preclude slot-charterers from being characterised as charterers.
[29] A final point that seems to me relevant is the purpose of s 3(7)(c).
It is to enable claims to be pursued by way of proceedings against an
associated ship in circumstances where no claim lies against the ship
concerned and its owner. The deeming provision simply enables the
first requirement for an associated-ship arrest to be satisfied without
affecting the commercial relationships underpinning the slot charter. If
the owner of the ship concerned is liable on the claim the deeming
provision cannot be invoked.Aconstruction of the word ‘charterer’ that
includes a slot-charterer will serve the purpose of promoting the ability
of creditors to recover maritime claims. That is the underlying purpose
of permitting proceedings to be instituted by the arrest of an associated
ship. So that construction is consistent with the statutory purpose.
The decision is to be welcomed. It brings South African law into
broad agreement with the law of other developed admiralty
jurisdictions that have accepted that a slot-charterer is a char-
terer. And it is also a pragmatic decision since it recognises that
slot-charters are very well established in international business
practice and frequently affect the liabilities of ships.
The second legal issue concerned the scope and ambit of
section 5(2)(b) and (c) of the Act. The provisions stipulate:
A court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction –
. . .
(b) order any person to give security for costs or any claim;
(c) order that any arrest or attachment made or to be made or that
76 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 5 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/03−Admiralty−Law
anything done or to be done in terms of the Act or any order of the
court be subject to such conditions as to the court appears just,
whether as to the furnishing of security or the liability for costs,
expenses, loss or damage caused or likely to be caused, or
otherwise . . . .
After considering the general meaning of the provisions, Wallis
JA added:
[54] . . . In The Paz [1984 (3) SA 261 (N) at 268B–C] it was said that an
applicant for a security arrest should say why it needed security; that it
had not already obtained security; and that it could not obtain security
in the other actual or contemplated proceedings. I would add the
following glosses. If some security has been obtained there should be
an explanation of the need for further security, for example, by
explaining that it is insufficient or of no real value. If it would be feasible
to obtain security elsewhere, or in the other or contemplated proceed-
ings, there needs to be an explanation for invoking the jurisdiction of a
South African court for that purpose. In other words, as Didcott J said
in The Paz [at 270A–B] the applicant must explain that ‘no alternative
and less disruptive opportunity for obtaining such has been or is likely
to become available to him and, if one has already been lost, that this
was not his fault or, I should rather say, not his fault to such a degree
as to be fairly held against him’. Whether security should be ordered
when a reasonable and genuine need therefor has been established
will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
[55] It will usually be convenient in considering an application for
security to address these questions sequentially.
The judgment has made the scope and ambit of section 5(2)(b)
and (c) much more precise. It will help to ensure the continued
reputation and use of the South African Admiralty Court by
international maritime claimants as one of the most favoured
forums for the security arrest of ships.
SAFETY OF FISHING VESSELS
On 23 January 2017, a Court of Marine Enquiry (convened
pursuant to s 266 of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951)
handed down an unreported judgment (the writer presided over
the court) concerning the loss of the MVF Kingfisher and fourteen
members of her crew. The findings and recommendations of the
court are of some significance given that fishing at sea is a very
dangerous occupation, especially in South African waters.
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The procedure followed by a Court of Marine Enquiry, as well
as its jurisdiction, are, however, little known. It is not often
understood that a Court of Marine Enquiry sitting in South Africa
today reflects – in all material respects – the procedure that was
followed and the jurisdiction that was exercised by the Court of
Formal Inquiry (established under s 466 of the Merchant Ship-
ping Act, 1894, of the United Kingdom) that investigated the loss
of the Titanic with 1490 lives in 1912.
A Court of Marine Enquiry is enjoined to make findings in
respect of a list of questions formulated by the Director-General
of the Department of Transport. Section 269 of the 1951 Act
provides:
(1) If a court of marine enquiry finds that any master or member of
the crew is incompetent or has been guilty of any act of misconduct, or
that loss, abandonment or stranding of or serious damage to any ship
or loss of life or serious injury to any person has been caused by the
wrongful act or default of any master or member of the crew, it may . . .
cancel the certificate of competency or service of the master or
member of the crew or suspend it for a stated period or, whether or not
the master or member of the crew holds a certificate of competency or
service, prohibit his employment in any stated capacity in a ship for a
stated period or impose a fine not exceeding R2 000 upon him or
reprimand him.
(2) Subsection (1) shall apply in respect of masters or members of
the crew of all ships which are registered or licensed in the Republic
or which are in terms of this Act required to be so licensed, and in
respect of masters or members of the crew of ships registered in a
country other than the Republic only if those ships are wholly engaged
in plying between ports in the Republic.
Although a Court of Marine Enquiry may thus cancel or
suspend the certificate of a seafarer, it has no jurisdiction to hear
and determine any maritime claim, while the imposition of a fine
does not result in a criminal conviction. But the findings of a Court
of Marine Enquiry frequently lead to subsequent criminal or civil
proceedings in other courts. And the recommendations of a Court
of Marine Enquiry generally carry great weight. In England, for
example, the recommendations made by Lord Mersey (who
presided over the Formal Inquiry into the foundering of the
Titanic) led directly to the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea in 1914, which is today the major convention
providing for the safety of ships.
Some of the major findings of the Court of Marine Enquiry into
the MVF Kingfisher was that the skipper of the fishing vessel
should not have relied on his own assessment of the weather; that
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he did not properly heed the weather warning; and that after
hearing the weather warning he should not have stopped and
delayed the voyage of his vessel to the nearest place or port of
safety. The Court of Marine Enquiry held:
Since a weather warning from the South African Weather Service is
almost certain to occur (requiring disaster management agencies to
be on standby), it is required of skippers – and it is their duty – to
navigate to the safety of the nearest lee before the arrival of the bad
weather, always leaving a clear margin for safety, free of commercial
considerations.
In the result, the certificate of the skipper of the MFV Kingfisher
was suspended and he was prohibited from taking employment
as a skipper or master for a period of five years.
The Court of Marine Enquiry also found that some other fishing
vessels in the vicinity of the MFV Kingfisher similarly failed
properly to heed the weather warnings. Consequently, the recom-
mendation was made by the Court of Marine Enquiry that the
Director-General of the Department of Transport should direct
SAMSA to issue a marine notice advising skippers of fishing
vessels of their duty to heed weather warnings, and that failure to
do so could result in severe criminal and civil liabilities. A marine
notice was very quickly issued by SAMSA (Marine Notice 12 of
2017: Heeding of Marine Weather Forecasts), which stated in
part that
[t]he importance of heeding weather forecasts by skippers and
preparing the vessel and crews for inclement weather was highlighted
during findings in a recent Court of Marine Enquiry that deliberated on
the contributing factors that led to the loss of lives off a fishing vessel.
This notice endeavours to advise all operators. Masters and skippers
should keep themselves informed on weather forecasts in order to
have sufficient time to avoid any weather conditions that could
threaten the safety of his/her vessel and crew and take the appropriate
safety precautions.
It is understood, at the time of writing, that the marine notice is
continuing to have a beneficial effect regarding the safety of
fishing vessels, and that skippers are in the main aware of their
inescapable duty to heed weather warnings, notwithstanding that
fishing vessel owners might sometimes implicitly encourage
skippers to run risks with the weather in order to maximise fish
catches.
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CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE AND
JURISDICTION
ESTELLE HURTER*
LEGISLATION
PRIMARY LEGISLATION
The Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017, was assented to
on 31 July 2017 (GN 769 GG 41017 of 2 August 2017). This Act
amends the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 by inserting
definitions of ‘court day’ and ‘National Credit Act’ (s 1); amending
section 36 to regulate the rescission of judgments where the
judgment debt has been paid in full; amending section 45 to
further regulate jurisdiction by consent; inserting section 55A
to enumerate the factors a court must consider when making
a just and equitable order; substituting section 57 to further
regulate the payment of debt in instalments or otherwise; substi-
tuting section 58 to further regulate consent to judgments and
orders for the payment of judgment debts in instalments; substi-
tuting section 65(1) and section 65E to further regulate debt
collection proceedings; substituting section 73 to regulate the
suspension of execution of a debt and the abandonment of
judgments; substituting section 65J to provide for emoluments
attachment orders and inserting section 106C to provide for
certain offences and penalties relating to judgments, emoluments
attachment orders and instalment orders; and by substituting
section 65M to provide for the enforcement of certain judgments
by divisions of the High Court or regional courts.
The Act also amends the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 by
inserting section 23A to regulate the rescission of judgments
by consent, or where the judgment has been paid in full.
The Judicial Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017 was also
assented to on 31 July 2017 (GN 770 GG 41018 of 2 August
2017). This Act amends, inter alia, sections 9 and 12 of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 to further regulate the benefits
of magistrates who are required to dispose of proceedings not
* BA (Law) LLB (UP) LLM LLD (UNISA). Attorney of the High Court of South
Africa, Professor of Law, UNISA.
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disposed of on vacation of the office of a magistrate, and to
provide for the appointment of magistrates of regional divisions,
respectively; section 3 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 to further
regulate the engagement of candidate attorneys; section 25 of
the Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984 to empower the Rules
Board for Courts of Law to make rules regulating various matters
relating to small claims courts; section 44 of the Superior Courts
Act 10 of 2013 to further regulate the electronic transmission of
summonses, writs, and other processes.
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
Legal Aid South Africa Act
The Regulations for Legal Aid South Africa were published
(R745 GG 41005 of 26 July 2017), and came into operation on
22 August 2017. The Regulations were published under section
23(1) of the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014, and regulate
the process relating to the provision of legal aid and matters
connected therewith.
CASE LAW
ADVOCATE
In General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Jiba & others
2017 (2) SA 122 (GP) the court considered the test to be applied
in an application under section 7(1)(d) of the Admission of
Advocates Act 74 of 1964 for the removal of an advocate from the
roll of advocates. The matter stems from the conduct of the three
respondents in the handling of certain cases (referred to as the
Booysen case; the spy-tapes case; and the Mdluli case respec-
tively – paras [7] [8]).
As in the case of attorneys, advocates may be removed from
the roll if they cease to be ‘fit and proper’ persons to practise as
advocates, and the same three-stage inquiry in determining the
outcome of this test applies (para [9]). Consequently, the court’s
first enquiry was whether the alleged conduct complained of had
been established on a preponderance of probabilities (this is a
factual enquiry); secondly, whether the person, in the court’s
discretion, is not a fit and proper person to continue to practise
(this entails a weighing up of conduct); and thirdly, whether, in
light of all of the circumstances, the person should be removed
from the roll.
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After a thorough and detailed analysis of the complaints
against the respondents, the court held that there was insufficient
information against the third respondent to justify the relief sought
against him (paras [174] [176]), but made scathing remarks
concerning the conduct of the first two respondents, Jiba and
Mrwebi. The court could not believe that two officers who held
such high positions in the prosecuting authority (Acting National
Director of Public Prosecutions and Special Director in terms of
the NPA Act, respectively) could ‘stoop so far’ for the protection
and defence of one individual who had been implicated in
serious offences (para [165]), and held that through their conduct
they had brought not only the prosecuting authority and the legal
profession into disrepute, but also the office of the President of
the Republic (para [166]). Having thus established the outcome
of the enquiry regarding the first two stages, the court conse-
quently held that the first two respondents were not considered fit
and proper persons to remain on the roll of advocates. In the
case of Jiba, the following led to this conclusion by the court: she
had failed to comply with Uniform Rule 53 in respect of the
timeous filing of the record relating to the decision to withdraw
charges against Mdluli, and the reasons advanced for the delay
were held to be unreasonable and indicated bad faith (para
[114.2.7]); she had further failed to supply a complete record with
no proper explanation, and thus acted contrary to her oath of office
(para [118]); she had also failed to comply with a directive by
the Deputy Judge President (para [119]); and failed to heed the
advice of counsel briefed to defend her, and acted contrary to that
advice (paras [135]). Jiba had done everything in her power to
ensure charges againstMdluli were permanently withdrawn, despite
prima facie evidence against him (para [135.9.5]); and she deliber-
ately attempted tomislead the review court by failing to disclose that
a memo by a prosecutor in the Mdluli case had been submitted to
her and then lied about it (paras [136.2.2] [136.2.3]).
In the case of Mrwebi, the following led to this conclusion: he had
lied about a consultative document he had prepared regarding
the Mdluli prosecution (para [141.4]); he had deliberately failed to
disclose a memorandum and note regarding the reasons for
discontinuing the Mdluli prosecution (paras [144]–[146]); he was
an unreliable and dishonest witness (para [151.3.3]); together with
the first respondent, he had ignored the advice of counsel (para
[152.3.1]); he had refused to reinstate charges against Mdluli
(para [159]); and he had given ‘patently’ dishonest evidence
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regarding the alleged consultation with the third respondent as to
the withdrawal of charges against Mdluli (paras [163] [164]).
APPEAL
The lodging of an application for leave to appeal against a
judgment of a High Court has the effect of suspending the
operation and execution of that judgment in terms of section 18 of
the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. However, a party aggrieved
by a section 18(1) order has an automatic right of appeal ‘to the
next highest court’ under section 18(4)(ii) of the Act. In MEC for
Co-operative Governance & others v Mogalakwena Municipality
& another 2017 (2) SA 464 (GP), a single judge granted an order
reinstating the second respondent as the municipal manager of
the first respondent, whereupon the appellants sought leave to
appeal against this order to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The
effect of this was that the reinstatement order was suspended
under section 18(1) of theAct, and, as a consequence, the second
respondent applied for an order for execution of the reinstatement
order pending the appeal (claiming ‘exceptional circumstances’
under s 18(3)). However, on the same date, appellants two to 37
served notice of appeal under section 18(4)(ii) of the Act, appeal-
ing against the order for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal, which resulted in the suspension of the enforcement
order.
The question for determination was whether the Supreme Court
of Appeal was ‘the next highest court’. The respondent argued
that the ‘next highest court’ in this instance did not refer to the
Supreme Court of Appeal, but to the full court of the Gauteng
Division. After a submission to the registrar of the Supreme Court
of Appeal to this effect, that court directed that the matter be dealt
with by the present full court. The present court, after considering
the construction of the relevant legislation (paras [11]–[18]), held
that the phrase was found in section 16(1)(a) and (b), as well as in
section 17(6)(a), which set out clearly the hierarchy of courts of
appeal. The court concluded that the context of section 18(4)
dictated that the appeal had to follow the so-called ‘default route’,
that is, from single judge to full court of the same division as the
‘next highest court’ (para [16]). It would then logically flow that in
the event of an order under section 18(1) to put the decision of a
court constituted of more than one judge into operation, an
automatic right of appeal would lie to the Supreme Court of
Appeal, being the next highest court in such instance (para [16]).
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For general noting, the court also commented on the use of the
phrases ‘full bench’ and ‘full court’. It pointed out that although
often used interchangeably, section 1 of the Act clearly provides
that ‘full court’ (in relation to any division of the High Court) means
a court consisting of three judges. It followed that a court of a
division consisting of two judges was a ‘full bench’ (paras
[20]–[21]). This matter illustrates clearly that terminology should
be used consistently and accurately at all times.
In Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Mogale City Local
Municipality & others 2017 (4) SA 207 (GJ), the crisp question for
decision was whether an application for leave to appeal a
decision had to be lodged before an application to execute that
decision could be brought; in other words, whether an applica-
tion to execute may precede an application for leave to appeal.
The court held that there was ‘nothing in the plain language of
s 18 of the Act’ (the Superior Courts Act, above) that required this
(para ([14]), and that ‘an expression of an intention to seek leave
to appeal was sufficient’ (para [16]). The outcome of a contrary
interpretation could, according to the court, not have been
intended by the legislature, and would have been ‘inflexible and
formalistic in the extreme‘, thus prohibiting the courts from taking
appropriate measures to ensure that justice is done during the
interim period (the period between the granting of an order and
the filing of an application for leave to appeal) (paras [19] [25]),
whereas the court’s approach would result in the successful
litigant not being left without a remedy in the interim period. At the
same time, the unsuccessful litigant would be prevented from
frustrating the operation of the order, especially where the
successful litigant may find itself in dire circumstances.
In the sequel to this matter, the full court in Mogale City Local
Municipality & others v Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd 2017
(4) SA 516 (GJ) dismissed the appeal by Mogale City under
section 18(4) of the Act, but held that on the facts of the matter, it
was unnecessary for the court to conclude that such pre-emptive
action was necessarily contemplated by section 18, properly
interpreted, and thus that the result arrived at by the court below
was correct (para [11]). The court instead considered whether the
application to execute by Fidelity had been premature, and held
that this was in fact so (para [14]). Consequently, this amounted
to an irregular step which could have been set aside on applica-
tion in terms of the rules of court (para [15]). Instead, Mogale City
embarked on different courses of action which, in effect, amounted
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to a ‘further step’ as contemplated by Uniform Rule 30. These
actions resulted in Mogale City forfeiting its right to complain
about the premature application to execute (paras [15] [16]).
In Ntlemeza v Helen Suzman Foundation & another 2017 (5) SA
402 (SCA), an appeal was lodged against an execution order made
by a full court (a three-judge High Court), which had ruled that its
order setting aside the appointment of the appellant as head of the
so-called ‘Hawks’ (the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation) on
the ground of his unfitness for the position would remain operational
and be executed in full during the appeal process.
In assessing the ruling of the court below, the Supreme Court of
Appeal found it necessary to restate the law regarding various
aspects of the appeal process. In the first instance, it pointed out
that the primary purpose of section 18(1) of the Act is to restate
the common-law position in relation to the ordinary effect of
appeal processes, namely that the order being appealed is
automatically suspended, not nullified (paras [28] [29]).
Secondly, while section 18(1) of the Act entitles a court to order
the execution of an order ‘under exceptional circumstances’, a
party seeking such an order is required ‘in addition’ to prove on a
balance of probabilities that he or she will suffer irreparable harm
if the court does not so order, and that the other party will not
suffer irreparable harm if the court so orders (s 18(3)). Conse-
quently, in considering whether the High Court in the present
matter had had due regard to this further controlling measure in
section 18(3) and had applied it correctly, the Supreme Court of
Appeal held that the High Court could not be faulted in finding
that the respondent had proved exceptional circumstances. The
factors constituting exceptional circumstances in this particular
matter were the necessity that the foremost crime-fighting unit in
the community should be untainted; the earlier adverse judicial
pronouncements in respect of its head; and the place that the
South African Police Service holds in the constitutional scheme
(para [45]). The court further held that the High Court could also
not be faulted for its approach to irreparable harm to the
appellant – the damage he suffered arose not from the main
application, but from earlier judicial findings against him. In
respect of the respondents, it held that they had proved, on a
balance of probabilities, that the public would suffer irreparable
harm if the court were not to grant the order (and the appellant
remained in his position) (para [47]). This matter offers a good
illustration of the practical import of section 18.
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APPLICATIONS
A deponent to a founding affidavit must set out enough facts to
demonstrate personal knowledge of the essential allegations
contained therein. Issues in this regard often arise in applications
by financial institutions relating to the National Credit Act 34 of
2005 (NCA). Consequently, in Firstrand Bank Ltd v Kruger &
others 2017 (1) SA 533 (GJ), the key issue was whether the
deponent, a ‘commercial recoveries manager’ at the bank, had
set out enough facts to demonstrate personal knowledge of the
facts in the affidavit in an application for outstanding debt in
terms of a credit agreement.
The founding affidavit suffered from various defects. First, it
was clear from the attached credit facility agreement, in which the
bank was represented by two named bank officials, that these
officials had made a mistake when inserting the applicable
interest rate. However, they filed no confirmatory affidavit relating
to the conclusion of the agreement or the mistake, while clearly
only they could provide evidence supporting these matters.
Secondly, the individuals from whom the deponent obtained the
information on which he relied were not identified. As a conse-
quence, the court found that it was not possible to ascertain
which parts of the evidence presented by the deponent were
within his own knowledge, and which were conveyed by his
unnamed sources (para [7]).
The court emphasized that a factual allegation in an affidavit
which amounts to no more than information that another party
could have provided (thus hearsay evidence) could not be
‘elevated to real evidence’ simply because the deponent, under a
‘standardised statement at the commencement of the affidavit,’
believed it to be true and correct (para [10]). In fact, relying on
others to provide the information called into question whether any
of the essential facts had indeed been gathered by him through
‘personally accessing and considering the bank’s records’ relating
to all aspects of the principal debtor’s loan account (para [17]).
In practice, the inherent difficulties in producing every indi-
vidual who dealt with the credit receiver and made each entry
reflected in a particular account are manifest. Consequently, in
considering whether circumstances existed in which hearsay
was admissible, it became necessary to consider the impact of
section 3(1)(c) of the Law of EvidenceAmendment Act 45 of 1988
(which describes the circumstances in which hearsay evidence
is admissible). The court explained that this section had at its
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core, for the reception of what would otherwise constitute hear-
say, the reliability and probative value of the evidence sought to
be tendered (para [24]). In determining the extent to which
hearsay evidence ought to be admitted in the present type of
application (ie, unopposed applications under s 3(1)(c)(i) of the
Act), the court drew on summary judgment case law in which it is
now accepted that where a person was in control of the relevant
files and was directly involved in the matter at hand (eg, by
engaging directly with the defendant, or by correspondence
without comeback), that person qualifies to depose to an affidavit
verifying the facts (para [20]).
Consequently, the court held that an applicant credit grantor
seeking judgment in an unopposed matter would be able to rely
on (a) the evidence of a person who exercised control over the
documents in issue (usually a bank manager or a recoveries
manager) to introduce them into evidence through the founding
affidavit, provided such allegation is made, or appears from the
contents of the affidavit as a whole, and the agreements are
attached and alleged to be true copies; (b) the evidence of a
person who has personal knowledge of the current status of
the credit receiver’s account by reason of having access to the
account and being involved in the present management of
the account or collection process in respect of the allegations
contained in the founding affidavit regarding the current outstand-
ing balance (if the agreement permits a certificate of indebted-
ness to constitute prima facie proof, it must be signed by a
designated official at the financial institution, and the court must
be satisfied that such person would ordinarily have personally
accessed the respondent’s records, accounts, and other relevant
records, and that the certificate is otherwise reliable); (c) the
evidence of a person who positively attests that notice was
properly sent to the respondent under either section 129(1) or
section 86(10) of the NCA (para [25]).
In the present matter, the deponent did not claim to have been
personally involved in the process or in recovering the debt, or to
have personally accessed the bank’s records (para [26]). As a
consequence, the court correctly held that the papers were not in
order and requested the filing of supplementary affidavits from
relevant persons (para [27]).
ATTORNEY
Admission
In an application for admission as an attorney, the determining
factor is whether the applicant is a ‘fit and proper person’ to be
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admitted, as required by section 15(1) of the Attorneys Act 53 of
1979. As stated in Summerley v Law Society, Northern Provinces
2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA) para [21], the attorneys’ profession
demands complete honesty and integrity from its members, and
therefore the court, when considering such an application, must
weigh up the conduct that is alleged to disqualify the applicant
against the conduct expected of an attorney.
Against this background, the court in Ex parte Mdyogolo 2017
(1) SA 432 (ECG) had to decide whether the applicant, who
disclosed three previous convictions for criminal offences, was a
fit and proper person to be admitted. One of these convictions –
robbery with aggravating circumstances – was central to the
court’s judgment. In his application, the applicant explained that
the robbery was politically motivated and that he had applied for
amnesty for it. The court requested the Cape Law Society to
appear before the court and to make its view known in this
regard. However, the Cape Law Society did not appear, but filed
an affidavit in which it simply noted that the offence had been
‘politically motivated’ and endorsed the application without fur-
ther ado. As the court had concerns about the applicant’s
explanation, and in view of the Law Society’s attitude, it requested
the Eastern Cape Society of Advocates to appear as amicus
curiae in the matter to assist the court.
From the facts before court, it transpired that the applicant’s
account of the robbery was not only ‘both bizarre and nonsensi-
cal’, but also false, and was ‘indicative of a person who is
unwilling to take responsibility for his actions, and of a person
who is willing to fabricate a version in the hope that it [will] benefit
him’ (paras [27] [28]). The court also found that the applicant’s
participation in the robbery (during which he was armed with a
semi-automatic rifle), was indicative of a ‘grave character flaw’
(para [32]). The court further held that the version of the events
that he placed on oath before the Truce and Reconciliation in
1998 was ‘clearly mendacious’ and also indicative of an unfit
person. Finally, in his current application before court more than
22 years later, he had lied about why he committed the robbery,
thereby illustrating the same character defects. Consequently,
the court held that apart from being dishonest and completely ‘at
odds with the ethical probity expected of an attorney’, the
applicant had also attempted to mislead both the Law Society
and the court. As the applicant’s conduct clearly fell short of what
was required of an attorney, his application for admission failed
(paras [34] [35]).
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Unfortunately, the Cape Law Society’s handling of the matter
was also less than could be expected and did not escape the
court’s censure. The court pointed out that those handling the
application could not have applied their minds properly to the
matter. Even the most perfunctory reading of the founding
affidavit should have raised a red flag, as the robbery occurred
nearly two months after the iconic 27 April 1994, and alleging that
it had been committed in the course of the armed struggle was
unlikely to be true.
Contingency fee agreement
At issue in Nash & another v Mostert & others 2017 (4) SA 80
(GP) was the interpretation of the clause in a remuneration
agreement which provided that the curator, appointed under
section 5 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28
of 2001, would be entitled to a curator’s remuneration of ‘16,33%
(exclusive of VAT) of . . . assets recovered’ (para [19]). Critical to
this interpretation was the paragraph in the judgment in terms of
which the curator had been appointed, which provided that the
curator would be entitled to ‘periodic remuneration in accordance
with the norms of the attorneys’ profession’ (para [9]). The
applicant contended that the remuneration agreement was invalid
and void ab initio by virtue of its being a contingency fee
agreement outside of the parameters of the Contingency Fees
Act 66 of 1997 (CFA) (para [28]).
As the court order did not merely govern the periodicity of the
remuneration but also its nature, it was held that the remuneration
had, therefore, to be in accordance with the norms of the
attorneys’ profession (paras [63] [64]) – ie, in accordance with the
‘ethical norms applicable to legal practitioners’ (para [82]). It
followed that the curator was constrained to conclude an agree-
ment which accorded with the norms of the attorneys’ profession.
In this case, the applicable norm was a general prohibition
against contingency fee agreements (para [85]). As far as the
court was concerned, there was no reason why an agreement
that complied in substance with the CFA should not have been
concluded – had he done so, the curator could have brought
himself within that norm (para [86]).
Despite the matter not being a non-litigious matter, the court
had no difficulty in finding that contingency fee agreements in
respect of non-litigious matters are against public policy and for
broadly the same reasons as those that apply to litigious matters,
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that is, that they subvert the interests of justice. The respondents
were incorrect in their assertion that there is case law to the effect
that the common law allowed contingency fee agreements in
respect of non-litigious matters. The position is rather that the
issue has not yet been expressly decided (para [71]). Hence, the
court decided the matter according to first principles (para [72]).
In yet another incident of attempted overreaching in respect of
a contingency fee agreement, the court in Mfengwana v Road
Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) had no difficulty in finding
that the particular agreement was in breach of section 2(2) of the
CFA, and therefore invalid. In this matter, the parties reached a
settlement before the matter went to trial, and requested the court
to make the settlement agreement an order of the court as
required by section 4(3) of the CFA. While the plaintiff’s attorney
averred in his affidavit (in which he claimed compliance with the
Act) that he would charge, as a fee, ‘25% from the client or
(double my fees and take whichever is lesser which would not be
more than 25% agreed fees)’ (para [22]), a reading of clauses 5
and 6 of the contingency fee agreement clearly indicated that he
would in fact charge ‘25% of the total of damages awarded’
(paras [17] [18]). As these clauses were clearly in conflict with
section 2(2) of the CFA, the contingency fee agreement as a
whole was invalid, and the plaintiff’s attorney was held to be
entitled only to a reasonable fee in relation to the work performed
under common law (paras [20] [21] and [25] [26]). To compound
matters, the court further held that in respect of the amount of
work involved in this matter, the ‘fee of 25%’ that the plaintiff’s
attorney attempted to charge was ‘grossly disproportionate’ and
amounted to ‘overreaching on an outrageous scale’ (para [19]).
Due to the widespread abuse of contingency fee agreements, the
court indicated that it would request the registrar of the court to
deliver a copy of the judgment to the Cape Law Society for
consideration (paras [28] [29]).
CLASS ACTION
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Oosthuizen
& others 2017 (6) SA 272 (GJ), the timing of a certification
application was considered. In this matter the applicant, as a
class action representative, approached the court for leave to
continue a pending action as a class action. This approach by
the applicant deviated from the customary approach in class
action proceedings in both South Africa and most foreign juris-
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dictions, which requires a certification process prior to a matter
proceeding in terms of class action proceedings. As a conse-
quence, the applicant submitted that even if the prior application
was a requirement, it was not a fixed rule, and the ultimate
criterion for certification was whether the interests of justice
justified it (para [46]).
As a starting point, the court correctly held that the Supreme
Court of Appeal in Children’s Resource Centre Trust & others v
Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) had laid
down as a requirement for a class action that a party seeking to
represent the class should first apply to court for authority to do
so. This requirement was endorsed by the Constitutional Court in
Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (5) SA 89
(CC) (para [45]). It then correctly (and importantly) pointed out
that the question of whether the interests of justice require
certification was determined with reference to the content of the
certification application, not its timing (para [47]). Consequently,
the pending action could not be certified as a class action ex post
facto (para [53]).
It is submitted that the logic of this approach is clear in light of
the objective of certification in most Commonwealth class action
regimes. Certification is generally described as the first hurdle to
be overcome in class action proceedings, and plays an important
role in ensuring that courts are able to make an informed decision
on whether a matter is appropriate for class treatment, and
should be allowed to proceed. This is illustrated by the Ontario
Law Commission’s reference to certification as a ‘special judicial
filter to weed out’ cases not suited for class action proceedings
(see Report on class actions (1982) 281). (See also Mahaeeane &
another v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2017 (6) SA382 (SCA) para [23],
in which certification was described as a ‘necessary precursor’ to
class action proceedings.)
COSTS
An interesting question regarding costs on the attorney-and-
client scale in respect of a secret settlement offer was considered
in AD & another v MEC for Health and Social Development,
Western Cape 2017 (5) SA 134 (WCC). Essentially, the question
for consideration was whether a settlement offer made without
prejudice could be produced in support of a specific costs order.
In this matter, judgment was granted in respect of the plaintiffs’
claim for damages, but the court ordered the determination of
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costs to stand over. During the subsequent proceedings, the
plaintiffs sought, among other things, a punitive costs award on
the attorney-and-client scale against the defendant. In support of
this the plaintiffs indicated that they had made a secret offer of
settlement prior to the trial on the basis that the defendant pay
them a specified lump sum, plus interest, plus party-and-party
costs, plus the qualifying and preparation expenses of 25 listed
experts. The plaintiffs contended that this offer had been unrea-
sonably rejected by the defendants, and that the defendants had
also unreasonably failed to make their own global counter-offer.
As a consequence, the plaintiffs had had to run a lengthy and
enormously expensive trial (para [40]).
In general, the privilege attaching to without-prejudice commu-
nications bars their production. However, over time exceptions
have been allowed based on the public policy concept of
encouraging settlements and discouraging costly litigation (paras
[43] [47]). Consequently, in respect of the secret offer, the
present court had to decide whether the principles involved in a
so-called ‘Calderbank offer’ (so named with reference to the
judgment in the English Court of Appeal Calderbank v Calder-
bank [1975] 3 All ER 333 (CA)) should be recognised in our law.
(In Calderbank, the court held that, in cases not covered by the
rules of court permitting secret offers, a litigant could be permit-
ted to produce, in support of a particular costs order once
judgment has been granted, a settlement offer expressly made
without prejudice ‘except in relation to costs’.) The court pointed
out that in England and other Commonwealth jurisdictions, it has
been held that the privilege attaching to without-prejudice com-
munications does not bar the production of Calderbank letters in
relation to costs, provided the offer explicitly stated that it was
made without prejudice ‘except in relation to costs’ (or words to
similar effect), thus qualifying ‘without prejudice’ (para [43]).
The court saw no reason why our law of evidence, based as it is
on English law (para [47]), should not recognise the same
exception recognised in England and other Commonwealth
jurisdictions (para [50]), and therefore held that Calderbank
offers are admissible in relation to costs, and may be disclosed
to the court for that purpose once judgment has been given
(para [60]).
In the present case, the plaintiffs’ secret offer complied with the
principles laid down for a Calderbank offer and the court held it to
be admissible (para [62]). However, the court held that the
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circumstances of the case did not warrant a punitive costs order
against the defendant, as it had not behaved unreasonably in
rejecting the offer (paras [61]-[82]). Importantly, the court pointed
out as regards a Calderbank offer, that it did not entitle a plaintiff
to attorney-and-client costs simply because he or she had made
a secret offer which was lower than the court awarded. In line with
Commonwealth cases, the court consequently listed the following
factors that could be considered in determining whether or not
the rejection of the offer was reasonable: whether the defendant
had engaged reasonably in attempting to settle; whether the
plaintiff was offering a fair discount based on a realistic assess-
ment of the case rather than holding out for the best conceivable
outcome; whether the plaintiff had allowed the defendant a
reasonable time to consider the offer; the extent of the difference
between the amount of the offer and the amount of the award;
and the nature of the litigants’ proceedings and resources (para
[6]).
In De Sousa & another v Technology Corporate Management
(Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ), a matter dealing with an
action by minority shareholders for relief in terms of section 252 of
the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the court also had to consider
whether the conduct of the defendants warranted a costs award
against them on a punitive scale of attorney-and-client. The court
unhesitatingly held that this was the case (para [338]), and on the
facts of the matter, listed the following factors that justified
the finding: the defendants’ approach to the litigation had been
obstructive, thus prolonging the hearing and delaying the finalisa-
tion of the trial; they had raised groundless objections; they had
brought abortive interlocutory applications; the cross-examina-
tion of witnesses had been excessively long; declared dividends
had been wrongfully withheld from the applicants; the defendants
had refused to engage in bona fide discussions or negotiations to
permit the plaintiffs to dispose of their shares at a fair value and
without resort to litigation; and wrongful use had been made of
company funds made by the plaintiffs to resist the present
proceedings (paras [340]–[351]). As a mark of its disapproval of
the defendants’ conduct, the court directed that costs on the
attorney-and-client scale be borne by the second to fifth defen-
dants (para [355]).
COURTS
Judicial authority
It is an entrenched principle that no one should be judge in his
or her own case. Consequently, in MEC for Health, Gauteng v
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Lushaba 2017 (1) SA 106 (CC) the Constitutional Court set aside
an order for costs issued by the Gauteng Local Division of the
High Court. In this matter, the High Court issued a rule nisi, calling
on the MEC to show cause why he should not be held liable for
costs de bonis propriis in his personal capacity, alternatively, to
indicate those officials in the Department of Health and the Office
of the State Attorney who should be held liable. The High Court
subsequently confirmed the rule, and ordered four officials whom
it deemed liable to pay such costs jointly and severally with the
defendant.
Although the Constitutional Court showed understanding for
the High Court’s concern and frustration over the ‘staggering’
increase in claims against the health service providers and the
resultant mounting litigation costs, it pointed out that a court, as in
the present instance, should nevertheless not apply ‘inapposite
implements’ in response and in order to bring accountability to
those responsible for this tragic state of affairs (para [11]). The
Constitutional Court held that the order issued by the High Court
was incompetent on two grounds. In the first instance, instead of
determining liability, the court impermissibly authorised one of the
parties before it to exercise a judicial power by leaving it to the
MEC to decide whether he was personally liable (and if he was
not of such a view, to identify persons who were, giving reasons
for this view). Also, by its order the court in effect sought to join
parties not involved in the litigation (para [13]). The parties
referred to (the officials) were clearly at no stage properly joined
in the matter, and the mere fact that they deposed to affidavits in
support of the MEC did not in any way provide a legal basis upon
which the court could exercise its judicial authority over them.
Therefore, the approach of the High Court failed to accord not
only with section 165 of the Constitution, which declares that
judicial authority is vested in the courts (para [14]), but also with
the entrenched principle that no one should be a judge in his or
her own case. Secondly, the High Court also violated the four
officials’ right to a fair hearing guaranteed by section 34 of the
Constitution (paras [18] [19]): no rule nisi was issued calling upon
them to show cause why they should not be held liable, and this
failure denied them the opportunity to make representations.
JUDGE
It is settled law that not only actual bias, but also the appear-
ance of bias disqualifies a judicial officer from presiding (or
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continuing to preside) over judicial proceedings. Furthermore,
continuing to preside after a recusal should have occurred
renders the further proceedings a nullity (see, eg, Take and Save
Trading CC & others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2004 (4)
SA 1 (SCA) para [5]). Consequently, in Mulaudzi v Old Mutual Life
Assurance Company (South Africa) Ltd & others 2017 (6) SA 90
(SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that there was a
reasonable apprehension that the particular judge in question
‘did not bring an open and impartial mind to bear on the
adjudication of the matter’ (para [68]), for the following reasons:
the appellant’s attorney was the presiding judge’s longstanding
attorney; the judge was not a duty judge on the return day, yet
assigned himself to the matter; the judge discharged a restraint
order without reading reports by the National Director of Public
Prosecutions and Old Mutual opposing such discharge; the
judge’s reasons for his order only ran to some six pages in
respect of a matter that was ‘neither easy nor clear’; his findings
in support of discharge were untenable; and he misapplied the
relevant principles in denying leave to appeal (paras [49]-[67]).
As a consequence, the proceedings before that judge amounted
to a nullity and the matter was remitted to the High Court
(differently constituted) to be properly adjudicated.
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS
Rescission
Under Uniform Rule 42(1)(c), a judgment granted ‘as the result
of a mistake common to the parties’ may be rescinded. The
question for decision in Botha v Road Accident Fund 2017 (2) SA
50 (SCA) concerned a settlement which had been made an order
of court. In this matter, the appellant’s attorneys ascertained,
subsequent to the court order and the respondent’s payment in
terms of that order, that the amount claimed and paid in respect
of the appellant’s past hospital and medical expenses in fact only
represented a portion of the actual expenses incurred. The
mistake occurred as a result of source documents having been
placed in another client’s file, and they were consequently not
presented to the respondent when the settlement was negoti-
ated. When the appellant’s attorney informed the respondent of
this ‘mutual error’ and proposed a rescission of the court order
(which was to be replaced by an order reflecting the correct
amount), the respondent predictably refused to agree. The
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respondents argued that the appellant (or his attorney) had
misrepresented the facts on which the settlement had been
rendered (paras [3]–[7]). The court below dismissed the applica-
tion for rescission, and held that the mistake relied upon by the
appellant was a ‘retrospective mistake by means of fresh evi-
dence’ (para [7]).
After hearing the matter, the Supreme Court of Appeal correctly
dismissed the appeal (para [14]). In the first instance, when
seeking relief under Uniform Rule 42(1)(c), it must be shown that
the settlement agreement had been concluded as a result of a
mistake as to the correct facts common to both the appellant and
the respondent – this was not the case here, as the mistake in this
instance could be described as a ‘unilateral mistake’ made by the
appellant’s attorney who, through his misrepresentation, induced
the respondent to contract on the terms it did [para 9]. Under the
so-called ‘reliance theory’, if there is no actual concensus due to
a material mistake by one party, the contract remains valid if the
other party reasonably relied on the impression that there was
consensus [para 10]. In this regard, the court pointed out that it
had not been suggested that a reasonable man would not have
accepted the facts presented to the respondent’s attorneys, or
would have realised that there had been a real possibility of a
mistake in the amount requested to be paid (para [11]). Conse-
quently, this misrepresentation on the part of the appellant had
misled the respondent and resulted in the conclusion of the
settlement agreement (para [11]). Clearly the appellant could not
have relied on his own mistake to avoid the contract.
In Moraitis Investments (Pty) Ltd & others v Montic Dairy (Pty)
Ltd 2017 (5) SA 508 (SCA), the court also considered whether a
settlement agreement which had been made an order of court
could be set aside. The appellants contended that the settlement
agreement was invalid, because the fifth appellant had not been
authorised to conclude the agreement. The court restated certain
important principles pertaining to rescission. First, the starting
point for the enquiry is the court order (in this instance the order
obtained by consent). A court order, for so long as it stands,
cannot be disregarded, regardless of being a consent order –
such an order has the same standing and qualities as any other
court order and is res iudicata as between the parties in regard to
the matters it covers. Also, the Constitutional Court has repeat-
edly stated that a court order may not be ignored, because to do
so would be inconsistent with section 165(5) of the Constitution of
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the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), which
provides that an order issued by a court binds all people to whom
it applies (para [10]). Secondly, until the judgment has been set
aside, the compromise agreement cannot be attacked.
Consequently, the starting point in this matter was whether
there were any grounds upon which rescission might be sought
(para [16]). As the appellants had failed to prove that concluding
the agreement had not been authorised (paras [33]–[35]) and the
doctrine of unanimous assent applied, the agreement was held to
be lawful (paras [36]–[38]), as no grounds for rescission had
been established.
JURISDICTION
In Snyders & others v De Jager & others 2017 (3) SA 545 (CC),
the Constitutional Court considered whether, in a case where a
magistrate’s court had granted an eviction order under the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (the ESTA) which
was subsequently confirmed by the Land Claims Court (the LCC)
under section 19(3) of that Act, an appeal lay to the Supreme
Court of Appeal or to the Land Claims Court (LCC).
This question was previously considered by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in Snyders & others v De Jager & others 2016 (5) SA
218 (SCA), where it was held that where the LCC has confirmed
the eviction order of the magistrate’s court, there is only one
decision, namely that of the magistrate’s court. An appeal would
consequently lie to the LCC, and not to the Supreme Court of
Appeal. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal
had followed a line of decisions of the LCC to the same effect
(paras [45] [46]). However, the Constitutional Court disagreed
and held that there was no basis in law for such an approach
(para [47]) – when a judge of the LCC confirms a decision of a
magistrate’s court under section 19(3), it confirms that the
decision is correct and free from irregularities that could render it
susceptible to being set aside on review. Such a decision is in
fact a decision or order of the LCC (para [48]), and therefore a
decision of a court ‘of a status similar to that of the High Court’
under section 16(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act, 2013, with the
result that appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal (para [47]).
The court pointed out that this approach was also consistent with
section 37(2) of the Restitution of Lands Rights Act 22 of 1994, but
that the Supreme Court of Appeal had not considered this section
(para [40]). Consequently, an appeal against a section 19(3)
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confirmation of an eviction order issued by a magistrate under the
ESTA was an appeal against an order of the LCC, and not against
an order of a magistrate’s court, and the appeal lay to the Supreme
Court of Appeal, and not to the LCC (paras [47]–[50]).
The administrator in respect of a debtor under administration is
tasked with the fair distribution of monthly payments among
creditors, and to this end, has a duty to prepare an emoluments
attachment order against a debtor and his or her employer to
ensure payment under the administration order. In the event of a
debtor defaulting, the administrator may, in terms of section 74I of
the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, obtain an emoluments
attachment order from the clerk of the court. Consequently, in
Smith NO v Clerk, Pietermaritzburg Magistrate’s Court 2017 (5)
SA 289 (KZP), the Pietermaritzburg magistrate’s court granted an
administration order against the debtor who resided in the district
of the court, and also authorised an emoluments attachment
order. However, the debtor’s employer’s head office and paymas-
ter’s office were situated in Durban, and therefore, when the
appellant (the administrator) at a later date requested the respon-
dent to issue the attachment order, the respondent refused to do
so on the ground that section 65J(1)(a) provided that the order
had to be authorised by the clerk of the court which had
jurisdiction over the employer (paras [9] [10]).
On appeal the court held that since the provisions of section
65J were very clear, the court below correctly held that only the
court of the district in which the employer ‘resides, carries on
business or is employed’ had jurisdiction to issue such an
attachment order (para [22]). The emoluments attachment order
had, therefore, been correctly refused as it was the Durban
magistrate’s court that was vested with jurisdiction. Despite the
clear wording of section 65J(1)(a), the administrator had con-
tended that only specified subsections applied in administra-
tions, that he was not required to enforce the emoluments
attachment order, but that the employer was obliged in terms of
section 74I to pay emoluments over to him. However, the court
rejected this contention and held that subsections did not oper-
ate in isolation or exclusively from the rest of the section – all the
provisions of section 65J applied in the present case, and legal
force is only given to emoluments attachment orders that have
already been authorised, issued, and/or served and suspended
on certain conditions (paras [38]–[40]).
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PRACTICE
Contempt of court
In Kenton-on Sea Ratepayers Association & others v Ndlambe
Local Municipality & others 2017 (2) SA 86 (ECG), the court
considered, among other things, what constituted contempt of
court. The court explained that, in accordance with the locus
classicus, Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) para [48], disobedience of a court order constituted
contempt if committed deliberately and in bad faith (para [52]).
Therefore, a deliberate disregard would be insufficient, because
the non-complier might ‘genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believe him-
or herself entitled to act in the way claimed to constitute the
contempt’. The court in Fakie further held that once the applicant
had proved the order, service, or notice, as well as non-
compliance, an evidential burden in relation to wilfulness and
mala fides was borne by the respondent, and failure to advance
evidence established contempt beyond reasonable doubt (para
[53]). Consequently, in the present matter, the order, service,
notice and non-compliance with the court order had been proved
by the applicants, and, therefore, the only remaining question
for consideration was whether the respondents had advanced
evidence that established a reasonable doubt as to whether
non-compliance had been wilful and mala fide. The court held
that there was more than sufficient evidence on the affidavits to
establish that the local municipality and the municipal manager’s
failure to comply with the interdict regarding the closure of a
dumping site and the commissioning of a new site were beyond
a reasonable doubt wilful and mala fide (paras [62] [67]).
In Readam SA (Pty) Ltd v BSB International Link CC & others
2017 (5) SA 184 (GJ), an application to commit the first and
second respondent for contempt of court was brought, because
they had failed to comply with an order of the Supreme Court of
Appeal to demolish an unlawfully erected building.
The form of contempt in evidence in this matter may usefully be
labelled ‘defiance of a court order’, to which the leading authority,
Fakie NO (above), applies. As stated above, Fakie requires that a
wilful and mala fide defiance be established beyond a reason-
able doubt. Should a respondent fail to advance evidence that
establishes such reasonable doubt, contempt will have been
established beyond reasonable doubt. In this particular matter,
the respondents did no such thing, but, as Sutherland J (para
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[10]) remarked, frankly confessed ‘to taking no steps towards
compliance’. Moreover, the respondents confessed ‘to doing so
deliberately’, leading inescapably to the conclusion that the
respondents were indeed in contempt (para [17]). Instead of
taking steps to comply with the order of the Supreme Court
of Appeal, the respondents devised a strategy which was
expected to render that order moot, and to legitimise their
unlawful enterprise (para [13]). To this end, the respondents
acquired a stand adjacent to the one on which the unlawfully
erected building stood, consolidated the stands, and then applied
to the City of Johannesburg for the rezoning of the consolidated
stand to allow for a greater building height, greater floor area
coverage, and more parking facilities (paras [4] [12]–[15]).
Unsurprisingly, the court rejected the respondents’ argument
that this course of events had the effect of ‘regularising’ their
unlawful conduct, and held that the strategy pursued was ‘incon-
sistent with any fair meaning to be attributed to the SCA order’ –
properly interpreted, a demolition of the unlawful building was not
optional, but had to have occurred, and therefore, it was not open
to the respondents to take steps that excluded a demolition (para
[18]). Moreover, as a matter of principle, accepting the respon-
dents’ evasive conduct would have been inappropriate and
would have militated against the doctrine of legality (paras [19]
[22] [23] [29]). Consequently, the court held that the respondents
were clearly in contempt (para [43]) and committed the second
respondent to incarceration for a period of 30 days, conditionally
suspended (para [54]).
Trial
The general principle laid down in Uniform Rule 38(2) is that
unless special circumstances exist, a witness must give evidence
viva voce and in open court. In Uramin (Incorporated in British
Columbia) t/a Areva Resources Southern Africa v Perie 2017 (1)
SA 236 (GJ), the question for decision was whether an applica-
tion to lead evidence of witnesses based abroad using a video
link should be granted.
The court indicated that the test to be applied by the court in
exercising its discretion to vary the above general principle was
whether or not it was ‘convenient or necessary for the purposes of
justice’ to do so (para [25]). In this matter the defendant, an
ex-employee of the applicant, sued the applicant for payment of
a sum of money on an alleged oral agreement. Both the appli-
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cant’s employee who allegedly concluded the agreement, and
the employee who had executed a settlement agreement relating
to the claim, were no longer in its employ, and neither lived or
worked in South Africa.
These facts clearly established special circumstances and
persuaded the court to hold that there was sufficient reason to
allow the witnesses to testify by video link (para [30]). The court’s
general support for the use of technology in court proceedings is
certainly to be welcomed, as it can play a significant role in
broadening access to justice and improving judicial economy.
PRETRIAL JUDGMENTS
Summary judgment
In ABSABank Ltd v Expectra 423 (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (1) SA
81 (WCC), the defendants, in their capacity as sureties and
co-principal debtors, opposed an application for summary judg-
ment. Shortly before the hearing date, they filed a notice in terms
of Uniform Rule 35(12), requiring the plaintiff to produce certain
documents. In addition, they filed what they termed a ‘provisional
affidavit’; applied for leave to file a ‘supplementary answering
affidavit’ coupled with a request for an extension of the date set
by Uniform Rule 32(3)(b) for the filing thereof to a date after the
production of the said documents; and also applied for the
postponement of the summary judgment application sine die.
In support of their taking this rather unusual approach, the
defendants relied on a dictum in Business Partners Ltd v Trustees,
Riaan Botes Family Trusts & another 2013 (5) SA 514 (WCC)
paragraph [11], that it was ‘of course open to the defendants to
invoke Rule 35(12) and (14)’. (Paradoxically, both parties relied on
this judgment in argument before court (para [10]).) This matter,
therefore, raised the question of whether the discovery procedures
provided for in Uniform Rule 35(12) and (14) applied to summary
judgment applications.
In considering whether Uniform Rule 35(12) and (14) could
defer an application for summary judgment, Bozalek J analysed
the Business Partners judgment. He pointed out that after the
court in Business Partners had set out at length the procedure
involved in an application for summary judgment and its ratio-
nale, as well as the interplay between Uniform Rule 32 (governing
summary judgment) and Uniform Rule 35 (governing discovery
and inspection of documents), it came to the conclusion that it
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could never have been the intention of the drafters of the rules to
allow a defendant to invoke Uniform Rule 35(12) or (14) in order to
delay summary judgment proceedings (paras [11] [12]). As far as
the above dictum is concerned, the court opined that it therefore
had to be seen in the context of the immediately subsequent
remarks of the court (para [13]), and that it meant, at most, that a
defendant might, ‘for what it is worth’, issue a notice in terms of
the said rules, but that this ‘cannot defer an application for
summary judgment’ on the basis that no reply had been forth-
coming. Failure to produce any document so sought would at best
put a defendant in the position to aver in its opposing affidavit that,
in its evaluation of the nature and grounds of its defence and the
material facts upon which it was based, the court had to take into
account that the defendant had not been able to gain access to
such documentation, and no more (para [14]).
The court further held that should it be incorrect in its interpre-
tation of the dictum, and Uniform Rule 35(12) and (14) could
indeed be used to defer an application for summary judgment,
then it was in disagreement with such a view, and that such a
view would be ‘incompatible with the purpose and nature of
summary judgment proceedings’ (para [15]). The court conse-
quently dismissed all the applications by the defendants as they
were without merit (para [16]).
Because the defendants had assumed that Uniform Rule
35(12) was applicable to the summary judgment proceedings,
they argued that since the plaintiff had failed to respond to
the notice in terms of this rule, and in the absence of leave of the
court having been sought, the plaintiff was disqualified from
using the relevant documents, and that the deponent in respect
of the supporting affidavit was consequently precluded from
relying thereon in order to acquaint himself with the facts not in
his personal knowledge for purposes of the affidavit. The court
made short shrift of this argument by pointing out that it was
without merit, as it rested squarely on an incorrect assumption
regarding the applicability of Uniform Rule 35(12) to summary
judgment proceedings (paras [17] [18]). The court also correctly
reiterated the general position regarding the requirement of
personal knowledge of the facts in a matter for purposes of the
supporting affidavit as set out in Maharaj v Barclays National
Bank Ltd 1976(1) SA 418 (A) and Rees & another v Investec Bank
Ltd 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA), namely that personal knowledge of
every fact which goes to make up the applicant’s cause of action
102 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 24 SESS: 21 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/04−Civil
was not required. Indeed, it should not be required of the
deponent, because to do so would not be consistent with the
principles espoused in Maharaj. The application for summary
judgment was upheld (para [49]).
Provisional sentence summons
In Wile & another v MEC, Department of Public Works, Gauteng
& others 2017 (1) SA 125 (WCC), the plaintiffs used provisional
sentence proceedings initially to seek an order directing the
Department to give effect to a foreign judgment. This was later
amended to an order directing the Department to give effect to
the judgment only to the extent of changing the plaintiff’s name
and surname in its records.
It is trite that the provisional sentence procedure provides a
creditor with a speedy remedy for the recovery of money based
on a liquid document. Consequently, the court had little trouble in
holding that the plaintiffs’ use of this procedure was clearly
inappropriate in the circumstances of the case (paras [7] [27]).
However, the defendants did not escape censure in the matter,
and their conduct was criticised by the court. The court held in
particular that it had been inappropriate for them to have engaged
with the plaintiffs on the merits, and also not to have raised any
objections or taken any steps beyond contending in their heads
of argument that the action failed to meet the requirements for
provisional sentence. As a foreign judgment clearly did not
constitute a liquid document, the defendants should at least have
used Uniform Rule 30 and applied to court to have the summons
set aside as an irregular step.
In considering whether to dismiss the claim on the basis of an
inappropriate procedure having been followed, the court adopted
a pragmatic approach and took into consideration that all the
issues between the parties had been fully ventilated in the existing
papers. It held that to dismiss the claim would, in the circum-
stances of the case, ‘elevate form over substance and would ill
serve the interests of justice’ (para [28]). Consequently, in the
interests of justice and of the parties, the court ruled that the
present proceedings should simply be treated as application
proceedings (para [30]), thus obviating the need for the plaintiffs to
start proceedings afresh (para [28]).
(See the chapter Conflict of Laws for a more comprehensive
analysis of this matter.)
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REVIEW
Applicability
It is trite that Uniform Rule 53 provides for the review of a
‘decision or proceedings of any inferior court and of any tribunal,
board or officer performing judicial, quasi-judicial or administra-
tive functions’. A magistrate, presiding officer, chairperson, or
officer (as the case may be) may be required either to file the
reasons and record sought to be reviewed with the registrar or to
furnish it to the applicant. Consequently, in Democratic Alliance v
President of the Republic of South Africa 2017 (4) SA 253 (GP),
the interesting question for decision was whether this rule also
applies to executive decisions of the President. This question
stemmed from the former President’s shock decisions to dismiss
and replace a minister and a deputy minister. The application,
which was brought on an urgent basis, in essence amounted to
an application for the review of these decisions.
In response to this application, the President merely filed a
notice of intention to oppose, but did not respond to the main
application, or file or furnish the record relating to the making of
the decisions or the reasons for those decisions (paras [7]-[10]).
Despite the respondent having been granted a limited extension
to file the record and reasons (para [11]), the failure to comply
continued, and resulted in the present urgent application to
compel the President to furnish the applicant with the record and
reasons.
In the answering affidavit filed on behalf of the President, the
urgency of the main and current interlocutory applications was
disputed. Importantly, it was contended that Uniform Rule 53 was
not applicable, because the decisions sought to be reviewed
constituted executive decisions taken in terms of section 91 of the
Constitution (para [16]), and also because the rule did not
include a reference to ‘executive decision’ within its ambit (para
[21]).
In considering the power vested in the President to take
decisions under section 91 and section 83(b) and (c) of the
Constitution, which compel the President to ‘uphold, defend and
respect the Constitution as the supreme law’ and to promote the
‘unity of the nation and that which will advance the Republic’,
these provisions respectively act as a starting point. The court
pointed out that this section had to be read with section 91 in this
regard. Having done so, the court concluded that while the
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executive power to appoint and dismiss ministers and deputy
ministers was wide-ranging, it was not unfettered – the executive
power was circumscribed by ‘the bounds of rationality’ as well as
by section 83(b) and (c) (para [18]). Consequently, irrational or
arbitrary executive decisions may be set aside as unlawful and
contrary to the doctrine of legality (para [19]).
As far as the applicability of Uniform Rule 53 was concerned,
the court first placed the rule in its proper context, and pointed
out that it had been promulgated at a time when executive
decisions were not subject to review, but that this is no longer the
case (as in fact acknowledged by the President) (para [21]).
Furthermore, this rule had not only served applicants well over
the years, but also the courts, as a court ‘cannot perform its
constitutionally entrenched review function’ without the record
(paras [22]-[25], quoting Navsa JA in Democratic Alliance &
others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & others
2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA)). Therefore, its applicability had to be
subjected to a ‘purposive interpretation’, and, relying on such
interpretation, the court held that there was no logical reason not
to utilise it mutatis mutandis in respect of executive decisions
such as in the present matter. Uniform Rule 53 consequently
applied (paras [29]-[31]), and it followed that the applicant in the
main application was entitled to call for the furnishing of the
reasons for the decisions, as well as of the record that formed the
basis upon which the decisions had been taken (paras [3] [37]).
Record of proceedings
In Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission &
others 2017 (1) SA 367 (SCA), the core issue on appeal was
whether the deliberations held in a closed session by the Judicial
Service Commission (JSC) in connection with the appointment of
judges formed part of the record of its proceedings for purpose of
Uniform Rule 53(1)(b) and had to be made available. The court
below dismissed the applicant’s application for an order directing
the JSC to deliver the full record of the proceedings sought to be
reviewed, including the audio recording and any transcript of the
JSC’s private deliberations after the interview of judicial candi-
dates on a particular date.
Although the JSC delivered a record of its proceedings, which
consisted of (a) the reasons for the JSC’s decision which
included its considerations in respect of each candidate; (b) the
transcripts of the interview with each of the candidates; (c) each
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candidate’s application for appointment; (d) comments on the
candidates from various professional bodies and interested
individuals; and (e) related research, submissions, and correspon-
dence (para [3]), the applicant was of the opinion that the JSC
had furnished an incomplete record by failing to furnish the
recording, and consequently contended that the JSC was in
breach of Uniform Rule 53(1)(b) (para [4]). These contentions did
not change on appeal, and the applicant then contended that the
deliberations (captured on the recording) constituted the ‘very
basis from which that reasoning was drafted and were therefore
indispensable to the exercise of review rights and clearly rel-
evant’ (para [8]). The applicant also challenged the comparison
of the deliberations to private judicial deliberations by the court
below, and argued that the JSC did not perform judicial functions
in this instance.
Before reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal
considered the primary purpose of the uniform rule and its
constitutional link (s 34 of the Constitution relating to access to
court (para [13])), and pointed out that it was only those portions
of a record relevant to the decision in issue that should be made
available (para [18]). It therefore followed that an applicant did
not have an unqualified right of access to the record, and that the
key enquiry was the relevance of the portion to the decision
sought to be reviewed.
Furthermore, in considering the effect of a decision-maker’s
deliberations, the court considered the well-known dictum by
Marais J in Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Transvaal
& others 1970 (2) SA 89 (T) (91G-92A), in which that court likened
a record of proceedings to the record of court proceedings which
‘quite clearly does not include a record of the deliberations
subsequent to the receiving of the evidence and preceding the
announcement of the court’s decision’. However, the court pointed
out that it was clear from recent constitutional jurisprudence that
this dictum had to be qualified insofar as it excluded ‘all and any
deliberations’ of a decision-maker from the ambit of Uniform Rule
53, since a disclosure thereof may be warranted in ‘appropriate
circumstances’ (para [15]). This means that while a decision-
maker’s deliberations do not automatically form part of the record
of proceedings envisaged by this rule, the decision-maker may in
certain circumstances be required to produce a record of
proceedings which would include its deliberations.
Finally, turning to the deliberations of the JSC in the present
matter, the court pointed out that the confidentiality of the JSC’s
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processes was recognised in legislation: first, in sections 38(1)
and 35 of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 (which
relate to the non-disclosure of confidential information or docu-
ments, and require deliberation in private); and secondly, section
12(d) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000,
which exempts the JSC’s processes relating to judicial appoint-
ments from its operation (paras [22]–[24]). The court ultimately
concluded that the JSC was set apart from other administrative
bodies by its unique features, which provide sufficient safe-
guards against arbitrary and irrational decisions (para [39]). In
the present instance, the court held that confidentiality consider-
ations warranted non-disclosure of the said deliberations, and the
relief sought by the applicants would undermine the JSC’s
‘constitutional and legislative imperatives by, inter alia, stifling the
rigour and candour of the deliberations, deterring potential
applicants, harming the dignity and privacy of candidates who
applied with the expectation of confidentiality of the deliberations
and generally hamper effective judicial selection’ (para [39]). The
court held that in order to determine whether disclosure was
warranted in a particular matter, what had to be weighed was,
inter alia, the nature and relevance of the information sought; the
extent of the disclosure; the circumstances under which the
disclosure was sought; and the potential impact upon anyone if
disclosure were to be ordered or refused (as the case may be) in
a manner that would enable the JSC to conduct a judicial
selection process that did not violate its positive obligations of
accountability and transparency (para [21]).
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
COSTS
In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister in the Presidency 2017
(1) SA 645 (CC), the costs order granted by the High Court
against LHR as the unsuccessful litigant claiming to enforce the
Constitution was at issue.
Although in Ferreira v Levin NO & others; Vryenhoek v Powell
NO & others 1996 (2) SA 621 (CC), the Constitutional Court
endorsed the long-standing principles that costs orders are in the
discretion of the court, and that, in general, the unsuccessful
party bears the costs, it was, however, held in Biowatch Trust v
Registrar, Genetic Resources & others 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) para
[24] that the general rule was not to award costs against
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unsuccessful litigants when litigating against state parties and
the matter was of genuine constitutional import. This rule applies
both to a costs order on the merits in constitutional cases, and to
ancillary issues and points.
In the present matter, the court confirmed these principles, and
pointed out that the Biowatch rule did not mean risk-free constitu-
tional litigation, but that the court, in its discretion, might order
costs if the constitutional grounds of attack were ‘frivolous or
vexatious, or if the applicant acted from improper motives or if
circumstances made it in the interests of justice to do so’ (para
[18]). Therefore, after a ‘close and careful examination’ of all the
circumstances of the case (para [21]), the court held that it could
not fault the High Court’s exercise of its discretion to award costs
against LHR (para [26]), and that the High Court had made an
order it deemed appropriate to protect its process (para [23]).
(The High Court considered the extreme delay in bringing the
proceedings only six weeks after search-and-arrest operations
had taken place in Johannesburg, and of only then placing the
matter on the urgent roll, inappropriate and uncalled for (para
[23]).) Leave to appeal against the adverse costs order was
consequently dismissed.
RESCISSION
Two justices of the Constitutional Court brought an application
for the rescission of an order in terms of which they were refused
leave to appeal against a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Nkabinde & another v Judicial Service Commission &
others 2017 (3) SA 119 (CC). The applicants brought this applica-
tion under Uniform Rule 42(1)(a), arguing that the order had been
‘erroneously . . . granted in [their] absence’ (para [14]). The
applicants contended that the practice of the Constitutional Court
to deal with applications for leave to appeal at a conference or a
meeting of the justices (thus not in open court) (para [4])
deprived them of an opportunity to make presentations, and that
while some of the court members were disqualified, they had
nevertheless taken part in the decision to dismiss their applica-
tion (para [15]).
The Constitutional Court held that Uniform Rule 42(1)(a) did not
apply when this court considered and decided applications for
leave to appeal at a judges’ conference – the requirement in this
particular rule was based on the assumption that a litigant was
entitled to be present in court when its matter was heard, but that
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it happened in its absence. However, no litigant (which included
the applicants) had a right to be present at a conference of the
judges (para [20]). Furthermore, the contention that the order had
been erroneously granted was also rejected, because Rule 19(6)
of the Constitutional Court Rules made it clear that when the court
dealt with applications for leave to appeal, it could do so
summarily and without oral argument or additional written submis-
sions (para [21]). Not only were the applicants, as justices of the
Constitutional Court, familiar with the conference procedure
(paras [4] [5]), they were also aware of the disqualification of their
colleagues and familiar with the principle established in Judge
President Hlope v Premier, Western Cape; Judge President
Hlope v Freedom Under Law & others 2013 (6) SA 13 (CC), which
compelled the court to refuse leave to appeal should the court be
rendered inquorate. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
109CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 1 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/05−Conflict
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ELSABE SCHOEMAN*
LEGISLATION
International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017
After many years in the making (starting in 1994), the Interna-
tional Arbitration Act 15 of 2017 (the IAA, 2017) was assented to
on 19 December 2017 and commenced on 20 December 2017.
This Act brings about significant changes to the arbitration
landscape in South Africa. It incorporates the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration (the UNCITRAL Model Law) into
South African law, gives full effect to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958)
(the New York Convention), and amends the Protection of Busi-
nesses Act 99 of 1978 (the PBA, 1978). From a private interna-
tional law perspective, the IAA, 2017, impacts on a number of
aspects relating to cross-border commercial dispute resolution.
Section 4(1) of Chapter 1 (General Provisions) of the IAA, 2017,
provides that the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 (the AA, 1965) no
longer applies to international arbitration. This means that the
AA, 1965, which previously applied to both domestic and inter-
national arbitration, now applies only to domestic arbitration.
Strangely, while the AA, 1965, no longer applies to international
arbitration, section 4(2) of the IAA, 2017, provides that section 2
of theAA, 1965, will continue to apply for the purposes of Chapter
3 of the IAA, 2017, which deals with the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements and foreign arbitral awards.
Section 2 of the AA, 1965, excludes matrimonial and related
causes, and matters relating to status, from arbitration. It is odd
that the IAA, 2017, refers to theAA, 1965, which no longer applies
to international arbitration, with the sole purpose of excluding
specific subject matter from international arbitration. A simpler
course would have been specifically to exclude the subject
matter identified in section 2 of the AA, 1965, from the IAA, 2017,
without having to refer to the AA, 1965.
* BLC LLB (Pret) LLD (Unisa). Professor of Law, Department of Private Law, the
University of Pretoria.
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The IAA, 2017, incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law into
South African law. In terms of section 7(1)(a) of Chapter 2
(International Commercial Arbitration) of the IAA, 2017, any
international commercial dispute submitted to arbitration under
an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration,
unless the subject matter of the dispute cannot be determined by
arbitration under South African law. In addition, any arbitration
agreement that is contrary to the public policy of South Africa
(s 7(1)(b) of the IAA, 2017) will have no effect. Section 7 of the
IAA, 2017, gives effect to party autonomy (allowing parties to
determine the method of dispute resolution by agreement) while
endorsing the private international law exclusionary doctrine of
public policy that operates as a check on party autonomy.
Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for certain
rules to apply in respect of the substance of a dispute submitted
to arbitration. For private international law purposes, the provi-
sions of article 28(1) and (2) are important.
Article 28(1) endorses party autonomy by allowing the parties
to choose the law that will govern their dispute. Presumably, this
also allows for a tacit or implied choice of law. In terms of article
28(3), parties may expressly authorise the arbitral tribunal to
decide the dispute ex aequo et bono or as ‘amiable compositeur’.
Where the parties have chosen the legal system of a particular
country, renvoi is excluded. This means that reference will be
made only to the internal law of the designated country, excluding
its private international law rules.
Article 28(2) deals with the situation where the parties have
failed to choose the law applicable to their dispute. In such a
situation the tribunal ‘shall apply the law determined by the
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable’. This article
does not lend itself to easy interpretation. It is not clear how the
tribunal will identify the conflict of law rules that will determine
the applicable law. As the arbitral tribunal is not an extension of a
South African court, South African conflict rules are not automati-
cally applicable. (For a recent exposition of approaches to this
issue, see Soterios Loizou ‘Revisiting the ‘‘content-of-laws’’ enquiry
in international arbitration‘ (2018) 78/3 Louisiana Law Review
811.) In this regard, see https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/full-text/?cid=135).
The IAA, 2017, repeals the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 40 of 1977 (the REFAAA, 1977) which
originally implemented the New York Convention in South Africa.
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The REFAAA, 1977, did not incorporate the full text of the New
York Convention. This resulted in inadequate effect being given to
the Convention. In contrast, the IAA, 2017, now incorporates the
entire New York Convention into South African law via Schedule 3
to the IAA, 2017. The IAA, 2017, therefore, gives full effect to
South Africa’s obligations under the New York Convention. Sec-
tion 16(1) of Chapter 3 (Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitra-
tion Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) of the IAA, 2017,
requires, subject to section 18, that an arbitration agreement and
a foreign arbitral award be recognised and enforced in South
Africa (see the discussion below). Moreover, section 16(4) of the
IAA, 2017, makes article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which
provides for a stay of proceedings and referral to arbitration in
situations where a dispute is the subject of an arbitration agree-
ment, applicable to arbitration agreements referred to in section
16(1).
There are a number of provisions across the IAA, 2017,
the UNCITRAL Model Law (Schedule 1 to the IAA, 2017), and the
New York Convention (Schedule 2 to the IAA, 2017), that contain
similar grounds for the refusal of recognition and/or enforcement
of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, as well as for
recourse to a court of law in order to have an arbitral award set
aside. In this contribution the focus is on those grounds that relate
to private international law matters. For ease of comparison, the
relevant provisions are set out in Tables 1 and 2 below. Table 1
sets out the provisions related to, and contained in, the New York
Convention, while Table 2 sets out the provisions contained in the
UNCITRAL Model Law.
Table 1
CHAPTER 3 (RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREE-
MENTS AND FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS)
of IAA 2017, section 18: Grounds for the
refusal of recognition or enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award:
NEW YORK CONVENTION (Schedule 2 to the
IAA 2017), article V: Grounds for refusal of
recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award:
• Where a party to the arbitration agreement
did not have contractual capacity under the
law applicable to that party (s 18(1)(b)(i));
or
• Where the parties to the arbitration agree-
ment were under some incapacity under
the law applicable to them (art V(1)(a)); or
112 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 4 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/05−Conflict
• Where the arbitration agreement is invalid
under the chosen governing law or, in the
absence of a choice by the parties, under
the law of the country where the award
was made (s 18(1)(b)(ii)); or
• Where the arbitration agreement is invalid
under the chosen governing law or, in the
absence of a choice by the parties, under
the law of the country where the award
was made (art V(1)(a)); or
• Where recognition or enforcement of the
award is contrary to the public policy of
South Africa (s 18(1)(a)(ii)).
• Where recognition or enforcement of the
award is contrary to the public policy of the
country where recognition and enforcement
is sought (ie South Africa) (art V(2)(b)).
No clarification regarding public policy No clarification regarding public policy
Table 2
CHAPTER VIII (RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law (Schedule 1 to the IAA
2017), article 36: Grounds for refusal of recog-
nition or enforcement of an international arbitral
award:
CHAPTER VII (RECOURSE AGAINST
AWARD) of the UNCITRAL Model Law
(Schedule 1 to the IAA 2017), article 34:
Grounds for an application for setting aside as
an exclusive recourse against an arbitral
award:
• Where a party to the arbitration agreement
was under some incapacity (art 36(1)(a)(i));
or
• Where a party to the arbitration agreement
was under some incapacity (art 34(2)(a)(i));
or
• Where the arbitration agreement is invalid
under the chosen governing law or, in the
absence of a choice by the parties, under
the law of the country where the award
was made (art 36(1)(a)(i)); or
• Where the arbitration agreement is invalid
under the chosen governing law or, in the
absence of choice, South African law (art
34(2)(a)(i)); or
• Where recognition or enforcement of the
award is against the public policy of South
Africa (art 36(1)(b)(ii)).
• Where the award is against the public
policy of South Africa (art 34(2)(b)(ii)).
Article 36(3), while not limiting the generality of
art 36(1)(b)(ii), determines that an award will
be regarded as contrary to South African public
policy if:
• The arbitral tribunal breached its duty to
act fairly and this has caused or will cause
substantial injustice to the party resisting
recognition or enforcement (art 36(3)(a); or
• There was fraud or corruption involved (art
36(3)(b)).
Article 34(5), while not limiting the generality of
art 34(2)(b)(ii), determines that an award will
be regarded as contrary to South African public
policy if:
• The arbitral tribunal breached its duty to
act fairly and this has caused or will cause
substantial injustice to the applicant (art
34(5)(a); or
• There was fraud or corruption involved (art
34(5)(b)).
It is important to note, so far as the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards are concerned, that the correct termi-
nology is ‘recognition and/or enforcement’ as it is possible for an
award to be recognised but not enforced. However, recognition is
always a prerequisite for enforcement.
It is clear from Table 1 above, which deals with the New York
Convention, that section 18 of the IAA, 2017, differs from article V
of the New York Convention in at least one respect as far as
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“contractual capacity is concerned: whereas article V(1)(a) of
the New York Convention refers to ‘the parties’ to the arbitration
agreement being under some incapacity, section 18(1)(b)(i) of
the IAA, 2017, refers to ‘a party’. Section 18(1)(b)(i) is to be
preferred in this regard as the contractual incapacity of only one
party should suffice in order to prevent the recognition and/or
enforcement of the award.
When comparing the provisions dealing with lack of contrac-
tual capacity in Tables 1 and 2, it appears that the New York
Convention (and the corresponding s 18 of the IAA, 2017)
subjects contractual capacity to the ‘law applicable’ to the ‘party/
parties’, while the UNCITRAL Model Law is silent on the issue.
Two points should be made in this regard. First, it is not clear what
the ‘law applicable’ to a party is in order to determine contractual
capacity. It is not clear whether the ‘law applicable’ to a party is a
party’s personal law (lex domicilii or, perhaps, the law of his/her
habitual residence, as habitual residence is used as a connect-
ing factor elsewhere (art 1(4)(b) of the UNCITRALModel Law)), or
the lex loci contractus. Secondly, it must be assumed that the
same legal system will apply to the same issue in respect of the
UNCITRAL Model Law.
Table 2 above shows that the grounds for refusal of recognition
and/or enforcement of, and for setting aside an arbitral award are
mutatis mutandis the same. Interestingly, both article 34 and
article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provide some clarification
as to what would be regarded as against the public policy of
South Africa. Even though article 36(3) and article 34(5) do not
provide an exclusive definition of the public policy exclusion, the
definition set out in these articles will certainly assist in determin-
ing public policy issues. The question arising is whether the
meaning of public policy in articles 36(3) and 34(5) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, albeit not exclusive or definitive, will also
be used for purposes of the New York Convention.
Finally, it must be pointed out that there are currently three sets
of provisions regarding the recognition and/or enforcement of
arbitral awards: section 18 of the IAA 2017; article V of the New
York Convention; and article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Although these provisions largely correspond to one another,
there are minor differences (as pointed out above). As these
provisions are intended to promote recognition and/or enforce-
ment of a wide range of arbitral awards (both international and
foreign), consistency in interpretation will be key to the success of
the IAA, 2017.
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The IAA, 2017, also amends the PBA, 1978, by deleting the
expression ‘arbitration award/awards’ from its long title as well as
from sections 1, 1D, and 1G of the PBA, 1978 (s 21 as read with
Shed 4 to the IAA, 2017). Previously, ministerial permission was
required for the enforcement of certain foreign arbitral awards
(as well as judgments, orders, etc) relating to ‘mining, production,
importation, exportation, refinement, possession, use or sale of or
ownership to any matter or material, of whatever nature, whether
within, outside, into or from the Republic’ (ss 1(1)(a) and 1(3) of
the PBA, 1978). Furthermore, section 1D of the PBA, 1978,
provided that, despite the requisite Ministerial consent having
been obtained in regard to these matters, no foreign arbitral
award (or judgment, order, etc),
connected with any liability which arises from any bodily injury of any
person resulting directly or indirectly from the consumption or use of
or exposure to any natural resource of the Republic, whether unproc-
essed or partially processed or wholly processed, or any product
containing or processed from any such natural resource, unless the
same liability would have arisen under the law of the Republic, as it
existed at the time of the occurrence of the event which gave rise to
the liability, would be recognised and/or enforced in the Republic.
(Section 1G provided for the application of s 1D to arbitral awards
issued before or after the commencement of the PBA, 1978.)
Although the PBA, 1978, has been interpreted restrictively by
the courts (Christopher Forsyth Private International Law 5 ed
(2012) 466-68), its provisions severely curtailed the effectiveness
of the New York Convention by allowing for executive interference
in respect of the matters referred to above instead of leaving
them to judicial determination by the courts. The IAA, 2017,
excludes international arbitral awards from the scope of the PBA,
1978. Consequently, ministerial consent is no longer required for
the recognition and/or enforcement of arbitral awards.
CASE LAW
Jurisdiction: Interdict in divorce matter
In V v V (5881/17) [2017] ZAGPPHC 324 (6 July 2017), a
husband (pilot) and wife, both born in South Africa, had been
living in Dubai, UnitedArab Emirates, for eight or nine years. They
never acquired permanent residence in Dubai and their resi-
dence was dependent on the husband’s working visa which
allowed him to remain in Dubai until the end of his contract of
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employment in 2021 (when he would be 60 years of age). After
that he would have to leave Dubai.
On 27 January 2017 the wife instituted divorce proceedings
against the husband in the Gauteng Division of the High Court of
South Africa. The husband commenced a divorce action against
the wife in a Dubai court on 27 February 2017. The divorce action
in the Dubai court was set down for 16 March 2017 ‘or any other
date’ (para [1]). However, on 15 March 2017 the wife brought an
urgent application in the South African court for an interdict to
prevent the husband from proceeding with his divorce action in
Dubai. According to the wife, the application of Sharia divorce
law in Dubai would be ‘highly prejudicial to her as a woman’ (para
[9]).
Under South African law (s 2(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979),
[a] court shall have jurisdiction in a divorce action if the parties are or
either of the parties is–
(a) domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the date on
which the action is instituted; or
(b) ordinarily resident in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the
said date and have or has been ordinarily resident in the Republic
for a period of not less than one year immediately prior to that
date.
As neither party had been ordinarily resident in any part of
South Africa for the year preceding the institution of proceedings,
the wife relied on domicile as the jurisdictional connecting factor.
In order to prove that the South African court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the matter, the husband had to prove that the
wife was not domiciled in South Africa. He was unable to do this.
The court held that there was no evidence that the wife had
established a domicile of choice in Dubai and, as a result, she
retained her original South African domicile. This meant that
the Gauteng Division of the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the
matter. Presumably, this was the area in South Africa in which
the wife (and her husband) resided before they left for Dubai,
although the address provided in the particulars of claim was that
of her brother. No issue can be taken with Mabuse J’s decision
that the wife was indeed domiciled in South Africa (and, more
specifically, in the area of the Gauteng Division of the High Court).
There was simply insufficient evidence to establish a change of
domicile in favour of Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
However, the case of V v V touches on a number of aspects
relating to an individual’s domicile. It is considered essential to
address these aspects for purposes of clarification.
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First, the wife had indicated in the combined summons (para
[5]) that although both parties were temporarily resident in Dubai,
each party had a ‘chosen domicile’ in South Africa. The wife had
also indicated in the combined summons that she regarded Pretoria
as her place of domicile. It should be clarified here that an individual
cannot decide where he or she is domiciled; it is the law (applied by
a court) that determines where an individual is domiciled. State-
ments by an individual regarding his/her domicile are of no effect
whatsoever. This point was confirmed by Mabuse J, albeit indirectly,
when referring to the principle that nobody can be without a
domicile (para [13]) Mabuse J cited, in this regard, Smith v Smith
1970 (1) SA 146 (R) 147G, where it was stated that
[i]t has been frequently laid down that no person can be without a
domicile because the law will attribute a domicile to him.
Secondly, no reference was made to the definition of a domicile
of choice as set out in section 1(2) of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992
(the Domicile Act) which provides that
[a] domicile of choice shall be acquired by a person when he is
lawfully present at a particular place and has the intention to settle
there for an indefinite period.
This omission is remarkable, considering that the case turned
on whether the wife had abandoned her South African domicile
and established a new domicile of choice in Dubai. This depended
on whether she intended to settle in Dubai for an ‘indefinite
period’. Instead, throughout the judgment, the court referred to
English and South African authority that pre-dated the Domicile
Act. A number of these older authorities emphasised ‘perma-
nently’ as the touchstone for the requisite animus. Indeed,
Mabuse J stated
[i]n order to acquire a domicile of choice, such a person . . . must have
formed the intention to reside permanently at that place (para [14]).
This statement is contrary to the requirement of intention to
settle ‘for an indefinite period’ in terms of section 1(2) of the
Domicile Act. Fortunately, this had no effect on the outcome of the
case. Nevertheless, the courts should not rely on outdated
authority, especially where there is a clear statutory provision to
the contrary.
Thirdly, although this may seem like splitting hairs (and it had
no effect on the outcome of the case), the distinction between
private-law status and capacity is worth noting – capacity is in
fact one of the incidences of status. Mabuse J stated:
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Quite evidently a person’s domicile plays a major role in determining
his or her capacities (para [11]).
The above statement may be true in relation to purely domestic
matters, but the distinction between status and capacity is of
great significance on the private international law level. While an
individual’s status in private international law is determined by
his/her lex domicilii, the incidences of such status (which include
capacity to marry or capacity to enter into contracts) may be
determined by a different legal system. For example, a person
married according to South African law (his/her lex domicilii), will,
in another country, say England, have the capacities accorded to
a married person under English law. According to Ulrich Huber:
[P]ersonal qualities impressed upon a person by the law of a
particular place surround and accompany him everywhere with this
effect that everywhere persons enjoy and are subject to the law which
persons of the same class enjoy and are subject to in that other place
. . . (Ulrich Huber De Conflictu Legum s 12, as translated by Ernest G
Lorenzen Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws (1947) 176).
Of course, public policy or mandatory rules may play a role in
recognising a ‘foreign’ status.
As far as jurisdiction was concerned, the combined summons
(para [5]) stated that the parties had agreed to the jurisdiction of
the court. This was disputed by the husband and not addressed
by the judge at all. It, therefore, does no harm to reiterate that
mere submission by the parties cannot found jurisdiction in
status-related matters such as divorce actions (Christopher For-
syth Private International Law 5ed (2012) 217) in the absence of a
recognised ground of jurisdiction (s 2(1) of the Divorce Act 70
of 1979 and, previously, the domicile of the parties with all
the attendant problems of the wife’s domicile of dependence
at the time).
The court granted an interdict restraining the husband from
proceeding with the divorce action in Dubai. This looks like an
anti-suit injunction – an equitable remedy well-known in Anglo
common-law jurisdictions. Such an injunction is binding on an
individual (not the foreign court) and, if breached, may result in
the imposition of the sanction of contempt of court in the
jurisdiction that issued the injunction. Anti-suit injunctions are not
normally used in matrimonial or divorce matters. In addition,
anti-suit injunctions have been criticised for interfering with
access to justice and comity (Richard Fentiman International
Commercial Litigation 2ed (2015) 537ff).
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The case of V v V should, however, be viewed as an instance of
lis alibi pendens (two sets of proceedings pending in different
jurisdictions) – a doctrine known to South African law (Forsyth
Private International Law 189ff). In solving such a case of lis alibi
pendens in respect of a divorce matter, the Anglo common-law
doctrine of forum non conveniens may be useful. This doctrine,
which is of Scottish origin (Scotland, like South Africa, being a
hybrid legal system), is slowly finding its way into South African
law (Forsyth Private International Law 184ff). Where two sets of
proceedings are pending in different jurisdictions, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens allows the court to determine the appro-
priate forum for the proceedings, instead of simply preferring the
forum where proceedings were first commenced.
A number of factors may be relevant to the forum non conve-
niens inquiry, namely where the parties reside, where the evi-
dence is located, the speed at which the proceedings will be
concluded in the different jurisdictions, the cost of litigation in the
respective jurisdictions, the legal system applicable to the merits
of the dispute, where a judgment will need to be enforced,
etcetera. Once the defendant or respondent has proven that
there is another, distinctly more appropriate and competent
forum where the case can be heard, the plaintiff or applicant has
a final opportunity to prove that he or she will not receive justice in
the foreign court. (For a detailed exposition of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, see Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd
[1986] UKHL 10, [1987] AC 460). Although this does not relate to
the content of substantive law or the merits of the case, it could
probably be argued that applying Sharia law to a non-Muslim
couple would result in an injustice.
Recognition and/or enforcement of foreign judgment
International Fruit Genetics LLC v Redelinghuys NO & others
(24870/16) [2017] ZAWCHC 6 (7 February 2017) concerned the
recognition and enforcement of Californian court orders in South
Africa. The applicant (International Fruit Genetics LLC) and the
respondents (known as AMT) had concluded various licensing
agreements in terms of which AMT was licensed to plant, grow,
and market certain varieties of table grape, owned by the
applicant, in South Africa. The applicant subsequently cancelled
the agreements when it discovered that the respondents had
breached the licensing agreements by exceeding the quantities
of grapes specified in the agreements and growing a variety of
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grapes that was not authorised by the agreements. (The unautho-
rised variety was grown from a cutting that one of the respon-
dents had smuggled into South Africa.)
The applicant successfully sought a declaration that the can-
cellation of the licensing agreements was lawful, as well as
consequential injunctive relief, in the United States (the US)
(Central District Court of California). The order granted by the
Central District Court of California required, amongst other things,
the respondents to cease all use of the applicant’s organic
material and confidential information. The California court further
ordered the respondents to destroy all the organic material in
their possession so that the proprietary plant material could not
be used for propagation of the applicant’s proprietary cultivars. In
addition, it granted the applicant two orders for costs. The
respondents appealed against the order for injunctive relief as
well as one of the costs orders. These appeals were still pending
in the US when the applicant applied for recognition and enforce-
ment of the orders in South Africa. The order for injunctive relief,
though appealed, had not been suspended in the US and the
respondents had not applied for a suspension of enforcement
(subject to appeal) of the costs order.
There were two important issues so far as private international
law is concerned. The first related to whether the provisions of the
Protection of BusinessesAct 99 of 1978 (the PBA, 1978) requiring
ministerial permission for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign orders applied to this matter. The second issue was
whether recognition and enforcement could be withheld on the
basis of the pending appeal against the court orders in the US.
Regarding the first issue, Rogers J held that the vines and
grapes were not ‘matter or material’ as envisaged by section 1 of
the PBA, 2017, and, therefore, no ministerial consent was required
for the recognition and enforcement of the Californian order for
injunctive relief (paras [24] [25]).
In relation to the second issue, Rogers J referred to Jones v Krok
1995 (1) SA 677 (A) and reiterated that an appeal pending against
a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction did not affect the finality of that
judgment for purposes of recognition and/or enforcement in South
Africa. However, a court in SouthAfrica has a discretion whether or
not to recognise and/or enforce the judgment. In exercising its
discretion, a court could stay the proceedings pending the final
determination of the appeal in the foreign jurisdiction. As a rule,
the court will not assess the merits of a pending appeal (para
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[45]). However, in this case it was abundantly clear that the
prospects of a successful appeal by the respondents against the
Californian orders were slim – the respondents were appealing as
of right and not with the leave of the court (para [46]). In addition,
two US courts (the District Court and the Court of Appeals) had
refused to suspend the order for injunctive relief pending the
appeal (para [46]). On the other hand, destruction of the vines in
terms of the Californian court order would render a successful
appeal against the order completely nugatory (para [47]).
In the final analysis, Rogers J decided to recognise the
Californian orders as a whole but to enforce only part of them as
far as the injunctive relief was concerned. He ordered that grapes
on the vines, as well as harvested grapes under the respondent’s
control, be destroyed immediately, and that the respondents
immediately stop using the applicant’s confidential information
(paras [50] [51]). It is not often that the distinction between
‘recognition’ and ‘enforcement’ plays out in this fashion. Rogers
J’s appreciation and application of this theoretical distinction in
order to achieve a workable, practical solution in this case is to be
welcomed.
Recognition and/or enforcement of foreign arbitral award
Balkan Energy Ltd & another v Government of Ghana 2017 (5)
SA 428 (GJ) concerned the recognition and enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award under the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,1958 (the New York
Convention) in terms of the provisions of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 40 of 1977 (the
REFAAA, 1977). Although the REFAAA, 1977, was recently
repealed by the International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017 ( the IAA,
2017), some of the issues raised in this case will still arise under
the IAA, 2017.
The first and second applicants were companies registered in
the United Kingdom and Ghana, respectively. The respondent
was the Government of Ghana. The applicants sought to have an
arbitral award, issued in London, recognised and enforced in
South Africa. The two main issues that arose from the facts
related to: (a) whether the respondent as a sovereign state was
immune from the jurisdiction of the South African courts; and
(b) whether the South African court had jurisdiction, as the
litigants were all peregrini. Kuny AJ also addressed a third issue,
namely, (c) the potential applicability of the Protection of Busi-
nesses Act 99 of 1978 (the PBA, 1978).
121CONFLICT OF LAWS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 13 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/05−Conflict
In regard to the first issue, the court found that the respondent
had waived immunity in any jurisdiction and from any legal
process when it entered into the electricity-supply contract with
the applicants. Had this not been the case, the applicants would
have had to make out a case for the commercial exception to
apply under section 4, or the arbitration exception under section
10 (depending on the terms of the arbitration agreement), of the
Foreign States Immunity Act 87 of 1981.
Regarding the second issue, the parties were all peregrini and
the cause of action had arisen outside South Africa. The issue of
the South African court’s jurisdiction therefore arose. Following
Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd 1984 (3)
SA 233 (D), the court held that jurisdiction could be established
through the attachment of the shares held by the respondent in a
South African company.
Notably, the court further considered the potential applicability
of the provisions of the PBA, 1978 even though the applicants
had not raised this issue. Kuny AJ held that the electricity-supply
contract did not involve the manufacture of any products from
raw materials and, as a result, section 1(3) of the PBA, 1978, was
not applicable (para [24]). Following the reforms brought about
by the IAA, 2017 (see above), the PBA, 1978, no longer applies to
foreign arbitral awards.
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CASE LAW
STRUCTURES AND PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT
EXECUTIVE
Reviewing executive decisions: Rule 53 record
Should a decision-maker provide the prior documents and
communications which informed a decision (as required by Rule
53 of the Uniform Rules of Court) during proceedings to review an
executive rather than an administrative decision? The High Court
in Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of SA; In re:
Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of SA & others
(9 May 2017) (24396/2017) [2017] ZAGPPHC 148, [2017] 3All SA
124 (GP), 2017 (4) SA 253 ruled that a decision maker may be
compelled to deliver such documents even when it is an execu-
tive decision that is subject to review.
The facts of the case related to a decision by former President
Zuma summarily to dismiss the former Finance Minister,
Mr Pravin Gordhan, and his Deputy Finance Minister, Mr Mcebisi
Jonas. The Democratic Alliance (DA) brought an application
challenging the rationality of this decision. In the course of
communications exchanged between the parties, the applicant
demanded that a full Rule 53 record be provided, including all
documents and electronic records related to the decision (para
[10]). The former President contested the obligation to do so on
the basis that the language of Rule 53 only concerns judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative decisions, and excludes execu-
tive decisions of this nature (para [16]). This led to an inter-
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locutory hearing. The issue before the court, therefore, was an
interpretive challenge.
The court viewed the matter as making a choice between a
literal and a purposive interpretation of Rule 53. It rejected the
former President’s argument that Rule 53 does not apply to
executive decisions, as these decisions are not expressly included
in the text. This was bolstered by the fact that when Rule 53 was
adopted, executive decisions were not reviewable, and that the
ushering in of our current constitutional dispensation requires the
extension of the Rule 53 process to executive decisions in order
to ensure ‘the proper and convenient administration of justice’
(para [28]). This was apparently the appropriate ‘purposive’
approach to the problem (para [29]).
While the court’s conclusion is sound, its reasoning is open to
criticism. First, it is controversial whether ‘purposive’ interpreta-
tion which ignores the particular wording of a statute and inserts
text without declarations of constitutional invalidity or inadequacy,
is a sound approach to resolving the types of interpretive
problem posed by pre-constitutional legislation. For instance,
some argue that a contextual approach which seeks to reconcile
literal meaning and purpose is more appropriate (Natal Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010)
[2012] ZASCA 13, [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA), 2012 (4) SA 593
paras [17]–[26]). Indeed, as Wallis JA argues:
Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to
substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or business-like
for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory
instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation
(Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4)
SA 593 (SCA) para [18]).
On this view, the purpose of a provision or of legislation is only
one among several factors to consider, including the wording,
background, and context. As to the argument that when Rule 53
was adopted executive decisions were not reviewable, the
obvious answer is that this is a call for this lacuna to be subjected
to a direct constitutional challenge. In fact, this particular approach
by the court is even more confusing considering the rather easy
‘out’ available to it to rely directly on its inherent power in terms of
section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 (the Constitution), to develop the common law in the
interests of justice. This could provide for an equivalent Rule 53
process (an argument submitted in the alternative by the appli-
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cant) for the review of executive decisions. Therefore, while it is
correct that the administration of justice calls for documents of
the sort contemplated by Rule 53 to be disclosed in executive
reviews, the reasoning of the court may be questioned.
Impeachment: Duty of Parliament to hold executive to account
In Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National
Assembly & others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National
Assembly & others (CCT 143/15; CCT 171/15) [2016] ZACC 11,
2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC), 2016 (3) SA 580 (EFF 1), the Constitu-
tional Court held that the President had violated the Constitution
by not complying with the Public Protector’s report on upgrades
to his home at Nkandla. Further, the court held that the National
Assembly (NA) had failed both in its duty to the Public Protector
and in its duty to hold the President accountable.
What followed were several attempts by opposition parties to
remove the President. On 5 April 2016, the DA brought an
impeachment motion in terms of section 89(1) of the Constitution.
It failed. That motion did not include a request for the establish-
ment of an ad hoc committee to consider whether the require-
ments for impeachment were present. There were several further
motions of no confidence in terms of section 102 of the Constitu-
tion. But those, too, failed.
During 2016, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) wrote
several letters to the Speaker requesting her to establish a
fact-finding inquiry into whether the President should be
impeached. The Speaker refused, claiming that the request had
not been properly made. The EFF – together with the United
Democratic Movement and the Congress of the People – then
brought an application directly to the Constitutional Court in terms
of its exclusive jurisdiction. In essence – and as supplemented by
the DA, which intervened in the matter – the applicants sought
declarations (a) that the NA had failed to put in place the
necessary mechanisms to hold the President accountable in
terms of section 89 of the Constitution; and (b) that the NA had in
fact failed to hold the President to account because it had failed
to scrutinise his violations of the Constitution as set out in EFF 1.
In a judgment by Jafta J (Cameron, Froneman, Mhlantla,
Theron JJ, and Kathree-Setiloane and Kollapen AJJ, concurring),
the majority held for the applicants on both issues (Economic
Freedom Fighters & others v Speaker of the National Assembly &
another [2017] ZACC 47; 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC); 2018 (3) BCLR
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259). There were two dissenting judgments, one by Zondo DCJ
(Mogoeng CJ, Madlanga J, and Zondi AJ concurring), and one
by Mogoeng CJ (writing for himself). Froneman J wrote a further
concurring judgment (with the support of all the majority judges)
responding to the Chief Justice’s dissent. The case raises a
number of issues and reveals very different understandings
among members of the court on the separation of powers and the
judiciary’s relationship with the legislature. We consider each
issue in turn, and then consider the more general issue of the
separation of powers, particularly in relation to the Chief Justice’s
dissent.
Mechanisms
The issue was whether the Constitution mandated the NA to
establish a special procedure to deal with impeachment motions
brought in terms of section 89(1).
The provision reads:
(1) The National Assembly, by a resolution adopted with a supporting
vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove the
President from office only on the grounds of –
(a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;
(b) serious misconduct; or
(c) inability to perform the functions of office.
The court pointed out how impeachment under section 89(1)
differs from removal through a motion of no confidence under
section 102. It explained as follows:
[T]he Constitution does not prescribe any conditions for the exercise
of the power to remove by means of a motion of no confidence. All that
is required is a motion of no confidence supported by a simple
majority (para [137]). By contrast, impeachment is only permitted on
the grounds clearly set out in section 89(1)(a)–(c). The difficulty is that
none of those grounds is defined in the Constitution (para [176]).
Nonetheless, Jafta J held that the drafters of the Constitution
‘could not have contemplated that members of the Assembly
would individually have to determine what constitutes a serious
violation of the law or the Constitution’ or serious misconduct
(para [177]). That would result in divergent views as to whether
the basis necessary for an impeachment existed. The only way to
avoid that outcome is to require ‘an institutional pre-determination
of what a serious violation of the Constitution or the law is. The
same must apply to serious misconduct and inability to perform
126 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 5 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
the functions of the office’ (para [178]). Jafta J summarised the
position in these terms:
Therefore, any process for removing the President from office must be
preceded by a preliminary enquiry, during which the Assembly
determines that a listed ground exists. The form which this preliminary
enquiry may take depends entirely upon the Assembly. It may be an
investigation or some other form of an inquiry. It is also up to the
Assembly to decide whether the President must be afforded a hearing
at the preliminary stage (para [180]).
The consequence is that, ‘[w]ithout rules defining the entire
process, it is impossible to implement section 89’ (para [182]).
In sum, the Constitution ‘implicitly imposes an obligation on the
Assembly to make rules specially tailored for an impeachment
process contemplated in that section’ (para [196]). The NA must
first determine, through that process, whether the conditions in
section 89(1) are present. Only having reached that conclusion,
can it vote on whether or not to remove the President. The NAwas
in breach of that obligation because it had failed to establish such
a process.
Indeed, if the NA had voted to remove the President without
first determining that one of the facts in section 89(1)(c) was
present, its decision would have been unlawful. The court was
unanimous on this question (para [103] – judgment of Zondo
DCJ). The only difference was that the majority held that a formal
process must be followed in making that determination. The
minority held that, while ‘in many, if not most, cases it will be
necessary or convenient that a Committee conducts an inquiry
. . . there may be cases where no such Committee may be
necessary’ (para [106]). That would be the case where the facts
were common cause.
The Chief Justice had the same complaint with the majority. For
him, it made no sense always to require an inquiry. He wrote:
An inquiry has a clear purpose to serve. It is to unearth the unknown or
ascertain the unclear. When all the information or evidence necessary
to resolve any issue is already well-established or available or
well-known to decision-makers, embarking on an investigation or
inquiry, just because the evidential material is documented or recorded,
would be an absurdity or a sheer waste of resources (para [225]).
The remainder of Chief Justice’s judgment explains why, in his
view, an inquiry would not always be necessary. Drawing an
analogy with action and motion proceedings before courts, he
argued that the existence of the impeachment grounds could, in
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some circumstances, be determined on the papers. Mandating
an inquiry in those circumstances was unnecessary.
In our view, the disagreement between the judgments is
exaggerated. We agree with the minority that a full-blown inquiry
with witnesses and cross-examination will not always be neces-
sary. But that is not what the majority required. It demanded a
process – what that process entails, is for the NA to decide. It may
be that the NA decides that the process can, in some circum-
stances, be resolved simply on documents or on common-cause
facts. We see nothing in the majority judgment that removes that
power from the NA. The key finding is merely that it must have
some sort of process designed to determine whether the grounds
for impeachment exist.
Returning to the case at hand, the question was whether the
existing rules adequately performed the required purpose of
section 89(1) for a prior determination. The majority found that the
existing rules were inadequate for the task. The closest possibility
was Rule 253, which permits the NA to establish an ad hoc
committee to investigate any matter. But the rule does not comply
with the constitutional demand. Because the initiator determined
whether the President had committed a serious violation (para
[189]), there was no set procedure for the committee to follow
(para [190]), and the committee could be dominated by the
majority party, which would defeat the purpose (paras [191]–
[194] citing Mazibuko v Sisulu & another (CCT 115/12) [2013]
ZACC 28, 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC), 2013 (11) BCLR 1297).
In his dissent, Zondo DCJ saw the matter differently. In his view
the mechanisms of a motion of no confidence and question-and-
answer sessions were adequate accountability mechanisms
(paras [36] [37]). In any event, the rules providing for an ad hoc
committee to investigate impeachment were adequate (para
[39]).
Much of the dispute between the majority and minority on this
score comes down to pleadings, and the conduct of the appli-
cants. The minority focused carefully on exactly how the case
had been pleaded and held that the applicants had not properly
presented the case for the relief they sought. It also criticised the
applicants for not exhausting internal mechanisms within the NA
before approaching the court (para [82]). The majority took a far
more flexible approach to the pleaded case. It was willing to
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overlook ‘inelegant’ (para [130]) pleading in order to get to the
heart of the complaint.
Failure to hold President accountable
The majority disposed of this issue fairly easily. It rejected the
applicants’ claim that ‘the Assembly did nothing to hold the
President accountable’ (para [199]). It had debated motions of no
confidence and required the President to answer questions. But it
was ‘self-evident that both these steps were not actions taken in
terms of section 89(1)’ (para [200]). They could not, therefore,
fulfil the NA’s duty under that section.
That left the motion brought by the DA under section 89(1) in
the immediate aftermath of EFF 1. Jafta J held that the EFF should
rightly be criticised for supporting that motion when it was
brought, and then arguing in its founding papers that the motion
was premature because it was not preceded by a fact-finding
inquiry (para [202]). However, the issue was not the conduct of
the applicants, but whether the motion complied with the require-
ments of section 89(1).
It did not. It had not been preceded by the ‘institutional
determination’ that the President was guilty of serious miscon-
duct. The court held as follows:
The Assembly did not approach the processing of the motion on the
footing that the President had indeed committed a serious violation of
the Constitution. This was a necessary condition for commencing a
section 89 process. Without accepting that one of the listed grounds
existed, the Assembly could not authorise the commencement of a
process, which could result in the removal of the President from office.
Moreover, it does not appear from the papers that the President was
afforded the opportunity to defend himself. Without knowing whether
the Assembly holds the view that the President has committed a
serious violation of the Constitution, it would be difficult for him to
mount an effective defence. The procedure followed by the Assembly
here does not accord with section 89 (para [205]).
Zondo DCJ took the view that the applicants’ case was that the
NA had ‘done nothing’ to hold the President accountable, and
they were only entitled to relief if that was true. It was not. Various
motions to impeach him and remove him had been debated.
Those motions ‘prove that the National Assembly did not just sit
idle and do nothing as the applicants claim but that it acted upon
the President’s conduct and held him accountable. The fact that
those motions were defeated does not detract from the fact that
the National Assembly did hold the President accountable’ (para
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[89]). The Deputy Chief Justice also held that the applicants – as
parties with representatives in the NA – could themselves take
steps within the NA to hold the President to account (para [97]).
And as he had found that the ad hoc committee was a permis-
sible means by which to determine whether the factors in section
89 were present, there was no obstacle to that process being
used; the court did not need to intervene at this stage.
Most interestingly, the minority concluded that there was no
need for a fact-finding investigation in this case. The facts had
already been determined by the court in EFF 1, as had the
question of whether or not the former President had violated the
Constitution – he had. The court declared the following:
Therefore, there is no room for the proposition that some fact-finding
process was required to establish whether the President had violated
the Constitution by failing to implement the Public Protector’s remedial
action (para [111]).
The NA only had to decide whether this violation was serious.
But that ‘is not a question of fact that needed to be investigated
. . . [it] is a question of a value judgement’ (para [113]).
Separation of powers
The Chief Justice’s judgment used extremely strong language.
It begins:
The [majority] judgment is a textbook case of judicial overreach – a
constitutionally impermissible intrusion by the judiciary into the exclu-
sive domain of Parliament (para [223]).
He described the majority judgment as ‘an unprecedented and
unconstitutional encroachment into the operational space of
Parliament by judges’ (para [254]). Later, he spoke of his
‘deep-seated agony and bafflement about the second judg-
ment’s refusal to recognise the discretion the Assembly obviously
has’ to decide whether or not to hold an inquiry (para [267]).
These are fighting words. And they elicited a fighting response.
Jafta J emphasised that he merely interpreted section 89(1) of the
Constitution and had happened to disagree with the Chief
Justice. As he pointed out, this happens frequently in courts
presided over by panels of judges. But what was unprecedented
was the suggestion that the construction of the section embraced
by the majority here constituted ‘a textbook case of judicial
overreach’ (para [218]). The suggestion was misplaced and
unfortunate. He found it ‘conceptually difficult’ to understand ‘how
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the interpretation and application of a provision in the Constitution
by a court may amount to judicial overreach’ (para [219]).
Froneman J, joined by the six other majority judges, took the
highly unusual step of writing separately solely to address the
tenor of the Chief Justice’s criticisms. He pointed out that the
majority merely instructed the NA to make rules; it did not
‘prescribe the content of those rules’ (para [284]). It sought to
give the NA ‘guidance on the tools necessary to enable it to fulfil
its constitutional duty’, not ‘to tell the National Assembly how to
use those tools’ (para [285]). In his view, the strong language
used by the Chief Justice was unhelpful: ‘The respective merits of
opposing viewpoints should be assessed on the basis of the
substantive reasons advanced for them. There is nothing wrong
in that substantive debate being robust, but to attach a label to
the opposing view does nothing to further the debate’ (para
[280]).
We agree. The Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice made
strong substantive points. At least some of the authors agree with
them as to the proper interpretation of section 89(1) and how the
case ought to have been resolved. But there is nothing unusual
about disagreement on constitutional interpretation.
There are different views about how the language used by the
Chief Justice might affect the legitimacy of the court in the future.
On the one hand, it could be used by those seeking to undermine
the court as evidence that the court does not respect the
separation of powers. On the other hand, the possibility for
strongly-worded dissent may well be a sign of institutional health.
Such language may also have implications for collegiality and
relations within the court. Time will tell.
As a general commentary on cases involving the executive and
holding the executive accountable, 2017 was a year where courts
clearly believed it justified and constitutionally necessary for
there to be greater scrutiny and clearer bright-line limits on
executive power. This, of course, cannot be divorced from the
political context of the time and the twilight of the Zuma presi-
dency. However, upon reflection, the expanding role of the courts
in this area may warrant caution. Perhaps now, without the
inflamed public discourse, such concerns may begin to be
seriously considered by commentators and, it is hoped, by the
courts themselves.
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LEGISLATURE
Notice of withdrawal: International treaties
May the national executive submit a notice of withdrawal from
an international treaty without the prior approval of Parliament
before submission? In Democratic Alliance v Minister of Interna-
tional Relations and Cooperation & others (Council for the
Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening)
(83145/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53, 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP), [2017]
2 All SA 123, 2017 (1) SACR 623, a full bench of the North
Gauteng High Court found that the national executive may not do
so without parliamentary approval.
The facts of the case are the tail-end of the earlier controversy
surrounding the failure to execute the arrest warrant issued
against President Omar al-Bashir by the South African govern-
ment as outlined in Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment & others v The Southern African Litigation Centre [2016]
ZASCA 17, 2016 (4) BCLR 487 (SCA), [2016] 2 All SA 365, 2016
(3) SA 317. Following this controversy, the government submitted
a notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 19 October 2016 (para [4]).
Importantly, the withdrawal only takes effect a year after the
notice of withdrawal has been deposited with the Secretary
General of the United Nations (art 127(1) of the Rome Statute).
The government, through the Minister of Justice, then informed
Parliament of the decision to withdraw, and began a process to
repeal the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. The applicant, the official national
opposition party, challenged this decision in the High Court. The
broad basis related to: alleged violations of section 231 of the
Constitution; the apparent irrationality of the decision to withdraw;
allegations related to violations of section 7(2) state obligations;
and procedural failures concerning the process of repeal related
to a lack of public participation (paras [30] [31]).
The High Court accepted the applicant’s first two arguments
but declined to answer the third and fourth. The court’s reasons
broadly were: (a) the separation of powers; and (b) a proper
conception of how such powers ought to be exercised in light of
rationality considerations flowing from the rule of law. As to the
first issue, the court found that a close interpretation of section
231 requires that withdrawals of this kind be approved by
Parliament prior to actual notification to the relevant international
132 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 11 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
body. In the main, the court emphasised that although the power
to negotiate and sign a treaty was allocated to the executive,
the power to ratify treaties was allocated to Parliament in terms
of section 231(2) of the Constitution (paras [43]–[46]). This, in
the court’s view, indicated that there was a careful scheme in
the Constitution appropriately to allocate distinct powers in the
process of acquiring international obligations to distinct branches
of government (para [45]). Withdrawal, therefore, was the oppo-
site of ratification, a power properly allocated to Parliament (para
[47]). This is because, unlike un-signing, withdrawal has the
effect that the international treaty obligations of a state are
terminated (para [47]). Therefore, notionally the body which has
the power to ratify must have the power to withdraw, unless
otherwise stated (para [53]). In our law, that body is Parliament.
The second issue was whether it was procedurally irrational for
the executive to be allowed to deposit a notice of withdrawal and
afterwards to seek parliamentary approval, provided the with-
drawal had not yet come into effect. The court found that allowing
such a process is irrational in that it creates the potential for South
Africa to send confused messages and signals to the inter-
national community about its position on particular international
treaty obligations (para [70]). For instance, while internationally
the International Criminal Court (ICC) would give effect to the
notice of withdrawal, domestically, the government would be
obliged, amongst other obligations, to arrest and surrender the
indicted leaders while the Implementation of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 remained in force
(para [66]). In the present case, the imposition of a timeline on
Parliament by the executive was a further impermissible violation
of the separation of powers and the rule of law (para [67]).
Parliament retains the power to control its own internal processes
(para [67] read with ss 57(1)(a) and 70(1) of the Constitution).
Therefore, the processes under this scheme would be ‘clumsy’
and ‘piecemeal’ with what the court deemed ‘undesirable’ and
‘embarrassing’ outcomes (para [70]). According to the court, the
ICC and the international community deserve South Africa speak-
ing with a ‘united, final and determinative’ voice on such matters
(para [70]). Aside from all of this, the court opined that the
government’s haste in withdrawing itself constituted procedural
irrationality (para [70]).
On reflection, the court’s reasoning is, in the main, correct. It
is certainly true that it is difficult to reconcile the exclusion of
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Parliament from the withdrawal process with a proper reading
of section 231 of the Constitution. This is a straightforward
interpretive question not readily open to objection, especially
when one considers the distinction between signing and ratifying
an international agreement. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume
the distinction between un-signing and withdrawal tracks similar
ground.
However, whether it then follows that parliamentary approval of
withdrawal must necessarily precede a formal notification of
withdrawal is slightly more complex. The court declared that
‘although the withdrawal does not take effect until after a year,
that notice constitutes, at international level, a binding, uncondi-
tional and final decision of withdrawal from the Rome Statute’
(para [47]). However, there may be cause to be wary of the
court’s emphatic position.
It is vital to recall that the question in this instance is how we
reconcile what a notice of withdrawal is understood to be at
international law, with our own domestic constitutional scheme in
order to determine the correct domestic constitutional processes
for withdrawal. The court’s reasoning on our constitutional pro-
cesses, therefore, depends to a large degree on what interna-
tional law understands to be the effect of a notice of withdrawal.
Fortunately, foreign courts have faced similar questions. In the
case of R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union 2017 UKSC 5, the majority of the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom colourfully described depositing a notice to
withdraw from the European Union as ‘pulling the trigger which
causes the bullet to be fired, with the consequence that the bullet
will hit the target and the Treaties will cease to apply’ (para [36]).
However, the Scottish Court of Session subsequently referred
the question of whether the UK can still unilaterally revoke
withdrawal from the European Union between the period when
notice is given and actual effective withdrawal, to the European
Court of Justice (Wightman & others v Secretary of State for
Exiting the European Union 2018 CSIH 62). The Advocate
General of the European Court of Justice issued an opinion
stating that the UK may indeed unilaterally revoke the notice for
withdrawal before actual effective withdrawal takes place (Advo-
cate General Sanchez-Bordona’s Opinion in Case C-621/18
(2018) Wightman & others v Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union para [89]). The Advocate General asserted that
because withdrawal is a unilateral act, so too is revocation – at
least until the ‘cooling off’ period has lapsed (ibid para [98]).
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This leaves two possible interpretations as to what a notice
of withdrawal accompanied by a cooling off period may be:
(a) either it is a suspensive condition with little legal effect at
international law save as a formal requirement to set the process
of withdrawal in motion (ibid para [92]); or (b) it is a trigger that
has serious effects and may later be confirmed (R (Miller) above
para [36]). This means that the exact effects of a notice of
withdrawal are unclear at international law. There are reasons,
therefore, to think the High Court may have been precipitous in
finding the effects of such a notice to be ‘unequivocal, final and
determinative’ (para [47]). This also means that the weight placed
by the High Court on the precise nature of a notice of withdrawal
in determining our own constitutional process requirements is
also less determinative of the issue than initially thought.
This possibility is made more plausible by a consideration of
the language of the Rome Statute itself. While article 127(1)
provides that withdrawal is through a notice which takes effect
after one year from deposit with the Secretary General, article
127(2) addresses the actual effect of withdrawal. Article 127(2)
states that a state is not released from obligations incurred,
particularly investigations and proceedings, ‘prior to the date on
which withdrawal became effective’. The aim of this article is to
clarify that only future obligations post-withdrawal are terminated.
However, read with article 127(1) it reinforces the view that
obligations are terminated through effective withdrawal and not
the notice of withdrawal. Therefore, it is strange that the High
Court focused on effects other than substantive obligations as
opposed to administrative procedures relevant to the ICC only,
especially as section 231 of the Constitution deals with South
Africa’s obligations, and not administrative burdens on interna-
tional signatories.
Secondly, the court argued that the constitutional text does not
address withdrawals because it specifically only ever envisaged
the executive acting with prior Parliamentary approval when
withdrawing (paras [54]–[56]). Notably, the court did not provide
any specific authority for this position but relied instead on an
understanding of the constitutional scheme as a whole and the
separation of powers. That may very well be ideal. However, one
can equally argue that there is an exception for cases where a
cooling-off period is granted by an international agreement
properly to evaluate, at a domestic level, the reasons for with-
drawal, as we do not have a strict separation-of-powers doctrine
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of the kind assumed by this view (Ex Parte Chairperson of the
Constitutional Assembly; In re Certification of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26, 1996 (4) SA
744 (CC) para [109]).
This brings us to the court’s finding of procedural irrationality.
The question is whether the process envisaged would be able to
realise the constitutional aims of proper negotiation of withdrawal
from treaty obligations. The argument here is that if government
did not first acquire parliamentary approval, a ‘piecemeal’, ‘clumsy’
process would be initiated which would lead to embarrassing
results, thus defeating the averred government aims of proper
diplomatic negotiation qua withdrawal. However, if certain trea-
ties such as the Rome Statute and European Convention allow for
a specific cooling-off period, it could easily be argued that the
potential for revocation during such a period allows for the kind of
‘clumsy’ and ‘piecemeal’ process for continued reconsideration
and revaluation until withdrawal is effected. What matters for our
domestic law is that Parliament take the final decision on the
matter before this ‘clumsy’ period elapses. Nonetheless, perhaps
the rationality standard can be expanded to include an increased
likelihood or risk of embarrassment and irrationality. That remains
to be considered by a court.
Parliamentary motion of no confidence: Secret ballot
Can the Speaker of the NA permit a motion of no confidence in
a President to be conducted by secret ballot? The Constitutional
Court in United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National
Assembly & others (CCT89/17) [2017] ZACC 21, 2017 (8) BCLR
1061 (CC), 2017 (5) SA 300 answered in the affirmative. (We
disclose that one of the present authors, Meghan Finn, appeared
for one of the amici curiae in this matter.)
The call for a secret ballot in a motion of no confidence arose
from the removal of Messrs Pravin Gordhan and Mcebisi Jonas,
members of President Zuma’s cabinet from office, which appar-
ently led to South Africa’s credit rating being downgraded to junk
status (para [13]). Allegedly, threats of physical violence and
dismissal were directed at any member of the NA who should be
discovered to have voted in favour of the motion (para [15]). The
Constitutional Court held that a motion of no confidence aims to
ensure regular government accountability, and thus serves the
public interest (paras [43]–[48]). It follows that the Speaker has
the discretion to allow either a secret or an open ballot (para
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[29]). This flows from Parliament’s constitutional powers to regu-
late its own process under section 57 of the Constitution (paras
[58] [59]).
Further, the court found that the Speaker must exercise this
discretion taking several factors into account. The first is whether
the chosen voting procedure would allow members of the NA to
vote by their conscience and in the public interest (para [74]).
The second is whether the prevailing circumstances are peaceful
or toxic and potentially hazardous (para [88]). The third is the
Speaker’s impartiality (para [87]); while the fourth is that the
effectiveness of a motion of no confidence as an accountability
and consequence-management tool must be supported by the
chosen voting procedure (para [44]). Fifth is the possibility of
corruption or bribes in the event of a secret ballot (para [88]); and
sixth, the need for the value of transparency to find expression in
the passing of the motion (para [80]). Finally, the decision must
be rationally connected to the purpose of a motion of no
confidence and should not be made arbitrarily (para [86]).
These factors are broad and wide-ranging. It is perhaps
inadvisable at the moment to pronounce on their soundness or
effectiveness in assisting the Speaker to decide when secret or
open ballots ought to be held in motions of no confidence.
Following this judgment, a vote of no confidence was held
against President Zuma by secret ballot, but failed to secure the
majority required. This process was not judicially challenged, and
to date no court has considered an actual decision by the
Speaker on this sort of issue. Time will tell.
Generally, courts appear to have seized every opportunity
properly to empower Parliament in its oversight and original
powers qua the executive. Of course, this is not necessarily
negative, nor can it be understood outside of the context of this
tumultuous year. However, the court’s reasoning in both these
cases may be even more open to criticism than cases of direct
executive review. Time will tell whether these moves to extend
and strengthen parliamentary powers will share the fate of cases
on the exercise of judicially-created remedial powers faced by
the Public Protector.
RULE OF LAW
Collateral challenges and reactive reviews
May an organ of state disregard an administrative action which
it regards as invalid? May it raise a defensive or collateral
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challenge to the action in subsequent enforcement proceedings?
These were the main questions in issue in Merafong City v
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd [2016] ZACC 35, 2017 (2) SA 211 (CC),
2017 (2) BCLR 182.
The administrative action in question was a ruling by the
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry in terms of the Water
Services Act 108 of 1997. Section 8(4) of the Water Services Act
allows a person who applies for access to water services and is
dissatisfied with the outcome to appeal to the Minister. Section
8(9) empowers the Minister to confirm, vary, or overturn the
decision. The Minister had exercised this power to uphold an
appeal by AngloGold Ashanti Ltd against a decision by Merafong
City Local Municipality (Merafong) to impose increased tariffs for
the supply of water. Merafong contested the validity of the
Minister’s decision, arguing that section 156(1) of the Constitution
gives local government exclusive competence over ‘[w]ater and
sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and
domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems’ (para [2]).
Both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal had held
that the Minister’s decision was effective until set aside and
enforced it (paras [14] [15]).
The majority of the Constitutional Court, in a decision by
Cameron J, reaffirmed the decisions in Oudekraal Estates (Pty)
Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) (Oudekraal) and
MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a
Eye & Lazer Institute [2014] ZACC 6, 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC), 2014
(5) BCLR 547 (Kirland), that organs of state may not ignore
purportedly invalid administrative action. However, overturning
the categorical approach that would have limited such chal-
lenges to private actors, the majority held that organs of state
may, in principle, be permitted to raise a collateral or ‘reactive’
challenge to administrative action sought to be enforced against
it (para [55]). This would depend on the specific facts, and the
court declined to lay down any hard and fast rules (para [55]).
The majority found that the constitutional challenge to section 8 of
the Act (on the basis that it intrudes on exclusive municipal
competence) was not properly before the court (para [82]). They
accordingly upheld the appeal, but remitted the matter to the
High Court to consider the merits, including Merafong’s explana-
tion of its delay in challenging the Minister’s decision (para [83]).
Jafta J dissented, joined by Bosielo AJ and Zondo J. For the
minority, the point of departure was that invalid administrative
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action is void. The minority also held that the constitutional
challenge was ripe for determination. They would have upheld
the challenge and declared section 8 of the Water Services Act
unconstitutional.
There appears to have been a similar division between the
justices on the question of whether an organ of state may refuse
to follow a court order enforcing its own allegedly invalid adminis-
trative decision. The court in Department of Transport & others v
Tasima (Pty) Limited 2017 (2) SA 622 (CC) found that an organ of
state cannot do so. This case is a further episode in the series of
fundamental disagreements between the justices on how prop-
erly to construe the rule of law and its relation to invalid adminis-
trative decisions. At its centre was the validity of the court’s
judgment in Kirland (above), which found that purportedly invalid
administrative decisions continue to have legal effect until set
aside by a court.
The facts of this case are somewhat convoluted. Tasima (Pty)
Limited (Tasima) contracted with the Department of Transport
(the Department) to provide traffic management services and
functions. In 2010, the Department’s Director-General extended
the contract for a period of five years. After internal investigation,
the Department established that the tender contract had been
unlawfully concluded and sought to transfer the associated
software and services to the Road Traffic Management Corpora-
tion, another state-owned entity. Tasima then approached the High
Court for an order enforcing the extension pending the outcome of
a dispute resolution mechanism agreed to in the contract. This
order was granted by Mabuse J.
In early 2015, the Department again attempted to begin the
transfer process. This resulted in Tasima seeking a further
interdict from the High Court. Tasima also sought declarations of
contempt of court and imprisonment for Department officials. In
reaction the Department contested the validity of the initial
extension of the contract.
The High Court agreed with the Department and set aside the
extended contract. It followed that the various court orders
should not have been granted. Tasima was ordered to hand over
the running of the software and associated services.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed. It con-
cluded that reactive challenges were not open to organs of state,
and that in any event, the counter-application had been brought
too late to be considered. It found, further, that even if the
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extension could be set aside by way of a reactive challenge, this
would not absolve the Department from complying with the court
orders enforcing the contract.
In a subsequent appeal, the Constitutional Court – much like
the lower courts – was divided on the issue. Khampepe J, writing
for the majority, argued that an organ of state may bring a reactive
challenge provided there has not been an unwarranted delay in
doing so (para [150]). Although there had been a serious delay in
raising this reactive challenge, there were several circumstances
explaining and justifying the delay (paras [170] [171]). It follows
that the delay was warranted, and the reactive challenge could
be considered. The majority found in favour of the Department’s
argumenet that the extended contract be set aside. However,
until the contractual extension had been set aside by a court, it
still had legal effect. The Department, therefore, could not ignore
Mabuse J’s orders enforcing the contract (para [198]) – a failure
to implement them would undermine the authority of the court and
the rule of law (para [199]). Consequently, Khampepe J upheld
the orders of contempt for the period until the extension had been
set aside by the court a quo, but found that committal of
Department officials was unnecessary.
Jafta J, writing for the minority, disagreed. He was of the view
that, as an organ of state, the Department was entitled to bring a
reactive challenge and that this should succeed. However, he
rejected the argument that any period of delay in bringing the
challenge could preclude a party from raising a reactive chal-
lenge (paras [95] [96]). Further, because the court orders
depended on the validity of the contract itself, if the contract was
invalid, so were the court orders (paras [116]–[120]). The Depart-
ment could, therefore, not be held in contempt of court.
Once again we see a sharp divide in the court’s understanding
of the rule of law’s implications for such cases. One view,
following Kirland (abve), is that allowing any authority to ignore
the legal effects of an invalid administrative act without the
approval and finding of a court that the decision was unlawful,
would threaten the very of authority of the court itself. This, by
implication, violates the rule of law as notionally it would result in
self-help and thwart the predictability of government decisions
promised by the rule of law. The danger is that certain justices
argue that this justifies tolerating the legal effects of even the
most patently unconstitutional and unlawful decision until a court
has ruled the decision unlawful. Naturally, other justices disagree.
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They contend that an unconstitutional decision has no force in
law, and that outside of the narrow set of circumstances described
in Oudekraal (above) such decisions have no legal effect. They
do not consider it particularly dangerous to allow citizens and
authorities to ignore the purported effects of an unlawful decision
without court intervention. The burden would notionally be on the
party arguing for the enforcement of the purportedly unlawful
decision to bring the matter to court. This disagreement is
exacerbated by court orders enforcing the unlawful decision.
Should citizens be held in contempt for failing to abide by court
orders granted on the basis of a previously unlawful decision?
Answering in the affirmative is not without its problems. For
instance, should orders granted by courts that patently lacked
jurisdiction to make them still have legal effect? Imagine a High
Court that decides an issue involving exclusive Constitutional
Court jurisdiction. Does it undermine the authority of a court and
the rule of law for a party to ignore that High Court order when a
lower court is arguably the one undermining the apparent author-
ity of another court in the first place? A reasonable case can be
made that the party aiming to rely on this dubious order can be
expected to institute litigation in order to enforce it. On the other
hand, the Constitutional Court’s majority expressly considered
this possibility in Kirland (above) and drew a sharp distinction
between an invalid court order on the basis of absence of
jurisdiction (which is void ab initio), and apparently invalid
administrative action. As the court then noted, this distinction
‘seems paradoxical but is not. The court, as the font of legality,
has the means itself to assert the dividing line between what is
lawful and not lawful. For the court itself to disclaim a preceding
court order that is a nullity therefore does not risk disorder or
self-help’ (n78).
Further, it is not necessarily clear that the stakes are quite that
high, considering that in practice this would be a disagreement
as to who has the obligation to approach a court in the event of a
purportedly unlawful case. As this case illustrates, the nature of
litigation is such that the party with interests to protect is likely to
seek court assistance in any event. Therefore, if an administrator
seeks to impose an unlawful decision and is rebuffed by an
affected party, the apocalyptic predictions of self-help and under-
mining the court’s authority would not necessarily follow. Far more
worrying, however, is the possibility of a state entity bypassing
the need to seek to review its own decision, and instead
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proceeding as if the decision is pro non scripto (see the
discussion in L Boonzaier ‘Good reviews, bad actors: The Consti-
tutional Court’s procedural drama’ (2015) 7/1 Constitutional Court
Review 1ff). Whatever one’s position on this debate, it is certain
that – notwithstanding Kirland – this disagreement is not settled
and will re-emerge in several guises.
Retrospective taxation: Rule of law
Is it constitutional to impose a tax retrospectively? This is a
vexed question for which different countries have offered different
answers. Some, like Canada, place no limits on retroactive
taxing. Others, such the United States, impose only a minimal
burden of rationality. Still others, including Germany, presume
that retroactive taxation is unlawful.
The Constitution provides no clear guidance. While it prohibits
retroactive criminal laws, it says nothing directly about retroactive
civil laws. Our law has always had a presumption against
interpreting legislation to apply retrospectively, but the courts
have not held that laws could be unconstitutional because they
apply retrospectively. That is, until Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service & another
[2017] ZAGPPHC 231, 2017 (6) SA 435 (GP), [2017] 4 All SA 175.
The case concerned a change in tax law which made the
shareholders of Pienaar Brothers liable to pay secondary tax on
companies (STC). Before the change in the law, payments made
to shareholders were not subject to STC. The details of the
change in the tax law are not important for our purposes. What is
important is the chronology of events.
In his budget speech on 20 February 2007, the Minister of
Finance announced that he intended to make changes to STC.
On 21 February 2007, the Commissioner of the South African
Revenue Service (the SARS) issued a press statement which,
depending on how it is interpreted, removed the exemption that
would have applied to Pienaar Brothers with immediate effect.
On 27 February 2007, the National Treasury published a Draft
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill which included the amendment
that would render Pienaar Brothers liable for STC. The transaction
that led to the STC liability was concluded in early May 2007.
On 7 June 2007, the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill was pub-
lished. It differed from the Draft Bill, but still sought to remove the
exemption. The explanatory memorandum to the Bill explained
that the government saw transactions like that of Pienaar Brothers
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as improperly exploiting a loophole in the legislation. The Bill was
promulgated as the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 8 of 2007 on
8August 2007. It applied retrospectively to 21 February 2007 and
therefore covered Pienaar Brothers’ transaction.
In addition to an interpretive argument that the Amendment Act
did not apply to the transaction (which we do not address),
Pienaar Brothers argued why the retrospective nature of the law
was unconstitutional. First, it argued that retrospectivity was
contrary to the principle of legality and the rule of law. Secondly, it
contended that the retroactive application of the tax law consti-
tuted an arbitrary deprivation of property contrary to section 25(1)
of the Constitution. Given the absence of any domestic law to
guide the court, all the parties made detailed submissions based
on comparative law. The court ultimately rejected both chal-
lenges. We address each in turn.
Retrospectivity and rationality
All the parties accepted that the retrospective application of a
law could be challenged on the basis that it violated the rule of
law. So, too, did the court. This is an important finding, and
Pienaar Brothers is the first court to make such a finding. After
considering the different standards applied in other jurisdictions,
the court held that ‘the basic ‘‘rationality’’ standard applies’ to
challenges to retroactive laws (para [82]). Fabricius J held that
this was the same standard applied by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v Carlton 114 S Ct 2018, 512 US 26 (1994).
He then held that, applying that standard, there was nothing
constitutionally problematic in the retrospective application of the
Amendment Act. That was because Pienaar Brothers had in fact
been notified of the intention to close the loophole and make the
transaction subject to STC. As the High Court explained:
What this means is that even on Applicant’s own test, it cannot
succeed. It contended there had been no adequate warning, but this
not so in the context of the budget speech of 21 February 2007 and
the Draft Bill published on 27 February 2007. All tax payers were thus
given ample notice that, to put it at its lowest, they could not safely rely
on Section 44 (9) of the Income Tax Act after 21 February 2007. The
question of whether the Applicant and its advisors actually made
themselves aware of the budget speech or Draft Bill is in the present
context not relevant (para [85]).
In our view, the court reached the correct result, but the
adoption of the rationality standard is open to criticism. Rational-
ity is already a requirement for all law, even laws that are purely
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prospective. Using it to evaluate retroactive laws fails to take
account of the additional violation resulting from the retroactive
application of a law. The correct constitutional standard should
acknowledge that retroactivity is in itself inherently inconsistent
with the rule of law and demands greater justification than similar
non-retroactive laws. In our view, the court should have adopted
a standard similar to those adopted by the Indian Supreme Court
(see, eg, National Agricultural v Union of India (2003) 5 SCC 23,
260 ITR 548; Ujagar Prints v Union of India & others 1989AIR 516,
1988 SCR Supl (3) 770; Empire Industries Limited & others v
Union of India & others 1986AIR 662, 1985 SCR Supl (1) 292); the
European Court of Human Rights (MA & others v Finland (2003)
37 EHRR CD 210, [2003] ECHR 712; NKM v Hungary Application
no 66529/11); the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal
(Carlton v United States 972 F 2d 1051 (1992)); or the German
Supreme Court (the German position is summarised in Pienaar
Brothers para [78]). While these standards differ in their detail,
they all recognise that mere rationality is insufficient to justify
retroactive taxation.
The key reason why these, and other countries, limit the
legislature’s ability to pass retrospective laws, is that they defeat
the expectations of citizens formed in reliance on the existing
state of the law. This undermines a central element of the rule of
law – that laws must be known in advance, and people’s reliance
on those laws should (generally) be protected. Where the reli-
ance is rational (there was good reason for it) and legitimate
(it was consistent with the underlying intent of the law), it is
difficult to see how defeating that reliance could be consistent
with the rule of law.
Applying that standard, the Amendment Act would still have
been constitutional. From 21 February 2007 when the press
statement was released, all taxpayers should have been on
notice that the STC regime would change and could impose tax
liabilities for transactions like those of the Pienaar Brothers that
had previously been exempted. Reliance at that stage was
neither rational nor legitimate. It was an impermissible attempt to
take advantage of a loophole before the legislature could close it.
Indeed, Fabricius J’s reasoning appears to apply a reliance
standard, rather than a rationality standard.
In addition, the High Court appears to have misinterpreted the
US Supreme Court’s decision in Carlton (above), and ignored the
compelling dissenting opinions. While the Supreme Court did set
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rationality as the primary standard by which to judge retroactive
laws, it also held that laws that retroactively imposed ‘wholly new
taxes’ or that reached too far back into the past would also be
unconstitutional. Fabricius J does not mention these elements of
the decision.
Moreover, as both Scalia and O’Connor JJ pointed out in their
minority opinions in Carlton, an ordinary rationality standard will
mean that retroactive taxation will never be unconstitutional. In
Scalia J’s words:
The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in this case
guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid. To
pass constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute need
only be ‘rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.’ . . .
Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose . . . and
any law that retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction, or
increases a rate rationally furthers that goal (US v Carlton para [40]).
For a constitutional standard prohibiting retroactive taxation to
be meaningful, it must be higher than mere rationality. A reliance-
based standard best fits with the purpose of the rule of law.
An appeal against the High Court’s ruling was abandoned, so
Pienaar Brothers sets the law for now. But there are likely to be
many more such challenges now that the door has been opened.
Future courts will, it is hoped, follow the High Court in permitting
these challenges, but set a more appropriate test.
Arbitrary deprivation of property
The High Court also rejected the challenge based on section
25(1) of the Constitution. It held, first, that ‘it cannot be argued
that all taxes involve a ‘‘deprivation’’ of property’’ (para [110]) as
intended in section 25(1). Fabricius J explained this view as
follows:
A State cannot exist without taxes. Society receives benefits from
them. Taxes are not penalties. Neither can they be, without any
qualification, be regarded as unjust deprivation of property use (para
[110]).
This passage does not appear to exclude the possibility that
some taxes may constitute deprivations of property, but merely
that in the ordinary course a tax should not be treated as a
deprivation. This is confirmed by the High Court’s second reason
for rejecting the challenge. It held that ‘[s]ufficient reason was
established and the process was fair in the present context’ (para
[110]). This was because all taxpayers had been given adequate
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notice of the upcoming change, and the fact that it would apply
retrospectively.
Again, we agree with the High Court’s outcome, but have
difficulty with its reasoning. The Constitutional Court has never
directly considered whether taxes constitute deprivations of
property. Indeed, it has expressly avoided the question on two
occasions (First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services & another;
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of
Finance (CCT19/01) [2002] ZACC 5, 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), 2002
(7) BCLR 702 and Law Society of South Africa & others v Minister
for Transport & another [2010] ZACC 25, 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC),
2011 (2) BCLR 150. Other High Courts have agreed that taxation
does not constitute deprivation (see, eg, First National Bank of SA
Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Services & another 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C), 2001 (3) SA 310 (C);
Eskom v Thabo Mofutsanyana Distriksraad [2004] ZAFSHC 17).
Academics, on the other hand, have criticised these judgments
and universally reasoned that taxation does amount to a depriva-
tion (AJ Van der Walt ‘Negating Grotius – the constitutional validity
of statutory security rights in favour of the state: First National
Bank of SA t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C)’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 86;
I Rautenbach ‘Overview of Constitutional Court decisions on the
bill of rights – 2010’ 2011 TSAR 342; D Visser ‘Unjustified
enrichment’ 2004 Annual Survey 280).
This is a sticky issue. But in our view taxes should be treated as
deprivations of property. They are laws that oblige people to pay
money to the state and allow the state to employ civil enforcement
mechanisms to collect that money. This does not mean that
courts will second-guess every tax. Almost all taxes will easily
clear the arbitrary threshold set by section 25(1). But if the
legislature seeks to abuse its taxing power, the courts will be able
to step in. As Van der Walt has explained:
On a purely conceptual and logical level, one has to disagree with the
view that taxation is neither a deprivation nor an expropriation of
property. In so far as taxation results in property being transferred
from private hands to the fiscus, it must qualify as either a deprivation
or an expropriation of that property. Of course, the property clause
does not render all deprivations or expropriations of property per se
unlawful – the property owner is only protected against unlawful
deprivations and expropriations. . . . However, taxation can be unlaw-
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ful, just as deprivation and expropriation of property can be unlaw-
ful. . . . [A] tax that is demonstrably overbroad or oppressive is subject
to judicial and constitutional challenge and scrutiny, and part of that
scrutiny may well include the question whether the tax conflicts with
the property clause (Van der Walt (2002) 18 SAJHR 86, 97) (emphasis
added).
That seems consistent with our constitutional scheme.
BILL OF RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
CHILDREN
Is it constitutional that the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 requires
that, in surrogacy agreements, there must be a genetic link
between a parent and the child who is born? In AB & another v
Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43, 2017 (3) BCLR
267 (CC), 2017 (3) SA 570, a majority of the Constitutional Court
said yes. In a challenge to section 294 of the Children’s Act –
which is a gatekeeper to surrogacy agreements, requiring a
genetic link between a commissioning parent and the child who
is subsequently born – Nkabinde J’s majority judgment found that
the provision must be upheld as it prioritises the best interests of
the child. Astonishingly, the majority judgment denied that the
countervailing right to bodily and psychological integrity – includ-
ing, most crucially, the right to make reproductive decisions –
arises at all. The majority also struck a blow against empirical
research in interpreting legislation, roundly rejecting the role of
credible data in determining whether a law is constitutional.
Ms AB had long wished to become a parent, but struggled with
infertility. In 2011, after a decade of unsuccessful in vitro fertilisa-
tion (IVF) treatments and a divorce, she was told to consider
surrogacy – to enter into an agreement with another woman to
carry her baby to term. The Children’s Act permits surrogacy, but
strictly regulates just how surrogacy arrangements come about –
only altruistic, and not commercial, surrogacy is allowed. A
surrogate mother can be reimbursed for her loss of income
during the pregnancy and her medical expenses, but cannot ask
for payment for carrying the child. Some are skeptical of whether
a clear line can be drawn between these two forms of surrogacy
(Sharyn L Roach Anleu ‘Reinforcing gender norms: Commercial
and altruistic surrogacy’ (1990) 33/1 Acta Sociologica 63). Never-
theless, the law across various jurisdictions preserves the distinc-
tion, and there are few countries that permit commercial surrogacy.
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This is based on the notion that the market has ‘moral limits’
(Michael J Sandel ‘What money can’t buy – The moral limits of
markets’ Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1998)), and on the
sheer inequality in bargaining power that can accompany such
agreements.
This is not the only way in which the Children’s Act regulates
surrogacy. Section 294 does not allow a surrogacy arrangement
where there is no direct genetic link between a prospective
parent and the child who is to be born as a result. What this
means is that if a prospective mother is, like AB, both conception
infertile and pregnancy infertile (ie, she can neither conceive a
foetus nor carry it term), surrogacy is not an option for her. For
men who are infertile, surrogacy is also precluded, unless they
have a partner who contributes genetic material to the foetus.
AB could not understand this restriction: when she underwent
IVF treatment, it was with both donor ova and sperm. Why, then,
should there be any difficulty with her also using double donors,
this time within a surrogacy arrangement? Supported by the
Surrogacy Advisory Group, a non-governmental organisation
working in this area, AB launched a constitutional challenge to
section 294 in the High Court, arguing that it violates a number of
her rights including her rights to equality and to reproductive
autonomy.
The Minister of Social Development and the Centre for Child
Law (admitted as a friend of the court) resisted these arguments,
instead placing weight on the importance of a child’s knowing his
or her genetic origin, in line with the constitutional injunction that a
child’s best interests are of paramount importance. Importantly,
the genetic link requirement, said the Minister, also ensures that
prospective parents do not use surrogacy to circumvent adoption
processes, and also safeguards against the creation of designer
babies and the perils of commercial surrogacy.
In the High Court (AB & another v Minister of Social Develop-
ment as Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law [2015] ZAGPPHC
580, 2016 (2) SA 27 (GP)), AB was successful, and the matter
was referred to the Constitutional Court to confirm the lower
court’s finding of unconstitutionality. The Constitutional Court
declined to do so. A majority of seven justices found that none of
AB’s rights had been violated by the legislation (para [240]), not
even her right to make reproductive decisions under section 12 of
the Constitution. In a compelling minority judgment Khampepe J
thoughtfully fleshed out the content of this right, and would have
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found for AB. The majority, however, construed the section 12
right extremely narrowly as concerning only decisions for one’s
own anatomy: it is not engaged in any parental choice that does
not encompass brute bodily facts (paras [315]–[318]).
On the majority’s take AB’s rights were not infringed at all.
Instead, at centre stage are children’s rights, with Nkabinde J
asserting that section 294 and its requirement of a genetic link
serve the purpose of creating a bond between child and parent,
which is ‘important to the self-identity and self-respect of the
child’ (para [294]).
Overall, there are some troubling aspects to the majority’s
reasoning. First, the question of ‘clarity’ regarding a child’s origins
is a difficult one because, although it is certainly the norm that
most children born to their parents are biologically linked to them,
it is quite different to suggest: (a) that the lack of such a link
necessarily constitutes harm to a child; and (b) that this harm
requires legal prohibition of reproduction without a genetic link.
For instance, it is not clear that a ‘self-identity’ aim such as this
could not be achieved by informing a child of its genetic origins
and surrogate mother’s background if necessary. It appears the
majority is not merely relying on a child being genetically
informed of its origins, but believe a genetic tie between child and
parent is a constituent part of forming a child’s self-identity.
Although this is not necessarily implausible as a psychological
phenomenon, further reasons ought to be provided as to the
weight of such a genetic tie and its impact on early childhood
development – especially if we are to claim that the state may
intervene in the reproductive choices of consenting and sober-
minded adults who appear fully capable of discharging parental
duties to children.
Further, it is one thing to accept that, all things being equal, a
child has an interest in having a genetic link with its parents. It is
another thing entirely to find that this interest trumps all others,
including those of a prospective parent. The majority, however,
found that this purpose is so important that it appears better for a
child not to be born at all, than to be born with no genetic link to
his or her parents. This is a dangerous implication, not least
because it casts aspersions on the value of the lives of adopted
children who do not share genes with their adoptive parents, and
elevates biological parental-child relationships over others.
Compounding this, Nkabinde J actively heldAB responsible for
being single, offering her the solution of either finding a partner
149CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 28 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
who is able to donate a gamete for surrogacy, or simply living with
the choices she had made (para [302]). The negative effects of
infertility do not have anything to do with legislative measures,
said the majority judgment: what disqualifies AB from surrogacy
is not legislation, but her own biology, paired with her choice to
remain single.
This argument by the majority judgment falls short. As
Khampepe J’s cogent minority points out, it fails to recognise the
value of diverse family formations and single parenthood (para
[96]). Worrying, too, is that it does not take seriously that
technological progress can reshape what is possible (para
[113]). And here, as the minority pointed out, AB and the
Surrogacy Advisory Group argued not that the state should be
responsible for paying for her surrogacy arrangement, but only
that it not impede her choices.
Perhaps, one might quibble, it is no bad thing, in a country with
almost 3,5 million orphans, that surrogacy is closely regulated so
that prospective parents like AB opt rather to adopt. After all, one
of the purposes of section 294’s genetic-link requirement is to
ensure that the rigours of the adoption process are not circum-
vented. However, this argument does not quite hold water: first,
adoption in South Africa is notoriously difficult, even for willing
prospective parents; and secondly, even if one thinks that
adoption is a morally good or even preferable decision, it simply
does not follow that this is the state’s decision to take. This is
especially so because those who can choose to fall pregnant do
not have the state informing their parental choices.
Nkabinde J’s judgment also renounced the usefulness of facts
in informing constitutional interpretation. She faulted the High
Court judgment for finding that credible data must be put forward
showing that the absence of a genetic link is detrimental to a
surrogate child: ‘[t]hat approach’, she objected, ‘elevates the
importance of empirical research above the purposive construc-
tion of the challenged provision’ (para [291]). It is true that the
courts, and not expert opinion, have the last say on constitutional
interpretation, and rightly so. But the majority judgment set up an
entirely false dichotomy between empiricism on the one hand,
and interpretation on the other, not least because the judiciary
has a rich track record of drawing on empirics – be this pointed
data or more sweeping societal context – to inform a constitu-
tional interpretation of legislation (Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused
Children & another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
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Development & another [2013] ZACC 35, 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC),
2013 (12) BCLR 1429; Minister of Health & others v Treatment
Action Campaign & others (No 2) [2002] ZACC 15, 2002 (5) SA
721 (CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033).
A final comment on the reproductive rights question: The
majority argues that the reproductive rights of the particular
individual must be impugned, and this was not the case before
us. However, it is somewhat strange to uncouple the concept of
reproductive rights from parenting so cleanly. Certainly, ‘reproduc-
tion’ is not exhausted by parenting but includes a myriad of other
interests such as autonomy and access to contraception. It is,
however, something else entirely to suggest that the decision to
become a parent and assume parental responsibilities cannot, in
the circumstances before the court, be regarded as a question of
reproductive rights. This is because it is entirely about how a
child is brought into the world and who will assume parental
responsibilities.
The primary initiator of that decision is AB. She is therefore the
main agent of the entire pregnancy. The surrogate mother and the
sperm and gamete donors would not have participated in this
particular form of reproduction had it not been understood that
AB would assume parental responsibilities. This reproductive
process was thus triggered and directed by AB. Therefore, it
logically involves her right to reproduce in this particular manner.
It is perplexing that this obvious causal relationship between
initiating agent and reproductive process could be ignored when
deciding the reproductive rights of the individuals involved. On
many fronts, then, it is regrettable that the majority judgment held
sway.
Surrogacy was also the concern of the Pretoria High Court in Ex
Parte HPP & others; Ex Parte DME & others (45037/2016) [2017]
ZAGPPHC 70, [2017] 2 All SA 171 (GP), 2017 (4) SA 528, which
was charged with determining whether a surrogacy facilitation is
unlawful in terms of the Children’s Act.
Two applications before the court sought the confirmation of
surrogate motherhood agreements. Ms Strydom, who had herself
six times acted as a surrogate, performed the services of a
surrogacy facilitator – or surrogacy coordinator – for both surro-
gate motherhood agreements. She was joined in the proceed-
ings, and the Centre for Child Law was admitted as a friend of the
court at the court’s request.
Strydom argued that she was entitled to act as a surrogacy
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coordinator as an exercise of her right to practice a trade or
occupation of her choosing under section 22 of the Constitution.
Tolmay J disagreed. Surrogacy facilitation in effect constitutes
a form of commercial surrogacy and is, accordingly, unlawful.
Section 301 of the Children’s Act limits the valid payments for
surrogacy to costs directly related to conception, pregnancy,
birth, and the confirmation of the agreement, in addition to
professional medical and legal expenses. This does not include
payment to a surrogacy coordinator.
The court emphasised the importance of the prohibition of
commercial surrogacy:
The reason why s 301 prohibits payments other than those provided
for is to prevent commercial surrogacy. As already pointed out the
limitations’ purpose is to prevent commercial surrogacy, which is
ultimately enacted to protect the public interest. Important issues of
public policy arise which justify a limitation of Ms Strydom’s right to ask
payment for her services. Surrogacy is strictly regulated, not only here
but also internationally, and the reason for this regulatory framework is
ultimately to protect the public against unscrupulous people who may
abuse vulnerable people (para [51]).
Tolmay J found that Strydom’s right to exercise her chosen
profession had not been limited: all that had been limited was her
right to ask for payment, and this was a justifiable limitation in
terms of section 36 of the Constitution. This reasoning is strained,
and is difficult to square with South African Diamond Producers
Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy & others [2017]
ZACC 26, 2017 (6) SA 331 (CC), 2017 (10) BCLR 1303, which
found that where a law puts in place a legal barrier to choice, or
makes ‘the practice of that trade of profession so undesirable,
difficult or unprofitable that the choice to enter it is in fact limited’,
then the choice element of section 22 is impaired (para [68]).
It would have been had Tolmay J found that section 22 of the
Constitution expressly contemplates the regulation of professions
(and so Strydom did not fall within the ambit of the right), or that
the prohibition imposed by section 301 effectively limits not only
her right to claim payment for services rendered, but, more
principally, her freedom to render those services (for, if one
follows the logic of the judgment, she would be permitted to
render those services voluntarily, and without seeking remunera-
tion, but if so the services would not truly constitute a trade,
occupation, or profession).
Far from Strydom’s having a right to demand payment for her
surrogacy facilitation services, the agreements to pay her consti-
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tuted a criminal offence, and the surrogacy facilitation agree-
ments were unlawful and unenforceable.
The court did, however, confirm the underlying surrogacy
agreements which were not similarly tainted by unlawfulness
(paras [70] [71]).
CLASS ACTIONS
In recent years, this chapter has discussed the significant
development of court-made rules to govern class actions, and
the certification and success of the first class actions under this
regime (for a discussion of this jurisprudence, see J Brickhill & J
Bleazard ‘Bill of Rights class actions’ in M Du Plessis et al (eds)
Class Action Litigation in South Africa (Juta 2017)). In the year
under review, a narrow question relating to class action proce-
dure arose in National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa
(NUMSA) v Oosthuizen & others (36016/2015) [2017] ZAGPJHC
56, 2017 (6) SA 272 (GJ) (Numsa v Oosthuizen). The applicant,
the NUMSA, applied for leave, as a class representative, to
continue a pending action it had already instituted as a class
action. This raised the issue of the timing of a certification
application: whether a party seeking to represent a class must
apply to court for authority to act as a class representative before
summons is issued.
The High Court answered in the affirmative (para [47]), drawing
on the decisions in Children’s Resource Centre Trust & others v
Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd & others [2012] ZASCA 182, 2013 (2) SA
213 (SCA), 2013 (3) BCLR 279; Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty)
Ltd & others [2013] ZACC 23, 2013 (5) SA 89 (CC), (2013 (10)
BCLR 1135. However, even assuming that ex post facto certifica-
tion in the interests of justice were permissible in principle, the
court held that the circumstances of the present case did not
justify the relaxation of the requirement of prior certification.
Therefore, prior class certification was required, and the already
pending action could not be certified ex post facto as a class
action (paras [48] [53]).
DIGNITY: EUTHANASIA
Who decides what kind of a life is valuable, or is worth living,
and on what basis? In Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services & others v Estate Late James Stransham-Ford & others
[2016] ZASCA 197, [2017] 1 All SA 354 (SCA), 2017 (3) BCLR
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364, 2017 (3) SA 152, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that, in
the absence of further facts or legal argument, an individual
should not be the arbiter of his or her own fate by choosing to end
his or her life – at least, not before the wheels of legislative
consideration or cautious common-law development creak into
action. The Supreme Court of Appeal declined to recognise that
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide is lawful, even when it is
requested by a terminal cancer patient.
Stransham-Ford had terminal cancer. He sought an order that a
doctor could lawfully help him end his life, and would be
exempted from criminal or disciplinary proceedings, and to
develop the common law to allow for voluntary euthanasia or
assisted suicide.
Fabricius J in the High Court, in Stransham-Ford v Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services & others [2015] ZAGPPHC
230, 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP), [2015] 3 All SA 109 (GP), 2015 (6)
BCLR 737 granted the order on an urgent basis, without knowing
that Stransham-Ford had died just two hours earlier. The High
Court judgment canvassed domestic and comparative law and
stressed that the current legal position prohibiting euthanasia
was forged in a pre-constitutional era. Fabricius J also found that
no principled distinction can be drawn between passive euthana-
sia – where life-sustaining medical treatment is withdrawn – and
active euthanasia.
The Ministers of Justice and Health, the National Director of
Public Prosecutions, and the Health Professions Council of South
Africa appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Wallis JAwrote the court’s unanimous and carefully considered
judgment, overturning Fabricius J’s order in strong terms and
castigating the High Court at various points for its approach.
Once Stransham-Ford had died, there was no cause of action to
be adjudicated by the court (para [20]), notwithstanding the
constitutional issues his claim raised. This alone, Wallis JA held,
was sufficient to set aside Fabricius J’s order.
However, given that the High Court had delivered a reasoned
judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal proceeded to address
the merits and to obviate any precedential effects that the High
Court judgment would otherwise have (para [26]). This was
particularly important, Wallis JA found, because the High Court
based its findings on an incorrect approach to the existing legal
position (para [57]). As to comparative law, that must not be too
readily ‘transplanted to South African soil’ (para [58]).
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In any event, found the court, the factual basis for the order had
not been established: there was no evidence confirming Stran-
sham-Ford’s prediction of the manner of his death, or his mental
capacity or willingness to go through with either assisted suicide
or voluntary euthanasia. There was also no evidence that there
was a doctor willing to assist. The factual basis that would have
grounded the order was missing. So too, the court found, was a
‘full and proper examination’ of contemporary domestic, foreign,
and international law (para [5]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment thus hewed closely to
the unfortunate line drawn by the Constitutional Court in H v Fetal
Assessment Centre [2014] ZACC 34, 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC), 2015
(2) BCLR 127: no matter how abstract or principled a legal
question may seem, where a party advocates the development of
the common law, that party must do so on the basis of all relevant
facts and circumstances (para [26]). This is crucial in South
Africa, Wallis JA found, because a court
would need to be satisfied that a proper regulatory framework was, or
could be put, in place and that the framework would not be a pious
hope designed in a bureaucrat’s or idealist’s office, but one the
functional operations of which had been tested and not found wanting
(para [98]).
This is not least, the court held, because any court considering
the matter must not only be animated by the individualistic
impulses that motivate one sector of society, but also must
account for more communitarian attitudes to life. The court
stated:
Acourt addressing these issues needs to be aware of differing cultural
values and attitudes within our diverse population. It needs to con-
sider the impact of its decision beyond our affluent suburbs into our
crowded townships, our informal settlements and in the vast rural
areas that make up South Africa. It is in that context that it must
determine whether its decision will further undercut the foundational
value of the right to life or be supportive of it. The notion of a dignified
death must be informed by a rounded view of society, not confined to
a restricted section of it. This was not done in this case and could not
have been done because of the inadequacies of the evidence and the
haste with which it was decided (para [100]).
Wallis JA did not, however, exclude the possibility of a person
applying to a court for an order such as the one Stransham-Ford
sought – provided that the requirements of legal standing are
met, and that both the facts and the law (including comparative
law) are fully canvassed. However, while this possibility is open
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in theory, Wallis JA indicated that it would be welcomed if
Parliament would rather resolve the issue through legislation
(para [101]).
EQUALITY
Intestate inheritance rights for same-sex permanent partners
In Laubscher NO v Duplan & another (CCT234/15) [2016]
ZACC 44, 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC), 2017 (4) BCLR 415, the
Constitutional Court affirmed the rights of same-sex partners in
permanent relationships to inherit intestate – notwithstanding the
enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.
Mr Duplan and Mr Laubscher had been in a permanent
partnership for twelve years when Laubscher died. The two had
never solemnised or registered their same-sex partnership under
the Civil Union Act, and Laubscher died without leaving a will. His
brother was the executor of his estate. Duplan argued that he was
entitled to inherit intestate, in line with an earlier decision of the
Constitutional Court in Gory v Kolver [2006] ZACC 20, 2007 (4)
SA 97 (CC), 2007 (3) BCLR 249, which found that the definition of
‘spouse’ in the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 includes
permanent same-sex partners who bore reciprocal duties of
support. But Gory v Kolver was decided before the Civil Union
Act came into effect, and the court had previously found in Volks
v Robinson [2005] ZACC 2, 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC), that where
a heterosexual couple can choose to regulate their relationship
by law but do not, the surviving member of that couple cannot
then benefit from the estate.
Did the enactment of the Civil Union Act analogously mean that
same-sex couples are precluded from inheriting intestate if they
failed to solemnise or regularise their relationship by law? The
Constitutional Court found that it did not. Mbha AJ’s majority
judgment found that all the Civil Union Act does is create a new –
but not exhaustive – category of beneficiaries, that is, same-sex
partners who have entered into civil unions. Gory v Kolver is still in
effect, and so surviving permanent same-sex partners who failed
to enter into registered unions can still inherit intestate. The
enactment of the Civil Union Act has not changed this – not least
because it must be presumed that new legislation does not alter
existing law more than is necessary (para [39]).
More controversial for the court was whether to overturn its
earlier decision in Volks v Robinson, one of the court’s most
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vigorously criticised judgments (n73). There, a heterosexual
permanent partner was found not to be entitled to claim any
maintenance from the estate of her deceased partner. The court
held:
By opting not to marry, thereby not accepting the legal responsibilities
and entitlements that go with marriage; a person cannot complain if
she [or he] is denied the legal benefits she [or he] would have had if
she [or he] had married. Having chosen cohabitation rather than
marriage, she [or he] must bear the consequences (Volks v Robinson
para [154], Sachs J criticising the majority judgment).
Mbha AJ found that Volks v Robinson was distinguishable in
that it concerned maintenance rather than intestate succession
(para [46]), and that, in any event, overturning Volks v Robinson
would have no effect on relief to same-sex permanent partners.
While this preserves the anomalous position – that same-sex
partners, but not heterosexual partners, can inherit intestate even
if they have not legally regularised their relationships – Mbha AJ
reasoned that the legislature could always change this position
(para [31]).
Froneman J’s separate concurring judgment confronted Volks
v Robinson head-on (para [60]). Gory v Kolver must be under-
stood as targeting the unconstitutionality of same-sex partners’
not being entitled to marry (para [63]). The Civil Union Act
removed this impediment. And so, in Froneman J’s view, the right
of same-sex partners in permanent relationships to inherit intes-
tate must be established independently of Gory v Kolver. To do
this, Volks v Robinson needs to be tackled, for it relied on the
general principle that ‘the law may distinguish between married
people and unmarried people’ (Volks v Robinson para [54]).
Instead of marriage or legal regularisation being the significant
determinant, Froneman J stated that ‘the existence of a reciprocal
duty of support’ (para [77]) should give rise to legal protection
after one partner has died. This is consistent with the constitu-
tional prohibition of discrimination on the ground of marital status
(para [81]). He reasoned that a departure from Volks v Robinson
was justified as, with the benefit of hindsight, that judgment was
clearly wrong as it sought to eradicate one form of unfair
discrimination by creating another (para [86]). Both unmarried
same-sex and heterosexual partners who bear reciprocal duties
of support should fall within the ambit of the Intestate Succession
Act and be entitled to inherit intestate.
Both Constitutional Court judgments correctly resist a ‘levelling-
down’ approach, that would establish equality between same-sex
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and heterosexual couples at the expense of depriving same-sex
partners of their extant rights. But Mbha AJ’s judgment means
that differentiation and disparate treatment of unmarried hetero-
sexual partners persists, and this raises clear equality concerns.
In our view, Froneman J’s approach takes the next logical step:
ensure equality by recognising that just as same-sex partners in
permanent relationships with reciprocal support duties can inherit
intestate, so can heterosexual partners. This recognition is cru-
cial, especially for ensuring the financial security of marginalised
partners – often women – who may not always be able to exercise
the choice to marry, but who are in relationships with de facto
reciprocal duties of support.
Polygamous Muslim marriages: Wills Act
Moosa NO & others v Harnaker & others [2017] ZAWCHC 97,
[2017] 4All SA 498 (WCC), 2017 (6) SA425 is the latest in a line of
decisions extending the word ‘spouse’ to include persons mar-
ried under Islamic law. The definition of ‘surviving spouse’ was
extended to include women in monogamous and polygynous
Muslim marriages under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act 27 of 1990 in Daniels v Campbell NO & others [2004] ZACC
14, 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC), 2004 (7) BCLR 735; and to inherit in
terms of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 in Hassam v
Jacobs NO & others [2009] ZACC 19, 2009 (5) SA572 (CC), 2009
(11) BCLR 1148. Moosa NO & others v Harneker & others
concerned the same issue in relation to the Wills Act 7 of 1953 as
it applies to spouses in Muslim marriages.
Section 2C(1) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 provides that ‘(i)f any
descendant of a testator, excluding a minor or a mentally ill
descendant, who, together with the surviving spouse of the
testator, is entitled to a benefit in terms of a will renounces his
right to receive such a benefit, such benefit shall vest in the
surviving spouse’. The term ‘surviving spouse’ did not include
spouses in monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriages
solemnised under Islamic law.
Le Grange J held that to that extent, section 2C(1) of the Wills
Act was in breach of section 9 of the Constitution, as it was
unfairly discriminatory on the grounds of religion and marital
status (paras [30]–[33]). The court accordingly declared the
provision unconstitutional and ordered that the following words
be read in at the end of section 2C(1): ‘For purposes of this
sub-section, a ‘‘surviving spouse’’ includes every husband and
158 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 37 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
wife of a de facto monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriage
solemnised under the religion of Islam’ (para [39]).
Transgender persons; alteration of sex description
The applicants in KOS & others v Minister of Home Affairs &
others [2017] ZAWCHC 90, [2017] 4 All SA 468 (WCC), 2017 (6)
SA 588 were three transgender women who had been born male,
but had subsequently undergone sex/gender realignment and
wished to have their sex altered in the birth register. This is the
first reported judgment to deal with transgender rights and
importantly recognises them as gender rights.
Each of the applicants had a female spouse, whom they had
married before their sex/gender realignment under the Marriage
Act 25 of 1961. The Department of Home Affairs initially delayed
and handled the applications incorrectly, before refusing the
applications of KOS and GNC. It said that the registration would
have the effect of reflecting persons in same-sex relationships as
married under the Marriage Act, which it considered impermis-
sible (paras [13] [14]). KOS, GNC and their spouses were
advised to divorce and remarry under the Civil Union Act, but
they could not do so because none of the grounds for divorce
applied to them (para [12]). As regards the third applicant, WJV,
the Department recorded her sex/gender realignment but deleted
the particulars of her marriage recorded in the population register
(para [15]).
The applicants, represented by the Legal Resources Centre,
approached the Western Cape High Court to review and set
aside the decisions of the Department of Home Affairs and to
direct the Department to register their sex/gender changes. They
also sought relief in the interests of similarly situated persons.
Binns-Ward J distinguished transgender persons from homosexu-
als, noting the ‘all too common tendency to conflate sex, gender
and sexuality, which is misconceived’ (para [21]). Regarding the
nature of marriage, the court firmly rejected the argument that
marriage requires the ‘capacity for natural heterosexual inter-
course’. Binns-Ward J quoted with approval from the following
dictum of the European Court of Human Rights:
Marriage is far more than a sexual union, and the capacity for sexual
intercourse is therefore not essential for marriage. Persons who are
not or are no longer capable of procreating or having sexual inter-
course may also want to and do marry. That is because marriage is far
more than a union which legitimates sexual intercourse and aims at
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procreating: it is a legal institution which creates a fixed legal
relationship between both the partners and third parties (including the
authorities); it is a societal bond, in that married people (as one
learned writer put it) ‘represent to the world that theirs is a relationship
based on strong human emotions, exclusive commitment to each
other and permanence’; it is, moreover, a species of togetherness in
which intellectual, spiritual and emotional bonds are at least as
essential as the physical one (para [20], citing Cossey v United
Kingdom [1990] ECHR 21 ((1991) 13 EHRR 622) para [4.5.2],
footnotes omitted).
Binns-Ward J ultimately upheld the application and granted an
order that not only granted relief to the individual applicants, but
also provided direction to the Department on its obligations in all
such cases. The court declared that the Department of Home
Affairs had violated the applicants’ rights to just administrative
action, equality, and dignity. It further declared that the Depart-
ment is obliged to determine applications submitted in terms of
theAlteration of Sex Description and Sex StatusAct 49 of 2003 for
the alteration of the sex description on a person’s birth register,
regardless of his or her marital status. The court set aside the
refusal or failure of the Department to decide the applications of
the individual applicants and remitted those decisions to it for
determination.
Although Binns-Ward J did not grant substitution and expressly
direct the Department to register the sex/gender realignments of
the first and second applicants but merely directed it to recon-
sider its refusal to do so, the judgment lays a strong foundation
for the review proceedings to follow.
EXPRESSION
Dismissal: Racial slurs: Reasonableness of arbitration awards
Is an arbitration award ordering the reinstatement of an
employee who made a racial slur unreasonable? If so, is this
sufficient to have the award set aside? The Constitutional Court in
South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration & others [2016] ZACC 38, 2017 (1) SA
549 (CC), 2017 (2) BCLR 241 answered both questions in the
affirmative.
Kruger, an employee of the South African Revenue Service (the
SARS), called his team leader a ‘kaffir’. As required by the
collective agreement which binds the SARS, a disciplinary hear-
ing was convened. Kruger pleaded and was found guilty. He
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received a final written warning, suspension without pay for ten
days, and was referred for counselling. Dissatisfied with that
sanction, the Commissioner of SARS (the Commissioner) altered
the sanction to dismissal.
Kruger then referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the Commis-
sion for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) arguing
procedural and substantive unfairness. He contended that the
Commissioner did not have the power to alter the sanction
imposed by the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry. The
CCMA arbitrator held that the collective agreement did not allow
the Commissioner to replace the sanction imposed by the
chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry. The arbitrator then ordered
Kruger’s reinstatement.
The SARS approached the Labour Court, and in a subsequent
appeal, the Labour Appeal Court, found in favour of Kruger. The
Constitutional Court, however, highlighted the seriousness of the
use of the word ‘kaffir’ (paras [9] [39] [44]). The court held that
this amounts to hate speech, and, to contribute to the eradication
of racism in line with the foundational values of our Constitution,
courts are obliged to act fairly but firmly against those who use it
(paras [43] [48]). It found that the CCMA arbitrator had acted
unreasonably by ordering Kruger’s reinstatement.
A few brief comments on this judgment. No matter how
laudable the sentiments and outrage at derogatory and racially
abusive language is, there are points worth criticising in its
reasoning. The court admonished the arbitrator in this case for
failing to take proper account of the seriousness of this slur. This
is not necessarily either fair or deserved on an analysis of the
basis for the award. Implied in the court’s reasoning is that the
Labour and Labour Appeal Courts also failed in a similar manner.
This is an astonishing accusation. Especially in light of the obiter
observation by Mogoeng CJ when he stated that ‘another factor
that could undermine the possibility to address racism squarely
would be a tendency to shift attention from racism to technicali-
ties, even where unmitigated racism is unavoidably central to the
dispute or engagement’ (para [10]). It appears that the fatal flaw
in the reasoning of the arbitrator, the Labour Court, and the
Labour Appeal Court was that they inappropriately focused on
technicalities so asto avoid dealing with the gravity of the racist
slur. This is strange, as none of these lower fora denied or
excused the slur. The issue on which they disagreed with the
court was who had the power to punish Kruger for his abusive
161CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 40 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
language. Unfortunately for the SARS, there was a collective
bargaining agreement which precluded the Commissioner from
replacing a decision made by the disciplinary process set up in
terms of that agreement. This was the question before the
arbitrator.
This, it appears in the Constitutional Court’s view, was an overly
technical approach to the dispute at hand. Once it was proven
that the word ‘kaffir’ had been said, it appears that there is a
change in the normative and legal position that is somewhat
unclear. It cannot be that the court argues that all legal reasoning
must be suspended as this slur is an overriding, pre-emptive
reason that defeats any and all other rights and considerations in
a dispute. Technical impediment certainly will seem less impor-
tant in a dispute such as this, but violating or flouting a collective
agreement, or violating competing labour law rights, is not merely
a technical but a substantive matter. These rights flow from labour
legislation and the Constitution itself. Furthermore, procedural
rights are not necessarily technical. A question as to whether a
certain person has the power to make a decision is as crucial a
‘procedural’ question as not being a judge in one’s own case or
being offered the chance to plead one’s case. So, it cannot be the
case that the arbitrator or the lower courts were seized inappro-
priately with technicalities.
The simple truth is that the court disagreed with the moral
judgment that these lower fora had made when they were asked
to decide the reasonableness of the arbitral decision in weighing
the procedural impediments of the collective agreement, the
provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (s 193), and the
constitutional rights of non-discrimination (s 9 of the Constitution),
dignity (s 10 of the Constitution) and fair labour practices (s 23 of
the Constitution). This, of course, the court is entitled to do when it
provides the reasons why it sees the matter differently. However,
it appears that the rhetoric peppering the judgment distracts from
the fact that this was, in fact, what it was doing, rather than
morally condemning all lower courts that could reasonably dis-
agree with it considering technicalities rather than substantive
principles.
HOUSING
The right to housing, and in particular the protection against
eviction, has been probably the most active and fruitful area of
socio-economic rights jurisprudence. The year under review saw
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this level of activity continue with some incremental develop-
ments building on existing principles. Three cases strengthened
the principle that under section 26(3) of the Constitution, no one
may be evicted without an order of court made after considering
all relevant circumstances. The single Constitutional Court deci-
sion that we review – Occupiers, Berea v De Wet NO [2017]
ZACC 18, 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC), 2017 (8) BCLR 1015 –
emphasised the active and protective role required of courts in
eviction proceedings even when there is alleged consent to
eviction.
However, two High Court decisions in the year under review
clawed back on established protection. Chapelgate Properties
1022 CC v Unlawful Occupiers of Erf 644 Kew & another 2017 (1)
SA 403 (GJ) (Chapelgate) represents an attempt to disqualify
foreign nationals from temporary emergency accommodation if
they have not regularised their status. Mtshali & others v Masawi
& others [2016] ZAGPJHC 291, 2017 (4) SA 632 (GJ) (Mtshali)
endorsed the practice of the state charging for the provision of
temporary emergency accommodation.
In Occupiers, Berea v De Wet (above) the Constitutional Court
considered whether, where an occupier has consented to evic-
tion, the court is absolved from the obligation to consider all
relevant circumstances before ordering eviction. The secondary
question was whether an eviction order may be rescinded at the
instance of occupiers who purportedly consented to it (para [1]).
The matter arose after the High Court granted an order for the
eviction of the 184 occupiers of a block of flats in Berea,
Johannesburg (paras [2] [3]). After service of the application, the
occupiers met and mandated four of their number and a local
ward committee member, Ngubane, to appear at court and seek
a postponement (para [7]). When the matter came before court,
the appearer applicants, Ngubane, and the property owner’s
legal representatives were present. The owner’s representatives
handed up a draft order of eviction and Ngubane confirmed the
order (para [8]).
The Constitutional Court delivered a unanimous judgment
penned by Mojapelo AJ. At the outset, the court considered the
issues of consent, waiver, and mandate. Mojapelo AJ held that
while the occupiers may have factually consented to the eviction
order (para [31]), their consent was not legally effective as it was
not given with full appreciation of their constitutional and statutory
rights (paras [32] [33]). The court held further that Ngubane had
no mandate to represent them (para [36]).
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Mojapelo AJ held that courts are not absolved from their duties
under section 26(3) of the Constitution and the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998 (the PIE Act) where parties have consented to an eviction
order. The court further held that courts must take an active role in
adjudicating eviction matters, taking into account all relevant
circumstances, and that the application of the PIE Act is manda-
tory. The nub of the judgment appears in paragraph 33, where the
court held:
An agreement to an eviction order in the circumstances would entail
the waiver of, at a minimum, the constitutional and statutory rights: (a)
to an eviction only after a court has considered all the relevant
circumstances; (b) to the joinder of the local authority and production
by it of a report on the need and availability of alternative accommoda-
tion; (c) to a just and equitable order in terms of PIE; and (d) to
temporary alternative accommodation in the event that eviction would
result in homelessness. The applicants and the amicus curiae con-
tended, with some force, that the rights are therefore incapable of
being waived because they are for the benefit of the public at large.
Even if they were capable of waiver, such waiver would need to be
free, voluntary and informed. It has not been disputed that the
applicants were not informed of any of these rights. It must therefore
be accepted that they were not aware of any such rights. Given that
the applicants were not aware of their rights, the factual consent that
they gave was not informed. Their consent is therefore not legally
valid. It is not binding on them. It is therefore not necessary in these
circumstances to decide whether these rights are capable of waiver
[footnotes omitted].
Accordingly, the eviction order fell to be set aside in terms of
Rule 42. As for remedy, the court indicated that without the local
authority being part of the proceedings, it was unable to grant a
just and equitable remedy that would bring finality to the matter.
Therefore, the court joined the local authority to the proceedings
and remitted the matter to the High Court to deal with it on an
expedited basis.
Whether a municipality may exclude foreign nationals who are
not legally in the country from the provision of temporary emer-
gency accommodation, in the absence of any law excluding
them, was the question raised by Spilg J in the High Court in
Chapelgate (above). The issue was raised by the court, not
having been relied upon initially by any of the parties.
In this case the applicant had applied to evict the occupiers of
a factory building it owned in downtown Johannesburg. The court
had ordered the occupiers to vacate, and also called on the City
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of Johannesburg (the City) to show why it should not provide
them with temporary emergency accommodation. This prompted
the court to ask whether occupiers who were ‘illegal foreigners’
were eligible for such accommodation (see paras [3]–[5] [9]
[14]).
The court designed a process which required the City to verify
the immigration status of occupiers seeking temporary emer-
gency accommodation before the eviction. Its order directed that
• the occupiers’ attorneys were to give the City a list of
occupiers who would require temporary emergency accom-
modation after eviction, including details of their age, income,
family circumstances, and residence status;
• the City was to then file a report on which occupiers were
eligible for the accommodation;
• hereafter, the occupiers or landowners could file comments
on the report, and occupiers found eligible who were illegal
foreigners were to provide the City with proof that they were
entitled to remain in South Africa;
• the City could then apply for an order that any eligible illegal
foreigners who had not produced proof were not entitled to
the accommodation;
• the occupiers were to vacate the factory building; and
• the sheriff was to remove any occupiers who had not left.
Chapelgate represents a retrogressive step in our housing
jurisprudence in which the court effectively legislated a limitation
of rights which appears nowhere in statute. The legal position in
relation to the socio-economic rights of foreign nationals is clear.
Section 26 of the Constitution, in language similar to the other
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights, guarantees the right
to housing to ‘everyone’. In Khosa & others v Minister of Social
Development & others; Mahlaule & others v Minister of Social
Development & others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC), the Constitutional
Court held that ‘everyone’ means everyone, and includes foreign
nationals (paras [46] [47]). The court in Khosa recognised that
the right could potentially be justifiably limited, including to
exclude foreign nationals, but only in a law of general application
that passes muster under section 36 (paras [79]–[85]). In the
context of housing, the relevant legislation does not refer to
immigration status as a criterion for eligibility for temporary
emergency housing. The Housing Code promulgated under
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section 4 of the National Housing Act 107 of 1997 simply refers to
all persons threatened with eviction. Spilg J sought to plug this
gap by holding that ‘the provisions of the Immigration Act [13 of
2002] as qualified by the Refugees Act [130 of 1998] are limiting
laws of general application and the respondents did not seek to
challenge their constitutionality in these proceedings’ (para [69]).
Rights cannot be limited by indirect implication, reading across
different statutes. Where a law gives effect to a right, the limitation
must be expressly made in that law. The High Court’s approach is
incorrect and ought not to be followed. If a restriction excluding
illegal immigrants is ever to be implemented, it would need to be
expressly incorporated into the Housing Code or the National
Housing Act by way of an amendment. The provision could then
be tested against section 36 of the Constitution. Absent such an
amendment, there is no basis for courts to apply immigration
status as a new criterion for eligibility for temporary emergency
accommodation.
The principle against eviction without a court order was also
broadly in issue in Residents of Setjwetla Informal Settlement v
Johannesburg City [2016] ZAGPJHC 202, 2017 (2) SA 516 (GJ).
The applicants had built shacks on Johannesburg City (the City)
land. Claiming illegal land invasion, the City demolished the
shacks without a court order. The applicants claimed that they
had been living in the shacks when they were demolished, and
were entitled to protection under the PIE Act. The City claimed
that the shacks were half-built and unoccupied when demol-
ished. Given the dispute over the facts, the court enquired
whether, even on the City’s version, a court order was needed. It
issued a rule nisi calling on the City to show cause why an
interdict should not be confirmed. On the return day, Van der
Linde J held that although the applicants had, in beginning
construction, unlawfully acquired possession of the City’s land
sufficient to constitute spoliation, the subsequent demolition
constituted unlawful self-help by the City (para [13]). The court
held that the PIE Act was not applicable because the shacks had
not yet been completed or occupied (para [14]). It nevertheless
held that local authorities should not be permitted, without court
sanction, to move in with heavy equipment whenever people
moved onto their land (see [19]). The court confirmed the rule nisi
interdicting the City from demolishing the shacks.
May a property developer include a clause in an agreement for
the sale of unimproved land that, should the purchaser not build a
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residential dwelling on the property within a specified period, the
developer may claim repurchase and transfer? In Bondev Midrand
(Pty) Ltd v Madzhie & others {2016] ZAGPPHC 1097, 2017 (4) SA
166 (GP), CR Jansen AJ held obiter that such a clause is
inconsistent with the right to housing in section 26(1) of the
Constitution, and contrary to public policy at common law. These
are merely obiter dicta because the developer, Bondev, had
applied to withdraw its application. The court nevertheless con-
sidered it appropriate to express a view, in case Bondev decided
to renew its application.
The court noted that for many people the purchase of land is
the first step in the realisation of their right to adequate housing.
Access to housing through the market mechanism falls squarely
within the ambit of section 26(1), and the acquisition of land also
falls within the broader concept of housing (para [27]). It follows
that developers must desist from preventing or impairing a
person’s attempts to gain access to adequate housing (para
[28]). Considering the overall context of planning legislation and
the relationship developers have with housing finance, develop-
ers also have a positive duty under section 26(1). In the present
case, the purchaser was for all intents and purposes forced to
build immediately (para [36]). Many people simply cannot afford
to do this. In this way the developer breached both the negative
aspect of section 26(1) – the obligation not to infringe the
purchaser’s quest for access to adequate housing – and the
positive duty (para [37]). The court held further that the enforce-
ment of such a repurchase clause would be contrary to public
policy (para [61]). Albeit obiter, the judgment is a considered
contribution to the constitutionality of repurchase clauses requir-
ing purchasers of land to build homes or sell back the purchased
land.
The second judgment with which we take issue is Mtshali
(above). (We disclose that one of the present authors, Jason
Brickhill, appeared for the occupiers in this matter.) This, too, was
a judgment by Spilg J in the Gauteng Local Division of the High
Court. The case arose as an appeal to the full bench (Spilg,
Coppin, and Moshidi JJ) against Molahlehi AJ’s refusal to rescind
an eviction order granted by Kathree-Setiloane J. The full bench
dismissed the appeal. The original eviction order, granted as a
default judgment, had been sought to be rescinded on the basis
that there had not been proper notice and that no case for an
eviction had been made out.
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While the judgment is open to criticism on those issues too, the
novel questions that arose concerned whether it was lawful for
the City to provide temporary alternative accommodation to those
occupiers left homeless by the eviction, subject to payment of a
monetary charge, and by out-sourcing to a private entity. The full
court answered both questions in the affirmative. The court held
that it was lawful for the City to charge for temporary emergency
accommodation, provided the amount was affordable (paras
[115] [118] [120] [134]). The essence of the court’s reasoning
here was that it was lawful for the City to do so unless a law
prohibited it from charging. In our view, this turns the principle of
legality on its head. The City is not empowered to make such a
charge without an empowering provision authorising it to do so.
In addition, to the extent that charging for the provision of a
constitutional right constitutes a limitation of the right, such a
limitation must be contained in a law of general application that
passes muster under section 36. The court also held that the
amount itself – R10 per person per day – was reasonable. Given
that the occupiers had tendered to pay the building’s owners
more than this if restored to their original homes, this conclusion
by the court is more plausible. The bigger principle is whether it is
permissible in the first place to charge for emergency accommo-
dation in the absence of a law (or at least a generally applicable
policy) prescribing the charge in advance. In our view, it is not.
The related question is whether it was permissible for the City
to outsource its obligation to provide temporary emergency
accommodation to Ekhaya House, a private shelter. Spilg J held
that it was lawful, emphasising the lack of alternatives available to
the City, and suggesting that the City should be afforded a wide
discretion in deciding how to discharge its obligations (paras
[146] [147]). The outsourcing issue is a difficult one, which may
arise again in future. Emergency situations following messy
eviction proceedings do not generate the ideal factual basis on
which to decide this issue of principle.
As with the issue of charging, in our view, both the right to
housing in section 26 and the principle of legality require that
there should be express legislative provision for a municipal
power to outsource the provision of temporary emergency accom-
modation. However, provided that such a framework is laid,
outsourcing ought to be permissible. It may result in the private
entity assuming constitutional obligations in addition to the rel-
evant municipality, as the Constitutional Court has concluded in
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the context of the right to social assistance, in Allpay Consoli-
dated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd & others v Chief Executive
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency & others
(No 2) [2014] ZACC 12, 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC), 2014 (4) SA179
(Allpay 2) para [58]. Importantly, such outsourcing does not
enable the organ of state to divest itself of its constitutional
obligations (para [59]).
LAND
The year 2017 was significant for land rights in the courts, and
against the backdrop of the unquestionable imperative of land
reform. The Constitutional Court, in particular, has affirmed the
role that private persons can be called on to play in the context of
land rights in two significant judgments: Daniels v Scribante &
another [2017] ZACC 13, 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) (Daniels); and
Baron & others v Claytile (Pty) Ltd & another [2017] ZACC 24,
2017 (5) SA 329 (CC), 2017 (10) BCLR 1225.
The horizontal application of land rights
In Daniels (above), a majority of the Constitutional Court found
that in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
(the ESTA), where the landowners have refused to make improve-
ments, occupiers have the right to make the improvements to
their accommodation that are necessary for living in acceptable
conditions, without the consent of the landowners.
Ms Daniels lived in a dwelling on a farm as an occupier in terms
of the ESTA. The farm is owned by a private company. Daniels’s
dwelling required basic, fundamental improvements (including
the levelling of floors, installation of indoor water supply, a
window, a ceiling, and partial outdoor paving). Daniels requested
consent from the company, indicating that she was happy to bear
the costs of the improvements. When she received no response,
she approached a builder to make the improvements and once
the builder had arrived, received a letter demanding that the
improvements stop.
Daniels approached the courts, seeking a declarator that she
was entitled to make improvements to the dwelling without the
owner’s consent, at her own cost. Both the Stellenbosch Magis-
trates’ Court and the Land Claims Court refused the declarator,
finding that the ESTA does not provide the right to make those
improvements. The Supreme Court of Appeal refused Daniels
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leave to appeal. Daniels approached the Constitutional Court,
arguing that the improvements were consistent with her right to
human dignity, and in any event would not seriously impinge on
the property owners’ common-law rights. The company resisted
these arguments on the basis that nowhere does the ESTA
provide for the right, and that because the ESTA does envisage
that an owner may be ordered to compensate an occupier for
improvements, if Daniels’ right to make improvements absent the
company’s consent were to be asserted, this would effectively
impose a positive duty on a private individual. The Trust for
Community Outreach and Education was admitted as a friend of
the court, making the argument that the ESTAmust be interpreted
not only according to the right to property in section 25 of the
Constitution, but also in light of the section 26 provision of the
right to access adequate housing.
Madlanga J wrote for the majority of the court, finding that
Daniels had the right, in terms of the ESTA read with section 25(6)
of the Constitution, to make improvements without necessarily
obtaining the owner’s consent; only meaningful engagement,
and not consent, is required (para [62]). His judgment includes
an extensive discussion of South Africa’s history of disposses-
sion, informing the urgent imperative for land reform:
Dispossession of land was central to colonialism and apartheid. It first
took place through the barrel of the gun and ‘trickery’. This com-
menced as soon as white settlement began, with the Khoi and San
people being the first victims. This was followed by ‘an array of laws’
dating from the early days of colonisation. The most infamous is the
Native Land Act (subsequently renamed the Black Land Act) (Black
Land Act). Mr Sol Plaatje, one of the early, notable heroes in the
struggle for freedom in South Africa who lived during the time this Act
was passed, says of it, ‘Awaking on Friday morning June 20, 1913, the
South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in
the land of his birth’ (para [14]).
The majority links the right to security of tenure to the right to
human dignity by stating that ‘there can be no true security of
tenure under conditions devoid of human dignity’ (para [2]).
Sections 5 and 6 of ESTA are to be read purposively; while they
do not explicitly provide that an occupier has a right to make
improvements to her dwelling to a standard suitable for human
habitation, an occupier’s right to human dignity must be given
effect to (paras [27]–[34]).
This, in turn, may have legal consequences for the private
owner. Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides for the horizontal
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application of the Bill of Rights, taking into account the nature of
the right and duty in question. While private persons do not bear
the exact same obligations as the state (para [40]), in this case
the private company did bear a positive obligation. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the possibility of an owner being
ordered to compensate an occupier is ‘tenuous at best’ (para
[51]).
But Madlanga J’s judgment is premised on the assumption that
permitting an ESTA occupier to make improvements to her home,
at her own expense, is a positive obligation imposed on the
landowner. This cannot be – instead, it is a negative obligation, in
that its content is effectively that a landowner is prohibited from
interfering in an occupier’s exercise of her right to make improve-
ments – at her own expense. Given that Daniels was to bear the
costs of the improvements herself, any putative positive obliga-
tions borne by the owner were not in question.
On horizontal obligations, Jafta J’s dissent (written solely to
express his disagreement on the effect of section 8(2) of the
Constitution) is even more startling. Jafta’s dissent expresses
skepticism that horizontal obligations can ever be positive in
nature. He held:
Apart from the general positive obligation imposed upon the state by
section 7(2), where the Bill of Rights imposes a positive duty, it does
so in express terms. There is no provision that expressly imposes a
positive obligation on a private person in the entire Bill of Rights. It
does not appear to me that any of the relevant provisions may be
interpreted as imposing a positive duty on a private person. It would
be odd for the Constitution to be express when it imposes a positive
duty upon the state and choose to be obscure when imposing such a
duty upon a private person (para [162]).
This difference in jurisprudential approach would not have
affected the outcome, however, as Jafta J would have found that
the owner has a negative obligation not to interfere with Daniels’
rights, including to effect necessary improvements (para [194]).
Froneman J (with Cameron J concurring) wrote separately, in
both English and Afrikaans, to express his ‘sense of shame’ (para
[109]) at the living conditions of farmworkers, and the race and
class discrimination that engender these conditions.Any substan-
tial progress in realising the Constitution’s ideals requires an
honest and deep recognition of past injustice; a re-appraisal of
how we conceive ownership and property; and an acceptance of
the consequences of constitutional change (para [115]). His
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judgment engages with a historical account of those living on
farms, and how poor white people benefited immensely from
concentrated social and political effort, which entirely excluded
black and coloured people (para [132]). Froneman J questioned
the paradigm governing property in South African law, pointing
out that ‘the absolutization of ownership and property . . . con-
firmed and perpetuated the existing inequalities’ (para [136]). For
this reason, constitutional change – and its necessary conse-
quences – must be accepted, including a move away from
privileging economic efficiency: ‘The right to dignity does not
easily fit into the subject of a market exchange’ (para [140]).
Cameron J concurred in both Madlanga and Froneman JJ’s
judgments, not least because those judgments ‘remind us all –
and remind white people in particular . . . that the past is not done
with us; that it is not past; that it will not leave us in peace until we
have reckoned with its claims to justice’ (para [155]). Cameron J,
however, also wrote separately to make the limited point that
while South Africa’s history is ‘omnipresent when one applies the
Constitution and the reparative legislation that flowed from it’
(para [148]), nevertheless ‘it is not within the primary competence
of judges to write history’ (para [149]).
Finally, Zondo J wrote separately, emphasising that the occupi-
er’s rights must be balanced against the owner’s (paras [213]
[214]) and that in this case, the owner was not prejudiced by the
improvements Daniels sought (para [217]).
Evictions and horizontal application of the right to property
Does a private landowner have a duty to provide alternative
accommodation to evicted occupiers where the state is unable
to? In Baron & others v Claytile (Pty) Ltd & another [2017] ZACC
24, 2017 (5) SA329 (CC), 2017 (10) BCLR 1225 the Constitutional
Court held that, in principle, a private landowner may bear this
duty.
Muldersvlei farm was occupied by employees of a brick
manufacturing business, who had their employment terminated.
The company instituted eviction proceedings in terms of the
ESTA, but during the eviction proceedings the City of Cape Town
indicated that no alterative accommodation was available, and so
the eviction order would have the effect of rendering the occupi-
ers homeless. The Land Claims Court confirmed the eviction
order granted by the magistrate’s court, notwithstanding the
absence of any arrangements for suitable alternative accommo-
172 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 51 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
dation. Both the Land Claims Court and the Supreme Court of
Appeal refused leave to appeal.
Shortly before the matter was to be heard by the Constitutional
Court, the City of Cape Town secured alternative accommodation
at Wolwerivier, which the occupiers rejected as the accommoda-
tion was too far from their places of employment and the school in
which their children were enrolled.
The majority of the Constitutional Court, in a judgment by
Pretorius AJ, held that the City of Cape Town could not escape its
duty to provide suitable alternative accommodation. However, as
the court had found in Daniels (above), private landowners can
bear positive obligations – even if these are not identical in
content or scope to those borne by the state. However, the court
clarified that a private landowner bears a positive obligation to
provide suitable alternative accommodation only very exception-
ally.
Here, there was suitable accommodation available at the City
of Cape Town’s instance: the occupiers had already twice
rejected accommodation offers made by the City. The private
landowner could not be expected to continue to provide housing
to the occupiers in this context. The Constitutional Court dis-
agreed with the applicants’ contentions that the alternative accom-
modation offered was unacceptable, given that it is far from their
places of employment and their children’s schools and so would
undermine their wellbeing and livelihoods (para [50]). The court’s
approach, which affirms that evictions should not render anyone
homeless, is nevertheless open to criticism, as the legislation
provides that alternative accommodation must be ‘suitable’, and
in accordance with section 28 of the Constitution, that children’s
best interests are of paramount importance.
However, the court stressed that when a private landowner
seeks the eviction of occupiers, it may bear a duty to help to find
suitable alternative accommodation or, exceptionally, to continue
to provide housing. Ultimately, the determination of when this
positive obligation is justified is fact-sensitive, and ‘cannot be
approached in a binary, all-or-nothing fashion . . . the result is
often found on a continuum that reflects the variations in the
respective weight of the relevant considerations’ (para [36]).
Zondo J wrote a qualified concurrence, differing with the
majority on the basis that the City of Cape Town ought not to be
liable to pay the applicants’ costs, and would have found that it
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was unnecessary for the court to express any view on private
persons’ obligations (para [56]).
Evictions and suitable alternative accommodation
Whether a report by a local authority on the suitability and
availability of alternative accommodation must necessarily be
considered by a court when granting an eviction order was
debated, but not decided, by the High Court in Jacobs v
Communicare NPC & another [2017] ZAWCHC 24, 2017 (4) SA
412 (WCC). A non-profit company which provides affordable,
low-cost housing to tenants rented out a flat to Jacobs and his
family from 2002. The rent increased from time to time, and in
2014 the company again increased the rent payable. Jacobs
approached the Rental Housing Tribunal, but a default ruling was
made against him. He had not been present for the hearing,
because the correspondence sent to him by the Tribunal had
been incorrect. Despite this clear error, the Tribunal refused to
reconsider the matter, and Jacobs in turn failed to seek to review
its decision. Jacobs fell behind with his rent, and the company
cancelled the lease and sought to evict Jacobs. The magistrate
granted the eviction, but failed to consider a report from the City
of Cape Town regarding Jacob’s prospects of finding suitable
alternative accommodation. On appeal, the High Court found that
this procedural defect tainted the eviction proceedings, but
declined to find whether this defect was fatal. Instead, the High
Court ordered that the Jacobs family vacate the flat.
Termination of employment and evictions
The Constitutional Court considered the consequences of
termination of employment on the right to reside on property in
terms of the ESTA in Snyders & others v De Jager & others [2016]
ZACC 55, 2017 (3) SA 545 (CC), 2017 (5) BCLR 614.
Snyders, an employee on the Stassen Farm in the Western
Cape, and Ms De Jager, the manager of that farm, became
embroiled in a dispute when De Jager dismissed Snyders from
the farm where he had been living and working since 1992. De
Jager only sought to evict Snyders and his family a year later. The
eviction order in terms of the ESTA was granted by the magis-
trate’s court and confirmed by the Land Claims Court. Snyders’s
attempted appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was struck off
the roll on the basis that the proper appeal lay to the Lands Claim
Court. Once the Supreme Court of Appeal had done so, De Jager
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evicted the Snyders family without any notice and in their
absence. De Jager quickly moved a third party, Breda, into the
house.
Rather inexplicably, this dispute gave rise to a suite of four
related judgments, all handed down on the same day. We
discuss only the fourth judgment, on the merits – Snyders &
others v De Jager & others (Appeal) [2016] ZACC 55, 2017 (5)
BCLR 614 (CC), 2017 (3) SA 545. Zondo J’s majority granted
leave to appeal to Snyders, finding that where a magistrate’s
court has granted an eviction order under the ESTA which the
Land Claims Court has subsequently confirmed, an appeal lies to
the Supreme Court of Appeal and not to the Land Claims Court.
This is because when the Land Claims Court chooses whether to
confirm the magistrate’s court’s judgment, it exercises wide
powers which are not limited, as review powers would be (para
[36]).
On the merits, while Snyders had been dismissed from employ-
ment, his right to reside on the farm had not been terminated. In
addition to the requirement of substantive fairness, Snyders had
the right to procedural fairness which had not been complied with
by De Jager. It was just and equitable, Zondo J found, that an
eviction order be granted against Breda and his family to give
effect to the Constitutional Court judgment, and so Breda was
ordered to vacate the house within fourteen days.
Froneman J wrote separately, finding that no eviction order
against the Breda family was necessary, because they would be
bound by the outcome of the appeal and, in any event, had not
acquired rights of occupation in respect of the property prior to
the eviction proceedings against the Snyders family.
Contrary to the majority approach, Froneman J’s judgment also
would have found that, once the Land Claims Court has con-
firmed an order of eviction granted by a magistrate’s court, the
next step is to appeal to the Land Claims Court and only then to
the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Development of the common law: Extension of a lease agreement and the
right of pre-emption
In another judgment penned by Madlanga J, Mokone v Tassos
Properties CC & another [2017] ZACC 25, 2017 (5) SA 456 (CC),
2017 (10) BCLR 1261, the Constitutional Court considered whether
a right of pre-emption in a written lease agreement is automati-
cally renewed on the extension of the lease, and additionally,
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whether a right of pre-emption must comply with the formalities
for a sale in the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. The majority of
the court answered the first question affirmatively, and the second
negatively. In doing so, the court developed the common law in
three significant ways: first, that an extension of an agreement
ordinarily renews all the terms of that agreement; second, that
courts have an equitable discretion to stay proceedings until
determination of a material legal point in another matter; and
third, that a right of pre-emption need not satisfy the formalities
required by legislation for the alienation of land.
Ms Mokone had entered into a written lease with a company in
2004 for a one-year period. The agreement gave her a right of
pre-emption. At the end of the year period, the parties extended
the lease orally. But the company later sold the property to a third
party, without first offering Mokone the opportunity to exercise her
right of pre-emption. It did so on the argument that the right of
pre-emption had not been part of the extended lease, and so was
not enforceable. The High Court agreed with the company,
finding that the right of pre-emption is a collateral term and so
was not renewed by the extension of the lease. In the meantime,
the third-party purchaser of the property applied to evict Mokone.
The majority of the Constitutional Court found that the common-
law rule that precludes collateral terms from operating on the
extension of a lease unduly favours the lessor (para [35]). A lay
person cannot be expected to distinguish between collateral and
incidental terms (paras [28] [29]), and in this case, in extending
the lease the parties renewed all the terms of the lease.
Turning to whether a right of pre-emption must comply with
section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act, the majority overturned
Hirschowitz v Moolman & others 1983 (4) SA 1 (T) paragraph
[63], which was authority for the view that a pactum de contra-
hendo – or agreement to agree – must comply with the require-
ments applicable to the main agreement. Instead, the court held
that a right of pre-emption does not constitute alienation of land
and so need not comply with formalities.
In the result, the court held the appeal regarding Mokone’s
eviction in abeyance, pending the High Court’s determination of
the pre-emption dispute.
Froneman J wrote a concurring judgment, agreeing with the
majority’s first two developments of the common law, which
preferred substance over form in legal agreements. However, he
stressed that the common law already embodies notions of
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fairness and justice (para [80]). Froneman J differed from the
majority in that he would not have overturned Hirschowitz v
Moolman, on the basis that that judgment was in any event
distinguishable (paras [81] [82]).
Restitution of land rights
The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 sets out that
persons – or their descendants – and communities who were
dispossessed of land after 1913 can lodge claims for the
restitution of their rights, but must do so before 31 December
1998. Thousands of claims were made, but finalising the claims
has been incredibly slow. The Restitution of Land Rights Amend-
ment Act 15 of 2014 revived the right to submit claims, which
could be lodged for a further five years until mid-2019. But in
2016 (in Land Access Movement of South Africa & others v
Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces & others [2016]
ZACC 22, 2016 (5) SA635 (CC)) the Constitutional Court declared
the Amendment Act invalid, on the basis that the National Council
of Provinces had conducted insufficient consultation and public
participation processes. However, the Constitutional Court found
that this did not extinguish claims that had been submitted in
good faith since 2014; instead, those new claims would still exist
pending a re-enactment of the legislation or judicial intervention.
During this period, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights
was interdicted from processing any new claims.
This complicated matters: how should a court adjudicate
competing land claims, brought under these two respective
legislative regimes? And can the Land Claims Court determine
any new claims, given the interdict granted against the Commis-
sion? In In re Amaqamu Community Claim (Land Access Move-
ment South Africa & others as Amici Curiae) 2017 (3) SA 409
(LCC), the Land Claims Court found that where a land claim was
made before the end of 1998 (under the Restitution of Land
Rights Act), a later new claim made under the Amendment Act
(which re-opened the land-claims process) cannot be consid-
ered. New claimants who contest old claims cannot be awarded
compensation or land but can be admitted as interested parties
to make submissions calling for the rejection of the old claim.
The Land Claims Court judgment has brought welcome cer-
tainty to the process of competing land claims. The judgment
also sounded a clarion call to urgent action to resolve existing
land claims, and disparaged the Commission’s sluggish pro-
cesses:
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Thousands of claimants have gone to their graves without having seen
the fulfilment of the hope the Constitution created by the establishment
of the right to restitution. The countless failures on the part of the
Commission to honour its constitutional obligations as a result of a
combination of insufficient funding, delay, procrastination and ineffi-
ciency are a blot on the country’s democratic dispensation and a stark
example of justice delayed causing justice to be denied (para [4]).
However, in Macassar Land Claims Committee v Maccsand
CC & another [2016] ZASCA 167, 2017 (4) SA 1 (SCA) the court
found that mining rights in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 are independent of land
ownership, and cannot be restored via a restitution claim.
A voluntary association representing members of the commu-
nity of Sandvlei, Macassar, sought restitution of a right in land.
The community is descended from a group of freed slaves who
enjoyed rights of commonage over land, and who were dispos-
sessed when Macassar was declared a coloured group area in
terms of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. Maccsand holds a
mining right over the land in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act. The association approached the
Land Claims Court for restitution, and to have Maccsand’s mining
right expropriated and expunged. The Land Claims Court, how-
ever, declined to expropriate this right, upholding arguments
made by Maccsand and the government that its powers of
expropriation could not extend to the expropriation of a mining
right.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in a unanimous
judgment by Wallis JA, agreed. While section 35(1)(a) of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act provides that the Land Claims
Court can order expropriation of land or a right in land, this power
can only be exercised to restore land or a right in land to a
claimant – and cannot extend to the restoration of the mining
right. This was not least because the association could not claim
more than the right of which it had been dispossessed (para
[20]). Instead, the association was bound by Maccsand’s mining
rights. The Constitutional Court dismissed the association’s appli-
cation for leave to appeal.
Labour tenants and the appointment of a Special Master
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 provides for
security of tenure of labour tenants. The Minister and Director-
General of Rural Development and Land Reform have a critical
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role to play in processing applications by labour tenants for
awards in land. In Mwelase & others v Director-General, Depart-
ment of Rural Development and Land Reform & others [2016]
ZALCC 23, 2017 (4) SA 422 (LCC), the Land Claims Court
rebuked the government for its widescale failure to process these
claims, and described the system as ‘chaotic’ (para [6]). Settling
the outstanding claims would take an estimated 40 years, which
is startling and constitutes an ‘unacceptable burden on labour
tenants’ (para [25]).
As a result of this dysfunction, an application for the appoint-
ment of a Special Master to process labour tenants’ claims was
launched in the Land Claims Court. A Special Master is an
independent person and agent of the court, appointed to assist
the court in processing and adjudicating claims. The appoint-
ment of a Special Master is a novel remedy in South African law,
aimed at securing systemic relief, but has been used in other
jurisdictions, mostly notably the United States of America and
India.
Ncube AJ, animated by the need for effective relief, drew on
the court’s extensive remedial powers and ordered the appoint-
ment of a Special Master. This remedial resourcefulness is
extraordinary but welcome. Nonetheless, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Appeal has subsequently overturned Ncube AJ’s order
appointing a Special Master, predominantly on the basis of the
separation of powers.
PRIVACY
Does the prohibition against the use of cannabis in one’s
private home impermissibly violate an individual’s right to pri-
vacy? The Western Cape High Court found in Prince v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development & others; Rubin v National
Director of Public Prosecutions & others; Acton & others v
National Director of Public Prosecutions & others [2017] ZAWCHC
30, 2017 (4) SA 299 (WCC), [2017] 2 All SA 864 that such a
violation was indeed constitutionally impermissible.
The facts of the case are straightforward. Several challenges
were made to South Africa’s current prohibition against the
possession, use, or transportation of cannabis in private or
public. The High Court focused its inquiry mainly on the private
possession and use of cannabis. After exploring the ambit of the
general right to privacy, the court found that particular limitations
impacting on one’s body are an especially egregious violation
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since privacy ‘becomes more powerful and deserving of greater
protection the more intimate the personal sphere of the life of a
human being which comes into legal play’ (para [22]).
When exploring whether this was a justified limitation on
privacy rights, the issue turned on the evidence provided on
behalf of either side. The evidence provided by the state’s expert
evidence was found insufficiently convincing when compared to
the evidence provided by Professor Mark Shaw, a criminologist at
the University of Cape Town. Mainly, the Shaw Report showed
that the apparent risks and harm posed by cannabis did not
necessarily require the criminal law to pursue such goals (paras
[48]–[63]). The court accepted this argument. We will review the
confirmation of this case by the Constitutional Court in the 2018
Annual Survey.
PROPERTY
Definition of constitutional property: Trading licences
Does the right to property include the right to conduct activities
and trading strategies in which a person was previously entitled
to engage under an earlier licensing regime? In South African
Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and
Energy & others, 2017 (10) BCLR 1303, [2017] ZACC 26, 2017
(6) SA 331 (CC) the Constitutional Court said ‘no’.
The Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 regulated the diamond trade in
South Africa. In 2007, the Act was amended: section 20A was
introduced. It provides that ‘[n]o licensee may be assisted by a
non-licensee or holder of a permit . . . during viewing, purchasing
or selling of unpolished diamonds at any place where unpolished
diamonds are offered for sale in terms of this Act, except at a
diamond exchange and export centre’. In terms of this provision,
any unlicensed persons are prohibited from being present at
diamond trading centres while unpolished diamonds are being
viewed or purchased. The purpose of this is to promote local
beneficiation and to ensure that unpolished diamonds are appro-
priately monitored and recorded.
The South African Diamond Producers Organisation – a volun-
tary association – approached the High Court for an order
declaring section 20A inconsistent with the Constitution and
invalid, on the basis that it constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
property (prohibited by s 25 of the Constitution), and unjustifiably
limits section 22 of the Constitution, providing for freedom of
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trade. The association contended that the effect of the provision
was a 30 per cent drop in the price of diamonds and that, prior to
the legislative amendment, a number of its members (who are
licensed diamond dealers) had developed a mode of operation in
terms of which unpolished diamonds from local producers were
offered at tender houses on an anonymous tender basis to other
licensed dealers, with non-licensed experts assisting the licensed
purchasers (often on behalf of prospective foreign buyers).
Khampepe J, in a unanimous decision, refused to confirm the
declaration of invalidity, finding that there was no deprivation of
property, as the association’s members did not suffer any legally
cognisable loss, nor was the interference with their property
rights sufficiently substantial to be legally relevant. The alleged
price drop tracked lost commission opportunities, and not the fair
market value of the diamonds. Nor did the provision limit the right
to choose a trade, profession, or occupation: all it did was
prohibit licensees from being assisted by unlicensed persons
except at a diamond exchange and export centre.
While diamonds – and the powers and entitlements associated
with their ownership – do constitute property for the purposes of
section 25 (para [39]), there is no generally legally protectable
interest in conducting the sale of diamonds in a particular way
(para [52]). Accordingly, Khampepe J found that there was no
deprivation:
The limitation on the manner in which producers and dealers may
alienate their diamonds is not sufficiently substantial to constitute a
‘deprivation’ of property in those diamonds. Producers and dealers do
not generally have a legally protectable interest in conducting a sale
according to a particular practice. And, a market is an inherently
regulated space, and prices obtainable in that market are necessarily
impacted by government regulation. A property holder does not
generally have a legally protectable interest either in obtaining a
specific value for his goods, or in valuing his goods according to a
particular method (para [53]).
However, the argument that a property holder has no legally
protectable interest in valuing his property, and that when a
particular form of valuation is barred by the state this does not
amount to deprivation, is strained. It is not implausible that the
ability to value your property using a method and process of your
choice, realising greater value for your own good, could either
directly entail an interest in a thing of value, or entail your ability to
realise your self-fulfilment (Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v
Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development,
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Environmental Affairs And Tourism, Eastern Cape & others [2015]
ZACC 23, 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC), 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (Madlanga
and Froneman JJ’s judgments respectively). The court was
perhaps too hasty in finding there to be no justifiable interest
worthy of constitutional protection in the matter.
Nor, Khampepe J found, was there any violation of section 22
of the Constitution, which protects the right freely to choose a
trade, occupation, or profession. The provision simply regulates
the practice of a trade, occupation, or profession, which is
permitted by the constitutional provision. It does not act as a legal
barrier to the choice of a profession or act as an ‘effective limit on
choice’ (para [69]). Further, section 20A has a rational basis:
promoting the local beneficiation of unpolished diamonds (and
so regulating the diamond trade in the public interest), and
ensuring that the movement of unpolished diamonds can be
properly monitored and recorded (para [77]).
Arbitrary deprivation: Transmissibility of municipal debts
Is it constitutionally permissible for a debt for rates and charges
previously owed to a municipality by a prior owner of a property to
be transmitted to a new owner? The Constitutional Court in
Jordaan & others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality &
others; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v New Ventures
Consulting and Services (Pty) Limited & others; Ekurhuleni Metro-
politan Municipality v Livanos & others [2017] ZACC 31, 2017 (6)
SA 287 (CC), 2017 (11) BCLR 1370 found that it is in fact not
constitutionally permissible.
The applicants were the new owners of property with debts
attached to it from rates and charges incurred by previous
owners of the property. They argued that on a proper interpreta-
tion of section 118(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Sys-
tems Act 32 of 2000 and section 25 of the Constitution, these
charges were: (a) not permitted by the section concerned; and
(b) were arbitrary deprivations of property unreasonably and
unjustifiably imposed by the state. The North Gauteng High Court
accepted these arguments. The Constitutional Court did the
same on confirmation. In a unanimous opinion penned by Cam-
eron J the court carefully considered both grounds.
As to statutory interpretation, the court found that a careful
study of the history of the provision concerned, and the common-
law terms which it codified, could only be interpreted in favour of
the applicants. Cameron J argued that the earlier versions of
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what became section 118(3) show that two distinct mechanisms
were incorporated into the statute to assist municipalities in
collecting debts. They are: an embargo on the resale of the
property that would be lifted on condition that all rates and
charges are paid; and a preferential claim in the event of
insolvency to recover municipal debts incurred (paras [15] [16]).
Therefore, it is important to understand that what the relevant
municipalities were arguing for in this case was a further mecha-
nism where debts were transferable to subsequent owners. The
court found that there was no evidence at all that before section
118(3) was enacted, any enactment had ever sought to impose
responsibility for a previous owner’s debts on a new owner (para
[26]). This is especially apparent once one considers the common-
law position which required some kind of formal aspect or
condition to be met for a debt to be transmissible to subsequent
holders of real rights (para [33]). This later became common
practice in legislative schemes through registration of such a
transmissible claim in the Deeds Office (para [40]). Because
there was no such formal requirement of registration, or anything
akin to it, in the alleged process of transmissibility in this case, it is
doubtful that transmissibility was ever intended to vest a right in
favour of municipalities.
The court proceeded to consider the claim of arbitrary depriva-
tion under section 25(1) of the Constitution. After finding this to be
a deprivation, it applied the requisite test for arbitrariness:
whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation. Crisply, the
court found that the imposition of un-prescribed debts on a new
owner of municipal property, without historical limit, would consti-
tute an arbitrary deprivation of property (para [72]).
Overall, this is a superbly reasoned and characteristically lucid
judgment from Cameron J. It carefully contextualises the constitu-
tional enquiry exploring proper limits to the legitimate means of
securing payment for public utilities available to municipalities.
What is remarkable about the judgment is the ease with which the
court’s reasoning carefully unearths the purpose of formal require-
ments for transmissibility at common law and how these, when
viewed in the light of the sufficient reason test, give effect in
various ways to concerns of municipal overreach and the public
good. In short, the judgment considers the entire corpus iuris
concerning the legal question before it, and carefully demon-
strates why seeming tensions and anomalies are, upon closer
inspection, illusory.
183CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 62 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
REFUGEES
In the year under review, the courts saw renewed attempts to
protect the rights of refugees against arbitrary detention, the right
to have an asylum seeker permit extended pending finalisation of
review proceedings regarding that person’s refugee status, the
‘crime’ exclusion from refugee status, and whether asylum seek-
ers are barred from applying for other visas and permits from
within South Africa.
In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs &
others [2017] ZACC 22, 2017 (10) BCLR 1242 (CC), 2017 (5) SA
480 the Constitutional Court upheld a challenge to the provisions
enabling detention of ‘illegal foreigners’ under the Immigration
Act 13 of 2002. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) directed its
challenge at section 34(1)(b) and (d) of the Immigration Act. LHR
contended that, by omitting to provide for automatic judicial
oversight before the expiry of 30 calendar days, section 34(1)(b)
and (d) was inconsistent with sections 12(1), 35(1)(d) and (2)(d)
of the Constitution. The challenge against section 34(1)(d) was
based on the contention that it did not permit a detainee to
appear in person before a court and impugn the lawfulness of his
or her detention. The state opposed the constitutional challenge,
arguing that the impugned provisions were not unconstitutional,
alternatively that the constitutional rights relied upon do not apply
to foreign nationals. The High Court upheld the challenge and the
matter was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation.
In a unanimous judgment by Jafta J, the court first confirmed
that the rights to freedom and security of person and protection
against arbitrary detention in sections 12 and 35(2) do indeed
apply to illegal foreigners (paras [30] [42]). After an analysis of
the impugned provisions, the court was satisfied that the they do
in fact limit the constitutional rights enshrined in sections 12(1)
and 35(2) of the Constitution. Section 34(1)(b) limited these rights
because it fails to provide for automatic judicial review of the
detention of foreign nationals, and because it allows detention for
up to 48 hours even without valid grounds (paras [52]–[54]).
Section 34(1)(d), which empowers a court to extend detention for
up to 90 days beyond an initial period of 30 days, limits sections
12(1) and 35(2) because it does not afford detainees the right to
appear in person to make representations to the court on whether
such an extension should be granted (paras [57] [58]).
On the issue of justification, the court found that the reasons
advanced by the state fell woefully short of justifying the limitation
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(para [63]). The court was not convinced that tinkering with the
wording of the impugned provisions, through severance and
reading-in, would sufficiently address the defects (para [67]). In
the result, the court held that a suspension of the declaration of
invalidity was appropriate. According to the court, this would
enable Parliament to correct the defects (para [69]). However, in
line with the principle that a successful litigant must be afforded
appropriate relief, the suspension was accompanied by condi-
tions which would protect the detainees’ rights in the interim (para
[70]), in the following terms:
4. Pending legislation to be enacted within 24 months or upon the
expiry of this period, any illegal foreigner detained under section
34(1) of the Immigration Act shall be brought before a court in
person within 48 hours from the time of arrest or not later than the
first court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if 48 hours expired
outside ordinary court days.
5. Illegal foreigners who are in detention at the time this order is
issued shall be brought before a court within 48 hours from the
date of this order or on such later date as may be determined by a
court.
The court confirmed the order of invalidity made by the High
Court and dismissed the appeal by the state. The judgment is an
important reaffirmation of the principle that rights in the Bill of
Rights generally apply to foreign nationals, even those in the
country illegally, unless the right in question expressly limits itself
to citizens. The judgment reasserts the strict limits on the
detention of foreign nationals for the purpose of deportation – in
particular their right to challenge such detention in court.
The second refugee rights decision that we consider here
concerns the right of asylum seekers to the extension of their
asylum status pending the finalisation of proceedings challeng-
ing the refusal to recognise them as refugees. When an asylum
seeker is granted a permit in terms of section 22 of the Refugees
Act 130 of 1998, the Refugee Reception Officer (RRO) has the
power to extend the permit. If an asylum seeker has exhausted
internal review and appeal routes under the Refugees Act, but
seeks judicial review of the refusal of refugee status, does the
RRO have the power to extend his or her section 22 permit? Yes,
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed in Minister of Home
Affairs v Saidi [2017] ZASCA 40, 2017 (4) SA 435 (SCA), [2017] 2
All SA 755.
In a unanimous decision by Gorven AJA, the Supreme Court of
Appeal analysed the RefugeesAct and confirmed (para [31]) that
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an RRO indeed has the power to extend a section 22 permit
pending the outcome of judicial review. The court declined to go
further and find a duty to grant such an extension. The court
dismissed the appeal, with the effect that the individual cases
before it were remitted to the RRO to consider the grant of
extensions (para [44]). The matter subsequently went on appeal
to the Constitutional Court. In Saidi & others v Minister of Home
Affairs & others [2018] ZACC 9, 2018 (7) BCLR 856 (CC), 2018
(4) SA 333, the Constitutional Court went further and held that the
RRO indeed has the power and the obligation to extend section
22 permits pending the outcome of a review.
Okoroafor v Minister of Home Affairs & another [2016]
ZAECPEHC 85, 2017 (3) SA 290 (ECP) concerned the exclusion
of a person believed to have committed a crime from refugee
status. Section 4(1)(b) of the Refugees Act provides:
A person does not qualify for refugee status for the purposes of this
Act if there is reason to believe that he or she –
. . .
(b) has committed a crime which is not of a political nature and
which, if committed in the Republic, would be punishable by
imprisonment; . . .
The applicant had been convicted of two offences under the
Immigration Act, and was sentenced to a fine or imprisonment,
and to imprisonment which was suspended. He was subse-
quently arrested and detained pending deportation as an illegal
foreigner. He then indicated his intention to apply for asylum, and
asked to be released and issued with a permit to enable him to
approach a refugee reception office in order to do so. However,
the immigration officers refused, apparently on the basis that he
did not qualify as a refugee under the section 4(1)(b) exclusion
set out above. He applied for a declaration that his detention was
unlawful; for a direction that second respondent issue him with a
permit to approach a refugee reception office; and for certain
other relief. Two key questions arose. The first issue was whether
the ‘crime’ referred to in section 4(1)(b) was restricted to a crime
committed outside of South Africa, or whether it covered a crime
committed either outside or inside the country. Eksteen J held
that it was restricted to crimes committed outside South Africa
(paras [13] [20]). The second question was who could decide
that there was ‘reason to believe’ an individual did not qualify for
refugee status. Here, the court held that only the Minister of Home
Affairs or his delegee could do so (paras [23]–[26]). The applica-
186 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 65 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/06−Constitutional−Law
tion was accordingly granted (para [33]). This decision, too,
protects the procedural rights of asylum seekers to seek refugee
status.
The final case under review, Minister of Home Affairs & another
v Ahmed & others [2017] ZASCA 123, 2017 (6) SA 554 (SCA),
also concerned eligibility to apply for a particular immigration
status. The narrow question was whether asylum seekers in South
Africa are entitled to apply from within the country for a visa or
permit under the Immigration Act. The High Court had held that
they are. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the
decision. It held that it was a precondition, in applying for a visa
or permit under the Immigration Act, that the application be made
from outside of South Africa (s 10(2) read with reg 9(2) of the
Immigration Regulations). The applications were accordingly
invalid (paras [9] [10] [14]). The court therefore upheld the
appeal (para [17]).
That was not the end of the story, however. In a case to be
reviewed in 2018, the Constitutional Court again reversed the
Supreme Court of Appeal (Ahmed & others v Minister of Home
Affairs & another [2018] ZACC 39, 2018 (12) BCLR 1451 (CC),
2019 (1) SA 1). The Constitutional Court declared provisions of
Immigration Directive 21 of 2015 invalid to the extent that they
impose a blanket ban on asylum seekers applying for visas under
the Immigration Act, and to the extent that it prohibited them from
applying for permanent residence while inside the country.
SOCIAL GRANTS
Black Sash v Minister of Social Development & others (Free-
dom Under Law NPC Intervening) [2017] ZACC 8, 2017 (3) SA
335 (CC), 2017 (5) BCLR 543 is the next instalment in the saga
created by the Department of Social Development’s dysfunction,
dereliction of duty and intransigence.
In brief, in AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v
Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency
[2013] ZACC 42, 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC), 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (Allpay
1), decided in September 2013, the Constitutional Court declared
the decision by the South African Social Security Agency (the
SASSA) to award a tender to administer the payment of social
grants to Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) unlawful and invalid. In
April 2014, in AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd
v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency
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[2014] ZACC 12, 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC), 2014 (6) BCLR 641
(AllPay 2)), the Constitutional Court suspended its order of
invalidity, and ordered SASSA to run a fresh tender process and
CPS to continue to pay social grants. Critically, the court exer-
cised its supervisory jurisdiction by requiring the SASSA to report
back to it at various stages. In AllPay Consolidated Investment
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African
Social Security Agency [2015] ZACC 7, 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC)
(Allpay 3), decided in March 2015, the court granted the parties
time to reach a settlement, and monitored the timetable for the
finalisation of the tender process and the resolution of any further
disputes.
In November 2015 the SASSA filed a progress report with the
court. The SASSA stated it would not award a new contract but,
rather, would itself take over grant payments after 31 March 2017
(when the suspension of invalidity, ordered by the court in AllPay
2, was set to lapse). The court accepted this assurance and
discharged its supervisory order on the strength of it.
But by at least April 2016, various officials of the SASSA
realised that the SASSA could not comply with the undertaking to
take over the payments of social grants. Neither the SASSA nor
the Minister of Social Development (charged with the political
oversight of the SASSA) informed the court, or approached it for
authorisation to regularise the situation. On the contrary, the
SASSA attempted to enter into a new contract with CPS. On
28 February 2017 – only a month before the suspension of
invalidity was due to lapse – the SASSA’s chief executive officer
made an urgent application to the Constitutional Court for an
order authorising the SASSA to take steps to ensure the payment
of social grants from 1 April 2017. The very next day, under
mysterious circumstances, the SASSA sought to withdraw the
urgent application on the Minister’s instruction and, a few days
later, filed a ‘follow up’ report.
Against this backdrop, the Black Sash urgently applied to the
court for direct access, seeking that the court exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction over an interim contract between CPS
and the SASSA for the payment of social grants. Freedom Under
Law sought leave to intervene, and both Corruption Watch and
the South African Post Office (which contended that it was
capable of facilitating the payment of social grants) successfully
applied to be admitted as friends of the court.
Froneman J (who had penned the three prior judgments) held
the majority of the court’s vote. He granted direct access and in
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trenchant terms castigated the state officials’ ‘extraordinary’
conduct (para [1]) and ‘continued recalcitrance’ (para [57]),
emphasising that as the country’s social assistance programme
was imperiled, the matter was urgent on a national scale (para
[36]).
Froneman J’s judgment is also notable for its robust criticism of
the Minister and the SASSA’s wholesale failure to inform the court
of its inability to meet the deadline, notwithstanding various legal
opinions recommending that it do so. This breached the ‘recipro-
cal comity’ owed to the judiciary (para [13]), and called for public
accounting. The court held:
This Court and the country as a whole are now confronted with a
situation where the executive arm of government admits that it is not
able to fulfil its constitutional and statutory obligations to provide for
the social assistance of its people. And, in the deepest and most
shaming of ironies, it now seeks to rely on a private corporate entity,
with no discernible commitment to transformative empowerment in its
own management structures, to get it out of this predicament (para
[8]).
Reasserting the finding of AllPay 2 – that, for the purposes of
the administration of the social grants system, CPS is an organ of
state with concomitant positive duties – Froneman J concluded
that the SASSA and CPS shared an ongoing constitutional
obligation to pay grants after 31 March 2017 (paras [41] [48]). He
also reasserted the no-profit rule: ‘No party has any claim to profit
from the threatened invasion of peoples’ rights. At the same time
no one should usually be expected to be out of pocket for
ensuring the continued exercise of those rights’ (para [50]).
Froneman J also found that, given the ‘very real threatened
breach of the right of millions of people to social assistance’ (para
[43]), the court was empowered in terms of section 172(1)(b)(ii) of
the Constitution, to grant a just and equitable order that would
enforce these positive obligations. The majority judgment ordered
that the contract would extend beyond 31 March 2017 for an
additional year, thereby also extending the suspension of the
declaration of the contract’s invalidity, originally ordered in AllPay
Remedies (para [44]).
Madlanga J wrote separately, concurring with Froneman J’s
majority save for its finding that the court ought first to extend the
contract that was to expire on 31 March 2017, and only then to
extend the suspension of the declaration of invalidity. Madlanga J
would, instead, have made a direct order to the effect that, under
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the court’s wide remedial powers and given its status as an organ
of state, CPS was to continue to pay social grants (para [79]).
Froneman J’s judgment observes that this is ‘another valid way of
arriving at an identical outcome’ (para [45]).
In the meantime, the court reasserted its supervisory juris-
diction, given the SASSA’s irregular conduct and the risks posed
to grant beneficiaries (paras [55]–[62]). The Minister and the
SASSA were ordered to file affidavits on a quarterly basis
detailing their plans to ensure the payment of social grants; steps
taken in that regard; further steps still to be taken; and a timeline
for when these steps would be taken. The court also provided for
the Auditor-General’s involvement to evaluate the implementation
of the interim contract. Finally, Froneman J ordered the Minister –
as the ‘office-holder ultimately responsible for the crisis and . . .
required in terms of the Constitution to account to Parliament’
(para [74]) – to file an affidavit explaining why she ought not be
joined in the proceedings in her personal capacity, and mulcted,
personally, in costs (paras [72]–[75]).
RIGHT TO VOTE
My Vote Counts NPC v President of the Republic of South
Africa [2017] ZAWCHC 105, 2017 (6) SA 501 (WCC) is the High
Court sequel to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in My Vote
Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly [2016] ZACC
31, 2016 (1) SA 132 (CC), 2015 (12) BCLR 1407. There, the
majority of the Constitutional Court took a startlingly obtuse
approach to the principle of subsidiarity. The Constitutional Court
was sharply divided on whether the Promotion of Access to
Information Act 2 of 2000 (the PAIA) is the only legislation
envisaged by the Constitution to give effect to the right of access
to information, with the majority of the court holding that the PAIA
is intended to cover the field. For this reason, the majority
directed My Vote Counts, a non-profit voluntary association, to go
back to square one and to initiate a frontal challenge seeking to
impugn the constitutionality of the PAIA’s failure to provide for a
mechanism to compel political parties to disclose the sources of
their private funding.
My Vote Counts advanced its argument in the High Court on
the following premises: first, that the right to access the private
funding information of political parties is not only safeguarded by
section 32 of the Constitution, but is also reasonably required
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effectively to exercise the right to vote and to make political
choices; second, that the effective prevention and detection of
corruption further requires that such information be accessible;
and third, that a number of international agreements, ratified by
South Africa, bolster this requirement.
This argument was resisted by two respondents: the Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services, and the Democratic Alliance
(DA). The DA argued that My Vote Counts failed to join the
Independent Electoral Commission, and that its application was
therefore defective, because this body is responsible for oversee-
ing political parties and promoting voter education. Meer J
quickly disposed of this preliminary argument: the Independent
Electoral Committee has little to do with information concerning
private political party funding, and so lacks any direct and
substantial interest in the relief sought.
On the merits, Meer J delineated three enquiries for determin-
ing whether the Constitution requires the disclosure of private
funding (para [12]):
(1) Does the right of access to information in section 32 of the
Constitution, read with the right to vote in section 19 of the
Constitution, require the disclosure of private funding?
(2) Is private funding information required for the exercise of the right
to vote, given the role political parties play in South Africa’s
constitutional democracy?
(3) Is private funding information required for the state to vindicate its
duty to prevent corruption, in terms of sections 7(2) and 1(d) of
the Constitution, as well as a number of international agreements?
The judgment answered the first enquiry in the affirmative:
section 32 is cast broadly. While it is true that section 32 qualifies
the right to access information held by non-state entities (and
political parties are not organs of state), this is no obstacle to My
Vote Counts, as the right to access information should not be
read in isolation. Instead, that right is engaged where information
is required to exercise or protect any other right, and so must be
read together with the right to vote (para [22]).
Endorsing the minority judgment’s approach in the Constitu-
tional Court, Meer J found that political parties play a unique role
in vindicating the right to vote. Given this, information about
political parties’ private funding is required for the exercise of an
informed right to vote (para [29]). This would not have the effect of
retrospectively casting a pall over the validity of elections to date.
The state has a duty to prevent corruption. Secret funding of
political parties thwarts this duty because it fosters the prospect
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of political parties making themselves beholden to donors and so
enables corruption to be concealed. For this reason, the state’s
corruption-busting duties require that political parties’ private
funding be disclosed (para [42]).
The PAIA does not allow for the disclosure of private funding
and, Meer J noted, in light of the majority’s approach in the
Constitutional Court, was the correct legislative target (para [45]).
Moreover, the PAIA fails to provide for access to the private
funding records of political parties. This is, in part, because
political parties do not fall comfortably within the PAIA’s definition
of either a public or a private body (para [52]). For this reason,
Meer J endorsed Cameron J’s minority finding in the Constitu-
tional Court that political parties fall outside the PAIA’s ambit:
‘[w]here political parties should be, there is a gaping hole’ (para
[53], quoting the Constitutional Court’s minority judgment in para
[116]).
The PAIAclearly falls short of what is constitutionally required. It
requires that information be available only on request, and only in
respect of a specific entity. This has the effect that ‘disclosure
under [the] PAIA is thus not a continuous process affording
citizens equal access to information’ (para [55]) and so sits
uncomfortably with the requirement for the continuous disclosure
of private-funding information. The PAIA’s terms would also
impose an onerous and expensive burden on citizens, and allow
a body to refuse to give access to information on the basis that it
only requires that access be given to recorded information.
A requester would not be entitled to any unrecorded information
on funding (para [58]). Even worse, a body could delete or
destroy records before an application for disclosure is made,
without this contravening the PAIA (para [59]). The PAIA also
provides an array of grounds on which a body may validly refuse
to disclose information (paras [60] [61]). The PAIA’s wholesale
inadequacy for the purpose of providing access to political party
funding information was demonstrated by My Vote Counts’ unsuc-
cessful attempts to obtain such information through the PAIA’s
mechanisms.
For these reasons, the PAIA infringes sections 32 and 19 of the
Constitution (para [64]). This infringement is not saved by a
limitations analysis, nor can political parties seek refuge in the
right to privacy, given ‘the public nature of political parties and
the fact that the private funds they receive have a distinctly public
purpose’ (para [67]).
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Meer J, therefore, declared that information regarding the
private funding of political parties is reasonably required for the
effective exercise of the right to vote and to make political
choices, and that the PAIA is inconsistent with the Constitution.
Constrained by findings made by the majority judgment in the
Constitutional Court, she declined to order continuous and sys-
tematic disclosure of political party funding. Instead, the declara-
tion of invalidity was suspended for eighteen months to allow
Parliament to remedy the PAIA’s defects.
The High Court judgment shows signs of strain within the
straightjacket imposed by the majority judgment of the Constitu-
tional Court. Indeed, Meer J’s careful analysis, which largely
tracks Cameron J’s minority judgment in the Constitutional Court,
demonstrates just how misguided the majority’s approach was:
the PAIA is simply not the natural legislative mechanism for
regulating access to political parties’ funding. The challenge
could and should have been directed at, for example, the
Electoral Act 73 of 1998, or any other statute dealing with political
parties. The clear and obvious structure of the PAIA is that the
obligations to create records, keep them, and make those
records proactively available, lie in subject-specific statutes, not
the PAIA. The PAIA is a backstop which relies on other record-
creation and record-keeping obligations (T Van Wyk ‘ ‘‘Don’t
blame the librarian if no one has written the book’’: My Vote
Counts and the information required to exercise the franchise’
(2016) 8 Constitutional Court Review 97).
Meer J’s declaration of invalidity has subsequently been con-
firmed by the Constitutional Court in My Vote Counts NPC v
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & another [2018]
ZACC 17, 2018 (5) SA 380 (CC), 2018 (8) BCLR 893 – a judgment
which could not sidestep the substantive questions.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW
ZT BOGGENPOEL*
LEGISLATION
No legislation relating to this topic was enacted during the
period under review.
CASE LAW
SECTION 25(1): DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
Regulatory restrictions that amount to arbitrary deprivation of property
In Jordaan & others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
& others; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v New
Ventures Consulting and Services (Pty) Limited & others; Ekurhu-
leni Metropolitan Municipality v Livanos & others 2017 (6) SA 287
(CC), the Constitutional Court was required, in line with section
167(5) of the Constitution, to confirm or deny a High Court
decision declaring section 118(3) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Municipal Systems Act)
unconstitutional. The North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, in
Jordaan & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality &
others; New Ventures Consulting & Services (Pty) Ltd & others v
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & another; Livanos &
others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality & another; Oak
Plant Rentals (Pty) Ltd & others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Munici-
pality 2017 (2) SA 295 (GP), had held that in so far as section
118(3) of the Municipal Systems Act is a charge on the land that
can be enforced against subsequent (or new) owners for debts
incurred by previous owners, the provision was unconstitutional.
The High Court assumed that section 118(3) can be interpreted in
such a way that it is enforceable against new owners, and, on that
basis, it was declared unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court
was, therefore, required to provide finality concerning, first, the
* BCom LLB LLD (Stell). South African Research Chair in Property Law, hosted
by Stellenbosch University in the Department of Public Law, funded by the Depart-
ment of Science and Technology and administered by the National Research
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correct interpretation of section 118(3), and secondly, the consti-
tutionality of the provision.
Cameron J, writing the unanimous judgment, pointed out that
the legal question to be decided was whether section 118(3)
could, or should, be interpreted to permit a municipality to hold
new owners liable for debts incurred by previous owners. Further-
more, if such an interpretation were at all plausible, it had to be
determined whether section 118(3) would pass constitutional
muster. The applicants on appeal were owners and corporations
acting on behalf of owners, who were recent transferees of
property to whom the respective municipalities suspended or
refused to provide services on the basis of unpaid municipal
debts owing on the properties (para [4]). The Constitutional Court
held that whether the applicants could be held liable for the debts
of their predecessors in title, was ‘large and pressing’ (para [9]).
The question is important because the interpretation of section
118(3) was not clear from previous cases such as City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 (4) SA 319 (SCA)
and City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mitchell 2016 (3)
SA 231 (SCA), and because the constitutional implications of the
statutory provision remain largely uncertain (para [10]).
In order to answer the legal question, the judgment is divided
into two parts. In the first part the court contextualised section
118(3) to determine the ‘true meaning’ of the provision by
providing insight into its history and the language used. The court
also considered the phrase ‘charge on the land’ in its common-
law meaning as a purported real security right. In the second
part, the court analysed the provision from a constitutional
perspective, especially in the context of section 25(1) of the
Constitution.
The court began by highlighting that when considering the
meaning of section 118(3), it is important to determine the meaning
of ‘charge upon the property’ in terms of the history of the phrase in
South African statute law. Section 118(3) of the Act provides that
[a]n amount due for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees,
property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties is a charge
upon the property in connection with which the amount is owing and
enjoys preference over any mortgage bonds registered against the
property (emphasis added).
Section 118(1) – the so-called embargo provision – is also
relevant to an understanding of the appropriate context of section
118(3), and, in turn, provides that
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[a] registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of property except
on production to that registrar of deeds of a prescribed certificate –
(a) issued by the municipality or municipalities in which that property
is situated; and (b) which certifies that all amounts that become due in
connection with that property for municipal service fees, surcharges
on fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties
during the two years preceding the date of application for the
certificate have been fully paid.
The embargo provision was the first mechanism to ensure that
municipalities were paid by potential transferors before they were
permitted to transfer their properties. The second mechanism,
section 118(3), was a preferent claim in favour of the municipality
to ensure that if historical debt existed in relation to the property,
the municipality could execute against the property and enjoy a
preferent claim against other creditors, such as mortgagees
(para [17]). Therefore, the second mechanism ensured prefer-
ence in the debt-collecting process and was never intended to
serve as a mechanism that could be enforced once the property
had been transferred to a subsequent transferee. It was always
an instrument to determine where the preference lay before
execution. This is clear from the legislative history leading up to
the enactment of section 118(3) (para [22]). Its predecessor,
section 50(3) of the Transvaal Local Government Ordinance 17 of
1939, however, differed materially.
In this regard, section 50(3) and section 50(1) (the embargo
provision’s predecessor) of the Ordinance were conjoined, which
meant that the preferent claim creating the charge on the land
existed only while the embargo provision operated, which was
initially two, and later three, years. Any question of whether the
right survived transfer was consequently not an issue. Therefore,
unlike its predecessor, section 118(3) does not have an explicit
link with the embargo provision in section 118(1). The major
implication is that it becomes difficult to determine the conse-
quences of section 118(3) for subsequent owners. It is on this
basis that the proposition is made that the charge survives
transfer. The court suggested that if the meaning ascribed to the
section, as provided by the municipalities, is followed, it would
be a radical departure from the statute law before 1 March 2001,
which is when section 118(3) of the Act came into effect. From an
historical perspective, it seems unlikely that section 118(3) is a
stand-alone provision which could survive the transfer of property
to another owner.
The court then analysed the meaning of ‘charge upon the land’
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under the common law (paras [28] [43]). Here it considered a
‘charge upon the land’ as a real security right. In this regard, it is a
common-law phrase which was incorporated into legislation
purportedly to create a statutory real security right. The court
reiterated that on its own the charge does not create a right which
can survive transfer of the property to another owner (para [30]).
Therefore, the right is not automatically enforceable against
subsequent owners. This does not mean that the provision does
not have value. Its value lies in the fact that if the property is
declared executable by an order of court, the municipality can
enforce the charge, presumably in preference to other mortgag-
ees (para [30]).
For the charge to constitute a transmissible right of security, it
must satisfy the requirement of publicity (paras [31] [34]). In the
context of real security rights, the purpose of the right is to secure
the payment of the debt, and the court pointed out that ‘if that
debt could be satisfied by execution upon the property before the
debtor disposes of the property – or even later – why should it be
enforceable against innocent third parties who are unconnected
with the debt and may not even know of its existence?’ (para [38]).
In the case of section 118(3) there is no indication that the
legislature requires the publicity function to apply, and no express
indication that the Act is enforceable against subsequent owners.
The court compared another piece of legislation, the Land and
Agricultural Development BankAct 15 of 2002, which uses similar
wording to the Municipal Systems Act. Sections 31(2) and 31(3)
are important in this regard. They provide:
31(2) Before any payment is made in respect of the advance referred
to in subsection (1), the Bank must transmit in writing to the Registrar
of Deeds concerned information . . . and on receipt of that information
the Registrar of Deeds must cause a note thereof to be made in his or
her registers in respect of the property.
31(3) The making of a note in terms of subsection (2) has the effect of
creating in favour of the Bank a charge upon the property until the
amount of the advance together with interest and costs has been
repaid.
Transmissibility is secured by the registration in the register of
deeds, which does not take place in the context of section 118(3)
of the Municipal SystemsAct (para [41]). Therefore, it is likely that
the charge created by section 118(3) only applies to the actual
debtor and not subsequent owners. The court concluded that the
unregistered charge is enforceable against the property only
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while the debtor owns the property. Therefore, without registra-
tion, it seems unlikely that debts will be enforceable against
subsequent owners. In this regard, it cannot be assumed that the
legislation itself fulfils the publicity requirement (para [43]). The
court reiterated that the legislation simply indicates the potential
debt in relation to the property, but does not state the value of that
debt. Presumably, if registration in the deeds registry were a
requirement in the context of the charge created in terms of
section 118(3), the deeds registry would provide the detail relating
to the value of the debt.
The court then examined the constitutionality of section 118(3)
as an indicator of whether the provision would survive transfer of
the property to a successive owner (para [44]). The municipalities
contended that the provision was constitutional in so far as it
survives transfer to new owners. In this regard, they argued that
municipalities have a peculiar responsibility to provide municipal
services and, therefore, the provision is constitutionally valid. In
order to resolve the problem of the new owner buying the
property without knowledge of existing historical debt, they
argued that the court could oblige the municipality to make that
information available.
The court highlighted the fact that it is not unthinkable to
imagine that new owners of property could be saddled with
certain responsibilities by virtue of their newfound status as
property owners. However, this does not mean that section 118(3)
can or should be interpreted as compelling new owners to accept
responsibility for the payment of historical debt owing by previous
owners. Other information regarding this specific provision must
be considered. First, the municipality has the peculiar responsi-
bility to recover debts (para [53]). In this regard, the provision
creates mechanisms which ensure that the debts can be recov-
ered from existing owners who incurred the debts. Therefore, all
outstanding debts can, in principle, be recovered before the
property is transferred (para [56]). On this basis, the court
emphasised the debt-collection mechanisms the municipality
had at its disposal which would negate the need to question the
unconstitutionality of section 118(3).
In the final part of the judgment, the court questioned whether
section 118(3) results in an arbitrary deprivation of property. The
court accepted that the new owner has a property interest for
purposes of section 25(1). Furthermore, bond-holders had inter-
ests that qualified as property for purposes of section 25(1). For
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purposes of deprivation of property, the court accepted that the
deprivation must be substantial in the sense that it has a legally
significant impact on property owners. In this regard, the court
equated ‘legally significant impact’ with a ‘substantial’ depriva-
tion.
The court examined the extent of the deprivation resulting from
the enforcement of section 118(3) on both the new owner and
bond-holders. It held that the provision results in a cognisable
(and significant) deprivation (paras [64] [68]). In determining
whether section 118(3) permits arbitrary deprivation of property,
the court compared First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v
Commissioner for the SouthAfrican Revenue Service; First National
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768
(CC) and Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipal-
ity 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC), where the constitutionality of statutory
provisions (albeit different provisions) was also at stake. More
specifically, in FNB and Mkontwana the Constitutional Court had
to decide on the constitutionality of provisions in legislation which
held third parties liable for debts incurred by someone other than
the third parties.
In FNB, the court found section 114 of the Customs and Excise
Act 91 of 1964 unconstitutional because it allowed the commis-
sioner of the South African Revenue Service to seize vehicles
belonging to someone other than the tax debtor. This meant that
there was an insufficient nexus or link between the owner, the
property, and the debt. In Mkontwana, the court held that section
118(1) of the Municipal SystemsAct, which resulted in holding the
owner liable for debts incurred in relation to the property even
when he or she was not responsible for incurring the debt, was
not unconstitutional, in that there was a sufficiently close link
between the owner, the property, and the debt.
The court in Jordaan held that in the context of section 118(3), a
new owner will have no control, or even knowledge, of the manner
in which the debt arose. ‘This is because it is intrinsically arbitrary
to impose responsibility for payment of a debt on a property
[owner] who has no connection with it and who had no control at
all over the property or those occupying the property when the
debt was incurred’ (para [73]). In this respect, the court found
that Jordaan was similar to FNB, but differed from Mkontwana.
Therefore, if the new owner were to be held liable for historical
debts in relation to the property, it would constitute arbitrary
deprivation of property (para [74]). Furthermore, it was unneces-
sary to engage in a section 36(1) analysis (para [76]).
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In the end, the court highlighted, in line with section 39(2) of the
Constitution, that, in order to prevent arbitrary deprivation in
terms of section 25(1), section 118(3) should be interpreted as
not surviving transfer of the property. The appeal succeeded and,
although the court did not confirm the High Court’s declaration of
invalidity, it granted a declaratory order that section 118(3) does
not survive transfer to the new owner (para [78]).
The Jordaan decision clarifies whether section 118(3) of the
Municipal Systems Act creates a charge on the land enforceable
against subsequent new owners who played no part in incurring
the debt. It appears that this outcome applies no matter how the
transfer of property takes place, an issue that was previously
contested (para [75]; see the earlier cases of Mathabathe,
Mitchell, and Jordaan HC).
The court in Jordaan relied heavily on the work of Brits (R Brits
‘Why the security right in section 118(3) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 is not enforceable against
successors in title – A follow-up occasioned by the SCA’s Mitchell
judgment’ (2017) 1 Stell LR 47–67). Brits argues that from an
historical (and logical) perspective, section 118(3) should be
interpreted as not surviving transfer (Brits (2017) Stell LR 52). This
appears to be in line with the provision’s predecessor, which was
linked to the embargo provision making it impossible for new
owners to be liable for debts incurred by previous owners. Brits
also suggests – and this is endorsed by the court – that the only
way in which this provision could in any way be enforced against
subsequent owners would be if it were coupled with some form of
publicity, like all other limited real rights (Brits (2017) Stell LR
52-3). The court strongly supported the idea that, without public-
ity, the legislative provision would apply only to current owners
who actually incurred the debt, and would have no third-party
effect. In this regard, the earlier decisions of Mathabathe and
Mitchell created the impression that the right could be enforced
against subsequent owners. In Mathabathe the Supreme Court of
Appeal held that the municipality does not lose its right to enforce
the municipal debt when the property is transferred to succes-
sors in title. Therefore, the right survived transfer and the munici-
pality did not have to enforce the right before such transfer
(Mathabathe para [12]). Similarly, although in a more limited
sense, in Mitchell the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine
whether the right created in favour of the municipality in terms of
section 118(3) of the Municipal Systems Act had been terminated
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when the property was sold in execution, thereby implying that
the right was not enforceable against subsequent owners. It
confirmed that historic debt relating to a specific property will
transfer to a new owner after a sale in execution has taken place
(Mitchell para [16]).
Brits rejects the arguments made in both these decisions, and
contends that this is not how real security rights operate (Brits
(2017) Stell LR 53). He compares some examples of other real
security rights and statutorily created real security rights before
concluding that in most cases real security rights are accompa-
nied by publicity. When there has been no publicity, there are
good policy reasons for dispensing with the requirement (Brits
(2017) Stell LR 53–5). Consequently, Brits asserts that ‘creating
publicity through such a mechanism would certainly lead to
greater fairness, but the fact that formal publicity is currently
lacking without good reason, contributes to the irrationality of
rendering the section 118(3) charge enforceable against succes-
sors in title’ (Brits (2017) Stell LR 56). This is the same line of
reasoning adopted by the court in Jordaan and the main reason
for the finding that the charge is not enforceable against subse-
quent owners.
As regards the constitutional property analysis, the court finally
provided clarity in line with arguments raised by a number of
academics, that, if section 118(3) were interpreted to hold new
owners liable for debts incurred by previous owners, it would
result in a violation of section 25(1). This case finally confirms that
without a direct link between the debt and the person incurring
the debt, it is virtually impossible for the statutory provision to
pass constitutional muster.
In 2016 Annual Survey 217ff, the same arguments were made
in relation to the purported consequences of section 118(3).
It was argued that if the provision is interpreted to allow for new
owners to be held liable for the historical debt of their predeces-
sors, the outcome would arguably amount to an arbitrary depriva-
tion of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution.
A number of academic authors have made similar arguments
(see R Brits ‘The statutory security right in section 118(3) of the
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 – Does it
survive transfer of the land? [Discussion of City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 (4) SA 319 (SCA)]’
(2014) 25 Stell LR 536 544–47; LM du Plessis ‘Observations on
the (un)-constitutionality of section 118(3) of the Local Govern-
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ment: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000’ (2006) 17 Stell LR
505 520–9; Brits (2017) Stell LR 59-64). This decision should
therefore be welcomed in so far as it (purportedly) puts an end to
any doubt regarding the consequences of section 118(3) for the
constitutional property clause.
SECTION 25(1): DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
Regulatory restrictions that amount to arbitrary deprivation of property
South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of
Minerals and Energy NO & others 2017 (6) SA 331 (CC), raises
the important constitutional property law question of what consti-
tutes deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of
the Constitution. The judgment also addresses section 22 of the
Constitution, which deals with the right to choose one’s own
trade, occupation, or profession. The focus here will, however, be
on the court’s analysis of section 25(1) – the deprivation issue. In
this regard, it is necessary to consider whether the decision shifts
the boundaries in terms of the law applicable in the context of
deprivation of property, and what the implications are of such a
shift for constitutional property law.
This decision came to the Constitutional Court as an appeal
against the High Court decision South African Diamond Produc-
ers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy NO & others
[2016] ZAGPPHC 817 (6 September 2016), where Van der
Westhuizen AJ held that section 20A of the Diamonds Act 56 of
1986 (the Diamonds Act) was unconstitutional for infringing
sections 22 and 25 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court
was called upon, in terms of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution,
to confirm the order of constitutional invalidity.
The facts that gave rise to the dispute are briefly the following:
The respondents were various state departments and their
Ministers, including the Department of Minerals and Energy (and
its Minister), the Department of Finance (and its Minister), the
South African Diamond, Minerals and Precious Metals Regulator,
and the State Diamond Trader. The respondents opposed the
application in so far as it would confirm the declaration of
invalidity of section 20Aof the DiamondsAct. The applicant was a
voluntary association known as the South African Diamond
Producers Organisation (the SADPO). The primary objective of
the SADPO is to streamline the diamond producing industry. To
that end, diamond producers and diamond dealers constitute its
202 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 10 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/07−Constitutional−Property−Law
main members and its aim is to see to the needs of the members.
The Diamonds Act regulates the trade in diamonds in South
Africa. The main purposes of the Act are to regulate ‘the
possession, sale, purchase, import and export of unpolished
diamonds; the premises where the sale and purchase of unpol-
ished diamonds may take place; and the processes to be
followed in order to export unpolished diamonds’ (para [7]). The
Act was amended by the First and Second Diamonds Amend-
ment Acts 29 and 30 of 2005, which came into effect in July 2007.
Section 20A, the impugned provision, was included under the
second amendment to theAct, and led to the SADPO approaching
the High Court to have it declared unconstitutional and set aside
(paras [11] [12]). Section 20A provides as follows:
(1) No licensee may be assisted by a non-licensee or holder of a
permit referred to in section 26(e) during the viewing, purchasing
or selling of unpolished diamonds at any place where unpolished
diamonds are offered for sale in terms of this Act, except at a
diamond exchange and export centre.
(2) No holder of a diamond trading house licence referred to in
section 26(f) or any person authorized in terms of the Act to sell
unpolished diamonds may allow the assistance prohibited in
subsection 1.
It should be noted that prior to the amendment of the Diamonds
Act some of the SADPO’s members had developed a practice
regarding the mode of operation at their licensed business
premises which entailed offering unpolished diamonds on an
anonymous tender basis. The licensed South African dealers
ordinarily made use of foreign non-licensed experts. Therefore,
these non-licensed experts acted as the middle-men between
the South African licensed dealers and the licensed buyers, who
were in the main prospective foreign buyers. Although the sale
was concluded between the licensed dealer and the purchaser,
this practice was used to determine the international market value
of the unpolished diamonds. The practice was conducted in
so-called ‘tender houses’, although this term, or even the general
practice highlighted above, was never provided for in the Act.
The SADPO asserted that even though the practice was not
specifically provided for in the Act, it was lawful in terms of the
pre-amendment version of the Act (para [9]). This assertion was
based on the fact that the Act did not specifically prohibit such a
practice, or provide for a predetermined manner in which the
trade in unpolished diamonds should take place.
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It is clear that section 20Aof theAct has the effect of precluding
the business practice developed in the diamond trade industry,
which is why SADPO approached the High Court raising the
argument that various provisions of the Amendment Act were
unconstitutional. The High Court narrowed down the enquiry to
the question of the constitutionality of section 20A only, specifi-
cally seeking the basis of such potential unconstitutionality. The
SADPO argued that the grounds for unconstitutionality of section
20A were sections 22 and 25 of the Constitution. In relation to
section 25 the SADPO argued that the prohibition against allow-
ing the assistance of unlicensed experts in securing an interna-
tional market value contravened section 25 as it prevented
SADPO members from obtaining the full proceeds of the diamonds
they owned (Diamond Producers HC para [38]). The respondents, in
turn, claimed that section 20A did not result in an infringement of
section 25 because there was no deprivation of property through the
alleged loss of income, and even if there were a deprivation of
property, it was not an arbitrary deprivation (Diamond Producers HC
para [45]).
The High Court held that section 20A of the Act was unneces-
sary because the mischief it purportedly sought to address could
be addressed adequately by other provisions in the Act (Dia-
mond Producers HC paras [29] [40]–[42]). In relation to whether
section 20A resulted in an arbitrary deprivation of property, the
High Court held that the provision authorised deprivation and that
the deprivation was ‘irrational, arbitrary and disproportional’
(Diamond Producers HC para [49]). On this basis, it declared
section 20A unconstitutional in so far as it infringed sections 22
and 25 of the Constitution (Diamond Producers HC para [51]).
Consequently the Constitutional Court had to determine whether
the declaration of constitutional invalidity should be confirmed.
As already mentioned, it is necessary to establish whether the
Constitutional Court’s analysis of whether section 20A of the
Diamonds Act contravenes the constitutional property clause can
be faulted or provides an accurate reflection of the law. The thrust
of the argument based on section 25(1) was that by virtue of the
prohibition against the use of unlicensed assistance, the SAD-
PO’s members had been deprived of the right to the realisation of
the full market value, which purportedly forms part of the right to
alienate property, or the ius disponendi, because they were
permitted to market the diamonds only to holders of local
licences. Moreover, the Amendment Act required previous hold-
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ers of diamond exchange certificates to apply for a trading
licence, because previous certificates were abolished by section
26(f) of the Act. The new ‘trading house certificates’ purportedly
gave fewer rights than the initial diamond exchange certificates in
the sense that they were focused on encouraging the South
African diamond trade as opposed to selling to the export market
(para [20]). It was on this basis that the SADPO asserted that
section 20A permitted deprivation of property which was not
justified and therefore arbitrary.
In response, the respondents contended that the practice
followed by the SADPO members was not expressly endorsed by
any legal right in the legislation. In fact, the respondents submit-
ted that the practice was illegal and that is why the legislature
enacted section 20A (para [24]). The respondents specifically
argued that the purpose of section 20A is ‘to promote the local
beneficiation of South African diamonds; to tighten the regulation
of the diamond trade; and to comply with the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme’ (para [26]). Therefore, there was a justifi-
able reason for the enactment of the provision.
The Constitutional Court demarcated the issues to be decided
into two principal aspects: first, whether section 20A contravened
the constitutional property clause; and second, whether section
20A infringed the right to choose one’s own trade, occupation, or
profession as enshrined in section 22 of the Constitution. An
analysis of the enquiry into the effect of section 20A on section 25
of the Constitution follows.
Khampepe J began the section 25 enquiry by reiterating the
wording of the provision, which, in short, states that no one may
be deprived of property except in terms of law of general
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of
property. She then considered the test set out in First National
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service & another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), empha-
sising that the section 25(1) part of the analysis rests on three
questions. These are: whether there is an interest worthy of
protection under section 25; whether there has been deprivation
of property; and if so, whether the deprivation was in line with the
requirements in section 25(1) – most notably the requirement
proscribing arbitrary deprivation of property (para [34]).
The SADPO maintained that, in this case, two property rights
were affected by the legislative amendment to the Diamonds
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Act. In the first place, it had an impact on ownership of the
diamonds, and more specifically, section 20A had an impact on
the entitlement of ius disponendi. Secondly, the SADPO argued
that their members had been deprived of ‘ownership of the
diamond dealer licences’, which were abolished under the Act
with the prerogative (or obligation) on the previous holders of the
licences to apply for the tender house certificates. The court dealt
systematically with these two property rights to determine whether
section 20A authorised deprivation of either of them.
Khampepe J stated that the FNB enquiry can be approached
from two perspectives. The first approach assumes that dia-
monds and licences are property for purposes of section 25(1),
and only during the deprivation stage is the impact on the
property interest (the ius disponendi and the licences) consid-
ered to establish whether the interference is significant enough to
constitute deprivation of property. The second approach sets the
bar for determining what constitutes property quite high. It begins
by examining whether that which has been taken away – 30 per
cent of the ownership of the diamonds and the right to engage in
terms of the previous licence in a particular manner – actually
constitutes property for purposes of section 25(1). Only if these
entitlements constitute property can one proceed to the next
stage in the enquiry, which assesses the deprivation issue.
Khampepe J preferred the first approach, and accepted that the
‘property’ in the two cases was ownership of the diamonds and
ownership of the licences. She assumed that ownership of
diamonds and ownership of the licences brought with them
various entitlements (para [39]).
With regard to ownership of the diamonds, the SADPO argued
that 30 per cent of the full market value was lost due the inability
of diamond producers and traders to use unlicensed experts, as
they had in the past. It is this loss of the full proceeds from the
sale of unpolished diamonds, due to the lack of assistance from
the middle-men, that the SADPO argued limited the right of its
members to alienate the diamonds (or the ius disponendi). The
court accepted that ownership of the diamonds constituted
property for purposes of section 25 (para [41]). The important
question was whether section 20A resulted in deprivation of
ownership of the diamonds (para [42]). The court began by
considering the definition of deprivation in Mkontwana v Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset & others v Buffalo City
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign & others v Mem-
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ber of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing,
Gauteng & others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). It emphasised that
whether there has been a deprivation of property depends on the
extent of the deprivation (para [42], relying on para [32] of
Mkontwana). The loss must be ‘beyond the normal expected
restrictions on property’ for the interference to constitute depriva-
tion under section 25(1) (para [43]). Khampepe J then consid-
ered Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation
(Pty) Ltd 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC), where the court again empha-
sised that deprivation requires a substantial interference in
property rights (Offit para [41]). The court in Offit stated that
although ‘direct or physical interference is not necessary, the
impact must be of sufficient magnitude to warrant constitutional
engagement’. Courts must, according to the Constitutional Court
in Offit, determine the extent to which property rights have been
diminished (Offit para [41]). Khampepe J also relied on the
judgment in Tshwane City v Link Africa 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC),
where a similar approach to determine deprivation of property
was followed (Link Africa para [167]). In Link Africa, the court
referred to the ‘extent of the intrusion’ in establishing whether
deprivation of property had occurred. Moreover, Link Africa
highlighted that the deprivation must be sufficiently significant to
have a legally relevant impact on the rights of the property holder
(Link Africa paras [163]-[173]). Therefore, a substantial or signifi-
cant interference was held as the measure by which to determine
whether the intrusion constituted deprivation of property in Dia-
mond Producers CC (para [47]).
On the basis of the definition of deprivation (above), the court,
in Diamond Producers, questioned whether the SADPO’s mem-
bers had been deprived of 30 per cent of the market value of the
diamonds they sold. The court accepted that the deprivation lies
in the limitation of, or interference with, the right to alienate the
diamonds, especially as the members are not able to obtain the
highest possible market value for the diamonds in terms of
section 20A. Khampepe J held that section 20Adoes not interfere
with the producers’ and dealers’ rights to any significant or legally
relevant extent (para [50]). This is because, in terms of the extent
of the interference, it is impossible to link the use of the unli-
censed foreign experts directly to the quantifiable loss suffered
as a direct result of section 20A. Therefore, it is not clear that the
drop of 30 per cent in the market value was a direct result of the
prohibition against the use of unlicensed persons in section 20A.
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The court consequently held that no loss could be proved as it
was impossible for the court to assess the extent of the interfer-
ence and so to determine whether it was sufficient to constitute
deprivation. The court also emphasised the difficulty, in this
particular case, of establishing when the loss should be assessed,
especially given the ever-changing market conditions which
make it very difficult to decide whether there has been a
sufficiently substantial deprivation of property (para [51]).
Interestingly, the court then reverted to what resembles an
enquiry into whether there was a legally protectable interest or
entitlement in this particular case. Here, the court in essence
linked the deprivation issue to (and even made it dependent on)
arbitrariness (where the extent of the deprivation determines
whether there has in fact been deprivation), and the property
question (where the existence of a legally protectable interest or
entitlement determines whether there has in fact been a depriva-
tion of property). Therefore, in this part of the judgment the court
renders the question of deprivation dependent on whether there
is a legally protectable interest or entitlement. In this regard, the
court made a number of interesting remarks. There would be no
deprivation because section 20A does not remove any ‘protect-
able’ legal interest or entitlement. Although producers and deal-
ers are limited in the sense of realising full market value, section
20Adoes not actually prohibit the sale of diamonds or compel the
members to donate the diamonds to the state – which would
presumably have constituted deprivation. The limitation lies in the
way in which the producers and dealers operate or conduct the
sale, so it is the manner of conducting sales that is affected by the
legislation. This limitation is not substantial enough to constitute
deprivation for purposes of section 25(1). The court held that ‘[a]
property holder does not generally have a legally protectable
interest either in obtaining a specific value for his goods, or in
valuing his goods according to a particular method’ (para [53]).
In the final analysis, the court concluded that there had been no
deprivation of property in their diamonds in accordance with the
FNB analysis (para [55]).
The court then examined whether there had been deprivation
of ‘ownership of the licences’ (paras [56]-[61]). It accepted, in line
with the judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC of
Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC),
that licences constitute property for purposes of section 25(1).
(For analyses of the Shoprite judgment, see IM Rautenbach
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‘Dealing with the social dimensions of property’ (2015) 4 TSAR
822; EJ Marais ‘Expanding the contours of the constitutional
property concept’ (2016) 3 TSAR 576; PJ Badenhorst & C Young
‘The notion of constitutional property in South Africa: An analysis
of the Constitutional Court’s approach in Shoprite Checkers (Pty)
Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA
125 (CC)’ (2017) 28 Stell LR 26.) It did so without going into the
differences in the approaches of Froneman J and Madlanga J in
establishing whether licences are in fact property. Khampepe J
simply assumed that the licences are property, because ‘even
assuming they are property for the purposes of section 25 of the
Constitution, there is no deprivation’ of property (see specifically
para [51] n51). She then considered whether there had been a
deprivation of these licences in terms of the definition outlined in
Mkontwana, Offit, and Link Africa (above). In this regard, it must
be determined whether the extent of the intrusion is such that it
has a legally relevant impact on the rights of the affected party
(para [58]).
The court stressed that in the context of these licences, holders
of the licence can buy, sell, import, and export unpolished
diamonds. Section 20A has not actually removed any of these
entitlements. It simply removes the practice of using unlicensed
foreign experts. This differs from the licences in Shoprite, where
the licence was withdrawn and the entitlement subsequently lost.
On this basis, ‘[t]here can be no deprivation in a change of
regulation that alters the strategies licensees are entitled to
pursue in the course of conducting licensed activities’ (para [60]).
Therefore, if the government makes a regulation that alters a
particular business strategy, or makes that strategy unlawful, it
cannot be argued that it amounts to deprivation of property.
Consequently, the court held that ‘[t]o the extent that the licences
in issue are in fact property, the limitation imposed by section 20A
is not substantial, as it does not have a legally relevant impact on
the rights of the affected party’ (para [61]).
The SADPO also argued that holders of diamond exchange
certificates had been deprived of property in that those certifi-
cates had been replaced by trading house licences (para [62]).
These trading house licences purportedly afforded fewer rights
than the previous certificates. However, the court held that it is
unclear how the rights of licensees have been reduced by
section 20A – as this section stands, it does not abolish diamond
exchange certificates in favour of trading house licences.
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Consequently, the order of the constitutional invalidity of sec-
tion 20A of the Diamonds Act on the basis of section 25(1) of the
Constitution was not confirmed by the Constitutional Court. The
court also, for reasons provided in paragraphs [64] to [80] of
the judgment, refused to confirm the constitutional invalidity of
section 20A on the basis of section 22 of the Constitution.
Therefore, the court declined to confirm the declaration of
constitutional invalidity as ordered by the High Court, and the
appeal succeeded (para [83]).
A number of interesting remarks can be made about the
Diamond Producers judgment, especially as regards the extent
to which it confirms existing principles relating to constitutional
property law. The most obvious point of discussion is around the
definition of deprivation as outlined by the Constitutional Court. It
is clear, from the court’s analysis of the meaning of deprivation,
that the bar is set very high in terms of establishing whether a
particular regulatory interference amounts to deprivation of prop-
erty. In other words, this case reiterates that in order for the
interference in property rights to amount to deprivation of prop-
erty, it must be sufficiently significant to make a legally relevant
impact on the property holding. This is in line with the cases
referred to by the court as authority. In this regard, cases such as
Mkontwana, Offit and Link Africa (above) are instructive. There
are also other cases which the court failed specifically to mention,
but which could equally have been used to support the point. For
instance, in Jordaan & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality & others; New Ventures Consulting & Services (Pty)
Ltd & others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality &
another; Livanos & others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality
& another; Oak Plant Rentals (Pty) Ltd & others v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality 2017 (2) SA 295 (GP), reference is
made to ‘severe deprivation’ in determining whether an interfer-
ence amounts to deprivation of property (para [24]). Similarly, in
AgriSA (Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy
[2013] ZACC 9 (18 April 2013)) the court referred to ‘substantial
interference’ (para [67]) in assessing the extent to which the
intrusion into property rights amounted to deprivation. Chevron
(Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport & others
[2015] ZACC 15 (5 June 2015)) is another decision where the
Constitutional Court found that a deprivation must be ‘substantial’
if it is to be open to scrutiny under section 25(1) (para [18]). All
these cases provide authority for setting the standard in defining
deprivation of property very high.
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It should be noted that on face of it, the determination of
deprivation of property under this approach is not in line with the
definition in FNB, where the bar was arguably set very low. In FNB
the court interpreted ‘deprivation’ widely (para [57]), when it
stated that any interference in the use, enjoyment, or exploitation
of private property involves some deprivation in respect of the
person having title or right to, or in, the property concerned.
Courts will quite readily accept that a deprivation has occurred
and proceed to consider the requirements in section 25(1), being
the third question in the section 25 analysis (see T Roux ‘Property’
in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of
South Africa vol 3 2ed (OS 2003) Ch 46 2–5, 18, 23–25). This is
also in line with Van der Walt’s reasoning that a more acceptable
solution to the definition of deprivation is that ‘every restriction
that has a perceptible effect on the property holder’s use and
enjoyment of property, no matter how small or insubstantial,
constitutes deprivation in terms of section 25(1) and is therefore
subject to its requirements’ (AJ van der Walt Constitutional
Property Law 3ed (2011) 209). In this respect, Van der Walt
explains that ‘it seems odd that deprivation should be limited to
that which exceeds restrictions that are ‘‘normal in an open and
democratic society’’ when all regulatory ([or] ‘‘police power’’)
restrictions on the use and enjoyment of property are normal in
society’ (AJ van der Walt ‘Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness
test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Munici-
pality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action
Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng’
(2005) 122 SALJ 79–80). He argues further that
it serves no useful purpose to associate deprivation with substantial or
abnormal – in other words excessive – regulatory deprivation when the
purpose of s 25(1) is to legitimize the imposition of regulatory depriva-
tion generally. In the framework of s 25(1), any regulatory restriction on
the use and enjoyment of property, however small or insignificant, can
be classified as deprivation without placing an additional burden on
the state because deprivation does not in general require compensa-
tion and regulatory state action is subject to constitutional review in
terms of the general legality requirement in any event (Van der Walt
(2005) 122 SALJ 80).
Therefore, the extent of the deprivation should be considered
in the step to determine whether the deprivation is arbitrary, and
not whether the limitation results in deprivation of property. All that
should be necessary to prove the first step in the deprivation
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inquiry is that the deprivation is significant enough to have a
legally relevant impact on the rights of the affected party.
Therefore, although one could probably arrive at the same
conclusion from FNB’s analysis of a generally wide approach and
the approach adopted in Diamond Producers in determining
deprivation, it is important to be aware that assessing the extent
of deprivation in FNB was essentially undertaken to determine the
degree to which the deprivation was arbitrary, and not whether
the interference amounted to deprivation at all. There is a subtle
distinction between the two approaches which arguably could
benefit from further attention in future cases.
SECTION 25(2)–(3): COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATION
Determining just and equitable compensation under section 25(3)
In Uys & another v Msiza & others [2017] ZASCA 130 (29 Sep-
tember 2017), the Supreme Court of Appeal heard an appeal
against a Land Claims Court judgment decided in 2016 (Msiza v
Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land
Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC)). The Land Claims Court judgment
was discussed in some depth in 2016 Annual Survey 235ff and it
is relevant here to establish the extent to which the Supreme
Court of Appeal’s reasoning differs from that of the Land Claims
Court on the determination of compensation for expropriation
under section 25 of the Constitution.
In the Land Claims Court, Ngcukaitobi and Canca AJJ ordered
that an amount of R1 500 000 compensation be paid to the owner
of the property expropriated in terms of section 23(1) of the Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (the LTA). A brief outline of
the facts is provided to the extent necessary to show why the
Supreme Court of Appeal deviated from the approach adopted in
the Land Claims Court to the determination of compensation for
expropriation for land reform purposes.
The property of Dee Cee Trust was expropriated and awarded
to Msiza, a labour tenant in terms of the LTA. The claim was
lodged for a portion of the land in November 1996, and the land
was awarded in November 2004. The expropriation was autho-
rised as outlined in Msiza & others v Uys & others [2004] ZALCC
21 (16 November 2004). However, the negotiations around
compensation could not be settled, and in August 2012, Msiza
launched the application in the Land Claims Court for the
determination of compensation in line with section 23(2) of the
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LTA. Consequently, in Msiza LCC the Land Claims Court had to
determine an appropriate amount of compensation for purposes
of section 16 of the LTA, read with section 25 of the Constitution. It
is against this judgment – and specifically the award of R1 500 000
compensation for the expropriation – that the appellants appealed.
The main thrust of the appellants’ appeal was that the Land
Claims Court had miscalculated the amount of compensation in
line with the use of the property as agricultural land, instead of its
potential future use for development. Moreover, they argued that
the amount of compensation had been erroneously reduced
simply on the basis that Msiza was a labour tenant (para [1]). Agri
SA was granted an opportunity to make submissions as to what
would constitute ‘just and equitable’ compensation for purposes
of section 25.
The court began its analysis by having regard to the extent of
the land and tenancy agreement expropriated in favour of Msiza,
in order to contextualise the determination of compensation.
Regarding the amount of land expropriated, the court highlighted
that the entire property consisted of 352 hectares, of which
approximately 45,8522 hectares had been awarded to Msiza
(para [2]). The labour tenancy in favour of Msiza (and his family)
had been concluded in terms of the Native Service Contract Act
24 of 1932, and it was clear that the family had exercised the right
since at least 1936.
The Supreme Court of Appeal began by setting out the wording
of section 23(1) of the LTA, which, where land is expropriated
under the LTA, simply refers, for the most part, to ‘just and
equitable’ compensation in line with the Constitution (paras [7]
[8]). The court identified what should be taken into account in
determining ‘just and equitable’ compensation for purposes of
sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. In this regard, it
should be remembered that section 25(2) provides the general
requirements for expropriation, which include that the expropria-
tion must be in terms of law of general application, effected for a
public purpose or in the public interest, and subject to compen-
sation. The amount of compensation, and the time and manner of
payment, must either be agreed upon by those affected, or decided
or approved by a court. Furthermore, section 25(3) of the Constitu-
tion provides that
[t]he amount of the compensation and the time and manner of
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance
between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having
213CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 21 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/07−Constitutional−Property−Law
regard to all relevant circumstances, including (a) the current use of
the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
(c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct state
investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital
improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.
Having regard to these constitutional provisions, the court
considered the judgment in Du Toit v Minister of Transport (2006
(1) SA 297 (CC)), where the Constitutional Court reiterated the
general principles relating to the requirement of just and equi-
table compensation. As a starting point, the Constitution provides
the appropriate standard (meaning ‘just and equitable’) even in
cases where legislation – such as the LTA (as in Msiza) or the
Expropriation Act (as in Du Toit) – applies (para [11]). Therefore,
the first step is to consider the list of factors in section 25(3), even
if there is direct legislation which regulates the specific type of
expropriation in the case and includes compensation provisions
of its own.
Having regard to all the factors listed in section 25(3), the court
conceded that market value is usually the one objectively quanti-
fiable factor. This reasoning endorses that of the Land Claims
Court in Msiza LCC, and the two-stage approach followed in
Du Toit. In terms of this approach, market value is used as a
starting point in the application of section 25(3), after which an
amount is deducted (or added) depending on the other factors
listed in the provision. The court in Du Toit stressed that this
approach may not work in all instances, but in most cases it
appears to be the most practical approach. According to the
court in Du Toit, this approach can only truly reflect just and
equitable compensation if all the factors (where applicable) are
accorded equal weight and due consideration (Du Toit para [84]).
In Msiza the dispute was whether the compensation should be
assessed according the actual use of the property (which as
agricultural land was valued at R1 800 000), or the development
potential of the land (as residential property estimated at
R4 000 0000). An expert on behalf of the state estimated the
current value of the property at R1 800 000 (para [15]). However,
according to the ‘Pointe Gourde’ principle (see paras [18] [19] for
the origins of the principle), Msiza’s claim for compensation
should not be taken into account in determining the market value
of the property (para [16]). In this respect, the court considered
whether ‘a known impediment to the property’s development
potential when the property was purchased which ha[s] a direct
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bearing on the price that a willing buyer in the Trust’s position
would have been prepared to pay for the property’ (para [19])
should be considered when determining compensation. How-
ever, the court relied on the earlier decision in Port Edward v Kay
1996 (3) SA 664 (A) 678, to conclude that the Pointe Gourde
principle does not apply in this case and that the accepted
market value of the property should be R1 800 000 (para [20]).
Nonetheless, the question arises whether there were any cogent
reasons to reduce the compensation to below market value in this
particular case.
The Supreme Court ofAppeal considered the approach adopted
in Msiza LCC and the reasons for the Land Claims Court
deducting R300 000 from the market value of R1 800 0000. The
Land Claims Court provided a number of reasons for its decision:
The reasons for making the deduction were listed as being: that there
was a ‘disproportionate chasm’ between the amount paid by the trust
and the market value it sought to claim; that the trust made no
significant investment in the land; that the use of the land had not
changed since it was acquired; that when the land was acquired there
was a land claim and the Msiza family were residing on the land; that
the land had been awarded to the Msiza family in 2004 and had not
been transferred; that as the object of compensation is land reform the
fiscus should not be saddled with extravagant claims for financial
compensation when the object of expropriating the land is to address
the pressing public concern for such reform; that the Msiza family had
lived and worked on the farm since 1936 as Labour tenants and
should receive compensation. The LCC also found that there has
been no direct State investment or beneficial capital improvement of
the land (Msiza LCC para [80]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal found these reasons unconvinc-
ing (para [20]). It held that most of the factors listed by the Land
Claims Court had in any event been accounted for in the
determination of the market value of the property (para [25]).
There was also no indication that the amount claimed by the
appellants was extravagant or that it could not be paid by
the state. Moreover, the court commented that the R300 000 had
been arbitrarily arrived at as there was no indication of its basis.
(See 2016 Annual Survey 235ff, for a similar argument.) In the
end, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that R1 800 000 consti-
tuted just and equitable compensation (para [28]).
The determination of what constitutes just and equitable com-
pensation (as required by the Constitution) has always been
contentious, especially in the context of land-reform expropria-
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tions. In 2017, the hype around compensation for expropriation
was elevated in the wake of a motion passed by the National
Assembly calling for expropriation without compensation, and the
extent to which it is necessary to amend section 25 of the
Constitution to enable expropriation of property without compen-
sation. The Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Msiza highlights
that courts essentially still follow a predominantly ‘market value
centred’ approach when determining compensation for expropria-
tion, and find it difficult to deviate from that standard. Stated
differently, when considering the factors (other than market value)
in section 25, courts struggle to find adequate justification for
reducing market value, and almost instinctively revert to market
value. This is especially interesting considering the recent debate
around expropriation without compensation. If the practice is
to award market value, even in land-reform expropriations, it
becomes difficult to accept the theoretical arguments asserting
that compensation below market value is possible within the
current legal framework of section 25(2).
A pertinent question arising from the Supreme Court of Appeal
Msiza judgment is: Is there a missing link between the rhetoric
that expropriation below market value is possible, and the actual
practice playing itself out in courts? More specifically, the Supreme
Court of Appeal decision calls into question the theoretical
argument that compensation below market value is possible. It
has been argued that just and equitable compensation may
necessitate an inquiry which a narrow market-driven determina-
tion of compensation would disregard (Van der Walt (2011)
509). There are various considerations in the just and equitable
requirement for compensation under the new constitutional dis-
pensation (WJ du Plessis Compensation for Expropriation
under the Constitution (LLD thesis Stellenbosch University (2009)
299-300). Therefore, determining the quantum of compensation
necessitates a contextualised judgment, which should be sensi-
tive to the facts in the particular case – it cannot be an abstract
analysis. In this regard, while consideration should be given to
the factors listed in section 25, courts are not limited to those
factors. They should pay special attention to land-reform aspira-
tions (Van der Walt (2011) 509). Msiza LCC could possibly have
been seen as a sensible approach to the application of the
section 25(3) factors in determining compensation for expropria-
tion in the land-reform context. It certainly purports to be a
different approach from the one which singles out market value
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as the determining factor, especially since the Land Claims Court
ordered compensation at below market value (see 2016 Annual
Survey 235ff). This decision was overturned by the Supreme
Court of Appeal, raising serious doubts regarding the contention
that compensation below market value is possible.
Therefore, this judgment raises questions about the extent to
which land-reform expropriations justify a lesser amount of com-
pensation as argued in the literature. One observation that is
apparent from the Land Claims Court decision in Msiza is that a
distinction exists between land-reform and non-land-reform expro-
priations (2016 Annual Survey 235ff). Du Plessis argues that in
the context of non-land-reform expropriations, the payment of
market value may reflect just and equitable compensation in that
market value may strike the most appropriate balance between
the interests of the public and those of the landowner affected by
the expropriation. However, in land-reform expropriations, where
there may be other considerations at play, and the protection of
existing property rights must be assessed in the light of the
promotion of social justice and transformation, a different interpre-
tation of public purpose when calculating just and equitable
compensation may be needed. Reconciling the opposing claims
in a just and equitable manner may require a more contextual
balancing approach which is sensitive to the task of promoting
the spirit, purport, and object of the Bill of Rights (WJ du Plessis
‘The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and
equitable compensation’ in B Hoops et al (eds) Rethinking
Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation (2015) 387).
Arguably, the outcome reached by the Supreme Court of
Appeal shows that courts still appear to award compensation at
market value, even in the context of land-reform expropriations.
Perhaps this judgment presents a missed opportunity for the
courts definitively to provide clarity on the question of whether
expropriation below market value, or even minimal compensa-
tion, can be justified in the land-reform context, and if so, how
such an adjustment from market value should take place within
the current legal framework. The case certainly proves that it is
difficult to justify why a reduction in market value is possible even
though, in theory, the law allows for such a possibility. The same
argument is made by Marais, where he submits that Msiza SCA
appears to suggest that a downward adjustment of compensa-
tion at market value, purely on the basis of land reform, is
impermissible (EJ Marais ‘Is onteiening sonder vergoeding werk-
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lik die antwoord?’ (2018) Litnet Akademies). The Msiza judgment
by the Supreme Court of Appeal has been taken on appeal to the
Constitutional Court, which will, it is hoped, provide clarity on this
matter once and for all.
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CONTRACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
ROBERT SHARROCK*
LEGISLATION
There was no relevant legislation enacted during the period
under review.
CASE LAW
AGREEMENT
Mistake
In Botha v Road Accident Fund 2017 (2) SA 50 (SCA), the court
erroneously applied the reliance theory, in particular, the principle
that A may hold B bound to contractual terms if B has led A
reasonably to believe that B assented to the terms.
The appellant (Botha) and his wife, who had both sustained
injuries in a motorcycle accident, instituted separate High Court
actions for damages against the Road Accident Fund (the RAF).
The RAF accepted liability for any damages Botha and his wife
were able to prove. After negotiating with Botha, the RAF agreed
to pay Botha R1 million in respect of general damages, and
R236 922,70 in respect of past hospital and medical expenses.
Botha had claimed only R150 000 for these expenses, but the RAF
was persuaded to accept liability for the higher amount because of
vouchers and documentation presented by Botha’s attorney. The
RAF furnished an undertaking in respect of Botha’s future hospital
and medical expenses, and the parties agreed to postpone the
determination of Botha’s loss of future earnings to a future date.
The settlement agreement was made a court order, and the RAF
paid Botha the sum of R1 236 922,70 in respect of his past
medical expenses and general damages.
Botha’s attorney then discovered that some of the documents
relating to Botha’s hospital and medical expenses were in his
wife’s file, and the correct amount of the expenses that Botha had
incurred was R784 278,78. The attorney proposed that the con-
* BCom LLB (Natal). Attorney and Conveyancer of the High Court of South
Africa. Senior Research Associate, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
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sent order be rescinded and replaced with an order reflecting
the correct amount. The RAF refused to do this, because the
agreement was res judicata as it had been made an order of
court. Botha’s attorney approached the High Court seeking
rescission or variation of the court order under uniform rule
42(1)(c), contending ‘there had been a mistake common to the
parties’ which rendered the settlement agreement void. The High
Court dismissed the application. The Supreme Court of Appeal
(Leach and Dambuza JJAwith Saldulker JAand Fourie and Victor
AJJA concurring) confirmed the High Court’s order.
The Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned as follows. To obtain
relief under rule 42(1)(c), Botha had to show that the settlement
agreement was concluded because of a ‘common mistake’
between him and the RAF as to the correct facts (para [8]). Botha
had relied on Tshivhase Royal Council & another v Tshivhase &
another; Tshivhase & another v Tshivhase & another 1992 (4) SA
852 (A) 863, in which Nestadt JA described a mistake envisaged
by the rule as a ‘common mistake’ as understood in the field of
contract, which occurs where both parties are of one mind and
share the mistake. The judges held that Tshivhase’s case was
clearly distinguishable from the present matter because there
both parties had acted in error on the strength of a misrepresen-
tation by a third party. In the present matter, the error was best
described as a ‘unilateral mistake’, because it was made by
Botha’s attorney who, through his misrepresentation, induced the
RAF to contract on the terms that it did (para [9]).
The court pointed out that under the so-called reliance theory, if
there is a material mistake by one party to a contract and,
therefore, no actual consensus, the contract will be valid if the
other party reasonably relied on the impression that there was
consensus (para [10]). This was recognised in Sonap Petroleum
(SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v
Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) 239. In Sonap Petroleum
Harms AJA expressed the test as to whether reliance on a
mistake entitles a party to resile from a resultant agreement
(which is an adaptation of a dictum by Blackburn J in Smith v
Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 607) as follows:
[D]id the party whose actual intention did not conform to the common
intention expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable man, to
believe that his declared intention represented his actual intention?
. . . . To answer this question, a three-fold enquiry is usually necessary,
namely, firstly, was there a misrepresentation as to one party’s
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intention; secondly, who made that representation; and, thirdly, was
the other party misled thereby? . . . The last question postulates two
possibilities: Was he actually misled and would a reasonable man
have been misled?
In the present case, there was no suggestion that a reasonable
person would have realised that there was a possibility of a
mistake in the amount of past expenses. Botha’s misrepresenta-
tion had misled the RAF and this had resulted in the conclusion of
the settlement agreement. Botha could not rely on his own
mistake, which was solely his fault, to avoid a contract (para [11]).
As stated by Christie (RH Christie & GB Bradfield Christie’s the
Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 329–30):
However material the mistake, the mistaken party will not be able to
escape from the contract if his mistake was due to his own fault. This
principle will apply whether his fault lies in not carrying out the
reasonably necessary investigations before committing himself to the
contract, that is, failing to do his homework; in not bothering to read
the contract before signing; in carelessly misreading one of the terms;
in not bothering to have the contract explained to him in a language he
can understand; in misinterpreting a clear and unambiguous term,
and in fact in any circumstances in which the mistake is due to his own
carelessness or inattention (para [11]).
Botha’s argument was that both parties had assumed that the
relevant documentation reflected the figure agreed upon for past
hospital and medical expenses and, consequently, the compro-
mise was based on an incorrect assumption. The court was not
persuaded. Leach and Dambuza JJA cited the case of Van
Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO & another 2002 (4) SA 264
(SCA), where it was pointed out that this was ‘no more than an
assumption based on a unilateral mistake’. As Harms JA said in
that case (para [7]): ‘The first problem facing the appellants is
that they are unable to rely on a unilateral mistake because, as
mentioned, the respondents were not the cause of the mistake in
the sense discussed in Sonap Petroleum . . .’. The Supreme
Court of Appeal concluded that the argument that there was a
common mistaken assumption was ‘no more than an attempt to
clothe a unilateral mistake in another garb’ (para [12]). While the
court had a discretion whether or not to grant an application for
rescission under rule 42(1)(a), where, as in the present case, the
court’s order recorded the terms of a valid settlement agreement,
there was no room for the court to do so (para [13]).
The court’s reasoning has two fundamental flaws. First, the
classification of the mistake as ‘unilateral’ rather than ‘common’ is
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clearly incorrect. The reliance theory is applied where A and B fail
to reach agreement on terms and B leadsA reasonably to believe
that he or she (B) agrees to the terms intended by A. In casu, the
parties both knew what the relevant terms were and both agreed
to those terms. The parties, however, both mistakenly assumed
that the amount agreed upon for past hospital and medical
expenses was correct, whereas the actual amount was a higher
sum. The agreement was, in fact, based on an incorrect common
assumption. This assumption was brought about by the action or
inaction of Botha or his attorney, but it was common to both
parties. Therefore, the question, which the court had to decide,
was whether the common assumption was sufficient to invalidate
the agreement. This depended on whether the assumption
embodied a tacit term providing that if the facts were not as
assumed, the agreement would be invalid.
The second flaw in Leach JA’s reasoning is its acceptance of
the proposition advanced by Christie that ‘[h]owever material the
mistake, the mistaken party will not be able to escape from
the contract if his mistake was due to his own fault’. This
proposition ignores the purpose of the reliance theory. The law
applies the reliance theory and upholds a contract without
agreement to protect the reasonable expectations of the party
seeking to uphold the contract (A); in particular, the reasonable
impression of assent formed inA’s mind as a result of the words or
conduct of the other party (B). The fundamental issue in each
case is whether B, by his or her words or conduct, led A
reasonably to believe that he or she (B) agreed to A’s terms (see,
for example, Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as
Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis above 238–9; Steyn v
LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A) 61–4; Unit Inspection Co of SA
(Pty) Ltd v Hall Longmore & Co (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 795 (A) 800;
Hlobo v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 2001 (2) SA 59
(SCA) 65-6; HNR Properties CC & another v Standard Bank of SA
Ltd 2004 (4) SA 471 (SCA) paras [22]–[25]; Constantia Insurance
Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) paras
[16]–[18]; Pillay & another v Shaik & others 2009 (4) SA 74 (SCA)
para [55]; Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 2011 (4)
SA 72 (SCA) para [9]; Spenmac (Pty) Ltd v Tatrim CC 2015 (3) SA
46 (SCA) para [30]; Dale Hutchison & BJ van Heerden ‘Mistake in
contract: A comedy of (justus) errors’ (1987) 104 SALJ 523 525).
The reliance theory does not exist to penalise B for his or her
stupidity or carelessness. In fact, whether B acted culpably in
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some way is irrelevant. Unreasonable conduct by the mistaken
party at the time of formation of the contract may, of course,
create the reasonable impression of assent in the mind of the
other party, but it may not do this and, if not, there is no good
reason for imposing contractual liability on the mistaken party.
One of the questions considered in K2012150042 (South
Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Zitonix (Pty) Ltd [2017] 2 All SA 232 (WCC) was
whether the respondent (Zitonix) could rely on mistake to avoid
liability under a number of written contracts it had concluded.
Zitonix, part of a group of companies (the Platinum Group), had
concluded five written lease agreements with the applicant. The
sole director of the Platinum Group (Joubert) had signed a deed
of suretyship in favour of the applicant in respect of all five leases.
Clause 16.1(e) of each lease provided that ‘should any surety of
the tenant be sequestrated or placed in liquidation, then and in
any such event the landlord shall have the right . . . forthwith to
cancel the lease and . . . resume possession of the premises . . .’
(para [11.15]). Joubert, who signed for Zitonix, contended that he
was unaware of this provision when he signed the leases and,
accordingly, the contracts were void for mistake.
Holderness AJ rejected the contention. She pointed out that in
Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 2011 (4) SA72 (SCA)
paragraph [12], Malan JA held that a contracting party is not
bound to inform the other party of the terms of the proposed
agreement apart from where there are terms that could not
reasonably have been expected in the contract. The inclusion of
clause 16.1(e) – which had featured in previous agreements that
the respondent had signed – was neither unexpected nor surpris-
ing (para [68]). In the light of the financial hardships that the
Platinum Group had experienced, and the fact that previous
tenants had defaulted leaving millions of rands owing, one would
have expected the applicant to have a safeguard in place, such
as the clause in question, entitling it to cancel the agreement
forthwith if its security was compromised (para [69]).
CERTAINTY
RM v BM 2017 (2) SA 538 (ECG) concerned an antenuptial
contract (ANC) with conflicting clauses. Plasket J concluded that
because of the conflicting clauses, the contract was void for
vagueness.
Clauses 1 and 2 excluded community of property and profit
and loss and clause 3 made the marriage subject to the accrual
223CONTRACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 6 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/08−Contract
system in terms of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984.
Clause 4 listed the assets comprising the intended spouses’
estates for purposes of calculating the accrual.
That for the purpose of proof of the net value of their respective estates
at the commencement of the intended marriage the intended spouses
declared the net value of their respective estates to be as follows:
4.1 That of BM [Mr M] is R810 105.00 consisting of
4.1.1 Farm 656 Monte Rosa 480 000, 00
4.1.2 Elliot Brothers Loan Account 100 000, 00
4.1.3 Elliot Brothers Shares 100, 00
4.1.4 Tomlinson & Wootton Loan Account 30 000, 00
4.1.5 Tomlinson & Wootton Shares 5, 00
4.1.6 Livestock and Implements 60 000, 00
4.1.7 Motor Vehicle 40 000, 00
810 105, 00
4.2 That of the said RJ [Mrs M]) is R20 000,00 in respect of cash on
hand.
Clause 5 directly contradicted clause 4 by excluding from the
accrual the husband’s listed property (or a substantial part of that
property). Plasket J held that clauses 4 and 5 were ‘irreconcilably’
contradictory, and this rendered the contract ‘void on account of
its vagueness’. In the result, the marriage of the spouses was in
community of property (para [8]).
The judge pointed out that in JK v RK [2014] ZAGPPHC 242
(paras [10] [13]), Louw J held that where two clauses in an ANC
contradicted each other materially and irreconcilably, theANC was
void for vagueness (para [9]). Louw J reached the same conclu-
sion in Bath v Bath GNP 8681/10 (5 November 2012) unreported,
in respect of an ANC structured in the same way as the one in the
present case. He pointed out that assets cannot both be included
in and excluded from the accrual and, consequently, the clauses
which provided for this could not be implemented (para [10]). This
judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal (Bath v
Bath [2014] ZASCA 14 (24 March 2014)). Lewis JA remarked
(paras [19]–[21]) that the relevant clauses were ‘so contradictory
and incoherent’ that they vitiated the contract as a whole. The
contract did not embody terms that enabled the court to give effect
to the intention of the parties. The High Court had correctly
concluded that the contract was void for vagueness (para [11]).
Plasket J pointed out that there was ‘no material difference’
between the ANC in the JK case and that in the present matter. In
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Bath, the only difference in the ANC was that no values were
ascribed to the assets listed in clause 4, but the assets were all
excluded in clause 5 (para [12]). For the reasons set out in those
cases, clauses 4 and 5 were ‘contradictory, and irreconcilably so’
and, being material, they were incapable of being severed from
the rest of the ANC. The result was that the ANC was void for
vagueness (para [13]).
The husband had argued that the assets listed in clause 4.1
were not to be taken into account in the calculation of the accrual.
Plasket J disagreed. He pointed out that there was ‘no solution to
the problem created by the conflict between clauses 4 and 5.’
Inconvenient provisions could not be ignored. The document had
to be interpreted as a whole and given meaning. If that could not
be done, the contract, subject to the possibility of severance,
would be void (para [14]).
In Roazar CC v The Falls Supermarket CC [2017] 2 All SA 665
(GJ), the court of first instance accepted that an agreement to
negotiate in good faith is enforceable, even if it does not include a
deadlock-breaking mechanism. On appeal (Roazar CC v The
Falls Supermarket (232/2017) [2017] ZASCA 166 (29 November
2017)), the court held that an agreement to negotiate is binding
only if it contains a deadlock-breaking mechanism. The view of
the lower court is preferable.
The respondent (The Falls) was a supermarket that hired its
premises from the respondent (Roazar) in terms of a five-year
lease concluded in May 2011. The relevant clauses in the lease
provided as follows:
3 Lease Period and Right of Renewal
3.2 The lease shall be for the period stated in Section 4 of the
Schedule.
3.3 The Tenant shall . . . be entitled to renew this lease for the period
set out in item 5 of the Schedule (‘the renewal period’) on the
same terms and conditions as herein contained, save that the
rental for the renewal period shall be set out in item 5 of the
Schedule and to be negotiated at the stipulated time.
3.5 The renewal period is to be negotiated and discussed at least
1 (one) calendar month prior to the expiry of the lease period
stated in Section 6 of the Schedule. The Landlord and Tenant
shall endeavor to reach agreement on the monthly rental which
shall apply during the renewal period and the escalation in
respect of such rental.
3.6 In the event that the renewal of the lease is not negotiated prior to
the expiry of the lease, the Lessee will be liable for the rental on
the same terms and conditions of this lease.
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3.7 In event of the situation envisaged in 3.5 above, the lease will then
continue on a month to month basis, subject to 1 (one) calendar
months written notice by either party for the cancellation thereof.
Schedule
Item 5 Fixed date: 1 March 2011
Item 6 Renewal period: 5 (five) years (To be agreed in writing and
negotiated between Tenant and Landlord 1 (one) month prior
to the expiration of the lease period).
As early as 2014, The Falls notified Roazar that it wished to
renew the lease when it expired. After expiry of the lease on
29 February 2016, Roazar gave The Falls a month to vacate the
premises. The Falls argued that it was entitled to remain in
occupation because it had a right to negotiate a renewal of the
lease.
The parties were in agreement that clause 3.3 of the lease
granted the lessee an option to renew. Roazar contended that the
exercise of the option needed to be in writing and had to take
place one month before the expiry of the lease. It sourced these
two requirements from Item 6 of the Schedule to the main lease
agreement, read with clauses 3.5 and 3.7. The result was that the
lease agreement would terminate at the end of February 2016 if
the option to renew were not exercised at least one month before
expiry of the lease period.
The Falls argued that the lease agreement did not expressly
prescribe when and how it had to exercise its right of renewal. It
was instead implied that the option to renew would have to be
exercised no less than one month prior to expiry of the lease. This
was implied from clause 3.5, which stipulated that the renewal
period was to be ‘negotiated and discussed’ one month prior to
expiry of the lease, and from item 6, which stated that the renewal
period was to be agreed in writing and negotiated one month
prior to expiry of the lease. Once the option to renew had been
exercised, the parties would then have to negotiate the renewal
period and the rental and escalation during the renewal period.
During this negotiation period, the lease would continue, on a
month-to-month basis, in terms of clause 3.7.
Klaaren AJ agreed with The Falls’ interpretation (para [16]).
Adopting this interpretation, the question was whether an agree-
ment to negotiate in good faith is enforceable. Klaaren AJ
concluded that it is and, accordingly, that Roazar’s eviction
application was premature (paras [33] [34]).
The acting judge reasoned as follows. In Everfresh Market
Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256
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(CC), the Constitutional Court indicated its thinking on the enforce-
ability of agreements to negotiate. Moseneke DCJ said (para
[72]):
Were a court to entertain Everfresh’s argument [that agreements to
negotiate are enforceable], the underlying notion of good faith in
contract law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that agreements
seriously entered into should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu,
which inspires much of our constitutional compact, may tilt the
argument in its favour. Contracting parties certainly need to relate to
each other in good faith. Where there is a contractual obligation to
negotiate, it would be hardly imaginable that our constitutional values
would not require that the negotiation must be done reasonably, with a
view to reaching an agreement and in good faith (para [18]).
Yacoob J, writing for the four dissenting judges, was ‘even
more positively inclined towards such a development’ and would
have sent the issue back to the High Court for ‘re-interpretation
and potential development’ (para [29]). Klaaren AJ noted that
legal academic opinion favours the development of the common
law to recognise a duty to negotiate in good faith, especially in
the context of renewal options. The judge referred to Graham
Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease (2014) 4ed 546-7; Andrew
Hutchison, ‘Agreements to agree: Can there ever be an enforce-
able duty to negotiate in good faith?’ (2011) 128 SALJ 273) (para
[30]).
The issue foreshadowed in Everfresh arose ‘squarely’ for
decision in the present case (para [31]). The Falls argued that an
objective standard such as ‘the arbitrium boni viri’ could be
applied where a party undertakes an obligation to negotiate a
further agreement. The party ‘would be obliged to act honestly
and reasonably in the conduct of the negotiations and a court
would be able to determine whether it complied with such
standards’ (Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v The Petroleum Oil and Gas
Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd & another 2012 (6) SA 96
(WCC) para [28]) (para [32]).
The Falls argued that this was an appropriate case for develop-
ing the common law by invoking section 39(2) of the Constitution.
Klaaren AJ found that it was unnecessary to take this step
because in the recent case of South African Broadcasting
Corporation Soc Limited v Via Vollenhoven and Appollis Indepen-
dent CC & others [2016] ZAGPJHC 228 (GJ), the court had
ordered parties to negotiate in good faith as required by the
terms of a contract. In that case, the enforceability of agreements
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to negotiate was not extensively canvassed. However, the deci-
sion was not clearly wrong and, accordingly, was binding on the
present court (para [33]).
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, Tshiqi JA agreed with The Falls’
interpretation of the lease. The judge came up with the following
‘sensible interpretation’ of the agreement. The Falls had to notify
Roazar at least one month before the expiry of the current lease
period that it wished to exercise its right of renewal. It did not have
to do so in writing. In that event, and whilst the parties were
negotiating the renewal terms, the provisions of clause 3.7 would
be invoked if necessary and the lease agreement would continue
on a month-to-month basis until an agreement was reached or
negotiations failed and one of the parties gave notice (para [11]).
Tshiqi JA reasoned that, as a general rule, an agreement that
the parties will negotiate to conclude another agreement is not
enforceable because of the absolute discretion vested in the
parties to agree or disagree (Premier, Free State & others v
Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) para [35];
Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) SA
202 (SCA) para [17]). However, the courts have been prepared to
enforce the terms of a contract that require parties to negotiate in
good faith in instances where there is a deadlock-breaking
mechanism (para [13]). The main agreement had no deadlock-
breaking mechanism and, accordingly, there was no obligation
on Roazar to continue to negotiate with The Falls (para [15]).
The Falls submitted that the common law should be developed
to recognise the validity of an agreement to negotiate in circum-
stances where there is no deadlock-breaking mechanism. For
this contention it relied on section 39(2) of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), and it referred
to Paulsen & another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015
(3) SA 479 (CC) and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite
Checkers (Pty) Ltd above (para [16]). Tshiqi JA dealt with the
argument as follows:
A development of the common law in order to compel parties to
negotiate in good faith even in circumstances where there are no
deadlock-breaking mechanisms is not without complications. In
Bredenkamp & others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA
468 (SCA) this court found it difficult to countenance the fairness of
imposing on a Bank the obligation to retain a client simply because
other banks are not likely to accept that entity as a client. The
appellants were unable to find a constitutional niche or other public
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policy consideration justifying their demand. It found that there was no
‘unjustified invasion of a right expressly or otherwise conferred by the
highest law in our land’. The court said that the Bank had a contract,
which was valid, and that gave it the right to cancel. It further said that
the termination did not offend any identifiable constitutional value and
was not otherwise contrary to any other public policy consideration.
The court highlighted important considerations that militate against
tampering with the notion of sanctity of a contract between two parties
(para [19]).
Carole Lewis in ‘The uneven journey to uncertainty in contract’
(2013) 76 THRHR 80 highlighted some of the fundamental
difficulties that a High Court would have to deal with if asked to
determine whether a party has negotiated in good faith. She said:
What would a high court, faced with parties who cannot agree on a
material term of their contract, do to determine the dispute? It cannot
make a contract for them. It cannot decide what future rental should
be. Can it even decide whether their bargaining power is equal, given
that they may be large corporate entities? And does equality of
bargaining power depend on the parties’ monetary worth or their
negotiating skills or their political or business influence?
With reference to Everfresh, Lewis said:
How could a court develop the common law in this regard? How would
it enforce a duty to negotiate in good faith and precisely what does
that mean? Does a failure even to discuss future rental amount to bad
faith? I think not. If a court were to order parties to agree on a term, and
they could not, would they be in contempt of court? And how would
one determine who, if anyone, was at fault? How could Everfresh, in
this matter, even rely on the expectation of renewal of the lease where
there was no basis upon which to proceed? If it means simply talking,
what is the point, given that Shoprite had decided that it did not wish to
renew its lease with Everfresh?And that it had commercial reasons not
do so, including a necessary renovation of the premises (para [20]).
Tshiqi JA concluded that the facts of the matter before it were a
clear illustration of the complications highlighted by this court in
Bredenkamp and by Lewis in her article (para [21]). The Falls had
not stated how long negotiations were required to take place and
the contract was silent on this issue. The contract also did not
state the criterion that would be used to determine whether either
of the parties was negotiating in good faith (para [22]). Tshiqi
found herself in agreement with Roazar that it would be against
public policy for a court to coerce a lessor to conclude an
agreement with a tenant whom it no longer wishes to have as a
tenant (para [24]).
Tshiqi JA’s judgment does not fully take into account what the
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Constitutional Court said in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd (above) regarding the enforceability
of agreements to negotiate. In addition, the following pertinent
remarks were made by Jafta J in Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4)
SA 121 (CC) paragraph [102], regarding the enforceability of
agreements to negotiate:
[I]t is not only difficult in the present circumstances but also undesir-
able to lay down an objective standard of good-faith bargaining which
the parties must undertake. Suffice it to say that what the parties are
precluded from doing is to negotiate in bad faith. They are not allowed
to enter into those negotiations just to go through the motions. For that
would not be what they have agreed to do, but a charade. Both sides
must enter into negotiations with serious intent to reach consensus.
It is clear from this passage that the parties to an agreement to
negotiate are not permitted to negotiate in bad faith: they must
enter into negotiations with a serious intention to reach consen-
sus. This principle accords with the view adopted in Indwe
Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South
Africa (Pty) Ltd (No 1) (above) paragraph [28], that a party who
undertakes an obligation to negotiate an agreement is compelled
to act honestly and reasonably in the conduct of the negotiations.
Dishonest or unreasonable conduct in breach of this duty would
clearly amount to negotiation in bad faith or, to use Jafta J’s
words, merely ‘going through the motions’ with no ‘serious intent
to reach consensus’.
The facts of Basson & others v Hanna 2017 (3) SA 22 (SCA),
[2017] 1 All SA 669 are set out under ‘Damages’ (below). One of
the arguments raised was that the alleged agreement between
Hanna and Basson had not come into being because the parties
had failed to reach consensus on the rate of interest applicable to
their agreement. The parties had, in fact, agreed that the interest
rate would be prime plus 1 per cent, but they had not reached
agreement on whether the rate would be fixed or variable.
The appeal court held that the failure to reach consensus on
interest did not matter. Zondi JA pointed out that the parties’ failure
to agree on the rate of interest does not render the agreement
invalid. If no rate has been agreed on, expressly or impliedly, and
the rate is not governed by any other law, the rate of interest is that
prescribed from time to time by notice in the Government Gazette
by the relevant Minister in terms of the Prescribed Rate of Interest
Act 55 of 1975 (para [16]).
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ILLEGALITY
Statutory illegality
Mfengwana v Road Accident Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG)
confirms that a contingency fee agreement which does not
comply with section 2(2) of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997
(the Act) is invalid and may constitute overreaching.
Mfengwana and his attorney, Rubushe, entered into a contin-
gency fee agreement for his claim against the Road Accident
Fund (the RAF). The claim was settled before it went to trial. As
required by section 4(3) of the Act, the parties requested a judge
(Plasket J) to make the settlement agreement an order of court. At
the first hearing, Plasket J postponed the matter so that a copy of
the contingency fee agreement could be made available to him
and affidavits required by section 4(1) and section 4(2) of the Act
could be filed (one by Rubushe stating the information specified
in section 4(1)(a)–(g), and another by Mfengwana stating the
information required in section 4(2)(a)–(c)). Before the second
hearing, Plasket J was supplied with a copy of the contingency
fee agreement and Rubushe filed an affidavit in which he said:
‘I will charge [a] fee of 25% from the client or . . . double my fees
and take whichever is lesser which would not be more than 25%
[of the] agreed fees’. Mfengwana did not file an affidavit.
Clause 5 of the contingency fee agreement entitled Rubushe to
25 per cent of the damages awarded by the RAF to Mfengwana.
Plasket J found that the agreement was contrary to the Act and
invalid, and that Rubushe’s attempt to claim 25 per cent of the
award constituted overreaching. The judge further ordered that a
copy of his judgment be delivered to the Cape Law Society.
The main points made in the judgment were as follows. The
basic idea behind a contingency fee agreement is that the
attorney takes on the risk of financing his client’s litigation. If the
litigation is not successful, the attorney will not be paid; if the
litigation is successful, the attorney will be entitled to a success
fee that is higher than his or her normal fee (paras [5] [6]). Section
2 is the core of the Act. It makes provision for contingency fee
agreements and for the higher than normal fee that an attorney
may charge. It provides:
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the
common law, a legal practitioner may, if in his or her opinion there
are reasonable prospects that his or her client may be successful
in any proceedings, enter into an agreement with such client in
which it is agreed –
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(a) that the legal practitioner shall not be entitled to any fees for
services rendered in respect of such proceedings unless
such client is successful in such proceedings to the extent
set out in such agreement;
(b) that the legal practitioner shall be entitled to fees equal to or,
subject to subsection (2), higher than his or her normal fees,
set out in such agreement, for any such services rendered, if
such client is successful in such proceedings to the extent
set out in such agreement.
(2) Any fees referred to in subsection (1)(b) which are higher than the
normal fees of the legal practitioner concerned (hereinafter
referred to as the success fee), shall not exceed such normal fees
by more than 100 per cent: Provided that, in the case of claims
sounding in money, the total of any such success fee payable by
the client to the legal practitioner, shall not exceed 25 per cent of
the total amount awarded or any amount obtained by the client in
consequence of the proceedings concerned, which amount shall
not, for purposes of calculating such excess, include any costs
(para [11]).
The case law indicates that contingency fee agreements that
do not comply with the provisions of the Act are invalid (Price
Waterhouse Coopers Inc & others v National Potato Co-operative
Ltd 2004 (6) SA66 (SCA) para [41]; Tjatji v Road Accident Fund &
two similar cases 2013 (2) SA 632 (GSJ) para [13]). Strict compli-
ance with the Act is necessary to prevent abuse by unscrupulous
legal practitioners (para [12]). It was clear that a ‘fee’ of 25 per cent
of R904 889,17 (R226 222,30) was grossly disproportionate and
amounted to overreaching on an outrageous scale (para [19]).
The contingency fee agreement in casu provided for a fee of
‘25% of the total of damages awarded’ (para [17]). This was in
conflict with section 2(2) of the Act, which allowed an attorney,
who was party to a contingency fee agreement, to recover a
success fee based on the work done at a maximum of twice his or
her usual fee. That amount could not, however, exceed 25 per
cent of the award (para [20]). Rubushe sought in his affidavit to
amend the agreement unilaterally and retrospectively. This could
not avail him. The contingency fee agreement as a whole was
invalid for its failure to comply with section 2(2) of the Act (paras
[23]–[25]). Therefore, the common law applied, meaning that
Rubushe was only entitled to a reasonable fee in relation to work
performed (para [26]).
The judge summed up the position:
This is yet another case in which an attorney – an officer of the court
who is supposed to act with integrity and comply with the highest
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ethical standards – is guilty of an attempt to grossly overreach his
client, of rapacious and unconscionable conduct. Unfortunately, in
this jurisdiction, this is a problem that is all too common. That said,
however, it seems to me that the problems in relation to contingency
fee agreements that come to the attention of the courts are, in all
likelihood, but the tip of the iceberg. . . . Anecdotal evidence within the
legal profession points towards widespread abuses. In a matter I
heard recently, counsel contended that s 2(2) of the Act was ambigu-
ous because many attorneys he had spoken to interpreted it to mean
that they were entitled to take 25% of their client’s award . . . This is all
cause for grave concern and, if I am correct, a manifestation of
endemic corruption embedded in the attorneys’ profession. For this
reason I intend requesting the registrar of this court to deliver a copy
of this judgment to the Cape Law Society so that it, as custodian of the
ethical standards of the profession in the public interest, may consider
ways and means of stopping the rot (paras [27]–[29]).
Nash & another v Mostert & others 2017 (4) SA 80 (GP)
concerned the validity of a contingency fee agreement relating to
a non-litigious matter. Tuchten J noted that the thread running
through the judgments and commentary is that ‘making a legal
practitioner a partner in his client’s enterprise tends to subvert
the interests of justice’ (para [79]). With this in mind, there could
be no justification for allowing legal practitioners to conclude
contingency fee agreements for non-litigious work. The judge
concluded that contingency fee agreements in relation to non-
litigious work are against public policy for broadly the same
reasons that such agreements are contrary to public policy in
relation to litigious work (para [80]).
Section 26 of the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976
provides that no person can perform an act as an estate agent
unless a valid fidelity fund certificate has been issued to him or
her, and to every person employed by him or her as an estate
agent. The section goes on to state that if the person in question
is a company, a valid fidelity fund certificate must also have been
issued to each of its directors. Section 34A of the Estate Agency
Affairs Act provides that if an estate agent is a company, the
company will only be entitled to remuneration for acts performed
as estate agent if at the time of the performance of the acts, a
valid fidelity fund certificate has been issued to the company and
to every director of the company. One of the issues in Crous
International (Pty) Ltd v Printing Industries Federation of South
Africa [2017] 1 All SA 146 (GJ) was whether there are circum-
stances in which an estate agent, which is not in possession of a
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valid fidelity fund certificate as required by the Act, is entitled to
recover commission on sales that it has brought about.
The plaintiff, an estate agency company, claimed an amount of
commission from the defendant for bringing about the sale of the
defendant’s property. It was common cause that for the period in
which the plaintiff was engaged in arranging this sale, it was not
in possession of a fidelity fund certificate, although certificates
had been issued to its directors. The plaintiff’s case was that,
although it was not in physical possession of the certificates, they
ought to have been issued to it because it had complied with the
requirements for their issue and the failure to issue was due
purely to a technical difficulty experienced by the Estate Agents
Board (the Board) in printing certificates. The plaintiff contended
that this was a unique situation and that, essentially, it ought to be
assumed that it had been issued with certificates for the period in
question. The plaintiff relied on Cape Killarney Property Invest-
ments (Pty) Limited v Mahamba & others 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA)
and Theart & another v Minnaar NO, Senekal v Winskor 174 (Pty)
Ltd 2010 (3) SA 327 (SCA) for its submission that form should not
be elevated above substance. The defendant maintained, on the
other hand, that section 34A requires strict compliance and this
means that certificates had to have been produced and given to
the plaintiff.
The court found for the plaintiff, reasoning as follows. Section
39(2) of the Constitution requires every court when interpreting
any legislation to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the
Bill of Rights. In terms of section 22 of the Constitution ‘every
citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profes-
sion freely’ but ‘[t]he practice of a trade, occupation or profession
may be regulated by law’ (para [88]). Sections 26 and 34A of the
Estate Agency Affairs Act regulate the practice of the profession
of an estate agent. A court is constitutionally obliged, when
interpreting these sections, to promote the right freely to choose a
trade, occupation, or profession, rather than to restrict that right.
The approach contended for by the defendant, being a ‘strict,
narrowly textual, or literal approach’, was not apposite to achiev-
ing that objective. ‘A more purposive, or substantive, approach
was called for’ (para [89]).
In Liebenberg NO & others v Bergrivier Municipality (Minister
for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development
Planning, Western Cape intervening) 2013 (5) SA 246 (CC)
paragraphs [22]–[26], the Constitutional Court held that the
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approach or test to be applied is ‘whether there has been
compliance with the relevant precepts in such a manner that the
objects of the statutory instruments concerned have been
achieved’ (para [91]). Consequently, the court had to determine
the purpose of sections 26 and 34A and whether, on the facts,
that purpose has been achieved (para [92]). The purpose of
sections 26 and 34A is to ensure that those performing acts as
estate agents are registered with the Board and meet the
requirements for the issue, by the Board, of a licence permitting
them to perform those acts lawfully for remuneration (para [95]).
The uncontested evidence was that the plaintiff had complied
with all of the provisions of the Estate Agency Affairs Act and that
there was no reason at all why certificates for the relevant years
could not have been issued to the plaintiff, save for inability of the
Board to print the certificates (para [97]). Moreover, the directors
of the plaintiff had been issued with certificates for the requisite
periods and this would not have happened if the plaintiff had not
complied with the requirements of the Act and regulations (para
[98]). The consequence of this was that the plaintiff’s claim to be
remunerated for the acts it performed as estate agent during the
years when it had not itself been issued with certificates, had to
succeed (para [99]).
Illegal enforcement
In Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel
Interests (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 243 (GJ), the court refused to
enforce a cancellation clause on the ground that implementing
the clause would be contrary to the constitutional value of
fairness implicit in the concept of ubuntu.
The lease between the applicant landlord (Leisure Holdings)
and the respondent tenant (Southern Sun) provided that ‘the
lessee shall make monthly. . .rent payments to the lessor by not
later than the seventh day of each month’. Clause 20 stated that
if lessee failed to any month’s rent by its due date, the landlord
would be entitled to cancel the contract and repossess the
property. In June 2014, Southern Sun failed to pay rental on
the due date. Leisure Holdings sent a letter to Southern Sun
demanding payment of the rent within five days, failing which the
lease would be cancelled. The letter added that in the event of
any future failure to pay rental on due date, no notice to remedy
would be given and cancellation of the lease would immediately
follow. The June rental was immediately transferred into Leisure
235CONTRACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 18 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/08−Contract
Holding’s bank account in compliance with the demand. On the
same day, Southern Sun’s bank, Nedbank, accepted responsibil-
ity for the late payment, stating in a letter addressed to Leisure
Holdings that the non-payment of rental was ‘caused as a result
of a change in Nedbank processes which impacted the payment
run for 1 June 2014 and by no omission of the client’ (para [9]).
The payments in respect of July, August, and September rent,
were all made before the due date. The October 2014 rent was
taken from Southern Sun’s bank account on 6 October 2014, but
it was not transferred to Leisure Holdings. Leisure Holding’s
attorneys informed Southern Sun of its breach of the agreement
and further advised it that Leisure Holdings had ‘elected to
exercise its right . . . to cancel the lease agreement with imme-
diate effect’ (para [12]). On the 21 October 2014, Southern Sun
transferred the amount of the October rental into Leisure Holding’s
bank account, including an amount of interest to compensate for
the late payment. Southern Sun was informed by Nedbank that an
investigation had revealed and the ‘non-payment occurred as a
result of a technical administrative error’ (para [13]). In a further
letter, Nedbank reported on ‘the time line events’ leading up to the
October non-payment. The report revealed a plethora of blunders
and inadvertence in administering Southern Sun’s stop-order
instruction. This was a result of Nedbank’s implementation of a
‘corporate payment system’ in May 2014, in replacement of the
existing stop-order system.
Van Oosten J held that Leisure Holdings was not entitled to
enforce the cancellation clause. He reasoned that in Juglal NO &
another v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise Division
2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA) paragraph [12], Heher JA said that a
‘creditor who implements the contract in a manner which is
unconscionable, illegal or immoral will find that a court refuses to
give effect to his conduct but the contract itself will stand’. In
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings & others 2015 (3) SA 215
(WCC) paragraph [36], Davis J understood this dictum to mean
‘that a contractual provision may not itself run counter to public
policy but that the implementation may be so objectionable that it
is sufficiently oppressive, unconscionable or immoral to consti-
tute a breach of public policy’ (para [23]). In Everfresh Market
Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd (above) para-
graph [71], the majority of the justices held that in the develop-
ment of the common law it is ‘highly desirable and in fact
necessary to infuse the law of contract with constitutional values,
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including values of ubuntu, which inspire much of our constitu-
tional compact’. The majority considered that the concept of
ubuntu emphasises the communal nature of society and ‘carries
in it the ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness’. It also
envelopes ‘the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect,
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity’
(para [26]).
Van Oosten J reasoned that in the present case, it was the
implementation of the cancellation clause that had to be sub-
jected to constitutional scrutiny (para [27]). The court was
required to make a value judgement based on constitutional
concepts and values. In particular, the concept of ubuntu was
paramount. The final test was whether the circumstances of the
case constituted sufficient cause for relaxation of the pacta sunt
servanda principle (para [28]).
Van Oosten J furnished the following information regarding the
nature of the hotel business conducted by Southern Sun:
The five-storey building in which the hotel is housed comprises 292
rooms, a restaurant, a bar, 5 meeting rooms, a ‘team’ room, an outdoor
pool, a gymnasium and parking. The premises have been utilised for
the conducting of the business as a hotel since 1982. The nature of the
business, primarily, is hotel accommodation across all market seg-
ments, including corporate, government, leisure, standard tour opera-
tors, conferencing and food and beverage services. Guests from
abroad are primarily from Europe, especially France and Ger-
many. . . . [Southern Sun’s] hotel is operated and managed as part of
a total of 18 Garden Court-branded hotels, which is a well-known,
established brand in the hospitality industry. Employment is provided
to 91 permanent members of staff, additional casual staff as well as
indirectly to secondary staff and service providers The annual turn-
over of the respondent’s hotel division in South Africa runs into millions
of rands (paras [29] [30]).
The prejudice either party would suffer from an order for
eviction was of crucial importance (para [31]). Southern Sun had
pointed out that its ejection would cause ‘untold damages, both
patrimonial and reputational’. Further, it would effectively sound
the death knell for the hotel, which Southern Sun would be unable
to replace in Cape Town. In short, an order to vacate the premises
would cause Southern Sun irreparable harm (para [32]). Leices-
ter Holdings had not shown that it would suffer any prejudice if the
eviction order were not granted (para [33]).
Van Oosten J pointed out that in the present case, Southern
Sun’s bank was ‘wholly responsible for the predicament’ in which
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the hotel now found itself. The bank had acted as Southern Sun’s
agent, but the hotel had not placed unjustified trust in the bank.
After the June non-payment of rental, Southern Sun had taken
steps to avoid a repetition thereof. For the next three months, the
bank processed the payments timeously. In relation to October
payment, Southern Sun had been led to believe that payment had
been made in time once the debit entry appeared on its bank
statement (para [34]).
Van Oosten J concluded as follows:
In a nutshell the court is required to balance the late payment of the
October rental, on the one hand, juxtaposed with the bank solely
having to bear the blame for the late payment, and the prospect of
[Southern Sun] . . . suffering disproportionate prejudice in the event of
eviction. The determinant criterion is the demonstrable unfairness in
the implementation of clause 20, in granting an order for eviction as
sought by the applicant. . . . Applying the value of ubuntu, ‘carrying
with it the ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness’, to the
facts of this matter, finally leads me to conclude that an order for the
eviction of [Southern Sun] . . . would offend the values of the Constitu-
tion I have alluded to, and that the application accordingly must fail’
(para [35]).
Accepting that enforcement of a contract may, in certain
circumstances, be so unfair as to be contrary to the value of
ubuntu, what specific principles are to be applied to ensure that
the outcome in any particular case does not ‘depend on the
personal idiosyncrasies of the individual judge’, and to prevent
unfair enforcement from becoming a ‘last resort’ defence of the
‘recalcitrant and otherwise defenceless’ debtor (cf Donelly v
Barclays National Bank Ltd 1990 (1) SA 375 (W) 381; Standard
Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 (3) SA 822 (C) 828; Pangbourne
Properties Ltd v Nitor Construction (Pty) Ltd & others 1993 (4) SA
206 (W) 210)? If no principles are recognised, this in all likelihood
will have the effect of introducing a large measure of uncertainty
into contract enforcement, with judges deciding cases according
to their personal sense of fairness and reasonableness.
A practical solution, immediately available, is for the courts to
follow the principles that they have adopted in relation to substan-
tive unfairness of terms (see Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1)
SA 1 (A) 8–9; Botha (now Griessel) & another v Finanscredit (Pty)
Ltd 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) 781–4, and Standard Bank of SA Ltd v
Wilkinson above 828) suitably tailored or modified to deal with
unfair enforcement. In Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA)
paragraph [32], the majority of the court foresaw that the courts
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would have to take this approach if the ‘Sasfin principle’ were
broadened to prevent the enforcement of contractual provisions
not per se contrary to public policy. See also Gerhard Lubbe
‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its
implications for the development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ
395 412, 418-19, cf Graham Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitutional
Court: An exhumation of the exceptio doli generalis?’ (2007) 124
SALJ 449 457.
Following this approach, certain general principles may be
formulated. A court may refuse to enforce a valid contractual
provision based on unfairness only if the enforcement would be
manifestly inimical to the interests of the community. A judge must
avoid finding that enforcement would be contrary to public policy
merely because it would offend his or her individual sense of
fairness (cf Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes above 8). The power to
refuse enforcement must be exercised sparingly. This should be
resorted to only in cases in which the element of public harm is
manifest (Botha (now Griessel) & another v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd
above 783; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson above 827;
Mufamadi v Dorbyl Finance (Pty) Ltd 1996 (1) SA 799 (A) 804;
Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative
Ltd 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) para [23]). To give judges discretionary
power beyond this could give rise to considerable legal and
commercial uncertainty (South African Forestry Co Ltd v York
Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) para [27]; Potgieter v
Potgieter NO 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) para [32]).
To decide whether enforcement would cause manifest public
harm, the court must consider the interests of the community as a
whole, and not merely the interests of the individual parties to the
contract or a few members of the community (cf Standard Bank of
SA Ltd v Wilkinson above 827–32). In addition, not too much
weight should be attached to the interests of the party who would
be adversely affected by the enforcement. It is clear from
Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel
Interests (Pty) Ltd (above) that relevant matters include whether
the party in breach knew of the breach or could have prevented
it from happening, and the prejudice either party will suffer if
enforcement is, or is not, granted.
Enforcement of a valid contractual term will not be offensive to
public policy if it can be justified in the broad commercial context
in which it is sought. This generally boils down to determining
whether the creditor has a sound commercial reason for wanting
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to enforce the provision in question (Standard Bank of SA Ltd v
Wilkinson above 832–7).
FORMALITIES
In Mokone v Tassos Properties CC & another 2017 (5) SA 456
(CC), the court confirmed that a contract of pre-emption in
respect of land need not comply with the formalities laid down by
section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 (the Act).
Mokone and Tassos concluded a written lease which contained
a right of pre-emption. The parties agreed to extend the written
lease and Tassos’s representative wrote on the cover of the lease:
‘Extend till 31/5/2014 monthly rental R5 500’. The representative
signed the note, but Mokone did not. Tassos subsequently sold
and transferred the property to Blue Canyon. Blue Canyon
argued that because only the representative of Tassos had
signed the manuscript endorsement extending the lease, the
right of pre-emption was invalid.
Madlanga J rejected the argument. He reasoned that in terms
of section 2(1) of the Act, the formality on signature relates to
‘alienation of land’. The Act provides that ‘alienate’ in relation
to land means to sell, exchange, or donate, irrespective of
whether such sale, exchange, or donation is subject to a suspen-
sive or resolutive condition (para [46]). In the case of a right of
pre-emption, an ‘alienation’ takes place only when that right is
exercised and a sale comes into being. Merely affording some-
one that right is not an alienation because that is simply not a
sale, exchange, or donation (para [47]).
Madlanga J held that when the Formalities in Respect of
Contracts of Sale of LandAct 71 of 1969 (the Formalities Act) was
still in operation, it did not apply to a right of pre-emption. In
Rogers v Phillips 1985 (3) SA 183 (E), Kannemeyer J adopted this
view. The parties asked the judge to deal with the preliminary
issue of whether writing was a prerequisite for the validity of a
right of pre-emption. Kannemeyer held that ‘neither in terms of
s 1(1) of [the Formalities Act] nor in terms of s 2(1) of [the Act]
does a right of pre-emption in respect of land have to be in writing
in order to be valid’ (188D–E). He explained:
[A] right of pre-emption gives the pre-emptor no right to claim transfer
of land; it merely gives him a right to enter into an agreement of sale
with the grantor should the latter wish to sell. When such an agreement
is completed then, and not before, will he have a right to claim transfer
of land, so that it is the agreement which must be in writing (188C–D).
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Corbett JA expressed a contrary view in Hirschowitz v Mool-
man & others 1985 (3) SA 739 (A). He held that section 1(1) of the
Formalities Act requires the signatures of all parties to a right of
pre-emption (paras [51] [52]). The reason is that a pactum de
contrahendo is required to comply with the requisites for validity,
including requirements as to form, applicable to the second or main
contract to which the parties have bound themselves. Crucially, that
view is held despite the fact that a right of pre-emption itself is
neither a sale nor an alienation. Corbett JA explained:
[I]n order that the holder of a right of pre-emption over land should be
entitled, on his right maturing and on the grantor failing to recognise or
honour his right, to claim specific performance against the grantor
(assuming that he has such right), the right of pre-emption itself
should comply with the Formalities Act. Were this not so, the anoma-
lous situation would arise that on the strength of a verbal contract the
grantee of the right of pre-emption could, on the happening of the
relevant contingencies, become the purchaser of the land. This would
be contrary to the intention and objects of the Formalities Act
(767F–H).
Madlanga J held that there is no reason why, upon the occur-
rence of the contingencies that trigger an entitlement to exercise
the right of pre-emption, the holder cannot exercise it in a manner
that complies with the requisite formalities. The judge explained:
The holder may simply make a signed written offer to purchase. If the
grantor accepts the offer in writing under signature, a sale that meets
the formalities will come into being. If she or he does not, the holder of
the right may seek a declarator by a court that she or he is entitled to
the exercise of the right and a mandamus requiring the grantor to
accept the offer in writing. If the relief is warranted, it must be granted.
That is nothing more than holding the grantor to the parties’ agreement
(para [54]).
Madlanga J concluded that we must not on formalistic or
technical grounds give an easy way out to a grantor of a right of
pre-emption. Our interpretation must be restrictive on the reach
of the formalities required by the Act (para [61]):
Contrary to what [Hirschowitz v Moolman & others 1985 (3) SA 739
(A)] suggests, I reach two related conclusions. First, regardless of the
stage to which a sale to a third party by the grantor of a right of
pre-emption may have progressed, generally the right is capable
of enforcement in a manner that complies with the formalities. (I say
‘generally’ because issues that may come into the equation are, for
example, whether transfer that has already taken place should be
undone or whether the right-holder is entitled to specific performance
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at all.) Second, the exercise of the right does not ineluctably lead to
the anomaly referred to in [Hirschowitz v Moolman & others]. In sum,
I disagree with the conclusion in that case (para [63]).
MISREPRESENTATION
One of the issues in De Freitas v Jonopro (Pty) Ltd & others
2017 (2) SA 450 (GJ) was whether the applicant was entitled to
rescind an agreement he had made on the ground of non-
disclosure.
The applicant and one Bettencourt ran an adult entertainment
business called ‘Cheeky Tiger’ from two premises. The appli-
cant’s premises were in Kempton Park and Bettencourt’s in
Randburg. The parties fell out and agreed to part ways. They
agreed orally that the applicant would change the name of his
Kempton Park operation from ‘Cheeky Tiger’ to ‘Manhattan Nights’.
When entering into this agreement, Bettencourt did not disclose
that he intended opening a similar entertainment operation using
the Cheeky Tiger get-up (but not the name) near the applicant’s
Manhattan Nights and this would draw on the applicant’s cus-
tomer base.
Spilg J held that Bettencourt’s failure to disclose his plan
amounted prima facie to actionable non-disclosure. The judge
explained that it was reasonable to conclude that Bettencourt
intended to capture the customers who frequented the appli-
cant’s Cheeky Tiger establishment and take the applicant’s
goodwill in that business, including its customer base, without
compensation. There was a legal duty to disclose because
Bettencourt knew that the customers of the applicant would go to
what was familiar to them. The applicant would unwittingly
destroy the goodwill he had built up under Cheeky Tiger but its
familiar logo and ambiance would simply transfer to Bettencourt’s
bigger operation, and the applicant would then have to compete
under a new brand unfamiliar to the customer base in the area
(paras [45] [46]).
Spilg J concluded that prima facie there was a duty on
Bettencourt to make disclosure ‘based on the requirements of
good faith in the circumstances of the relationship and the
consequences of the alleged bargain struck’ (para [49]). The
applicant, in the simplest terms, would have been duped to give
up, at no cost, the goodwill he had built up in the area (para [49]).
Prima facie the factual and legal requirements of actionable
non-disclosure were present and it appeared, therefore, that the
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applicant could terminate the agreement to change the name of
the applicant’s establishment (para [52]). Spilg J, accordingly,
issued an interim interdict prohibiting Bettencourt from using a
get-up that would lead the applicant’s clients to believe that
Bettencourt’s business was associated with it (para [60]).
INTERPRETATION
In Thomani & another v Seboka NO & others 2017 (1) SA 51
(GP), an issue was whether a mortgage bond registered by the
applicants to secure repayment of a home loan which they had
received from the fourth respondent (the bank) also covered a
separate debt owed by the applicants to the bank in terms of
a deed of suretyship. The suretyship secured repayment of a loan
granted by the bank to a company (Abrina 1591 (Pty) Ltd).
The court concluded that the bond did not cover the suretyship
debt. Clause 4 of the mortgage bond stated:
The bond shall remain in force as continuing covering security for the
capital amount, the interest thereon and the additional amount, [and]
notwithstanding any intermediate settlement, the bond shall be and
remain of full force, virtue and effect as a continuing covering security
and covering bond for each and every sum in which the mortgagor
may now or hereafter become indebted to the bank from any cause
whatsoever to the amount of the capital amount, interest thereon and
the additional amount.
Clause 5 of the deed of suretyship stated:
I/We acknowledge and admit that this suretyship is additional to any
security which the Bank currently holds or may hereafter hold in
respect of the obligations of the debtor (Abrina 1591 (Pty) Ltd) and
that this suretyship shall not detract in any way from other security
already furnished by me/us in favour of the Bank, which security shall
remain in force until terminated in writing by the Bank.
Jansen J held that the relevant words in clause 4 of the bond,
‘for each and every sum in which the mortgager may now or
hereafter become indebted to the bank from any cause whatso-
ever’, could not be construed to include the applicants’ liability to
the bank in terms of the suretyship agreement. The judge
explained that the wording of clause 4 made it clear that it related
to ‘the obligatory part of the bond – namely the capital amount,
the interest thereon and the additional amount payable in respect
of the home loan’. The phrase ‘any cause whatsoever’ was limited
to the amount of the capital, interest thereon and the additional
amount. Clause 5 of the surety agreement referred to the
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obligations of the principal debtor. One could hardly believe that
the bank would rely on one mortgage bond to secure a home loan
in an amount of approximately R500 000 and, in addition thereto,
to secure an amount of R921 322 loaned to Abrina 1591 (Pty) Ltd
(paras [26] [27]).
In Roazar CC v The Falls Supermarket CC (above), one of the
issues was whether the lease agreement before the court pro-
vided the lessee with a right of renewal. Klaaren AJ confirmed
that when interpreting a contract, the court is required to give a
commercially sensible meaning to the contract. The court cited
the passage by Lewis JA in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality
v Germiston Municipality Retirement Fund 2010 (2) SA 498 (SCA)
paragraph [39]:
The principle that a provision in a contract must be interpreted not only
in the context of the contract as a whole, but also to give it a
commercially sensible meaning, is now clear. It is the principle upon
which [Bekker NO v Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 159 (T)]
was decided, and, more recently, [Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Murray &
Roberts Construction (Pty) Ltd & another 2008 (6) SA 654 (SCA)] was
based on the same logic. The principle requires a court to construe a
contract in context – within the factual matrix in which the parties
operated. In this regard see [KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v
Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) para [39]].
The idea that the contract must be given a ‘commercially
sensible’ meaning needs to be qualified. Where a contract is
capable of two meanings, one commercially sensible and the
other not, then, obviously, the court should choose the former
meaning. This is, no doubt, what Lewis JA had in mind in the
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality case. However, if her inten-
tion was to say that even where a contract is not capable of a
commercially sensible meaning, the court must give it one, this
cannot be supported. The court must adhere to the words chosen
by the parties. Even if what they said cannot be given a
commercially sensible meaning, the court must give effect to the
specific meaning that the parties intended.
In GPC Developments CC & others v Uys & another [2017] 4All
SA 14 (WCC) paragraph [36], the court confirmed that, in
interpreting a contract, the court must consider the language
chosen by the parties against the background facts and circum-
stances known to them and considered at the time of conclusion
of the contract, and give the language its ordinary grammatical
meaning, The court should also give the language a sensible and
244 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 27 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/08−Contract
businesslike interpretation provided it does not violate the actual
wording of the agreement.
In Nash & another v Mostert & others 2017 (4) SA 80 (GP), the
court applied the general principles of interpretation to ascertain
the meaning of a court order. The court cited a passage from
Electoral Commission v Mhlope & others 2016 (5) SA 1 (CC)
paragraph [23], where it was confirmed that these principles
apply to the interpretation of court orders:
The basic principles applicable to construing documents also apply to
the construction of a court’s judgment or order: the court’s intention is
to be ascertained primarily from the language of the judgment or order
as construed according to the usual, well-known rules. . . . (A)s in the
case of a document, the judgment or order and the court’s reasons for
giving it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its intention. If,
on such a reading, the meaning of the judgment or order is clear and
unambiguous, no extrinsic fact or evidence is admissible to contra-
dict, vary, qualify or supplement it (para [62]).
RECTIFICATION
The facts of RM v BM 2017 (2) SA 538 (ECG) are set out above.
In response to Mrs M’s argument that the antenuptial contract
was void, Mr M claimed rectification of the contract.
Plasket J held that the claim for rectification had not been
proved. He pointed out that a party seeking rectification of a
written contract bears the onus of proving that the contract does
not reflect the common intention of the parties as a result of an
error in its drafting and what that common intention was. While
rectification generally presupposes an agreement antecedent
to the written contract, this is not essential. It may be the best
proof of the common intention of the parties but there is no reason
in principle why that common intention should not be proved in
some other manner, provided the proof is clear and convincing
(para [17]).
Plasket J considered the evidence dealing with rectification
(paras [18]-[30]) and concluded that no agreement was reached
between the parties at any time prior to the signing of the ANC. At
best for Mr M, the common intention of the parties was that they
would marry by ANC with the accrual system. That fell well short
of the common intention that was pleaded, namely ‘that all
business interests then owned by the defendant, and to be
acquired by the defendant in the future, should be excluded from
the defendant’s estate, both in respect of the commencement
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value and at the dissolution of the marriage’. That being so, Mr M
had failed to discharge the onus that rested on him to prove his
claim for rectification (paras [31] [32])
In K2012150042 (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Zitonix (Pty) Ltd
[2017] 2 All SA 232 (WCC), a party to a written contract
contended that because he was unaware of a clause in the
document, the document fell to be rectified by the striking out of
the clause. Holderness AJ, not surprisingly, rejected the argu-
ment.
She pointed out that where a party attempts to enforce a
contract affected by common mistake, the other party may rely on
the mistake as a defence without counterclaiming for rectification,
if it proves such facts as would entitle it to rectification (para [56]).
However, rectification is a remedy which is only available where
there has been a common mistake (not a unilateral one) and the
court is asked to change the agreement to bring it into line with
the parties’ true common intention (para [58]). Even if one
accepts that the respondent was unaware of the clause in
question, there was no suggestion that the applicant was unaware
of the clause and the respondent’s error in this regard was a
unilateral one (para [57]). This meant that a claim for rectification
was not available (para [58]).
PERFORMANCE
In Absa Bank Ltd v Moore & another 2017 (1) SA 255 (CC), the
court applied the principle that payment of a debt by a third party,
acting fraudulently or in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, is
effective to discharge the debt if it is made with the purpose of
discharging the debt and is accepted in good faith by the
creditor in discharge of the debt.
In ABSABank Limited v Lombard Insurance Co Ltd 2012 (6) SA
569 (SCA), Malan JA explained the underlying rationale:
A debt-extinguishing agreement . . . will be invalid where both parties
know that the debt will be discharged with stolen money. This
conclusion hardly requires authority. But none of the authorities . . .
suggest[s] that the same result would follow where the creditor is in
good faith and unaware of the fact that the debt is to be discharged
with stolen funds. Any suggestion that the validity of the payment may
be questioned for this reason would lead to series of payment
transactions being declared invalid ex post facto after discovery of the
theft. Nor is it required that the law be developed further. The common
law has already been developed to impose a duty of care on a
collecting bank. Extensive legislation aimed at the prevention of
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money laundering applies to banks. Any further development . . .
which, to my mind, is neither necessary nor desirable, should be by
way of legislation (para [18]).
Brusson, a fraudster, preyed on homeowners in financial
distress by offering them a chance (as the Brusson brochure put
it) to ‘make money without capital outlay or risk’. Lured by
Brusson’s brochure, the Moores had signed three agreements:
an ‘offer to purchase’; a ‘deed of sale’; and a ‘memorandum of
agreement’. The effect of these agreements was that the Moores
had unwittingly signed away their home to Brusson’s accomplice,
Kambini. Having discharged the Moores’ bond debt, Kambini
obtained, then defaulted on, a new home loan from Absa. Absa,
which had cancelled the Moores’ existing bonds when the
underlying debt was discharged, took judgment against Kambini
and attached the house in execution.
In an application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court,
Absa sought only the re-imposition of the original mortgage
bonds passed by the Moores. Absa argued that the cancellation
of the Moores’ bond debt was part of a fraudulent scheme which
should be unwound so as to restoreAbsa to its pre-fraud position.
Cameron J rejected the argument. He held that Kambini’s
payment of the Moore’s debt to Absa had been effective in
discharging the debt:
[A] thief who pays her own debts with stolen funds extinguishes those
debts, provided the creditor who receives and accepts payment is
innocent (Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Co Ltd 2012 (6) SA569
(SCA) para [18]). Thus, an employee who steals money and deposits
it for her own benefit in various accounts that are in debit, effectually
extinguishes those debts, although the amounts that remain in credit
can be recovered by the victim (Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance
Co Ltd 2012 (6) SA 569 (SCA) para [19]). Our law goes further.
Provided the payee/creditor is innocent, payment of another’s debt,
even by a thief, with stolen funds, operates to extinguish the debt
(Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser 1959 (1) SA 452 ( A)
458). . . . In short, payment is a bilateral act requiring the cooperation
of the payer and the payee – but not the debtor. The payer is usually
the debtor, but doesn’t have to be. If A owes money to B, and C
decides to pay off the debt, then C . . . must intend to pay, and B . . .
must intend to accept the payment. But A . . . does not have to know of
or consent to the payment (Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser
1959 (1) SA 452 (A) 458) (paras [35] [36]).
Absa’s argument was that ‘fraud unravels all’ and that this
principle operated in its favour by ‘undoing’ the debt payment
and the bond cancellation. Cameron J rejected the argument. He
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held that the payment by Kambini was valid despite the fraud,
and effective in discharging the Moores’ debt to Absa (para [37]).
CESSION
In Brayton Carlswald (Pty) Ltd & another v Brews 2017 (5) SA
498 (SCA), the court confirmed that where a party pays a debt,
the right arising from that debt is incapable of cession.
Brayton Carlswald (Pty) Ltd (the first defendant) had borrowed
amounts from a bank (FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Origin (the bank))
and then failed to repay them. The bank obtained judgment
against the first defendant and Jonathan Paul Brews (the second
defendant). In execution of this judgment, the bank caused
certain immovable properties owned by the company to be
attached. To forestall the bank executing against its property, the
company arranged for the respondent, Gordon Donald Brews
(Brews), to pay what was owed.
Some time after payment of the judgment debt, the bank ceded
its rights arising from the judgment to Brews. Brews applied to be
substituted for the bank in the execution process. This relief was
denied by the High Court (KadesAJ) but allowed by the full court.
This caused the company to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal. Theron JA held that the cession was not competent.
Brews’s payment of the amount owing extinguished the bank’s
right to payment, rendering it incapable of transfer.
The main points in Theron JA’s reasoning were as follows. The
court a quo failed to distinguish between the agreement to cede
(the obligatory agreement whereby an obligation is created), also
referred to as the pactum de cedendo, and the cession itself (the
real agreement whereby rights are bilaterally transferred), also
known as the pactum cessionis. Justice PM Nienaber explained it
well in his contribution to The Law of South Africa (Lawsa 2 ed
para 8), aptly distinguishing between these two types of agree-
ment:
The undertaking to cede and the actual cession will often coincide
and be consolidated in a single document, yet they remain discrete
juristic acts. However, because they are frequently merged into one
transaction the clear distinction between the obligatory agreement to
cede and the actual cession sometimes tend to be smudged. They
are nevertheless distinct in function and can be so in time: by the
former a duty to cede is created, by the latter it is discharged (para
[15]).
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The deed of cession was critical in determining the intention of
the parties. When interpreting documents, words must be read in
their context and in application to the subject matter to which they
relate. The ordinary meaning of the words had to be determined
in the context of the document, read as a whole (para [17]). The
parties intended the written document to embody their contract.
The words of clause 2.1: ‘The bank hereby cedes, transfers and
makes over’, made it plain what the bank and Brews intended. In
terms of the deed of cession, the respondent accepted the
‘cession upon and subject to the terms of this Agreement’. The
parties intended that upon signature thereof, transfer of the right
would take effect (para [18]).
When the deed of cession had been executed and fulfilled,
there was nothing left to cede because the debt had been
extinguished by payment. The author JC Sonnekus in Unjustified
Enrichment in South African Law (2008) 237 states that ‘a debt is
after all fulfilled and extinguished through payment’ (para [19]).
Brews had paid the bank all that was due to it. Transfer of a ‘right’,
which has been extinguished, is a nullity as there is nothing which
can be transferred. As a matter of logic, transfer of a non-existent
right can never in law be the subject matter of a cession (First
National Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO & others 1996 (2) SA 339 (A)
346) (para [20]).
EXCUSES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE
Prescription
In Monyetla Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v IMM Graduate
School of Marketing (Pty) Ltd & another 2017 (2) SA 42 (SCA), the
court held that a landlord’s claim for damages against its tenant
had prescribed in terms of section 11 of the Prescription Act 68 of
1969 (the Act).
The lease agreement was between the appellant (M) as
landlord, and the first respondent (I) as tenant. The second
respondent had bound himself to M as surety and co-principal
debtor for the obligations of I. On 6 March 2009, M cancelled
the lease alleging that I had breached it. On 16 March 2012,
M instituted an action in the High Court in which it claimed
damages from the respondents for loss allegedly suffered as a
result of I’s breach of the lease and the resultant cancellation of
the contract. The respondents raised the special plea that the
claim had prescribed.
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The High Court upheld this plea and dismissed M’s claim. In an
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the respondents con-
tended that M’s claim had arisen on the date of cancellation of the
agreement (6 March 2009) and that the summons in the present
action had been served more than three years after this (on
19 March 2012), so any claim for damages flowing from the
breach had prescribed under section 11 of the Act. M’s conten-
tion was that the damages claimed related to the period after I
had vacated the premises. At the earliest, those damages only
became ‘due’ for purposes of section 12 of the Act on 30 April
2010 when I vacated the premises.
Leach JA upheld the respondents’ argument. He reasoned that
M’s claim was founded on a breach of contract and the general
rule is that where one party breaches a contract, the other may
claim damages to place it in the position it would have been in
had the contract been properly performed. The prima facie
measure of damages is the rental that would have been paid for
the premises over the remaining period of the lease (Hazis v
Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Co Ltd 1939 AD 372 387)
less any amounts received which would not have accrued had
the lease not been cancelled (para [16]). The lessor’s loss was
suffered whether or not the lessee vacated or remained in
occupation, and it constituted a debt ‘immediately claimable’
(para [17]). It followed that on cancellation of the contract due to
I’s breach, M became entitled to claim damages for the remain-
ing period of the lease, less whatever amounts it received in
mitigation of its loss. These damages were due and payable as at
the date of cancellation. On that date everything had happened
which would have entitled M to institute action. The debt sued
upon was, therefore, due for purposes of prescription on 6 March
2009 (para [19]). Since action was instituted more than three
years after the debt sued upon had become due, the special plea
of prescription was correctly upheld by the High Court (para
[22]).
Section 11 of the Act provides that the period of prescription is
30 years in respect of any debt secured by a mortgage bond,
and six years in respect of a debt arising from a notarial contract,
unless a longer period applies in respect of the debt in question.
In Factaprops 1052 CC & another v Land and Agricultural
Development Bank of South Africa 2017 (4) SA 495 (SCA), the
issue was whether the period of prescription applicable to a
special notarial bond, which complies with the Security by Means
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of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993, is 30 years or six years.
Zondi JA held that the phrase ‘mortgage bond’ in the Act has a
wide meaning and includes a special notarial bond passed in
terms of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act. Accord-
ingly, the 30-year prescription period applies to it.
Zondi JA’s reasoning may be summarised as follows. The
question in issue is whether the term ‘mortgage bond’ in section
11(a)(i) is sufficiently wide to include a special notarial bond (para
[1]). The court below (Msimeki J) concluded that, properly
interpreted, the phrase ‘mortgage bond’ includes a special
notarial bond. The judge followed the judgment of Rabie J in
Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa v Boeke
& another GP 12506/07 (17 February 2011), in which it was held
that where the debt is secured by a special notarial bond, the
prescription period is 30 years. A similar conclusion was reached
by Molopa-Sethosa J in Land and Agricultural Development Bank
of South Africa v Phato Farms (Pty) Ltd & others 2015 (3) SA 100
(GP) paragraph [69]. Msimeki J disapproved of the reasoning
and conclusion in the judgments of Phatudi AJ in Land and
Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa v Factaprops
1052 CC & another [2015] 3 All SA 319 (GP) paragraph [74], and
Mabuse J in Absa Bank Ltd v Hammerle Group (Pty) Ltd [2013]
ZAGPPHC 402 paragraph [27], where it was held that a special
notarial bond is not a mortgage bond for the purposes of the
Prescription Act (para [9]).
Zondi JA pointed out that the Act does not define ‘mortgage
bond’ nor does it make any reference to a ‘notarial bond’ (para
[12]). When interpreting legislation, what must be considered is
the language used, the context in which the relevant provision
appears, the apparent purpose to which it is directed, and the
material known to those responsible for its production (para [13]).
A close analysis of the language used in section 11(a)(i) of the
Prescription Act, and of its history, shows conclusively that the
phrase ‘mortgage bond’ includes a special notarial bond. The
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles Vol II
3 ed defines ‘mortgage’ as
the conveyance of real or personal property by a debtor (called the
mortgagor) to a creditor (called the mortgagee) as security for a
money debt, with the proviso that the property shall be reconveyed
upon payment to the mortgagee of the sum secured within a certain
period.
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It is apparent from this definition that ‘mortgage’ is used in
relation to immovable property or movable property (para [17]).
The Afrikaans texts in both the 1943 and 1969 Prescription Acts
use the word ‘verband’ for ‘mortgage bond’. The meaning of
‘verband’ according to HAT Verklarende Handwoordeboek van
die Afrikaanse Taal 5 ed (2005) is ‘’n verbintenis volgens wetlike
bepaling waardeur eiendom as sekuriteit gegee word vir ’n
lening’. Kritzinger & Labuschagne VerklarendeAfrikaanse Woorde-
boek (8 ed (1993)) give the meaning of ‘verband’ as ‘verpanding
van, beswaring op ’n eiendom’. These definitions make it clear
that ‘verband’ may be used both in respect of a mortgage bond in
respect of immovable property, and a notarial bond in respect of
movable property (para [18]). Having regard to the history of the
Act, it is clear that the term ‘mortgage bond’ has been consis-
tently used in a wide sense. The Transvaal Prescription Amend-
ment Act 26 of 1908, which predates the Act, did not differentiate
between mortgage bonds and notarial bonds for purposes of
prescription. It simply referred to a ‘mortgage bond, general or
special’. There is no indication that the legislature intended to
deviate from that meaning when it used ‘mortgage bond’ in the
Act (para [19]).
Zondi JA observed that in the case law, the phrase ‘mortgage
bond’ was also used to describe a notarial bond. For example, in
Oliff v Minnie 1953 (1) SA 1 (A) 3, the phrase was interpreted to
mean an instrument hypothecating immovable property and
other goods. Van den Heever JA said that ‘[a] mortgage bond as
we know it is an acknowledgement of debt and at the same time
an instrument hypothecating landed property or other goods’
(para [20]). The purpose of the Act is to protect a debtor against
any claim that he or she may be unable to defend due to lack of
evidence attributable to the passage of time. It follows that longer
periods of prescription are justified where transactions are matters
of public record, as is the case with special notarial bonds (para
[21]).
Zondi JA concluded that accepting that the phrase ‘mortgage
bond’ may be given a narrow meaning that excludes a notarial
bond, there is no reason to adopt such a meaning in the
interpretation of section 11(a)(i) of the Act. Van den Heever JA in
Oliff chose the correct meaning and this meaning is also sup-
ported by MM Loubser Extinctive Prescription (1996) 37-8. It
follows that the conclusions reached by Phatudi AJ in Land and
Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa v Factaprops
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1052 CC and Mabuse J in Absa Bank Ltd v Hammerle Group
(Pty) Ltd could not be sustained (para [22]).
Section 12(3) of the Act provides that a debt shall not be
deemed to be due for purposes of prescription until the creditor
has knowledge of the facts from which the debt arises. In
Fluxmans Incorporated v Levenson [2017] 1All SA313 (SCA), the
issue was whether knowledge that a contingency fee agreement
did not comply with provisions of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of
1997 (the CFA) was a fact needed to complete the creditor’s
cause of action for repayment of the amount overcharged. The
court held that it was not.
In February 2006, the respondent (L) instructed the appellant
(Fluxmans) to institute a damages action on his behalf against the
Road Accident Fund. The parties agreed that Fluxmans would
charge L a contingency fee of 22,5 per cent of the damages that
L recovered from the RAF, plus Value Added Tax on that amount.
The claim was settled, and the terms of the settlement were made
an order of court on 23 May 2008. On 20 August 2008, Fluxmans
sent L a statement of account reflecting his award of compensa-
tion and the fees charged by Fluxmans. More than six years later,
on 9 April 2014, L wrote a letter to Fluxmans in which he alleged
that the contingency fees agreement which he and Fluxmans had
concluded did not comply with the provisions of the CFA. In July
2014, L instituted proceedings claiming the sum of R844 994,57.
Fluxmans did not dispute the allegation that the agreement did
not comply with the CFA. It contended that L’s claim had been
extinguished by prescription.
The High Court held that the respondent’s claim had not
prescribed. It reasoned that one of the minimum facts necessary
for the debt to have become due was L’s knowledge that the
agreement was unlawful and invalid, which knowledge he had
only acquired in 2014. On appeal, both the majority and minority
judges accepted that the High Court had erred in its finding that
the invalidity of the agreement was a factual and not a legal
conclusion (paras [10] [32]).
Zondi JA, delivering the majority judgment, pointed out that a
debt is due for purposes of prescription when the creditor
acquires a complete cause of action for its recovery (Evins v
Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) 838; Deloitte
Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Bowthorpe Hellerman
Deutsch (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 525 (A) 532; Truter & another v
Deysel 2006 (4) SA 168 (SCA) para [16]; MM Loubser Extinctive
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Prescription (1996) 80-1). For prescription to start running, sec-
tion 12(3) of the Act requires only that the creditor has knowledge
of the identity of the debtor and of the facts from which the debt
arises (para [35]). Immediately after L had paid fees to Fluxmans
in August 2008, he had knowledge of all the facts from which his
claim arose, even though he did not know the crucial legal
conclusion flowing from those facts, that the agreement did not
comply with the CFA (para [41]). Knowledge of this conclusion
was not a fact which the respondent needed to acquire to
complete a cause of action and was, therefore, not relevant to the
running of prescription. Zondi JA observed:
This Court stated in [Minister of Finance and others v Gore NO 2007
(1) SA 111 (SCA) para 17] that the period of prescription begins to run
against the creditor when it has minimum facts that are necessary to
institute action. The running of prescription is not postponed until it
becomes aware of the full extent of its rights nor until it has evidence
that would prove a case ‘comfortably’. The ‘fact’ on which the
respondent relies for the contention that the period of prescription
began to run in February 2014, is knowledge about the legal status of
the agreement, which is irrelevant to the commencement of prescrip-
tion. It may be that before February 2014 the respondent did not
appreciate the legal consequences which flowed from the facts, but
his failure to do so did not delay the date on which the prescription
began to run (para [42]).
Zondi JA concluded that when L instituted proceedings in July
2014, his claim had prescribed (para [44]).
Section 12(3) of Act states that the creditor shall be deemed to
have knowledge of the identity of the debtor and the facts from
which the debt arises if the creditor could have acquired this
knowledge by exercising reasonable care. In Nuance Invest-
ments (Pty) Ltd v Maghilda Investments (Pty) Ltd & others [2017]
1 All SA 401 (SCA) paragraph [19], Tshiqi JA made the point that
reasonable care for the purposes of section 12(3) of the Act is not
measured by the objective standard of the hypothetical reason-
able or prudent person, but by the more subjective standard of a
reasonable person with the creditor’s characteristics.
In terms of section 14(1) of the Act, the running of prescription is
interrupted by an express or tacit acknowledgment of liability by the
debtor. The question in KLD Residential CC v Empire Earth Invest-
ments 17 (Pty) Ltd 2017 (6) SA 55 (SCA), [2017] 3 All SA 739 was
whether this provision is to be applied where the acknowledgment
is contained in a letter that makes an offer of compromise.
254 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 37 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/08−Contract
In the court a quo (KLD Residential CC v Empire Earth
Investments 17 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (5) SA 485 (WCC), [2016] 3 All SA
832) it was held that the without-prejudice rule applicable to
settlement negotiations renders evidence of the acknowledgment
inadmissible. The appeal court, by a majority, overruled this
decision. Lewis JA, delivering judgment for the majority, held that
where an acknowledgment of liability is made and this would
interrupt the running of prescription, the acknowledgment is
admissible for this purpose, even if made without prejudice
during settlement negotiations.
Lewis JA reasoned that section 14 of the Act serves the purpose
of protecting the creditor. The reason is clear: if the debtor
acknowledges liability, there is no uncertainty about the debt
(para [16]). Does the protection given by section 14 fall away if
the acknowledgment of debt is made without prejudice? The
question requires consideration of a competing policy, which is
that admissions made in the course of negotiating a settlement
should not be admissible in proceedings between the creditor
and the debtor (para [18]). The policy is intended to promote the
settlement of disputes without resort to litigation (para [20]).
The tension between competing policies was recognised in
Bradford & Bingley plc v Rashid [2006] 4 All ER 705 (HL). Lord
Walker concluded that ‘the policy underlying the without pre-
judice rule seems . . . to outweigh the countervailing policy
reason for lengthening the period of limitation through an acknow-
ledgment’. Lord Hoffman said:
[I]t takes two to negotiate and there is also a public policy in
encouraging the creditor not to initiate legal proceedings. The acknow-
ledgment rule plays an important part in furthering this policy because
it means that a creditor, negotiating on the basis that his debt has
been acknowledged, can proceed with the negotiations and give time
to pay without being distracted by the sound of time’s winged chariot
behind him (para [23]).
In Ofulue & another v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16, Lord Neuberger
accepted the view of Lord Walker in Bradford (para [27]). Zeffertt
and Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) 702
suggest that the solution to the problem is to allow evidence of
communications for the purpose of determining whether the debt
has prescribed but not for other purposes (para [28]).
KLD’s argument was that the judgment in ABSA Bank Limited v
Hammerle Group (Pty) Ltd 2015 (5) SA 215 (SCA) is authority for
the view that our law recognises exceptions to the without
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prejudice rule. In that case, the court recognised that an offer
made ‘without prejudice’ is admissible in evidence as an act of
insolvency. The question to be decided was whether another
exception should be allowed for admissions of liability, made
without prejudice, where the debt would otherwise prescribe
(paras [30]–[34]). There was no authority that prevented the
appeal court from deciding that where an acknowledgment of
indebtedness is made in the course of without-prejudice discus-
sions, it should be admissible for the limited purpose of inter-
rupting the running of prescription (para [35]). As Grosskopf AJA
said in Murray & Roberts Construction (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Uping-
ton Municipality 1984 (1) SA 571 (A) 579, where the debtor
removes uncertainty by admitting liability, the running of prescrip-
tion is ‘suitably adapted’.
This accords with the views expressed in Bradford: it is in the
public interest that a debtor who acknowledges his debt, ‘and so
induces his creditor not to have immediate resort to litigation’,
should not be able to claim that the debt has prescribed because
‘the creditor held his hand’ (para [36]). In Bradford, Lord Hope
said there is a balance to be struck between the public interest in
prolonging the prescription period when there has been an
acknowledgment of liability, and the public interest in preventing
statements made in the course of negotiations being used at trial
as admissions of liability. He stated:
[I]t would be bizarre if a claimant who had been dissuaded from taking
proceedings time and time again both before and after the expiry of
the limitation period by prolonged correspondence which contained
repeated statements that liability was admitted, and which sought to
negotiate only on the matter of quantum, was to be deprived of his
claim on limitation grounds when negotiations broke down simply
because the admissions were made in letters which contained
proposals as to the amount that was to be paid in settlement of that
liability (para [37]).
Lewis JA held that the exception contended for was ‘well-
founded’. She concluded that where acknowledgments of liability
are made, and by virtue of section 14 of the Act they would
interrupt the running of prescription, such acknowledgments
should be admissible, even if made without prejudice during
settlement negotiations. The admission is protected in so far as
proving the existence and the quantum of the debt is concerned
and it is not a question of the without-prejudice rule trumping
prescription. The law recognises that both section 14 of the Act
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and the without-prejudice rule protect policy interests and must
ensure that both interests are properly served (para [39]).
Section 15(1) of the Act provides that the running of prescrip-
tion is interrupted by the service on the debtor of any process
whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt. In Huyser v
Quicksure (Pty) Ltd & another [2017] 2 All SA 209 (GP), the court
held that service of a joinder application has the effect of
interrupting prescription as provided for in section 15(1). Prinsloo
J reasoned that joinder applications avoid multiplication of actions
and wasted costs and it is generally accepted that a joinder
application is a ‘process’ in the spirit of section 15(6) of the Act. If
a joinder is granted and the trial then takes its course, final
judgment can be expected. To reject this approach would be to
argue that a fresh summons issued and served at the time when
the joinder application was issued and served, would serve to
interrupt prescription but the joinder application, which is the
preferred procedure, would not. Such a conclusion could not be
correct.
Reciprocity
In Roazar CC v The Falls Supermarket CC (above under
‘Certainty’) a lessor of property contended that it was not obliged
to negotiate a renewal of the lease with the lessee, as required by
a clause in the lease, until the lessee had paid the amounts it had
promised the lessor under two additional agreements. The court
found that as the two additional agreements were unlawful,
non-performance under those agreements posed no bar to the
exercise by lessee of its right to negotiate a renewal of the lease
agreement (paras [18] [19]).
BREACH
Repudiation
One of the issues in Starways Trading 21 CC v Pearl Island 714
(Pty) Ltd [2017] 4 All SA 568 (WCC) was whether the applicant
(Starways) had repudiated its contract with the first respondent
(Pearl). The court pointed out that repudiation is conduct from
which a reasonable person in the position of the innocent party
would conclude that the repudiator, without having a lawful
ground, would not comply with some or all of its contractual
obligations. ‘The conduct in question should be clear-cut and
unequivocal and should engender a reasonable certainty of an
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eventual malperformance by the party in question of the obliga-
tions under the agreement’ (paras [52] [53]).
Pearl had purchased 25 000 metric tons of white refined sugar
from Starways. Section 59(2) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of
1964 imported an implied term into the contract: a duty on
Starways to reduce or permit a reduction of the contract price.
Starways had unequivocally indicated that it was willing to
perform its obligation to deliver, but it would not perform its duty
to reduce or permit the reduction of the contract price.
The court found that this was an act of repudiation justifying
cancellation of the contract (para [56]). The court pointed out that
a repudiation is not avoided when a party refuses to perform one
duty, but is prepared to perform the remaining duties in terms of
the contract (para [57]). In short, repudiation is conduct from
which a reasonable person can conclude that the alleged
repudiator, without having a lawful ground, will not comply with all
or some of its contractual obligations. As was made clear in
Metamil (Pty) Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd 1994 (3)
SA 673 (A) 684-5, the fact that the repudiator was bona fide in its
interpretation of the agreement and subjectively intended to be
bound by it does not preclude the conclusion that its conduct
constituted repudiation in law. In effect, the repudiator was
insisting on a different contract, however bona fide it might have
been in its belief that it was not (para [58]).
The ‘repentance principle’ allows a party who has elected to
abide by a repudiated contract to change that election and
choose to cancel the agreement and claim damages where the
defaulting party persists with its refusal or failure to perform. In
Primat Construction CC v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan
Municipality 2017 (5) SA420 (SCA), it was held that the aggrieved
party may change its election if it reasonably perceives that the
defaulting party will not remedy its breach despite having been
given the opportunity to do so. No further act of repudiation is
required.
The appellant (Primat) concluded a contract with the respon-
dent (the Municipality) for the upgrade of roads in Motherwell,
Port Elizabeth. Primat sued the Municipality for damages for
breach of contract. The Municipality pleaded that it had repudi-
ated the contract and that Primat had elected not to accept the
repudiation and to abide by the contract. Primat, it alleged, was
bound by its election and could not subsequently cancel the
contract and claim damages.
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Lewis JA pointed out that Revelas J, in the trial court, held that
Primat was entitled to change its election and was not barred
from claiming cancellation and damages. Revelas J relied on the
decision in Sandown Travel (Pty) Ltd v Cricket South Africa 2013
(2) SA 502 (GSJ), where it was held that the innocent party could
change his or her election if the guilty party persisted in the
repudiation after being given the opportunity to perform (para
[12]). The full court, relying on a passage discussing Sandown
Travel in 2013 Annual Survey of South African Law 570-2, held
that in order for the aggrieved party to change his or her election,
there had to be a further act of repudiation after the election had
been made (para [13]). The Municipality had acted consistently
since first repudiating the contract. After each repudiation, Primat
had elected to keep the contract alive and was bound by its
election. It was not entitled to change its stance (para [15]).
In 2013 Annual Survey (above), Sharrock pointed out that the
‘repentance’ principle was well established as far back as De Wet
v Kuhn 1910 CPD 263-4 and had been approved by this court,
albeit in a dissenting judgment, in Culverwell & another v Brown
1990 (1) SA 7 (A) 17, where Nicholas AJA said:
[W]here the injured party refuses to accept the repudiation and
thereby allows the defaulting party to repent of his repudiation and
gives him an opportunity to carry out his portion of the bargain, and
the defaulting party nevertheless persists in his repudiation, the
injured party is entitled to change his mind and notify the other party
that he would no longer treat the agreement as existing, but that he
would now regard it as rescinded and sue for damages (para [16]).
Sharrock put a gloss on this principle. He said:
The notion of persisting in the repudiation requires clarification.
Repudiation consists of words or non-verbal conduct which indicate
an intention not to be bound by the contract. Each separate statement
or act indicating an intention not to be bound, is a separate instance of
repudiation. It makes no difference whether the guilty party has said or
done the same thing before. Where a court speaks of persisting in the
repudiation, what it is effectively referring to is the commission of a
further repudiation which is the same as or similar to, an earlier one,
not simply a failure by the guilty party to retract his or her initial
repudiation. It follows that where the innocent party, having initially
elected not to cancel the contract, elects to do so because the guilty
party has persisted in the repudiation, the innocent party is not simply
changing his or her election regarding the earlier repudiation, but
making a fresh election based on a new repudiation. The innocent
party is given the right to do this because of the guilty party’s
continued display of bad faith (para [17]).
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Sharrock opined that in Sandown Travel, Cricket SA had
‘clearly committed an additional repudiation by treating the
contract as cancelled after the expiry date’ (para [18]). Lowe J, in
the full court, following the approach advocated by Sharrock,
concluded that each time the Municipality confirmed its repudia-
tion of the contract, Primat had elected to abide by the contract.
There was no new act of repudiation that entitled Primat to make a
fresh election (para [19]).
Lewis JA considered that one must have regard to the nature of
repudiation, and to the principles applicable to the doctrine of
election, in determining whether an aggrieved party to a contract
can change his or her election (para [21]). As Nicholas AJA
observed in Culverwell, even where the aggrieved party has
elected to abide by the contract, if the guilty party persists in the
breach despite the opportunity to relent, the aggrieved party may
elect to cancel. This was the view taken by GB Bradfield in
Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) 639. The
author suggests that ‘persistence’ should be understood ‘as a
further indication of intention to repudiate after having been given
an opportunity to reconsider’, in which case ‘what is involved is
an election to cancel based on repeated breach rather than a
change of mind’ (para [25]).
Lewis JA pointed out that the requirement of a new and
independent act of repudiation is not one mentioned in any of the
earlier authorities (para [26]). The doctrine of election is not
inviolable: the double-barrelled procedure, sanctioned in Ras &
others v Simpson 1904 TS 254, allows the aggrieved party to
claim in the same action specific performance, and, in the event
of non-compliance, cancellation and damages. The repentance
principle does the same. The aggrieved party gives the default-
ing party the opportunity to repent of the breach and to perform. If
the defaulting party fails to perform, ‘the aggrieved party should
then be entitled to change its election, and cancel and claim
damages’ (para [27]).
The Municipality had persisted in its repudiation by refusing
Primat access to the site and appointing new contractors. That
conduct showed an unequivocal intention on the part of the
Municipality no longer to be bound and Primat reasonably
perceived it as such (para [28]). No further act of repudiation was
necessary: it was sufficient that Primat reasonably perceived that
the Municipality would not repent of its breach and then decided
to change its election (para [30]).
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REMEDIES FOR BREACH
Cancellation
In GPC Developments CC & others v Uys & another [2017] 4All
SA 14 (WCC), the court confirmed that where a contract specifies
a procedure for cancellation, that procedure must be followed or
the cancellation will be ineffective.
The appellants (the sellers) and the first respondent (Uys)
concluded a written deed of sale in terms of which a residential
dwelling was effectively sold to Uys through the disposal of the
sellers’ interest in GPC Developments CC (GPC). The price was
R968 000. Uys took occupation of the dwelling but he did not
comply with his obligations by the agreed time and so the parties
concluded an addendum which required Uys to pay the outstand-
ing amount into the trust account of a firm of attorneys and repay
the bond on the property.
Clause 10 of the deed of sale provided:
If the Purchaser commits a breach of this agreement . . ., then the
Sellers shall be entitled to give the Purchaser 10 (ten) working days’
notice in writing to remedy such breach . . . and if the Purchaser fails
to comply with such notice, then the Sellers shall forthwith be entitled
but not obliged without prejudice to any other rights or remedies which
the Sellers may have in law . . . to cancel this agreement . . .
Clause 3 of the addendum provided, inter alia, that should the
purchaser fail to comply with a notice to settle all outstanding
obligations in terms of the mortgage bond,
the sellers shall be entitled to demand that they . . . be reinstated as
members of the close corporation . . . In the latter circumstance the
sellers will be obliged to repay to [Uys] the aforesaid amount of
R968 000, less all proven damages as suffered by the sellers because
of [Uys’] breach of contract.
Uys failed to comply with his bond payment obligations. The
sellers cancelled the contract and sought to evict Uys from
the property. The dismissal of this application led to an appeal.
The only issue on appeal was whether Uys was in unlawful
occupation of the property.
The court below (Ntuku J) reasoned that where a contract
specifies a procedure for cancellation, that procedure must be
followed or the purported cancellation will be ineffective. Ntuku J
found that in the absence of a tender to repay the purchase price,
less all proven damages, the cancellation was a nullity.
The sellers contended that they were entitled, upon default by
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the purchaser, to cancel under clause 10 and, having exercised
that election, they were not bound to resort to clause 3 of the
addendum. Gamble J rejected the contention. He pointed out
that Ntuku J relied on a passage in Christie: ‘If the contract lays
down a procedure for cancellation, that procedure must be
followed or a purported cancellation will be ineffective’ (para
[27]). Clause 10 constituted a classic lex commissoria. It afforded
the sellers the right to cancel in the event of default on the part of
the purchaser after the latter had been given notice to remedy the
breach within ten days and had failed to do so (para [37]).
However, clause 10 was not the only lex commissoria available to
the parties as clause 3 fell into the same category. At the time the
addendum was concluded, the sellers had a right to rely on
clause 10 and resile from the contract. But that did not happen.
On the contrary, the parties took positive steps to keep the
agreement alive by concluding the addendum (paras [38] [39]).
Having opted to invoke the lex commissoria incorporated in
clause 3, the sellers were bound to observe the cancellation
requirements of that clause, which required a tender to repay the
purchase price paid, and did not permit a claim for forfeiture
(paras [40] [47]).
Damages
In Basson & others v Hanna (above), the question was raised
whether a claim for the objective value of performance (referred
to as ‘damages as a surrogate for specific performance’) is
competent in our law. During 2002, the respondent (Hanna), the
first appellant (Basson), and the second appellant (Dreyer)
concluded a contract to develop a farm situated on the banks of
the Vaal River. The intention was to use the farm as a weekend
retreat. The farm was owned by the third appellant, a close
corporation (the CC), of which Basson was the sole member.
Basson undertook to build three houses on the property and
Hanna and Dreyer each agreed to purchase a third of Basson’s
membership interest in the CC. Basson carried out the required
construction work and in December 2002, the parties each took
occupation of a house. The purchase price of Hanna’s third share
in CC was R624 953, payable, with interest, in monthly instal-
ments over twenty years. Basson was obliged to transfer Hanna’s
third share to him once he had paid the full amount.
During 2007, the friendship between Hanna and Basson
ended. In June 2007, Basson, in breach of his contractual
262 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 45 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/08−Contract
obligations, told Hanna that he was selling Hanna’s membership
interest in the corporation. He maintained that he was free to do
this because the agreement between the parties was invalid.
Hanna stopped paying his monthly instalments and applied for
an order of specific performance against Basson, as well as an
interim interdict restraining Basson from alienating his member-
ship interest in the corporation. Before the interdictory relief was
granted, Basson alienated the subject matter of the contract to
his brothers. Hanna amended his particulars to claim ‘damages
as a surrogate of performance’ instead of specific performance.
Basson and the CC defended the action. They denied that
Hanna was entitled to damages as a surrogate for performance.
They contended that by failing to pay all amounts due by him in
terms of the agreement, Hanna had repudiated the agreement,
and Basson had been justified in cancelling the contract. The
court dismissed these arguments and awarded Hanna damages.
On appeal, the parties reached agreement on the quantum of
Hanna’s claim and the interest rate to be awarded should the
appeal fail. Zondi JA accepted the conclusion of the court a quo
that Basson’s actions constituted repudiation of the agreement
because the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from
them was that he did not regard himself bound by the agreement
and was not prepared to perform its terms (para [19]). Hanna was
accordingly entitled to claim damages in lieu of specific perfor-
mance (paras [23]–[27]).
The appellants’ argument was that Hanna was claiming
damages ‘as a surrogate for specific performance’ and, accord-
ing to the majority decision in ISEP Structural Engineering &
Plating Ltd v Inland Exploration 1981 (4) SA 1 (A), such a claim
was not competent in law. Hanna contended that the majority
decision in ISEP should not be followed as its correctness was
doubted by Smalberger ADCJ in Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life
Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 159 (SCA) 186.
Zondi JAdeclined to consider the correctness of ISEP as, in his
view, that case was distinguishable (para [37]). The judge
pointed out that in the case before him, justice demanded that
damages be paid in lieu of specific performance because
specific performance was no longer possible. Hanna was ready
to carry out his side of the agreement and had a right to demand
the monetary value of that performance from Basson. The judge
added that a creditor’s right to demand performance from the
debtor cannot be at the debtor’s mercy. The exercise of that right
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cannot depend on what the debtor chooses to do with the asset
to which the creditor’s right relates (paras [38]–[41]). Zondi JA
concluded that because of Basson’s conduct, which rendered
specific performance impossible, Hanna had amended his par-
ticulars of claim to introduce a claim for damages in lieu of
specific performance. The parties had agreed on the quantum
and the mora interest rate to be awarded should the appeal fail.
This meant that the judgment of the court below should be
corrected to the extent proposed by the parties (para [42]).
Therefore, because the parties agreed upon the quantum of
damages, Zondi JA did not have to decide whether the majority
decision in ISEP was correct. The ISEP case concerned a claim
for damages as a surrogate for specific performance in the sense
of the reasonable cost of obtaining the performance from a third
party. This is different from a claim for damages in lieu of
performance which is the amount of loss suffered by the creditor
as a direct result of not having received the promised perfor-
mance (the amount by which the performance would have
enhanced the value of the creditor’s estate).
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CORPORATE LAW
PIET DELPORT*
IRENE-MARIE ESSER**
LEGISLATION
CORPORATE LAW
There was no legislation on corporate law during the period
under review.
CASE LAW
COMPANIES ACT 61 OF 1973
OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT
Off-Beat Holiday Club & another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa
Shareblock Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) was an application
for leave to appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal (see 2016 Annual Survey 267 for the SCA case).
The facts were that Mr Harri, who held most of the shares in
Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Limited (Shareblock),
amended Shareblock’s articles of association. The other mem-
bers of the company argued that the amendment of the compa-
ny’s articles of association was unfair, prejudicial, unjust and
inequitable. They approached the court for relief in terms of
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (1973 Companies
Act). The High Court held that the claim, as a debt under sections
11 and 12 of the PrescriptionAct 68 of 1969 (the PrescriptionAct),
had prescribed (para [9]). The Supreme Court of Appeal, attach-
ing a wide meaning to the term ‘debt’, confirmed this viewpoint
regarding the prescription of the section 252 debt.
The applicants sought to challenge the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s decision that the claim brought by the applicants in
* LLB LLD (Pret) H Dip Tax Law (Wits). Professor, Mercantile Law, University of
Pretoria.
** LLB (US) LLM (University of Aberdeen) LLD (Unisa). Attorney of the High
Court; Professor Extraordinarius, Mercantile Law, Unisa; Visiting Professor, Open
University, United Kingdom; Senior Lecturer, University of Glasgow, United King-
dom.
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terms of section 252 of the 1973 Companies Act had prescribed.
They argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning went
against the decision in Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121
(CC) (para [1]).
To decide this matter, it was necessary to determine whether
claims brought under section 252 were ‘debt’ that could pre-
scribe under the Prescription Act. The applicants argued that
‘debt’ should be given a narrow meaning in that context (Makate
above). In Makate it was held that a debt can only be a ‘claim for
the payment of money, or a claim for the delivery of some-
thing. . .’. It was argued that as claims under section 252 were
neither, the applicants’ claim had not prescribed (para [17]). The
respondents contended that the applicants’ claim was a debt as
it sought the performance of an obligation in the form of the
alteration of the company’s articles (para [19]).
It was held that the court had a broad discretion under section
252 to grant equitable relief (para [28]), and that until a determi-
nation had been made under section 252, neither party could
discharge its obligations to the other because neither party would
be aware of the existence and extent of those obligations (para
[30]). The manner in which section 252 was drafted made it clear
that a particular claim brought under that section could not be
classified as a ‘debt’ as defined in Makate above (paras [31]–-[34]
[48]). To determine whether a claim would fall within the definition
of a ‘debt’ under the Prescription Act, one had to characterise the
claim correctly (para [33]). The court found that the applicants’
claim was based on section 252, which deals with an entitlement
to an equitable judicial determination. Consequently, the claim
was for declaratory relief and not for an alteration of the terms of
contract or a money award (para [34]). The court concluded that
a claim under section 252(3) fell outside the Prescription Act
(para [35]) and upheld the appeal.
In De Sousa & another v Technology Corporate Management
(Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) the minority shareholders,
De Sousa (co-founder and 30% shareholder) and Diez (7,45%
shareholder), launched an application in terms of section 252 of
the 1973 Companies Act for relief from oppressive conduct in the
form of unfair prejudice. This arose from a breakdown in the
relationship between the shareholders following the purchase of
shares in TCM (an information technology company) by the
Hassim Family Trust (the controlling shareholder). The 1973
Companies Act applied to this case as the proceedings com-
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menced in 2010, before the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008
Companies Act) came into operation.
(Notably, this case was preceded by an exception application
during 2016. See 2016 Annual Survey for De Sousa & another v
Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd & others 2016 (6)
SA 528 (GJ), where the court held that that there was no
justification for the proposition that section 252 did not apply
where prejudice was suffered by all the members. The court also
held that the evidence had to be considered as a whole, to
determine whether there was unfair prejudice under section 252
(para [43]). The conduct had to be viewed, objectively, as not
only prejudicial, but also ‘unfairly prejudicial’ (paras [30] [46]). It
is, therefore, clear from that case that although all the members/
shareholders may have the same rights, a difference in interests
can result in an action based on unfair prejudice in that sense. It
is argued in Piet Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies
Act 71 of 2008 (updated June 2018) (Henochsberg) 574(10) that
it is not clear whether the same principles, if all the members were
prejudiced, will apply in respect of section 163 of the 2008
Companies Act.)
TCM was formed in 1987. The first plaintiff, De Sousa, and the
second defendant, Cornelli, were its only directors and share-
holders. TCM was, consequently, a domestic company owned
and managed on an equal basis. The relationship between the
first plaintiff and the second defendant was similar to that
between partners. Three other shareholders were subsequently
added, bringing the number of shareholders to five. The majority
shareholders, led by Cornelli, embarked on conduct that was
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and unjust to the minority share-
holders. When it became apparent that the Hassim Family Trust
could not afford the agreed purchase price for the shares it
acquired in TCM, Cornelli (the CEO and one of the founding
members) attempted to persuade the shareholders to amend the
shareholders’ agreement to reflect a lower purchase price. De
Sousa and Diez resisted this on the ground that it was against the
interests of the company and shareholders. The plaintiffs further
claimed that when they attempted to dispose of their shares in
TCM, Cornelli had not negotiated with them in good faith to arrive
at a fair price for their shares. De Sousa was ultimately dismissed
as an employee of TCM, while Diez was transferred to a post in
TCM’s Namibian office.
The principal question was whether the plaintiffs had satisfied
the jurisdictional requirements for relief under section 252(3).
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The court dealt with the legal principles relating to section 252
in detail (paras [31]ff). It found that section 252 provided a
member, or some of the members of a company, with the means
of obtaining relief from unfairly prejudicial, unjust, or inequitable
acts or omissions by the company, or the conducting of its affairs
in that manner. The emphasis was on the unfairness of the
conduct complained of. Amember seeking relief had to show that
the conduct was ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust, or inequitable’ to that
member or to some part of the members. This conduct must not
only be prejudicial, it must be unfairly so. Fairness was, therefore,
the criterion by which a court would decide whether it had
jurisdiction to grant relief (para [34]). The court held that the test
for unfair prejudice was an objective one and that fairness was an
elastic concept. What is fair or unfair will depend upon the
context in which it is used (para [35]).
Various instances have been identified in case law that would
qualify as ‘unfairly prejudicial’ conduct. It has been held that a
form of unfair prejudice arises where a minority shareholder who
has a right or legitimate expectation to participate in the manage-
ment of the company is excluded from doing so by the majority,
without a reasonable offer or arrangement being made to enable
the excluded shareholder to dispose of his or her shares. The
prejudicial inequity or unfairness lies not in the legally justifiable
exclusion of the affected shareholder from the company’s man-
agement, but in the effect of the exclusion on that shareholder if a
reasonable basis has not been offered for the withdrawal of his or
her capital (para [44]).
The court further held that although the right of a shareholder to
manage the affairs of a company usually derives from the articles
of association or agreements between the shareholders, the
relationship between a company’s shareholders could give rise
to a legitimate expectation of participation in the company’s
management. This, according to the court, usually occurs in the
case of a small domestic company or a ‘quasi-partnership’ (para
[47]).
Cornelli and the majority shareholders under his instruction,
had conducted the affairs of TCM in a manner that was detrimen-
tal to the plaintiffs’ financial interests in various ways. For example,
the business of TCM’s profitable supplies division had been
operated as if it were a entity separate from TCM, with all its
income and profits being diverted to another company, in which
Hassim was a shareholder. This resulted in TCM losing the
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business and profit derived by the supplies division and jeopar-
dised shareholder value (paras [204] [335]).
The court granted the order sought by the plaintiffs. It further
ordered that a referee be appointed to determine the value of the
plaintiffs’ shares as at the date of the granting of the order. No
allowance was to be made for the fact that plaintiffs were minority
shareholders in the valuation of their shares, ie no discount was to
be factored in for that reason.
The following can thus be taken from this case, in the context of
section 252:
• The test of fairness is objective. One must consider the
conduct as a whole and not in isolation;
• The test is not merely a commercial one;
• Various forms of unfairly prejudicial conduct have been identi-
fied in case law. This case is an example of an unfair prejudice
where a minority shareholder who has a right or legitimate
expectation to participate in the management of the company,
is excluded from so doing by the majority without a reason-
able offer or arrangement being made to enable the excluded
shareholder to dispose of his or her shares;
• The right of a shareholder to manage the affairs of a company
is usually derived from the articles of association or agree-
ments between the shareholders, but the relationship between
a company’s members may give rise to a legitimate expecta-
tion to participate in the company’s management.
LIQUIDATION & WINDING-UP
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & another v
South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Associa-
tion & others [2017] 1 All SA 331 (SCA), 2017 (3) SA 95 was an
appeal from South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitio-
ners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment & others, and another application 2015 (2) SA 430 (WCC),
where the court had found, in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitu-
tion), that the Policy on the Appointment of Insolvency Practitio-
ners in Government Notice 798 GG 38088 of 17 October 2014),
read with Government Notice 77 of 7 February 2014 (GG 37287]
of 7 February 2014) (policy) in terms of section 158 of of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the Insolvency Act), was inconsistent
with the Constitution and invalid (see 2015 Annual Survey 235).
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The appeal was dismissed on the basis that clause 7.1 of the
policy embodied a strict allocation of appointments in accor-
dance with race and gender, and was rigid and inflexible (para
[33]) as well as arbitrary and capricious (paras [34] [36] [38]).
This conflicts with the requirements set in Minister of Finance &
another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) (para [41]). The
court held that the policy, however, did not improperly fetter the
discretion of the Master but merely restricted it (para [45]). As
regards irrationality, the court held that the real problem was that
in the absence of proper information as to the basis on which the
policy was formulated, and without proper information on the
current demographics of insolvency practitioners, one could not
say that the policy was formulated on a rational basis properly
directed at the legitimate goal of removing the effects of past
discrimination and furthering the advancement of persons from
previously disadvantaged groups (para [47]). The factors which
the court identified included that there was no explanation as to
what qualifies as a complex estate or an unsuitable practitioner
(para [48]). Furthermore, the Master’s definition of a senior
practitioner as a person who had received at least one appoint-
ment per year over the preceding five years was flawed. The
definition did not take the size and complexity of the insolvent
estate or winding-up into account (para [49]). In addition, the
requirement of the policy that the Master has to appoint the
next-in-line practitioner in each case was itself irrational as it
failed to consider factors such as the nature of the individual
estate, or the industry-specific knowledge, expertise or seniority
of the practitioner concerned (para [50]).
Wishart NO & others v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa
(Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (4) SA 152 (SCA) was an appeal against
an exception upheld by the court a quo. It considered the
application of section 44(1) of the Insolvency Act and section
366(2) of the 1973 Companies Act (applicable by virtue of item
9(1) of Schedule 5 to the 2008 Companies Act), and more
specifically, whether the provisions of section 44(1) of the Insol-
vency Act, by virtue of section 339 of the 1973 Companies Act,
allowing the court or the Master to give leave for the late proving
of a claim, applied in the winding-up. The appellants sought the
High Court’s leave under section 44(1) to prove a late claim and
the exception was upheld. On appeal, the respondents con-
tended that the judgment in Mayo NO & others v De Montlehu
2016 (1) SA 36 (SCA) (see 2015 Annual Survey 244) was
270 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 7 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/09−Corporate−Law
confined to the application of only three aspects of section 44(1):
the time period; the fixing of costs; and payment of costs by a
creditor who submitted a claim after the three-month period had
expired. The balance of the proviso, dealing with the proof of a
late claim with the leave of the court or the Master, does not apply
to claims in the winding-up of a company. The reason for this, it
was argued, was that section 366(2) of the 1973 Companies Act
itself provides for a time limit in that the Master could fix a time
within which creditors could prove their claims or otherwise be
excluded from the benefit of the distribution under any account
lodged with the Master (para [13]).
In De Montlehu v Mayo NO & others 2015 (3) SA 253 (GJ) the
court (para [20]) stated:
[T]he two sections are functionally different, and have different
objectives. Section 366(2) of the Companies Act is a special provision
intended to enable participation in a distribution under a particular
account. It has no application to the late proof of claims in general,
which is governed by the proviso to section 44(1) of the InsolvencyAct
. . . . Simply put, its objective is to nullify an attempt by a creditor to
delay proving his or her claim until a lodged account shows that a
distribution is to occur. The proviso to section 44(1) of the Insolvency
Act, on the other hand, is to prevent proof of a claim after the
expiration of a period of three months as from the conclusion of the
second meeting of creditors, except with leave of the court or the
master. The overall purpose of the proviso to section 44(1) of the
Insolvency Act is to ensure that the administration of the estate is
concluded expeditiously.
This was confirmed on appeal in Mayo NO & others v De
Montlehu (above) where the court said (para [18]) that
. . . neither in logic nor in the grammar of the respective provisions is
there a reason why the three-month time period, together with the
fixing of costs and the payment thereof by a later creditor [as provided
for in section 44(1) of the Insolvency Act], should not apply alongside
the discretionary power granted in terms of s 366(2).
It was further stated:
[19] Were the three-month period not to apply [in liquidations], then in
the absence of a time period being fixed by the master in terms of
section 366(2), there would be no formal time period within which
creditors would be required to lodge and prove their claims. The risk
of tardiness, if not inertia, would be ever present. Clearly, this would
not be in the interest of either the creditors or the general public. The
three-month period stipulated in section 44(1) of the Insolvency Act
relating to the proof of claims thus remains the bench mark in both
sequestrations and liquidations. Section 366(2) does not, therefore,
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affect the applicability of section 44(1) of the Insolvency Act to
companies in liquidation.
Consequently, the appeal against the order upholding the first
exception was successful (para [16]).
The appellants’ second claim was for the expungement of the
respondents’ claim in the winding-up of Euro Coal from the
liquidation and distribution account (L&D account). The excep-
tion taken by the respondents was that an objection to an L&D
account is governed by section 407 of the 1973 Companies Act.
The court found that section 403 required the account to be
lodged with the Master, and to lie for inspection as provided in
section 406. Section 407 specifies the persons who may object to
the account and the procedure for doing so. Section 407(4)(a)
provides:
The liquidator or any person aggrieved by any direction of the Master
under this section, or by the refusal of the Master to sustain an
objection lodged thereunder, may within fourteen days after the date
of the Master’s direction and after notice to the liquidator apply to the
Court for an order setting aside the Master’s decision, and the Court
may on any such application confirm the account in question or make
such order as it thinks fit (para [17]).
The respondents’ second exception was that objections to an
L&D account had to be first made to the Master, and that only
once the Master had made a decision as provided for in section
407(4)(a), could the decision be reviewed by a court. In the
absence of an allegation that the Master had made a decision,
the particulars disclosed no cause of action. The court a quo
upheld the exception on the basis that the remedy was statutory
as a review in terms of section 407, and that a court had no
jurisdiction to expunge a claim. The appellants (paras [1] [20])
referred to Millman & another NNO v Pieterse & others 1997 (1)
SA 784 (C), where the liquidators had instituted action to claim
expungement of the claims of certain creditors that had been
admitted to proof at the first meeting of creditors. The defendants
in that case had excepted to the claims on the basis that a court
had no jurisdiction to expunge claims, but was confined to
reviewing a decision of the Master under section 151 of the
InsolvencyAct. The court had, however, dismissed the exception,
holding that it had the jurisdiction to review a decision at common
law, and that section 151 of the Insolvency Act did not oust that
jurisdiction. However, contrary to the decision in Millman (above),
in Standard Bank of South Africa v The Master of the High Court &
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others 2010 (4) SA 405 (SCA) (para [93]), it was held that before
resorting to review proceedings under section 151 of the Insol-
vency Act, a liquidator is obliged to follow the procedures set out
in section 45 of the Insolvency Act. If a trustee disputes a claim
after proof at a meeting, he or she must report on this to the
Master and explain why the claim was disputed. The Master may
confirm the claim, or, after affording the claimant an opportunity
to substantiate the claim, reduce or disallow it. The court pointed
out that it is this decision which triggers the review procedure
under section 151 of the InsolvencyAct (para [25]). In Wishart NO
& others (above) the court held that the decision in Millman
(above), insofar as it is not consonant with the principle enunci-
ated in Standard Bank of South Africa, was incorrect (para [26]).
The court concluded that
. . . the appellants should have invoked the procedures set out in
s 407 of the 1973 Companies Act. The power to expunge a claim or to
reduce it is conferred on the master alone. (See B Galgut et al (eds)
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 vol 1 at 861–2
(service issue 20) and the authorities cited there.) Only when the
master has made a decision in this regard may an interested person
approach a court to review it. The second exception was thus
correctly upheld by the court a quo.
COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008
SHARES AND SHAREHOLDERS
In Barry v Clearwater Estates NPC & others 2017 (3) SA 364
(SCA) the first respondent’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI)
provided that a proxy must be delivered to the company at least
48 hours before the shareholders’ meeting at which the proxy was
to be exercised. The applicant disputed the validity of resolutions
passed at a meeting of the shareholders of the first respondent,
on the ground that the proxies submitted and accepted on the
day of the meeting were in contravention of the first respondent’s
MOI. Had the proxies in dispute not been accepted, the atten-
dance at the meeting would not have met the quorum require-
ments for the purpose of passing the resolutions. Therefore, the
issue was whether the provisions of the first respondent’s MOI,
which stipulated a time limit for the appointment of a proxy, were
valid in light of section 58(1)(a) of the 2008 Companies Act, which
gives shareholders the right to appoint proxies at ‘any time’.
The court a quo held that the relevant provisions of the first
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respondent’s MOI were inconsistent with section 58(1)(a) of the
2008 Companies Act and were, consequently, void in terms of
section 15(1) of the 2008 Companies Act (s 15(1) provides that a
provision of the MOI shall be void to the extent that it is
inconsistent with the 2008 Companies Act). The result was that
the proxies in dispute had been properly considered and the
resolutions had been validly passed at the meeting. (See Helena
Stoop ‘Alterable and unalterable provisions of the Companies Act
71 of 2008: Recent cases expose inherent uncertainties’ (2016) 1
The Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 40–51
for a discussion on this case.) On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Appeal confirmed the decision of the court a quo (para [16]). A
provision in a company’s MOI that prescribes a minimum time
period within which a proxy must be lodged before the meeting
will thus be invalid. This case confirmed the position under
section 58(1) of the 2008 Companies Act, which provides that a
shareholder may appoint a proxy at ‘any time’. It should be noted
that a provision in an MOI requiring the proxy to be submitted
before a certain time should not invalidate the proxy itself. The
words ‘any time’ in 58(1) further imply that a proxy can be
submitted during the meeting.
The case of Du Plooy NO & others v De Hollandsche Molen
Share Block Ltd & another 2017 (3) SA 274 (WCC) dealt with
three important issues: the status of the original subscribers of
shares; the transfer of the shares; and the application of sections
161 and 163 of the 2008 Companies Act.
In regard to the status of the subscribers of shares, the court
found that an analysis of section 103 of the 1973 Companies Act
was relevant. It made reference to Blackman’s Commentary on
the Companies Act (para [20]) in this regard. It also referred to
Henochsberg (para [26]), where it is pointed out that the 1973
Companies Act used to provide that subscribers to a company’s
memorandum were deemed to have agreed to become members
of the company upon incorporation, and that as soon as the
company was incorporated the subscribers were supposed to be
entered as members on the company’s register of members.
However, neither entry into the register of members nor allocation
of shares was a condition precedent to becoming a member of
the company. The court further referred to Palmer’s Company
Law Vol 27.005, where the author, relying on Alexander v
Automatic Telephone Company [1900] 2 Ch 52, asserted that
subscribers to the memorandum of association became mem-
bers upon incorporation of the company (para [27]).
274 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 11 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/09−Corporate−Law
Concerning the issue of whether ownership of shares depends
on registration thereof in a company’s share register, the court
held that (as explained by Blackman), in the case of certificated
shares, the complex incorporeal rights which constitute a share
are transferable by way of cession. The owner (who may also be
the registered member) can thus sell such shares and cede the
rights attached to them independently of, and prior to, the
registration of the purchaser. Ownership of shares is, therefore,
not dependent on registration (para [33]).
In regard to the application of sections 161 and 163 of the 2008
Companies Act, it was held that in a situation where share
certificates are issued but the holders of the shares are not
entered in the securities register, the court could exercise a
discretion in terms of section 161 to ensure that the securities
register reflects the true owner of securities (para [59]). (See JS
Oosthuizen & PADelport ‘Rectification of the securities register of
a company and the oppression remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228.)
DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
The key question addressed in Kaimowitz v DeLahunt & others
2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) related to the duties of a company
director, particularly the extent to which these include involve-
ment in the day-to-day management of the company. The appli-
cant was one of five directors of the fifth respondent (the
company) and had previously been employed by the company.
The first to fourth respondents were the other four directors of the
company. The applicant’s employment was terminated and he
was informed that he would remain as a non-executive director of
the company. As a non-executive director, he would not be
involved in the day-to-day management of the business of the
company. The applicant brought an application in terms of
section 163 of the 2008 Companies Act, arguing that such
conduct was unlawful, prejudicial, and oppressive to him in that a
post of non-executive director had been created which excluded
him from the management of the company’s business. This was,
so he averred, in conflict with section 66(1) of the 2008 Compa-
nies Act which provides that the business and affairs of a
company must be managed by or under the direction of its
board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and
perform any of the functions of the company, save to the extent
that the 2008 Companies Act or the company’s MOI provides
otherwise. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that
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section 66(1) conferred on the board of directors the right and
obligation to ‘manage’ the business of the company (para [13]).
Although in the court’s view the exact nature of the relief sought
by the applicant was not spelt out clearly, the court found that the
applicant sought to play a greater role in the affairs of the
company than merely attending board meetings. Consequently,
the court had to consider two separate questions. The first
question was whether the applicant, as a director, was as of right
entitled to be involved in the day-to-day running of the business
of the company. If not, the second question was whether the
applicant had been prevented from being involved in the compa-
ny’s business in a manner that impeded his role as a director in
terms of the applicable law. The court quoted R v Mall & others
1959 (4) SA 607 (N) 623, where a clear distinction was made
between a director and a manager and it was pointed out that
directors appointed by the shareholders are vested with the
management and control of the company, and act as a body
unless their powers have been lawfully delegated. A manager, on
the other hand, is an employee of the company and his services
are engaged by the directors. The court held that it was clear that
the office of a director did not intrinsically involve the day-to-day
running of the company, unless such powers were conferred,
such as in the case of a managing director (para [19]). The court
further referred to Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 505
as authority for a summary of the general position that the board
fulfills a monitoring role over the business of the company as
opposed to dealing with its day-to-day affairs. However, the
question remained as to whether a director on a board (save
where it was provided for in the MOI and where such director,
pursuant thereto, could be given the task, by way of membership
of a subcommittee created by the board, of being responsible for
the management, or an aspect thereof, of the company) was
entitled to be involved in the overall day-to-day running of the
affairs of the company (para [24]). With reference to the the
dictum in Howard v Herrigel & another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A)
678 that not every director has to be involved in the day-to-day
running of a company, the court concluded that it was clear from
section 66(1) of the 2008 Companies Act that the management of
the company in terms of the overall supervision thereof vested in
the board of directors as opposed to individual directors.
In Moraitis Investments (Pty) Ltd & others v Montic Dairy (Pty)
Ltd 2017 (5) SA 508 (SCA), M and K conducted a dairy business
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together. They held their respective interests indirectly. In respect
of M, that vehicle was the Moraitis Trust (the Trust) of which he
and his brothers were trustees. The Trust was the sole share-
holder in Moraitis Investments, which in turn held stakes in the
various companies through which the business was conducted.
There was a dispute between M and K and they entered into a
settlement agreement. M signed the agreement on behalf of both
the Trust and Moraitis Investments. The settlement agreement
was then made an order of court by consent. In the court a quo
the trustees sought to set aside both the settlement agreement
and the order making that agreement an order of court. They
argued that the agreement was invalid because M had not been
authorised by either the Trust or Moraitis Investments to conclude
it. They further argued that a special resolution in terms of section
115(2)(a) was required as the settlement agreement involved a
disposal of the whole of Moraitis Investments as contemplated in
section 112 of the 2008 CompaniesAct. It was contended that the
agreement was void as no special resolution had been passed.
The court found that Moraitis Investments had one shareholder,
the Trust, and two directors, M and K. The authority of Moraitis
Investments could, therefore, emanate from two sources, ie, a
decision by its sole shareholder to conclude an agreement, or a
decision by its two directors (para [35]). It held that the purpose
of the requirements of sections 112 and 115 was to ensure that
the views of all the shareholders were taken into account, and
section 65(9) and (10) provided for the majority of the votes
required to pass the special resolution (para [37]). Where a
company had only one shareholder, these requirements would
become a mere formality and, in the court’s view, the principle of
unanimous consent could be invoked in answer to the appellants’
contention. This English company law principle was accepted as
part of our law under both the 1926 and the 1973 CompaniesActs
(Sugden & others v Beaconhurst Dairies (Pty) Ltd & others 1963
(2) SA 174 (E) 179H–181A; Gohlke & Schneider & another v
Westies Minerale (Edms) Bpk & another 1970 (2) SA 685 (A)
693E–694E). The court concluded that it could see nothing in the
2008 Companies Act to suggest that the principle was no longer
applicable. The statement by the court that a shareholder can by
resolution authorise conclusion of a contract for the company is
not correct. This is so because the sole authority, unless the MOI
provides otherwise, lies with the directors in terms of section
66(1) of the 2008 Companies Act. Even though the principle of
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unanimous consent is still part of our law, it was not applicable to
the facts of this case as the directors still managed the business
and affairs of the company in terms of section 66(1) and a
resolution, even of a single shareholder, cannot amend section
66(1). The court also accepted the principle of unanimous
consent between the directors as a basis for excluding the duty
to disclose an interest in a contract in terms of section 75(6) (para
[39]).
OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT
Harilal v Rajman & others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) dealt with
an application in terms of section 163 of the 2008 CompaniesAct.
The applicant sought an order directing the first to the fourth
respondents to purchase her shareholding and loan account in
the fifth respondent. The applicant had obtained her sharehold-
ing from her husband, who had transferred it to her. The applicant
also replaced her husband as a director, although she never took
up any duties in that capacity (para [6]). Her husband also
attended the shareholder meetings as her proxy. The respon-
dents claimed that the husband had transferred his shareholding
to them, meaning that the applicant did not have the necessary
locus standi to bring the application as she was not a shareholder
at that stage. The applicant did not comply with the elaborate
procedure in the shareholders’ agreement for the disposition of
the respective shareholding (para [8]).
On the first issue of locus standi, the court assumed that the
applicant had the necessary locus standi without deciding this
issue. It held that the applicant had not succeeded in discharging
the onus of proving her allegation that the respondents had
repudiated the shareholders’ agreement (para [67]). She
attempted to brush the shareholders’ agreement aside with
vague and general statements that it had been repudiated and
that its auditor was biased, without providing any evidence (para
[75]). It was also held that the applicant was not entitled to the
alternative relief of a winding-up order based on the just and
equitable principle (para [76]).
On section 163, the court held that, in order to succeed, an
applicant must allege and prove that an act or omission by the
company or a shareholder had resulted in oppressive or unfair
prejudice and that it had unfairly disregarded the interests of the
applicant (para [78]). The applicant had not shown this.
The application was dismissed with costs. This case confirmed
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the principles in respect of section 163 and we agree with this
decision.
In De Klerk v Ferreira & others 2017 (3) SA 502 (GP) the court
confirmed the wide discretion to compel a transfer of shares or
interests in order to deal with prejudicial, unjust, and inequitable
conduct by a company director or shareholder against each
other. This case is specifically relevant to the definition of a
‘related person’ in this context.
De Klerk and Ferreira were equal members in a close corpora-
tion and shareholders of a company. When their relationship
broke down, De Klerk sought orders in terms of section 163(1) of
the 2008 CompaniesAct to compel Ferreira to transfer his interest
in the close corporation and shares in the company to him at fair
compensation. The court held that the intertwined nature of the
relationship between the close corporation and the company was
not sufficient for the application of section 163 of the 2008
Companies Act. The real issue was whether the close corporation
was a ‘related person’ with respect to the company (paras [10]
[76]). Section 163 provides relief to shareholders or directors who
are subject to oppressive conduct by a company or a ‘related
person’. The court considered, in this regard, whether Ferreira
had the ability materially to influence the policy of both the close
corporation and the company in the same way as a person who
exercises control through a majority vote at a board or general
meeting. It found that the business of the close corporation was
conducted on the company’s land and the former could not have
functioned without the latter. The close corporation was, there-
fore, a ‘related person’ (para [83]).
It was held that Ferreira had conducted the affairs of the close
corporation in a way that was unfairly prejudicial to De Klerk, and
that it was appropriate to make orders ending his membership
and for De Klerk to acquire his interest (ss 49 and 36 of the Close
Corporations Act 69 of 1984) (para [72]). As the relationship
between the company and the close corporation was not suffi-
ciently interlinked, it was necessary to show that the close
corporation was a ‘related party’ in order for it to be entitled to
relief in terms of section 163. De Klerk was entitled to relief under
section 163(2) in respect of the company as the close corporation
was a ‘related person’ in terms of section 163(1) (paras [83]–[86]).
In Henochsberg 32(6) it is argued that if the MOI or a valid
shareholders’ agreement or the 2008 Companies Act (section 66)
provides for co-management in a company by the shareholders
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and/or directors, the usurping of these powers by a shareholder
or director cannot be seen as being able to exercise the element
of control in the ‘majoritarian’ situations as envisaged in sub-
section (2)(a)–(c). This ‘power’ must be in terms of an agreement,
express or otherwise, between the shareholder(s) or even between
the shareholders, on the one hand, and a third party on the other.
Such powers, if given by the board, must comply with section 66.
However, such an agreement must comply with the MOI and the
2008 Companies Act. The agreement will be void if it is in conflict
with the MOI and/or the 2008 CompaniesAct. Such an agreement
can regulate how the shareholder will exercise his or her rights in
terms of the MOI or the 2008 Companies Act, without affecting
those rights per se and without conflicting with the MOI or the
2008 Companies Act. A shareholder can, in this manner, validly
agree to exercise his or her votes in favour of certain resolutions
to be presented, thereby conferring the ‘majoritarian’ power upon
a person or persons, as envisaged in subsection (2)(a)–(c), who
does or do not have that power de jure in terms of the MOI or the
2008 CompaniesAct. These resolutions may include, for example,
a sale of the company’s assets in terms of section 112 or
obtaining a loan for the company where the MOI requires certain
loans to be approved by a stipulated majority. A person who is a
shareholder and/or director of a company, and also a full-time
employee, cannot, in the capacity of employee, without an
agreement as discussed above, evolve into a person who
controls the company as envisaged in subsection (2)(d). But
compare De Klerk v Ferreira & others (above).
APPRAISAL REMEDY AND THE PAIA
Loest v Gendac & another 2017 (4) SA 187 (GP) dealt with
section 164 of the 2008 Companies Act, which allows share-
holders who are dissatisfied with proposed company resolutions
to exit the company in return for the fair value of their shares. The
issue in this case was whether an aggrieved shareholder could
rely on the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information
Act 2 of 2000 (the PAIA) to exercise or protect his or her rights
under section 164.
The applicant made a request under section 50 of the PAIA to
be given access to company records in order to determine the
fair value of his shares. The respondent companies argued that
the applicant did not have the necessary locus standi as he had
been stripped of his status as a shareholder by the exercise of his
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rights in terms of section 164 of the 2008 Companies Act. They
also argued that the applicant was barred from relying on section
50 of the PAIA because section 164 provided for the valuation of
shares by the court.
The court held that section 164 did not deprive the applicant of
his status as shareholder, but merely removed other privileges
associated with this status while he pursued the appraisal
remedy (para [13]). He remained a shareholder for purposes of
receiving fair value for his shares. In regard to whether the
applicant was entitled to request access to information in terms of
the provisions of the PAIA, the court highlighted that even though
section 164 of the 2008 Companies Act had built-in mechanisms
for dissenting shareholders to protect their right to receive fair
value for their shares, there was no impediment in the section to
exercising the rights of access to information in terms of the PAIA
(para [40]). However, the court found that the applicant had not
established why access to information was required for the
exercise of his appraisal rights in terms of section 164. It held that
a parallel process under the PAIA would also result in unneces-
sary costs and burdens for the company (para [45]).
DERIVATIVE ACTION
Section 165 of the 2008 Companies Act has abolished the
common-law derivative action and replaced it with the statutory
derivative action. A wide range of persons, including company
directors, can now institute derivative proceedings by serving a
demand on the company to commence or continue legal proceed-
ings or to take related steps to protect the legal interests of the
company. If the company does not accede to a demand, the
person who has made the demand may apply to court for leave to
bring or continue proceedings in the name or on behalf of the
company. The court may only grant leave if it is satisfied that the
applicant is acting in good faith, the proposed proceedings
involve a trial of a serious question of material consequence to
the company, and it is in the best interest of the company that the
applicant be granted leave (s 165(5)(b)). In Mbethe v United
Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2017 (6) SA 409 (SCA) the
central issue related to the nature of the onus which the appli-
cants had to discharge in terms of section 165(5)(b) of the 2008
Companies Act. The court held that the applicants bore the onus
of proving (on a balance of probabilities) the requirements of
section 165(5)(b), and that the court still had an overriding
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discretion to refuse relief even if these requirements were satis-
fied (see 2016 Annual Survey 265 for the court a quo). It was
further held that the individual requirements of section165(5)(b)
should not be viewed in isolation. The court pointed out that, in
considering whether the ‘proceedings involve the trial of a serious
question of material consequence to the company’, a finding that
the applicant had an ulterior motive would also be relevant when
deciding whether the applicant acted in good faith (para [19]).
Concerning the requirement that an applicant must be acting ‘in
good faith’, the court held that while the test for good faith is
subjective, it is also subject to evidence-based objective control
(para [20]). The enquiry was, therefore, whether the evidence
revealed reasonable grounds on which to find that the applicant
was acting in good faith. The absence of reasonable grounds
could establish an absence of good faith. If the evidence proved
the presence of some ulterior motive/purpose, the pursuit of
which did not involve the trial of a serious question of material
consequence to the company, or which was not in the best
interest of the company, that would also constitute evidence of an
absence of good faith (para [22]). This case clarified the position
regarding the nature of the onus to be discharged by an
applicant for relief under section 165 in order to satisfy the court
that the applicant is acting in good faith.
Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam & others 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)
concerned an application in terms of section 165(2)(a) of the
2008 Companies Act, which entitles any shareholder, or a person
entitled to be registered as a shareholder, to institute a derivative
action. The first respondent served a demand in terms of section
165(2)(a) of the 2008 Companies Act, calling upon the applicant
company to protect its legal interests by commencing proceed-
ings to declare four of the company’s directors (the second to fifth
respondents) delinquent.
Notably, section 162 of the 2008 Companies Act provides for
the application to declare a director delinquent or under proba-
tion. In terms of section 162(2) a wide category of persons,
including a company, a shareholder, director, company secre-
tary, prescribed officer of a company, or a registered trade union,
may apply to court for a director or former director to be declared
delinquent or placed on probation. Therefore, companies have
standing to bring proceedings for the disqualification of their
directors or former directors (para [10]).
The court must declare a person delinquent if the person, while
a director: (i) grossly abused the position of director; (ii) took
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personal advantage of information or an opportunity, contrary to
section 76(2)(a); (iii) intentionally, or by gross negligence, inflicted
harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the company, contrary
to section 76(2)(a); (iv) acted in a manner that amounted to gross
negligence, wilful misconduct, or breach of trust in relation to the
performance of the director’s functions within, and duties to, the
company or contemplated in section 77(3)(a), (b) or (c) (see
s 162(5)(c) of the 2008 Companies Act). In the context of section
162(5)(c), the court referred to Gihwala & others v Grancy
Property Ltd & others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA), 2017 (2) SA 337
para [13]. Concerning ‘grossly abused the position of director’,
the court held that the conduct in question must relate to the use
of the position as director and not to the performance by the
person concerned of his duties and functions as a director (para
[143]). In regard to ‘intentionally, or by gross negligence, inflicted
harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the company’, the
court held that what would be required is conduct that is intended
to harm the company (para [16]). It concluded that for a
company, or any of its shareholders, to succeed in obtaining a
declaration of delinquency it must demonstrate serious miscon-
duct by the person concerned – for example, dishonesty, wilful
misconduct, or gross negligence. Poor business decisions or
‘ordinary’ negligence will not be sufficient (para [18]).
An important question that the court had to answer, however,
was whether the applicant could proceed derivatively for relief
when he could proceed for such relief on a personal basis (para
[19]). The question was, consequently, whether standing under
sections 165 and 162, respectively, was mutually exclusive. The
court held that the aim of section 165 is to permit the institution or
continuance of proceedings in the company’s best interests in
circumstances where the company was refraining from acting on
its own initiative (para [31]). It pointed out that section 165 is not a
vehicle for an applicant to protect its own interests using the
company’s name and legal personality (para [32]). It was also no
longer necessary to show that the wrongdoers were using their
control of the company to prevent the company from taking
action (para [34]). When considering the relationship between
sections 165 and 162, the court held that there was a conscious
distinction between the concept of the legal interest of a particu-
lar company, to which proceedings in terms of section 165
related, and that of protection of the public interest, to which
section 162 related (para [39]). It found that the shareholder’s
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right protected in terms of section 162 is not a right of the
company. Instead, it is a separate and personal right that each
and every shareholder enjoys individually (para [43]). The court
concluded that there was nothing in the nature of the complaints
or the contents of the demands to indicate why the first respon-
dent should be allowed to proceed derivatively for relief that he
could claim personally (para [52]). The court also held that the
shareholder’s right in terms of section 162 did not derive from the
company but existed independently of the right of the company
(para [27]).
It is interesting to note that the court also held that the first
respondent was not a shareholder as defined in section 1 of the
2008 Companies Act (para [20]). A ‘shareholder’ is defined in
section 1 to mean ‘. . . the holder of a share issued by a company
and who is entered as such in the certificated or uncertificated
securities register, as the case may be’. The applicant’s counsel
submitted, however, that the first respondent could easily have
qualified himself as a shareholder (as defined) of the applicant
company simply by obtaining the registration in his name of one
or more of the shares he owned beneficially. It is argued, in
Henochsberg (32(3)), that the 2008 Companies Act is clear on
the requirements to be a shareholder and that the ‘contextual
import’ of section 162, or any other section for that matter, cannot
change the express wording of section 1.
The court questioned the principle that a director owed fidu-
ciary duties only to the company (para [49]). It found that,
following the decision in Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, the
notion that a director’s fiduciary duty was exclusively to the
company, and not to its shareholders, appeared still to be
entrenched in our law. (See Henochsberg 298(17) in this regard.)
The court also referred to Grancy Property Limited & another v
Gihwala & others; In Re: Grancy Property Limited & another v
Gihwala & others ( [2014] ZAWCHC 97 para [104]), where it was
held that ‘the duty of company directors to act honestly and in
accordance with their fiduciary duties to the company is owed not
only to the company, but also to the shareholders personally’. In
Gihwala & others v Grancy Property Ltd & others (above)
paragraph [144], the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the
relationship between shareholders and the directors they have
put into office involved a ‘bond of trust’.
The case of Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam & others (1) [2017] 1
All SA 231 (WCC) concerned two interlocutory applications (to
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the main application above) in relation to the rules governing
discovery as well as a counter-application for an order to deliver
the answering affidavit within ten days. The court made some
important comments regarding section 165 of the 2008 Compa-
nies Act. It held that the bases upon which a company could
challenge a demand made in terms of section 165(2) were strictly
limited (para [13]). Furthermore, when considering whether a
demand is without merit, the court would not pre-empt the
determination of the claim that the demander intended to pros-
ecute derivatively, nor would the court be concerned with the
prospects of success of that claim. When the court assesses the
demand, it does so merely to determine whether the demand has
made out a cognisable basis for the contemplated derivative
action (para [14]).
DISQUALIFICATION
Gihwala & others v Grancy Property Ltd & others [2016] 2 All
SA 649 (SCA), 2017 (2) SA 337 was an appeal against an order of
the Western Cape Division of the High Court which, among other
things, declared the first and second appellants to be delinquent
directors in terms of section 162(5)(c) of the 2008 Companies
Act. (See Grancy Property Ltd & others, in re Grancy Property
Limited & another v Gihwala & others [2014] ZAWCHC 97.) For
our purposes, the court made important remarks regarding the
scope, ambit, and constitutionality of section 162. This section,
dealing with applications to declare directors delinquent in
certain instances, is a unique South African provision. (See Du
Plessis and Delport ‘ ‘‘Delinquent directors’’ and ‘‘directors under
probation’’: A unique South African approach regarding disquali-
fication of company directors’ (2017) 134 SALJ 276 for a detailed
discussion of s 162 and this judgment.)
Concerning the constitutionality of section 162 of the 2008
Companies Act, the first issue was whether the entire section was
unconstitutional as it was allegedly retrospective in its operation.
The second issue related to whether the absence of judicial
discretion in regard to the delinquency order potentially violated
the constitutionally protected rights to dignity, to choose a trade,
occupation or profession, and the right of access to courts. It was
argued, in regard to the first issue, that all the facts relied on to
justify the delinquency order were based on events that occurred
before the commencement of the 2008 Companies Act. This
argument, however, fell away when the court held that a statute
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was not retrospective ‘because a part of the requisites for its
action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing’ (para [141]).
The argument was then confined to the second issue.
The court started by considering the purpose of section 162(5).
It held that the aim of section 162 is to protect those who invested
in companies against directors who engaged in serious miscon-
duct. It further held that the provision protected those who dealt
with companies by seeking to ensure that the management of
companies is in the hands of capable people. Those who enjoy
the benefit of limited liability should not abuse their positions
(para [144]).
The argument that the absence of flexibility in regard to the
imposition of delinquency has the potential to infringe the right to
choose a trade or occupation and the right of access to courts,
failed (paras [146] [147]). In regard to the right to access to
courts, the court held that the court was involved in every stage of
the enquiry under section 162(5). It was the court that made the
findings on which a delinquency order would rest. Furthermore,
the exclusion was for a period of seven years but the court had a
discretion to relax this period after three years by placing the
person under probation (para [147]). Concerning the right to
choose a trade, occupation or profession, the court held that the
first and second appellants had not suggested that section
162(5) was either capricious or arbitrary. On that ground alone,
the constitutional challenge had to fail (para [146]).
Regarding the constitutional challenge based on the right to
dignity, the appellants argued that the right to dignity is infringed
as the terms of the statute do not permit the court to take the
individual directors’ circumstances and degree of blameworthi-
ness into account (para [150]). The court held that this could only
be argued if the rationality of the section was attacked, and this
was not the case.
(See also on this case R Cassim ‘Delinquent directors under
the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property
Limited 2016 ZASCA 35’ 2016 PER 19.)
It is clear from this case that:
• Conduct that occurred prior to the effective date of the 2008
Companies Act may be considered in an application under
section 162. This is indicated in item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the
2008 Companies Act. It is not clear how far back the conduct
can go. However, it appears that there is no time limit, as the
2008 Companies Act provides no guidelines or prescription
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period (see Cassim above on this point). The maximum period
within which an application under section 162(5) must be
instituted after the conduct occurred has not been specified.
• The court dismissed the argument that the absence of judicial
discretion regarding to the imposition of a delinquency order
renders the provision unconstitutional.
• The court held that section 162 was not a penal provision but
was aimed at protecting the public.
BUSINESS RESCUE
Business rescue plan
In Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd & another
2017 (4) SA 51 (WCC) the applicant, an employee of the
company under business rescue, instituted action against the
company and the business rescue practitioner for payment of
outstanding remuneration. The applicant’s outstanding remunera-
tion had been admitted as a preferent claim in the business
rescue plan. Section 133(1) of the 2008 Companies Act provides
that during business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding,
including enforcement action, against the company, or in relation
to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its
possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum,
except, as far as it is relevant here, with the written consent of the
practitioner or with the leave of the court and in accordance with
any terms the court considers suitable. The question was whether
the applicant had to obtain such leave from the court in a
separate substantive application before instituting the main appli-
cation, or whether the application for leave could be brought as
part of the main application. The court analysed the conflicting
judgments on this aspect (paras [30]-[38]). In Merchant West
Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies
and Engineering Company Ltd 13/12406 10 May 2013 (GSJ)
(para [67]); Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden NO
& others 18486/2013 14 June 2013 (GSJ) (para [71]); Elias
Mechanicos Building & Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Lim-
ited v Stedone Developments (Pty) Limited 2015 (4) SA 485
(KZD) and Msunduzi Municipality v Uphill Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd &
others [2015] JOL 33101 (para [8]), it was required that a
separate formal application be brought. On the other hand, in
African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (6) SA 471 (GNP), such
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application was allowed in the main application for the setting
aside of the business rescue plan. The court also pointed out that
if an applicant – as in Safari Thatching Lowveld CC v Misty
Mountain Trading 2 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (3) SA 209 (GP) – commenced
with an application to wind up the company, there was no need to
bring a substantive and separate application to proceed with the
application if the business rescue did not proceed or was
ineffective (para [54]). However, an application relating to the
business rescue plan itself, its development, adoption, and
implementation was not subject to section 133(1) (Moodley v On
Digital Media (Pty) Ltd & others 2014 (6) SA 279 (GJ) (para [10])).
This was so because such an application had to be instituted
against the company and the business rescue practitioner.
Section 133(1) only applies to legal proceedings against the
company. The court rejected the approach followed in Elias
Mechanicos Building & Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Lim-
ited and Moodley (above). Instead, it held that it would be wrong
to require that in every matter leave in terms of section 133(1) be
sought and obtained by way of a formal application, or that such
leave must always be sought by way of a separate, prior
application (para [54]). What would be sufficient would depend
on the circumstances of each particular matter and the court
would have to exercise its discretion in each case. In Arendse &
others v Van der Merwe & another NNO 2016 (6) SA 490 (GJ)
(para [11]) it was held that the court’s discretion, in this regard,
had to be exercised judicially, based on considerations of
convenience, fairness, and what would be in the interests of
justice (see 2016 Annual Survey 259 on the Arendse & others
case).
The court rejected the argument that section 133(1) did not
apply in respect of the adoption or implementation of the busi-
ness rescue plan (para [58]). It held that there was no reason why
the leave of the court should not be obtained to sanction any
proceedings brought in order to give effect to, or to implement,
the business rescue plan. Moreover, the court would have every
reason to consider whether to grant leave to proceed with such
proceedings in the interests of the company and the business
rescue to which it was subject, as the precipitous launch thereof
could well endanger the chances of the successful rehabilitation
of such a company if the proceedings were to be allowed. The
court stated that ‘it could never have been intended by the
legislature to exclude any and all legal proceedings that deal with
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the adoption or implementation of a business plan, from the
requirement of the consent of the business rescue practitioner or
the leave of the court’. However, a full bench in LA Sport 4X4
Outdoor CC & another v Broadsword Trading 20 (Pty) Limited &
others [2015] ZAGPPHC 78 paragraphs [35] and [36A] held that
the right to approach a court to set aside a voluntary business
rescue process initiated in terms of section 129 was not subject
to leave by the court (or consent of the practitioner). If this were
the case, the application for leave would, as a ‘legal proceeding’,
in itself also be subject to leave by the court ad infinitum. In
addition, the right to approach the court is an essential counter-
weight to the curtailment of the affected persons’ rights licensed
by the (unilateral) action by the company by way of a board
resolution. (See also Henochsberg 473.) The purpose of the
measures does not require section 130(1) to be subject to section
133(1). The contrary is correct. There is also no textual indication
that the right in section 130(1) is subject to section 133(1). The
court concluded that the business rescue practitioner could not
acquire a right to unilaterally amend the adopted business
rescue plan, as it would effectively circumvent the procedure set
out in the 2008 Companies Act in terms of which the claims,
which are to be discharged as per the rescue plan, derive their
binding force (para [67]).
BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Intertrans Oil SA (Pty) Ltd &
others 2017 (4) SA 592 (GJ) also addressed the issue of section
133(1) of the 2008 Companies Act. The case involved an
application for the winding-up of the respondent. A resolution to
place the respondent under business rescue had been adopted
but a business rescue plan had not yet adopted. It was con-
tended that separate a priori proceedings were required, by way
of a substantive application, to lift the moratorium before the
winding-up application could have been launched, and that
substance should trump form, particularly as leave to institute
proceedings and the merits were so intertwined (para [26]). The
court held that where the main relief to be sought related to the
very status which invoked the moratorium protection, it seemed
overly technical to insist on two distinct applications as opposed
to one application with two (sets of) prayers: one for permission,
and one for the substantive relief (para [27]). The court, in that
case, allowed one application. The court’s decision was also
based on the decision of the full bench in the LA Sport 4X4
Outdoor CC & another case. The business rescue practitioner
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had suspended all the obligations of Intertrans in terms of the
contract with the applicant (supplier). The applicant disputed the
entitlement of the business rescue practitioner to do so while at
the same time insisting on performance by the applicant of its
reciprocal obligations in terms of that agreement. The key
question related to the application of section 136 of the 2008
Companies Act, which was the basis of the business rescue
practitioner’s actions. The relevant part of section 136 provides:
(1) Despite any provision of an agreement to the contrary –
. . .
(2) Subject to subsection (2A), and despite any provision of an
agreement to the contrary, during business rescue proceedings,
the practitioner may –
(a) entirely, partially or conditionally suspend, for the duration of
the business rescue proceedings, any obligation of the
company that –
(i) arises under an agreement to which the company was a
party at the commencement of the business rescue
proceedings; and
(ii) would otherwise become due during those proceed-
ings; or. . .
The court held that the language conferring the power of
suspension was, on the face of it, clear and that ‘any’ is
notoriously a word of wide, if not unlimited, import (para [37]).
Therefore, ‘any obligation of the company’ would, at least prima
facie and unless any absurdity was thrown up, include obliga-
tions that were contractually tied with a reciprocal obligation of
the creditor. The court stated:
Also, since the section is silent about the effect that the suspension
has on such an obligation, and since the legislature knew and knows
the residual law of contract, it must be accepted that the creditor has
available, subject to the normal rules, the exceptio non adimpleti
contractus and, again, if the normal rules of materiality and contractual
notices apply, the creditor also has available the normal rights of
cancellation (para [38]).
It was, therefore, held that the suspension of all Intertrans’s
obligations entitled the applicant to withhold the product, access
to the premises, and access to the equipment. The applicant
could also cancel the branded distribution agreement, provided
the appropriate notices were given. However, the applicant could
not simply ignore the suspension and insist on performance
contrary to it (para [40]).
Intertrans had also ceded its book debts to the applicant as
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security. The question was whether the cession of book debts
continued to operate in respect of debts that arose from sales
concluded during business rescue. Section 134(3) of the 2008
Companies Act provides:
If, during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the company
wishes to dispose of any property over which another person has any
security or title interest, the company must –
(a) obtain the prior consent of that other person, unless the proceeds
of the disposal would be sufficient to fully discharge the indebted-
ness protected by that person’s security or title interest; and
(b) promptly –
(i) pay to that other person the sale proceeds attributable to that
property up to the amount of the company’s indebtedness to
that other person; or
(ii) provide security for the amount of those proceeds, to the
reasonable satisfaction of that other person.
The court posed the question as to how the security could be
preserved if the debtor’s obligations to the creditor were sus-
pended (para [44]). It concluded that section 136(2A)(c) expressly
created a suspended provision of an agreement relating to
security, and provided that it ‘continues to apply for the purpose
of section 134, with respect to any proposed disposal of property
by the company’. However, according to the court, that provision
had to be be applied in the context of the applicable law which
provided that security cession of future book debts was complete
and effective by mere initial agreement. When at the future date
the book debts came into existence, then, without more and
without any further obligation of the cedent, they became the
property of the cessionary (para [45]). No further obligation on
the part of the cedent existed or was required to be performed for
the debt to become subjected to the rights of the cessionary.
There was, therefore, no obligation for Intertrans arising from the
cession of book debts that was capable of being suspended,
even if the right of the cessionary to enforce the debts arose only
in business rescue (para [46]). The court pointed out that in terms
of section 130(1)(a)(ii), read with section 130(5)(a)(i), a business
rescue resolution could be set aside if there was no ‘reasonable
prospect’ of rescuing the company (para [71]). With reference to
Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd & others v Farm Bothasfon-
tein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) para-
graphs [29]ff, the court summarised the test for ‘reasonable
prospect’ to mean ‘something less than a reasonable probability;
something more than a prima facie case; something more than an
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arguable possibility; a prospect based on reasonable grounds;
and mere speculative suggestion is not enough’. In the circum-
stances of the case, the court found that there was no such
reasonable prospect and it granted the winding-up order. The
court added that the court hearing such an application could
also, under section 130(5)(a)(ii), set aside the resolution if, having
regard to all of the evidence, the court considered that it was
otherwise ‘just and equitable’ to do so. However, it should be
noted that, in contrast to Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd & another v
Nel & others NNO 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA) (2015 Annual Survey
263), the ‘just and equitable’ ground was apparently still accepted
as a separate ground in terms of section 130(5).
Section 134 of the 2008 Companies Act was also discussed in
Energydrive Systems (Pty) Ltd v Tin Can Man (Pty) Ltd & others
2017 (3) SA 539 (GJ). The applicant had sold movable assets to
the company under a ‘reservation of ownership’ clause. The
company subsequently went into business rescue. The business
rescue practitioner of the company sold those movable assets to
the respondent. The applicant instituted an application in the
form of a rei vindicatio as the assets had been sold in contraven-
tion of section 134(3). The court noted that the term ‘title interest’
differed from ‘security’, and was not defined in the 2008 Compa-
nies Act. However, the court pointed out that the difficulty in
defining ‘title interest’ did not provide a valid reason to disregard
the use of that term by the legislature as an alternative to ‘security’
(para [13]). It held that, like ‘security’, ‘title interest’ was something
which safeguarded the payment of the indebtedness due to the
creditor of the company under business rescue. The court
therefore found (para [16]) that:
In South Africa it is not unusual for creditors to safeguard their rights
by way of reservation of ownership clauses in contracts such as
contracts for the sale of goods where the purchase price is paid over
time. The use of the word title as a synonym or alternative for
ownership is also not unusual; for example, ownership of immovable
property is based on a title deed. In my view the term ‘title interest’
would include a reservation of ownership clause such as the one in the
lease between the applicant and the second respondent.
The court did not consider the obligation to pay or secure the
debt as a mere personal right against the practitioner. The effect
of such an interpretation would be to destroy the agreed security
or ownership and replace it with a personal right against the
practitioner. Therefore, the court interpreted the obligation to
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promptly pay or secure the debt and the consideration as a
requirement for the valid transfer of ownership by the practitioner
by way of a sale and delivery in terms of section 134 without
consent of the creditor. It held that the rights of the creditor would
only be terminated on payment or provision of other security
(para [20]). If the practitioner did not pay or secure the debt due
to the applicant, the applicant would remain the owner of the
equipment and would be entitled to institute a rei vindicatio (para
[21]).
Firstrand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) [2017]
3 All SA 1 (SCA) was an appeal from KJ Foods CC v First National
Bank [2015] ZAGPPHC 221. The appellant, a creditor holding
29,81 per cent of the voting interest, voted against the adoption of
a business rescue. Consequently, the business rescue plan was
rejected as the 75 per cent of the creditors voting interests
required to approve the business rescue plan had not been
obtained. The parties reached an agreement but the appellant
did not withdraw as it was agreed that the industry would greatly
benefit from the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in the
matter. Section 153(1)(a) of the 2008 Companies Act provides, as
far as it is relevant here,
[i]f a business rescue plan has been rejected . . . the practitioner may
–
(i) seek a vote of approval from the holders of voting interests to
prepare and publish a revised plan; or
(ii) advise the meeting that the company will apply to a court to set
aside the result of the vote by the holders of voting interests or
shareholders, as the case may be, on the ground that it was
inappropriate.’
Section 153(7) in turn provides:
(i) On an application contemplated in subsection (i)(a)(ii), . . ., a
court may order that the vote on a business rescue plan be set
aside if the court is satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so,
having regard to–
(a) the interests represented by the person or persons who
voted against the proposed business rescue plan;
(b) the provision, if any, made in the proposed business rescue
plan with respect to the interests of that person or those
persons; and
(c) a fair and reasonable estimate of the return to that person, or
those persons, if the company were to be liquidated.
The question was whether the court should first determine
whether the vote was inappropriate and, if so, invoke section
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153(7) to determine whether the vote should be set aside. Various
cases, for example, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Berryplum
Retailers CC [2015] ZAGPPHC 255 and Ex parte Target Shelf 284
CC [2015] ZAGPPHC 740, favoured the two-step approach – an
approach which was also followed by the minority judgment of
Seriti JA. However, Schoeman AJA, delivering the majority judg-
ment, held:
It is clear that s 153(1)(a)(ii) and s 153(1)(b)(i)(bb) are inextricably
linked to s 153(7). On an application to set aside the result of a vote in
terms of any of these subsections, the court is enjoined by s 153(7) to
determine only whether it is reasonable and just to set aside the
particular vote, taking into account the factors set out in s 153(7)(a)–
(c) and all circumstances relevant to the case, including the purpose
of business rescue in terms of the Act. Put differently, the vote would
be set aside on application on the grounds that its result was
inappropriate, if it is reasonable and just to do so in terms of s 153(7).
To my mind this entails a single enquiry and a value judgment (para
[80]).
Although the court accepted the dictionary definition of ‘inappro-
priate’ as meaning ‘not suitable or proper in the circumstances’, it
is notable that the court did not determine the meaning of that
term, particularly in the context of the purpose of business rescue
in terms of section 7(k) (para [78]). It merely held that the vote
would be ‘inappropriate’ if it was reasonable and just to set it
aside in terms of section 153(7). Considering that the appellant
would still be paid in full, albeit not immediately, the court
concluded that it was reasonable and just to set aside its vote
against the approval of the business plan.
Section 153(1)(a)(ii) provides for the setting aside of the ‘result
of the vote’, while section 153(7) refers to an ‘order that the vote’
(not the result) be set aside. The question arose as to whether the
business rescue plan had to be put to the vote again at the
resumption of the postponed meeting. That, according to the
court, did not result in a businesslike interpretation, for if the
creditor who voted against the adoption of the business rescue
plan were to vote once more against it, the whole process would
start all over again (para [88]). The court held that the 2008
Companies Act clearly did not provide for another round of
voting. The businesslike interpretation was, therefore, that the
vote rejecting the business rescue plan having been set aside, it
followed by operation of law that the business rescue plan would
be considered to have been adopted and no further voting was
envisaged.
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The position of a surety in business rescue was considered in
an application for summary judgment in Nedbank Ltd v Zevoli
208 (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (6) SA 318 (KZP). The facts were that
the second, third and fourth defendants (‘sureties’) bound them-
selves as sureties and co-principal debtors for the debt of the first
defendant, Zevoli 208 (Pty) Ltd. The first defendant breached the
terms of the loan contract with the consequence that the full
outstanding loan and interest became due and payable. The first
defendant, however, voluntarily resolved to commence business
rescue in terms of section 129 of the 2008 Companies Act. The
effect was that the plaintiff was precluded in terms of section
133(1), unless certain conditions were complied with, from pro-
ceeding against the first defendant. The sureties claimed that that
they were also entitled to the moratorium under section 133(1).
Various previous judgments have been given on this matter. The
court referred to Desert Star Trading 145 (Pty) Ltd & another v No
11 Flamboyant Edleen CC & another 2011 (2) SA 266 (SCA),
where it was held that the surety could use the defences which
were available to the principal debtor, barring defences of a
personal nature. It further referred to Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns
2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC), where it was held that the statutory
moratorium in terms of section 133(1) was for the benefit of the
company and was, therefore, a defence in personam which did
not protect the surety. Reference was also made to New Port
Finance Company (Pty) Ltd & another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (5) SA
503 (SCA), where it was stated that the creditor could, upon
default of the debtor, directly sue the surety who was bound as
surety and co-principal debtor and there was no authority for the
proposition that a compromise of the principal debtor’s liability,
whether as a result of business rescue or otherwise, would
accrue to the surety after judgment had been taken against him
(see 2016 Annual Survey 261). The sureties also claimed that the
creditor could not pursue its claim against the first defendant in
the future, ie, after business rescue proceedings. In this regard,
the court referred to Investec Bank Ltd (above), where it was
stated that if, at a later stage, the creditor recovered from the
original debtor and the principal debt had been discharged or
reduced before judgment against the surety, then the surety was
entitled to claim the benefit of the discharge or reduction. Where
the creditor recovers in full from the surety, the surety takes the
creditor’s place by virtue of the surety’s right of recourse against
the principal debtor. In such a situation the surety would be
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entitled to consider a compromise of the claim against the
principal debtor. The court also affirmed, with reference to
Investec Bank Ltd, that section 133(1) was only for the benefit of
the company and that if the legislature had intended to preclude
enforcement of claims against sureties of companies in business
rescue, it would have done so in the 2008 Companies Act (see
also Henochsberg 536(8F)).
The case of Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd & others v
GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd (Esterhuizen & another intervening) 2017
(3) SA 74 (WCC) dealt with an application for winding-up, with an
intervening application for business rescue. The court rejected
the statement in Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty)
Ltd v Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty)
Ltd & another [2013] ZAGPPHC 109 paragraph [8] that a
company could not be placed under business rescue if it was
already ‘insolvent’. Instead, the court held that the definition of
‘financially distressed’ in section 128(1) of the 2008 Companies
Act merely created a threshold and that current commercial or
factual insolvency was not a prerequisite. It did not follow that,
because the company was already commercially or factually
insolvent and therefore obviously financially distressed, it could
no longer be the subject of business rescue. Such an interpreta-
tion would, according to the court, be inconsistent with section
5(1) read with section 7 of the 2008 Companies Act, particularly
subsections 7(d) and (k), as it would oblige the court to liquidate
a company even though there might have been a reasonable
prospect of rescuing it. The court highlighted that in Oakdene
Square Properties (Pty) Ltd & others v Farm Bothasfontein
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA), commercial
insolvency was regarded as ‘financial distress’ and that there was
no reason why factual insolvency should be treated differently.
However, the court said it did not matter whether factual insol-
vency fell outside the scope of the definition of ‘financial distress’
because the two legs of the definition were disjunctive – one or
the other sufficed. (See also Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty)
Ltd & others (para [16]).) The insolvency of the company would
not be a bar to business rescue as, in terms of section 131(4)(a)(iii),
the court could grant a business rescue order if it was just and
equitable to do so for financial reasons, irrespective of whether
the company was ‘financially distressed’.
The key issue in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Gas 2
Liquids (Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) SA 56 (GJ) related to the meaning and
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application of section 131(6) of the 2008 Companies Act. Section
131(6) provides that an application to court for an order placing a
company under supervision and commencing business rescue
proceedings will suspend liquidation proceedings at the time
when the business rescue application is made (para [1]). The
respondent was placed under provisional liquidation and on the
return day the applicant creditor applied for a final liquidation
order. At the close of the argument, the respondent debtor
presented an application by a third party for the respondent to be
placed under supervision and for business rescue proceedings
to commence in terms of the 2008 Companies Act. The question
was whether the issue, out of court, of the business rescue
application had the effect of suspending the liquidation proceed-
ings. In Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) and
Blue Star Holdings (Pty) Ltd v West Coast Oyster Growers CC
2013 (6) SA 540 (WCC), it was pointed out that there was always
the possibility that a business rescue application might be used
by an obstructive debtor intent on avoiding the obviously inevi-
table liquidation (para [5]). The respondent argued that a busi-
ness rescue application was made by the mere issue out of court
of the notice of motion in the business rescue application. On the
other hand, the applicant contended that for such application to
have been properly ‘made’, service had to have been effected
upon both the company and the Companies and Intellectual
Property Commission (the CIPC). In addition, according to the
applicant, all reasonable steps need to have been taken to
identify affected persons and their addresses, and to deliver the
application to them (para [11]). Cases such as the Blue Star
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (above) indicate that a business rescue
application was ‘made’ with the lodging of the business rescue
application with the registrar for the issue thereof. The court
distinguished this case as there was no provisional winding-up
order or an appointment of a provisional liquidator. In Taboo
Trading 232 (Pty) Ltd v Pro Wreck Scrap Metal CC & others 2013
(6) SA 141 (KZP), which also concerned a liquidation application,
it was held that a business rescue application was only to be
regarded as having been made once the application had been
lodged with the registrar, had been duly issued, a copy thereof
served on the CIPC, and each affected person had been properly
notified of the application (see also Absa Bank Ltd v Summer
Lodge (Pty) Ltd 2013 (5) SA444 (GNP)). Although neither of these
cases dealt with a provisional winding-up where a provisional
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liquidator had been appointed, the court chose to follow the dicta
in these cases (para [26]) for the reason that if there was no
service of the application on the provisional liquidator, he or she
would not officially know of the suspension of his or her duties and
powers, and would carry them out in ignorance (paras [23] [24]).
He or she would be acting without authority (and perhaps
unlawfully) in a multiplicity of respects, a consequence which the
legislature could not have intended (para [25]). The court,
therefore, concluded that there had to be service and notification
as provided in section 131 before a business rescue application
could be said to have been ‘made’ and before the liquidation
proceedings could be said to have been suspended (para [26]).
JUST AND EQUITABLE WINDING-UP
In Minister of Environmental Affairs v Recycling and Economic
Development Initiative of South Africa NPC; Minister of Environ-
mental Affairs v Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd [2017] 4 All SA
783 (WCC), the Minister of Environment Affairs (the Minister)
brought ex parte applications for the final liquidation of two
entities which were in provisional liquidation. The respondent in
the first application, Recycling and Economic Development Initia-
tive of South Africa NPC (Redisa), had been appointed to
implement a waste tyre management process in terms of the
Waste Tyre Regulations (GN R 149 of 2009). Redisa was regis-
tered as a non-profit company and was, according to the
Minister, also an organ of state engaged in the administration and
implementation of subordinate legislation and with an indepen-
dent board. Redisa appointed the respondent in the second
application, Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd (KT), as its manage-
ment company. KT had complete executive control. Erdmann,
who was the CEO of Redisa, owned 80 per cent of the shares in
Nine Years Investments (Pty) Ltd (NYI). NYI, in turn, held 75 per
cent of the shares in KT. The other executive directors had
shareholding in KT through Avranet (Pty) Ltd (Avranet). The legal
nature of the ‘Redisa Plan’ as an ‘integrated industry waste tyre
management plan’ was described by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Retail Motor Industry Organisation & another v Minister
of Water and Environmental Affairs & another 2014 (3) SA 251
(SCA) paragraphs [30]–[32] as an instrument of subordinate
legislation which came into legal existence or force after Ministe-
rial approval of the Redisa Plan under the Waste Tyre Regulations
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(para [18]). There were certain statutory amendments, the effect
of which was that a tyre tax or an environmental levy on tyres was
introduced for collection by the SARS. As a result, Redisa was no
longer charged with the responsibility of collecting its contribu-
tion from tyre producers or importers in South Africa in terms of
the Redisa Plan (paras [23] [24]). The court had granted the
Minister leave, in terms of section 157(1)(d) of the 2008 Compa-
nies Act, to bring the ex parte application for the provisional and
final winding-up of the respondents in terms of section 81(1)(c)(ii)
or 81(1)(d)(iii). It had also granted an order for the provisional
liquidation of both respondents (para [4]). On the return day the
respondents opposed the granting of a final winding-up order on
the grounds that the Minister did not have locus standi to bring
the application, the application should not have been brought on
an ex parte basis, and it would not be just and equitable to wind
up the respondents (paras [8] [9]).
The Minister contended that it was just and equitable to wind
up the respondents. In respect of Redisa, the ground for seeking
the winding-up was that Redisa had set up a management
company, KT, to handle all operational aspects of the plan.
Furthermore, instead of implementing the Redisa Plan with an
independent board, Redisa had handed the complete executive
control of the Redisa Plan over to KT (para [27]). Erdmann
directly controlled KT as the majority shareholder in NYI, which
owned KT (the other executive directors had shareholdings in KT
throughAvranet). He was, therefore, directly remunerated through
his majority shareholding. This, according to the Minister, was in
direct contravention of the 2008 Companies Act and Redisa’s
MOI. This interest had not been disclosed (para [32]). In respect
of KT, the grounds for seeking the liquidation were that KT and
Redisa were involved in a scheme to divert public funds ear-
marked for the advancement of a specific environmental objec-
tive. Those funds would be diverted by way of management fees
to KT. It was further contended that Redisa’s executive directors
had abused KT’s corporate identity to achieve this goal (para
[44]). KT and Redisa were also, for all intents and purposes, a
single entity. In addition, the cessation of business by Redisa
would mean the substratum of KT would disappear as KT existed
to manage the business of Redisa (paras [43] [50]). (See also Kia
Intertrade Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd v Infinite Motors (Pty) Ltd
[1999] 2 All SA 268 (W) and Henochsberg 329.) In terms of item
1(3) of Schedule 1 to the 2008 Companies Act a non-profit
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company must not, directly or indirectly, pay any portion of its
income or transfer any of its assets, regardless of how the income
or asset was derived, to any person who is or was an incorporator
of the company, or who is a member or director, or person
appointing a director, of the company, except as reasonable
remuneration for goods delivered or services rendered to, or at
the direction of, the company, or as payment of, or reimburse-
ment for, expenses incurred to advance a stated object of the
company. In Hülse-Reutter & others v Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336
(SCA) paragraph [20], the test as to whether it would be
appropriate to pierce the corporate veil was formulated as
follows: ‘[T]here must at least be some misuse or abuse of the
distinction between the corporate entity and those who control it
which results in an unfair advantage afforded to the latter’ (see
also Henochsberg 89). The court held that there was clearly a
misuse or abuse of the distinction between the corporate identity
of KT, NYI, and Avranet and those who controlled it – such as
Erdmann and the other executive directors of Redisa – which
resulted in their receiving an unfair advantage (para [152]). It was
unlawful that, as directors of Redisa, they indirectly received
income to which they were not entitled in terms of Redisa’s MOI
and item 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the 2008 Companies Act. In terms
of section 239 of the Constitution, an ‘organ of state’ is any
functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing
a public function in terms of any legislation. The court found that
Redisa’s MOI required it to carry out its functions for the benefit
of, or in a way that is widely accessible to, the general public or
any section thereof. Redisa was, therefore, an organ of state
(para [157]) and the moneys it collected were public funds (para
[163]).
Concerning the question whether the Minister had the neces-
sary locus standi to bring the application for the winding-up of the
respondents in terms of section 81 of the 2008 Companies Act, it
was clear that section 81 did not directly grant the Minister the
necessary standing to bring an application for the winding-up of
solvent companies. The court held that the category or catego-
ries of persons or entities that could bring such an application
was restricted in terms of section 81. These were: the company
itself; its directors and shareholders; a business rescue practitio-
ner; a creditor where the company’s business rescue proceed-
ings have ended in the manner contemplated in section 132(2) of
the 2008 Companies Act; the CPIC; or the Takeover Panel under
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the conditions and circumstances set out in section 81 (paras
[165] [166]). With reference to Natal Joint Municipal Pension
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) paragraph
[20], the court rejected as absurd and nonsensical the respon-
dents’ submission that section 157(1)(d), merely because it is
listed under Chapter 7 of the 2008 Companies Act dealing with
remedies and enforcement, does not extend to other applications
that may be brought in terms of the 2008 Companies Act,
especially applications under section 81(1) (paras [167] [169]). It
held that the title of section 157 also clearly intended to extend
locus standi to the categories of persons referred to in section
157(1)(a) to (d) to bring applications or matters before a court in
terms of other provisions of the 2008 Companies Act in instances
where such a person or persons does or do not otherwise have
such standing. The provision gives effect to one of the stated
goals of the 2008 Companies Act: to promote compliance with
the Bill of Rights in the sphere of company law. This goal,
according to the court, accords with section 39(2) of the Consti-
tution, which influenced the formulation of section 157, which in
turn resembles section 38 of the Constitution (para [174]). The
Redisa Plan, which the Minister adopted, could be regarded as ‘a
reasonable legislative and other measure[s] to prevent pollution
and ecological degradation’, which clearly gives effect to the
constitutional obligation placed upon the Minister by section 24 of
the Constitution. Therefore, the Minister, apart from the public
interest, had a direct interest in the litigation. However, given the
allegations of impropriety levelled against Redisa as an organ of
state, the interests of justice or the public interest compelled the
court to scrutinise the action even where the Minister’s standing
was questionable (para [182]). Neither Mukaddam v Pioneer
Foods (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (5) SA 89 (CC) nor Children’s
Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 (2) SA 213
(SCA) referred to the extended standing on the basis of public
interest being sought. Those cases also did not require that prior
leave be sought in such instances. In granting the respective
provisional applications, the judges had adequate grounds to
grant the orders (paras [188] [191]). It would be unduly onerous,
in most urgent applications brought on motion, to bring a
separate substantive motion for certification. Such an approach
would be absurd and not in the interests of justice if, in the
determination of the merits of the application, a court had to
decide whether extended standing should be granted as a
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matter of course (para [189] and see Justice Chris Jafta ‘Critical
analysis of the extended legal standing provisions under section
157(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to apply for legal
remedies’ (2015) 1 (Issue 2) The Journal of Corporate and
Commercial Law & Practice 35).
In respect of the ex parte application, it was held that the courts
were loath to grant orders against a party on an ex parte basis,
and would as a rule discourage litigation by stealth or ambush
unless there were compelling reasons to allow it. Matters could
be brought ex parte in a limited number of situations only. One of
these situations would be where immediate relief was sought,
even though of temporary nature, because of imminent harm that
would ensure should the relief not be granted. In respect of both
the application against Redisa and KT, the court was satisfied
that the Minister had made out a sufficient case why the applica-
tions should be brought ex parte. It was clear that urgent and
drastic action on the part of the Minister and the Department had
to be taken after they had been made aware of the conduct of
Erdmann and the other directors of Redisa, as well as how funds
had been spirited away to KT.
The court granted the Minister extended standing in terms of
section 157(1)(d). Consequently, if an application is brought
under section 81(1)(c), the Minister must be substituted as one of
the parties who can bring the application. The court determined
that the application by the Minister would, in such a case, be
regarded as one brought by a creditor (para [202]). If the
application was brought under section 81(1)(d), the application
by the Minister would then be regarded as one brought by the
company, one or more of its directors, or one or more of its
shareholders (para [203]).
The categories of the ‘just and equitable’ ground were stated in
Rand Air (Pty) Ltd v Ray Bester Investments (Pty) Ltd 1985 (2) SA
345 (W) and were summarised by the court (para [102]) as: (1)
the disappearance of the company’s substratum; (2) illegality of
the objects of the company and fraud in connection therewith; (3)
a deadlock in the management of the company’s affairs; (4)
grounds analogous to those for the dissolution of a partnership;
and (5) oppression. The court held that it was trite that these
categories do not constitute any kind of numerus clausus and it
was left open to the courts to devise other categories in future,
and the court referred to Kia Intertrade Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd v
Infinite Motors (Pty) Ltd [1999] 2 All SA 268 (W) (paras [204]
302 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 39 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/09−Corporate−Law
[206]). With reference to Pienaar v Thusano Foundation 1992 (2)
SA 552 (BGD), the court held that in considering whether to grant
a final winding-up order on the ground that it was just and
equitable to do so, the court had to be satisfied that the applicant
had established this on a balance of probabilities. In addition, the
court had to exercise a judicial discretion based on the broad
principles of law, justice, and equity (paras [210] [211]). In its final
analysis, the court considered, among other factors, the acri-
mony between the Minister and Redisa, and by extension KT, as
to the manner in which Redisa should be funded; a deadlock and
breach of trust between the Minister and Redisa about funding;
and the unlawful misappropriation of public funds by the direc-
tors of Redisa that could continue if further funding were to be
provided by National Treasury. The court concluded that it was
just and equitable to wind Redisa up under section 81(1)(c)(ii) or
section 81(1)(d)(iii) (paras [215] [216]). The factors that the court
considered in relation to whether it was just and equitable to wind
KT up were that if Redisa ceased operations, the KT’s substratum
would disappear, and that KT had been complicit in the misappro-
priation of funds in direct contravention of item 1(3) of Schedule 1
to the 2008 Companies Act and the MOI of Redisa. It had acted
as a vehicle through which the money had been misappro-
priated. It was, therefore, just and equitable to wind KT up under
section 81(1)(c)(ii) or section 81(1)(d)(iii) (paras [217] [218]).
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CRIMINAL LAW
SV HOCTOR*
LEGISLATION
HIGHER EDUCATION AMENDMENT ACT 9 OF 2016
This Act amends the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 in
various respects. Insofar as criminal liability is concerned, in
terms of section 39 of this Act, section 66(1A) has been inserted
(with effect from 22 September 2017) in the Higher EducationAct,
which provides for a new offence. This offence, which is punish-
able by a sentence which may be imposed for fraud, is commit-
ted by any person contravening the provisions of section 51
(relating to the unregistered and non-prescribed provision of
higher education by a local juristic person or foreign juristic
person) or section 65D (relating to the offering, awarding or
conferring of an unregistered degree, or an unregistered higher
education diploma or an unregistered higher education certifi-
cate).
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE AMENDMENT ACT 1 OF 2017
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 has been
amended by this Act, which commenced on 13 June 2017. There
is a notable trend in this Act to transform criminal penalties into
administrative sanctions, and to give legislative effect to United
Nations Security Council resolutions. Hence the insertion of a new
offence contained in section 49A in the principal Act, which
provides that anyone who contravenes a provision of section 26B
is guilty of an offence. Section 26B, which has been inserted in
the principal Act by this Act, although it has yet to commence,
prohibits the use or provision of property, financial or other
service, or economic support in contravention of a resolution of
the Security Council of the United Nations. The form of mens rea
required for criminal liability encompasses both intent (‘knows’)
and negligence (‘ought reasonably to have known’).
* BA LLB LLM (Cape Town) DJuris (Leiden) PG Dip (Latin) (Wales Trinity Saint
David). Advocate of the High Court of South Africa and Professor of Law at the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT 4 OF 2017
This Act, which came into force on 29 June 2017, amends
certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
relating to the accused’s capacity to understand legal proceed-
ings, mental illness, and criminal responsibility. While the proce-
dural amendments to sections 77 to 79 are more properly
discussed in the Criminal Procedure and Sentencing chapters, it
may be noted, in the context of the substantive criminal law, that
section 78 has been amended by the substitution of the term
‘intellectual disability’ for the erstwhile term ‘mental defect’. Whilst
this terminological change does not change the ambit of the
provision, it reflects a growing sensitivity to the use of descriptors
which can be regarded as pejorative.
PROTECTED DISCLOSURES AMENDMENT ACT 5 OF 2017
This Act, which commenced on 2 August 2017 makes certain
changes to the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, including
the insertion of section 9B (in terms of s 10 of the Amendment
Act). Section 9B provides for the creation of a new offence of
disclosure of false information, where an employee or worker
who, knowing that certain information is false or who ought
reasonably to have known that such information is false, intention-
ally discloses such false information, with the intention to cause
harm to the affected party, and where the affected party suffers
harm as a result of such disclosure. The formulation of the offence
indicates the need for actual harm to occur to the affected party,
as a result of a disclosure which intentionally seeks to harm such
party. Dolus eventualis would suffice in this regard. It is further
notable that liability may follow such disclosure where the informa-
tion is known to be false, which is consistent with the requirement
that the harm be intentionally inflicted, but, further, that liability
may follow where the accused merely ‘ought reasonably to have
known’ about the falsity of the information. It is hard to reconcile
this extension of liability into the realms of negligence with the
balance of the provision, which is structured in terms of subjec-
tive liability. Surely, once again, liability should be limited to dolus
eventualis, ie, the accused should at least foresee the possibility
of the falsity of the information before proceeding to disclose it?
Institution of a prosecution under this provision is dependent
on the written authorisation of the Director of Public Prosecutions,
which may be delegated. In terms of section 9A of the Protected
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Disclosures Act (also inserted in terms of s 10 of the Amendment
Act), criminal liability may be excluded for a protected disclosure,
despite that disclosure being prohibited by ‘any other law, oath,
contract, practice or agreement requiring him or her to maintain
confidentiality or otherwise restricting the disclosure of the infor-
mation with respect to a matter’.
COURTS OF LAW AMENDMENT ACT 7 OF 2017
This Act, inter alia, amends the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of
1944 by inserting (in terms of s 13) new offences relating to
judgments, emoluments attachment orders, and instalment orders,
contained in section 106C of the Act. In terms of this provision,
the operation of which has yet to commence, it is an offence for
any person to require the applicant to consent to a judgment or
any instalment order or emoluments attachment order prior to the
granting of the loan (s 106C(1)). Moreover, it is an offence for any
person fraudulently to obtain or issue a judgment, or any instal-
ment order or emoluments attachment order in terms of this Act
(s 106C(2)).
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION ACT 9 OF 2017
ThisAct (which did not commence in 2017) seeks to provide for
a system of financial regulation and enforcement in South Africa.
In terms of section 7 of this Act, its objective is to achieve a stable
financial system that works in the interests of financial customers,
and that supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in
the Republic, by establishing, in conjunction with the specific
financial sector laws, a regulatory and supervisory framework
which promotes (a) financial stability; (b) the safety and sound-
ness of financial institutions; (c) the fair treatment and protection
of financial customers; (d) the efficiency and integrity of the
financial system; (e) the prevention of financial crime; (f) financial
inclusion; (g) transformation of the financial sector; and (h)
confidence in the financial system. These goals are to be
achieved, in part, by the application of the criminal law. In this
regard, the Act creates a number of offences.
First, there are a number of offences which enforce the duties
attaching to the members and staff of certain bodies. Hence, a
member of the Prudential Committee or of a subcommittee
established in terms of section 45(1) of the Act is required to act
honestly in all matters relating to the Prudential Authority, to
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perform the functions of office as a member in good faith, for a
proper purpose, and with the degree of care and diligence that a
reasonable person in the member’s position would exercise
(s 46(1), read with s 265 of the Act). Further, a person who is or
has been a member of the Prudential Committee or of a subcom-
mittee established in terms of section 45(1) of theAct may not use
that position or any information obtained as such a member to
benefit himself or herself or another person improperly; impede
the Prudential Authority’s ability to perform its functions; or cause
improper detriment to another person (s 46(2), read with s 265 of
the Act). Similar duties (to those set out in s 46(2)) apply to
persons who are or have been staff members of the Prudential
Authority (s 52(1), read with s 265 of the Act). The terms ‘benefit’
and ‘detriment’ are not limited to financial benefit or detriment in
respect of these provisions (s 46(3); s 52(2)). Similarly, the Com-
missioner, each Deputy Commissioner, and each member of a
subcommittee of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (estab-
lished as contemplated in s 51(1)(a)(ii) of the Public Finance
Management Act or of s 68 of this Act) is required to act honestly
in all matters relating to the Financial Sector Conduct Authority;
and to perform the functions of office as a member in good faith,
for a proper purpose, and with the degree of care and diligence
that a reasonable person in the member’s position would exer-
cise (s 69(1), read with s 265 of the Act). Further, such a person
may not use that position or any information obtained as such a
member improperly to benefit himself or herself or another
person; impede the Financial Sector Conduct Authority’s ability to
perform its functions; or cause improper detriment to another
person (s 69(2), read with s 265 of the Act). Similar duties (to
those set out in s 69(2)) apply to persons who are or have been
staff members of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (s 74(1),
read with s 265 of the Act). The terms ‘benefit’ and ‘detriment’ are
not limited to financial benefit or detriment in respect of these
provisions (s 69(3); s 74(2)). Similarly, a member of the Board of
the Ombud Council is required to act honestly in all matters
relating to the Ombud Council; and to perform the functions of
office as a member in good faith, for a proper purpose, and with
the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person in the
member’s position would exercise (s 189(1), read with s 270(1) of
the Act). Further, such a person may not use that position or any
information obtained as such a member improperly to benefit
himself or herself or another person; impede the Ombud Coun-
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cil’s ability to perform its functions; or cause improper detriment
to another person (s 189(2), read with s 270(1) of the Act). Similar
duties (to those set out in s 189(2)) apply to persons who are or
have been staff members of the Ombud Council (s 192(1), read
with s 270(10 of the Act). The terms ‘benefit’ and ‘detriment’ are
not limited to financial benefit or detriment in respect of these
provisions (s 189(3); s 192(2)).
In addition to these offences, the Act provides for further
offences which criminalise failure to comply with licensing require-
ments (s 111 read with s 266); failure by a supervised entity (ie, in
terms of s 1, each of: a licensed financial institution, a person with
whom a licensed financial institution has entered into an outsourc-
ing arrangement, and a representative of a financial institution) to
assist in providing specified information (s 131(1)(b) read with
s 267(1)), or to provide a specified business document in the
context of a supervisory on-site inspection (s 134(a)(iii)) read with
s 267(2), (3)); interference in a supervisory on-site inspection
(s 133 read with s 267(4)); interference with an investigation
(s 139 read with s 267(5)); failure to comply with a regulator’s
directive (s149(1) read with s 268(1)); failure to comply with a
debarment order issued by the responsible authority for a
financial sector law, or contracting with someone under such an
order (a debarment order prohibits a person from being involved
in the provision of financial products or services, or performing
certain roles in a financial institution – s 153(4) read with s 268(2),
(3)), or as an employer of someone subject to such order, failing
to give effect to such order (s 153(5) read with s 268(4)), or
engaging in conduct which violates a debarment order issued by
the Ombud Council, or contracting with someone under such an
order (s 205(8) read with s 270(3), (4)); failure to comply with a
directive of the Ombud Council (s 202(11) read with s 270(2));
failure to provide the Ombud Council with specified information
(s 207(2) read with s 270(5)); restrictions on financial institutions
in relation to ombud schemes (s 210 read with s 270(6)); failure
by a financial institution to comply with the governing rules of the
recognised industry ombud scheme (s 215 read with s 270(7));
failure adequately to report, in the context of an ombud scheme,
Ombud Council, or ombud (s 217 read with s 270(8)); and
offences related to proceedings in the Financial Services Tribunal
(s 232(5) read with s 271).
There are also a number of offences directed at (mis)use of
information: a financial sector regulator or the Reserve Bank (or
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an official, auditor or employee) commits an offence if information
is disclosed improperly or in an unlawful manner (ss 251, 252,
254 read with s 272); the intentional or negligent provision of false
or misleading information is an offence (s 273); inaccurate,
reckless, or intentionally misleading keeping of accounts or
records is an offence (s 274); and the false assertion of connec-
tion with the financial sector regulator is an offence (s 275).
Section 276 provides for liability in relation to juristic persons.
REFUGEES AMENDMENT ACT 11 OF 2017
This Act, which has yet to commence, adds (in terms of s 28)
further offences to the current list of offences set out in section 37
of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998. These are (i) in respect of a
public servant, the intentional provision of false, inaccurate, or
unauthorised documentation or benefit, or the facilitation of
disguising identity or status, or the acceptance of undue financial
or other consideration to perform any act or exercise his or her
discretion in terms of the Act; (ii) the wilful or grossly negligent
production of false certification or documentation in terms of this
Act or another Act administered by the Department of Home
Affairs; and (iii) the manufacture or provision by any person, while
not being a duly authorised officer of the Department of Home
Affairs, of a document purporting to be a document issued or
administered by the Department.
CASE LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Euthanasia
In Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services & others 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP), the court granted an order
ruling that a medical doctor who complied with the request to
assist the terminally ill applicant to end his life by providing and/or
administering a lethal agent would not be acting unlawfully. In
granting this order, the court held that the current absolute
prohibition of assisted suicide in the form of the crimes of murder
and culpable homicide, as applied in this context, unjustifiably
infringed the applicant’s rights to dignity, and to freedom and
security of the person. While this decision, which was discussed
in 2015 Annual Survey 298, was welcomed by some as a
309CRIMINAL LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 7 SESS: 7 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/10−Criminal−Law
significant development in the decriminalisation of physician-
assisted suicide and physician-assisted euthanasia, as was
pointed out, the order granted was narrowly construed in that it
applied only to the applicant, and its value as a precedent was
accordingly limited.
The value of the precedent was, however, entirely negated on
appeal in Minister of Justice & others v Estate Stransham-Ford
2017 (3) SA 152 (SCA). A full bench of the Supreme Court of
Appeal (Wallis JA) granted the appeal on the basis of three
inter-related reasons. Firstly, the applicant had predeceased the
making of the order, as a result of which his cause of action had
ceased to exist. Although Fabricius J was unaware of this fact
prior to making the order, as were the applicant’s counsel (paras
[16] [17]), the request for the order to be recalled prior to reasons
being given was imprudently turned down by the judge on the
basis that he believed that his judgment had ‘broader societal
implications’ (para [17]). Secondly, the appeal court held that
there had been no full and proper examination of ‘the present
state of our law in this difficult area, in the light of authority, both
local and international, and the constitutional injunctions in rela-
tion to the Bill of Rights and the development of the common law’
(para [5]). In this regard, the appeal court held that given that the
cases cited in the High Court judgment could be distinguished
from the matter at hand, as not having ‘anything to do with either
assisted suicide (PAS) or active voluntary euthanasia (PAE)’ but
rather with ‘mercy killing’ (para [38]), and given that the High
Court ‘was not in a position to consider whether and subject to
what conditions the law in regard to consent as a defence to
murder needed to be altered’, the court should have refused to
entertain this question (para [41]). Thirdly, the appeal court held
that the order was made on an incorrect and restricted factual
basis, without complying with the Uniform Rules of Court and
without affording all interested parties a proper opportunity to be
heard (para [5]). The fundamental deficiencies of the High Court
judgment are set out in some detail by the Supreme Court of
Appeal, for example (para [70]):
At the outset the High Court misstated the present situation in South
African law. It then failed to consider precisely what development was
being sought. It treated PAE and PAS as clear and simple concepts
capable of easy application, when they are nothing of the sort. It did
not recognise the distinction between the two. It paid little regard to
international jurisprudence or to the answers to . . . constitutional
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questions . . . It claimed that the relief it was granting was ‘case
dependent and certainly not a precedent for a general free for all’
without any indication of how its effects could be so limited.
Despite the appeal court dismissing the order, it engaged in a
consideration of the merits of the case, specifically in order to
deal with the view that the High Court judgment had created
binding precedent (para [27]). The court proceeded to examine
the state of the SouthAfrican law, pointing out that the focus of the
application was not on whether the applicant could commit
suicide – the right to die – but rather on the right to choose a
method of doing so which was acceptable to him (para [30]). The
right to refuse medical treatment is constitutionally protected, the
only qualification being that the patient must have the necessary
mental and legal capacity to make such decision (paras [31]
[32]). Where the patient is unable to make such decision, the
doctor, in consultation with the family, may decide to cease
treatment. Where there is a difference of opinion or uncertainty in
this regard, a declaratory order may be sought (para [33]).
Moreover, a medical practitioner who prescribes medication for
palliative purposes, which he knows will have the effect of
hastening death, does not commit an offence (para [34]). Hence,
the court concluded, there are currently a number of options
within the law open to both individuals and medical practitioners
responsible for their care, which will not lead to preservation of
life simply for its own sake, or for artificial purposes. Furthermore,
given the advances in palliative care, ‘the spectre commonly
conjured up of a helpless patient confined to a hospital bed and
attached to an array of machinery is, in the vast majority of
end-of-life situations, not what occurs, even with patients suffer-
ing from extremely grave diseases’ – and was not what occurred
with Stransham-Ford.
In contrast, the court stated (paras [36]-[40]) that both mercy
killing (as occurred in the cases of S v Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 532
(C) and S v De Bellocq 1975 (3) SA 538 (T)), where neither
suicide nor the consent of the person who died is a relevant
consideration, and PAE (‘active voluntary euthanasia’), where the
consent of the person who died has been given, are both murder.
In the latter situation, the consent of the deceased does not justify
the actions of the medical practitioner. (The court noted that the
question whether PAE could be justified, and whether the law in
South Africa should be changed to this end, was entirely hypo-
thetical, and was not given full and proper consideration by the
High Court – para [41]).
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With regard to PAS (‘assisted suicide’), the court once again
noted that there was no question of criminal liability attaching to
the person committing suicide, but that the question of criminal
liability arose in relation to the party (in the context of this case,
the medical practitioner) providing assistance to this end. The
court then carefully examined the case of Ex parte Die Minister
van Justisie: In re S v Grotjohn 1970 (2) SA 355 (A), where the
court was required to answer the question whether encouraging,
providing the means for, or assisting someone to commit suicide
was a crime. Wallis JA held that, in the light of the Grotjohn case,
whether criminal liability would follow in these circumstances was
not, as bluntly stated by the High Court, a necessity. Instead, a
more nuanced and careful assessment of this question on the
facts of the case, incorporating both comparative perspectives
and constitutional concerns, was called for (paras [42]–[56]).
The court engaged in a brief synopsis of the law in ‘permissive
jurisdictions’, from which it concluded that neither is a common
approach to the treatment of PAE and PAS shared, nor is there
unanimity as to the effect of guaranteed human rights on PAE or
PAS (paras [58]–[67]). Proceeding to a consideration of the South
African position, and more specifically whether the common law
could and should be developed, the court noted that not only did
the High Court engage in something no court may do – exempt-
ing an individual from obligations that apply to the rest of society
(para [68]) – but it entirely failed to consider a range of significant
questions regarding constitutionality, not least the issue of justifi-
cation of the infringement of rights (in terms of s 36 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). This latter
question was particularly pertinent given the consensus in all the
jurisdictions considered that the state has a ‘legitimate interest in
imposing constraints on the application of PAE, PAS and other
forms of aiding and abetting suicide’ (para [71]). Such questions
must crucially be placed in the South African context, unlike the
approach of the High Court, where the Canadian approach was
too readily accepted (para [71]; see further paras [98]–[100]).
Given the serious inadequacy and concerns regarding the
factual record (paras [79]–[97]), along with the three stated
reasons provided by the court (each of which in its own right was
sufficiently determinative in this regard), the appeal succeeded
(para [101). The court concluded the judgment by reiterating the
error that the High Court fell into in seeking to develop the
common law of homicide so as to accommodate PAE and PAS
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(para [101]). The court, however, indicated that the common law
‘will no doubt’ evolve in this area, and stated its preference that
this occur through Parliament, in order to give the broadest
possible option for democratic participation in this complex and
somewhat vexed debate. This is certainly wise advice.
Necessity
In response to the charge of aiding and abetting in the rape of
her daughter by her partner (the girl’s father), the accused in S v
MD & another 2017 (1) SACR 268 (ECB) pleaded that she had
acted ‘under compulsion and out of necessity’, as a result of her
life or bodily integrity being threatened by the girl’s father (para
[52]). The court defined the defence of necessity as arising when,
‘confronted with the choice between suffering some evil and
breaking the letter of the law in order to avoid it, the accused
chooses the latter alternative’ (para [53]). It is clear that in the
present case, the accused’s averred choice was not merely
whether to break the ‘letter of the law’ in order to avoid suffering
harm at the hands of her partner, but indeed, whether to inflict the
most serious form of sexual assault on her daughter in order to
avoid harm to her own bodily integrity. Nevertheless, the court
noted that this situation, which may be described as ‘compul-
sion’, may be incorporated in the general definition of necessity.
The court (Mbenenge J) set out the requirements for the
justification ground of necessity (para [55]) as they are rendered
by Burchell (for the most recent reference, see Principles of
Criminal Law 5ed (2016) 166–7):
(a) A legal interest of the accused must have been endangered;
(b) there must be a threat to the interest which had commenced
or was imminent;
(c) the threat must not have been caused by the accused’s fault;
(d) it must have been necessary for the accused to avert the
danger; and
(e) the means used for averting the danger must have been
reasonable in the circumstances.
The unreliability of the accused’s evidence, and her apparent
indifference to the plight of her daughter, sounded the death knell
for her defence. Moreover, the court did not accept that a number
of the requirements to be applied to establish the justification
ground of necessity had been proven: there was no imminent
danger to the accused, nor was it necessary for her to avert the
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danger, nor was the means used – to assist in the rape of her
daughter – reasonable (para [61]). What is notable is that the
court did not explicitly consider the possibility of putative neces-
sity as a defence. Despite reaffirming that the test for necessity is
objective in nature, the court stated that the accused ‘could not
have seriously and genuinely believed that her life was in
imminent danger’ (para [61]). Reference to the accused’s subjec-
tive state of mind cannot be relevant to the question of whether
the justification ground has been established. It would apply to
the question of putative necessity, but as mentioned, this defence
does not appear to have been considered by the court.
Intoxication
In the case of S v Ramdass 2017 (1) SACR 30 (KZD), Ploos van
Amstel J held (para [6]) that despite the criticism engendered by
the decision in S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), along with the
statement in the notorious case of S v Eadie 2002 (1) SACR 663
(SCA) paragraph [27], where Navsa JA suggested that the
judgment in Chretien may have miscalculated the community’s
attitude to intoxication (para [27]), the Chretien judgment contin-
ues to reflect the current state of our law. Any reliance on a
defence of non-pathological incapacity requires the laying of an
evidential foundation for the defence, which would be carefully
scrutinised by the court, before making a decision based on all
the evidence before it (para [7]). However, the onus of proof of
criminal capacity beyond reasonable doubt remains on the state.
The case for the state was hampered by the lack of forensic
psychiatric testimony properly to negate the possibility of incapac-
ity, and notably, the concession by the expert witness for the State
that it was reasonably possible, at least in theory, that due to
consumption of alcohol and crack cocaine the accused may
have lacked capacity (para [13]). Other difficulties with the state
case arose from the apparent absence of any motive to kill (para
[15]), the fact that the state witnesses bolstered the accused’s
account that he was intoxicated and disorientated (para [16]), the
court’s view of the accused as a truthful witness despite gaps in
his memory of events (para [17), the lack of any indication that the
accused was merely feigning amnesia (para [28]), and the
absence of expert evidence that these goal-directed actions
were inconsistent with his claim of intoxication (para [28]).
Ploos van Amstel J recognised the need for caution in finding
that someone acted involuntarily or without capacity in killing
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another. He specifically took into account Rumpff JA’s warning
not to bring the administration of justice into disrepute by too
readily making such a finding (para [29]). In this context, it was
held that the accused had established an evidential foundation
for his defence of incapacity due to intoxication, and that the state
had failed, in the face of this evidence, to prove beyond reason-
able doubt that the accused had the requisite criminal capacity
when he killed the deceased (para [30]). Therefore, the possibil-
ity of criminal liability for the killing (or indeed the crime of robbery
with which he was also charged) was altogether excluded (para
[35]). In coming to this verdict, Ploos van Amstel J added his
voice to those who have bemoaned the problematic nature of the
offence introduced as a counter to the Chretien verdict, section
1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988, and in
particular the difficulty that
where the accused is acquitted on a charge of murder on the basis
that there is a reasonable possibility that he was so drunk that he
lacked the required capacity he cannot be convicted of the statutory
offence unless the court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
did not have such capacity (para [33]).
The complete acquittal of an accused who has carried out a
brutal killing, on the basis of his voluntary intoxication, cannot fail
to be controversial. However, the case of Chretien was never
intended to subvert the functioning of the criminal law by readily
acquitting intoxicated accused. As indicated in the judgment in
the present case, Rumpff JA specifically warned against too
readily accepting that intoxication had negated one of the key
elements of liability. Moreover, Rumpff JA made it clear that only
in highly exceptional cases will it be found that the effect of the
intoxication was such as to exclude the accused’s capacity to
know that what he was doing was unlawful, or such as to result in
a fundamental disintegration of the accused’s inhibitions, and
consequently that the accused lacked capacity (1106C-E). That
such a finding of non-pathological incapacity can only be made
where the evidence justifies this conclusion, is iterated by the
court (1106F–G). In the face of policy concerns, a word in
defence of our prevailing system of psychological liability on
which our criminal principles are based (and on which basis the
Chretien judgment was handed down): only persons whose acts
are truly responsible and worthy of blame can be made liable to
punishment. Any other approach violates the right to dignity
underpinning our constitutional values.
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Rumpff JA in Chretien pointed out that any difficulty in adopting
the principled approach lies not so much in the legal principle
itself, as in the manner of its application (1105H). In the present
case, the court’s thorough approach commends itself. It is
evident that the state’s case was unfortunately hopelessly under-
mined by the lack of crucial expert evidence on certain aspects,
such as amnesia (specifically alcoholic amnesia (para [30])), and
the inconsistency of such evidence in respect of other aspects. It
is telling that in his closing remarks, Ploos van Amstel J states
(para [34]):
The outcome of this case does not mean that persons charged with
violent crimes can escape liability easily by claiming a lack of criminal
capacity due to the use of alcohol or drugs. Each case will be decided
on its own facts and the evidence scrutinised carefully. The State will
be well advised to lead expert evidence to assist the court in deciding
the issues relating to criminal capacity. Such expert evidence should
be cogent and thorough, which unfortunately was not the case before
me (emphasis added).
SPECIFIC OFFENCES
Crimes against bodily integrity
Intimidation
The offence of intimidation has a long history in South African
law, first in the specific context of employment, and the prohibi-
tion of violent acts or threats by employees towards employers,
and indeed by employers towards employees (for the develop-
ment of the offence, see SV Hoctor ‘Intimidation’ in Milton,
Cowling and Hoctor South African Criminal Law and Procedure
Vol III: Statutory Offences 2ed HA1:1ff). In 1961, the ambit of the
offence was widened to include threatening conduct outside of
the employment relationship, and then a more expansive regula-
tion of intimidating conduct was created in the Intimidation Act 72
of 1982. The offences created by this Act include intimidation by
violence or threat of violence (s 1(1)(a)), and intimidation by
conduct inducing fear of harm (s1(1)(b)). The latter offence is set
out as follows:
Any person who–
(b) acts or conducts himself in such a manner or utters or publishes
such words that it has or they have the effect, or that it might
reasonably be expected that the natural and probable conse-
quences thereof would be, that a person perceiving the act,
conduct, utterance or publication–
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(i) fears for his own safety or the safety of his property or the
security of his livelihood, or for the safety of any other person
or the safety of the property of any other person or the
security of the livelihood of any other person. . .
Crucially, proof of the offences contained in section 1 of the
Intimidation Act has been facilitated by a reverse onus presump-
tion in section 1(2) of the Act:
In any prosecution for an offence under subsection (1), the onus of
proving the existence of a lawful reason as contemplated in that
subsection shall be upon the accused, unless a statement clearly
indicating the existence of such a lawful reason has been made by or
on behalf of the accused before the close of the case for the
prosecution.
The constitutionality of the provisions of section 1(1)(b) and
section 1(2) were challenged in the case of Moyo & another v
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2017
(1) SACR 659 (GP). The challenge in respect of the section
1(1)(b) offence was based on the right to freedom of expression,
contained in section 16 of the Constitution, and in particular the
alleged over-breadth of this provision. The provision has been
subjected to both judicial (Holbrook v S [1998] 3 All SA 597 (E)
600i-601c) and academic (CR Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014)
456; C Plasket & R Spoor ‘The new offence of intimidation’ (1991)
12/4 ILJ 747 at 750) criticism in respect of its breadth. It is,
however, evident that in order for liability to ensue under this
section, the accused’s acts must at least be negligent (‘that it
may reasonably be expected that the natural and probable
consequences thereof would be’), which would qualify the scope
of liability under the section. It was held in the Moyo case that
there are certain forms of expression which are not protected in
terms of section 16 (paras [34] [35]), such as incitement of
violence, and that the exercise of this right must further be
balanced with, and limited by, the right to freedom and security of
the person (paras [38] [45]). Given the protection against vio-
lence or threat of violence afforded by this provision (para [42])
and the unavailability of less intrusive options which would
provide the same level of protection (paras [56] [57]), the court
held that the restriction of the right to freedom of expression
entailed by section 1(1)(b) is reasonable, necessary and justifi-
able (para [53]).
In respect of the argument that the reverse onus contained in
section 1(2) constituted an unconstitutional limitation on the right
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to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to be
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence (s 35(3) of the
Constitution), the court held that the provision was nevertheless
constitutional, as there was no risk of unjust conviction (para
[75]). The court reasoned that the onus of proving a lawful reason
would only arise at the close of the state’s case, once a prima
facie case had been established against the accused, and that
the right to be silent had, therefore, not been infringed (paras
[67]–[69]). The court further stated that, given the significant
policy factors in favour of the existence of the offence of
intimidation and the legitimate purpose served by the offence, the
burden imposed by the reverse onus is proportionate and less
invasive than other reverse onus provisions, and is thus justifiable
(paras [91]–[95]).
Can and should reverse onus provisions be ranked? Is the
issue not that an accused person may be convicted while a
reasonable doubt exists? It is submitted that the reverse onus
provision in section 1(2) cannot be justified on the basis of policy
factors where it has created the possibility for the presumption of
innocence to be breached. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the
court in Moyo was correct in defending the need for intimidation
offences to exist (para [91]) – even critics of the Act acknowledge
this (Snyman 455, Plasket & Spoor 751).
Sexual offences
In S v MD & another 2017 (1) SACR 268 (ECB), the two
accused, the biological parents of the complainant – their ten-year-
old daughter – were charged with rape, aiding and abetting in
rape, and causing the complainant to witness or be in their
presence while engaging in a sexual act. Upon a careful consid-
eration of the evidence, the court had no difficulty in concluding
that the complainant had indeed been raped by her father, and
that her mother had assisted on one of the occasions when he
had done so. (The accused mother’s plea of necessity is dis-
cussed above.) In respect of the charges relating to rape, the
court held that the complainant’s evidence was corroborated by
other testimony and evidence.
However, the remaining charge, that of causing the complain-
ant to witness or be present whilst engaging in a sexual act, in
contravention of section 21(2)(a) of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, was
held not to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In discussing
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this charge, the court noted that the background to the charge is
that the 2007Act was introduced to remedy the ‘prevalence of the
commission of sexual offences in our society. . .a social phenom-
enon. . .reflective of deep-seated, systemic dysfunctionality in
our society’ (para [66]). Moreover, in dealing with children, the
court pointed out that children ‘are great imitators and are quick
to learn what they see. . .lived’ and need to be protected from
scenes that ‘their immature minds may not process well’ (para
[67]).
In the case at hand, it was not in dispute that the accused
engaged in sexual acts in the presence of their children. The
court was at pains to stress that the ‘mere presence of a child’
does not offend against the section; if this were so, ‘the multitudes
of persons who live in abject poverty, occupying single-roomed
shacks together with their children’ – as did the accused – ‘would
always run the risk of contravening the section’ (para [69]). The
court set out its interpretation of the offence in section 21(2)(a) in
the following terms (para [70]):
In my view, the offence is committed by the perpetrators intentionally
and unlawfully causing a child to witness the sexual activity engaged
in. Upon a proper construction of the section, the persons concerned
must have consciously and deliberately created circumstances that
conduce to a child witnessing the sexual activity being engaged in.
Furthermore, in my view, the perpetrators must be conscious of the
fact that the child is watching them engage in sex.
It was held that despite the evidence of much drunken carous-
ing on the part of the accused, culminating in sexual activity,
since the crux of the offence was causing a child to witness
sexual intercourse, not the ‘mere possibility that the child might
be watching or might have been watching’ (para [71]), there
could be no liability on the basis of dolus eventualis for the
offence set out in section 21(2) (para [72]).
The reasoning of the court would benefit from a little clarifica-
tion. The requirement that a person accused of contravening this
offence should be ‘conscious’ of the fact that his or her sexual
activity is being witnessed by a child is uncontroversial, so too
that this circumstance must be caused ‘intentionally and unlaw-
fully’. The explanation that such circumstances must be ‘deliber-
ately created’ seems, however, to militate against liability being
based on dolus eventualis. There is no indication that this was the
intention of the legislature. The further statement that liability
could not be founded on the ‘mere possibility’ of the child
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watching the sexual activity also requires clarification – foresight
of such a possibility, along with a reckless continuation in the
envisaged sexual conduct, would indeed suffice to found liability
on the basis of dolus eventualis.
The court also stated that there could not be liability on the
basis of the offence set out in section 1 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 1 of 1988, in terms of which a person who
‘voluntarily consumes alcohol to such an extent that it leads to
criminal non-responsibility, and who, while in this condition,
commits an act punishable by law, of which he would have been
convicted but for his self-induced lack of criminal responsibility’ is
guilty of an offence. The question arises why the accused would
not be held liable under this offence. The judgment does not
explain the court’s conclusion in this regard. It may be that the
accused could not, in the view of the court, be convicted of this
offence, due to the fact that the intoxication did not exclude the
accused’s criminal capacity, but only their intention. If so, this
would only add to the misgivings about the Act mentioned in the
Ramdass case (discussed above).
Crimes against dignity
Crimen iniuria
In S v Van Leperen 2017 (1) SACR 226 (WCC), the appellant’s
conviction in the trial court for crimen injuria, following the uttering
of remarks of a sexual nature, and contact with the complainant’s
buttocks, was set aside on appeal due to the procedural irregu-
larities inherent in the conviction. Allie J nevertheless considered
the law relating to crimen iniuria, particularly in the context of the
alleged verbal utterances, and held that these were ‘humiliating
and belittling’ (para [34]), and that ‘[s]exual innuendos and
gratuitous sexually offensive misconduct. . .are made with a view
to treating a person condescendingly and patronisingly’ (para
[44]). Despite the acquittal of the appellant, an attorney, the court
required that a copy of the record and judgment should be sent
to the Law Society of the Cape for consideration of corrective
measures.
Viewed as a whole, the appellant’s conduct in touching the
complainant’s buttocks, along with the offending words, would
certainly qualify as the requisite actus reus for crimen iniuria,
given the unmistakable ‘taint of sexual impropriety’ associated
with the conduct (JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and
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Procedure Vol II: Common-law Crimes 3ed (1996) 510). However,
as Milton points out, the evaluation of whether there was sexual
impropriety is often dependent on the time and place in which it
occurs, and the precise language used. In this regard, the court
was at pains to emphasise that the offending words and conduct
took place in a courtroom where other colleagues and members
of the public were present (para [34]). The offending words and
conduct can, therefore, be distinguished from words or conduct
which are merely forward, impertinent, or annoying, where there
will not be liability (Milton 515, and cases listed there).
Crimes against public welfare
Drug offences
In Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
& others 2017 (4) SA 299 (WCC), the court upheld a challenge to
the constitutionality of a number of legislative provisions criminal-
ising the use of cannabis by an adult in a private dwelling (ss 4(b)
and 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, read
with Part III of Sch 2 to this Act; and ss 22A(9)(a)(i) and 22A(10) of
the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965,
read with Sch 7 of GN R509 of 2003 published in terms of
s 22A(2) of this Act). Having set out the history of the application,
which incorporates the earlier Constitutional Court decision in
Prince v President, Cape Law Society, & others 2002 (1) SACR
431 (CC), the court identified the crucial foundation for the
challenge from amongst a ‘veritable constitutional laundry list’, as
the right to privacy (para [11]). Crucially, the court noted that the
previous pronouncement by the Constitutional Court involving
Prince was solely and narrowly focused on the question of
whether the prohibition on possession of cannabis limited the
religious rights of Rastafari, and that the current application was
therefore not bound by the majority decision which upheld the
constitutionality of the prohibition.
Counsel for the respondents did not challenge that the prohibi-
tions on private possession and use of cannabis constituted an
infringement of the right to privacy, and offered very limited
justification of the prohibition. In comparison, the applicants
provided the court with very detailed argument on the interna-
tional trend towards the decriminalisation of private use – a trend
which, it may be noted, has not been evidenced elsewhere in
Africa. The court also took note of a similar trend permitting
private use in the case law of jurisdictions such as Argentina,
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Alaska, and Mexico. Moreover, the court held that the decriminali-
sation of private use and possession of cannabis was consistent
with South Africa’s international law obligations, in that the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs allows for criminalisation to
take place subject to the ‘constitutional limitations’ of each party,
and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances provides that in respect of offences
which do not relate to trafficking or dealing in drugs, the duty to
criminalise is similarly subject to a party’s ‘constitutional prin-
ciples and the basic concepts of its legal system’.
The court was at pains to stress that by holding that the right to
privacy was unjustifiably infringed by private use and possession
of cannabis, it was not seeking to undermine the need to curb
drug-trafficking, and moreover, that the use of drugs by children
could not be permitted. Nevertheless, in the light of the argu-
ments presented to the court, it was held that the ‘blunt instru-
ment of the criminal law as employed in the impugned legislation
is disproportionate to the harms that the legislation seeks to curb
insofar as the personal use and consumption of cannabis are
concerned’. The Constitutional Court’s pronouncement on this
issue is awaited.
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JUDICIAL MATTERS AMENDMENT ACT 14 OF 2014
Sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 14
of 2014 came into operation on 1 December 2017 (Proc 40 in
GG 41287 of 1 December 2017). These provisions amend the
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 and relate to the determination of
criminal capacity of a child.
Also see Reg Gaz 41288 GN 1338 of 1 December 2017.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT 4 OF 2017
The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 (GN 119
GG 40946 of 29 June 2017) amends section 77 of the Criminal
Procedure Act so as to provide courts with a wider range of
options in respect of orders to be issued in cases where it is
found that the accused persons are unable to participate in or
understand their criminal proceedings, or are by reason of mental
illness or intellectual disability, or for another reason, not crimi-
nally responsible for the offences with which they are charged,
and to clarify the composition of the panels provided for in
section 79 of the Act to conduct enquiries into the mental
condition of accused persons.
CASE LAW
FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS
It is the duty of all judicial officers to ensure that there is no
irregularity or illegality in the proceedings over which they
preside, and that all formalities, rules, and principles of proce-
dure required in such a trial are adhered to (Dube v S (A532/15)
[2016] ZAGPPHC 302 (29 April 2016) para [11]).
The right of an accused to a fair appeal
The Constitutional Court in Phakane v S (CCT61/16) [2017]
ZACC 44 (5 December 2017), 2018 (1) SACR 300 (CC) consid-
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ered whether the failure by the state to furnish a complete trial
record on appeal constitutes an infringement of an appellant’s
right to a fair appeal as entrenched in section 35(3) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitu-
tion).
The applicant in this case was convicted of murder and
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal to the North
Gauteng High Court (Phakane v S 9A186/2013) [2014] ZAGP-
PHC 1073 (3 November 2014)), the state delivered an incomplete
record of the trial proceedings which did not include the evi-
dence of the main state witness. Despite the absence of this
evidence, the High Court found that it was still able to determine
the appeal fairly. With regard to the incomplete record, the High
Court said (paras [15] [22] of the Constitutional Court judgment)
that
[a]lthough the evidence and statement of Manamela [are] missing, the
court a quo did not rely solely on her evidence in order to convict the
appellant. The trial court considered the evidence in totality in order
for it to make a finding that the appellant was guilty. The learned Judge
also quoted the missing statement in full in his judgment. I am satisfied
that the nature of the defects in the record are not so serious that a
proper consideration of the appeal is not possible. I am, therefore, of
the opinion that the appellant will not be prejudiced by the [ir]regular-
ity occasioned by the failure to reconstruct the record and that the
record before us is adequate for a fair and meaningful adjudication of
this appeal.
The High Court subsequently dismissed the appeal against
conviction, but upheld the appeal against sentence and reduced
the term of imprisonment from twenty years’ to fifteen years’
imprisonment (para [2]).
The Constitutional Court reached a different conclusion. In
considering the evidence led at trial, Zondo J, for the Constitutional
Court, observed that the evidence of the main state witness,
which was absent from the trial record, was indeed crucial to the
state’s case, and clearly also decisive in the trial court’s determi-
nation of the applicant’s guilt. Particularly significant was that
there were two discrepancies in the evidence which this main
state witness gave at trial, and which she had earlier made in her
statement to the police (paras [10]–[13]). The first discrepancy
related to the date on which the applicant had visited the main
state witness. Justice Zondo noted that the trial judge preferred
the version of the statement that the main state witness had given
to the police, and rejected, by implication, the version she had
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given in court (para [14]). And with regard to the second
discrepancy – which related to the main state witness’s testimony
in court and which was not included in her police statement – the
trial judge accepted the version given in court without noting its
absence in the witness’s police statement (para [15]). Justice
Zondo stated as follows:
[33] It is remarkable that the trial court said nothing in its judgment
about the discrepancy between Ms Manamela’s evidence in court and
the contents of her statement of 2 September 2006 to the police. In its
judgment, the trial court also did not say which parts of Ms Maname-
la’s evidence in court the applicant admitted and which ones he
disputed nor did it say which parts of Ms Manamela’s statement of
2 September 2006 the applicant admitted and which ones he denied.
The judgment of the trial court does not even say whether the defence
or the Court itself asked Ms Manamela why this critical part of her
evidence was not in her statement and how she explained this conflict
if she did provide an explanation. The trial court also did not take into
account the fact that, when Ms Manamela made her statement as at
2 September 2006, she was still in a romantic relationship with the
applicant but, when she testified in court, the two had broken up.
. . .
[35] In the absence of a transcript of the trial proceedings or any
reconstruction of the record of the trial proceedings, an appeal court
could not know whether Ms Manamela ever explained the conflict and
how she explained it. Without knowing whether Ms Manamela ever
explained this conflict between her evidence in court and her state-
ment to the police, an appeal court would never be in a position to
determine the appeal fairly. . .
Justice Zondo subsequently concluded that it was difficult to
understand how the trial court had made its finding without
having dealt with the ‘obvious and material conflict’ between the
testimony of the main state witness and her earlier police
statement. It was, he found, equally difficult to understand how
the High Court could conclude that the applicant’s appeal could
be determined properly and fairly in the absence of an adequate
transcript of the trial proceedings or a reconstructed record of the
main state witness’s testimony (para [37]). As to the appropriate
remedy – where missing evidence cannot be reconstructed for
the purpose of an appeal, and where this renders an appellant’s
right to a fair appeal nugatory or illusory – Zondo J quoted from
S v Joubert 1991 (1) SA119 (A), where it was held as follows (126,
para [38] of the Constitutional Court judgment):
If during a trial anything happens which results in prejudice to an
accused of such a nature that there has been a failure of justice, the
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conviction cannot stand. It seems to me that if something happens,
affecting the appeal, as happened in this case, which makes a just
hearing of the appeal impossible, through no fault on the part of the
appellant, then likewise the appellant is prejudiced, and there may be
a failure of justice. If this failure cannot be rectified, as in this case, it
seems to me that the conviction cannot stand, because it cannot be
said that there has not been a failure of justice.
He also referred to S v Chabedi 2005 (1) SACR 415 (SCA),
where the Supreme Court of Appeal held as follows (paras [5] [6]
and para [39] of the Constitutional Court judgment):
[T]he requirement is that the record must be adequate for proper
consideration of the appeal; not that it must be a perfect recordal of
everything that was said at the trial. The question whether defects in a
record are so serious that a proper consideration of the appeal is not
possible, cannot be answered in the abstract. It depends, inter alia, on
the nature of the defects in the particular record and on the nature of
the issues to be decided on appeal.
Consequently, given that the available trial record was not
adequate for a proper consideration of the applicant’s appeal,
the conviction on the murder charge was set aside and replaced
with a competent verdict of assault. Based on the time the
applicant had already served in prison, his immediate release
was ordered (para [46]).
Also see Mulaudzi v S (A083.2015) [2017] ZALMPPHC 48
(10 May 2017) and Sippel v S (A160/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 187
(12 May 2017).
In another case before the Constitutional Court, Barlow v S
2017 (2) SACR 535 (CC), it was emphasised that the right to a fair
trial includes the right to appeal, and that section 35(3)(a) of the
Constitution provides that every accused person has the right to
a fair trial, which includes the right to be informed of the charge
with sufficient detail to answer to it; a right which applies equally
where a case is taken on appeal.
The applicant in this case was charged with eight counts:
‘(1) unlawful pointing of a firearm; (2) murder; (3) robbery with
aggravating circumstances; (4) attempted murder; (5) unlawful
possession of a firearm; (6) unlawful possession of ammunition;
(7) another count of unlawful possession of a firearm; and
(8) another count of unlawful possession of ammunition’ (para
[2]). At the close of the state’s case, the applicant’s request for
discharge in terms of section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act
succeeded in respect of count one (unlawful pointing of a
firearm), and counts five and six (the first counts of unlawful
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possession of a firearm and ammunition) (para [3]). The applicant
was found guilty of the remaining counts and was sentenced to
ten years’ imprisonment on count two (murder), three years on
count three (theft), five years on count four (attempted murder),
and three years on counts seven and eight (unlawful possession
of a firearm and ammunition). All the sentences were ordered to
run concurrently, which made for an effective term of fifteen years’
imprisonment (para [6]). However, when delivering judgment,
Mabesele J started by stating that (Barlow v S [2015] ZAGPJHC
318 (30 January 2015 paras [1]–[2] para [4] of the Constitutional
Court judgment)
[t]he accused stands trial on counts of pointing a firearm, murder
(read with the provisions of section 51 of Act 105 of 1997), robbery
with aggravating circumstances (read with the provisions of [s]ection
51(2) of the Act 105 of 1977), unlawful possession of firearms and
unlawful possession of ammunition.
This was clearly an ‘inadvertent mistake’ as the applicant had
already been discharged on the count of pointing a firearm
(count one) and it did not refer to the count of attempted murder
(count four) (para [5]).
The applicant subsequently appealed against his convictions
on the grounds that the state had not proved his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as regards the convictions for murder and
attempted murder, and that the element of intention permanently
to deprive the deceased of his firearm had not been established
(para [7]). In finding no misdirection in the trial court’s evaluation
of the evidence, and further that its conclusion that the state had
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt could not be faulted,
the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. However, in
doing so, the High Court failed to mention that the applicant had
been found guilty of theft on count three (the robbery charge)
(para [9]). The Constitutional Court subsequently had to decide
whether the inaccuracies in the introductory paragraph of the trial
court’s judgment relating to the charges, and the failure of the
High Court to mention the theft conviction in the appeal judgment,
compounded the infringement of the applicant’s right to a fair trial
(para [10]).
Justice Froneman, writing for the majority of the Constitutional
Court, noted that the trial court’s initial incorrect reference to the
charge of pointing a firearm (count one) instead of attempted
murder (count four) had clearly been inadvertent, as the trial
court continued to deal extensively with all the evidence pre-
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sented. This included the evidence relating to the attempted
murder charge on which the court ultimately concluded that the
applicant was guilty (para [12]). On appeal, however, the High
Court did not expressly consider the reasons the trial court gave
for the theft conviction, nor did it expressly consider the basis
upon which the applicant appealed, namely, that his intention
permanently to deprive the deceased of his firearm had not been
established beyond a reasonable doubt (para [13]). Justice
Froneman explained (para [14]) that –
[b]ecause the Full Court did not expressly consider Mr Barlow’s
appeal on theft, it may be argued that he has had no appeal on the
theft conviction. Consequently it may be argued that the applicant has
not had a fair trial regarding his appeal on the theft conviction. The
application for leave to appeal against the conviction of theft on
the basis of a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial must
therefore be considered with care.
However, although this aspect of the applicant’s case raised a
constitutional issue, there were no prospects of success as
the Constitutional Court also found no reason to interfere with the
factual findings made by Mabesele J in the trial court (para [15]).
To this, Judge Zondo added:
It is important that courts should consider all issues or matters before
them and decide them properly and give reasons for their conclu-
sions. When they do not do that, they infringe the fair trial rights of
accused persons or appellants (para [45]).
The right to legal representation
The accused in S v Sokoi (R75/2017) [2017] ZAFSHC 201
(10 August 2017) appeared, together with co-accused, before
the Bloemfontein magistrate’s court on a charge of housebreak-
ing with intent to steal and theft and was convicted and sen-
tenced to ten months’ imprisonment (para [1]). On review under
of section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was noted from
the record that the accused and his co-accused first appeared in
court on 1 September 2014, and that the accused then applied
for legal assistance from Legal Aid SA (LASA). The matter was
subsequently postponed on numerous occasions unrelated to
the accused’s application for legal assistance to LASA, until
16 April 2015, when the accused terminated the mandate of his
legal representative provided by LASA and elected to conduct
his own defence (para [5]). On 25April 2015, the matter could not
proceed to trial as one of the other accused had a new private
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attorney; and on 23 July 2015, the accused’s newly provided
legal representative withdrew from the matter on the basis that
the accused refused to give her instructions, although she was
for her part ready to proceed with the trial. The trial court
subsequently directed that the trial proceed without the accused
being legally represented, notwithstanding his protestations and
explanation of his differences with the legal representative in
question (para [6]).
The trial proceeded but the accused refused to participate in
the proceedings by declining to cross-examine witnesses; he
also informed the court on numerous occasions that he would like
to secure another legal representative from LASA (paras [7] [8]).
The trial court, however, refused to allow the accused an oppor-
tunity to acquire or consult a legal representative, ‘pointing out
that he would not be allowed to abuse the right to legal represen-
tation by changing attorneys provided by Legal Aid SA ‘‘left, right
and centre’’ ’ (para [7]).
Judges Lekale and Mbhele for the High Court, Free State
Division, Bloemfontein, emphasised that the right to a fair trial
requires ‘a substantive, rather than a formal or textual approach’
(para [10]; S v Shaik & others 2008 (2) SA 208 (CC) para [43]).
While the judges acknowledged that fairness is ‘not a one-way
street conferring an unlimited right on an accused to demand the
most favourable possible treatment’, it is nonetheless essential if
confidence is to be instilled in the South African criminal justice
system (para [10]; S v Shaik & others 2008 (2) SA 208 para [43]).
Thus, while it is not inconceivable that an accused person may
abuse the right to legal representation by constantly changing
legal representatives, it is equally conceivable that he or she may
have sound reasons for moving from one legal representative to
another, ‘with the view to ensure that his rights are well protected
and he, as such, gets a fair trial’ (paras [13] [14]). Likewise, an
accused who has elected to conduct his or her own defence may
also, during the course of the trial, decide rather to enlist the
services of a legal practitioner. This may, of course, also be done
maliciously to delay the process, or simply because a real need
for legal assistance exists (para [15]).
Based on the trial record, Judges Lekale and Mbhele found
that the accused in this case had insisted throughout the trial that
he needed legal representation, and that the situation between
himself and the first legal representative appointed by LASA
could have been resolved with the necessary assistance from the
presiding officer. The judges explained as follows (para [21]):
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Practical experience and common sense indicate that in most, if not
all, cases Legal Aid SA provided legal representatives first have to
make deliberate or extra efforts to win the trust and confidence of
accused persons before they may hope to get full and proper
instructions simply because they are not necessarily the choice of and
are often unknown to such accused persons.
Therefore, it was concluded that the accused in this matter had
neither abused his constitutional right to legal representation, nor
had his exercise of the right been unreasonable. The delay in
starting the trial was also not attributable to his exercise of the
right to legal representation, as, on numerous occasions, the trial
had been postponed for reasons relating to the co-accused
joined in the same proceeding (para [24]). In finding that the
proceedings had not been in accordance with justice, the court
set aside the accused’s conviction and sentence and held that it
served no purpose ‘in law and equity’ to remit the matter to the
trial court, as the accused had already served the sentence
imposed in full (para [25]).
Also see S v Meyer & others (204/2012) [2017] ZAGPJHC 286
(4 August 2017).
The right to a speedy trial without unreasonable delay
The applicant in Mohan v Director of Public Prosecutions
KwaZulu-Natal 2017 (2) SACR 76 (KZD) faced charges in three
criminal proceedings, for submitting fraudulent VAT returns to the
South African Revenue Service (the SARS), and purchasing
property using the proceeds of these fraudulent VAT refunds
(paras [1]–[6]). The applicant first appeared in court on these
charges in 2014 and the three proceedings were, at the time of
the hearing before Chetty J for the High Court, KwaZulu-Natal
Local Division, Durban, at different stages of completion. In the
first proceeding, the evidence of state witnesses had already
been led after which the matter was adjourned. In the second and
third proceedings, the state had not yet led evidence and the
matters were adjourned pending the outcome of this present
application for the confirmation of a temporary stay of proceed-
ings granted to the applicant in June 2016 (paras [1]–[7]). The
applicant sought an interdict restraining the respondents from
commencing and continuing the three criminal proceedings
against him, pending the completion of investigations by the
SARS, the South African Police Service (the SAPS), and the Public
Protector. These investigations related primarily to the criminal
330 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 9 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/11−Criminal−Procedure
liability of another individual, as well as a number of SARS
employees, who were alleged to have been involved in the alleged
illegal transactions, and who had, to date, not been charged with
any of the offences (para [12]). The applicant also sought that full
information regarding the status of these investigations be made
available to him (para [9]).
The basis for this application was, therefore, that the matters
pending against the applicant were not ripe for hearing, and
should, therefore, not remain on the roll as there was no indication
as to when investigations would be completed (para [11]). The
applicant also submitted that ‘he has a right to a fair hearing,
entrenched in the Constitution, and [that] he will be prejudiced if
the criminal trials go ahead without the investigations referred to
above being finalised. He further contends that he is not being
given an opportunity to prove his innocence’ (para [14]). Finally,
with regard to the nature of the relief sought, the applicant
recognised that ‘the relief sought is a drastic step but submits
that the stay of prosecution being sought is only of a temporary
nature, and that if the criminal proceedings against him were to
go ahead, he would suffer irreparable trial prejudice’ (para [16]).
Chetty J first noted that the applicant had not disclosed, with
regard to the original application for a temporary stay which had
been granted, that the first (of three) criminal proceedings against
him had already commenced, that the state had led its evidence,
and that the defence had cross-examined the state witnesses
(para [27]). This seemingly willful non-disclosure of material infor-
mation by the applicant was criticised by the judge, who empha-
sised that both litigants and their legal representatives at all times
owe a duty to place the full facts before a court. This duty was
described as ‘an essential ingredient in a system designed to
achieve a fair and just outcome of a dispute. This duty cannot be
switched on and off depending on whether an application is ex
parte. It is an abiding duty worn at all times by legal practitioners’
(paras [25]–[30]; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Pilane
& others (692/06) [2006] ZANWHC 68 (16 November 2006);
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Basson & another 2002
(1) SA 419 (SCA), [2002] 1 SA 419 para [21]).
With regard to the nature of the relief sought, ie, a confirmation
of the order for a temporary stay of proceedings against the
applicant granted in June 2016, Chetty J noted as follows (para
[34], quoting respectively from Sanderson v Attorney-General,
Eastern Cape 1998 (1) SACR 227 (CC) para [38] and Attorney-
General of Natal v Johnstone & Co Ltd 1946 AD 256 261):
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The relief the appellant seeks is radical, both philosophically and
socio-politically. Barring the prosecution before the trial begins – and
consequently without any opportunity to ascertain the real effect of the
delay on the outcome of the case – is far-reaching. Indeed it prevents
the prosecution from presenting society’s complaint against an alleged
transgressor of society’s rules of conduct. That will seldom be
warranted in the absence of significant prejudice to the accused
(Sanderson para [38]).
Now there is no doubt that, in general where it is alleged by the
Crown that a person has committed an offence, the proper way of
deciding on his guilt is to initiate criminal proceedings against him;
and where such proceedings have already been commenced, even if
the stage of indictment only has been reached, it seems to me that a
court which is asked to exercise its discretion by entertaining proceed-
ings for an order expressly or in effect declaring that the accused is
innocent would do well to exercise great caution before granting such
an order. In most types of case such an order would be entirely out of
place (Johnstone 261).
Therefore, an accused person who seeks a permanent stay of
prosecution for reasons associated with an unreasonable delay
before the commencement of criminal proceedings must bring that
application before the High Court having jurisdiction; and for
‘intra-curial’ delays occurring after the commencement of criminal
proceedings, the matter falls to be dealt with exclusively by the
court seized with the criminal proceedings (para [36]; S v Naidoo
2012 (2) SACR 126 (WCC)). A High Court will, therefore, interfere in
incomplete criminal proceedings in the lower courts in ‘rare’ cases
only, ‘where a grave injustice might otherwise result or ‘‘where
justice might not by other means be attained’’ ’ (para [36], quoting
from Wahlhaus & others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg &
another 1959 (3) SA 113 (A), [1959] 3 All SA 194). Judge Chetty
consequently concluded that given the absence of any evidence
pointing to any miscarriage of justice that would befall the applicant
in the event of the three criminal trials proceeding at the same time,
the temporary interdict granted for a stay of prosecution could not
be confirmed (paras [46]-[50]). The judge also found that to grant
an order for the temporary stay of proceedings in all three criminal
trials pending finalisation of the investigations the applicant believed
were outstanding would infringe on the doctrine of separation of
powers as the decision to prosecute falls within the exclusive
domain of the National Prosecuting Authority (para [51]).
The right to a speedy trial without unreasonable delay: A permanent stay
of prosecution
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Van Heerden & another v
National Director of Public Prosecutions & others 2017 (2) SACR
332 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 11 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/11−Criminal−Procedure
696 (SCA) emphasised that a permanent stay of prosecution is
an extraordinary remedy that is appropriate under exceptional
circumstances only.
The appellants in this case were employed by the third
respondent, British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd
(BATSA), and the employment of both was terminated in 2010
after the first appellant was accused by BATA of the theft of
cigarettes (paras [5] [6]). In August 2011, in anticipation of criminal
charges to be preferred against the appellants, the National
Director of Public Prosecutions (the NDPP) applied for and obtained
a provisional restraint order under section 25(1)(b) of the Preven-
tion of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (the POCA), effectively
preventing the appellants from dealing in any manner with virtually
all their property (para [7]). The appellants were ultimately charged
with the theft of hundreds of boxes of cigarettes with an estimated
value of R3,47 million on 29 August 2011 (para [8]). In September
2011, five more accused were charged together with the appel-
lants (para [8]). From this date to the date on which the present
matter was decided, there were numerous postponements for a
variety of reasons, including: the state awaiting confirmation from
the NDPP as to the charges to be instituted under the POCA; a
request on the part of the appellants for further particulars;
postponements due to changes in legal representatives; a post-
ponement pending the Constitutional Court decision in Savoi v
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 (1) SACR 545 (CC);
and the appellants objecting to the charge sheet (paras [9]–[26]).
In December 2015, the appellants launched an application for
a permanent stay of criminal prosecution on the ground that the
numerous delays and the paucity of information supplied by
the state – including a defective charge sheet – had resulted in
them being denied a fair trial (para [29]). It was noted, for
example, that a period of six years had elapsed since the
opening of the police docket, and that the events on which
the charges were based covered a period stretching back to
January 2009 (paras [38] [44]). The appellants also submitted
that, as a result of their loss of employment and the extended
duration of the criminal proceedings, which included the restraint
order on their property, they had been severely prejudiced, and
that their finances were in a perilous state (para [33]). The state,
in turn, submitted that the appellants had been ‘economical with
the truth’, had not been truthful about their assets, and had failed
to submit monthly financial reports to the curator as required by
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the POCA (para [35]). The state also relied on the reasons given
for previous applications by the appellants for release of funds,
which had been dismissed (paras [35]–[40]).
In considering whether the appellants were entitled to the
extraordinary relief of an order permanently staying a criminal
prosecution against them, Navsa ADP, writing for the majority of
the Supreme Court of Appeal, had regard to the Constitutional
Court decision in Sanderson v Attorney-General Eastern Cape
1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) (para [47]). The judge described the right to
a trial within a reasonable time as an incidence of the right to a fair
trial, and pointed out that the prejudice suffered by an accused
pending the outcome of a criminal proceeding is not only trial-
related, but also of social and personal import and effect (paras
[47]–[50]). With regard to the time elapsed, it was noted that ‘time
has a pervasive significance that bears on all the factors and
should not be considered at the threshold or, subsequently, in
isolation’ (para [49], quoting from Sanderson v Attorney-General
Eastern Cape above). In addition to considerations that may have
resulted in, or otherwise impacted on, the time elapsed, regard
must also be had to the nature of the case and to systemic delays
which can include resource limitations, court congestion, etcet-
era (paras [53] [54]). The ultimate question, in considering these
factors in the context of an application for a permanent stay of
proceedings, is whether an accused, like the two appellants in
this case, had suffered unreasonable delay (para [55]).
Applying these considerations to the facts of the present case,
Judge Navsa noted that the many delays could
rightly be termed as systemic delays and that periods of time were lost
due to the needs of a number of the appellants’ co-accused, the
request for further particulars, the State’s response thereto as well as
the time that passed whilst the parties awaited the decision in Savoi
(a period of slightly more than two-and-a-half months). A further five
months were lost when the matter was postponed to enable the
appellants to respond to the further particulars supplied by the State.
However, a careful consideration of that history also reveals that the
State was irresponsibly lax in investigating the case, finalising
the charge sheet and moving forward with the prosecution. It is clear
that substantial and material parts of the delays were occasioned by
the inertia and vacillation of the prosecutors involved on behalf of the
NDPP (para [56]).
Furthermore, considerable emphasis was placed on the fact
that initial postponements had been granted to the state to allow it
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to consider bringing racketeering and money-laundering charges
against the appellants under the POCA, only for the state to
indicate that the case would proceed on the theft charges alone,
but then later including a racketeering charge on the charge
sheet. What were described as ‘disingenuous’ actions on the part
of the state had also contributed to the delays in the case (paras
[57] [58]). Finally, it was noted that the state had remained ‘inert’
by refusing to release the appellants’ property under restraint
(para [60]). It was, therefore, concluded that ‘inadequate consid-
eration, if any, was given by the State to the appellants’ rights to a
trial within a reasonable time and that a material and substantial
part of the delay was due to the State’s tardiness and lack of
application and concern’ (para [61]).
Judge Navsa ultimately concluded that ‘the passage of time in
this case, relative to its facts, was unreasonable. Importantly, the
dishonest and unacceptable conduct of the State in facie curiae
cannot go unnoticed and must be taken into account in favour of
the appellants and against the NDPP’ (para [69]). A permanent
stay of criminal proceedings in respect of the charges brought
against the appellants was ordered (para [71]). The judge further
emphasised that
decisions in matters of this kind are fact-specific. It follows that this
judgment should not be resorted to as a ready guide in determining
the reasonableness or otherwise of delays in the finalisation of trials.
Whether a breach of a right to an expeditious trial has occurred and
relief is justified, is to be determined by a court after having been
apprised of all of the facts on a case by case basis (para [70]).
Also see Naidoo v Regional Magistrate, Durban & another 2017
(2) SACR 244 (KZP).
Addressing an accused person in court
In S v Chabalala 2017 (2) SACR 486 (LT), Nair AJ for the High
Court Limpopo Local Division, Thohoyandou, reaffirmed that
presiding officers should not address those before them in court
as ‘accused’ (para [9]). This, he explained, is ‘deprecated and
not in keeping with the decorum of the Court’ (para [9]). He also
held that the way in which judicial officers address litigants,
witnesses, and accused persons is a reflection of the tempera-
ment of the bench as a whole, and presiding officers should,
therefore, take the necessary care (para [13]). In S v Gwebu 1988
(4) SA 155 (W), it was stated (158F–H):
It is perhaps as well also to say something about the habit which a
number of magistrates, and some prosecutors in the magistrate’s
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courts, have developed in recent years, of addressing accused
persons by the appellation ‘accused’ or ‘beskuldigde’. And, one sees,
too, in many records that some magistrates (not in this case) refer to
witnesses as ‘witness’ or ‘getuie’. This depersonalising of people is
disrespectful and degrading. It is no cause for difficulty for people to
be called by their proper names. I can find no reason for the appellant,
in this case, when addressed directly by the magistrate, not being
called ‘Mr Gwebu’. Members of the public who appear in our courts,
whether as accused or as witnesses, are entitled to be treated
courteously and in a manner in keeping with the dignity of the court. It
is hoped that judicial officers will always be alive to this and discour-
age this practice. Nothing further needs be said on this issue.
PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME ACT 121 OF 1998
The primary purpose of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act
121 of 1998 (the POCA) is to provide a civil remedy for the
preservation, seizure, and forfeiture of property derived from or
concerned with the carrying out of unlawful activities.
Basic principles
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mtwazi & others
(441/2016) [2017] ZAECBHC 4 (5 June 2017), Hartle J for the
High Court, Eastern Cape, Bhisho, reaffirmed the basic principles
underpinning the legislative scheme of the POCA. With reference
to NDPP v Mohammed NO & others 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC), he
explained that the overall purpose of theAct is to strip criminals of
the proceeds of their offences, and thereby to remove the
incentive from crime (para [7]). The POCA uses two mechanisms
to achieve this: Chapter 5 (ss 12–36) provides for the forfeiture of
the benefits derived from crime. Confiscation of such forfeited
benefits is ultimately only invoked once the accused has been
convicted of an offence. Chapter 6 (ss 37–62), in turn, provides
for the preservation and forfeiture of property that was an
instrumentality of an offence, or is the proceeds of unlawful
activities, or is property associated with terrorist and related
activities. Different from Chapter 5 proceedings, the provisions of
Chapter 6 are in rem, in other words, civil proceedings that are in
no way subject to criminal proceedings or to an accused
subsequently being convicted of any offence. Judge Hartle
explained further that the provisions of the POCA apply to
offences committed both before and after its commencement,
and that it has a wider ambit than purely the organised crime
offences referred to in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the Act. For
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example, the Act also applies to cases of individual wrongdoing
(para [9]; Mohunram v NDPP 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC)). The
Constitutional Court, in NDPP v Elran 2013 (1) SACR 429 (CC),
described the seemingly draconian provisions of the POCA as
follows (para [70], and para [8] of the judgment under discus-
sion):
There is no constitutional challenge to these provisions. We therefore
have no reason to approach the powers POCA confers on courts with
reserve. We should embrace POCA as a friend to democracy, the rule
of law and constitutionalism – and as indispensable in a world where
the institutions of state are fragile, and the instruments of law some-
times struggle for their survival against criminals who subvert them.
Specifically with regard to Chapter 5 proceedings under the
POCA, the following basic principles can be noted: a restraint
order can only be made once the prosecution for an offence has
been instituted against the defendant concerned, and either a
confiscation order has been made against that defendant, or it
appears to the court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that a confiscation order may be made against that
defendant; and the proceedings against that defendant have
been concluded (s 25(a)(i)-(iii)). It is further required that, before
a restraint order is made, the NDPP first discharge ‘the onus of
showing a reasonable prospect of obtaining both a conviction in
respect of some or all of the charges levied against an accused
person and a subsequent confiscation order’ (para [18]; NDPP v
Tam & others 2004 (4) SACR 126 (W) 129). Given that restraint
order applications are civil proceedings, the POCA also requires
that any question of fact be determined on a balance of probabili-
ties (s 13(1), (2) and (5); para [20]). Judge Hartle explained that
‘[a] court making a restraint order does not have to decide that
the offences were probably committed. It is only called upon to
find that there are ‘‘reasonable grounds for believing that a court
might find that they were probably committed’’ ’ (para [22],
quoting from NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 (4) SA 603 (SCA) paras
[27] [51]).
A confiscation order (also under Chapter 5 of the POCA), in
turn, can only follow upon a conviction of the defendants of an
offence (s 18(1) of the POCA; NDPP v Alexander & others 2001
(2) SACR 1 (T)), and is directed at confiscating the benefits that
accrued to the offender, whether or not the offender is still in
possession of the particular proceeds (para [16]). And section
12(3) of the POCA states that a person has benefited from
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unlawful activities ‘if he or she has at any time, whether before or
after the commencement of [POCA], received or retained any
proceeds of unlawful activities’ (para [15]).
The provisions of Chapter 5 of the POCA were considered in
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Ramlutchman 2017 (1)
SACR 343 (SCA). The respondent in this case was convicted on
21 counts of fraud and one count of corruption (para [1]). The
NDPP also applied for the amount of R52 million to be confis-
cated in terms of section 18(1)(a) of the POCA (para [3]). This
amount reflected the total amount the respondent had been paid
under sixteen construction contracts which he had succeeded in
securing based on his fraudulent and corrupt activities (para [2]).
While it was not in dispute that the respondent had benefited from
the offences for which he had been convicted, the amount of the
benefit to be confiscated was disputed (para [9]). It was submit-
ted on behalf of the respondent that the value of the proceeds of
his unlawful activities did not amount to R52 million, that only the
net proceeds constituted a benefit under the POCA, and that the
appellant had failed to establish the precise amount of the net
proceeds (para [10]). The appellant, in turn, argued that, because
the contract value was R52 million, it was this gross value which
constituted the benefit which fell to be confiscated in terms of
section 18(1), read with section 12(3) of the POCA (para [22]).
Both the regional magistrate and the High Court agreed with the
respondent and concluded that
the entire contract amount received by the respondent as proceeds of
unlawful activities could not be regarded as a benefit because it was
not exclusively a gain or profit. In other words, it held that the costs of
the construction component of the proceeds could not rationally be
equal to a gain or benefit. . . . to treat the gross proceeds as a benefit,
would result in the state being unjustly enriched at the expense of the
respondent and this would be disproportionate and result in the
respondent paying more than the amount which he benefited from,
and which is prohibited under section 18(2) of POCA (para [12]).
Mathopo JA, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, held with regard to section 18 of the POCA as follows:
In view of the fact that there is a close connection between the criminal
conviction and the confiscation order, the discretion conferred upon a
court by section 18 is a discretion to determine the amount that it
should order a defendant to pay. That determination is made once the
court has convicted the defendant of a criminal offence and at the
same time imposes a sentence upon such a person. The presiding
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officer upon whom the discretion is conferred by statute is normally
the presiding officer who has presided over the criminal trial and had
sentenced the accused. Such a judicial officer would have heard all
the evidence and the arguments in the criminal trial and would, in the
circumstances, have been apprised of all the issues in the case.
Consequently the discretion to deal with the confiscation order is
analogous to the discretion to determine the proper sentence to be
imposed in criminal proceedings. . . With that in mind the legislature
sought to ensure that it would be that court which would determine the
appropriate amount to be confiscated. It is only in instances where the
presiding officer who convicted the defendant is absent or for any
reason not available that another judicial officer may be appointed in
his stead in terms of section 18(4) of POCA.
[21] In approaching this question a court will bear in mind that the
enquiry as to whether the proceeds should be confiscated is not the
same enquiry to be undertaken when resolving disputes of fact in
motion proceedings. The purpose of confiscating proceeds of crime is
to ensure that criminals realise that they cannot benefit from their
ill-gotten gains and that crime does not pay. When considering the
amount to be confiscated a court must have regard to the extent to
which the property to be confiscated derived directly from the criminal
activities. In certain instances, as in the present case, where the entire
contract amount was not retained by the respondent, a balancing act
must be done by a court in the exercise of its discretion to determine
the precise amount to be confiscated (paras [20] [21]).
Mathopo JA concluded that it would be unjust in this case to
confiscate the full contractual sum of R52 million, as the respon-
dent had used approximately 90 per cent of this sum to construct
the buildings which he had completed and handed over to the
Department of Public Works (para [23]). To determine the amount
to be confiscated under the POCA, section 18(2) requires that the
amount confiscated may not exceed the value of the proceeds of
the offences or related criminal activities as calculated in accor-
dance with Chapter 5 of the POCA (para [27]). And this must be
read together with section 19(1) of the POCA, which provides as
follows:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the value of a defendant’s
proceeds of unlawful activities shall be the sum of the values of the
property, services, advantages, benefits, or rewards received, retained
or derived by him or her at any time, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, in connection with the unlawful activity
carried on by him or her or any other person.
Unfortunately, the evidence placed before the regional magis-
trate was not sufficient for a proper determination to be made
under the provisions of the POCA, and the matter was conse-
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quently remitted back to the regional court to conduct an inquiry
in terms of section 18(6) of the POCA, in order to determine the
amount to be confiscated under section 18 of the Act (para [32]).
The provisions of Chapter 6 of the POCA were considered in
Stemele & another v National Director of Public Prosecutions
(3428/2015) [2017] ZAECPEHC 44 (14 September 2017). Judge
Eksteen for the High Court, Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth,
explained that whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe
that property is the proceeds of unlawful activity, the NDPP is
entitled to bring an application for the preservation of the
property. Where the NDPP is aware of persons who have an
interest in the property, those persons should be cited and notice
of the order should be served on them. For example, and as in
this case where the NDPP was aware of a marriage in community
of property which might result in a spouse having an interest in
certain property or properties, the NDPP is obliged in terms of
section 39(1)(a) of the POCA to serve notice of the preservation
order on such a person/spouse (para [12]). In addition, section
39(1)(b) of the POCA also requires that the NDPP give notice of a
preservation order granted by a court by publication to this effect
in the Government Gazette (para [11]). This publication serves as
an invitation to any persons having an interest in the property or
properties to join in the proceedings (paras [12] [13]). Therefore,
the fact that the NDPP is not aware of any or further persons who
may have an interest in the property does not preclude the
granting of the preservation order. Sufficient safeguards are in
place to ensure that any such persons who may have an interest
be informed (s 39 of the POCA) and be enabled to join in the
proceedings (para [11]).
Also see National Director of Public Prosecutions v PDP &
others 2017 (2) SACR 57 (NCK) and National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Scholtz & others 2017 (1) SACR 483 (NCK).
Forfeiture under Chapter 6 of the POCA
The respondent in Brooks & another v National Director of
Public Prosecutions 2017 (1) SACR 701 (SCA) contended that
there were reasonable grounds to believe that the residential
property of the two appellants, as well as R6,2 million in cash,
were an instrumentality of an offence under the POCA (para [22]).
It was submitted that the property was used for illegal diamond
dealing, and that both the property and the cash used in the illicit
transactions had been deliberately chosen and were integral to
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the commission of the offences (para [22]). A forfeiture order
under section 50(1) of the POCA was subsequently made, and
the appellants appealed against this order.
Schippers AJA and Mocumie JA, for the Supreme Court of
Appeal, dismissed the first appellant’s denial of involvement in
any illicit diamond dealing, that any such transaction had taken
place on the property, and that the property was an instrumental-
ity of any offence (para [24]). Therefore, issue was whether the
property had been used in a real and substantial way which
made the commission of the offences possible or easier (para
[27]). With reference to the provisions of the Diamonds Act 56 of
1986, it was held that the property would be an instrumentality of
the offences with which the appellants were charged, if it was not
registered in terms of the Act as a diamond trading house – ie,
premises at which the holder of a diamond trading house licence
may facilitate the local purchase and sale of unpolished dia-
monds (para [27]). Therefore, ‘the frequent use of the property
as a place to facilitate the buying and selling of unpolished
diamonds not only renders the property itself instrumental in the
offence of using the property as a diamond trading house, but
also points to a direct and immediate connection between the
property and the numerous offences of unlawful trading in
unpolished diamonds’ (para [28]). In considering the facts of the
case, Schippers AJA and Mocumie JA subsequently concluded
that the property was an instrumentality of the offences with which
the appellant was charged, and that there could be ‘no question
that the property made the commission of the offences possible
or easier’ (paras [29]–[34]). It was held that ‘[t]he relationship
between the use of the property and the commission of the
offences was neither tenuous nor remote. The involvement of
the property was not merely incidental to the commission of the
offences: it was put to use in a positive sense and was a means
through which the crimes were committed. The property was the
base for a significant, organised and well-funded illicit diamond-
dealing business’ (para [36]).
With regard to the proportionality enquiry aimed at balancing
the constitutional imperative of law enforcement and combating
crime against the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property,
the judges found that in this instance the property was ‘the base
for an ongoing, organised and well-funded criminal enterprise
involving diamond-dealing, huge amounts of cash and inevitably,
money laundering. And the uncontroverted evidence is that the
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offences were committed in the course of a broader enterprise of
criminal activity . . .’ (para [41]). The appellant, however, submit-
ted that the residential property was not only his family’s home,
but that the amount that he had allegedly received from the illegal
activities (R58 000) was far less than the market value of the
property (R960 000 in 2014) (para [46]). But the Supreme Court
of Appeal did not agree, and held that given the ‘nature of the
offences and the extent to which the property was used as an
instrument thereof, forfeiture was not disproportionate’ (para [46];
Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (2) SACR
525 (CC)). With regard to the impact that the forfeiture of the
property would have on the appellants’ children, it was noted that
this matter had not been raised by the appellants themselves
(paras [51] [52]), and that the court a quo was ‘alive both to the
interests of the children and the fact that the appellants did not
allege that they or their children would be rendered homeless if
the property were forfeited to the State’ (para [53]). It was
consequently held that the forfeiture order had been properly
made, and the appeal was dismissed (para [54]).
Also see National Director of Public Prosecutions v Ivanov &
another 2017 (2) SACR 639 (WCC).
Property susceptible to a preservation of property order under section 38 of
the POCA
At issue in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kalmar
Industries SA (Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) SACR 593 (SCA) was whether
certain tools and equipment, as well as a ‘Swift 011 purpose built
lifting platform’, were susceptible to a preservation of property
order under section 38 of the POCA and, consequently, to a
forfeiture order in terms of the provisions of sections 48 and 50 of
the Act (para [1]). The factual background giving rise to this issue
was a commercial dispute involving the respondent and a com-
pany, Q6, which claimed to be the owner of the platform and to
have paid all the costs relating to the research, design, and
manufacture of the platform (para [4]).
In considering the evidence before it, the Supreme Court of
Appeal (Schippers AJA) held that an allegation of theft with
regard to the property had been made, and that this had not been
proved in the court a quo. Therefore, the matter remained in
essence a commercial dispute between the respondent and Q6
(para [17]). He explained that the NDPP should have known that
there were numerous, genuine disputes of fact which could not
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be resolved on the papers before the court. These disputes
related to, among other things, the terms of the agreement
between the respondent and Q6; ownership of the platform and
the equipment; the circumstances under which Q6 had been
ejected from the site belonging to the respondent; where the
property was held; and the subsequent use of the property by the
respondent (para [18]). But more fundamental than the commer-
cial nature of this dispute, Schippers AJA also noted that the
dispute was ‘far removed from the objectives of POCA, which,
according to its title, was enacted, among other things, to combat
organized crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities;
and to prohibit certain acts relating to racketeering activities’
(para [19]; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohamed
NO 2002 (2) SACR 196 (CC); 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC) para [14]).
The dispute in this case was not related to Chapter 6 of the
POCA, dealing with the civil forfeiture of property in the context of
‘removing incentives for crime; deterring persons from using or
allowing their property to be used in crime; eliminating or
incapacitating the means by which crime may be committed; and
advancing the ends of justice by depriving those involved in
crime of the property concerned’ (para [19]).
It was consequently concluded that the facts upon which the
NDPP relied for the contention that the platform and equipment
were instrumentalities of the crime of theft were insufficient for a
preservation of property order to be granted under section 38 of
the POCA, or for the property to be forfeited in terms of sections
48 and 50 of the Act (paras [25]–[30]):
What all this shows is that the applications for a preservation-of-
property order and a forfeiture order were ill-conceived, and should
never have been brought by the NDPP. They were far removed from
the main purpose of POCA: to give effect to SouthAfrica’s international
obligation to ensure that criminals do not benefit from their crimes. In
the result, limited public resources have been wasted, and the costs
of the abortive POCA applications as well as the costs of this appeal
will ultimately be borne by taxpayers. The NDPP’s decision to apply in
this case for preservation-and-forfeiture orders under POCA, is inexpli-
cable, irrational, and must be severely deprecated (para [33]).
BAIL
Bail refers to the release of an accused person from custody,
subject to the obligation to appear before the proper authority at
a future date and time. The release may also be subject to other
specific conditions as the authorised officer – whether a police
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officer, a magistrate, or judge – sees fit (Mfini v S (CA&R15/2016)
[2017] ZAECGHC 6 (2 February 2017)).
A qualified right to be released on bail
The four accused in S v Hewu & others 2017 (2) SACR 67
(ECG) were arrested on 11 January 2016 on suspicion of
participating in an armed robbery and attempted murder. The
accused appeared in the regional court for the first time on 4 May
2016, and the matter was remanded for trial to 19 August 2016.
Given that no foreign language interpreter was available to assist
the complainant on that day, the matter was further remanded to
5 October 2016 (para [2]). On 5 October 2016, the foreign
language interpreter was again not available and the regional
magistrate refused to postpone the case further. The matter was
consequently struck from the roll. However, the accused were
almost immediately re-arrested on the same day during the lunch
adjournment, pursuant to a warrant issued by a peace officer in
terms of section 43 of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [3]). They
were subsequently brought before a different regional magistrate
on 6 October 2016. The prosecutor advised that the foreign
language interpreter, whose attendance was required to assist
the complainant, would indeed be available the following week
and insisted on a postponement of the matter, arguing that the
accused should remain in custody as they were lawfully before
the court in that the state was entitled to re-arrest them (para [7]).
The accused, in turn, argued that their re-arrest almost immedi-
ately after the matter had been struck from the roll the previous
day, was malicious (paras [4]–[6]). The presiding magistrate
agreed and stressed the fact that the previous regional court
magistrate had struck the matter from the roll just two days earlier,
and that the re-arrest of the accused immediately thereafter was
‘procedurally unfair’ and infringed their fair trial rights as guaran-
teed under sections 12 and 35 of the Constitution. She subse-
quently proceeded to strike the matter from the court roll for a
second time (para [8]). But on 13 October 2016, the matter again
came before the same regional magistrate; it had been set down
for trial notwithstanding her dismissal of the application for
postponement to that date and the fact that she had struck the
matter from the roll. The accused were arrested that very morning
on a warrant signed by a different magistrate, taken into custody,
and brought to court. The regional magistrate again struck
the matter from the roll and told the prosecutor: ‘If you intend
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bringing, re-arresting the accused what I would advise is that you
bring it before the presiding officer because I am not going to
entertain this matter any further’ (para [9]).
The matter was ultimately referred for special review to Judge
Revelas of the High Court, Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown.
The prosecution argued that the provisions of section 60(11) of
the Criminal Procedure Act require an accused to be detained in
custody until dealt with in accordance with the law, unless that
accused is able to show ‘exceptional circumstances which in the
interest of justice permit his or her release’ (para [10]). It was
further submitted that no matter how many times an accused is
brought before a court on a Schedule 5 or 6 offence, he or she
should always be brought while in custody in order to enable the
court to comply with section 60(11) (para [11]). The regional
magistrate, in turn, reiterated her view that had she not struck the
matter from the roll, it would have been a further infringement of
the rights of the accused, and she would have simply been a ‘tool
of the state furthering. . .a gross injustice. . .of an individual who
is deemed to be innocent until proven guilty’ (para [12]; Minister
of Police & another v Ashwell du Plessis (666/2012) [2013]
ZASCA 119).
Judge Revelas, in determining whether the 13 October 2016
proceedings were in accordance with justice, observed the
following: first, he noted that it was ‘most undesirable’ that
the expedition of prosecutions are increasingly hamstrung by the
absenteeism of interpreters, social workers, witnesses, and other
court personnel (para [17]). He agreed that the re-arrest of the
accused by the police immediately after their release ‘seemed
like conduct aimed at thwarting the effect of the magistrate’s
order and bore a close resemblance to contempt of court’ (para
[17]). Such police conduct, he added, might also constitute
grounds for or bolster a civil suit for damages against the Minister
of Police (para [17]). However, the judge agreed with the
prosecution that striking a matter from the roll for a second and
third time, as a summary response to the actions of the police,
was not appropriate, or legally sound (para [17]).
The presiding magistrate could, for example, have invoked
section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Act, which, in peremptory
terms, requires a court to investigate any delay in the completion
of pending criminal proceedings where the delay appears to be
unreasonable, and if the delay may cause substantial prejudice
to any of the parties involved (para [18]). It is only once a court
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has investigated the delay and taken all the relevant factors into
account, that it may issue an appropriate order, which may
include refusing further postponement of the proceedings (para
[18]; S v Geritis 1966 (1) SA 753 (W)).
Judge Revelas concluded that section 60(11) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, which is primarily concerned with a court’s
discretion to grant bail in circumstances where Schedules 5 and
6 apply, does not constitute an absolute bar to a court’s refusal of
postponement and a decision to strike the case from the roll in
terms of section 342A(3)(a) of the Act. It will always depend on
the unique facts and circumstances of the case (para [23]).
Failure of an accused on bail to appear
The accused in S v Porritt & another (SS40/2006) [2017]
ZAGPJHC 202 (21 July 2017) failed to appear in court for the
continuation of the criminal proceedings against him, although he
had been warned by the presiding officer to do so. The accused
was subsequently arrested and brought before the court, where
he explained that he had been unable to appear on the date and
time set down for the continuation of the proceedings due to a
medical condition. An enquiry was consequently held under
section 67 of the Criminal ProcedureAct to determine whether the
accused’s failure to appear was due to his own fault, and if so,
what the consequences of this would be.
Judge Spilg, for the High Court, explained that the substance
of the inquiry under section 67 of the Criminal Procedure Act is to
determine whether an accused should be held in custody as an
awaiting trial prisoner as a consequence of having his or her bail
withdrawn (para [22]). This is a particularly significant inquiry
given that ‘[i]ncarceration, whatever its form, amounts to an
institutionalised deprivation of liberty’ (para [22]). It was conse-
quently held that section 67 of the Act must be read as requiring
the accused to satisfy the court that there is no reasonable
possibility that any failure on his or her part to appear before the
court was due to his or her fault (para [27]). Such a ‘reasonable
possibility’ does not entail a burden of proof (para [47], quoting
Die Afrikaanse Pers Bpk v Neser 1948 (2) SA 295 (C) 297), where
it was held that
‘[s]atisfy’ does not mean ‘prove’. I take ‘satisfy’ to mean therefore that
the court must feel that there is a fair probability that the defendant’s
defence is a good one, at any rate that it is bona fide.
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Judge Spilg further noted that an accused who has had his bail
revoked subsequent to a section 67 inquiry, may nonetheless
reapply for bail (para [22]). Moreover, given that section 58 of the
Criminal Procedure Act is an overarching provision governing
bail under Chapter 9 of the Act, the judge also held that there is
‘no requirement that an accused on bail must be warned to
appear provided the court has directed the date or dates on
which the trial will commence or continue’ (paras [37] [39]). In
terms of section 67 of the Criminal Procedure Act, therefore, an
accused released on bail will have his or her bail cancelled and
the bail money forfeited, if he or she fails to appear on the date
and time specified, or fails to remain in attendance, as the case
may, and furthermore fails to satisfy the court, at his or her
subsequent appearance, that there is no reasonable possibility
that any failure to appear was due to any fault on his or her (the
accused’s) part. This provision must be distinguished from the
provisions under section 72 of the same Act, which deals with
accused persons charged with less serious offences and who
have been released on a warning, in contradistinction to a
release on bail, and who also fail to appear on the date and time
specified. Such accused persons, having been released on a
warning pursuant to the provisions of section 72 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, and who subsequently fail to appear on the date
and time as specified, and are also unable to satisfy the court that
this failure was not due to any fault on their part, may be
sentenced summarily to a fine not exceeding R300, or to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding three months (s 72(4); S v Singo
2002 (2) SACR 160 (CC)).
With regard to the determination whether there is indeed a
reasonable possibility that the failure of an accused to appear on
a date and time as specified was not due to any fault on his or her
part, Judge Spilg noted that while such an accused may exercise
his or her right to remain silent, the accused must nonetheless
‘produce evidence that raises a reasonable doubt’ that the failure
to appear was not due to any fault on his or her part (para [28]).
As to the meaning of ‘fault’ in this context, it was held that section
67 of the Criminal Procedure Act ‘has in mind culpability in the
form of intent and not negligence’ (paras [29] [30]; Savoi & others
v National Director of Public Prosecutions & another 2014 (5) SA
317 (CC) paras [86] [87]; S v Coetzee & others 1997 (3) SA 527
(CC) para [162]). With regard to the nature of the section 67
inquiry in this case specifically, Judge Spilg explained as follows:
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(In the context of s 67 I believe that the requirement of fault resulting in
the cancellation of bail and forfeiture of the bail money will arise in the
circumstances of this case if;
a. Porritt fails to satisfy the court that his non-appearance was not
due to circumstances which reasonably prevented him from
appearing; and
b. the court is satisfied that he intended to avoid attending court for
the purpose of frustrating the case from either continuing or being
postponed to another suitable date.
While this may overstate the position I would prefer to give Porritt the
benefit of such a broad interpretation (para [31]).
In considering the evidence presented by the accused in this
case as to why he had failed to appear on the date and time as
specified for the continuance of the criminal proceedings against
him, Judge Spilg ultimately found that he was satisfied that the
accused had not intended to appear in court on any of the dates
and times specified, and that he purposefully delayed the
proceedings: ‘This conclusion arises from Porritt’s own evidence
regarding what he did and did not do and his failure to satisfy the
court that his explanations create a reasonable possibility that his
failure to appear was not due to his fault’ (para [205]). The
accused’s bail was consequently provisionally cancelled and the
bail money was provisionally declared forfeit (para [208]).
CUSTODY AND PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT IN TERMS OF
SECTION 108 OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURTS ACT 32 OF 1944
The magistrate presiding in S v Lekalakala (113/2017) [2017]
ZALMPPHC 36 (9 November 2017) observed how the accused,
who was seated in the gallery of the magistrate’s court, passed
something (by throwing it) to a Rulane Baloyi, who was at that
stage in the dock appearing before the presiding magistrate on
drug-related charges. The presiding magistrate subsequently
called the accused to the bar and informed him that what he had
done was ‘contempt of court in facie curiae’ (para [1]). The
accused had his rights explained to him and the magistrate, upon
learning that the accused had passed a packet containing dagga
to Baloyi, summarily convicted the accused and sentenced him
to three months’ imprisonment in terms of section 108(1) of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (para [2]). In his reasons for
this conviction and sentence, the magistrate explained that the
‘[c]ourt felt very disturbed by the accused’s preparedness to go
to jail [as he did not respond to any of the questions put by the
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magistrate in this regard] and the manner in which he promoted
his detention even though the said package could not be found’
(para [4]).
On review, Muller J, for the High Court, held that section 108 of
the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 applies to magistrates
only, and contemplates three possible situations of unlawful
behaviour: ‘(a) where a judicial officer is wilfully insulted during a
sitting; or (b) where the proceedings of a court is wilfully
interrupted; or (c) where a person otherwise misbehaves in the
place where the court is held’ (para [6]). ‘Misbehaviour’ in this
context includes behaviour which is not ‘necessarily directed at
the judicial officer to insult him/her, but which is nevertheless
serious enough to invoke the provision of section 108(1). . .It has
been held that the word ‘‘misbehave’’ in section 108(1) connotes
impropriety which undermines or interferes with the proceedings
to the extent that it undermines the due administration of justice’
(paras [7] [8]).
With regard to the conduct of the accused in this case, Muller J
observed that the accused’s actions had not interrupted the
proceedings, nor had they been aimed at insulting the presiding
officer (para [9]). As to whether the presiding magistrate was
justified in dealing with the case in a summary fashion, Muller J
held that the proceedings in terms of section 108(1) are prima
facie contrary to the provisions of section 35(3) of the Constitu-
tion, but that ‘the need for swift measures to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process by means of a summary enquiry into the
conduct of the accused is sometimes called for’ (para [12]).
However, when invoking the provisions of section 108 of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, the principles laid down in S v
Lavhengwa 1996 (2) SACR 453 (W) must be followed (para [13],
quoting from S v Lavhengwa 1996 (2) SACR 453 (W) 495b-j):
1. The magistrate should first carefully consider whether or not
he/she should resort to the normal procedure of referring the
matter to the Attorney-General or the summary procedure. Consid-
erations which would become important at this stage are whether
or not he can disregard the accused’s conduct as unimportant . . .
or merely stupid and not wilfully contumacious. . .or whether the
matter can be disposed of by merely removing the accused from
the court . . . or whether the conduct is insulting or insolent in its
nature towards the magistrate personally. In the instances men-
tioned above it would be better to take evasive action (such as e.g.
the removal of the accused from the court or an adjournment or
requesting an apology from the accused or reporting him to his
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professional body if the accused is a practitioner) which would
obviate the necessity to embark upon a trial under section 108(1)
or to take the normal route of referring the matter to the Attorney-
General rather than resorting to the summary procedure.
2. If, however, the circumstances are such that the summary proce-
dure is called for (eg in cases of disobedience to rulings,
interruption of the proceedings etc) he should warn the accused of
his intention to proceed with summary trial under the provisions of
section 108(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. Depending on the
accused’s prior knowledge of the contents of section 108(1), it
would be advisable for the magistrate to read out the section to the
accused so as to inform him of the provisions thereof and thus
inform the accused of the nature of the offence with which he is
being charged.
3. The magistrate must then proceed to inform the accused of the
latter’s conduct which in his view contravened section 108(1) and
which of the three categories mentioned in section 108(1) his
conduct is alleged to have transgressed.
4. The magistrate thereafter should inform the accused of his consti-
tutional rights as set out in section 25(3) of the Constitution and
enquire from the accused whether he wishes to remain silent,
testify, give an explanation or call witnesses. If the accused is a lay
person he should be afforded the right to obtain legal representa-
tion should he wish to do so, subject to such time and feasibility
constraints as may seem reasonable in the circumstances of the
case. Depending on the decision of the accused, the magistrate
should then afford the accused full opportunity to exercise his
rights in order to ensure that his constitutional rights are not
infringed nor that the rules of natural justice are transgressed.
5. After the accused has been given an opportunity to exercise these
rights the magistrate should then weigh up all the circumstances,
evidence and arguments and convict the accused only if the facts
before him prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
wilfully contravened any of the offences mentioned in section
108(1).
The presiding magistrate in the case of Lekalakala had clearly
failed to follow these principles, and the conviction and sentence
were set aside (paras [14]–[16]).
ADDUCING FURTHER EVIDENCE ON APPEAL IN TERMS OF SECTION
309B OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT
The appellant in Munyai v S 2017 (2) SACR 168 (GJ) was
convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment in January
2016. In appealing against both his conviction and sentence, an
application was brought on behalf of the appellant in October
2016, in which a request was made for further evidence to be led
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under section 309B(5) and (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act
(paras [1] [2]). This application was based on a sworn affidavit by
the complainant dated April 2016 and in which she recanted her
claim of rape (para [4]). Judges Sutherland and Shangisa, for the
High Court, described the content of the document as follows:
[6] The contents are instructive as much for what they do not say, as
for what is alleged. Notably what is absent is an account of what
happened on the day in question. The document is entirely cast in
generalities. The high point of the explanation for initially lying is
that the appellant hurt her feelings. She does not advance an
alternative version. She does not identify what she initially said
was false and what, if anything, was true. For example, was she
assaulted, even though not raped? Did her mother and brother
arrive to rescue her? Was she crying at the time?
[7] Two additional important points are touched on in the affidavit.
[7.1] First, her poor relationship with her own family and her
sense of rejection by her mother. This provokes a thought
about whether her motivation to recant is the absence of
support for her and her children, a matter that requires
investigation.
[7.2] Second, the claim that she was, on 14 April 2016, pregnant
with the appellant’s third child is significant. A birth certifi-
cate of a child born to [the complainant] on 19 April 2016 is
among the documents in the record of appeal. She states
the child was conceived whilst the appellant was on bail
which had been granted on 6 July 2015. By inference,
conception must have occurred in July or August 2015.
Accordingly, she deposed to this affidavit, five days before
that birth, and some three months after the appellant was
sentenced. At the time when her evidence was given, on
12 August 2015, she would on the probabilities have not
known she was pregnant. Notably, during the trial, she
testified to having had sex with the appellant in July 2015,
despite his bail conditions stipulating no contact between
them.
The only other document submitted in support of the applica-
tion for further evidence to be led under section 309B(5) and (6)
of the Criminal Procedure Act, was an affidavit by the appellant in
which he indicated that he had learnt of the recantation affidavit
from his Legal Aid Board representative (para [8]). Judges
Sutherland and Shangisa noted that this was not sufficient to
establish a full and convincing case for further evidence to be led
on appeal. They described the two affidavits by the complainant
and the appellant as ‘woefully inadequate’, and the application
under section 309B(5) and (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act as
‘fundamentally flawed’ (para [11]).
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The test for acceding to such an application is set out in S v De
Jager 1965 (2) SA 612 (A) 613A–D:
This Court can, in a proper case, hear evidence on appeal; see R v
Carr 1949 (2) SA 693 (AD); but the usual course, if a sufficient case
has been made out, is to set aside the conviction and sentence and
send the case back for the hearing of the further evidence, as was
done, for example, in R v Mhlongo and another 1935 AD 133.
However, it is well settled that it is only in an exceptional case that the
Court will adopt either of the foregoing courses. It is clearly not in the
interests of the administration of justice that issues of fact, once
judicially investigated and pronounced upon, should lightly be re-
opened and amplified. And there is always the possibility, such is
human frailty, that an accused, having seen where the shoe pinches,
might tend to shape evidence to meet the difficulty. Accordingly, this
Court has, over a series of decisions, worked out certain basic
requirements. They have not always been formulated in the same
words, but their tenor throughout has been to emphasise the Court’s
reluctance to re-open a trial. They may be summarised as follows:
(a) There should be some reasonably sufficient explanation, based
on allegations which may be true, why the evidence which it is
sought to lead was not led at the trial.
(b) There should be a prima facie likelihood of the truth of the
evidence.
(c) The evidence should be materially relevant to the outcome of the
trial.
Therefore, while criteria (a) and (b) had been met in the case
under discussion, criterion (b) was not properly addressed in the
application for further evidence to be led, as it was unclear, for
example, how the complainant’s affidavit got into the record
without an application to admit it, or who had drafted the affidavit,
what role the complainant’s family had played in the recanting of
her complaint, and whether a rational basis existed for accepting
that the recanting had been voluntary (paras [9] [13]). However,
the judges also emphasised that it is important to take a
pragmatic approach and to consider the contents of the affidavits
despite the inadequacies of the application (para [14]). In this
regard, they found that apart from the deficiencies in the applica-
tion to lead further evidence, the evidence used to substantiate
the claim of rape in the court a quo was problematic (para [15]). It
was noted that the complainant initially only laid a charge of
assault and mentioned rape only at a clinic where she had been
taken for a medical examination in regard to the assault charge
she had laid (para [16]). In cross-examination this discrepancy
had not been adequately resolved, and it was further noted that
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the complainant (under cross-examination) conceded to having
had sex with the appellant again after the rape and while he was
out on bail. This, too, had not been dealt with further under
cross-examination at trial (para [17]). Having perused the trial
record, judges Sutherland and Shangisa came to the following
conclusion (paras [21] [22]):
[A]lthough there is substantial evidence that points to an abusive
relationship between the appellant and [the complainant], and assaults
on the night and day in question, there is very little to offer assurances
that a rape indeed occurred, other than [the complainant’s] belated
say-so. The probability that the rape was an exaggeration, aimed at
punishing him for yet another assault, cannot be ruled out.
[22] Regrettably, the trial was conducted with such robustness that
the many finer details and nuances which are important in this type of
case were not addressed. Foremost is the pedestrian attitude of the
police and prosecution to proving rape by reference to discernible
vaginal injuries, often a fruitless exercise and, indeed, a useless
exercise when the key facts about rape are constituted not by raw
violence, but by overpowering intimidation inducing submission.
There is no shortage of cases on appeal bemoaning these systemic
shortcomings in rape cases, but it is apparent that no heed is paid by
those who investigate or prosecute.
The judges found the fact that the complainant had continued
to have a sexual relationship with the appellant after the arrest
and his subsequent release on bail particularly questionable.
They held that this was ‘a profound consideration in casting
doubt on the veracity of the allegation of rape itself, but again,
must not be taken out of context and her claims dismissed’ (para
[23]). Thus, ‘some degree of rapprochement’ between the com-
plainant and the appellant after the alleged rape had occurred
does not necessarily mean that the allegation of rape is untrue,
yet, post-arrest sexual encounters cannot be ignored completely
and must also be taken into account in considering the veracity of
complaints made (para [23]). What this case rather illustrated,
according to the judges, is that ‘there is no room for superficiality
in prosecuting rape cases’ (para [23]).
The appellant’s conviction and sentence were subsequently
set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial court to be
reopened for further evidence to be led (para [24]).
Also see Moyo: Justice v S (A204/2017) [2017] ZAGPJHC 356
(30 November 2017), where it was held that lack of jurisdiction is
not a new ground of appeal, but rather a ground for review.
However, Opperman J for the High Court, Gauteng Local Divi-
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sion, Johannesburg, found that appeal and review procedures
run parallel, and that a court may interfere where a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result, as ‘substantive justice should
always prevail over strict adherence to legal principle’ (para [11]).
Judge Opperman summarised the procedures in respect of
conviction and sentence on the one hand (appeal procedures)
and irregularities in the procedures arriving at the conviction and
sentence (review) as follows:
38.1 The whole of the procedure to access an appeal court (High
Court) on the question of conviction and of sentence, is regu-
lated by statute.
38.2 Where a ground on conviction and on sentence was not raised in
the application for leave to appeal before the magistrate, or not
in the petition to the Judge President where leave was refused,
leave to appeal that new ground must be sought. The new
ground raises issues that are in fact res judicata, despite such
new ground of appeal not having been raised previously. Each
new ground is not a fresh appeal, see Molaudzi v S [2015] ZACC
20, para [44]. The proper approach under such circumstances
would be to defer the hearing on the appeal, to afford the
appellant an opportunity to obtain leave from the proper court
in the hierarchy, see Pieterse v the State (A332/2016) 2017
JDR 0748 (GJ) (assuming of course the new ground were
meritorious). Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata should
be relaxed as contemplated in Molaudzi (supra), would be for
such courts to decide having regard to the particular circum-
stances of the case.
38.3 Where a point of procedure is raised, the appellant can raise
such point in the appeal. Where, however, this did not occur, the
review procedure should, as a general rule, be followed, employ-
ing rule 53 of the rules of the Superior Court, for this purpose.
There is no reason in principle, in my view, why the provisions of
section 304(4) of the CPA could not come to the assistance of an
appellant in appropriate circumstances.
BROADCASTING (VIA AUDIO, AUDIO-VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC
MEANS) THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL
The High Court, Western Cape Division, Cape Town, in Media
24 Limited v National Director of Public Prosecutions, In re: S v
Van Breda (5027/2017) [2017] ZAWCHC 35 (4 April 2017)
granted the applicant, a multi-media organisation with interests in
digital, print, and other media, permission to, among other things,
install two video cameras and record and broadcast the proceed-
ings in S v Van Breda. This case involved an accused indicted on
several charges of murdering members of his family at their home
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on a golf estate near Stellenbosch. His sister survived the attack.
Given the shocking nature of the allegations, as well as the
modus operandi of the crimes, the matter obviously received
wide attention in the media. Important limitations were, however,
placed on the media in an order granting permission to the
applicant to broadcast the entire criminal trial. These limitations
included: that no exhibits could be photographed, videotaped or
published without the express permission of the court (para [4]);
that the video cameras could not be directed at any person,
witness or otherwise (para [1.3.2]); and that no photographs,
audio recordings or video footage could be taken of the accused’s
surviving sister who was set to testify testify at trial (para [2]).
Reasons for this order were given by Desai J on 4 April in
Media 24 Limited v National Director of Public Prosecutions, In re:
S v Van Breda (5027/2017) [2017] ZAWCHC 37 (6 April 2017).
The judge placed special emphasis on the vulnerable position of
accused’s surviving sibling because of the injuries she had
sustained during the attack (para [8]). And it was for this reason
that he placed stricter limitations on the extent to which the media
could report on her testimony at trial. Desai J generally agreed
with the applicant that the alleged murders were indeed a matter
of ‘acute public interest’ (para [11]).
However, the NDPP objected to the granting of the order to
broadcast the entire criminal trial. It was submitted, among other
things, that ‘witnesses might be intimidated by the presence of
recording equipment in the court’; that witnesses might find it
inhibiting; and that a witness might even be influenced in
deciding not to testify (paras [12] [17]). In this regard, Desai J
stated that the original order granted may be varied at any stage
during the proceedings, and if any witness, on good cause,
asked that his or her evidence not be broadcast, ‘the Court will
come to his assistance’ (para [18]). Another logical difficulty with
the broadcasting of witness testimony is that it may prejudice
cross-examination, as all persons and witnesses will have access
to the proceedings and the value of subsequent testimony may
therefore be compromised (para [20]). However, Desai J observed
that the media would in any event report extensively on the trial,
and further that it would be possible for a witness to access
accounts of the proceedings through various media platforms
(para [20]).
In balancing the competing interests and rights of the accused
in this matter against the interests of witnesses and of the public,
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Desai J concluded that the interests of justice do not dictate that
greater emphasis be placed upon any of the competing interests;
it ‘is not whether witnesses and participants in the judicial
process will experience a degree of stress if the evidence was to
be broadcast. The question is whether any additional burden
imposed is so sufficiently serious as to justify a limitation of the
fundamental right to freedom of expression’ (para [27]; s 16 of the
Constitution). This order was again confirmed in Media 24 Limited
v National Director of Public Prosecutions, In re: S v Van Breda
(5027/2017) [2017] ZAWCHC 37 (6 April 2017).
The matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal in Van
Breda v Media 24 Limited & others; National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Media 24 Limited & others 2017 (2) SACR 491
(SCA), after both the NDPP and the accused continued to resist
the video recording and broadcast of the criminal trial. While the
position of the NDPP was one of blanket opposition to any part of
this criminal proceedings, or any other in future, being broadcast
(paras [7] [60]), the appellant’s appeal was directed only to that
part of Desai J’s ruling which allowed Media 24 to place two video
cameras in the courtroom to record and broadcast the proceed-
ings. The relevant part of the order made by Desai J reads as
follows (paras [5] [7]):
1.3 During the sitting of the court, the applicant is permitted to install
two video cameras to record and or broadcast the proceedings,
with the following guidelines:
1.3.1 The cameras shall be set up by no later than 15 minutes
before the commencement of proceedings every day, and
shall be removed by not later than half an hour after the
adjournment of proceedings at the end of the day;
1.3.2 The video cameras shall be stationary, erected on tripods,
and shall not be attended by a person;
1.3.3 The video cameras shall be left to record and broadcast the
proceedings, and shall be located in such positions as the
court may direct from time to time;
1.3.4 The cameras shall be located discreetly to cause as little
intrusion in the proceedings of the court as possible.
The appellant did not object to the recording and broadcast of
counsel’s argument and the rulings and judgment of the court
(para [7]).
Ponnan JA, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, considered the broadcasting of court proceedings involv-
ing the use of the media, like video cameras and sound record-
ings, and for the purpose of communicating the proceedings to
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the public, from historico-legal and comparative perspectives
(paras [17]–[30] and [65]–[68]). The first South African court
having to engage with the issue was in 2000 in the case of
Doctom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd t/a Live Africa Network News v King
NO 2000 (4) SA 973 (C) (para [31]). The issue arose again in
2004, in Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a e-tv v Director of Public
Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 (5) SA 540 (SCA) (paras
[32]–[34]); in Thatcher v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development 2005 (4) SA 543 (C) (paras [35] [36]); in 2006, in
South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Downer NO &
Shaik [2006] ZASCA 90); in 2005, and in 2010, in AfriForum v
Malema 2011 (6) SA 240 (EqC) (para [38]). The most recent case
dealing with the broadcast of a criminal proceeding was the
murder trial of Oscar Pistorius in Multichoice (Proprietary) Limited
v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re: Pistorius, In Re; Media 24
Limited v Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng [2014]
ZAGPPHC 37, 25 February 2014 (paras [39]–[41]).
In considering these South African cases, and also how the
broadcast media have been dealt with in other jurisdictions,
Ponnan JA noted that ‘[t]he question whether, and under what
circumstances, cameras should be permitted in South African
courtrooms provokes tension between the rights of the press, on
the one hand, and the fair trial rights of an accused person, on the
other’ (para [42]). Concerning these conflicting constitutional
rights, Ponnan JA held that it is essential to the proper functioning
of any true democracy that these rights – freedom of expression
and the fair administration of justice – be harmonised insofar as
this is possible (para [42]). On the use of media in the courtroom,
he stated that conventional media reporting will inevitably be
limited and incomplete, and that despite their importance,
newspapers (and even television) are yesterday’s technology. Pencils
and sketchpads are now considered anochronistic: There is no
restriction regarding filming outside the court. Nor is there any
restriction regarding attending in court and taking notes, drawing
pictures or upon accessing exhibits. The [current] restriction relates to
the means of gathering the information and the place where it may be
gathered. There simply can be no logic in a court permitting journalists
to utilise the reporting techniques of the print media but not permitting
a television journalist to utilise his or her technology and method of
communication, being the broadcasting and recording of proceed-
ings, despite the fact that ‘live camera footage will be more accurate
than a reporter’s after-the-fact summary’ (para [44]).
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In emphasising the important role of the media in relaying
information to the public and in making governmental conduct,
in all of its many facets (including courts), more transparent,
Ponnan JA held that the media have a discretion to determine
what means of communication would be most effective, and that
court proceedings must be meaningfully accessible to any
member of the public who wishes to be timeously and accurately
apprised of such proceedings (paras [45]–[47]). He also listed
the following advantages to allowing televised proceedings of
criminal trials: it demystifies the judicial process; ensures more
informed deliberation and critical assessment of the judiciary
based on the public’s ability to readily observe judicial proceed-
ings; increases the understanding of and respect for the judiciary
based on the public’s increased ability to observe the daily
working of the courts; improves journalistic standards relative to
court reporting, resulting in greater coverage of proceedings and
the development of court reports specialising in judicial matters;
and heightens the public’s awareness of deep seated societal
problems (para [58]).
However, he also noted the objections to the use of broadcast
media in the courtroom, the most persuasive being the effect that
the cameras may have on the testimony of witnesses in criminal
trials. In this regard, Ponnan JAheld that ‘it must be accepted that
the courtroom is already a public place with a physical public
presence – proceedings are transcribed and members of the
press and public are free to be present. Television broadcasts
provide members of the public with a virtual presence in the
courtroom. If the physical presence of members of the public
cannot be said to inhibit or distract counsel, the judges and
witnesses, it has to be open to debate that a virtual presence will
have that effect’ (para [52]). Moreover, with regard to concerns of
privacy and security, it must be noted that judicial proceedings
are public events and the private interests of individuals appear-
ing in a courtroom may, therefore, have to give way because their
disputes are being resolved in a public forum that must be open
to public scrutiny (para [57]). Ponnan JA also dismissed con-
cerns about the risk of witness exposure by stating that precise
and cautious instructions by the judge to witnesses, that they
must testify based solely on their personal knowledge, would
ameliorate any possible external influence (para [54]). And, with
regard to the argument that commercial imperatives will likely
impel the media to focus on high-profile cases or cases that are
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particularly unusual or gruesome, he stated that the courts
cannot prescribe to the media which trials they should cover, and
that it is in any event those high-profile cases on which the public
should receive the maximum amount of information relating to the
process by which a particular judicial outcome is achieved (para
[56]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that the default
position must be that there can be no blanket objection, in
principle, to the media recording and broadcasting court proceed-
ings, but that courts have an inherent power, in terms of section
173 of the Constitution, to limit the nature and scope of the
broadcast, where necessary, in order to ensure the fairness of the
proceedings before it. This power must be exercised in the
interests of justice and must be consistent with constitutional
imperatives (paras [59] [72]). In permitting the televising of court
proceedings, the Supreme Court of Appeal noted that it was
doing no more than recognising an appropriate starting point;
ultimately, it remains for the trial court to exercise a discretion
under section 173 of the Constitution, and on a case-by-case
basis (para [70]). The following guidelines were set down in this
regard:
(a) A trial court must exercise a discretion by balancing the
degree of risk involved in allowing cameras into the court-
room, against the degree of risk that a fair trial may not ensue
(para [71]). In exercising this discretion, courts should not
restrict the nature and scope of the broadcast unless the
prejudice is demonstrable, and there is a real risk that such
prejudice will occur (para [75]).
(b) A trial court may issue such directions as may be necessary,
including to ‘(a) control the conduct of proceedings before
the court; (b) ensure the decorum of the court and prevent
distractions; and (c) ensure the fair administration of justice
in the pending case’ (para [71]).
(c) In reaching a decision, the trial court may consider whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that broadcasting the pro-
ceedings would: ‘(i) interfere with the rights of the parties to a
fair trial; or (ii) unduly detract from the solemnity, decorum
and dignity of the court’ (para [71]).
(d) The following should not be broadcast: ‘(a) communications
between counsel and client or co-counsel; (b) bench discus-
sions; and (c) in camera hearings’ (para [71]).
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(e) A trial court may terminate the broadcast of proceedings at
any stage where the directions given by the judge have been
violated, or the substantial rights of individual participants, or
the rights to a fair trial will be prejudiced by continuing the
broadcast (para [71]).
(f) Counsel’s address and all rulings and judgments by the
court in respect of both the conviction and sentence are
delivered in open court and may therefore, in principle, be
recorded and broadcast (para [72]).
(g) A witness may raise an objection with the trial judge as to
having his or her testimony broadcast and must specify the
grounds upon which the objection is based. The trial judge
may then exercise a discretion with regard to each objection
raised by each individual witness. Such an individual
approach will allow for a distinction to be made between
experts, and professional (such as police officers) and lay
witnesses. However, in dealing with these objecting partici-
pants, the court should not allow the trial to be drawn out
unnecessarily (para [72]).
(h) And, where the objection of a witness or other trial participant
is found to be valid, it will also be within the discretion of the
trial court either to require that cameras be excluded (para
[74]), or to provide for alternative means by which such an
objecting participant’s testimony may be covered, eg by
disguising the identity of the person being questioned,
altering his or her voice, etcetera (para [73]).
Ponnan JA accordingly set aside paragraph [1.3] of the order
made by Desai J (above), and remitted the matter back to that
court for the judge to reconsider his decision in accordance with
the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of Appeal (para
[76]).
Also see S v Van Breda (SS17/16) [2017] ZAWCHC 120
(31 October 2017), in which Judge Desai refused an application
by the accused for his testimony not to be broadcast.
ARREST
Arrest constitutes one of the most drastic infringements of the
rights of an individual, ie the right not to be deprived of your
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, and the right not to be
restricted in your freedom of movement. In the year under review,
the following two important cases dealt with the power to arrest
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and the objects of such an exercise of power, specifically with
regard to women.
An arrest under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998
The plaintiff in Rautenbach v Minister of Safety and Security
2017 (2) SACR 610 (WCC) was arrested on a warrant issued in
terms of section 8 of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, after
a complaint by his former wife (the complainant) that he had
breached the protection order granted in her favour. It was
argued for the plaintiff that there was no evidence to support the
the complainant’s statement that he had threatened her, or that
she was at risk of imminent danger from the plaintiff, and that his
arrest and subsequent detention were, therefore, unlawful (para
[17]). In relying on Seria v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (5)
SA 130 (C), counsel for the plaintiff further submitted that the
arresting officer had failed properly to investigate the matter, and
that he had not exercised his discretion to arrest the plaintiff in a
reasonable manner (para [18]).
The events giving rise to the complaint, included: an alleged
threatening e-mail sent by the plaintiff to his former wife; his
visiting her house under false pretenses; and his snooping
around the house at night and peeping through the windows
(para [10]). This information was included in the police docket
relating to the complaint. The arresting officer also contacted the
complainant telephonically, and she told him that she feared for
her life, and pleaded with him to do something about the matter
(para [10]). The arresting officer contacted the plaintiff to inform
him of the complaint laid against him, and as the plaintiff was
apparently in Worcester and not in the near vicinity of the
complainant, the arresting officer decided to inform the plaintiff to
attend the local police station in Mossel Bay on the following
Monday in order to take down a warning statement from him
(para [12]). However, the complainant phoned the arresting
officer shortly thereafter, and informed him that the plaintiff had
phoned her after learning of the complaint laid against him, that
he had lied about his whereabouts, and that he was still in Mossel
Bay (para [13]). The arresting officer then went to the plaintiff’s
house where he was arrested (para [14]).
In considering whether the arresting officer had properly
exercised the discretion entrusted to him under sections 8(4) and
8(5) of the Domestic ViolenceAct 116 of 1998, Le Grange J for the
High Court, Western Cape Division, Cape Town, emphasised that
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the Act had been promulgated in response to the alarmingly high
incidence of domestic violence in South African society, and that
its central purpose was to afford victims of domestic violence the
maximum protection available under law (paras [20] [24]; Minis-
ter of Safety and Security v Venter 2011 (2) SACR 67 (SCA) paras
[19]–[22])). In the latter case, it was held that
[t]he extensive protection available under the Act would be meaning-
less if those responsible for enforcing it, namely SAPS members, fail to
render the assistance required of them under the Act and the
Instructions. The legislature clearly identified the need for a bold new
strategy to meet the rampant threat of ever increasing incidences of
domestic violence. Its efforts would come to naught if the police, as
first point of contact in giving effect to these rights and remedies,
remain distance and aloof to them . . . (para [27]).
With regard to what constitutes ‘reasonable grounds to sus-
pect’ and ‘reasonable suspicion’, Le Grange J held that this must
be determined objectively, and the grounds must be those which
would induce a reasonable man to have the suspicion (paras
[28]-[30]; R v Van Heerden 1958 (3) SA 150 (T) 152E; Ralekwa v
Minister of Safety and Security 2004 (2) SA 342 (T) 347D–E;
Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 (5) SA 367 (SCA)).
And the phrase ‘imminent danger’, in the context of section 8 of
the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, refers to ‘harm which is
about to happen, if not certain to happen’ (para [32], quoting from
Seria v Minister of Safety and Security above 146A–C). Given the
factual matrix of this case, judge Le Grange concluded that
the plaintiff’s arrest had been lawful and in accordance with
section 8(4) of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, and that
the arresting officer had applied the standards specified as
contemplated in section 8(5) in arriving at his decision to arrest
the plaintiff (para [33]). To arrest the plaintiff, it had to appear to
the arresting officer that there were reasonable grounds to
suspect that the complainant in this case may suffer imminent
harm as a result of the alleged breach of the protection order.
Judge Le Grange explained that it is not necessary for the
arresting officer to be convinced that harm is about to happen or
is certain to happen, but merely that there is a possibility that
imminent harm may well happen (para [33]). He held that while
the arresting officer in this case may not have fully investigated
the complaint made, it did not detract from the fact that he acted,
‘with the available information to his disposal, rationally’ (para
[43]). Judge Le Grange held that ‘the standard was not breached
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because an arrestor exercised the discretion in a manner other
than that deemed optimal by the court. The standard is not
perfection, or even the optimum, judged from the advantage of
hindsight, and, as long as the choice made fell within the range of
rationality, the standard was not breached’ (para [43]).
Arrest without a warrant and subsequent detention: Prejudices based on
gender
The plaintiff in Mathe v Minister of Police 2017 (2) SACR 211
(GJ) was arrested, without a warrant, on a suspicion of prostitu-
tion, and was then detained for 37 hours before appearing in a
magistrate’s court. It was clear from the evidence before the High
Court, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, that the arrest had
been unlawful and that the plaintiff had suffered considerable
personal and material loss as a result. The court awarded her
damages in the sum of R120 000.
Opperman J’s judgment contains a lengthy narrative dealing
with the prejudices women face in society generally, in South
Africa specifically, and also under the South African criminal
justice system. The judge also placed strong emphasis on the
fact that section 205 of the Constitution places a duty on the
SAPS not only to investigate crime, but also to protect South
African society. This narrative on gender-based prejudices in the
South African criminal justice system is important, and deserves
to be quoted in full:
[31] In the present case, three women were waiting for transport when
an unmarked police vehicle arrived. After a very short exchange,
the women were arrested. There is nothing before me to suggest
that the police had any lawful reason whatsoever for arresting
them. From the facts before me they were arrested because they
were out in the early hours of the morning (02h00), they were
women and they were seated on chairs at a filling station. These
facts appear to have triggered the suspicion (or conclusion), that
they were prostitutes. There exists very little doubt in my mind that
had three men been seated at the very same location and time,
they would not have attracted the police officers’ attention let
alone have moved them to make an arrest.
[32] The police abused the power entrusted upon them. They did not
even take the basic step of identifying themselves to their victims
prior to starting their interrogations of these women. . . .
[34] At that time of the morning, the plaintiff and her friends were
particularly vulnerable. It is not this court’s duty to pronounce
upon the wisdom of being out that late without transport. How-
ever, women, like all other members of society, should be entitled
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to the protection from our police services. When the police turn on
those they are supposed to protect the Constitutional order is
threatened. It is noteworthy that section 205 of the Constitution
goes further than merely obliging the police to investigate crimes.
The section imposes a positive duty on the police to prevent and
combat crime. To have prevented and combatted crime in this
situation may have entailed these policemen advising these
women of the fact that the men approaching them were police-
men. It would have been beyond reason for the policemen to
have prevented and combatted crime by waiting nearby to make
sure that the women caught the taxi that they were waiting for.
That would have protected them from criminal attention in the
vulnerable time that they were not in the vehicle. Instead these
policemen put them in their vehicle and took them away to a place
of filth and fear for two days without even the benefit of being
allowed to advise their loved ones or employer of their fate. In the
plaintiff’s case this resulted in her losing her job. If one wanted to
drive a person to a life of crime, one could hardly think of a more
effective way of doing so than causing them to lose their legal
employment.
[35] Women are entitled to equal treatment and, as I have already
observed, men in the same situation would be unlikely to attract
the negative attention that these policemen bestowed on these
women. One cannot but deduce that the motives of the police in
question were influenced by the fact that the people they arrested
were women. Our society does not have a day of protest against
violence against men. Our society does not have a public holiday
called Men’s Day. Women, it is widely recognised, are often
undervalued for the role that they play in society as caregivers of
children and the elderly. It is equally widely recognised that they
are frequently subject to sexual violence. That those who, in
general terms, play such a valuable role should be treated so
badly is a bitter irony that all South Africans, particularly members
of the police service should be working towards eliminating. The
members of the police engaged in this arrest and detention did
the opposite of what section 205 of the Constitution requires them
to do and they added unnecessarily to the infinite quotient of
women’s humiliation and distress in the history of our society. This
cannot be treated lightly by a Court enjoined to apply the
Constitution.
[36] The plaintiff was subjected to prejudices which are exclusively
based on gender. The grinding down of women’s rights, erodes
the rights of the community as a whole. One pictures the youths
who spoke cruelly to the plaintiff being encouraged by the fact
that it was the police who instigated her fall from grace. Role
modelling of this kind, our young men can do without. Rather, they
should be seeing our police being considerate and respectful of
the women in our communities, in the finest traditions of all South
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African cultures. Terms of familial bonds, like ‘sister‘ and ‘mother‘
are commonly used by South Africans of many languages to
address women. The women leaders of the struggle towards the
liberation of our country, who are celebrated in our Woman’s Day
public holiday, are not lightly referred to as the mothers of the
nation. Our police, though facing many stresses and challenges
of their own, should strive to maintain the ethos of kindness and
respect that underpin these fine traditions, common courtesies
and kindnesses, particularly towards women, as part of their daily
interactions.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE NSPCA PRIVATELY TO PROSECUTE CRIMES
OF ANIMAL CRUELTY
In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2017 (1)
SACR 284 (CC), the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals (NSPCA), challenged the constitutionality of section
7(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, in that the provision does
not allow for the NSPCA, a juristic person, privately to prosecute
crimes of animal cruelty. This constitutional challenge by the
NSPCA had previously failed in both the High Court (National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development [2014] ZAGPPHC 763,
8 October 2014), and the Supreme Court of Appeal (National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development 2016 (1) SACR 308
(SCA)) where it was held that only natural persons and public
bodies have the power to institute private prosecutions in terms of
sections 7 and 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act (paras [13]–[17]).
In the matter before the Constitutional Court, the NSPCA also
argued, in addition to the constitutional challenge of section 7 of
the Act, that it was already empowered to institute private
prosecutions in terms of section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act,
read with section 6(2)(e) of the Societies for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals Act 169 of 1993.
Justice Khampepe, writing for the majority of the Constitutional
Court, emphasised that the care and protection of animals fall
within the ambit of the Constitution (paras [26] [57] [58]; S v
Lemthongthai 2015 (1) SACR 353 (SCA) para [20]), and that the
NSPCA has a specific statutory mandate to prevent animal
cruelty and promote animal welfare (para [2]). The power of
prosecution, in turn, is also established through the Constitution
and can take one of three forms: state prosecution (by the
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National Prosecuting Authority described in s 179 of the Constitu-
tion as a ‘single national prosecuting authority in the Republic’);
statutory prosecution (s 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act) or
private prosecution (s 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act) on a
certificate nolle prosequi (para [31]). In considering section 8 of
the Criminal Procedure Act, which makes provision for a private
prosecution under a statutory right, it was held that conferral of
such a right to institute a private prosecution must be conveyed in
the empowering statute in a sufficiently clear manner, but need
not be verbally explicit or use specific words – eg, ‘private
prosecution’ (para [33]). Against this background, section 6(2)(e)
of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act must,
therefore, be read in a manner that gives expression to the
underlying values of the Constitution (para [34]). This provision
does not make explicit reference to ‘private prosecution’, but
empowers the NSPCA to ‘institute legal proceedings connected
with its functions, including such proceedings in an appropriate
court of law’ (para [35]). However, both the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal found that this power to ‘institute legal
proceedings’ does not include the power to institute a private
prosecution (para [35]; National Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Devel-
opment [2014] ZAGPPHC 763, 8 October 2014).
The Constitutional Court did not agree. In highlighting that the
types of legal proceedings that the NSPCA can institute are
intimately connected with its functions, Justice Khampepe noted
that the NSPCA is ‘uniquely placed to robustly and responsively
combat animal cruelty’ (para [40]). This was recognised in
Parliament with the enactment of the Societies for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals Act (para [41], quoting from Debates of the
National Assembly (Hansard) 25 November 1993 14065 (Minister
of Agriculture)):
[T]he responsibilities of animal welfare organisations are becoming
greater as urbanisation in South Africa accelerates and animals in
many disadvantaged communities are in dire need of basic animal
care. The state is and will probably remain unable to provide these
services. . .The [Act] gives [the NSPCA] a platform to face this
challenge.
In addition to the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act, the animal protection regime includes five other
associated statutes: the Performing Animals Protection Act 24 of
1935; the Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965;
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the Veterinary and Para-Veterinary ProfessionsAct 19 of 1982; the
Animal Diseases Act 35 of 1984; and the Abattoir Hygiene Act
121 of 1992. These statutes set the standards for how animals are
to be cared for, treated, and used, and the NSPCA is explicitly
charged with upholding these statutes (paras [44]–[46]).
Justice Khampepe therefore concluded that the phrase ‘insti-
tute legal proceedings’ connected with its functions in section
6(2)(e) of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Act, must be interpreted to encompass prosecutions of animal
cruelty (para [46]). The NSPCA is best placed to conduct a
private prosecution and give effect to preventing and enforcing
the offences set out in the animal protection regime, and to read
section 6(2)(e) as excluding the right of private prosecution
would render it futile (paras [47] [48]). This reading of section
6(2)(e) is further supported by the historical development of the
legislative scheme, and specifically the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act 8 of 1914, which expressly confers a right of private
prosecution on the NSPCA (para [49]). The declaratory order was
subsequently granted to the effect that the NSPCA is already
empowered to institute private prosecutions in terms of section 8
of the Criminal Procedure Act read with section 6(2)(e) of the
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 169 of 1993
(para [62]).
With regard to the challenge to the constitutionality of section
7(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was held that this was no
longer a live dispute given that the declaratory order had been
granted (para [63]).
AUTOMATIC REVIEWS IN TERMS OF SECTIONS 302 AND 303 OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT
Seven matters in S v Jacobs and Six Similar Matters 2017 (2)
SACR 546 (WCC) were remitted to the High Court, Western Cape
Division, Cape Town, on automatic review in terms of sections
302 and 303 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 302 of the
Criminal ProcedureAct deals with reviewable sentences imposed
by a magistrate’s court, while section 303 addresses the transmis-
sion of the record by the clerk of the court to the registrar of the
provincial or local division having jurisdiction, within one week
after the determination of the case, and for the purpose of having
the proceedings reviewed by a judge in chambers. A sentence is
reviewable if it was imposed by a judicial officer who has not held
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the rank of magistrate for a period of more than seven years, and
if the sentence exceeds three months’ imprisonment or a fine of
R6 000 (para [7]; s 302(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act). Or,
in the case of magistrates who have held the rank for longer, if the
sentence imposed exceeds a term of six months’ imprisonment or
a fine of R12 000 (para [7]; s 302(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure
Act). In addition, section 85 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008
provides that any matter in which a child has been sentenced to
any form of imprisonment, including a sentence of compulsory
residence in a child and youth care centre, is also subject to
automatic review irrespective of the length of the sentence or the
period the judicial officer concerned has held the substantive
rank of magistrate or regional magistrate, or whether the child
appeared before a district or regional court (para [7]; S v LM
2013 (1) SACR 188 (WCC) paras [50] [51]).
The primary purpose of the review powers as set out in these
statutory provisions is to consider whether there was any irregu-
larity in the proceedings (para [8]). The reviewing judge must, for
this reason (para [8]),
evaluate whether the entire proceedings, ie those pertaining both to
the sentence as well as the merits of the conviction, are not only
formally in order and regular, but also whether they are fair, and in
doing so it has long been accepted that the reviewing judge exercises
a function akin to that ordinarily exercised by an appellate court. As
such, the process of automatic review is aimed at ensuring both the
validity, as well as the fairness, of the underlying conviction and
sentence, and the powers of the reviewing judge are extremely wide
and include not only the power to alter or reduce the sentence
imposed but also the power to quash the conviction or to set aside or
‘correct’ the proceedings, or to make any other order which may
promote the ends of justice.
Curiously, this statutory framework for automatic review is
unique to the South African legal system and is not derived from
Roman-Dutch or English law (para [7]). In S v Letsin 1963 (1) SA
60 (O), it was described as ‘an institution of vital importance to the
administration of justice in this country as the great majority of
accused who come before the magistrates’ courts are legally
unrepresented and criminal proceedings in these courts are not
considered to be properly concluded until the reviewing judge
has certified that they were in accordance with justice’ (para [9];
S v Letsin 1963 (1) SA 60 (O) 61A-B). And in S v Joors 2004 (1)
SACR 494 (C), it was described as ‘a measure intended to lend
substance to the constitutional right which an accused has to
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review by a higher court and the constitutional right of every
detained person to challenge the lawfulness of their detention’
(para [10]; S v Joors 2004 (1) SACR 494 (C) 497d). Yet, even
before the introduction of the Bill of Rights, it was an accepted
principle in South African law that a gross irregularity during the
course of a criminal trial could result in a conviction and sentence
being set aside (para [11]; S v Moodie 1961 (4) SA 752 (A); S v
Mushimba 1977 (2) SA 829 (A)).
With regard to the ‘statutory insistence on the expeditious
forwarding of records for review’ in terms of section 303 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, it was held in S v Manyonyo 1997 (1)
SACR 298 (E) that this is imperative for the promotion of speedy
and efficient administration of justice, which should not be
compromised by administrative incompetence (para [10]; S v
Manyonyo 1997 (1) SACR 298 (E) 300f). Previously, in S v Letsin
1963 (1) SA 60 (O), an obligation was placed on presiding
magistrates to see to it that criminal trials were properly con-
cluded by ensuring that the record of proceedings was placed
before the High Court for review as speedily as possible (para
[25]; S v Letsin 1963 (1) SA60 (O) 61G; S v Lewies 1998 (1) SACR
101 (C)). And the remedy adopted in S v Manyonyo 1997 (1)
SACR 298 (E) by the court for a five-month delay in submitting the
record, ie to direct that the magistrate provide a full explanation to
the court, has since become expected practice in the case of a
lengthy delay (para [27]; S v Mekula 2012 (2) SACR 521 (ECG)
para [13]). Unfortunately, however, it is often not adhered to (para
[27]). But while an unreasonable delay post-conviction is cer-
tainly lamentable and is often remarked upon with ‘the strongest
of disapproval’ by review courts, it does not per se constitute a
failure of justice which would preclude certification that the
proceedings were in accordance with justice (paras [27] [28]; S v
Maluleke 2004 (2) SACR 577 (T)). Possible remedies available to
an accused suffering prejudice due to an unreasonable delay are
to allow for a claim of damages, or to allow that accused to
exercise his or her right to appeal or review, as the case may be
(para [29]). And only where the delay is serious and no cogent
and convincing reasons have been provided, can the proceed-
ings, in certain instances, be set aside (para [29]; S v VC 2013 (2)
SACR 146 (KZP)).
Given this uncertain position as to consequences of an unrea-
sonable delay in bringing an automatic review before the appro-
priate High Court in terms of sections 302 and 303 of the Criminal
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Procedure Act, Sher AJ and Henney J for the High Court, Western
Cape Division, Cape Town, set down the following guiding
principles:
• An accused’s rights of review and appeal are a subsidiary
part of the overall right to a fair trial (para [32]).
• The jurisprudence on pre-conviction delay of proceedings is
distinct from that relating to delays post-conviction, and is,
therefore, not always of assistance/relevance (para [33]). For
example, the enquiry in respect of a delay in the appeal or
review proceedings post-conviction is generally much simpler
and the causes are usually much easier to establish than in
the case of an enquiry into pre-conviction delay (para [35]).
And while the seriousness of an offence may be highly
relevant for an enquiry into a pre-conviction delay, the con-
verse may be true of a delay in post-conviction proceedings
on a trivial offence. For example, where a person has been
sentenced to a term of incarceration or a sizeable fine for a
relatively trivial offence, the need to have a speedy review or
appeal may be more urgent and compelling (para [36]).
Moreover, ‘at the post-conviction stage of criminal proceed-
ings which originated from the magistrates’ courts, there is
much less congestion in the criminal justice system and a lack
of resources will not ordinarily constitute a factor of sub-
stance. As such, there is much less room for delay to be
tolerated post-conviction than pre- and the objective should
surely be to process appeals and reviews as expeditiously as
possible’ (para [34]).
• The aim of the review proceedings post-conviction is to obtain
the review court’s confirmation of the integrity of the conviction
and the fairness of the sentence imposed as soon as possible
(para [34]). This is necessary ‘at a time when great poverty
and rampant crime combined with a lack of legal aid resources
often coincide and are common features of our daily experi-
ence in the criminal justice system’ (para [37]). Closely
connected with the aim of review proceedings is the important
goal of the review proceedings provided for in terms of
sections 302 and 303 of the Criminal Procedure Act, ie to
maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system and the
public confidence therein by providing a free, far-ranging,
and expeditious review by the High Court of proceedings in
the lower courts (para [37]). Judges Sher AJ and Henney J
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further added that if this review process is not effective, then,
‘quite frankly, there is no point to it’ (para [37]).
• ‘It would be unfair and fallacious to adopt the attitude that if a
conviction is sound, any post-conviction delay in the auto-
matic review process is inconsequential and should always
be condoned’ (para [38]).
The judges concluded that (para [39])
where an irregularity pertaining to delay in an automatic review matter
is egregious and has resulted in prejudice to an accused, and such
irregularity has not been brought about through any act or fault of the
accused, it should be treated in no lesser fashion that it would
ordinarily be treated in the context of the general principles applicable
to a criminal trial, ie that if there is a failure of justice, this could,
depending on the circumstances, result in a vitiation of the proceed-
ings as a whole.
They explained that ‘[w]ithout the lower courts being at risk in
this regard there will be no incentive for them to ensure that the
peremptory requirements of the statutory review provisions are
complied with and that there is due and proper adherence to the
time periods and the procedures prescribed’ (para [39]). Thus, if
an accused’s constitutional right of review is effectively stymied
and rendered nugatory because of egregious delay, ‘his constitu-
tional right to a fair trial has been infringed and this may constitute
a failure of justice and a ground for the court not only to decline to
certify that the proceedings are in accordance with justice, but
also to set aside or correct the proceedings, or to make any other
order in connection with the proceedings as will, to the court,
seem likely to promote the ends of justice’ (para [40]).
While it may in certain circumstances be difficult to comply with
the strict time limit of seven days laid down in section 303 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, the court stated that (para [41]) –
[t]he reviewing judge must be alive to this inbuilt difficulty which
almost in itself sets the system up to fail, and it should not be
understood that this judgement in any way seeks to lay down a
general principle or rule of law that mere non-compliance with the
peremptory period will in itself constitute an irregularity, or that if it
constitutes an irregularity it will be of such a nature as to necessarily
and inevitably vitiate the entire proceedings. Each matter will have to
be decided on its own facts.
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DELICT
JOHANN NEETHLING*
JOHAN POTGIETER**
LEGISLATION
There was no new legislation directly affecting this field of the
law during the period under review.
CASE LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY
WRONGFULNESS
Legal duty of obstetrician to prevent cerebral palsy
In TS & another v Life Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd & another
2017 (4) SA 580 (KZD) a child suffered birth asphyxia while his
mother was in labour, as a result of which he developed cerebral
palsy. His parents claimed damages from the hospital at which
the mother gave birth, as well as from the attending obstetrician
(the doctor). The parents averred that in attending to the mother’s
labour, both had acted negligently so causing the harm. The
defendants undertook, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiffs
a sum of R20 million in settlement of liability and quantum. The
plaintiffs played no part in the current proceedings which con-
cerned the apportionment of liability between the hospital and the
doctor as joint wrongdoers, with the former seeking a contribution
from the latter in terms of section 2(12) read with section 2(6) of
the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 (para [7]). While
the hospital accepted negligence on the part of its nursing staff in
failing to recognise warning signs of the baby’s distress during
labour, the doctor denied all liability, saying that he had settled
the issues relating to liability and the quantum of damages
without any admission of negligence on his part (paras [1] [2]).
The hospital contended, in the delictual context, that the doctor
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owed the patient a legal duty and had been negligent, and,
therefore, was liable for a contribution in terms of the Act
(para [8]; as to joint wrongdoers, see J Neethling & JM Potgieter
Neethling-Potgieter-Visser Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 279-81).
Ploos van Amstel J pointed out that the legal duty of the doctor
related to the requirement of wrongfulness (para [10]), and that
the test for wrongfulness
. . . is trite and has been stated in many reported decisions. The general
norm to be employed in determining whether a particular infringement
of interests is unlawful is the legal convictions of the community: the
boni mores. It is an objective test based on the criterion of reasonable-
ness. The question is whether the community regards a particular act or
form of conduct as delictually wrongful. The legal convictions of the
community must be seen as the legal convictions of the legal policy-
makers of the community, such as the legislature and judges. In the
case of an omission which causes harm to someone the omission will
only be wrongful if in the particular circumstances a legal duty rested on
the defendant to act positively to prevent harm from occurring and he
failed to comply with that duty. The question of whether such a duty
existed is answered with reference to the flexible criteria of the legal
convictions of the community and legal policy [with reference to
Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2010) 36-41 42 57] (para [14]).
The judge continued by recounting the new test for wrongful-
ness as part of the wrongfulness enquiry – that wrongfulness is
present if it would be reasonable to impose liability on a defen-
dant – as formulated in Le Roux & others v Dey (Freedom of
Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici
Curiae 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC), 2011 (6) BCLR 577 para [122] and
Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising
Standards Authority 2006 (1) SA 461 (SCA) para [13]).
With reference to the present case, Ploos van Amstel J stated
that the question was whether public policy considerations
required that the doctor owed the patient and her unborn baby a
legal duty, and whether he should be held liable to compensate
them for the damage caused by his negligence (para [16]). After
examining the facts (paras [17]-[23]), the judge concluded that in
the circumstances, and at the relevant time, considerations of
reasonableness and public policy required that the doctor should
be held liable for the consequences of any negligent omissions
on his part; in other words, that he ‘had a legal duty to exercise
the required degree of care and skill’ (para [23]). Therefore,
wrongfulness had been established (para [27]).
With regard to negligence (paras [24]ff), the judge found on the
facts that the doctor’s failure to examine the patient earlier and to
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verify for himself that everything was in order, was a serious lapse
which fell short of the degree of care and expertise expected of
him as a specialist obstetrician, and that he had accordingly
been negligent (paras [27] [28]).
Finally, the court dealt with the question of causation (paras
[28]ff). The judge pointed out that the onus of proving a causal
link between the doctor’s negligence and the cerebral palsy
suffered by the baby was on the hospital, and that this had to be
established on a balance of probabilities. In this case, it had to
be shown that had the doctor gone to the hospital earlier, as
the experts said a reasonable obstetrician would have done, the
baby would not have suffered cerebral palsy. However, this had
not been established on a balance of probabilities (para [34]).
In summary, Ploos vanAmstel J found that the doctor had been
negligent and in breach of his legal duty to the patient. However,
he was unable to find that, had the doctor acted as it is said he
should have, the tragic outcome would have been avoided. The
hospital’s claim against the doctor was, therefore, dismissed
(paras [35] [36]).
This judgment provides clear evidence of a reconciliation
between the traditional boni mores legal duty criterion for wrongful-
ness and the new formulation of the wrongfulness test as the
reasonableness of holding the defendant liable (see J Neethling
& JM Potgieter ‘Aanspreeklikheid ex delicto weens ’n late:
Harmonieuse vervlegting van uiteenlopende benaderings’ (2017)
5 TSAR 98-103; see also the discussions of MTO Forestry (Pty)
Ltd v Swart NO 2017 (5) SA 76 (SCA), [2017] 3 All SA 502 and
Barley & another v Moore & another [2017] 3 All SA 799 (WCC)
below). Ploos vanAmstel J described and applied these two tests
as if they did not differ (para [14]). This approach can be
supported in principle, provided it is borne in mind that the
objections to the new test remain valid. For example, the state-
ment that wrongfulness has nothing to do with the reasonable-
ness of the defendant’s conduct, is unacceptable (see Neethling
& Potgieter Delict (2015) 81-2 84-5).
It is submitted that in establishing wrongfulness in cases of an
omission, a court should, in determining the existence of a legal
duty, first apply the traditional boni mores test which takes
account of all relevant policy considerations and factors. If these
considerations justify a finding that a legal duty existed, its
damaging breach would constitute wrongfulness. Provided that
all the other delictual elements are present, it would be reason-
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able to hold the defendant liable (see Country Cloud Trading CC
v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development, Gauteng
[2014] 1All SA 267 (SCA), 2014 (2) SA 214, 222; see also Minister
van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 597; Local Transitional
Council of Delmas v Boshoff 2005 (5) SA 514 (SCA) 522;
Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 81-2). Therefore, the decision
to hold a person liable is the consequence of the fact that a delict
has been committed, and not (merely) the result of the applica-
tion of the test for wrongfulness.
Pure economic loss resulting from a municipality’s failure to fulfil its legal
duty to issue certificate
In Home Talk Developments (Pty) Ltd & others v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality [2017] 3 All SA 382 (SCA), 2018 (1) SA
391, the basis of the appellants’ claims, stated briefly, was that
employees of the respondent municipality failed to discharge
their duty to issue a certificate in terms of section 82 of the
Townships and Town Planning Ordinance 15 of 1986 (the Ordi-
nance) relating to land development (the ‘section 82 certificate’)
to the appellants, causing them to suffer pure economic loss
(para [2]).
The municipality’s plea was that the claims were Aquilian for
pure economic loss arising from the alleged delay occasioned by
the failure of the defendant to issue the section 82 certificates.
This legislation does not anticipate either compensation or
damages for any person aggrieved by the failure of, or delay by,
the local authority in issuing any such certificate (para [18]). The
municipality submitted that any person aggrieved by a decision
of the local authority should appeal to a Statutory ServicesAppeal
Board. Alternatively, he or she could apply for a mandatory
interdict or judicial review. The municipality pleaded that the
statutory duty did not provide a basis for inferring that a duty
existed for the first plaintiff at common law, and that neither public
policy nor public interest justified holding the defendant’s alleged
conduct unlawful in the Aquilian sense, and so susceptible to a
remedy in damages (para [18]).
Ponnan JA stated that although the appellants were entitled to
proper administrative legal proceedings, this does not mean that
a breach of administrative duties, as set out in the particulars of
claim, necessarily translates into a private law duty giving
rise to delictual claims. An incorrect administrative decision is not
per se wrongful. Administrative law has its own remedies and, in
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general, delictual liability will not be imposed for a breach of its
rules unless convincing policy considerations point in a different
direction. If the legal duty invoked is imposed by a statutory
provision, the focal question is one of statutory interpretation.
Whether the existence of an action for damages can be inferred
from the controlling legislation depends on its interpretation, and
it is especially necessary to have regard to the object or purpose
of the legislation. This involves a consideration of policy factors
which, in the ordinary course, will not differ from those that apply
when one determines whether or not a common-law duty exists
(para [19]).
Ponnan JA then proceeded to set out the requirements for and
general principles underlying delictual liability (para [20]ff), stating,
as starting point, that conduct ‘is wrongful in the delictual sense if
public policy considerations demand that in the circumstances
the plaintiff has to be compensated for the loss caused by the
negligent act or omission of the defendant. It is then that it can be
said that the legal convictions of society regard the conduct as
wrongful’ (para [20]). One of the questions in the present case
was whether the legislator intended a claim for damages in
respect of loss caused, in addition to the other administrative law
remedies available to the appellants (para [22]). The fact that the
legislator had made provision for an internal appeal was a sure
indicator that the legislator did not consider the refusal of a
section 82 certificate, without more, to constitute a wrong entitling
an action for damages against the municipality (para [23]). After
referring to relevant foreign common-law authorities (para [24]),
Ponnan JA cautioned that the English law ‘duty of care’ straddles
both wrongfulness and negligence. Accordingly, in our legal
context this phrase is inherently misleading (para [25]).
With reference to Telematrix (above) and Steenkamp NO v
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA),
[2006] 1 All SA 478 para [30], the judge pointed out that
‘something more’ than a mere negligent statutory breach and
consequent economic loss was required to hold a functionary
delictually liable for the improper performance of an administra-
tive function (para [26]; see also J Neethling ‘State (public
authority) liability ex delicto (3)’ (2013) 76 THRHR 335). For this,
the appellants attempted to rely on the alleged mala fide conduct
of one of the functionaries of the municipality, but failed to prove
it (paras [27]ff [42]). As regards wrongfulness, Ponnan JA
concluded that the municipality’s actions were not delictually
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wrongful, nor had it breached any legal duty owed by it to the
appellants.Accordingly, the municipality enjoyed immunity against
liability for damages resulting from the conduct complained of
(para [44]). Although this could have been the end of the matter,
Ponnan JA elected to discuss the element of causation briefly
(para [45]ff) and came to the conclusion that both factual and
legal causation were absent (paras 52]). The appeal was accord-
ingly dismissed.
Schippers AJA agreed with Ponnan JA’s judgment, but added
a few observations with regard to causation (paras [54]ff). In a
dissenting judgment, Cachalia JA concluded that he would have
upheld the appeal (para [223]), mainly because the city manager’s
dishonesty and mala fides in withholding the certificates were an
abuse of power, and therefore wrongful (paras [206]-[209]). The
non-issuing of the certificates was also the factual and legal
cause of the appellants’ loss (paras [210]ff).
Failure to halt spread of veld fire
MTO Forestry (Pty) Ltd v Swart NO (above) involved delictual
liability for an omission (for a review of this case, see J Neethling
& JM Potgieter ‘Foreseeability: wrongfulness and negligence of
omissions in delict – the debate goes on’ (2018) JJS 145–161, on
which this discussion is based). The appellant company, which
ran a forestry business, was the beneficial owner of a plantation
called Witelsbos in the district of Humansdorp in that it had the
right to harvest the trees and enjoy the income from the forest’s
production. A fire broke out on the respondent’s immediately
adjacent farm in an area packed with dense thickets of highly
flammable alien plants (‘warbos’). A strong wind caused the fire to
spread onto Witelsbos, where it burned for several days, destroy-
ing some 1 300 hectares of forest. Despite the efforts of teams of
firefighters to halt the spread of the fire, the appellant suffered
considerable loss. The appellant sued the respondent in the High
Court, Cape Town, for damages of more than R23 million, alleging
that its negligent omissions had caused or allowed the fire to
spread onto Witelsbos. Relief was refused in the High Court and
the appellant approached the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Leach JA, in commencing his enquiry into the liability of the
respondent, stated the elements of a claim founded in delict –
conduct, wrongfulness, fault, harm, and causation (para [12]). He
pointed out that the appellant sought to hold the respondent
liable, not for starting the fire on the day in question, but for its
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alleged negligent omission to take preventative steps, which
allowed or caused the fire to spread onto Witelsbos, and that
there was no doubt that such a negligent omission, if established,
could found liability. It is indeed trite law that a legal duty may rest
on the owner, occupier, or controller of property to control a fire
on the property (see, eg, Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty)
Ltd 1973 (3) SA 69 (A); Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry &
others v Durr & others 2006 (6) SA 587 (SCA) paras [18] [19];
Lubbe v Louw [2006] 4 All SA 341 (SCA) paras [13]-[17];
Steenberg v De Kaap Timber (Pty) Ltd 1992 (2) SA 169 (A); Dews
& another v Simon’s Town Municipality 1991 (4) SA 479 (C) 485;
and Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 64). This view was also
confirmed as follows in HL & H Timber Products (Pty) Ltd v Sappi
Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd [2000] 4 All SA 545 (SCA), 2001 (4) SA
814 para [14], to which Leach JA referred (para [13]):
Conduct . . . can take the form of a commissio, for example where the
fire causing the loss was started by the defendant . . . or an omissio,
for example the failure to exercise proper control over a fire of which
he was legally in charge . . . or the failure to contain a fire when, in the
absence of countervailing considerations adduced by him, he was
under the legal duty, by virtue of his ownership or control of the
property, to prevent it from escaping onto a neighbouring property
thereby causing loss to others . . .
Leach JA (para [14]) continued by stating that terms such as
‘duty’ or ‘legal duty’ have, with justification, been criticised as not
really contributing to the determination of whether a defendant’s
conduct should be regarded as wrongful, and that this may lead
to confusion with the concept of duty of care in English law which
straddles both wrongfulness and negligence (see Country Cloud
(SCA) (above) 222). Accordingly, Leach JA supported the com-
ment by FDJ Brand ‘Aspects of wrongfulness: A series of lectures’
(2014) 25/3 Stell LR 451–70 455, that concepts such as ‘a legal
duty’ are ‘no more than an attempt at formulating some kind of
practical yardstick as to when policy considerations will require
the imposition of legal liability’.
These statements are subject to criticism (J Neethling ‘Delik-
seis deur derde party weens kontrakbreuk’ (2015) 1 TSAR 188ff).
First, the concept of a legal duty is central to the inquiry into the
wrongfulness of an omission (Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015)
58-9). Secondly, notwithstanding possible confusion, which should
be guarded against, the legal duty concept is so ingrained in
positive law that the courts and academic writers will not – and
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should not – readily renounce it. Even recent decisions by our
highest courts continue to use the duty concept to establish the
wrongfulness of an omission. For example, in Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development v X 2015 (1) SA 25 (SCA), 2015
(1) SACR 187 para [13], FourieAJAsaid that a negligent omission
will be wrongful only if the appellant is under a legal duty to act
positively to prevent the harm suffered by the respondent. The
omission will be regarded as wrongful when the legal convictions
of the community impose a legal – as opposed to a mere moral –
duty to avoid harm to others by positive action. The duty issue
was also paramount in the Constitutional Court’s decisions in
Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016 (3) SA
528 (CC), 2016 (2) BCLR 204 paras [16]-[30] and Oppelt v Head:
Health, Department of Health Provincial Administration: Western
Cape 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC) 2015 (12) BCLR 1471 paras
[51]–[54]. This approach is supported by academic writers on the
law of delict (JC van der Walt & JR Midgley Principles of Delict 4
ed (2016) 115-6; M Loubser & R Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict
in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 147-8; Neethling & Potgieter Delict
(2015) 58ff). Van der Walt & Midgley Delict 115 state as follows:
The breach of a legal duty is therefore an independent criterion for
determining wrongfulness and plays a vital practical role in founding
liability in cases where no infringement of a right is evident [such as in
cases of omission].
At this stage in the development of our law it is very unlikely that
the legal duty concept with regard to wrongfulness will still be
confused with the English law duty-of-care doctrine. Suffice it to
say that the Supreme Court of Appeal and academic writers have
clarified the distinction between these concepts sufficiently,
and have rejected the duty-of-care approach in our law. (See
McIntosh v Premier, KwaZulu-Natal [2008] 4 All SA 72 (SCA),
2008 (1) SA 1 8–9; Chartaprops 16 (Pty) Ltd & another v
Silberman [2009] 1 All SA 197 (SCA), (2009) 30 ILJ 497, 2009 (1)
SA 265, 279; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995] 1 All SA
673 (A), 1995 (2) SA 1, 27; Local Transitional Council of Delmas &
another v Boshoff 2005 (5) SA 514 (SCA) 522; Telematrix (above)
468; see also Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 159 n200, but
see also 160 for a number of earlier Supreme Court of Appeal
cases that still appear to confuse these concepts.) Furthermore,
since the legal duty concept has been firmly embedded in our
law to establish wrongfulness, it is not acceptable to shrug it off
as, at most, ‘an attempt at formulating some kind of practical
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yardstick’ for the imposition of legal liability (Country Cloud (SCA)
para [19]).
Leach JA then turned to the distinction between wrongfulness
and fault (negligence) (paras [15]ff), beginning with the following
quotation from Brand (2014) 25/3 Stell LR 451:
Wrongfulness – sometimes also referred to as unlawfulness – is one of
the elements of delictual liability. The other elements are conduct,
fault, causation and harm. Without the convergence of all these
elements delictual liability will not ensue . . . In modern South African
law, wrongfulness has become the most interesting of these elements.
Under this rubric the law determines whether the defendant should be
held legally liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff that resulted
from the defendant’s blameworthy conduct. If the law determines that
there will be no liability, the defendant is afforded immunity from the
consequences of the wrongful conduct; the defendant is not liable
despite the presence of all the other elements of delictual liability.
As has often been stated by Brand JA (Le Roux v Dey (above)
315 and in Country Cloud (SCA) (above) 222-3; Roux v Hattingh
2012 (6) SA 428 (SCA) 439; Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v
Fisher Hoffman Sithole [2013] 2 All SA 629 (SCA), 2013 (5) SA
183, 193, the criterion for wrongfulness, in his view, is the
reasonableness of holding the defendant liable. As this is the
case, his statement that, if the law determines that there will be no
liability, the defendant is afforded immunity from the conse-
quences of the wrongful conduct, does not make sense, because
if, in terms of the new criterion for wrongfulness, the law deter-
mines that there will be no liability, wrongfulness should have
been absent with the result that there could also be no conse-
quences of ‘wrongful conduct’.
As far as wrongfulness is concerned, Leach JA endorsed the
development in the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitu-
tional Court (Loureiro & others v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty)
Ltd 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC), 2014 (5) BCLR 511 para [53]; Country
Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Develop-
ment 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC) paras [20] [21]) over the last decade or
so, that wrongfulness is determined in accordance with the
criterion that it depends on the reasonableness of imposing
liability (para [16]). However, for liability to ensue, wrongfulness
needs to be accompanied by fault (para [16]). According to the
judge, this was confirmed in Minister of Safety and Security v Van
Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) para [12], where Nugent JA
stated:
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A negligent omission is [wrongful] only if it occurs in circumstances
that the law regards as sufficient to give rise to a legal duty to avoid
negligently causing harm. It is important to keep that concept quite
separate from the concept of fault. Where the law recognises the
existence of a legal duty it does not follow that an omission will
necessarily attract liability – it will attract liability only if the omission
was also culpable as determined by the application of the separate
test that has consistently been applied by this court in Kruger v
Coetzee [1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430], namely whether a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant would not only have foreseen
the harm but would also have acted to avert it.
Leach JA emphasised that wrongfulness and negligence are
indeed separate elements of a delict, but he appears to believe
that this view has been questioned in academic circles (para
[17]; see also Leach JA’s similar remark in Pauw v Du Preez
(20197/2014) [2015] ZASCA80 (28 May 2015) para [7]), referring
to Neethling’s 2006 contribution in the South African Law Journal
(J Neethling ‘The conflation of wrongfulness and negligence: Is it
always such a bad thing for the law of delict?’ (2006) 123 SALJ
204-14; RW Nugent ‘Yes, it is always a bad thing for the law: A
reply to Professor Neethling’ (2006) 123 SALJ 557-63 for a
response to Neethling’s viewpoint; cf Brand (2014) 25/3 Stell LR
451ff, where Neethling expresses the view that certain factors,
such as foreseeability and preventability of harm, are relevant to
the determination of both wrongfulness and negligence. This
means that a degree of conflation of these two elements is
inevitable, and that, if a degree of overlap can be accepted
‘without negating the distinctive functions of wrongfulness and
negligence as separate elements of delict’, it would ‘not be a bad
thing’. Neethling based his observation that certain factors are
relevant to both wrongfulness and negligence on a number of
decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal. (As regards foresee-
ability as one such factor, see, eg, Hirschowitz Flionis v Bartlett &
another 2006 (3) SA 575 (SCA) 589; Telematrix (above) 468;
Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd v Loureiro & others [2013] 2 All
SA 659 (SCA), 2013 (3) SA 407 418; Steenkamp NO v Provincial
Tender Board, Eastern Cape (above) 159-60; Minister of Safety
and Security & another v Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA) 324;
Stewart & another v Botha & another [2009] 4 All SA 487 (SCA),
2008 (6) SA 310 314; and, with regard to preventability of harm,
eg, the factors applied in Cape Metropolitan Council v Graham
2001 (1) SA 1197 (SCA) 1203; Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a
Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 (2) SA 118 (SCA) 123; Adminis-
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trateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe [1994] 4 All SA 321 (AD), 1994
(4) SA347 361-2, and Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security
(Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae) [2002] 4 All SA
346 (SCA), 2003 (1) SA 389 400.) Nevertheless, Neethling has
emphasised throughout that, where it is appropriate (realistic,
practical and convenient), a certain extent of overlap should be
accepted, provided that this can be done without negating the
distinct functions of wrongfulness and negligence as distinct
elements of a delict – in the case of wrongfulness, to indicate that
a legally protected interest has been infringed in an unreason-
able manner; and, in the case of negligence, to indicate the
blameworthiness of the alleged wrongdoer for such infringement
((2006) 123 SALJ 209-10 214; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015)
163-4 n222-223). To deny this reality would amount to placing the
various factors relevant to the establishment of wrongfulness, on
the one hand, and negligence, on the other, into watertight
compartments where no particular factor may be applied with
regard to more than one of the elements. Ultimately, as far as we
know, there is no evidence from academic circles (apart, per-
haps, from D Milo ‘The cabinet minister, the Mail & Guardian, and
the report card: The Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in the
Mthembi-Mahanyele case’ (2005) 122 SALJ 28 38-9) questioning
the separate and discrete existence of wrongfulness and negli-
gence in our law. There is, therefore, no debate in this regard.
(Milo (2005) 122 SALJ 38-9 argues that courts in South Africa
should refrain from distinguishing between wrongfulness and
negligence – in the field of media defamation law – and simply
apply a test of reasonableness for both elements; but see
Neethling (2006) 123 SALJ 214 for criticism.) Leach JA’s com-
ment that the debate regarding the separate existence of wrong-
fulness and negligence has become ‘sterile’ is, therefore, beside
the point. Brand JA’s ((2014) 25/3 Stell LR 451 458) similar remark,
on which Leach JA based his comment, clearly relates to a
different debate, namely, the acceptability or not of the new test
for wrongfulness as formulated by Brand JA in Le Roux v Dey
(above) 315. In passing, the so-called ‘sterility’ of this debate can
be addressed if our highest courts engage with the criticism
levelled against the new test for wrongfulness, instead of simply
echoing Brand JA’s formulation thereof. (For criticism of this test,
see, among others, Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 80-85;
JC Knobel ‘Thoughts on the functions and application of the
elements of a delict’ (2008) 71 THRHR 650-60 652; TJ Scott
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‘Delictual liability for adultery – A healthy remedy’s road to
perdition’ in J Potgieter, J Knobel & R-M Jansen (eds) Essays in
Honour of / Huldigingsbundel vir Johann Neethling (2015) 421-38
433; FE Marx ‘The naming and shaming of spammers’ in Potgi-
eter, Knobel & Jansen (eds) Essays 323-32 329-30; M Loubser
‘Unlawfulness in the South African law of delict: Focus areas
in the debate’ in T Boezaart & P de Kock (eds) Vita Perit, Labor
non Moritur – Liber Memorialis PJ Visser (2008) 117-43 122;
JM Potgieter ‘Die nuwe onregmatigheidstoets: ’n Trojaanse perd
wat delikteregbeginsels bedreig?’ (2017) 14/2 LitNet Akademies
813-30.) An attempt to engage our criticism of the new test was
proffered by FDJ Brand ‘The contribution of Louis Harms in the
sphere of Aquilian liability for pure economic loss’ in Essays in
Honour of Louis Harms (2013) 76 THRHR 57-69, to which we
reacted (J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Wrongfulness in delict: A
response to Brand JA’ (2014) 77 THRHR 116-24), but did not
receive a response. (For a recent contribution to the wrongful-
ness debate, see D Visser ‘Taming the chimera: The treatment of
‘‘wrongfulness’’ in SouthAfrican delict scholarship’ in Ars Nocendi
et Scribendi – Essays in Honour of Johan Scott (2018 PULP)
194–209.)
At this stage it is important to emphasise that the new test for
wrongfulness is not regarded by all courts as the sole test for the
determination of wrongfulness, but, according to Nugent JA in
Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 (2)
SA 118 (SCA) 122, merely as a recent formulation of one variation
of the test for wrongfulness in our law. In the result, the traditional
test for wrongfulness for an omission may still be applied. As said,
this entails whether, according to the boni mores or reasonable-
ness criterion (where legal policy considerations, including con-
stitutional norms, play an important part), there was a legal duty
on the defendant to act positively to prevent harm to the plaintiff
(see Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v X
(above) 28; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s
Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae) (above) 395; Steenkamp
NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (above) 138;
Harrington NO & another v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail & others
[2010] 2 All SA 220 (SCA), 2010 (2) SA 479 485; RH v DE 2015 (5)
SA 83 (CC) 101; cf Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 38-9;
Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict 219-20; Van der Walt & Midgley
Delict 122–3).
Initially, Brand JA was highly critical of the traditional test for
wrongfulness (see Country Cloud (SCA) (above) para [19]), but,
383DELICT
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 13 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/12−Delict
in South African Hang and Paragliding Association & another v
Bewick [2015] 2 All SA 581 (SCA), 2015 (3) SA 449 452–3 (see
also J Neethling ‘Aanspreeklikheid weens ’n late: Versoening
tussen die tradisionele en nuwe toets vir deliktuele onregmatig-
heid, of nie?’ (2015) 12/3 Litnet Akademies 810ff 813–15), he was
willing to reconcile the traditional boni mores test with the new
test for wrongfulness. He stated:
As has by now become well established, negligent conduct mani-
festing itself in the form of a positive act which causes physical injury
raises a presumption of wrongfulness. By contrast, in relation to
liability for omission and pure economic loss, wrongfulness is not
presumed and depends on the existence of a legal duty. The
imposition of this legal duty is a matter for judicial determination
according to criteria of public and legal policy consistent with
constitutional norms . . . On occasion the same principles had been
formulated somewhat differently, namely that wrongfulness depends
on whether or not it would be reasonable, having regard to consider-
ations of public and legal policy, to impose delictual liability on the
defendant for the loss resulting from the specific omission.
This reconciliatory approach is also evident in decisions of the
Constitutional Court, for example, the 343-4 (see also H v Fetal
Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) 216; Loureiro (CC)
(above) 410) where the court proposed the boni mores, the legal
duty to prevent damage, and the reasonableness of holding the
defendant liable, as a potpourri for the determination of wrongful-
ness:
The next enquiry is whether the ‘negligent omission is unlawful only if it
occurs in circumstances that the law regards as sufficient to give rise
to a legal duty to avoid negligently causing harm’. In Loureiro [(CC)
(above)], Van der Westhuizen J explained that the wrongfulness
enquiry is based on the duty not to cause harm, and that in the case of
negligent omissions, the focus is on the reasonableness of imposing
liability. An enquiry into wrongfulness is determined by weighing
competing norms and interests. The criterion of wrongfulness ulti-
mately depends on a judicial determination of whether, assuming all
the other elements of delictual liability are present, it would be
reasonable to impose liability on a defendant for the damages flowing
from specific conduct. Whether conduct is wrongful is tested against
the legal convictions of the community which are ‘by necessity
underpinned and informed by the norms and values of our society,
embodied in the Constitution’ (italics added).
As both the traditional and the new tests emphasise consider-
ations of policy, they would, closely examined, ultimately produce
the same result (see, however, our critical discussion of TS v Life
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Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd (above) para [14], where the court
said that the test for wrongfulness in our law is trite, and thereafter
described the boni mores legal-duty test, followed by the new
test, as if they do not differ).
Next, Leach JA turned to the question of the applicability of
foreseeability as a factor in determining wrongfulness, and came
to the conclusion that it should play no role at all in this regard
(paras [18]ff). He stated:
It is potentially confusing to take foreseeability into account as a factor
common to the inquiry in regard to the presence of both wrongfulness
and negligence. Such confusion will have the effect of the two being
conflated and lead to wrongfulness losing its important attribute as a
measure of control over liability. Accordingly, I think the time has now
come to specifically recognise that foreseeability of harm should not
be taken into account in respect of the determination of wrongfulness,
and that its role may be safely confined to the rubrics of negligence
and causation.
Historically, (reasonable) foreseeability has indeed played a
role in determining wrongfulness (see the Supreme Court of
Appeal cases cited above). In Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet
2005 (5) SA 490 (SCA) 499, Scott JA explained this as follows:
The courts have in the past sometimes determined the issue of
foreseeability as part of the inquiry into wrongfulness and, after finding
that there was a legal duty to act reasonably, proceeded to determine
the second leg of the negligence inquiry [preventability], the first
(being foreseeability) having already been decided. If this approach is
adopted, it is important not to overlook the distinction between
negligence and wrongfulness.
For this reason, declared Harms JA in Steenkamp (above)
159-60, the role of foreseeability differs depending on whether it
is considered in the context of wrongfulness or negligence:
The role of foreseeability in the context of wrongfulness must be seen
in its correct perspective. It might, depending on the circumstances,
be a factor that can be taken into account but it is not a requirement of
wrongfulness and it can never be decisive of the issue. Otherwise
there would not have been any reason to distinguish between
wrongfulness and negligence and since foreseeability also plays a
role in determining legal causation, it would lead to the temptation to
make liability dependent on the foreseeability of harm without anything
more, which would be undesirable.
In similar vein, Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict 151 conclude
that foreseeability can be part of both wrongfulness and negli-
gence. While foreseeability is a factor that can be considered in
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the wrongfulness enquiry, it is one of two core factors to consider
in determining negligence (the other being preventability). Fore-
seeability of harm is, therefore, a requirement for negligence, but
although it may add weight to the wrongfulness decision, it may
not prove decisive in the latter regard in that other factors could
override it. Van der Walt & Midgley Delict 107 add that, in line with
the objective reasonableness approach to wrongfulness which
takes all relevant aspects into account, and, even though it is also
a component of negligence and causation assessments, the
foreseeability of harm is a factor that may be considered in
determining (in the words of the new wrongfulness test) whether
liability ought to be imposed in a particular case (cf also Loubser
& Midgley (eds) Delict 148-51).
In light of the foregoing, it should be emphasised that although
foreseeability may be a factor in determining wrongfulness, care
should be taken not to elevate it to the determining factor for
wrongfulness, as this will confuse wrongfulness with negligence
and ‘lead to the absorption of the English law tort of negligence
into our law, thereby distorting it’ (see Telematrix (above) 468). An
example of such an unfortunate application of foreseeability is the
judgment by the Appeal Court in Government of the Republic of
South Africa v Basdeo & another 1996 (1) SA 355 (A) (see
J Neethling ‘Onregmatigheid, nalatigheid; regsplig, ‘‘duty of
care’’; en die rol van redelike voorsienbaarheid – Praat die
Appèlhof uit twee monde?’ (1996) 59 THRHR 682ff; cf J Neethling
& JM Potgieter ‘Wrongfulness and negligence in the law of delict:
A Babylonian confusion?’ (2007) 70 THRHR 120-30 123-4).
Contrary to this position where foreseeability was recognised as a
factor in determining wrongfulness, the Supreme Court of Appeal
has now emphatically stated in the case under discussion (para
[18]) that foreseeability of harm should not be taken into account
at all in the determination of wrongfulness, and that its role should
be confined to negligence and causation. (See also Brand JA’s
remark in Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads
Agency Ltd [2009] 1 All SA 525 (SCA), 2009 (2) SA 150 163 that
‘the issue of foreseeability should more appropriately be consid-
ered under the rubric of legal causation and not as part of
determining wrongfulness’, and his categorical statement in
Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Fisher Hoffman Sithole
[2013] 2 All SA 629 (SCA), 2013 (5) SA 183 197-8 that ‘foresee-
ability . . . [does] not play a role in establishing wrongfulness’.
Cf his judgment in Country Cloud (SCA) (above) 225; cf, however,
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Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure
Development (CC) (above) [34].)
Leach JA’s decision can be supported as regards the applica-
tion of reasonable foreseeability, not only because of the possible
confusion between wrongfulness and negligence that could
result from the use of reasonable foreseeability in determining
both these elements, but also because – and this is very
important – this viewpoint tallies with the traditional test for
wrongfulness. In Waldis & another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 (4) SA
503 (WCC) para [21], Davis J put it as follows in the context of
defamation:
The general test for wrongfulness is based upon the boni mores or the
legal convictions of the community. This means that the infringement
of the complainant’s reputation should not only have taken place but
be objectively unreasonable. See Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of
Personality 2 ed (2005) at 135. The application of the boni mores test
involves an ex post facto balancing of the interests of the plaintiff and
the defendant in the specific circumstances of this case in order to
determine whether the infringement of the former’s interests was
reasonable.
The defendant’s conduct is determined diagnostically (ex post
facto, by looking back) by taking account of all the relevant facts
and circumstances actually present, and all the consequences
that actually ensued. Naturally, the prognostic (ex ante, by
looking forward) reasonable foreseeability of harm plays no part
here but is a core requirement of negligence (Neethling &
Potgieter Delict (2015) 164-5). However, this does not mean that
subjective foreseeability (the defendant’s subjective foresight or
knowledge) should not play a role with regard to wrongfulness.
Clearly, judged ex post facto, the defendant’s knowledge is also a
relevant fact which is actually present and should be taken into
account in determining wrongfulness. This approach is already
established practice in case law (Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict
223; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 65-6 309 for further
references). Unfortunately, Leach JA opined that the fact that the
respondent in casu had been aware, or had knowledge of, the
fire risk created by the ‘warbos’, his (subjective) foreseeability of
the fire hazard was a factor relevant to the determination of
negligence, rather than wrongfulness. (The viewpoint that foresee-
ability should play no role at all with regard to wrongfulness is
strongly supported by Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel & Jansen (eds)
Essays 229-43 239-242 nn54 74. According to him, any sub-
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jective factor, such as foreseeability, knowledge of harm, and
motive, should co-determine fault, not wrongfulness.)
Although, according to Leach JA, foreseeability does not play
a role in determining wrongfulness, it may still be relevant to the
rubrics of negligence and causation. In this regard it should be
borne in mind that foreseeability does not play the same role with
regard to negligence, on the one hand, and causation, on the
other (see, in general, Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 211-
13 214-16). Whereas, in the case of negligence, harm of a
general kind should be foreseeable (see, eg, Loureiro (SCA)
(above) 416; Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd & another v
Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd & another 2000 (1) SA 827
(SCA) 839; Mukheiber v Raath & another 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA)
1077; Jaftha v Honourable Minister of Correctional Services
[2012] 2 All SA 286 (ECP) paras [22] [23]; cf Standard Chartered
Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd [1994] 2 All SA 524 (A),
1994 (4) SA747, 768), foreseeability of the actual harm is relevant
as regards legal causation (despite the fact that the specific
result was not reasonably foreseeable, should considerations of
reasonableness, justice and fairness dictate that the defendant
should be held liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff
(JM Potgieter ‘Deliktuele aanspreeklikheid vir onvoorsienbare
gevolge van mediese nalatigheid’ (2017) 14/3 LitNet Akademies
975–90). In this regard, if the distinctive functions of negligence
and causation are borne in mind, there need be no concern that
the application of foreseeability in regard to both may lead to
confusion between, or even the conflation of, the two elements.
With regard to negligence, the court, after dealing with a
dispute between the parties in this regard (paras [20]-[25]),
proceeded on the assumption that, in terms of section 34(1) of
the National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998, there was
indeed a presumption that the respondent, being the owner of the
land on which the fire started, had been negligent in relation to
the fire, and that the section placed an onus on it to show that the
fire spread to Witelsbos without negligence on its part (para [25]).
In terms of section 34(2) of the National Veld and Forest Fire Act,
the presumption of negligence does not exempt the plaintiff from
the onus of proving that any act or omission by the respondent
was wrongful (para [20]). The court then dealt with the alleged
negligent omissions advanced by the appellant (paras [26]ff).
Leach JA stated:
A reasonable landowner in the respondent’s position was . . . not
obliged to ensure that in all circumstances a fire on its property would
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not spread beyond its boundaries. All the respondent was obliged to
do was to take steps that were reasonable in the circumstances
to guard against such an event occurring. If it took such steps and a
fire spread nevertheless, it cannot be held liable for negligence just
because further steps could have been taken (para [47]).
The court found that the respondent had more than fulfilled its
obligation to take reasonable steps and that it, therefore, had not
been negligent (para [48]).
We return to Leach JA’s remarks about the appellant’s allega-
tions that the respondent acted wrongfully because it had been
aware or had knowledge of the fire risk created by the ‘warbos’. In
this regard, the judge stated that ‘the allegation of wrongfulness
was, thus, the foreseeability of the fire hazard caused by the
‘‘warbos’’ but, for reasons already mentioned, that is a factor
relevant to the determination of negligence rather than wrongful-
ness’. He therefore concluded that the dispute ultimately turned
on whether the respondent had been negligent in failing to
remove the ‘warbos’, rather than on whether its failure was
wrongful (para [44]). He continued:
As was mentioned by this court in [the Durr case (above) para [19]], a
landowner is under a ‘duty’ to control or extinguish a fire burning on its
land. But, as Nienaber JA stressed in [H L & H Timber Products
(above) para [21]], whilst landowners may be saddled with the
primary responsibility of ensuring that fires on their land do not escape
the boundaries, this falls short of being an absolute duty (para [45]).
As indicated, it is trite law that there is a legal duty on a
landowner or a person in control of land to prevent fire from
spreading from their land to a neighbouring property, and that
this duty clearly relates to the wrongfulness issue (Van der Walt &
Midgley Delict 125; Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict 221; Neeth-
ling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 64 and the case law cited there).
Failure by the owner or person in control to prevent such spread
is clearly wrongful. Perhaps Leach JA could have stated more
clearly that the ‘duty’ in casu concerned wrongfulness. The
judge’s failure to do so may perhaps be ascribed to the fact that
he, following Brand JA, intimated that the legal-duty approach
may readily be replaced by the reasonableness of holding the
defendant liable as criterion for wrongfulness (cf para [14]).
Nevertheless, in establishing wrongfulness as required by sec-
tion 34(2) of National Veld and Forest Fire Act, Leach JA did not
apply this criterion in casu.
It should be emphasised that the fact that a person acted
wrongfully does not necessarily mean that he or she will be
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delictually liable, as negligence still has to be established (see,
eg, the dictum in Van Duivenboden (above) para [12] quoted by
Leach JA para [16]). As has been explained (see, eg, J Neethling
‘Delictual liability for an omission: The tragic fishpond incident’
2016 TSAR 798-806 805; J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Aanspreek-
likheid ex delicto weens ’n late: Harmonieuse vervlegting van
uiteenlopende benaderings?’ (2017) 5 TSAR 97-110 106; Neeth-
ling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 166-7), an omission is unreason-
able, and consequently wrongful, where, on applying the boni
mores test, it emerges that there was a legal duty on the
defendant to act positively in order to prevent harm and he or she
failed to comply (fully) with that duty. However, where a defendant
did attempt (albeit unsuccessfully) to comply with such a duty
and his or her attempt coincided with what the reasonable person
would have done, his or her (unreasonable) wrongful act is not
accompanied by (unreasonable) negligent conduct (damage
could not reasonably have been prevented), and he or she will
escape liability. The Quathlamba case (above) may be cited as
an example. Fire broke out on X’s land without any fault on his
part. Despite his attempts to extinguish the fire, it spread to Y’s
land and caused damage. The court held that there is a legal duty
on a landowner to control a fire on land under his control.
Because the fire caused damage to Y, it may be said that X did
not fully comply with his duty and his conduct (omission) was
wrongful (unreasonable). The court nevertheless correctly held
that, in attempting to extinguish the fire, X acted in accordance
with the standard of the reasonable person and that he was thus
not liable (88-9). Despite the wrongfulness of his conduct in not
complying fully with his legal duty, he escaped liability because
of the absence of negligence (see also Neethling & Potgieter
Delict (2015) 167). It is submitted that this explanation of the
relationship between wrongfulness and negligence is preferable
to the view expressed by Leach JA that the duty concerned is not
absolute and by implication, therefore, is limited by negligence.
In conclusion, Leach JA found that the steps taken by the
respondent to avoid a fire on its property spreading to its
neighbours were reasonable in the circumstances. Therefore, for
lack of negligence, the appellant had failed to prove its case and
the claim was dismissed (paras [50] [51]).
The most important aspect of the decision is that Leach JA
ruled conclusively on the relevance of foreseeability in the
determination of wrongfulness, an area of some controversy in
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the law of delict. The court held that it was potentially confusing to
take foreseeability into account as a factor common to the inquiry
into the presence of both wrongfulness and negligence. Such
confusion would have the effect of the two elements being conflated
and lead to wrongfulness losing its important role as a measure of
control over liability. Accordingly, foreseeability of harm should not
be taken into account in the determination of wrongfulness, and its
role should be confined to the rubrics of negligence and causation.
This aspect of the judgment can be supported because it tallies with
the ex post facto evaluation of wrongfulness which excludes any
use of the ex ante reasonable foreseeability of harm; also (subject to
the Constitutional Court possibly deciding otherwise) it brings
certainty to the role of foreseeability.
This approach seemingly also applies to subjective foreseeabil-
ity (awareness or knowledge) which, according to the court,
should rather be used as a factor in determining negligence. But,
as has been pointed out, it is established law that subjective
foreseeability may indeed play a role in determining wrongful-
ness ex post facto.
Be that as it may, until the Constitutional Court confirms Leach
JA’s approach to foreseeability and wrongfulness, the final word
in this regard has not been spoken. In the meantime, the question
remains whether our law will not be unduly impoverished by
restricting foreseeability to the watertight compartments of negli-
gence and legal causation, while disregarding the numerous
authoritative earlier judgments on the role of foreseeability with
regard to wrongfulness. Moreover, if one bears in mind the
distinctly different roles that reasonable foreseeability plays in
regard to wrongfulness and negligence, the possibility of confu-
sion between these two elements is in all likelihood slight, and this
objection to the use of foreseeability for both wrongfulness and
negligence may fall by the wayside. Granted, however, this
viewpoint cannot be reconciled with the ex post facto determina-
tion of wrongfulness.
Other aspects of the court’s decision worth mentioning are the
following. First of all, notwithstanding Leach JA’s rejection of
the legal-duty approach to the wrongfulness of an omission, this
approach remains of paramount importance in establishing wrong-
fulness in the present field and, to this end, has become
engrained in our law of delict. Interestingly enough, Leach JA
himself relied on decisions such as HL & H Timber Products
(above) and Van Duivenboden (above) where the legal-duty
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approach was applied, while also recognising the legal duty of a
landowner to control or extinguish a fire burning on its land.
However, the judge’s approach in seemingly using negligence to
limit the absolute nature of the legal duty may cause confusion
between wrongfulness and negligence.
Secondly, notwithstanding criticism of the new test for wrongful-
ness as the reasonableness of holding the defendant liable, and the
fact that this test is merely a recent formulation of one variation of the
test for wrongfulness in our law, Leach JAclearly favours this test as
the only test for wrongfulness in the present context. In this way, he
attempted to set aside the traditional legal-duty approach to estab-
lishing the wrongfulness of an omission, but, as indicated, without
success. Be that as it may, there does not appear to be any
indication of the judge applying the new test for wrongfulness to
establish the wrongfulness of the respondent’s conduct.
Thirdly, when dealing with the importance of the distinction
between wrongfulness and fault, Leach JA’s claim that this
distinction is criticised by certain academics does not hold water.
Finally, in regard to Leach JA’s view that foreseeability may be
relevant to both negligence and causation, it should be borne in
mind that foreseeability does not play the same role in negligence,
on the one hand, and causation, on the other (see, in general,
Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 211-13 214-16). Whereas, with
reference to negligence, harm of a general kind should be foresee-
able (see, eg, Loureiro (SCA) (above) 416; Sea Harvest (above)
839; Mukheiber (above) 1077; Jaftha (above) paras [22] [23]; cf
Standard Chartered Bank of Canada (above) 768), foreseeability of
the actual harm that has ensued is relevant as regards legal
causation ((2017) 14/2 LitNet Akademies 813-30 825-6; Potgieter
(2017) 14/3 LitNet Akademies 975-90 985-7. In passing, it should be
noted that in terms of the flexible approach to legal causation
(Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 200–203), there may be cases
where a result may be imputed to the defendant despite the specific
result not being reasonably foreseeable, should considerations of
reasonableness, justice, and fairness dictate that the defendant be
held liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff (see Potgieter (2017)
14/3 LitNet Akademies 975-90).
NEGLIGENCE
Attack by person released on parole: Negligence of Minister of Correctional
Services
In Naidu v Minister of Correctional Services 2017 (2) SACR 14
(WCC), [2017] 2 All SA 651, the plaintiff sued the defendant after
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she had been attacked in her home by a person on parole. She
claimed that the attack was a direct result of the negligent release
of the perpetrator (Michaels) on parole. The judgment dealt only
with the merits and called for a determination as to the liability of
the defendant on the ground of negligence (paras [1] [2]).
According to the plaintiff, the defendant failed to act with reason-
able care and diligence when determining whether Michaels
should become the subject of community correction; failed
adequately to take into account Michael’s previous convictions
and that he had previously violated his parole conditions; and
failed to have proper regard to the reports of the Case Manage-
ment Committee tasked with assessing Michaels. It was averred
that the defendant, as custodian and guardian of all sentenced
prisoners, had a legal duty to prevent harm to members of the
public by sentenced prisoners within her custody and subject to
community corrections (para [3]). The defendant conceded that
there existed a legal duty on its part to ensure the safety of
members of the public such as the plaintiff, sufficient to found
liability, and that if it were to be found that the defendant had been
negligent in releasing Michaels on parole, such negligence was
causally connected to the harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.
However, the defendant denied any knowledge of the attack or
that it was due to any negligence on its part (para [4]). Therefore,
the remaining issue for determination was whether the defendant,
acting through the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board
(the Board), had been negligent in releasing Michaels on parole
(para [5]).
The provisions governing the release of a sentenced prisoner
on parole are set out in the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998.
According to Meer J, it was common cause that these provisions
had not been complied with in the present case (paras [46]-[48]).
Next, the judge dealt with whether the failure to comply with the
provisions of the Correctional Services Act constituted negli-
gence (para [49]ff). In this regard, the court applied the classic
test for negligence as formulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA
428 (A) 430, namely, reasonable foreseeability and preventability
of harm (para [49]). Applying this test to the facts at hand, Meer J
concluded that a reasonable person in the position of the Board
would have foreseen the reasonable possibility that, if released,
Michaels would cause harm of the kind he ultimately inflicted on
the plaintiff (para [50]), and would have acted differently to
prevent his release. Given the absence of evidence that Michaels
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had been rehabilitated, the Board, in the circumstances, ought to
have taken reasonable steps to guard against the foreseeable
harm resulting from Michaels’s release on parole, by refusing his
parole application. Failure to do so was an act of negligence. A
further act of negligence was the failure to comply with the
mandatory statutory requirements of section 42(2) of the Correc-
tional Services Act (para [53]). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim
was upheld on the merits (para [54]).
It is not clear in our law whether conduct contrary to a statutory
provision is per se negligent, or whether the provision merely
affords proof of negligence. It should probably be accepted that
in such a situation it is incorrect to speak of statutory negligence,
and that the statutory provision at best provides evidentiary
material; the infringement of the provision in question is conse-
quently not conclusive proof of negligence and the general
criterion of the reasonable person still applies (see Neethling &
Potgieter Delict (2015) 157-8).
Negligent failure to prevent fire in university hostel
The plaintiff in Potgieter v University of Stellenbosch [2017] 1
All SA 282 (WCC) sustained serious and permanent injuries
when, as a student at a hostel of the defendant, he was
compelled to escape a fire through the window of his top-floor
room (para [1]). He claimed damages from the defendant,
asserting that the defendant was obliged to ensure that proper
and reasonable measures and procedures were in place, and
implemented, to ensure the safety of students in its hostels,
including in the case of fire (para [3]). The plaintiff contended
that the defendant was aware of the risk which a fire in non-
compartmentalised roof voids posed to the residents in such
hostels, and had, after a similar fire at a women’s residence,
taken steps to mitigate the risk (para [4]). It was contended that
the steps taken by the defendant in installing smoke detectors
linked to an alarm in the roof void of the plaintiff’s hostel were
entirely inadequate (para [6]).
Cloete J stated that in order to succeed with his claim, the
plaintiff had to show that the defendant was guilty of an omission
which was negligent, wrongful, and the cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries (para [17]). He then outlined the applicable legal prin-
ciples against which the evidence had to be assessed (paras
[18]-[30]). The most important of these principles are, in sum-
mary: everyone must bear the loss he or she suffers unless,
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among other things, a delict has been committed (para [18]); the
test for negligence is the reasonable foreseeability and prevent-
ability of harm (para [19]); as to foreseeability, fault would be
established if a reasonable person in the defendant’s position
would have realised that harm to the plaintiff might be caused,
even though the exact nature of the ensuing harm fell outside that
realisation (para [22]); preventability entails four basic consider-
ations – the degree or extent of the risk created by the actor’s
conduct, the gravity of the possible consequences if the risk of
harm materialises, the usefulness of the actor’s conduct, and the
burden of eliminating the risk of harm (para [20]). Factual
causation is determined by the application of the ‘but-for’ test
where the plaintiff must establish that it is more likely than not that,
but for the defendant’s wrongful and negligent conduct, his or her
harm would not have ensued (para [21]). As regards wrongful-
ness, the court is obliged to make what is in effect a value
judgment based, among other things, on its perceptions of the
legal convictions of the community and on considerations of
policy on grounds rooted in the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) (paras [23] [25]). These
considerations dictate whether it would be reasonable to impose
liability on the defendant (paras [24] [25]), and adherence to a
statutory rule does not in itself exclude negligence, while the
breach of a statutory duty does not necessarily constitute negli-
gence (paras [26]-[28]). Further, accountability is but one of the
considerations to be taken into account in determining wrongful-
ness (para [29]), and in the context of wrongfulness, reasonable-
ness has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the defendant’s
conduct (para [30]).
After an in-depth analysis of the evidence and the facts, and
applying the legal principles set out above, Cloete J found that
the defendant had been negligent. A diligens paterfamilias in the
position of the defendant would have foreseen that its failure to
take reasonable steps to guard against a similar occurrence
would cause injury to students in its hostels, and would also have
taken reasonable steps to guard against such an occurrence.
The steps taken by the defendant were not reasonable and fell far
short of the reasonableness standard. In this regard, the risk of
the fire spreading was severe; the gravity of the possible harm if
the risk materialised was serious; the defendant was financially
able to take reasonable steps adequately to address that risk;
and the burden of adequately addressing the risk was not unduly
onerous (paras [146] [147]).
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The judge also found that factual causation was present
because the defendant’s failure to take reasonable steps caused
the plaintiff’s injuries (para [147]).
Cloete J further found the defendant’s conduct wrongful. He
explained that compliance with a statutory obligation is not in
itself determinative of the issue, and that other considerations of
policy are equally important. Stereotypes such as those relating
to persons in control of dangerous property are not irrelevant,
and will still provide guidance to answering the question of
whether or not policy considerations dictate that it would be
reasonable to impose delictual liability on a defendant in a
particular case. According to the judge, foreseeability may also
be a factor (para [148]).
The judge rejected the defendant’s ‘floodgates’ argument – ie,
the possibility of indeterminate liability. He stated that all cases
such as these are fundamentally fact-bound, and that a finding of
wrongfulness will depend on each particular set of proven facts.
A finding of wrongfulness in a particular matter will not have the
automatic effect of opening the floodgates to potential liability for
others (paras [150] [151]). Therefore, wrongfulness was estab-
lished (para [152]).
The judge concluded that the defendant should be liable to the
plaintiff for such damages as might be agreed upon or proven in
consequence of the injury (para [157]).
It is clear that Cloete J did not expressly use the traditional boni
mores, legal-duty approach to wrongfulness which we prefer, but
referred to the formulation of the new test for wrongfulness: the
reasonableness of holding the defendant liable (eg, para [148]).
For criticism of the new test, see Neethling & Potgieter Delict
(2015) 80-85. In this regard, it should again be emphasised that
the reasonableness of a person’s conduct indeed plays a promi-
nent role in determining delictual wrongfulness, contrary to Brand
J’s pronouncement in Le Roux v Dey (above para [122]), echoed
by Cloete J in paragraphs [30] and [149], that it does not. In
addition, as Froneman J also indicated in Masstores (Pty) Ltd v
Pick ’n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) BCLR 152 (CC), 2017 (1)
SA 613 paragraph [48] (discussed below), the new wrongfulness
test does not necessarily assist in determining when it is reason-
able to hold a person liable. Further, Cloete J’s statement that
foreseeability is also a factor to be taken into account in determin-
ing wrongfulness (para [148]) is no longer valid in light of the
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Supreme Court of Appeal’s contrary decision in MTO Forestry
(Pty) Ltd v Swart NO (above) paragraph [18].
Medical negligence
The plaintiff in Joubert v Meyer [2017] 3 All SA 878 (GP) sued
the defendant, a plastic surgeon, for damage arising from an
abdominoplasty – commonly referred to as a ‘tummy tuck’ –
performed on her by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed general
damages, past medical expenses, and future medical expenses
(para [98]). The merits of the case were settled on the basis that
the defendant undertook to pay 90 per cent of the plaintiff’s
proven or agreed loss arising from the performance of the
surgical procedure. The court had to decide which of the
sequelae complained of arose from the incident and complica-
tions arising therefrom, and what damages, if any, were to be
awarded. In this regard, Avvakoumides AJ had to determine
whether the claim was based on breach of contract (‘breach of a
legal duty’, as the judge would have it) or delict (‘breach of a duty
of care’, in his words) (para [128]). The court confirmed as trite
law that the test for negligence in the case of members of the
medical profession is ‘not whether a medical professional acted
as a reasonable ordinary man-on-the-street would, but whether
the medical professional acted like a reasonable medical profes-
sional, with the same training and knowledge, would have acted’
(para [125]; see also Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 145-7). It
is important to establish the correct basis for the claim because
general damages cannot be claimed for breach of contract (para
[120]; see Administrator of Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A),
[1990] 2 All SA 374; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 272-3),
but only if a delict has been committed. In exercising its discre-
tion, the court held that the claim was based in delict and that
general damages for pain, suffering, discomfort, and loss of
amenities of life could, therefore, be claimed (paras [129]ff
[136]), in addition to damages for, among other things, psycho-
therapy sessions and medical expenses (paras [133]-[135]). The
judge discussed the principles to be applied in determining
general damages (paras [136] [137]; see, in general, JM Potgieter,
L Steynberg & TB Floyd Visser & Potgieter Law of Damages 3ed
(2012) 108ff) and awarded general damages of R200 000 (para
[128]).
Negligence of financial services provider
Oosthuizen v Castro (Centriq Insurance Company Ltd as Third
Party) [2017] 4 All SA 876 (FB) was about the loss sustained by
397DELICT
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 27 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/12−Delict
the plaintiff, a widow, who invested R2 million of the proceeds of
her husband’s life insurance policy in the notorious Sharemax
scheme on the advice of the respondent, a financial services
provider or broker (FSP), and the obligation of an insurance
company (the third party) to indemnify the FSP (para [2]). Apart
from an amount of R1 400, she received no further interest and/or
dividends and the total amount of the capital was lost. She
instituted a claim for damages against the defendant (para [9]),
alleging, among other things, that the defendant had failed to act
honestly and fairly in the interest of the plaintiff in recommending
the investment scheme; to furnish objective financial advice
to the plaintiff appropriate to her needs and interests; and to
exercise the degree of skill, care and diligence to be expected of
an authorised financial services adviser furnishing investment
advice (para [10]). The defendant admitted the agreement relied
upon by the plaintiff and that he had given financial advice of a
general nature, but pleaded that the plaintiff elected to make the
investment in Sharemax notwithstanding the fact that he had
drawn her attention to a recent negative article about Sharemax
in a newspaper. He denied any alleged breach of contract (para
[11]). With regard to the damages claim, the duties of a financial
advisor such as the defendant had to be considered, as well as
the rules of construction of contracts in general and insurance
contracts in particular. Daffue J relied heavily on the locus
classicus, Durr v Absa Bank Ltd & another 1997 (3) SA 448
(SCA). In Durr (a case dealing with an investment broker; see
also Page v First National Bank Ltd & another 2009 (4) SA 484 (E)
488-9; H Koziol ‘Incorrect advice to investors and the liability of
banks’ (2011) 74 THRHR 1ff) the Supreme Court of Appeal
approved the approach in Van Wyk v Lewis 1924AD 438 444 and
emphasised that it is for the court to decide what is reasonable
under the circumstances. It will pay considerable attention to the
views of the profession, but is not bound to adopt them. In
respect of the facts before it, the court held that the appropriate
standard was not that of the average, typical broker of modest
accomplishments, since the acceptance of such a standard
would allow a definition chosen by a witness (for the defendant)
for his own purposes, to dictate the result, so making the enquiry
as to what was required of a particular kind of broker pointless. In
Durr the appropriate standard was that of the regional manager
of the broking division of a financial institution professing invest-
ment skills and offering expert investment advice (see Neethling
& Potgieter Delict (2015) 147).
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After also referring extensively to authority such as relevant
parts of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37
of 2002 (the FAIS Act), case law, and the opinions of writers
(paras [27]-[49]), Daffue J set out the legal principles and
authorities relevant to the liability of a financial advisor and their
application in the present case (paras [50]-[59]). He found that
the defendant was aware that the plaintiff was in a vulnerable
position (para [52]) and stressed that she could not afford to lose
‘two cents of her investment’ (para [53]). There were flashing red
lights around the investment scheme that required him to pro-
ceed with caution in advising the plaintiff. He should have known
that a return on an investment in the scheme was pie in the sky.
His inexplicable, but obviously poor, advice was indicative of lack
of skill, care, and diligence, and was not commensurate with the
commission he had received. The defendant did not say much to
the plaintiff, but what he said was false (para [58]). He acted
contrary to the provisions of section 16 of the FAIS Act and the
Codes of Conduct published since then, and to what the law
expects of FSPs, when he provided the financial advice that led
to the investment. The judge was satisfied that the defendant did
not act as could have been expected of a reasonable FSP (para
[59]) and concluded:
Much more may be said of the defendant’s actions and/or inactions,
but I conclude by finding that defendant was negligent, and even
dishonest, when he advised plaintiff, by placing no credence on the
negative articles in the press and failing to objectively investigate
the criticism. He failed to exercise the degree of skill, care and
diligence which one is entitled to expect from a FSP (para [60]).
The defendant was insured in this matter by the third party (the
insurer) cited in the case. The insurer relied on an exclusion of
liability clause contained in the insurance contract, claiming that
the consequences of the defendant’s action and/or advice fell
squarely within the parameters of the exclusion clause. Daffue J
did not agree and held that the FSP was entitled to indemnifica-
tion, bearing in mind that the ultimate beneficiary was the client
who received wrong advice (paras [61]-[76]; for a full discussion
of this aspect of the case, see the Chapter ‘Insurance’).
The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the capital
amount of R2 million and interest as set out in the court order, and
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the insurer was ordered to indemnify the defendant against the
latter’s liability to the plaintiff (para [80]).
Negligence of rail commuter service operator
In Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa v Moabelo [2017] 4
All SA 648 (SCA) the respondent claimed damages from the
appellant (the PRASA), alleging that he had been injured just
outside the railway station after having been pushed from a
crowded moving train with open doors (paras [4]-[6]). This
version was disputed by the appellant. It claimed that the
respondent was a pedestrian who had run or walked in front of an
oncoming train outside the confines of the station when it was
dangerous or inopportune to do so (paras [7]ff). The trial court
found that the appellant’s negligence had caused the respon-
dent’s injuries and held it liable for damages. On appeal, the full
court confirmed the order of the trial court, and dismissed the
appeal. The main issue before the Supreme Court of Appeal was
whether the appellant’s or the respondent’s version of the facts
should be accepted (para [3]).
Mbatha AJA, delivering the majority judgment, accepted the
respondent’s version of the facts (paras [27] [41]). The court
applied the decision of the Constitutional Court in Mashongwa v
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016 (2) BCLR 204 (CC),
2016 (3) SA 528 (for a discussion of this case see 2016 Annual
Survey 727-31) that the PRASA’s failure to ensure that the doors of
a train were closed when the train left the station had been
negligent. In Mashongwa it was also held that the PRASA had a
legal duty to protect its passengers from physical harm by, among
other things, keeping the doors closed while an overcrowded train
was in motion. The Constitutional Court found that this situation
posed a real danger to passengers on the train (paras [32]-[35]).
Mbatha AJA confirmed that in the present case it was reasonably
foreseeable that a train operating at peak hours, in motion with
open doors, would result in injury to commuters (para [42]), and
that the trial court could not be faulted for finding in favour of the
injured repondent. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
In a minority judgment, Ponnan JA found that the respondent
had failed to establish factual or legal causation, and therefore
that his claim should have been dismissed (paras [46]ff).
See also, as to negligence, the discussion of TS & another v
Life Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd & another (above).
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CAUSATION
Liability for death of baby at day-care centre
In Barley & another v Moore & another [2017] 3 All SA 799
(WCC) the plaintiffs instituted a delictual claim for damages
against the defendants based on the death of their five-month-old
daughter at the first defendant’s day-care centre. It appeared
that the child rolled off a bed on which she was sleeping and
died. The second defendant, the provincial Department of Social
Development, admitted that it had a constitutional and legislative
mandate (in terms of the Constitution, the Child Care Act 74 of
1983, the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, and relevant regulations and
guidelines) to regulate, manage, and control the provision of
early childhood development services in the province, as well as
to respect, protect, and promote all rights, including the right to
life, of all children (including that of the deceased infant) within
the province (paras [4]-[6]).
The plaintiffs averred that the first defendant had a legal duty to
ensure the safety and security of the child while in her custody
and care, and that the death of the child was a direct result of the
her wrongful and negligent breach of a legal duty, among other
things, in that she had left the child alone and unattended on a
bed and failed to place her in a cot or some other safe resting
area (para [3]). Dlodlo J confirmed that it was probable that the
child had rolled off the first defendant’s bed onto the floor and that
her positioning on the floor led to a lack of oxygen and death by
suffocation. The evidence led to an inescapable conclusion that
the first defendant’s actions were clearly wrongful and negligent
(para [47]).
The plaintiffs alleged that the Department had failed in its duty
in a number of ways, including by registering the first defendant’s
facility without conducting a proper inspection (para [7]). The
Department’s defence was essentially a bald denial that it had
any positive legal duty as alleged by the plaintiffs, and that it had
wrongfully and/or negligently breached its legal duty in any
respect (para [8]).
The court found that had the Department processed the first
defendant’s application for registration and visited the premises
(which it was required to do as part of the evaluation of the
application), it would have realised that the first defendant and
her staff were not properly qualified or trained to look after infants,
and that they were unfamiliar with and had failed to implement
401DELICT
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 31 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/12−Delict
safe sleep practices (para [64]). The death of the child would
probably have been prevented had the second defendant inter-
vened as it could and should have done (para [65]).
Dlodlo J stated that it is trite law that in order to succeed in a
delictual claim, a claimant must prove causation, wrongfulness,
fault (negligence), and harm (para [65]). Factual causation must
be determined through the ‘but-for’ test where the plaintiff
must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that, but for the
negligent omissions of the Department, the child would not have
died. The judge confirmed the approach to factual causation in
recent case law, namely that it is a matter of common sense
whether the facts established a sufficiently close link between the
omission and the harm (paras [66]-[70]). He found that had the
Department complied with its obligations after it received the first
defendant’s application for registration, the risk of the first defen-
dant leaving the child unattended and alone on the bed would
have been eliminated, and her death would have been avoided.
Therefore, factual causation had been established (para [70])
(also see, as to factual causation, Neethling & Potgieter Delict
(2015) 193-4).
As for wrongfulness, Dlodlo J commenced his discussion as
follows:
The Department’s omission will only be unlawful if it occurred in
circumstances that the law regards as sufficient to give rise to a legal
duty to avoid negligently causing harm. The wrongfulness enquiry is
based on the duty not to cause harm and that (in the case of negligent
omissions), the focus is on the reasonableness of imposing liability. An
enquiry into wrongfulness is determined by weighing competing
norms and interests. The criterion of wrongfulness ultimately depends
on a judicial determination of whether, assuming all other elements of
delictual liability are present, it would be reasonable to impose liability
on a defendant for the damages flowing from specific conduct.
Whether conduct is wrongful is tested against the legal convictions of
the community which are ‘by necessity underpinned and informed by
the norms and values of our society, embodied in the Constitution’
(see Oppelt v Department of Health, Western Cape [2016 (1) SA 325
(CC) para [51]] (para [71], cf para [73]).
Closely examined, this exposition is a clear example of the
conciliatory approach between the traditional boni mores legal-
duty test for wrongfulness, and the new test of the reasonable-
ness of holding the defendant liable (see the discussions of TS &
another v Life Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd & another and MTO
Forestry (Pty) Ltd v Swart NO (above); Neethling & Potgieter
(2017) 5 TSAR 98-103).
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Dlodlo J continued with an in-depth exposition of all the legal
principles with regard to wrongfulness developed in our law,
referring to and discussing cases such as: Mashongwa v Passen-
ger Rail Agency of South Africa (above); Van Eeden v Minister of
Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus
Curiae) (above); Loureiro & others v Imvula Quality Protection
(Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC); Olitzki Property Holdings v State
Tender Board & another 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA); Minister of
Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (above) and Minister of
Safety and Security & another v Carmichele (above) (para [74]ff).
The judge concluded that the Department had acted wrongfully:
An important consideration in favour of recognising delictual liability
for damages on the part of the Department in circumstances such as
the present is that there is no other practical and effective remedy
available to the plaintiffs. Conventional remedies such as review and
mandamus or interdict do not afford plaintiffs any relief at all. The only
effective remedy for plaintiffs is a private law delictual action for
damages. . . . [T]here is no reason (no policy considerations) to
depart from the general principle that the Department (as an organ of
State), will be liable for its failure to comply with its constitutional and
legislative duty to protect [the child]. On the contrary, Ava [the
deceased baby] was pre-eminently a person who required the State’s
protection . . . Thus, in my view, it would be eminently reasonable to
impose legal liability on the Department in this matter (para [84]).
According to Dlodlo J, legal causation – as the second leg of
the causation enquiry apart from factual causation – relates to
whether the wrongful act is linked sufficiently closely or directly
to the loss for legal liability to ensue, or whether the loss is too
remote (para [85]). The judge was of the view that
the question of legal causation is not a logical concept concerned with
causation but a moral reaction, involving a value judgment and
applying common sense, aimed at assessing whether the result can
fairly be said to be imputable to the defendant. If the negligence of the
Department caused or contributed to the death of [the child], then it
could never be contended by the Department this was too remote a
consequence to give rise to legal liability. I hold that policy consider-
ations based on the norms and values of our Constitution and justice
point to the reasonableness of imputing liability to the Department. I
further hold that failure of the Department to prevent [the child’s] death
is accordingly the kind of conduct that ought to attract liability (para
[87]).
The statement does not accurately reflect the flexible approach
to legal causation as set out in, for example, S v Mokgethi &
others 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) 39ff. Here it was stated that the basic
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question is whether there is a sufficiently close relationship
between the wrongdoer’s conduct and its consequences for the
consequences to be imputed to the wrongdoer in view of policy
considerations based on reasonableness, fairness, and justice.
Moreover, the statement appears to confuse the flexible test for
legal causation with the new wrongfulness test. This may eventu-
ally have the unfortunate and unacceptable result of legal causa-
tion becoming redundant as a separate element of delict
(Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 82-3 n332). Be that as it may,
Dlodlo J concluded that the element of legal causation had been
satisfied (para [87]).
Applying the reasonable foreseeability and preventability test
for negligence as formulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA428
(A) 430, Dlodlo J concluded that the Department had acted
negligently. As far as the element of foreseeability is concerned,
the judge stated that even where the circumstances of a case are
deemed somewhat unusual, the element of foreseeability will be
met if the general nature of the harm was foreseeable (para [88]).
As for the element of harm, Dlodlo J simply stated that the
element was not in dispute (para [91]). Unfortunately, it is not
clear from the judgment which of the plaintiffs’ rights had been
infringed as a result of the child’s death or what the nature of the
harm was.
The plaintiffs were found to have proved liability on the part of
both defendants on a balance of probabilities. The defendants
were jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs
arising from the wrongful death of their child (paras [92] [93]).
See also, as to causation, the discussion of TS & another
(above).
DAMAGES
Future medical expenses: Tender of services in lieu of monetary award
In Premier, Western Cape v Kiewitz 2017 (4) SA 202 (SCA) the
respondent sued the Western Cape provincial government for
damages suffered by her son, who became blind when staff at
the provincial hospital at which he was born, failed to detect an
eye disease at birth. All damages – save for a claim for the son’s
future medical expenses – had been settled. In its ‘plea in
mitigation’, the province undertook to provide all future medical
care required by the son for his sight impairment, arguing that
failure to accept the undertaking and thus mitigate the damage
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would result in a concomitant reduction in the damages. The High
Court dismissed the plea. In an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal, Nicholls AJA commenced his analysis by stating that
delictual damages have been defined as the ‘monetary equiva-
lent of damage awarded to a person with the object of eliminating
as fully as possible his or her past as well as future damage’ (para
[4], with reference to Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Damages
185). He continued:
It is trite that the primary purpose of awarding delictual damages is to
place the injured party in the same position as they would have been
in, absent the wrongful conduct. As a general rule, restitution in kind is
prohibited where patrimonial loss, such as past and future medical
expenses, past and future loss of income and loss of support, has
been suffered as a result of personal injury. Claimants have a duty to
mitigate their [damage] but this goes no further than obliging a plaintiff
to take reasonable steps to minimise the loss, either by reducing the
original loss or by averting further loss (para [4]).
In support of their plea, the Western Cape provincial govern-
ment argued that the respondent should mitigate the loss by
accepting health services based, not on the exorbitant cost of
private healthcare, but free of charge in the public health system.
As the damages in respect of future medical costs would be
reduced to zero, the son and his mother consequently had a duty
to accept the tender. In the result, the plea would absolve the
province from paying a monetary award (para [5]). Nicholls AJA
did not agree. According to him, the province’s plea to offer
restitution in kind, rather than a monetary award, boiled down to
an attempt to abolish the long-established common-law rule that
compensation for patrimonial loss should sound in money (para
[6]). This would also undermine the application of the once-and-
for-all rule (paras [8]-[10]) as it would provide fertile ground for
future litigation, a situation that this rule was designed to avoid
(para [7]). In the court’s opinion, digressing from the once-and-
for-all rule in situations such as the present is a policy decision for
the legislature and not one for judicial reform (para [12]; see also
MEC for Health and Social Development, Gauteng Provincial
Government v Zulu [2016] ZASCA 185 (30 November 2016) para
[12]). Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
We agree with the court’s conclusion on the facts in this case,
that, despite the Western Cape provincial government’s disavowal
of any reliance on the development of the common law, its plea in
mitigation offended against both the once-and-for-all rule and the
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rule that compensation in bodily injury matters must comprise a
monetary award, and that the plea was thus ill-conceived and
unsustainable (para [13]). (See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd
Damages 153-84 185-9 respectively on the once-and-for-all rule,
the principle that damages must be expressed in money, the
concept of ‘restitution in kind’ and the approach that, in delictual
liability, an order for restitution in kind may generally not be given,
as well as that, in the absence of a specific rule, neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant may insist on compensation for loss in
a form other than an award of damages.)
The matter raised in Kiewitz also came before the Constitu-
tional Court in Member of the Executive Council for Health and
Social Development, Gauteng v DZ obo WZ (Member of the
Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape & another as Amici
Curiae) 2017 (12) BCLR 1528 (CC). In the latter case, a child was
born with cerebral palsy caused by asphyxia due to the negli-
gence of hospital staff. The applicant, the Member of the Execu-
tive Council for Health and Social Development in Gauteng (the
MEC), conceded liability for future medical expenses, but pleaded
that she did not have to pay these expenses in one lump sum, but
could rather give an undertaking to pay service providers directly
for future medical expenses as and when they might arise. She
contended that this could be done under common law, and that, if
it could not, the court should develop the common law accord-
ingly. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal,
following the same reasoning as in Kiewitz, found against the
MEC in this regard. The MEC approached the Constitutional
Court for leave to appeal the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal. The Constitutional Court granted leave to appeal but
dismissed the appeal.
In the majority judgment, Froneman J indicated that the MEC
and various amici curiae contended that delictual compensation
need not necessarily sound in money, but could also be paid in
kind; that the once-and-for-all rule applied only to the determina-
tion of liability on the merits of a delictual claim, and not to the
quantification of damages; and that in circumstances such as
those in the present case it was open to a defendant to challenge
an amount claimed as damages on the basis that the sum was
not reasonable because the plaintiff would be likely to use public
healthcare rather than private healthcare, the former being as
good as, and cheaper than, the latter. Claims for future medical
loss, it was argued, may sometimes best be satisfied by the
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provision of actual medical services, rather than the payment of
money (para [12]).
Froneman J pointed out, with reference to Standard Chartered
Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd (above) 782, that the
common-law rule is that when damages are due by law, they are
to be awarded in money, and that this rule still stands (para [14]).
Likewise, the once-and-for-all rule still forms part of our law (para
[15]). This rule is to the effect that a plaintiff must generally claim
all past and prospective damages flowing from a single cause of
action, in one action (para [16]). Froneman J found that the
MEC’s first two general propositions: that delictual compensation
need not sound in money; and that the once-and-for-all rule does
not relate to the quantification of damages, but only to the
determination of liability on the merits, do not reflect our current
law (para [17]). However, he found the MEC’s third proposition –
that it is open to counter the method and measure of the claim for
damages on the basis that the amount claimed is not reasonable
because a plaintiff is more likely to use public healthcare, which
is as good as, and cheaper than, private healthcare – feasible
(paras [18]ff), relying on Ngubane v South African Transport
Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (AD); [1991] 4 All SA 22. According to
him, this approach is in accordance with general principles in
relation to the proof of damages (para [21]) and does not offend
the once-and-for-all rule (para [22]). However, if the damages
claimed have been proven reasonable, a lump sum assessment
must be made of the future loss (para [23]). If not, at least four
possibilities exist:
The first is that no damages for future medical expenses should be
awarded if the evidence shows that the claimant is likely not to suffer
any loss in the future. The second is that, if the evidence establishes
only a lesser loss, then that sum must be awarded as the monetary
damages. The third is that the assessed loss may be ordered to be
paid in instalments [as in Wade v Santam Insurance Company Ltd
1985 1 PH J3 (C)]. The fourth is that the defendant be ordered to
ensure the actual rendering of the medical services that it claims
obviates or reduces the claimant’s monetary loss. The first two
possibilities fall comfortably within the current law of monetary com-
pensation that must be paid ‘once and for all’. The latter two may not
[para [24]).
Froneman J stated that our law currently requires evidence to
substantiate a defence that a claimant has suffered no or less
damage than is claimed, for reasonable future medical expenses.
As the MEC elected not to present any evidence to show that the
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claim for future medical expenses was unreasonable, the pleas
had to fail on the state of our existing law. The only question was
whether the development of the common law could come to her
assistance (para [26]). After a thorough and in-depth investiga-
tion (paras [27]ff), Froneman J found that the required factual
material upon which the assessment of the development of the
common law to be made, was absent. For this reason, the appeal
had to fail (para [57]). However, the failure of the appeal did not
mean that the door to further development of the common law is
shut: ‘Factual evidence to substantiate a carefully pleaded argu-
ment for the development of the common law must be properly
adduced for assessment. If it is sufficiently cogent, it might well
carry the day’ (para [58]). (See in general Potgieter, Steynberg &
Floyd Damages 153-94.)
Joint wrongdoers
See the discussion of TS & another v Life Healthcare Group
(Pty) Ltd & another and Barley & another v Moore & another
(above).
Loss of support – effect of widow’s physical appearance and nature on
remarriage contingency
In Esterhuizen & others v Road Accident Fund 2017 (4) SA 461
(GP) the plaintiff instituted a claim for loss of support after the
death of her husband in a motor vehicle accident. The merits
were conceded by the defendant and it was liable for 100 per
cent of the proven damages. All the disputes between the parties
were settled, but for the contingency to be applied to allow for the
possibility of remarriage (para [3]).
Tolmay J pointed out that the possibility of remarriage is usually
taken into account when a claim for loss of support is considered. In
this regard, factors such as the claimant’s number of children and
attitude to marriage, as well as her appearance and personality, are
considered in determining her chances of remarriage (para [7]).
The judge found that cases such as Legal Insurance Company Ltd
v Botes 1963 (1) SA 608 (A) 616–8 and Snyders & Another NO v
Groenewald 1966 (1) SA 857 (C) as they relied on a woman’s
appearance and nature, revealed a rather outdated and offensive
approach towards women. To take appearance and nature into
consideration is not in accordance with the values of dignity and
equality enshrined in our Constitution. In The Member of the
Executive Council Responsible for the Department of Road and
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Public Works, North West Province v Oosthuizen GP 671-2007
(2 April 2009) it was stated that reliance on appearance is offensive
and should not be part of our law (paras [10] [11]). Tolmay J agreed
with the approach in Oosthuizen (above) – an award of damages
should be fair and to allow for the possibility of remarriage is
appropriate, but no reliance should be placed on factors such as
appearance (para [12]). It should also be borne in mind, in
considering the remarriage contingency, that a second marriage
may not necessarily result in financial support (para [13]). The judge
concluded:
To determine the plaintiff’s prospects of remarriage and the possibility
of financial support is to gaze into the proverbial crystal ball. I take into
consideration all the aspects alluded to in her evidence. I take note of
the fact that the care of the children might make it more difficult for her
to focus on her own life and will probably impact on her social life. She
is relatively young, and I think one can accept that a younger woman
might be more inclined to remarry, not based on appearance or
desirability but rather based on the fact that one might be more
inclined when you are younger to take another chance at marriage.
Tolmay J held that the twenty per cent contingency proposed
by the plaintiff was too low, that the 39 per cent proposed by
defendant was too high, and that a 27 per cent contingency
deduction will be fair under the circumstances.
As to general damages, see also the discussion of Mathe v
Minister of Police 2017 (2) SACR 211 (GJ), [2017] 4 All SA 130
and Bridgman NO v Witzenberg Municipality (JL & another
intervening) [2017] 1 All SA 466 (WCC), 2017 (3) SA 435 below.
AQUILIAN LIABILITY
Interference with contractual relationship
Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ’n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA
613 (CC), 2017 (2) BCLR 152 was preceded by three similar
cases (Pick ’n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd v Liberty Group Ltd 2015 (4)
SA 241 (GP); Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ’n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd
2016 (2) SA 586 (SCA); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Masstores
(Pty) Ltd [2016] 2 All SA 351 (SCA), [2016] 3 All SA 926 (ECG)). In
all four cases, it was alleged that Masstores committed a delict by
interfering with the exclusive contractual relationship between a
supermarket (Pick ’n Pay or Shoprite Checkers) and the owner or
lessor of a shopping centre in terms of which the supermarket
had the exclusive right to sell groceries in the shopping centre. In
the first three cases an interdict was granted against Masstores
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to prohibit it from trading as a general food store in its Game store
in the centre (for discussions, see 2015 Annual Survey 863-5,
2016 Annual Survey 758-62, and, for a review of the Constitu-
tional Court judgment, J Neethling & J Potgieter ‘Bemoeiing met
’n uitsluitende kontraktuele verhouding getroef deur vrye mededi-
nging’ (2017) 14/1 LitNet Akademies 374-88, on which the
present discussion is based). In the case under discussion here,
the Constitutional Court came to the opposite conclusion.
Froneman J started by emphasising the difficulty of determin-
ing the dividing line between lawful and unlawful interference with
the trade of another (617). According to him, inducement to
breach of contract, which is a recognised form of delict, did not
arise in the present case. Rather, the case concerned whether
the interference by Masstores in a contract between Hyprop (the
owner of the shopping complex and lessor) and Pick ’n Pay
(the lessee) was delictually actionable, and therefore allowed
for the granting of an interdict against Masstores (para [3]). The
requirements for a final interdict are, according to the court: a
clear right; an injury actually committed or reasonably appre-
hended; and the lack of an adequate alternative remedy (para
[8]).
Masstores alleged that the Supreme Court of Appeal inter-
preted the decision in Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC,
Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC)
incorrectly. Pick ’n Pay argued that its claim fell squarely within
the established deprivation category of interference cases recog-
nised in Country Cloud (above), and was therefore a case where
wrongfulness need not be established positively but could be
presumed. Even without that initial presumption, it contended that
wrongfulness had nevertheless been established (para [11]).
Froneman J stated that the issues arising from this were:
(a) Whether Pick ’n Pay’s claim falls within the alleged recognition in
Country Cloud of a second category of delictual interference with
contractual relations (narrow delictual enquiry).
(b) If it does not, a further issue may arise, namely whether Mass-
tores’ conduct, while not falling into the established categories of
the delict of unlawful interference with contractual relations,
nevertheless was actionable on an extended or analogous appli-
cation of the principles of the delict of unlawful competition
(extended unlawful competition enquiry) (para [12]).
With regard to the first requirement, the court was critical of
three statements made in Masstores (SCA) with regard to the
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decision in Country Cloud (CC) (above). The first was that the
reference in Country Cloud (CC) (above) to the ‘usurpation of
rights’ in Lanco Engineering CC v Aris Box Manufacturers (Pty)
Ltd 1993 (4) SA 378 (D) could be equated with the examples of
‘deprivation of interests’. According to Froneman J, this did not
happen as Country Cloud (CC) (above) did not use the phrase
deprivation of interests at all. He continued: ‘Whatever the merits
of a pure ‘‘deprivation’’ case may be, this Court’s decision in
Country Cloud cannot serve as authority that it is a case where
wrongfulness does not need to be established positively but can
be presumed’ (para [18]).
The second proposition (paras [20] [21]) was that Country
Cloud (CC) (above) held that there are two types of delictual
action in interference cases, namely those where inducement is
present, and others where there has been a breach of a legal
duty or the infringement of a subjective right. According to
Froneman J, from this it can be deduced that in instances of
inducement, such a breach or violation of a right is not part of the
wrongfulness enquiry, and that this would be both unfortunate
and wrong. That statement was not made in Country Cloud (CC)
(above). That court referred to cases of inducement which
arguably could be prima facie wrongful, but earlier referred to the
statement in Loureiro (above) that the wrongfulness enquiry is
‘based on the duty not to cause harm – indeed to respect rights –
and questions the reasonableness of imposing liability’. Frone-
man J emphasised that our law of delict is based on general
principles of liability and not on separate, independent torts. This
also applies to the different forms of unlawful competition where
the right to goodwill is involved and where inducement cases are
no exception. Inducement without harm to, or the infringement of,
the right to goodwill, will usually not be wrongful.
The third proposition (paras [22] [23]) was that because
Country Cloud (CC) (above) recognised dolus eventualis as an
appropriate form of fault in interference cases, its presence
would be sufficient to constitute an actionable delict on the part of
Masstores. Nevertheless, according to Froneman J, the court in
Country Cloud (CC) (above) paragraphs [39] [40] went further
and, in the footsteps of Roux v Hattingh 2012 (6) SA 428 (SCA),
opined that the intensity of fault – for example, where the conduct
was intentional, or where there was knowledge that it could entail
serious consequences (but not negligence: see also Cape
Empowerment Trust Limited v Fisher Hoffman Sithole [2013] 2 All
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SA 629 (SCA), 2013 (5) SA 183 191-3) – can be relevant to the
inquiry of wrongfulness. However, as has been pointed out
repeatedly, intent in its legal technical sense, which includes
consciousness of wrongfulness, cannot be involved here (see
Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 46-7). Indeed, the fact that a
person directed his or her will to causing a detrimental result (the
other leg of intent besides consciousness of wrongfulness) can,
just as malicious motive, be relevant in finding that he or she
acted wrongfully, but then there is no intent in its technical legal
sense (Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 252). Therefore, so
long as it is clear that intent as determining factor for wrongful-
ness cannot be used in its technical legal sense, such use is
acceptable.
Froneman J summarised the preceding discussion as follows
(para [24]):
So, in summary, this Court’s judgment in Country Cloud is no authority
for the proposition that the deprivation of contractual rights in delictual
claims for interference with contractual relations is prima facie unlaw-
ful. Nor did it lay down that in inducement cases the wrongfulness
enquiry need not be concerned with the duty not to cause harm or the
infringement of rights. And it confirmed that the degree or intensity of
fault may indeed play an important role in the wrongfulness enquiry in
these kinds of claims.
In the light of the fact that Froneman J refuted the three
propositions that the Supreme Court of Appeal made in Mass-
tores (SCA) (above) with regard to the decision in Country Cloud
(CC) (above), he held that Masstores’s trading as a general
supermarket did not deprive Pick ’n Pay of its entitlement to
continue trading as a supermarket in the shopping centre. There
may have been a deprivation of a part of Pick ’n Pay’s trading
interest, namely its exclusivity, but Masstores had not usurped
that exclusivity: ‘Masstores did not usurp any exclusive right of
Pick ’n Pay and appropriate it as its own. It claims no entitlement
to exclusivity’ (para [25]). As a result, Pick n Pay had not proved
wrongfulness on the ground of interference with a contractual
relationship by Masstores.
The question, however, remained whether Pick n Pay was not
guilty of the extended form of the delict of unlawful competition
(paras [27]-[29]), and here (para [30]) the general principles of
Aquilian liability had to be applied, namely whether there was a
wrongful, culpable act which caused damage (in this case, pure
economic loss) to another. In cases of unlawful competition it is
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recognised that the loss can lie in the infringement of the right to
goodwill or the legal duty to respect this right (para [30]).
Although the general right to goodwill enjoys protection in our
law, it is not this right that Pick ’n Pay wished to protect, but its
exclusive right to trade in terms of its rental agreement with
Hyprop. Froneman J continued (paras [33] [36]):
Our law does not usually recognise this kind of exclusive right as
worthy of general protection. The reason lies in the fact that the
underlying purpose of the law of unlawful competition is to protect free
competition, not to undermine it by making it less free. Our courts have
often acknowledged the need for protection of free competition as an
important policy consideration when assessing the unlawfulness of
competitive conduct by confirming the need for free and active
competition or by taking into account that by prohibiting competition
an unlimited monopoly will be bestowed upon the complainant . . . As
a general proposition then, there is no legal duty on third parties not to
infringe contractually derived exclusive rights to trade. (See especially
also Taylor & Horne (Pty) Ltd v Dentall (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 412 (A)
421-2, cited in para [34].)
The question then arose whether the circumstances in casu
justified a different finding. After a thorough investigation, Frone-
man J came to the conclusion that an analogous argument on the
ground of existing authority did not constitute a convincing case
for the extension of the protection of Pick ’n Pay’s exclusive right
(paras [37]-[46]). This could indicate that the extension should
not take place, or perhaps that it should rather be sought in
general principles (para [47]). In order to determine wrongfulness
in cases not covered by existing precedent, the boni mores or
reasonableness criterion should be utilised. According to him,
this test has recently been refined in decisions of the Constitu-
tional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in matters that did
not involve the delict of unlawful competition. The refinement
probably lies in the recognition that, ultimately, the wrongfulness
enquiry questions ‘the reasonableness of imposing liability’.
Froneman J added, and this is very important: ‘Recognising that
reality, however, does not necessarily assist in determining when
it is reasonable to do so’ (para [48]).
Froneman J continued (para [49]) that, because the boni
mores or reasonableness criterion on its own is often too vague
to provide a rational yardstick for the delimitation of the right to
goodwill in the wrongfulness enquiry, J Neethling Van Heerden-
Neethling Unlawful Competition (2ed (2008) 128-33) suggests
that the particular concretisation of the boni mores test may be
found in the so-called competition principle (129 and n83):
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The competition principle is therefore that the competitor who delivers
the best or fairest (most reasonable) performance, must achieve
victory, while the one rendering the weakest (worst) performance,
must suffer defeat . . . Victory over a rival may be obtained in two
ways: either by offering the same performance at a lower price, or by
offering a better performance at the same price.
Froneman J (para [50]) also pointed out that Neethling Unlaw-
ful Competition 128–33 recognises that this principle can be
properly applied only where the activities of the competitors are
comparable, or where the playing fields are even. Where this is
the case, or where there is performance (merit) competition,
competitive conduct by a rival will in principle be lawful. Applying
the competition principle to the facts in this case, the same
conclusion is reached according to the judge, namely that as a
general proposition there is no legal duty on third parties not to
infringe contractually derived exclusive rights to trade. The
underlying rationale is the same: exclusive trading rights make
the competitive field uneven (para [51]).
According to Froneman J, the question arose whether there is
nevertheless room for a delictual claim elsewhere. According to
him, this may possibly lie in the unreasonable manner in which
Masstores exercised its rights. Liability in these kinds of circum-
stances has been variously described as grounded in malice, or
as an abuse of rights, or where the level of intention or other
fault-related elements such as ‘motive to cause’ are highly
relevant in establishing wrongfulness (para [52]).
Accordingly, the appeal succeeded (para [53]). Froneman J
made short thrift of the minority judgment of Jafta J who was of
the view that Pick ’n Pay’s claim for an interdict was based on
contract (paras [55]ff).
In summary, the following comments can be made on the
salient aspects of the four decisions on the topic of interference
with an exclusive contractual relationship. In the courts below, it
was held that interference with such a contractual relationship by
a third party which results in a contracting party not obtaining
the performance to which it is entitled is wrongful. However, the
Constitutional Court decided that in our law such exclusive
agreements are not protected against third-party interference
because to do so would restrict free competition. But this does
not mean that in other cases where such exclusive clauses do not
exist, the interference by a third party preventing a contracting
party from realising its performance may not be regarded as
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actionable, especially where the interference takes place in an
unreasonable manner, for example where malice or abuse of
rights are present.
Secondly, the courts below accepted, mistakenly, that intent is
a requirement for an actionable interference with a contractual
relationship with regard to both an interdict and theAquilian action.
The Constitutional Court correctly held (by implication) that fault
(including intent) is not a requirement for an interdict. As regards
intent as a form of fault for the Aquilian action in these cases, there
are fortunately already indications that the Supreme Court of
Appeal is willing to accept negligence as a sufficient form of fault.
Thirdly, the traditional test for wrongfulness – the boni mores or
reasonableness criterion – was consistently applied in the cases
under discussion. This also applies to the Constitutional Court,
where Froneman J was nevertheless prepared to use a special
concretisation of the boni mores test, namely, the competition
principle. This first recognition of the competition principle in our
law by our highest court is a milestone in the development of
unlawful competition as an independent delictual cause of action.
Both Shoprite (ECG) and the Constitutional Court referred to
the new test for wrongfulness – the reasonableness of holding the
actor liable – alongside the traditional boni mores test. Such
references may indicate an attempt to reconcile the two tests.
However, the Constitutional Court remarked that the fact that
the wrongfulness enquiry ultimately involves questions as to the
reasonableness of imposing liability does not necessarily assist
in determining when it is reasonable to do so. In fact, for
Froneman J the reasonableness of holding a person liable is
determined with reference to the boni mores criterion, as concreti-
cised in the competition principle. In light of this, it can be asked
whether there is any value in involving the new test at all in the
wrongfulness enquiry. It happens all too often that courts simply
apply the boni mores test while merely paying lip-service to the
new test.
Fourthly, the Constitutional Court emphasised that although
wrongfulness and fault are two independent delictual require-
ments, the degree or intensity of fault or fault-related factors such
as malice, or the knowledge that damage may be caused, can
play a part in the wrongfulness enquiry. Intent in its technical
sense can, however, not be involved here.
The outcome of the series of Masstores decisions is that the
Constitutional Court carefully investigated aspects of interference
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with a contractual relationship as delictual cause of action and
made it clear that exclusive agreements between a supermarket
and the owner or lessor of a shopping centre will not be protected
against competitors. These exclusive agreements are therefore
trumped by free competition, which is regarded as the ‘lifeblood
of commerce’ (Taylor & Horne (Pty) Ltd v Dentall (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1)
SA 412 (A) 421-2) and, therefore, is desirable in both a social and
an economic sense. Free competition is, therefore, rightly empha-
sised by the courts as an important public-policy consideration in
order to establish the lawfulness or otherwise of competition
(Neethling Unlawful Competition 1-2).
PURE ECONOMIC LOSS
See the discussion of Home Talk Developments (Pty) Ltd
(above).
UNLAWFUL COMPETITION
Passing-off of competing businesses
In De Freitas v Jonopro (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (2) SA 450 (GJ)
the applicant (D) and one Betterncourt (B) had a close personal
relationship spanning some twenty years. Each ran an adult-
entertainment business; the applicant in Kempton Park, and B in
Midrand under the name Ipi-Tombi. In 2011, they came up with
the name Cheeky Tiger and discussed the broad terms of the
concept of adult entertainment targeting a certain income group,
but nothing further transpired. In 2013, D single-handedly imple-
mented the concept in a business named Cheeky Tiger and
invested money and time to create and build the reputation of
Cheeky Tiger in the area. In January 2015, B got D to agree to
change the name of his business to Manhattan Nights without
disclosing that he (B) intended opening a competing business,
using the Cheeky Tiger get-up, near Manhattan Nights. Some
time later, B began trading near D’s business, replicating the
Cheeky Tiger brand in all but name.
In December 2015, D obtained an interim interdict prohibiting
B from running the competing business, contending that the only
reason B had chosen to open it so close by was to exploit the
goodwill he (D) had built up under the Cheeky Tiger brand. The
order prohibited B ‘from commencing and/or trading business
under the name and style of Cheeky Tiger’ near D’s business.
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In March 2016, D approached the present court for (i) an order
declaring B to be in contempt of the December 2015 order; and
(ii) an interim interdict prohibiting B from conducting a competing
business. D argued that he wanted the interdict as an alternative
to the contempt proceedings in case the first order did not cover
B’s passing-off of his get-up. B argued that the decision in the first
order had dealt with passing-off and that the matter was res
judicata.
We do not deal with the aspects of the judgment relating to
contempt of court, res judicata, and issue estoppel (for a
discussion of these, see the Chapter ‘Intellectual Property’ and
the chapter ‘Contract: General Principles’).
With regard to passing-off, after a thorough investigation of the
background and facts, Spilg J held that in order for D to succeed
with passing-off, he was required to rely on the common-law
principles governing passing-off. The requirements for passing-
off are: first, that an applicant must show that the mark-up or
get-up is distinctive of his or her services (that is, that they have
acquired a reputation in connection with the business); secondly,
that the respondents are passing off their services as those of, or
as associated with the applicant, in conducting their business
(para [29]; see also Neethling Unlawful Competition 164ff 171-
2 183ff) (para [29]). Spilg J found it necessary to return to basic
principles and ask what name, logo, or get-up of the respon-
dent’s business is likely to lead the client base from which the
applicant’s business is drawn to believe that the respondent’s
business is that of, or is associated with, the applicant’s business,
and is likely to divert custom from applicant’s business to that of
the respondents (para [57]). In his view, aside from the name and
style of Cheeky Tiger – the subject of the current interim interdict –
there were many other features of the get-up that would lead the
ordinary clientele to believe that it was part of the branding of
the same business or one associated with it (para [58]).
The court granted the interdict and handed down detailed
orders restraining the respondents from utilising various logos
and get-ups at their business (para [60]).
Passing-off of competing products: defamation
The facts in Herbal Zone (Pty) Ltd & others v Infitech Technolo-
gies (Pty) Ltd & others [2017] 2 All SA 347 (SCA), as they appear
from the judgment of Wallis JA, were briefly the following. The
second appellant, sole shareholder of the first appellant (Herbal
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Zone), became involved with a Malaysian company (Herbal Zone
International) which manufactured capsules containing a root
extract believed to have aphrodisiac properties that enhanced
male sexual performance. He called the capsules ‘Phyto Andro’
and, since 2006, it has been marketed in South Africa as ‘Phyto
Andro for Him’ (para [1]). From 2009 to 2014, the first respondent
(Infitech), was, in terms of a distribution agreement with Herbal
Zone, the sole distributor of Phyto Andro in this country. The
present dispute arose from events after the termination of that
sole distributorship. Before the termination the third and fourth
respondents, shareholders in Infitech, formed the second respon-
dent (Herbs Oils). Herbs Oils has since 2014 distributed a
product in South Africa, also under the name ‘Phyto Andro for
Him’, in competition with the product imported by Herbal Zone.
This competing product was imported by Infitech, which claimed
that it had procured it from an unidentified source in Malaysia.
Although neither Herbal Zone nor Herbs Oils had secured
registration of ‘Phyto Andro’ as a trademark, the packaging that
each uses for its product includes, after the words ‘Phyto Andro’,
the standard symbol ® used to indicate such registration (para
[2]).
In response to Herbs Oils’s actions, Herbal Zone published an
advertisement in a popular newspaper at the foot of which
appeared a statement that products distributed by others under
the same name were counterfeit (para [3]). Herbal Zone also
distributed a circular to pharmacies and other outlets with a
similar message, indicating that the like-named counterfeit
products were distributed by Herbs Oils (Infitech) (para [4]).
Herbal Zone also employed a private investigator to investigate
the source and origin of the competing product, and instigated a
search and seizure operation by the police at the premises of
Infitech and Herbs Oils (para [6]).
Eventually, Infitech and the other respondents launched pro-
ceedings in the High Court seeking a number of interdicts against
the appellants. The latter counter-applied for an interdict restrain-
ing the respondents from marketing, selling, advertising, promot-
ing, or presenting consumable herbal capsules using trademarks,
labels, or names including the words Phyto Andro, or packaging
confusingly similar to that being used by Herbal Zone and its
distributors. They contended that Infitech and its associates were
passing their product off as that of Herbal Zone (para [7]).
The court below granted some of the interdicts sought by
Infitech on the basis that the statements made about Infitech and
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Herbs Oils in the advertisements and circular were defamatory.
The court dismissed the counter-application on the basis that
Herbal Zone had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the
reputation and goodwill attaching to Phyto Andro, as marketed in
South Africa, vested in Herbal Zone, as opposed to Herbal Zone
International, which was not party to the application. In the appeal
against that decision, Wallis JA treated the passing-off claim as
the primary issue, and the defamation claim as the secondary
issue (paras [8]ff).
With regard to passing-off, Wallis JA indicated that there was
no dispute over the relevant legal principles. He continued, with
reference to Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd &
others v Holiday Inns Inc & others [1977] 3 All SA 306 (A), 1977
(2) SA 916, 929; Caterham Car Sales & Coachworks Ltd v Birkin
Cars (Pty) Ltd & another [1998] 3 All SA 175 (SCA), 1998 (3) SA
938 paragraphs [13] [15] [16]; and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v
Bothaville Milling (Pty) Ltd [2014] 2 All SA 282 (SCA) paragraph
[7]:
Passing off occurs when A represents, whether or not deliberately or
intentionally, that its business, goods or services are those of B, or are
associated therewith. It is established when there is a reasonable
likelihood that members of the public in the marketplace looking for
that type of business, goods or services may be confused into
believing that the business, goods or services of A are those of B or
are associated with those of B. The misrepresentation on which it
depends involves deception of the public in regard to trade source or
business connection and enables the offender to trade upon and
benefit from the reputation of its competitor. Misrepresentations of this
kind can be committed only in relation to a business that has
established a reputation for itself or the goods and services it supplies
in the market and thereby infringe upon the reputational element of the
goodwill of that business. Accordingly proof of passing off requires
proof of reputation, misrepresentation and damage. The latter two
tend to go hand in hand, in that, if there is a likelihood of confusion or
deception, there is usually a likelihood of damage flowing from that
(para [9]).
Applying these principles to the present case, Wallis JA
pointed out that the packaging of Herbs Oils’ product used the
same name, Phyto Andro, to describe the product and that the
packaging was very similar. The name Phyto Andro was not
descriptive of the product, but was an invented mark attached to
it in order to distinguish it from other products of a similar type. By
calling their product Phyto Andro, there was plainly a representa-
tion to the public by the respondents that when they bought
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Herbs Oils’ product it was the product that enjoyed a reputation in
South Africa under that name. The crucial question then was
whether Herbal Zone enjoyed the reputation attaching to Phyto
Andro in South Africa (para [10]). In passing it should be
mentioned that as Phyto Andro was an invented mark or fancy
name, it made no sense to require actual proof of reputation,
because the connection of such a name or mark to an undertak-
ing or goods can only serve to individualise them. From its very
nature it is almost impossible to evade an inference of passing-off
where a rival starts using an identical or imitated fancy name
(Truck and Car Co Ltd v Hirschmann 1954 (2) SA 117 (E) 120-1).
This point of view is indeed, by necessary implication, apparent
from a decision of the Appellate Division, Truck and Car Co Ltd v
Kar-N-Truk Auctions 1954 (4) SA 552 (A) 557. Greenberg JA
simply accepted that an ‘invented or fancy’ name is in itself
already distinctive. Reputation was, therefore, not set as an
additional requirement for individualisation in these cases (see
Neethling Unlawful Competition 168-9).)
Wallis JA summarily disposed of Herbs Oils’ claim that the
reputation in the Phyto Andro mark vested in it. He pointed out
that Infitech’s role concerning the product sold under that mark
was that of a distributor. It acquired that role in terms of a
distribution agreement that provided that Herbal Zone was the
owner of all rights, title, trademarks, and logos in respect of the
product (paras [13] [14]).
Turning to Herbal Zone’s claim that proprietorship in the mark
and the reputation attaching to it vested in it, the difficulty it faced
lay in the confusion on the papers between it and Herbal Zone
International, and their respective roles in the manufacture of
Phyto Andro and its marketing in South Africa. The court agreed
with the High Court’s finding that Herbal Zone had failed to show
that the reputation in the mark vested in it and not in Herbal Zone
International (paras [15]-[29]). Accordingly, the appeal against
the finding on the issue of passing-off failed (para [30]).
With regard to the defamation claim (paras [31]ff), the respon-
dents argued that in the appellants’ advertisements, Infitech and
Herbs Oils had been accused of selling counterfeit products,
and it was alleged that such conduct on their part was illegal
(para [32]). Wallis JA considered the arguments of the parties
(paras [33]ff) and set out the proper approach to an application
for an interdict to prevent the publication of defamatory matter
(para [36]ff):
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Such an interdict is directed at preventing the party interdicted from
making statements in the future. If granted, it impinges upon that
party’s constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech. For that
reason such an interdict is only infrequently granted, leaving the party
claiming that they will be injured by such speech to their remedy of a
claim for damages in due course (para [36]).
Wallis JA stated that a corporate entity such as Herbs Oils was
entitled to claim damages based on defamation, but that no
attempt had been made to show that Herbs Oils had suffered a
loss as a result of the publication of the advertisements and
circular, and still less that it would suffer irreparable future harm
from the further publication of the material. Nor had it alleged that
damages would not be an adequate remedy for any such
publication. Indeed, the third respondent’s founding affidavit
made no mention of these two elements of a claim for an interdict
(para [36]).
The judge continued that contentions as to the onus of proof
were also contrary to established authority. The proper approach
to an application for an interdict to restrain the publication of
defamatory matter was dealt with in Hix Networking Technologies
CC v System Publishers (Pty) Ltd & another 1997 (1) SA 391 (A),
[1996] 4 All SA 675 where the court, citing Heilbron v Blignault
1931 WLD 167-9, accepted that a person against whom an injury
is about to be committed is not compelled to wait for the damage
to occur and then sue for damages, but can persuade the court
to prevent any damage being done to him or her. However, he or
she is not entitled to the intervention of the court by way of
interdict, unless it is clear that the defendant has no defence.
Therefore, if the defendant in a defamation matter can, for
example, prove truth and public benefit, the court is not entitled to
disregard this, as the basis of the claim for an interdict is that an
actionable wrong – that is, conduct for which there is no defence
in law – is about to be committed (para [38]). According to Wallis
JA, what is required is that a sustainable foundation be laid by
way of evidence that a defence such as truth and public interest
or fair comment is available to the respondent. It is not sufficient
simply to state that at a trial the respondent will prove that the
statements were true and in the public interest without providing
a factual basis therefor (para [39]).
On the other hand, Herbal Zone produced evidence that it had,
over a lengthy period, first introduced the product ‘Phyto Andro
for Him’, and then caused it to be distributed in South Africa. This
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entitled it to describe its own product as the genuine or original
product, and to denounce the product of others who were
marketing competing products from a different manufacturer and
source as ‘counterfeit’, that is, not the genuine article. Even if the
reputation in Phyto Andro did not vest in it, the fact that it was
importing it into this country and distributing it here entitled it to
level the charge of counterfeit against Herbs Oils products. In
those circumstances, and on the authority of Hix Networking
Technologies (above), the application for an interdict should not
have been granted and the appeal against it was upheld.
Finally, Wallis JA also stressed, obiter, the importance of
freedom of speech as a constitutionally protected fundamental
right. This right now carries greater weight than it did in the past.
Accordingly, when considering an application for an interdict the
proper recognition of the importance of free speech is a factor
which must be given full value in all cases (para [40]).
On passing-off, see also the discussion of Masstores (Pty) Ltd
v Pick ’n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd (above).
DEFAMATION
Defamatory remarks in the political sphere
In Afriforum & another v Pienaar 2017 (1) SA 388 (WCC),
Afriforum (first applicant) and one of its employees, Pawson
(second applicant), applied on an urgent basis for a final interdict
that the respondent (Pienaar) remove certain allegedly defama-
tory postings from his Facebook and Twitter accounts, and for a
temporary interdict that he be prohibited from posting any such
statement on any form of social media pending the finalisation of
an action for defamation and possible further interdicts to be
instituted by the applicants against him.
Pienaar had posted on social media that he ‘had witnessed
Afriforum supporters threaten to rape women today’, and in three
further posts invited readers to watch attached video footage
showing that Afriforum supporters ‘shouted rape threats’ and that
‘Marcus Pawson from Afriforum use[d] rape to intimidate a rape
survivor’. These posts related to an altercation on the University of
Stellenbosch’s campus between students from the ‘End Rape
Culture Campaign’ (the ERCC) and Afriforum employees and
student supporters.
In order to obtain their temporary interdict, Donen AJ pointed
out that the right to be set up by the applicants need not be
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shown on a balance of probabilities; it is sufficient if it is prima
facie established though open to some doubt. The facts as set
out by the applicants, together with any facts set out by the
respondent which the applicants could not dispute, must be
taken and consideration given to the inherent probabilities as to
whether the applicants could, on those facts, obtain final relief at
trial. The facts set up in contradiction by the respondent should
then be considered. Serious doubt was thrown on the applicants’
case by the respondents’ affidavits and the applicants, therefore,
could not succeed in obtaining temporary relief (para [54]).
In dealing with whether a final interdict could be granted, it had
to be clear that Pienaar’s postings constituted actionable defama-
tion. Donen AJ pointed out, citing from The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd
& others v McBride (Johnstone & others, Amici Curiae) 2011 (4)
SA 191 (CC) paragraphs [99] [100], that public discussion of
political issues has, if anything, become more heated and intense
since the advent of democracy. However, freedom of expression
does not extend to hate speech, and everyone enjoys constitu-
tional protection of their dignity, including their reputation (para
[56]). In the political dynamics on the campus of Stellenbosch
University it is almost inevitable that any response to Afriforum by,
among others, the ERCC would be emotional, bitter, and would
involve violent language (para [57]). Accordingly, Pienaar was
entitled to a certain amount of latitude in describing the confron-
tation between Afriforum and students on the campus. It was
political, emotional, bitter, and liable to be described in violent
language (para [59]). A statement would be defamatory if it would
tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking
members of society generally, and it must be accepted that all
right-thinking or reasonable members of society subscribe to the
norms and values of the Constitution (para [60]). A reasonable
reader would interpret Pienaar’s statements in the context of the
events in relation to which they were made. He or she would
accommodate the patois employed in the assertion of the ERCC.
The meaning of the words used must be determined, not in
isolation, but against the established factual matrix of this particu-
lar case (para [62]). Donen AJ continued:
By thrusting themselves into the public eye, and by entering the
premises of Stellenbosch University in order to confront student
groups with opposing political views, Afriforum opened themselves to
public scrutiny. They must consequently display a greater degree of
tolerance to criticism than ordinary individuals . . . Afriforum’s promo-
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tion of a political confrontation by pamphlet and by the follow-up
action of its members, resulted in violence erupting on the campus
which . . . involved Afriforum’s supporters committing assault, sexual
violence, sexual aggression and intimidation, and expressing of rape
culture in an egregious form. The consequence was the employment
of the language of the ERCC by its protagonist against apparent
perpetrators of rape culture. According to the cases cited above,
Mr Pienaar’s robust political riposte constitutes an exercise of freedom
of expression which, in my view, does not involve defamatory state-
ments concerning the applicants (para [63]).
Furthermore, Donen AJ stated that the protection of the dignity
of the women violated by Afriforum supporters is of paramount
importance under the Constitution. The comment on these unlaw-
ful acts in the present publications cannot give rise to a remedy
for the applicants based on a violation of their own dignity (para
[64]). The comments made by Pienaar were fair within the context
of the acts described by the witnesses who deposed to affidavits
in his support (para [65]). The applicants failed to establish that
the publications in issue are unlawful in that the respondent had
no valid defence in the defamation proceedings; or that the
applicants would be irreparably injured if the interdict were not
granted. Pienaar’s assertions, claims, statements, and comments
could be countered most effectively and just as quickly as this
urgent application, by refuting them in public meetings, on the
internet, on radio and television, and in the newspapers (para
[66]), and by countering them in the political arena (para [67]).
Donen AJ held that in all the circumstances
the applicants have not established a prima facie right to have
Pienaar’s publication taken down from social media; less so have they
established a clear right. Nor have they established a well-founded
apprehension of irreparable harm. The harm of which they complain
has been done. The post has been posted, shared and viewed. The
internet world has moved on. They can avail themselves of other
remedies such as those referred to above, and claim damages via a
defamation action (para [68]).
In the final analysis, Donen AJ held that the application for a
temporary interdict in substance, though not in form, amounted to
a permanent interdict (para [70]). He dismissed the application
for either the mandatory or the interim interdict, stating that the
orders sought would have a chilling effect on political free speech
and that the limitations sought were oppressive and unjustified
(paras [71] [72]).
Donen AJ’s judgment resonates with the general approach in
our law that politicians, public figures, and public officers are
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required to be robust and thick-skinned in relation to negative
comments made against them (Neethling & Potgieter Delict
(2015) 356 and n155).
Defamatory words must have ‘illocutionary force’
Waldis & another v Von Ulmenstein (above) concerned an
application for an interdict ordering the respondent to remove an
allegedly defamatory Internet blog post in which the applicants
were accused of fraudulently mislabelling their chocolate prod-
ucts by claiming, among other things, that some of the products
were sugar free and thus diabetic-friendly.
Davis J briefly set out the general principles of the law of
defamation (para [19]). The law of defamation is defined as the
wrongful and intentional publication of defamatory words or
conduct that refers to the plaintiff. Once a plaintiff has established
that a defendant published a defamatory statement concerning
him or her, it is presumed that the publication is both wrongful
and intentional. The defendant can then rebut the presumptions
by raising a defence that either wrongfulness or intention was
absent (para [20]). As to wrongfulness, Davis J stated:
The general test for wrongfulness is based upon the boni mores or the
legal convictions of the community. This means that the infringement
of the complainant’s reputation should not only have taken place but
be objectively unreasonable. See Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of
Personality 2 ed (2005) at 135. The application of the boni mores test
involves an ex post facto balancing of the interests of the plaintiff and
the defendant in the specific circumstances of this case in order to
determine whether the infringement of the former’s interests was
reasonable (para [21]).
In this balancing process, the conflict between the defendant’s
freedom of expression and the plaintiff’s right to a good name
must be resolved. The test to establish whether the alleged words
or conduct were defamatory is whether a reasonable person with
ordinary intelligence might reasonably understand the words
concerned to convey a meaning which is defamatory of the
litigant concerned (para [22]). Once it has been shown that
the words were defamatory, the defence is not limited to
whether the words were true; they must also be in the public
interest. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between
‘what is interesting to the public’ as opposed to ‘what is in the
public interest’ (para [23]). Davis J then referred to Fagan’s
criticism of the majority judgment Le Roux v Dey (above) (see A
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Fagan ‘The Constitutional Court loses its (and our) sense of
humour: Le Roux v Dey’ (2011) 128 SALJ 395). Fagan drew a
distinction between utterances with a propositional content but
no ‘illocutionary force’ and utterances with illocutionary force.
According to him, the former cannot be defamatory. In other
words, Davis J explained,
the point made is that to defame someone is to make probable one or
more of a particular set of consequences by performing conduct of a
particular kind or nature (Fagan at 402). Expressed differently, speech
must contain a specific form of assertion before it can be regarded for
the purposes of the law as being defamatory . . . The concept of
illocutionary force must be distinguished from propositional content
as, in the former case, the illocutionary force connotes the effect of the
words which the speaker intended to convey (paras [25] [26]).
Next, the court dealt with the defences available to the respon-
dent, namely truth and public interest, and fair comment (paras
[28]ff). With regard to truth and public interest (see also Neethling
& Potgieter Delict (2015) 360), Davis J stated that the prima facie
wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct will be rebutted if he or
she proves that the defamatory remarks are substantially true and
in the public interest. What is in the public interest, depends on
the convictions of the community (the boni mores) and in this
regard, ‘the time, the manner and the occasion of the publication’
play an important role (Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd &
others v Suliman [2004] 3 All SA 137 (SCA) para [47] (para [41])).
Also, past transgressions should not be raked up after a long
lapse of time. According to Davis J, it is sufficientto suggest that if
something is recently in the public domain, the fact that it is
already present does not mean that the defence of truth and
public interest cannot be invoked (para [42]).
So far as fair comment is concerned (see also Neethling &
Potgieter Delict (2015) 362), the prima facie wrongfulness of
defamatory publication may be rebutted if a defendant proves
that the defamation forms part of fair comment on facts that is true
and in the public interest. This requires the establishment of four
issues: the defamation must amount to comment and not to the
assertion of an independent fact; the comment must be fair;
the facts on which the comment is based must be true; and the
publication of these facts must be in the public interest (para
[43]).
With reference to the present case, Davis J held that there can
be no doubt that chocolates which claim to be diabetic-friendly
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but are in fact not, fall within the scope of the public interest,
particularly because, as the respondent submitted, this claim
holds major concerns for diabetics who purchase chocolates
which do not comport with their diabetic-friendly claim, that is,
that they are sugar-free (para [45]). Furthermore, in this case,
persistent allegations about a product that is not what it purports
to be, definitely remain of public interest and importance, notwith-
standing the allegations having been made at some point in the
past (para [46]). The respondent raised a justifiable defence on
either of the two defences, save for the following sentences which
appear within the blog: ‘[The applicant’s] claims on the Le
Chocolatier chocolate slab range have been misleading and
even life-threatening to diabetics’ and ‘It is clear that [the appli-
cant] is a fraud continuously looking for business opportunities to
make money at the expense and even the health of consumers’.
Only these sentences, because they have illocutionary force and
are assertions of a kind which have the defamatory meaning as
averred by the applicants, should fall within the scope of the law
of defamation (para [47]).
From this, it is clear that a distinction can be made between
traditional disputes arising from the publication of a newspaper
report or similar written publications, and a blog on the internet
where the offending passages can be deleted, leaving the
balance of the report in the public domain because it does not
breach the law of defamation and can be preserved, thus giving
effect to freedom of speech (para [48]). The court, therefore,
ordered the respondent to remove the offending sentences cited
above from the blog concerned (para [54]).
It is interesting that Davis J, despite referring to Le Roux v Dey
(above), in which the new test for wrongfulness was formulated,
did not take note of this new formulation but only referred to and
applied the traditional boni mores or legal convictions of the
community criterion for wrongfulness.
On defamation, also see the discussion of Herbal Zone (Pty)
Ltd & others v Infitech Technologies (Pty) Ltd & others (above).
UNLAWFUL ARREST AND DETENTION
Due date of debt in claims for unlawful arrest and detention
In Makhwelo v Minister of Safety and Security 2017 (1) SA 274
(GJ) the applicant had been arrested and detained by members
of the South African Police Service, servants of the Minister of
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Safety and Security, for over a year when the charges were
withdrawn and he was released (para [3]). The applicant then
served summons against the Minister in terms of section 3(2)(a)
of the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of
State Act 40 of 2002 (para [5]), claiming damages for unlawful
arrest and detention and for the loss of income sustained while in
detention (para [6]). At a pre-trial conference the plaintiff indi-
cated that he would amend his particulars of claim to increase the
damages sought, and he delivered the amended particulars
some seven weeks before the start date of the trial (paras [10]
[11]). Two court days before the trial, the Minister delivered an
amended plea, as well as a special plea that plaintiff’s notice was
defective because it had been served out of time and so barred
him from proceeding with the matter (paras [11]-[13] [17]). The
plaintiff then applied for an urgent order that the notice was
competent because it was timeous; or failing that, for condona-
tion.
For our purposes, the most relevant issue to be decided was
whether the plaintiff’s notice was defective in terms of the
Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State
Act (see para [16] for an exposition of the other issues involved).
In this regard, the respondent contended that the applicant was
obliged to give the statutory notice within six months, reckoned
from the date when he was arrested, and not from the date of his
release more than a year later, as the plaintiff contended (para
[16]).
According to Spilg J, the present cause of action arises from a
delict under the actio iniuriarum. A delictual debt becomes due in
terms of section 3(3)(a) of Institution of Legal Proceedings
against Certain Organs of State Act when the creditor has
knowledge of the identity of the organ of state and of the facts
giving rise to the debt, or when, with the exercise of reasonable
care, he or she could have acquired such knowledge, unless the
organ of state willfully prevents the creditor from acquiring such
knowledge (para [43]). In summary, according to Spilg J, a debt
is due only when (a) the material facts from which the debt arises
are known, or ought reasonably to have been known (see Truter &
another v Deysel 2006 (4) SA 168 (SCA) paras [22] [23]); and
provided (b) it is immediately claimable and the debtor is obliged
to perform immediately. The material facts do not include knowing
that the actions were culpable, as culpability, whether in the form
of negligence or otherwise, is a conclusion of law drawn from the
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evidence. The presence or absence of negligence is therefore
not a factor for these purposes (para [53]). (The latter require-
ment is not applicable in the present case as fault is not a
requirement in cases of wrongful arrest or detention, where
liability is strict: Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Personality 119-20;
Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 388-9.)
As to the requirement of knowledge of the material facts, Spilg
J stated that it is difficult to appreciate that at the time of the
arrest, or even during detention, the suspect would have had
sight of the docket in order to form a view that the arresting officer
did not have a reasonable suspicion that an offence had been
committed. As the docket is not available to an accused until
the investigation has been completed and he is presented with
the indictment, it is most unlikely that the identity of the complain-
ant or the evidence available when the arrest was made would be
known to a would-be plaintiff. Without that knowledge a plaintiff
cannot assume that the arresting officer was acting unlawfully
when effecting the arrest, rather than that the complainant had
falsified a charge against him (para [55]). It is therefore clear that
as the docket was not available to the plaintiff in the present case,
he did not have knowledge of the material facts.
So far as the second requirement for a debt being due is
concerned, the court held that it is difficult to appreciate how a
debt can be immediately claimable and, therefore, justifiable
before the outcome of a criminal trial, or prior to charges being
dropped or otherwise withdrawn (para [58]). (For a full discussion
of the reasons why a person cannot institute a civil action before
the prosecution process has concluded and the plaintiff been
discharged, see paras [59]ff; see also Unilever Bestfoods Robert-
sons (Pty) Ltd & others v Soomar & another 2007 (2) SA 347
(SCA) and the other cases discussed by Spilg J.)
In the result, it was held that in cases of unlawful arrest and
detention the debt becomes due on release and not on arrest.
Spilg J, therefore, declared that the notice of intention to institute
legal proceedings against the respondent in terms of the Act had
been timeously given, and, if he was wrong, that the late delivery
of such notice in terms of the Act could be condoned (para [64]).
In Mathe v Minister of Police 2017 (2) SACR 211 (GJ), [2017] 4
All SA 130 the plaintiff was arrested by members of the South
African Police Service on a charge of prostitution and detained
overnight in a police cell. Flowing from the arrest and detention,
the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages. The defendant
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conceded that the arrest and detention had been unlawful and
the court was called upon to determine the quantum of general
damages and the scale of costs to be awarded to the plaintiff
(para [1]).
The plaintiff’s claim for damages was based on an infringement
of her constitutional rights to equal protection and benefit of the
law, human dignity, freedom and security of the person, freedom
of movement, and conditions of detention that are not consistent
with human dignity. The damages were also based on an
infringement of her personal rights to physical integrity, dignity,
privacy, reputation, and sense of self-worth. The particulars of
claim alleged that as a result of her arrest and detention, she
suffered shock, psychological trauma, emotional shock, and
contumelia (para [17]).
In assessing general damages, Opperman J discussed the
general approach to the assessment of damages for unlawful
arrest and detention (para [18]), and, citing Potgieter, Steynberg
& Floyd Damages 545-8, the factors that can play a role in the
assessment (paras [18]ff):
In deprivation of liberty the amount of satisfaction is in the discretion of
the court and calculated ex aequo et bono. Factors which can play a
role are the circumstances under which the deprivation of liberty took
place; the presence or absence of improper motive or ‘malice’ on the
part of the defendant; the harsh conduct of the defendants; the
duration and nature (eg solitary confinement or humiliating nature) of
the deprivation of liberty; the status, standing, age, health and
disability of the plaintiff; the extent of the publicity given to the
deprivation of liberty; the presence or absence of an apology or
satisfactory explanation of the events by the defendant; awards in
previous comparable cases; the fact that in addition to physical
freedom, other personality interests such as honour and good name
as well as constitutionally protected fundamental rights have been
infringed; the high value of the right to physical liberty; the effects of
inflation; the fact that the plaintiff contributed to his or her misfortune;
the effect an award may have on the public purse; and, according to
some, the view that the actio iniuriarum also has a punitive function.
Although Opperman J was conscious of the limited value that
previous cases provide in assessing damages, he discussed
some of them in the process of calculating damages in the
present case (paras [23]-[30]). In considering the facts of the
present case, the judge related how the plaintiff and two other
women had been arrested in the early hours of the morning
without any lawful reason whatsoever, apparently on suspicion
that they were prostitutes (para [31]). The police had abused the
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power entrusted to them, had not identified themselves, had
failed to inform the women why they were being arrested, and
conducted themselves in a high-handed manner (para [32]). The
plaintiff was locked up with other inmates in an unhygienic, dirty,
stinking holding cell with only one open toilet that did not work,
but in which inmates relieved themselves in full view of others.
Not only was the plaintiff detained under these inhumane condi-
tions, but she also lost her employment, a job she had held since
2009. The plaintiff was stigmatised as a result of the nature of the
offence which she was alleged to have committed (paras [34]
[38] [39]). After setting out the prejudices and violence to which
women are generally subjected (para [35]), Opperman J pointed
out that the plaintiff had been prejudiced exclusively on the basis
of her gender (para [36]). As to damages, the court concluded:
The plaintiff has sought R175 000 for the unlawful arrest and subse-
quent 37 hours of unlawful detention. The defendant has contended
that R60 000 would adequately compensate the plaintiff. Having
regard to the facts as a whole, the past awards and the relevant case
law, in my view a fair and reasonable amount for the damages to be
awarded to the plaintiff is the amount of R120 000.
The case is particularly important for the emphasis it places on
the vulnerability of women in assessing general damages for
personality infringement when their rights have been infringed.
RAPE AND ASSAULT
Liability of municipality for rape of mentally disabled woman
In Bridgman NO v Witzenberg Municipality (JL & another
intervening) [2017] 1 All SA 466 (WCC), 2017 (3) SA 435 an
eighteen-year-old woman (L) with a mental disability (she func-
tioned cognitively at the level of a six- to eight-year-old child) was
abducted and raped by three youths at the Pine Forest Holiday
Resort in Ceres, Western Cape, where she was staying with her
adoptive parents (for a review of this case, see also J Neethling &
JM Potgieter ‘Delictual liability of a municipality for the rape of a
mentally disabled woman’ (2018) 81 THRHR 325-33, on which the
present discussion is based). The resort was owned, managed,
and controlled by the defendant, the Witzenberg Municipality (the
municipality). The plaintiff, in his capacity as L’s curator ad litem,
instituted an action against the municipality, claiming damages
arising from injuries L had suffered as a consequence of the rape.
He submitted that the rape had been caused by the negligent
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omissions and conduct of the municipality. The municipality denied
that it had been negligent. In the alternative, it argued that if it had
indeed been negligent, the rape was caused partly through its own
negligence, and partly through the negligence of L’s parents.
Donen AJ (para [4]) stated that a municipality is an organ of
state within the local sphere of government, and as such is bound
to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the aforementioned rights
in the Bill of Rights (s 39(2) of the Constitution). He continued (ibid):
The Municipality failed to protect [L] from being raped. The wrongful-
ness of this omission is tested by reference to the legal convictions of
the community, which by necessity are underpinned and informed by
the norms and values of our society embodied in the Constitution.
Because of its constitutional duties, and because it owned, managed
and controlled the resort in the circumstances described further
below, the failure on the part of the Municipality to prevent the rape
was unlawful.
(In this respect, the court referred, among other things, to the
locus classicus on liability for an omission, Minister van Polisie v
Ewels (above) 597.)
This approach is in conformity with Van Eeden v Minister of
Safety and Security (above) 395, where the court stated:
The appropriate test for determining wrongfulness [of an omission]
has been settled in a long line of decisions of this Court. An omission is
wrongful if the defendant is under a legal duty to act positively to
prevent the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The test is one of reasonable-
ness. A defendant is under a legal duty to act positively to prevent
harm to the plaintiff if it is reasonable to expect of the defendant to
have taken positive measures to prevent the harm.
(See also Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 (2) SA
144 (CC) 167; Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
v X above para [13]; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 56.)
Interestingly, Donen AJ made no reference to the new test for
delictual wrongfulness with regard to the liability for an omission
(see generally Neetling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 80-5 for an
exposition and criticism of this test). Recently, there has been a
tendency in our courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeal
and the Constitutional Court, to attempt, albeit by implication, to
reconcile the traditional boni mores or reasonableness test with
the new test (see the discussion of MTO Forestry (Pty) Ltd v Swart
NO above).
The municipality averred that L’s parents committed a delict as
against L and should therefore be joined as joint wrongdoers
(third parties) in the action. In our law, given the close relationship
432 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 62 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/12−Delict
between parents and children, children would probably not have
an action against their parents. Actions between parents and
children should, on ethical grounds, be viewed with circum-
spection. As far as we could determine, a child has never
succeeded in our law in a delictual claim against its parent
(Saitowitz v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (3) SA 443 (W)
445-6; J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Aquiliese aksie van ’n kind vir
mediese koste weens persoonlike beserings’ (1992) 55 THRHR
480-4; J Neethling ‘The Constitutional Court affirms the potential
existence of an action for wrongful suffering as a result of
disability (wrongful life) in South African law’ (2016) 79 THRHR
533-50). By extension, it has also never been considered whether
the child may institute action against a parent as joint wrongdoer
(third party) where the child’s damage was caused by the negligent
conduct of both a defendant and the parent. Contrary to what has
previously been contended (cf J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Swem-
baddens, visdamme, ander waterpoele en kinderslagoffers – Delik-
tuele aanspreeklikheid’ (2017) 14/1 LitNet Akademies 389-400),
section 2(1B) of theApportionment of DamagesAct 34 of 1956 does
not apply in a case such as the present as the provision applies to a
situation where someone suffers damage as a result of the injury or
death of another caused partly by the conduct of the injured person
as well as a third party. Be that as it may, it seems that Donen AJ,
without further ado, proceeded on the basis that it was indeed
possible for a parent to be a joint wrongdoer in a delictual action by
its child.
The municipality’s alternative plea entailed that L’s adoptive
parents had a duty of care towards L, and that they had breached
this duty by, among other things, failing to supervise her properly
when she was abducted while playing alone in the resort. The
municipality contended that the parents, while they were acutely
aware of L’s mental disability and hence vulnerability, had failed
to exercise reasonable care or to take adequate steps to prevent
harm to her when they could and should have done so; failed
adequately to monitor her movements at all relevant times prior
to, during, and subsequent to the rape; allowed her to stray from
their control and area of supervision while being acutely aware of
her mental disability and consequential vulnerability or exploitabil-
ity; and failed to avoid the rape when, by the exercise of
reasonable care and measures, they could and should have
done so. In the circumstances the municipality maintained that
L’s adoptive parents and the municipality were jointly and sever-
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ally liable to the plaintiff (paras [6] [7]). (The use of the expression
‘duty of care’ is a source of confusion. In English law, a ‘duty of
care’ is used to denote what in SouthAfrican law would entail both
the second leg of the enquiry into negligence, and ‘legal duty’ in
the context of wrongfulness. Thus ‘duty of care’ ‘straddles both
elements of wrongfulness and negligence’ – see McIntosh v
Premier, KwaZulu-Natal 2008 (6) SA 1 (SCA) 8–9; Trustees, Two
Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA
138 (SCA) 144. To avoid confusion, it would be preferable to
describe the duty involved in the test for wrongfulness as a ‘legal
duty’; see Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 159.)
The question implicit in this exposition was whether the con-
duct of the parents was wrongful as against their daughter, L. It is
generally accepted in our law that the primary responsibility for
the safety of children rests with their parents. Parents have a legal
duty to supervise their children and to ensure that harm does not
befall them (cf Neethling & Potgieter (2017) 14/1 LitNet Akade-
mies 389-400). Although at eighteen L was technically an adult,
she lacked the mental capacity to function in accordance with her
age. The fact that L may have been vulnerable to exploitation, and
lacking in social skills, judgement, and defence mechanisms, as
well as being emotionally vulnerable and socially inept (para [8]),
are, in our view, clear indications that she required some super-
vision by her parents. This legal duty on the parents was breached
when they allowed L to wander freely and unsupervised on the
playground from where she was abducted and subsequently
raped. They, therefore, acted wrongfully as against L.
Be that as it may, according Donen AJ, L’s disabilities did not
allow the court to limit her rights and freedoms as a woman. He
continued (para [8]):
Both as a woman and a disabled person, [L] enjoyed entrenched
rights to her dignity and security, control over her body, her freedom of
movement, and equality before law. She may not be discriminated
against on the basis of her gender, sex and disability. A duty rests
upon the court to afford [L], both as a woman and a disabled person,
the full and equal enjoyment of all her rights and freedoms under the
Constitution. Insofar as the alternative plea seeks to rely on the fact
that [L] is a disabled woman, the placing of any limitations on her
freedom (which is implicit in the alternative plea) is anathema to the
Constitution.
Donen AJ was of the opinion that this view of L’s rights is
supported by international law and, particularly, the Disability
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Convention adopted by the UN General Assembly, which is
regarded as law in South Africa (para [10]).
It appears that Donen AJ regarded L’s rights as absolute
because of his view that to attribute delictual liability to L’s
adoptive parents (‘as wrongdoers’) for allowing her to exercise
independence, freedom of movement, and control over her body,
would conflict with the aforementioned constitutional principles.
He stated that L’s rights could be limited only in terms of the
limitation clause in the section 36 of the Constitution. This clause
provides that fundamental rights may be limited by a law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality, and freedom. Owing to L’s stage of
development, and in order to protect her rights, there would have
had to be a legitimate reason for limiting her freedom to exercise
her fundamental rights in the particular circumstances of the case
(para [12]). According to the judge, the only relevant consider-
ation in this regard was whether L had the capacity to refuse the
perpetrators consent to sexual intercourse (para [13]). He found
that as she lacked such capacity, any limits on her freedom of
movement and control over her own body could not be justified
(para [14]). This view is open to criticism. In our view, precisely
because L ‘may have been vulnerable to exploitation, lacking in
social skills, judgement and defence mechanisms, as well as
being emotionally vulnerable, and socially inept’ (para [8]), and
having the cognitive capacity of a six- to eight-year-old child, they
are more than sufficient grounds to found a reasonable and
justifiable limitation of her rights to freedom of movement, inde-
pendence, and control over her body. Seen in this light, these
limitations placed a legal duty on her parents to take reasonable
steps to supervise and protect her, or, in other words, it was
reasonable to expect of the parents to have taken positive
measures to prevent harm from befalling her (cf citation from Van
Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre
Trust as Amicus Curiae) above 395). Therefore, it cannot be
accepted that the recognition of a duty on L’s parents to
supervise her would amount to an unreasonable interference and
limitation of her rights to independence and freedom, as appears
to have been suggested by Donen AJ (paras [8]ff). The failure of
L’s parents to supervise her under the circumstances should,
therefore, be branded as a breach of their legal duty in this
regard and thus as wrongful.
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However, this does not mean that L’s parents would necessarily
be delictually (jointly) liable for the damage she suffered. Apart
from wrongfulness, negligence – in particular – is required for
such liability and in this regard it appears that the parents’
decision to allow L to play alone in the park was reasonable under
the circumstances, and they consequently did not act negli-
gently. According to the judge (para [19]), the evidence of L’s
mother established that a reasonable person in the position of the
parents would not have foreseen that L would be raped in the
playpark in which she was allowed to play. Nor would a bonus
paterfamilias have taken any measures exceeding those taken by
the parents to monitor L, given the security measures they had
seen to be in place at the resort. The evidence showed that the
parents had indeed supervised L appropriately. The decision not
to allow the municipality’s alternative plea was therefore justified.
In view of the above, it is clear that an omission can, on the one
hand, be in breach of a legal duty in terms of the boni mores or
reasonableness criterion and thus wrongful, but, on the other
hand, not negligent in terms of the reasonable foreseeability and
preventability test for negligence (see Neethling & Potgieter
Delict (2015) 166-7; Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba 1973 (3)
SA 69 (A); cf Neethling 2016 TSAR 804-6 with regard to the
decision in BS v MS 2015 (6) SA 356 (GP)). Unfortunately, Donen
AJ did not make this distinction clear in his judgment.
Donen AJ (para [153]) commenced his discussion of the
municipality’s negligence by setting out the well-known reason-
able foreseeability and preventability test for negligence as
formulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430. The
judge (para [154]) held that, in the light of the numerous incidents
of crime (tens of break-ins, five serious incidents, and assaults)
that had occurred at the resort, the broader problem of rape in
the Ceres area before L’s rape, and the defective security at the
resort, a reasonable executive in the control of the municipality,
which had assumed responsibility for security in the resort, would
have foreseen the very real risk of a very violent incident taking
place there. The rape of a resident at the resort was, therefore,
reasonably foreseeable.
With regard to the preventability of the rape, the court (para
[155]) referred to the four considerations set out in Ngubane v
South African Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A) 776. These
are: the degree or extent of the risk posed by the actor’s conduct;
the gravity of the possible consequences if the risk of harm
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materialises; the utility of the actor’s conduct; and the burden of
eliminating the risk of harm (see also Van der Walt & Midgley
Delict 253-4; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 151-4). The
court (paras [158] [165]) held that the degree or extent of the risk
of a serious crime being committed was apparent from the
evidence; the gravity of possible consequences, if serious crime
materialised, was immense; and the burden of eliminating the risk
of the harm was no greater than simply putting into force the
municipality’s security plans. The municipality had not only failed
to take such steps, but it had also abandoned any dominance of
the terrain on the afternoon of the rape. No reasonable person
concerned about security at the resort would have done so. The
municipality had therefore been negligent as regards the conse-
quences suffered by L.
The question then arose (paras [159]ff) as to whether the rape
would have occurred had the municipality taken reasonable
steps to guard against it by providing proper security measures
at the resort. This is the question of factual causation which is
established by applying the ‘but-for’ or conditio sine qua non test,
and involves an inquiry into whether, but for the omission, the
damage would probably not have occurred. (Factual causation
can also be determined by enquiring whether one fact arises out
of another [Lee above 161-2; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015)
195], in other words, whether the rape of L flowed from the failure
by the municipality to provide proper security.) In applying the
but-for test, Donen AJ relied on the decisions in Minister of
Finance v Gore NO 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA) paragraph [33] and
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (above)
paragraph [25], where the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that
establishing factual causation ‘is a matter of common sense
based on the practical way in which the ordinary person’s mind
works against the background of everyday life experience’ and
that
[a] plaintiff is not required to establish the causal link with certainty, but
only to establish that the wrongful conduct was probably a cause
of the loss, which calls for the sensible retrospective analysis of
what would probably have occurred, based upon the evidence
and what can be expected to occur in the ordinary course of human
affairs rather than an exercise in metaphysics.
Applying the commonsense approach, which was also empha-
sised by the Constitutional Court in Lee (above, paras [46] [47])
to the matter at hand, the court concluded that the municipality’s
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one (positive) act (the withdrawal of all staff, except one) and
various omissions (failure to provide for the security presence
required by the tender specifications; failure to ensure that four
security guards were on duty for the day shift; and failure to
ensure that its own access regulations were enforced) were the
probable cause of the rape (para [165]).
The application of the but-for test in the case of an omission
requires a mental elimination of the wrongful conduct, the substi-
tution of a hypothetical course of conduct, and posing the
question whether upon such an hypothesis, the plaintiff’s loss
would have occurred or not (see Neethling & Potgieter Delict
(2015) 191-2). It is clear that, following this approach in casu, the
substitution, for the failures of the municipality, of the appropriate
positive conduct would probably have prevented the rape.
Donen AJ’s (para [159]) statement that factual causation
involves whether the rape would have occurred had the munici-
pality taken ‘reasonable’ steps to guard against it, could cause
confusion between the elements of factual causation and negli-
gence. First, it must be determined whether the wrongdoer could
have done anything to prevent the relevant consequence (causa-
tion), and only then whether a reasonable person in the position
of the wrongdoer would have prevented the consequence (negli-
gence) (see again Lee (above) 162; Neethling & Potgieter Delict
(2015) 192–3).
The court concluded (para [166]) that the plaintiff’s claim
should be upheld and that the plaintiff was entitled to be awarded
damages.
There is authority in our law that damages for rape should be
substantial. In N v T 1994 (1) SA 862 (C) 864, a case involving the
rape of an eight-year-old child, Williamson J stated:
Rape is a horrifying crime and is a cruel and selfish act in which the
aggressor treats with utter contempt the dignity and feelings of his
victim. An award of damages in a situation of this kind . . . should be
substantial.
Donen AJ’s approach to determining damages in Bridgman
reflects this view, and rightly so. Before considering the damages
to be awarded, the judge (paras [167]-[215]) presented a
thorough analysis of the evidence relating to the damage suf-
fered by L as a result of the rape. This included contumelia, acute
shock and distress, pain and suffering, and loss of the amenities
of life (see as regards damages for these heads of damage,
Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Damages 506-11). Because all
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these heads of damage were a consequence of one and the
same omission, Donen AJ (para [218]) attempted an holistic
approach and made a single award for damages. This approach
was not followed in F v Minister of Safety and Security 2014 (6) SA
44 (WCC) paragraph [59], where the plaintiff, a thirteen-year-old
child, had been raped by a policeman, and the court made
separate awards for contumelia (R300 000), on the one hand,
and pain and suffering (R200 000), on the other (see for a
discussion Neethling & Potgieter 2014 Annual Survey 754-5).
In passing, it should be noted that contumelia covers not only
insult or the infringement of dignity, but may also be considered
as the equivalent of the broader concept of iniuria, thus including
any wrongful and intentional infringement of a personality right
(see Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality
(2005) 44-5; cf F (above) para [54]). In F, Meer J used contumelia
in the wide sense of the infringement of personality rights under
the actio iniuriarum. She stated with regard to the rape involved
in F:
[The plaintiff] was subjected to the most heinous invasion of her
chastity and privacy and an aggression on her person and reputation.
Her constitutionally protected right to dignity, privacy, freedom and
security and her right as a child to be protected from abuse and deg-
radation were trampled upon in an utterly inhumane manner, and the
effects thereof will be with her always as aforementioned (para [58]).
To avoid confusion, it is suggested that the term contumelia
should rather be avoided. In casu the court used the term in the
narrow sense of insult. Donen AJ (para [221]) stated that a
remedy for injury should be given when words or conduct involve
degradation or an element of insult. Although the court took into
account that the act of rape was not perpetrated by the munici-
pality or its servants, nor was any intention attributable to them, it
stated that the approach of the municipality in placing the burden
on L to prove that she had been raped, when this was in fact
clear, added insult to her injury and further violated her dignity.
Such an attitude, according to the court, translated into damages
(cf Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Damages 531-2 on the conduct
of the defendant as a factor aggravating the amount of dam-
ages).
Although, generally speaking, awards in earlier cases are a
relevant factor in assessing damages (see Potgieter, Steynberg &
Floyd Damages 502-6), DonenAJ (para [218]) pointed out that no
precedent had been placed before him regarding the rape of a
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mentally disabled person, but that, in any event, he placed little
reliance on awards made prior to the introduction of the new
constitutional dispensation because the entrenchment of person-
ality rights in the Bill of Rights has given these rights a higher
status than previously existed. In addition, he pointed out that in
delict the defendant must take its victim as it finds her (para
[222]), and that prior cases did not address the delicate situation
of iniuria by rape of a mentally disabled person and did not deal
with the appropriate value to be placed upon the loss of dignity of
a victim such as L. To follow these cases would ignore this reality,
which the court was not prepared to do (para [223]). In the end,
the court awarded R750 000 for contumelia, shock, pain, suffer-
ing, and loss of amenities of life (para [224]). A further amount of
R30 780 was awarded for future medical expenses and therapy
sessions for L and her parents.
We agree with the outcome of the case. The municipality
should be held delictually liable for the damage caused as a
result of the rape of L. The court correctly found that the
municipality acted wrongfully because it failed to comply with the
legal duty to protect L in the circumstances; its failure caused the
rape; and it acted negligently. The substantial award of general
damages of R750 000 was completely justified.
Although we also agree with the court’s decision that the parents
should not be liable as joint wrongdoers with the municipality, we
differ from the court’s approach in reaching this conclusion. The
court first accepted that the parents acted lawfully because it
would have been a transgression of L’s constitutional rights (to
freedom of movement, independence and control over her body)
were the parents to be under a legal duty to supervise L in the
circumstances. To our mind, among other things, L’s vulnerability
to exploitation, lack in social skills, judgment, and defence mecha-
nisms, and her limited cognitive development, are clear indica-
tions that she did require some supervision by her parents, and
that they therefore had a legal duty to protect her. This duty was
breached when they allowed her to wander freely and unsuper-
vised on the playground from where she was abducted to be
raped. The parents thus acted wrongfully as against L. However,
we agree with the court that the parents did not act negligently and
that they therefore did not commit a delict against L.
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PRIVACY INFRINGEMENT
Use of cannabis for personal consumption
Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development &
others and related matters [2017] 2 All SA 864 (WCC) involved
the constitutional validity of certain statutory provisions which
prohibit the use of cannabis (dagga) and the possession, pur-
chase of and cultivation thereof exclusively for personal consump-
tion. The core question was whether this limitation of the ‘right to
privacy’ was justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.
Davis J held that the limitation should be narrowly tailored to
achieve its purpose, should be carefully focused, and should not
be overbroad (para [104]). As the impugned legislation did not
employ the least restrictive means to deal with the problem, it was
held to be unconstitutional and ordered to be reviewed by
Parliament (paras [106] [132]). (For a full discussion of this case,
see the chapters ‘Constitutional Law’ and ‘Criminal Law’.) The
decision of Davis J was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince
[2018] ZACC 30.
For purposes of the law of delict, it is essential to formulate and
apply a clear definition of the concept of privacy as it is ‘an
amorphous and illusive one which has been the subject of much
scholarly debate’ (Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 750 (CC)
787-8). It is now accepted – also by the courts – that privacy
entails an individual condition of life characterised by seclusion
from the public and publicity. This condition embraces all those
personal facts which the person concerned has him- or herself
determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and
in respect of which he or she has the will that they be kept private
(see Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Personality 29-33; see also
National Media Ltd & another v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271;
Greeff v Protection 4U h/a Protect International 2012 (6) SA 393
(GNP) 406-7; Jooste v National Media Ltd 1994 (2) SA 634 (C)
645; Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk
1977 (4) SA 376 (T) 384; Bernstein (above) 789; Swanepoel v
Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 (4) SA 549 (T) 553;
cf NM & others v Smith & others (Freedom of Expression Institute
as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC), 2007 (5) SA 250,
262-3; Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd & another v
Janit & another 1994 (3) SA56 (W) 60; and Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd
& others v Sage Holdings Ltd & another 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 462).
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This concept of informational privacy should, for the sake of
conceptual clarity and legal certainty, be distinguished from other
concepts of privacy in South Africa which, on closer examination,
reveal different protected interests (such as a person’s good
name or reputation, psycho-physical integrity – including sensory
feelings – dignity, identity, autonomy, and self-realisation; see
Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Personality 33-5). For present
purposes, only the concept of privacy as autonomy is relevant.
Where an outsider dictates to a person how he or she should
manage his or her private life (in the religious or political spheres,
the education of children, etc), or where the state prohibits
individuals from, for example, practising sodomy, possessing
and using dependence-producing substances, or possessing
and reading pornographic material, such conduct is often viewed
as an infringement of privacy (see Neethling, Potgieter & Visser
Personality 34-5). In American law these instances are also
classified under the protection offered by the right to privacy. In
fact, in recognition of the right to privacy as a constitutionally
protected human right in Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US
479, the Supreme Court dealt with such a case and held that a
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives in marriage violates
the right to privacy. Our Constitutional Court has also extended
the field of application of the constitutional right to privacy
beyond the protection of informational privacy to include so-
called ‘substantive’ or ‘personal autonomy’ privacy rights which
enable persons to make free decisions about such matters as
their family, home, and sexual life (see, eg, Case & another v
Minister of Safety and Security & others; Curtis v Minister of Safety
and Security & others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC), 1996 (3) SACR 587
para [91]; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality &
another v Minister of Justice & others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), 1998
(12) BCLR 1517; De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions,
Witwatersrand Local Division & others 2003 (12) BCLR 1333
(CC), 2004 (1) SA 406 431 440-1). The constitutional right to
privacy is, therefore, more comprehensive that the common-law
right in that it includes autonomy. However, these instances do
not involve an infringement of informational privacy as there is no
acquaintance with private facts contrary to the will and determina-
tion of the person in question. In reality, a person’s autonomy
(decision-making freedom) is related to the freedom of human
self-determination in society within the limits imposed by the law.
This obviously includes a person’s freedom to make decisions
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about his or her private affairs. As such, it falls under the concept
of legal subjectivity which should be distinguished from the
concept of informational privacy.
The concept of privacy as autonomy was also accepted by
Davis J in Prince (above) (para [23]):
It follows from the animating idea of privacy that a right to make
intimate decisions and to have one’s personal autonomy protected is
central to individual identity of a person who is entitled to make
decisions about these concerns without undue interference from the
State. Indeed in Case . . . para 91 Didcott J, in a case dealing with the
question of the prohibition of the possession of pornography, went so
far as to say: ‘What erotic material I may choose to keep within the
privacy of my home, and only for my personal use there, is nobody’s
business but mine. It is certainly not the business of society or the
State.’
Publication of images of graphic sexual nature by online newspaper
NT v Kunene & others [2017] 4 All SA 865 (GJ) concerned an
application for an order to remove graphic sexual videos featur-
ing the applicant from the site of the respondents’ online newspa-
per, and to prohibit the respondents from publishing similar
material in the future. The images of the applicant were embed-
ded in an article alleging that the Deputy President of SouthAfrica
had engaged in extramarital relationships with a number of
women, including the applicant, who was alleged to have sent
erotic pictures and intimate videos to the Deputy President.
According to the applicant, the posting of her intimate videos
without her consent exceeded the legitimate bounds of media
freedom, and unjustly infringed her rights to privacy and dignity
(para [17]). The respondents averred that the videos were a
necessary element of the article because they authenticated its
textual content, which gave detaiIs of the alleged extra-maritaI
relationship that the Deputy President had with the applicant.
They asserted that the publication of the videos without the
applicant’s consent was in the public interest, and that the
manner in which they had dealt with the videos represented an
acceptable balance between the applicants’ rights and the
respondents’ right to media freedom (paras [18]-[19]).
Keightley J commenced by deciding that the applicant was
recognisable and therefore identifiable on the videos (para [12]).
The judge accepted that there is an inherent public interest
element in the authentication of media reports, particularly where
high-profile public persons are involved, and even more so when
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the media reports involve allegations of unlawful, immoral, or
otherwise reprehensible conduct on the part of our constitutional
leaders (para [25]). But this does not mean that the respondents’
conduct in publishing the videos was justifiable (para [27]). As far
as authentication for media reports was concerned, the media
must be sensitive to, consider very carefully, and respect counter-
vailing rights such as the rights to privacy and dignity (para [28]).
Individual sexual choices lie at the heart of the right to privacy
(para [30]; see also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v Minister of Justice (above) para [32]; Prinsloo v RCP
Media Ltd t/a Rapport 2003 (4) SA 456 (T) 471). However, where
a high-profile person is reported to have conducted him- or
herself in a reprehensible manner, authentication by way of
publishing private information may be justified. Arguably, this
might even, in some cases, include the publication of material
involving private sexual conduct (para [29]). This was not the
case with the videos in question, as they featured only the
applicant. Viewed on their own, the videos showed no more than
an ordinary person engaging in sexual activities in her private
space. The conduct depicted in the videos did not authenticate
the alleged relationship with the Deputy President. Very little value
could be attached to the videos as a means of authenticating
the allegations contained in the article (paras [33]-[36]).
The court concluded that the respondents had not acted
responsibly and with due regard to the applicant’s rights to
privacy and dignity. They had failed to exact the appropriate
balance between her rights and the public interest (para [41]).
Accordingly, Keightley J was satisfied that the applicant had
demonstrated that she was entitled to an order directing the
respondents to remove the videos from the website, together with
the other relief sought, among other things, that the respondents
be interdicted and restrained from further publishing such images
in future. It made no difference that the publication had already
taken place and that the videos had been in the public domain for
over a week. The applicant averred that for so long as the videos
remained on the website, she would be subjected to an ongoing
violation of her rights. In this regard, the judge accepted the
decision in Prinsloo (above) 468 (see also Neethling, Potgieter &
Visser Personality 236-9), where Van der Westhuizen J held:
[D]espite the fact that a considerable number of people had already
viewed the material, possession of the images by someone who was
not authorised by the original author or those depicted on them could,
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in principle, amount to an ongoing violation or, at least, a continuing
threat of violation of their privacy. Every instance when the images
were viewed, even by someone who had already seen them, could
constitute a renewed intrusion into their privacy (para [43]).
We agree with Keightley J’s judgment, particularly as regards
the principle developed and applied with regard to the authenti-
cation of published allegations by means of images.
Second medical examination as invasion of privacy, physical integrity and
dignity
In Cape Town City & others v Kotzé 2017 (1) SA 593 (WCC) the
City of Cape Town, the defendant in a damages claim, applied for
an order in terms of rule 36 of the Uniform Rules of Court that Mrs
Kotzé, the plaintiff, attend a second medical examination before a
psychiatrist. The issue was whether the examination was ‘neces-
sary or desirable for the purpose of giving full information on
matters relevant to the assessment of such damages’ (para [44]).
(For a full discussion of the case, see the chapter ‘Evidence’.)
For purposes of delict, the recognition and protection of privacy,
physical or psychological integrity, and dignity, as personality
interests, are relevant in the present circumstances. Sher AJ
pointed out that these interests are protected by the Constitution
and that they must be juxtaposed against section 34 of the
Constitution, which provides that everyone has a right to have any
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law, decided in
a fair hearing before a court (paras [26]-[29]). The limitation of a
party’s rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and dignity, as occa-
sioned by the application of the relevant evidentiary rules, are
clearly reasonable and justifiable limitations in an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality (s 36 of the
Constitution). Courts should nevertheless be alive to, and effec-
tively regulate, any abuses of rule 36 of the Uniform Rules (para
[34]). Sher AJ continued:
Where a court is of the view that a medical examination is likely to
result in an invasion of a party’s personal privacy and bodily integrity
in circumstances where this is not necessary and the information can
be obtained in another manner, or it will cause the party to suffer
undue hardship or inconvenience, or physical, emotional or psycho-
logical distress or pain, it should not allow the examination to go
ahead, or should put conditions in place to safeguard the examinee’s
rights (para [38]).
In conclusion, Sher AJ dismissed the application as he was of
the view that the applicants had substantially all the necessary
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information they required to enable them to prepare for trial and
to meet the respondent’s case. The judge was not disposed to
subject the respondent to yet another psychiatric examination
which, in his view, was neither necessary nor desirable, and
which could cause her further psychological and emotional
distress (paras [53] [54]).
We agree with Sher AJ’s careful balancing of the personality
rights involved and the evidentiary rules to ensure a fair hearing
before a court.
STRICT LIABILITY
Injuries caused by electricity: Applicability of section 61 of the Consumer
Protection Act 68 of 2008
In Eskom Holdings Ltd v Halstead-Cleak 2017 (1) SA 333
(SCA) the plaintiff suffered burns when he cycled into a low-
hanging live power line under Eskom’s control. He instituted a
claim for damages against Eskom, relying on delict and product
liability. The central question was whether Eskom could be held
strictly liable in terms of section 61 of the Consumer Protection
Act 68 of 2008 (the CPA) for harm caused to the plaintiff by the
powerline which was not supplying or required to supply electric-
ity to anyone (the parties having agreed that the alternative
grounds for liability would stand over for later determination, if
necessary). (See, as to the application of s 61 of the Act,
M Loubser & E Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 56ff;
J Neethling ‘Product liability South Africa’ in P Machnikowski (ed)
European Product Liability (2016) 549ff; Neethling & Potgieter
Delict (2015) 399-400.) The High Court found for the plaintiff,
holding that the CPA did not require the plaintiff to be a consumer
in a contractual sense for the defendant to be strictly liable.
However, in the Supreme Court of Appeal, Schoeman AJA held
that as the CPA’s purpose was to protect consumers, there had to
be a supplier/consumer relationship for strict liability to ensue
(paras [21] [22]).
Schoeman AJA held that in the present case, the plaintiff was
not a consumer vis-à-vis Eskom because (a) he had not entered
into any transaction with Eskom as a supplier or producer of
electricity in the ordinary course of Eskom’s business; and (b) he
was not at the time utilising the electricity, nor was he a recipient
or beneficiary thereof (paras [22] [23]). Consequently, because
the respondent was not a consumer who was entitled to the
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protection of the CPA, and, furthermore, the circumstances of this
case clearly fell outside the ambit of a consumer-supplier relation-
ship to which the CPA applies, the appeal had to succeed (para
[25]). (See, however, Loubser & Reid Product Liability 93-4, who
state: ‘It should be noted also that there is no requirement for the
injured person or to have been involved in any transaction or
involving the goods, or to have acquired any specific right
relating to the defective goods. Third parties physically injured as
a result of a defect of goods purchased, owned or possessed by
another person may claim compensation in terms of these
provisions in the same way as the purchasers, owners or
possessors themselves.’)
In the result, the plaintiff would have to base his claim on
alternative grounds, namely Eskom’s role as the sole supplier or
producer of electricity on the national grid, and its control of all
power lines not falling under the control of a local authority or
municipality, and on delict in that Eskom wrongfully and negli-
gently caused the respondent’s loss (as set out in para [3]). In this
regard, note that section 25 of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of
2006 creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part
of an electrical undertaking (see, eg, Eskom Holdings Ltd v
Hendricks 2005 (5) SA 503 (SCA); Malherbe v Eskom 2002 (4) SA
497 (O) 504; Neethling & Potgieter Delict (2015) 161 n207 and
400 n195).
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MICHAEL KIDD*
LEGISLATION
There was no new environmental legislation (Acts of Parlia-
ment) during 2017. The currently applicable Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) Regulations and relevant listing notices
(GN R982 (Regulations); GN R983 (Listing Notice 1); GN R984
(Listing Notice 2); GN R985 (Listing Notice 3), all in GG 38282 of
4 December 2014) have been amended, respectively, by Govern-
ment Notices 324, 325, 326 and 327 in GG 40772 of 7 April 2017.
In broad substantive terms, there are no major changes that
require discussion here.
CASE LAW
ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORISATION AND CONSIDERATION OF CLIMATE
IMPACTS
In Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental
Affairs & others [2017] 2 All SA 519 (GP), Murphy J focused on
the environmental authorisation of the Thabametsi coal-fired
power station near Lephalale in Limpopo. A decision to grant
such an authorisation is made in terms of section 24 of the
National Environmental ManagementAct 107 of 1998 (the NEMA).
The Minister had dismissed Earthlife’s appeal against the environ-
mental authorisation originally granted by the national depart-
ment. Earthlife’s argument was that authorisation of a development
of this kind required consideration of the climate-change impacts,
which had not been carried out in this case. The court character-
ised a climate-change impact assessment,
in relation to the construction of a coal fire power station [as one that]
ordinarily would comprise an assessment of (i) the extent to which a
proposed coal-fired power station will contribute to climate change
over its lifetime, by quantifying its GHG emissions during construction,
operation and decommissioning; (ii) the resilience of the coal-fired
power station to climate change, taking into account how climate
change will impact on its operation, through factors such as rising
* B Com LLB LLM PhD (Natal). Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
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temperatures, diminishing water supply, and extreme weather pat-
terns; and (iii) how these impacts may be avoided, mitigated, or
remedied (para [6]).
In her appeal decision, the Minister recognised that the original
decision had not satisfactorily canvassed climate-change consid-
erations. Although she upheld the original decision, she added as
a condition of approval, that the proponent was to carry out a
climate-change impact assessment before the commencement
of the project. As Earthlife pointed out, however, if the assessment
were to conclude that the project ought not to proceed, the
Minister would have no power to withdraw the authorisation. In
this light, Earthlife argued that the Minister’s decision was unlaw-
ful, irrational, and unreasonable.
The court’s conclusion, following a careful consideration of the
parties’ arguments, and the constitutional, statutory, and interna-
tional law context, was that
the legislative and policy scheme and framework overwhelmingly
support the conclusion that an assessment of climate change impacts
and mitigating measures will be relevant factors in the environmental
authorisation process, and that consideration of such will best be
accomplished by means of a professionally researched climate
change impact report. For all these reasons, I find that the text,
purpose, ethos and intra- and extra-statutory context of section
24O(1) of NEMA support the conclusion that climate change impacts
of coal-fired power stations are relevant factors that must be consid-
ered before granting environmental authorisation (para [91]).
The relevant administrative law ground of review is the require-
ment to take relevant considerations into account. On a review of
the facts, the court held that the Chief Director in his original
decision had not adequately taken the climate-change impacts
into account.
The department had argued, in relation to the Minister’s appeal
decision, that the purpose (or one of the purposes) of the
condition requiring the climate-change impact assessment was
that it would allow the Minister to use her powers to amend the
authorisation in such a way as to revoke it entirely (as there are no
express powers to revoke an authorisation), if it showed that there
were problems in allowing the project to proceed. The court,
however, concluded that the Minister had misconstrued her
powers in this regard and that this amounted to a material error of
law, which is another ground of administrative-law review.
In fashioning a remedy, the court decided that it would be
disproportionate to set aside the entire decision and require the
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authorisation process to start afresh. Considering that the Minis-
ter has the power to decide the appeal de novo, the court
ordered that the Minister must take the climate-change impact
report into account and come to a decision on the basis of how
that report would influence the outcome. This would be more
abbreviated than setting aside the entire decision and requiring
the entire environmental authorisation process to start anew.
From an administrative-law perspective, the decision may not
be that remarkable – the court correctly found the existence of the
ground of review: ie, that a relevant consideration had not been
taken into account. The court was assisted in its conclusion by
the fact that in her appeal decision, the Minister had seemingly
recognised that this factor had not been considered in the
original decision. From an environmental-law perspective, on the
other hand, this is a landmark judgment which serves to highlight
the problematic nature of coal-based activities in South Africa
today. It is to be welcomed because there is no express require-
ment in the Act and relevant regulations that a climate impact
assessment must be carried out; the court came to this conclusion
on a contextual and purposive interpretation of what the NEMA
requires, in the light of section 24 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). It is important to
bear in mind, though, that it is not a judgment on the merits of
coal-based power stations, but a consideration of such merits
(although probably not in the courts) that is not likely to be too far in
the future.
ANIMAL WELFARE AND CONSERVATION
The main legal issue in National Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Devel-
opment & another 2017 (1) SACR 284 (CC), 2017 (4) BCLR 517,
is not particularly significant from an environmental-law perspec-
tive. It concerned the statutory power of the National Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (the NSPCA) to institute a
private prosecution, conferred upon it by section 6(2)(e) of the
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 169 of 1993
read with section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The
court decided, for reasons that need not be discussed here, that
the NSPCA does have this power.
The environmental-law relevance involves comments made by
the court in reaching the decision. In highlighting the importance
of animal welfare, the court referred to the Supreme Court of
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Appeal’s decision in S v Lemthongthai 2015 (1) SACR 353 (SCA),
saying that the latter decision is
notable because it relates animal welfare to questions of biodiversity.
Animal welfare is connected with the constitutional right to have the
‘environment protected . . . through legislative and other means’. This
integrative approach correctly links the suffering of individual animals
to conservation, and illustrates the extent to which showing respect
and concern for individual animals reinforces broader environmental
protection efforts. Animal welfare and animal conservation together
reflect two intertwined values (para [58]) (emphasis added).
These statements are significant in relation to the link between
animal welfare and biodiversity (animal) conservation. Somewhat
ironically (since the court, in NSPCA, refers to the decision in
South African Predator Breeders Association & others v Minister
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism [2010] ZASCA 151 as
supporting its approach on animal welfare), the decision in
NSPCA, had it preceded the Predator Breeders case, may have
supported a different finding in relation to at least one of the
issues raised in the earlier case. In Predator Breeders, the court
held, in essence, that the regulations set aside in that case were
aimed at unethical hunting, which is not consistent with the
legislative purpose of the relevant empowering provision (s 57(2)
of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of
2004) which provides for the conservation of species under
threat. There may be some debate about the conflation of animal
welfare and biodiversity conservation objectives, particularly in
relation to the governance mandates of conservation agencies
and the NSPCA, but delineation of appropriate mandates ought
not to be a reason to avoid a sentiment that is a welcome
recognition of the importance of individual specimens of species
in biodiversity conservation initiatives.
MINING IN PROTECTED AREAS
In Barberton Mines (Pty) Ltd v Mpumalanga Parks and Tourism
Agency ( 43125/2013) [2016] ZAGPPHC 254, the applicant was
seeking an order declaring that it was entitled to prospect
(pursuant to a prospecting licence) on certain land that the
respondent alleged was a protected area (the so-called Barber-
ton Nature Reserve). The relevant environmental-law feature of
the judgment is whether the land in question was, legally, a
protected area. The respondents relied on three different deci-
sions of both the former Transvaal Provincial Administration and
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then the Mpumalanga province. However, the court held that
none of these decisions had formally and properly declared the
area in question a protected area. Consequently, there was no
bar – on this basis – to prospecting in the area. While this
judgment emphasised how important it is for a protected area to
be correctly declared in terms of the applicable law, in such a
way that it is clear whether or not a piece of land is part of a
protected area, it did not survive appeal.
The appeal decision is Mpumalanga Tourism & Parks Agency v
Barberton Mines (Pty) Ltd 2017 (5) SA 62 (SCA). The Supreme
Court of Appeal did not agree with the High Court, stating that it
had taken ‘far too narrow a view of the matter’ (para [10]).
Proclamation 12 of 1996 of the Mpumalanga Environmental
Affairs MEC had listed the Barberton Nature Reserve as a
protected area in the province. In dealing with the issue of
vagueness, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that
reference to the ‘Barberton Nature Reserve’ in the 1996 Proclamation
had the meaning given and applied to it by the provincial authorities
since at least 1985. When regard is had to the nature of the 1996
Proclamation as a ‘designation’ and to its context – including its
relationship to the 1985 Resolution and the administration of the land
as the Barberton Nature Reserve since then, it cannot be said that the
persons to whom it is addressed would be left in any uncertainty.
Since the 1996 Proclamation was a designation of an area already as
a matter of fact reserved, its validity and effectiveness did not require
a detailed description of the area concerned, as the High Court found.
To achieve its purpose, the 1996 Proclamation could simply indicate
the designated area by name, as it did (para [17]).
Section 12 of the Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 reads:
A protected area which immediately before this section took effect
was reserved or protected in terms of provincial legislation for any
purpose for which an area could in terms of this Act be declared as a
nature reserve or protected environment, must be regarded to be a
nature reserve or protected environment for the purpose of this Act.
Because of this provision, and in view of the court’s observation
quoted above, the Barberton Nature Reserve was to be deemed
a nature reserve under the Protected Areas Act.
It is difficult to assess the correctness or otherwise of the
court’s decision without more information as to how the area had
been identified over the years, and whether there was any
uncertainty as to its precise footprint and boundaries. At first
glance, one would expect a protected area to be clearly desig-
nated, especially given the ramifications of land forming part of a
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protected area. Whether the decision is correct or not, it is
undoubtedly desirable from the point of view of environmental
conservation. The effect of the decision is that mining or prospect-
ing may not take place within the nature reserve in terms of
section 48(1) of the Protected Areas Act. This is a significant
decision, since the Barberton Nature Reserve is an important
conservation area, as described in the opening paragraphs of
the appeal judgment.
WORLD HERITAGE SITE
The judgment in Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority & another
v Feasey Property Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd (unreported KZP
case 17351/2014 19 August 2016) has limited environmental-law
significance. The case arose from an interdict that had been
granted against various respondents in an earlier judgment,
ordering them to stop development, construction, and marketing
of sites within the Isimangaliso Wetland Park (the Park), which is a
World Heritage Site and under the management authority of the
applicant in the case. This particular judgment relates only to the
sixth and seventh respondents, natural persons who were devel-
oping on sites within the Park. The latter raised technical and
procedural arguments that have limited environmental signifi-
cance and which the court characterised as essentially delaying
tactics. Consequently, the court had little hesitation in upholding
the application and ordering the respondents to vacate the land
they were occupying, to rehabilitate it, ‘and restore it to its pristine
state’. The environmental-law significance of the case as a whole,
rather than of the judgment itself, is that it shows – at least as
regards this World Heritage Site – that the relevant authorities
(particularly the first applicant) are clearly vigilant in relation to
contraventions of the applicable law in their area of jurisdiction.
ENFORCEMENT
Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District
of Vredendal, Kroutz NO & others [2017] 2All SA599 (WCC) dealt
with the validity of a search warrant issued by the first respondent
in September 2016. The search warrant authorised a search of
the applicant’s Tormin sand mine near Lutzville. As the judgment
indicated, the case raises,
among other issues, . . . questions (i) about the interpretation of
statutory provisions giving effect to the government’s One Environmen-
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tal System agreement, an arrangement intended to establish a single
environmental system for assessing the environmental aspects of
activities, including mining activities, and (ii) about the powers of the
various kinds of inspectors appointed to monitor and enforce compli-
ance with environmental legislation (para [1]).
The case arose out of concerns that the Tormin mine was not in
compliance with the conditions of its environmental authorisation
to carry out mining operations. Acting on these concerns, officials
of the national Department of Environmental Affairs (the DEA)
approached the respondent magistrate and requested the search
warrant, which was granted. It was this search warrant that was
the focus of the case.
The main aspect of the applicant’s (the MSR’s) case was that
the DEA officials lacked a mandate to investigate most of the
alleged contraventions of the environmental legislation in ques-
tion. The NEMA prescribes in section 31D the mandates of the
various types of inspector, including environmental management
inspectors (the DEAofficials), and environmental mineral resource
inspectors (s 31D(2A)).
Section 31D(3) provides:
A person designated as an environmental management inspector or
environmental mineral resource inspector may exercise any of the
powers given to environmental management inspectors in terms of
this Act that are necessary for the inspector’s mandate in terms of
subsections (1) or (2A) that may be specified by the Minister, the
Minister responsible for water affairs, the Minister responsible for
mineral resources or MEC by notice in writing to the environmental
management inspector or environmental mineral resource inspector.
Subsection 4 provides:
Despite the provisions in subsections (2A) and (3), the Minister may,
with the concurrence of the Minister responsible for mineral resources,
if the environmental mineral resource inspectors are unable or not
adequately able to fulfil the compliance monitoring and enforcement
functions, designate environmental management inspectors to imple-
ment these functions in terms of this Act or a specific environmental
management Act in respect of which powers have been conferred on
the Minister responsible for mineral resources.
Subsections (5) to (9) inclusive provide for a process for a
decision in terms of subsection (4).
In this case, there had not been a finding that the mineral
resources inspectors were unable to do their job, and there had
been no concurrence of the Minerals Minister. On these facts, the
court held that the DEA officials did not have a mandate to
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investigate the alleged infractions of the environmental legisla-
tion. In other words, there is no concurrent mandate for environ-
mental and mineral resources inspectors unless the procedure
set out in subsection 31D(4) has been followed.
The judgment also deals with issues relating to disclosure of
relevant information to the magistrate, including the relevant
legislation and recent changes thereto, as well as the clarity of
the evidence provided to the magistrate (which was found to be
inadequate and ‘too confusing and unclear’ – para [213]) in
relation to the one charge (relating to dumping of mining waste)
that was not within the mandate of the mineral resources inspec-
tors. On the basis of the cumulative findings of the court, the court
found, in an exhaustive and thorough judgment, that the search
warrant and its execution were unlawful and set the warrant
aside.
The interpretation of the law reached by the court in relation to
the mandates of the various inspectors provided for by the NEMA
is correct and the court’s conclusion was the only one that could
validly have been reached.
CONSERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES
Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform v Normandien
Farms; Mathimbane v Normandien Farms [2017] ZASCA 163,
[2018] 1 All SA 390 (SCA), 2019 (1) SA 154 is a land reform case
with some relevance to environmental law and the application of
the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983.
Normandien applied for orders that livestock belonging to labour
tenants on the farm be removed from the farm and that the Land
and Agriculture Ministers and/or the Regional Commissioner
facilitate their removal to alternative land. The relief was claimed
on the basis that the farm had been severely overgrazed and that
the continued presence of the livestock on the farm contravened
the Act (para [5]).
The court did not agree that requiring removal of the livestock
from the farm amounted to an eviction in terms of the Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (the LTA). The court
correctly held that the LTA ‘does not exempt labour tenants from
other laws which limit the way in which land can be used’ and that
labour tenants, ‘like everyone else, are subject to CARA’ (para
[61]).
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APPEAL IN TERMS OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ACT
MEC for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Develop-
ment Planning, Western Cape v Hans Ulrich Plotz NO [2017]
ZASCA 175 involves an appeal against an administrative fine
levied in terms of section 24G of the NEMA. The respondent
(Plotz) was the trustee of a trust found to have carried out a
NEMA-identified activity without the requisite authorisation. This
is an offence in terms of section 24F of the Act and triggers the
operation of a (controversial) procedure in section 24G of the Act
which in effect requires an applicant to apply for ex post facto
authorisation of the activity. The trust was required to pay an
administrative fine in terms of section 24G in the amount of
R475 000. The trust lodged an appeal against this fine, but
significantly after the deadlines set in the relevant regulations
(GN R982 GG 38282 of 4 December 2014).
The case is a straightforward administrative-law matter involv-
ing the necessity of exhausting internal remedies under the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA).
Section 7(2) of the PAJA provides that an application for judicial
review to the courts may only take place after exhaustion of
internal remedies (an appeal is an internal remedy), failure to do
so being subject only to condonation in exceptional circum-
stances. Failure to exhaust internal remedies will result in the
court refusing to consider the review application. In this case,
consideration of the facts led the Supreme Court of Appeal
correctly to decide that there were no exceptional circumstances.
Consequently, it found that there had been no compliance with
section 7(2) of the PAJA. On this basis, the court a quo’s decision,
condoning the late appeal application, was overturned and the
appeal upheld.
In my opinion, this case was correctly decided. It emphasises
the importance of observing the requisite time limits for lodging
appeals against decisions in terms of the NEMA. Failure to
appeal in time means that the opportunity to use an internal
remedy is lost, and consequently, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, the aggrieved individual will be unable to bring a
review application to the High Court.
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LEGISLATION
No relevant legislation was promulgated in the period under
review.
CASE LAW
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
At common law an admission by one co-accused cannot be
admitted against another co-accused. There was a brief period of
confusion when the Supreme Court of Appeal, in S v Ndhlovu &
others 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA), held that an admission could
be admitted against a co-accused if it met the requirements of
the hearsay rule as set out in section 3 of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act 45 of 1988. However, the Supreme Court of
Appeal, recognising that it had erred in Ndlovu, restored the
common-law position in S v Litako 2014 (2) SACR 431 (SCA). This
was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in S v Mhlongo; S v
Nkosi 2015 (2) SACR 323 (CC). (See also Molaudzi v S 2015 (2)
SACR 341 (CC), discussed in 2015 Annual Survey 906-8.) In
Khanye & another v S 2017 (2) SACR 630 (CC), the two
appellants, who had been co-accused of the successful appel-
lants in S v Mhlongo; S v Nkosi and S v Molaudzi, appealed on the
basis that the extra-curial statements made by their co-accused
had been wrongly admitted against them. The court held that the
trial court had erred in admitting the extra-curial statements and
that the remaining evidence was insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion. This is clearly in accordance with the common law. It would
be interesting to know how many accused were incorrectly
convicted between 2002 (Ndhlovu) and 2014 (Litako).
ALIBI
The court emphasised the importance of investigating an alibi
at the earliest possible opportunity in S v Steward 2017 (1) SACR
* BA(Wits) LLB LLM (Natal) LLD (Stell). Professor of Law, University of Cape
Town.
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156 (NCK) and endorsed the approach taken by the Constitu-
tional Court in S v Thebus 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC). The failure of
the police to investigate the alibi, to take statements from two alibi
witnesses at the outset, together with a litany of other omissions
and errors, led to the acquittal of the accused, leaving a lingering
suspicion that he was indeed the perpetrator.
CROSS- AND RE-EXAMINATION
The defendants in De Sousa & another v Technology Corporate
Management (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) engaged in
litigation tactics which unnecessarily prolonged proceedings.
The clearly frustrated presiding officer sought to get the parties to
agree to a timetable; the plaintiffs were agreeable, but the
defendants refused. In the face of the defendants’ refusal to
cooperate, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ proposed timetable.
The defendants proceeded to cross-examine one of the plaintiffs
(De Sousa) for eight days without putting their version to him
(despite being requested to do so by the court). The court ruled
that the defendants would only be allowed one more day of
cross-examination. The defendants then argued for the exclusion
of De Sousa’s evidence on the basis that cross-examination had
been curtailed and this infringed the constitutional right to a fair
trial. Boruchowitz J recognised that cross-examination was a
crucial component of a fair trial, but noted that it was not an
absolute right, and whether curtailing cross-examination consti-
tuted an infringement of the right to a fair trial would have to be
determined in the context of the circumstances that gave rise to
the limitation (para [94]). The primary consideration in deter-
mining trial fairness is whether the defendant suffers any preju-
dice (Distillers Korporasie (SA) Bpk v Kotze 1956 (1) SA 357
(A)).The court noted its inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own
proceedings in the interests of the administration of justice (para
[98]), which includes limiting protracted cross-examination which
increases the cost of litigation and wastes public time (para [97]).
(See R v Melozani 1952 (3) SA 639 (A); Take and Save Trading
CC & others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA);
Universal City Studios Inc & another v Network Video (Pty) Ltd
1986 (2) SA 734 (A).)
In determining whether the defendants had suffered any
prejudice, the court noted that although the defendants had been
allocated five days for cross-examination, they had in fact been
allowed to take up nine days. The court had placed no limitations
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on the topics or line of cross-examination, despite the defendants
spending a significant amount of time on matters that were ‘not
dispositive of the case’ (para [101]). The defendants had plenty
of time to ask the pertinent questions and their failure to do so
was a consequence of their own choices. Boruchowitz J con-
cluded that the right to a fair trial could not be equated with the
right to a long trial, and held that the defendants had not suffered
any prejudice and, accordingly, the right to a fair trial had not
been infringed (para [112]). It followed that the evidence of De
Sousa was not excluded (para [113]). As the defendants chose to
close their case without leading any evidence, De Sousa’s
evidence was not contradicted.
This case provides a textbook example of how a presiding
officer can use his or her authority to regulate court proceedings
better to promote the administration of justice. It is also an
excellent example of how litigation should not be conducted, and
is useful material for those who teach procedural law and ethics.
The Constitutional Court in Snyders & others v De Jager &
others 2017 (3) SA 545 (CC) noted with disapproval the failure of
the presiding officer in the magistrate’s court to disallow new
evidence led during re-examination (paras [64] [65]). The evi-
dence led in re-examination was not confined to issues arising
from cross-examination; it also went outside the scope of the
leave granted for evidence to be led in the motion proceedings.
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Legal systems that are primarily adversarial (as is the case in
South Africa) place significant weight on evidence being pre-
sented by means of oral testimony in open court. This allows for
public scrutiny and cross-examination. In Uramin (Incorporated
in British Columbia) t/a Areva Resources Southern Africa v Perie
2017 (1) SA 236 (GJ), Satchwell J held that a court can depart
from the viva voce requirement and in exercising its discretion, it
will ask whether ‘it is convenient or necessary for the purposes of
justice’ to do so (para [25]).
The judge took an extremely pragmatic approach by allowing
witnesses who were out of the country and unable to attend court
proceedings to testify via video link. In doing so, she emphasised
South Africa’s place in the global economy and the ability and
desirability of the rules of court to adapt to evolving technology.
She also held that it should not be considered exceptional to use
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video-link technology and that the prohibitive costs of bringing
witnesses from afar might alone justify its use (para [28]).
The court found that the evidence of the distant witnesses was
necessary for the defendant to have a fair opportunity to conduct
its defence (and possibly counterclaim) (paras [13] [15]). The
fact that they did not wish to come to South Africa, and that there
were no means of compelling them to do so, provided sufficient
justification for the use of a video link in the circumstances.
In facilitating access to justice, the court was not deterred by
the absence of the requisite facilities in the courtroom (para [35]).
The court moved to the offices of the defendant’s attorneys,
where all parties were able to view the witnesses testifying from
offices in their respective countries of residence, each accompa-
nied by an independent legal professional. The witnesses were
examined without intermediaries and there was very little to
differentiate testifying by video link from oral testimony in court,
save for the occasional hiccup in the quality of the video link
(para [36]).
This is a very sensible judgment that embraces the use of
available technology to ensure access to justice whilst ensuring
that the necessary safeguards remain in place.
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
Inference from silence
Boruchowitz J in De Sousa & another v Technology Corporate
Management (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) noted that
where a defendant, in a civil case, closes its case without calling
available witnesses, no inference will be drawn if the plaintiff has
failed to establish a prima facie case. (See also Titus v Shield
Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (3) SA 119 (A); Tshishonga v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development & another 2007 (4) SA
135 (LC).) However, where a prima facie case has been estab-
lished, it is possible that a negative inference might be drawn
depending on the surrounding circumstances. For example, if a
witness is available and would be able to testify to matters
relevant to the issue before the court, an inference may be drawn
that he or she does not wish to testify, as cross-examination may
elicit information that is unfavourable to him or her (Brand v
Minister of Justice 1959 (4) SA 712 (A)). The court also noted that
‘no reliance can be placed on versions put to witnesses in
respect of which no evidence is subsequently given’ (para [125],
460 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 5 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/14−Evidence
citing ZT Mtembu v Safety & Security Sectional Bargaining
Council & others LC JR2870/10).
Unlike in criminal proceedings, the drawing of inferences from
silence in civil proceedings does not give rise to a constitutional
issue. An accused’s right to remain silent draws its rationale from
the specific context of a criminal trial.
In DPP, Gauteng Division, Pretoria v Heunis 2017 (2) SACR 603
(SCA), the accused pleaded in terms of section 115 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and then declined to testify.
On the basis of his section 115 statement, the trial court convicted
him of culpable homicide. The prosecution appealed pursuant to
the reservation of a question of law in terms of section 319 of the
Criminal Procedure Act. In summary, the questions of law were
directed at the manner in which the section 115 statement had
been evaluated, the weight given to the evidence of a ballistics
expert, and the failure of the trial court to draw an inference from
the accused’s choice not to testify.
The appeal court held that the trial court had not properly
evaluated the accused’s section 115 statement in that his assertion
that he had accidentally shot his wife was contradicted by the
uncontroverted testimony of the ballistics expert. This, together with
the admissions made by the accused in his section 115 statement,
constituted a prima facie case of murder which the accused had not
challenged when he failed to testify. The court was clear that once
the prosecution has established a prima facie case, the failure to
testify may, in the absence of rebuttal, result in a prima facie case
becoming conclusive. The failure to testify will not automatically
result in the state’s prima facie case becoming a conclusive one,
but the court held that it is more likely to do so when the person who
has exclusive knowledge of the true facts elects not to testify. A
distinction can be drawn between a prima facie case becoming
conclusive in the absence of a rebuttal, and the drawing of a
negative inference from silence. The latter can be said to infringe
the right to silence, whereas the former is simply the consequence
of uncontroverted evidence. In Heunis the court, citing S v Boesak
2000 (1) SACR 633 (SCA), refrained from explicitly drawing an
inference – but perhaps that is just semantics.
See also Hohne v Super Stone Mining (Pty) Ltd 2017 (3) SA 45
(SCA) under ‘Unconstitutionally’ and ‘Improperly obtained evidence’
below.
Contradictory accounts
Kgomo J in Barends v S 2017 (1) SACR 193 (NCK) held that a
trial-within-a-trial should only be held to determine the admiss-
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ibility of a statement made by the accused, and not an ordinary
witness’s statement which differs from the one recorded by the
police (para [35]). The appropriate course of action in these
circumstances is to cross-examine the witness on the discrepan-
cies between the two statements. The court found the following
headnote from the judgment in S v Mafaladiso & others 2003 (1)
SACR 583 (SCA) extremely useful:
The juridical approach to contradictions between two witnesses and
contradictions between the versions of the same witness (such as,
inter alia, between her or his viva voce evidence and a previous
statement) is, in principle (even if not in degree), identical. Indeed, in
neither case is the aim to prove which of the versions is correct, but to
satisfy oneself that the witness could err, either because of a defective
recollection or because of dishonesty. The mere fact that it is evident
that there are self-contradictions must be approached with caution by
a court. Firstly, it must be carefully determined what the witnesses
actually meant to say on each occasion, to determine whether there is
an actual contradiction and what is the precise nature thereof. In this
regard the adjudicator of fact must keep in mind that a previous
statement is not taken down by means of cross-examination, that there
may be language and cultural differences between the witness and
the person taking down the statement which can stand in the way of
what precisely was meant, and that the person giving the statement is
seldom, if ever, asked by the police officer to explain their statement in
detail. Secondly, it must be kept in mind that not every error by a
witness and not every contradiction or deviation affects the credibility
of a witness. Non-material deviations are not necessarily relevant.
Thirdly, the contradictory versions must be considered and evaluated
on a holistic basis. The circumstances under which the versions were
made, the proven reasons for the contradictions, the actual effect of
the contradictions with regard to the reliability and credibility of the
witness, the question whether the witness was given a sufficient
opportunity to explain the contradictions – and the quality of the
explanations – and the connection between the contradictions and the
rest of the witness’ evidence, amongst other factors, [are] to be taken
into consideration and weighed up. Lastly, there is the final task of the
trial Judge, namely to weigh up the previous statement against the
viva voce evidence, to consider all the evidence and to decide
whether it is reliable or not and to decide whether the truth has been
told, despite any shortcomings.
EXPERT EVIDENCE
Rule 36(5) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides:
If it appears from any medical examination carried out either by
agreement between the parties or pursuant to any notice given in
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terms of this rule, or by order of a judge, that any further medical
examination by any other person is necessary or desirable for the
purpose of giving full information on matters relevant to the assess-
ment of such damages, any party may require a second and final
medical examination in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
The provisions of rule 36 were carefully scrutinised by Sher AJ
in Cape Town City & others v Kotzé 2017 (1) SA 593 (WCC) in
ruling on an interlocutory application requiring the respondent to
submit herself to yet another psychiatric examination. At the
instance of the applicant, she had already been examined by a
psychiatrist and a psychologist. Also at the applicant’s request,
she had been examined by a different psychiatrist, ‘C’, and this
examination resulted in a charge of professional misconduct
being laid against ‘C’. The respondent was persuaded to see yet
another psychiatrist, ‘C2’, at the applicant’s instance. However,
45 minutes into the consultation she ‘broke down’ and was unable
to continue with the examination. Her refusal to attend any
follow-up consultations with ‘C2’ led to the interlocutory applica-
tion.
The court, recognising that rule 36 infringed parties’ rights to
dignity and privacy, held that it was a justifiable limitation.
However, it needed to be interpreted strictly to minimise any
impairment of rights that might arise (paras [25] [34]).
Sher AJ held that in considering an application that required a
party to submit him- or herself to further medical examination, the
court had to balance the interests of ensuring that a party has
sufficient information to prepare for trial with the impact it has on
the party to be examined. The court then set out six inquiries that
a court could make when undertaking such a balancing exercise
(para [37]):
(i) ‘[t]he importance of, and the need for obtaining, the informa-
tion sought’;
(ii) the purpose of obtaining the medical information, ie whether
it is to assist the court in the resolution of a dispute or is to
gain a tactical advantage;
(iii) whether ‘the examination which is proposed is sought on the
basis of a medically justifiable rationale or reason relevant to
the issues in dispute’;
(iv) what the effect of the proposed examination on the party to
be examined will be;
(v) ‘at what stage in the litigation the examination is being
sought’ – whether it is an appropriate follow-up or a new
inquiry embarked on shortly before trial; and
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(vi) ‘how many other examinations the party has been subjected
to’.
The court found that in the circumstances the parties had
sufficient information and that it was not in the interests of justice
to require the respondent to undergo further examination as ‘to
do so would be unduly oppressive and unfair’ (para [52]) and,
further, it would cause undue stress. In reaching this conclusion
the court held (para [38]):
Where a court is of the view that a medical examination is likely to
result in an invasion of a party’s personal privacy and bodily integrity
in circumstances where this is not necessary and the information can
be obtained in another manner, or it will cause the party to suffer
undue hardship or inconvenience, or physical, emotional or psycho-
logical distress or pain, it should not allow the examination to go
ahead or should put conditions in place to safeguard the examinee’s
rights.
Despite the absence of a clear two-stage analysis in finding
that rule 36 infringed the rights to privacy and dignity, the
judgment does a skilful job in interpreting the provision so as to
promote its underlying rationale (to ensure that parties have
sufficient information to enable the court to make a fair decision)
in the context of the normative values to be found in the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitu-
tion’).
HEARSAY
Affidavit
The evidence in issue in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Kruger & others
2017 (1) SA533 (GJ) was the admissibility of an affidavit deposed
to by a commercial recoveries manager employed by the appli-
cant. The court, drawing on case law developed in summary
judgment cases, held that the deponent had insufficient personal
knowledge reliably to confirm the facts contained in the affidavit.
It consequently ordered that the applicant file a supplementary
affidavit by a person having the requisite personal knowledge.
The court usefully set out the evidentiary requirements that
should be met by a credit grantor seeking judgment against a
defaulting credit receiver:
Under the exceptions to the hearsay rule, the inherent difficulties of
producing every individual who dealt with the credit receiver and
made each entry reflected in the account in question would, in my
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view, together with the other factors already mentioned regarding
probity and reliability, entitle an applicant credit grantor seeking
judgment in an unopposed matter to rely on:
(a) the evidence of a person who exercises custody and control of
the documents in issue to introduce them into evidence through
the founding affidavit provided such allegation is made, or
appears from the contents of the affidavit as a whole, and
provided the agreements are attached and are alleged to be true
copies. This would usually be a bank manager or an official
holding the position of a recoveries manager;
(b) the evidence of a person who has personal knowledge of the
current status of the credit receivers’ account by reason of having
access to the account and being involved in the present manage-
ment of the account or collection process, in respect of the
allegations contained in the founding affidavit regarding the
current outstanding balance. This would be subject to the terms
of the agreement which may permit a certificate of indebtedness
to constitute prima facie proof provided it is signed by a desig-
nated official at the financial institution and provided further that
the court is otherwise satisfied that such person would, in the
ordinary course, have personally accessed the records, accounts
and other relevant records of the respondent and provided the
certificate is otherwise reliable;
(c) the evidence of a person who positively attests that notice was
properly sent to the respondent under either section 129(1) or
section 86(10) of the NCA (para [25]).
The court did not refer to section 3(1)(a) of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which permits hearsay to be
admitted by consent. However, it must be implied from the
judgment that consent will not be inferred from the unopposed
nature of the proceedings.
Dying declaration
In terms of section 3(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act
45 of 1988, hearsay evidence may be admitted (a) by consent;
(b) when the party upon whose credibility the probative value of
the evidence depends, testifies; and (c) when it is in the interests
of justice to do so. In determining whether it is in the interests of
justice to admit hearsay evidence the court is required to take a
number of factors into account (s 3(1)(c)). The court in Parkins v S
2017 (1) SACR 235 (WCC), in a systematic application of section
3(1)(c), considered the admission of a dying declaration made to
a policeman, identifying the accused as the deponent’s assailant.
In admitting the evidence, the court emphasised that the evi-
dence was not the only evidence incriminating the accused, and
465EVIDENCE
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 10 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/14−Evidence
found that there were sufficient indicia of honesty and reliability
to overcome the caution required in respect of identification
evidence. It is interesting that the court did not refer to the ‘dying
declaration’ common-law exception to the hearsay rule, which it
was entitled to do under ‘any other factor’ stipulated in section
3(1)(c)(vii). Perhaps this may be ascribed to the flimsy grounds of
rationality underlying the common-law exception.
OATH
‘The child was not properly admonished’ or ‘the presiding
officer did not make a sufficient inquiry into a child’s ability to
understand what it means to tell the truth’ are regular allegations
on appeal against convictions arising out of harm committed
against children. Sometimes the appeal court takes a holistic
approach, but at other times it takes a technocratic approach.
Fortunately, in Mbokazi v S 2017 (1) SACR 317 (KZP), the court
took an holistic approach and found that the child victim had
been sufficiently admonished and was able to distinguish between
truth and lies. What makes this judgment interesting is the
following statement (para [16]):
The finding by the learned magistrate that she [the child witness] was
competent to give evidence is also reinforced by the manner in which
she gave evidence. Her evidence is clear and her answers to
cross-examination reflect her maturity and competence.
Surely, the record of the child’s testimony will always be the
best evidence of his or her competency and ability to understand
what it means to tell the truth. However, this is seldom reflected in
the judgments of appeal courts, which does little to bolster public
confidence in the criminal justice system.
S v Baadjies 2017 (2) SACR 366 (WCC) is yet another case
where a person convicted of the rape and sexual assault of
young child appealed on the basis that the oath had not been
properly administered. The court in this instance took a sensible
approach and held that a formal inquiry into an understanding of
the oath was not required, and that the admonishment to tell the
truth in the circumstances of the case before it had been
adequate. The court held that the child’s evidence was admis-
sible; it noted that it had been corroborated and found that it
conclusively proved the appellant’s guilt. The difficulty with this
case is not in the court’s approach – the judges simply applied
the law and did so correctly. The problem is the law. It allows for
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the possibility that offenders can escape conviction on the basis
of technicalities, such as the administration of the oath or admon-
ishment, which have no impact on the reliability of evidence. It also
directs that the evidence of the most vulnerable witnesses must be
approached with the utmost caution when there is an absence of
social science evidence supporting the rationale for this eviden-
tiary requirement. This is unfortunate in a society where children
are raped every day.
In Mali v S 2017 (2) SACR 378 (ECG), the eleven-year-old
complainant who had been raped was asked by the presiding
magistrate to confirm that she would tell the truth. The appeal
court found that the reminder did not constitute an admonishment
for the purposes of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Malusi J held that the accused had suffered no prejudice as a
result of the failure to admonish, and that the irregularity was
‘procedural and technical in nature’ (para [22]). The court set
aside the conviction and sentence and remitted the matter to the
regional court where the complainant could be properly admon-
ished and asked to confirm her prior testimony after it had been
read to her. It is extremely difficult to imagine how this procedure
would place the court in a better position to assess the reliability
of the complainant’s evidence. However, it is very easy to see
how having to relive the horror of her rape once again, could
deeply traumatise the child witness. A child in the initial trial had
to wait five months between giving her evidence in chief and
cross-examination. The legal system will continue to lose legiti-
macy if it clings to technicalities that do not assist the truth-
seeking function of the court.
The High Court in S v Pilane 2017 (2) SACR 154 (SCA) was not
referred to the full text of section 165 of the Criminal Procedure;
instead, it was referred to an incomplete version in a textbook.
Consequently, the court upheld the appeal of a convicted rapist
on the basis that the interpreter (in the presence of the presiding
officer) administered the oath to three witnesses when this should
have been done by the presiding officer. The court found the
evidence of the three witnesses inadmissible and held that the
irregularity vitiated the proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the High Court had
erred in that section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Act clearly
makes provision for the administration of the oath by an inter-
preter. The section reads as follows:
165 Oath, affirmation or admonition may be administered by or
through interpreter or intermediary
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Where the person concerned is to give his evidence through an
interpreter or an intermediary appointed under section 170A(1), the
oath, affirmation or admonition under section 162, 163 or 164 shall be
administered by the presiding judge or judicial officer or the registrar
of the court, as the case may be, through the interpreter or intermedi-
ary or by the interpreter or intermediary in the presence or under the
eyes of the presiding judge or judicial officer, as the case may be.
A novel argument raised by the respondent’s counsel was that
the judicial officer, in permitting the interpreter to administer the
oath, failed to ask the witnesses if they had any objection to
taking the oath. The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected this
argument as there was nothing in the Criminal Procedure Act that
made this line of inquiry mandatory, and the failure to do so would
not constitute a defect in the proceedings.
As section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Act clearly makes
provision for the administration of the oath by an interpreter, the
content of the judgment leaves little to comment on. Neverthe-
less, it does highlight the importance of lawyers using original
sources when they are available. The Criminal Procedure Act
should have been readily available to all parties. It also provides
an opportunity for considering the purpose of administering an
oath or admonition.
The oath made sense when people believed they would be
punished by a God if they did not tell the truth, and it is also useful
for purposes of prosecuting perjury. However, it is not clear that
the oath increases the veracity of witnesses, and if it does, is
failure to take the oath sufficient to render the evidence inadmis-
sible? The court, in evaluating the evidence of a witness, places
that witness’s evidence in the context of all the evidence that is
before the court, and all witnesses would have been subject to
cross-examination. It is indeed surprising that courts should find
the appropriate remedy for a perceived deficiency in the admin-
istration of the oath to constitute an acquittal.
PRIVILEGE
Private privilege against self-incrimination in bail proceedings
Section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act reads:
(c) The record of the bail proceedings, excluding the information in
paragraph (a), shall form part of the record of the trial of the
accused following upon such bail proceedings: Provided that if
the accused elects to testify during the course of the bail
proceedings the court must inform him or her of the fact that
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anything he or she says, may be used against him or her at his or
her trial and such evidence becomes admissible in any subse-
quent proceedings.
An interesting set of facts led to Msimeki J’s scrutiny of this
provision in S v Miya & others 2017 (2) SACR 461 (GJ). One
Grigorov, in a case referred to by the court as the ‘Sandton case’,
had made an affidavit in support of his bail application. The court
in the ‘Sandton case’ had failed to inform him that the evidence he
presented at his bail application could be used at his trial and in
subsequent proceedings. The affidavit was, therefore, inadmis-
sible in the ‘Sandton case’, which had not been concluded when
S v Miya & others was heard. Although Grigorov had started off
as an accused in the Miya case, the state had subsequently
withdrawn the charges against him when he became a state
witness.
Accused number one wished to use the affidavit made by
Grigorov in the ‘Sandton case’ for purposes of cross-examining
Grigorov in the Miya case. After a detailed examination of section
60(11B)(c) and the limited authorities available, Msimeki J con-
cluded that (c) applied to the trial of the accused and to any
subsequent proceedings. Inadmissibility applied to all subse-
quent proceedings, irrespective of the status of the maker of the
‘bail statement’. In other words, the fact that Grigorov was now a
witness and not an accused was irrelevant, and the affidavit he
had given at the bail proceedings without being appropriately
warned, remained inadmissible. The court registered its con-
cerns about Grigorov’s fair-trial rights in the ‘Sandton case’
should the statement that was inadmissible in that case be used
against him in the present case. Although dealt with cursorily in
the judgment, this gives rise to several vexing questions.
First, how do we balance the fair-trial rights of the accused in
the Miya case with those of a witness, albeit it an accused, in
another case? Second, does the rationale underlying section
60(11B)(c) support an extension of inadmissibility to subsequent
proceedings where self-incrimination is not in issue?
It should be noted that the wording of the section addresses
itself to the admissibility, not the inadmissibility, of evidence given
at bail proceedings at subsequent trials.
There can be little doubt that the requirement that an accused
be advised that whatever he or she says at a bail hearing can be
used against him or her at trial or in subsequent proceedings, is
intended to enable him or her to make an informed choice as to
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whether to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to remain silent. It is on this basis that, in the absence of a
warning, the evidence becomes inadmissible at trial. These two
rights will not always arise in subsequent proceeding and,
consequently, there would be little purpose in making evidence at
subsequent proceedings inadmissible when these rights are not
in issue.
A section 204 witness may not refuse to answer a question on
the basis that it incriminates him or her – but only in relation to the
offence specified by the prosecutor. In the Miya case, Grigorov
would only be compelled to answer questions relating to the
offences specified by the prosecutor in that case. He could still
refuse to answer questions that might incriminate him in the
‘Sandton case’ or in any other case. If the complexity of testifying
in these conditions caused him inadvertently to implicate himself
for the purpose of the ‘Sandton case,’ the admissibility of that
evidence could always be challenged in the ‘Sandton case’.
Had the court taken a purposive approach to interpretation and
focused on the rationale of the rule and the rights it sought to
protect, it might have found a way of balancing the competing
rights of the accused in both cases. It is trite that the interests of
justice require that wherever possible relevant evidence should
be put before the court, particularly where it is relevant to the
accused’s defence.
See also ‘Evaluation of evidence – Inference from silence’
above.
Statements made without prejudice
A statement made by a party involved in a dispute which is
genuinely aimed at achieving a compromise is protected from
disclosure. These statements are usually marked ‘without preju-
dice’ and can only be accepted into evidence with the consent of
both parties. The rationale of the rule is based on public policy,
which encourages the private settlement of disputes by the
parties themselves. This was articulated by Trollip JA in Naidoo v
Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1978 (3) SA 666 (A) 677C–D as
follows:
[P]arties to disputes are to be encouraged to avoid litigation and all
the expenses (nowadays, very high), delays, hostility, and inconve-
nience it usually entails, by resolving their difference amicably in full
and frank discussions without the fear that, if the negotiations fail, any
admissions made by them during such discussions will be used
against them in the ensuing litigation.
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The question before the court in KLD Residential CC v Empire
Earth Investments 17 (Pty) Ltd 2017 (6) SA 55 (SCA) was whether
a ‘without prejudice’ admission of indebtedness could be used
for the sole purpose of showing that the running of the period of
prescription had been interrupted.
Section 14 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 provides:
(1) The running of prescription shall be interrupted by an express or
tacit acknowledgement of liability by the debtor.
(2) If the running of prescription is interrupted as contemplated in
subsection (1), prescription shall commence to run afresh from the
day on which the interruption takes place or, if at the time of the
interruption or at any time thereafter the parties postpone the due date
of the debt from the date upon which the debt again becomes due.
Lewis JA, citing a number of authorities (including Murray &
Roberts Construction (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Upington Municipality
1984 (1) SA 571 (A); Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide 2011 (2) SA
26 (CC); Myathaza v Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus Services
(SOC) Ltd t/a Metrobus (2017) 38 ILJ 527 (CC); GB Bradfield
Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) 561;
MM Loubser Extinctive Prescription (1996)), identified the primary
rationale of extinctive prescription as certainty in social and legal
affairs. The justification for interruption of prescription provided
for in section 14(1) of the Prescription Act is that uncertainty is
eliminated when a debtor acknowledges liability. The judge then
went onto examine the competing interests underlying the ‘with-
out prejudice’ rule and the section 14 provisions governing the
interruption of prescription.
These can be summarised as follows: if an admission made for
the purposes of settlement can be used for other purposes, it will
discourage parties from being frank in reaching out-of-court
settlements. Conversely, if an acknowledgment of debt made in a
‘without prejudice’ statement does not interrupt prescription,
there is no reason for a creditor to give the debtor time to pay off
the debt – as in doing so the creditor would run the risk of his
claim prescribing. Although not finding any authorities directly in
point, Lewis JA pointed to numerous authorities which indicated
that the ‘without prejudice’ rule is not absolute and is subject to
exceptions – for example, where a statement amounts to an act of
insolvency (see, eg, Absa Bank Ltd v Hammerle Group 2015 (5)
SA 215 (SCA)), or where there is an admission of liability separate
from the settlement sought on quantum (see, eg, Kapeller v
Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika Bpk 1964 (4)
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SA 722 (T)).Similarly, statements that are not connected with the
settlement negotiations will not be covered by the privilege
(Naidoo above).
The majority of the court (Lewis JA, with Tshiqi JA, Mbha JAand
Fourie AJA concurring) held that an exception to the ‘without
prejudice’ rule was justified in the circumstances and that the
admission of liability should be admitted for the sole purpose of
interrupting the running of prescription. The court noted that the
exception was not absolute and whether an admission of liability
served to interrupt prescription would depend on the facts of
each case (para [38]). For example, the parties in their settlement
negotiations might agree that any admission of liability would not
interrupt prescription.
The court concluded that the recognition of the exception
should not be viewed as one rule trumping the other, but rather as
a means by which the rationale underlying both section 14 and
the ‘without prejudice’ rule could be accommodated. Schipper
AJA, in a lone dissenting judgment, expressed the contrary view
that to recognise the exception for the purposes of interrupting
prescription would fatally undermine the public policy and con-
tractual foundation of the ‘without prejudice’ rule. This view
ignores the possibility that it is open to the parties to exclude the
exception, and that not recognising the exception could also
discourage creditors from engaging in settlement negotiations.
The issue that arose in AD & another v MEC for Health and
Social Development, Western Cape 2017 (5) SA 134 (WCC) was
whether such an offer could be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not punitive costs should be awarded.
Rogers J referred to the ‘without prejudice’ offer as a ‘secret
offer of settlement’ (para [4]). In this case, the plaintiff’s offer was
one made ‘without prejudice save as to costs’. The addition of
the phrase ‘save as to costs’ called for a different descriptor,
and the court adopted the terminology arising from the judgment
of the English Court of Appeal in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975]
3 All ER 333 (CA), and called it a ‘Calderbank offer’. The court
noted that in England and other Commonwealth jurisdictions,
Calderbank offers may be taken into consideration in determining
costs orders. However, in order to be admissible, it must explicitly
state that it is subject to costs. Calderbank offers are considered
to be permitted by public policy because the ‘substantive issues
between the parties have been determined’ (para [43]). Rogers J
found that there was no reason to deviate from the English law
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approach, and held that the ‘public policy of encouraging
settlements would be better served if litigants appreciate the risk
of adverse costs orders if they disregard reasonable offers of
settlement’ (para [43]).
However, although a Calderbank offer may be admitted for the
purposes of determining costs, it will not automatically result in
costs being awarded on an attorney/client scale against the party
who turned down the offer. The impact of the offer on the costs
determination will depend on the court’s consideration of the
surrounding circumstances (para [61]).
STATE PRIVILEGE
Docket privilege
A police docket is usually divided into three sections: ‘A’
containing the statements of witnesses, expert reports, and
documentary evidence; ‘B’ containing internal reports and memo-
randa; and ‘C’ containing the investigation diary. Following the
judgment in Shabalala & others v Attorney-General of Transvaal &
another 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC), the prosecution will, in granting
access to the police docket, divulge those documents contained
in section ‘A’. The court in Panayiotou v S & others 2017 (1) SACR
354 (ECP) held that the accused’s request for pre-trial disclosure
was not restricted to section ‘A’ of the docket. However, the
accused had to show why he needed further disclosure to place
him in a position effectively to adduce and challenge evidence. In
this instance, the accused could show why access to information
contained in ‘C’ was necessary to protect his right to a fair trial,
but he was unable to present an adequate argument in relation to
section B. This purposive approach to the realisation of rights
enables an appropriate balance to be struck between fair-trial
rights and the effective administration of justice.
STANDARD OF PROOF
Mbenenge J, in considering the matter referred to the High
Court in terms of section 116(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act
in S v Qhayiso 2017 (1) SACR 470 (ECB), set aside the accused’s
conviction and sentence on the ground that the magistrate, whilst
finding that the accused’s version was reasonably and possible
true, nevertheless convicted him. This meant that the accused
had been convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt
(para [19]; see also S v Sithole & others 1999 (1) SACR 585 (W)).
473EVIDENCE
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 18 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/14−Evidence
SUBPOENA
The accused is entitled to subpoena witnesses to appear at
trial and produce relevant documentation. (See s 179(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Act; rules 38 & 54 of the Rules of Court; and
s 35 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.) However, an accused
cannot use this process to summon witnesses to appear on a
date other than the trial date. In Panayiotou v S & others 2017 (1)
SACR 354 (ECP), the court held that the accused’s attempt to do
this contemporaneously with an application for further discovery
by the prosecution was irregular.
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
Criminal proceedings
The facts in S v Gumede 2017 (1) SACR 253 (SCA) can be
summarised as follows: the police entered and searched the
accused’s home, seized a firearm, and arrested the accused, all
without a warrant. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the
police had had sufficient time to obtain a warrant and had misled
the court by alleging that they did not. Shortly after the accused’s
arrest, he made a pointing-out (which also constituted a confes-
sion). His rights were read to him, but the court found that he had
not been advised of the consequences of not remaining silent,
and that ‘he must have been subjected to a considerable degree
of coercion, such that his conduct was neither free nor voluntary’
(para [39]).
Applying section 35(5) of the Constitution, Zondi JA held that
the search and seizure violated the accused’s right to privacy but
not the accused’s right to a fair trial, as the firearm which
constituted real evidence ‘would have been revealed indepen-
dently of the infringement’.
The court then went on to consider whether the admission of
the firearm would nevertheless be detrimental to the administra-
tion of justice. In doing so the court noted there was ‘an
inextricable link between the firearm evidence and the pointing-
out evidence, which was obtained by some degree of coercion’
(para [35]). It is here that the court, having rejected the notion that
the accused’s right to a fair trial had been infringed, started to
conflate the two legs of the section 35(5) inquiry – has the right
to a fair trial been infringed, and, if not, will admission of the
evidence nevertheless be detrimental to the administration of
justice?
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In reaching its conclusion that the evidence should be excluded
as its admission would be detrimental to the administration of
justice, the court took the following factors into account:
• The police deliberately sought to mislead the court.
• The appellant’s right to privacy was violated by the police.
• The appellant’s right against self-incrimination was violated by
the police.
• The accused did not make the pointing-out freely or voluntarily.
• The police failed to advise the accused fully of his rights.
At least three of the above five points relate to aspects of trial
fairness and it appears that this arises from the court merging the
two pieces of evidence – (i) the firearm; and (ii) the pointing-out –
into a single inquiry. If they are indeed inseparable, then they
should have been excluded on the basis that they infringe
the right to a fair trial. If not, it would be appropriate to exclude the
firearm on the basis that it would be detrimental to the administra-
tion of justice to admit it, and the pointing-out on the basis that it
infringed the right to a fair trial.
The judgment in S v Bakane & others 2017 (1) SACR 576 (GP)
is somewhat of a Pandora’s box. The three presiding officers
handed down three separate judgments with Preller and Khu-
malo JJ concurring and constituting the majority judgment, and
Manamela AJ dissenting. Unfortunately, all the judgments
(although Manamela AJ was a little more forthcoming) give a very
restricted account of the facts, which makes an assessment of
the import of the following statement by the trial court (para [51])
very difficult:
We accept that some slapping and rough handling took place. The
slapping could be classified as assault but not torture. I then exer-
cised my discretion to accept the somewhat tainted evidence insofar
as the assaults were concerned in the interest of justice and for fear
that the administration of justice would otherwise be brought into
disrepute.
The majority judgments correctly point out that for evidence to
be excluded in terms of section 35(5), there must be a link
between the infringement of a right and the obtaining of the
evidence. The judge then concluded that as there was no link
the slapping and rough handling did not call for exclusion of the
evidence. However, it is not possible to establish from the
majority judgment why Preller and Khumalo JJ found there was
no link, save that none was expressly articulated in the judgment
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of the court a quo. Manamela J looked more closely at the
judgment of the trial court, and drew an inference that there was a
link from the following passage:
In my view another court may well come to a different conclusion as
regards the slapping, to what extent it might have affected the
voluntariness issue.
This may not be conclusive proof, but it certainly indicates that
the trial court did think that there was possibly a link between the
mistreatment of the accused by the police, and the voluntariness
of their confessions. It is indeed unfortunate that there is no
record of the sequence of events and it is surprising that, for the
majority of the court, ‘slapping and rough handling’ were not seen
as at least prima facie evidence of coercion.
It would also appear that there was some contestation among
the judges as to the classification of the accused’s statements as
an admission or a confession. On the limited information given, it
would appear irrelevant, as the court appeared to consider the
admissibility on the basis of section 35(5) of the Constitution. But
if the admissibility was determined by the trial court in terms of
section 217 or section 219A of the Criminal Procedure Act, then it
would be expected to reach a conclusion without reference to the
repute of the administration of justice.
The majority and minority judgments both stressed the impor-
tance of taking an holistic approach to the evaluation of evidence
but nevertheless reached different conclusions. Only Manamela
J, in his dissenting judgment, found that the inferences to be
drawn from evidence did not exclude the possibility of a reason-
able doubt.
Civil proceedings
The appellant in Hohne v Super Stone Mining (Pty) Ltd 2017 (3)
SA 45 (SCA) disputed the admissibility of a videotaped confes-
sion to the theft of diamonds from his employer, a confession
made to a police officer, and a written acknowledgment of debt.
Before making the statement he had been threatened with
criminal prosecution and media exposure. The threats were
extensive and were referred to in the trial as the ‘dirty dozen’.
They included a promise to request immunity from prosecution if
he told the full truth. At his subsequent criminal trial, the confes-
sion and resulting pointing out were deemed inadmissible on the
basis that they had not been made freely and voluntarily. Super
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Stone Mining (the appellant’s employer) then instituted civil
proceedings for the recovery of damages (R6,015 million) result-
ing from the appellant’s dishonesty. It succeeded in its claim in
the High Court, and Hohne appealed to the Supreme Court of
Appeal.
The civil court was presented with a most unusual situation in
that it was called upon to consider the admissibility of evidence
that had been rejected by a criminal court. The Supreme Court of
Appeal did not find its prior decision in Janit v Motor Industry
Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 293 (A) 306H-307C
useful, in which it left the question open as to whether it could
exclude relevant but unlawfully obtained evidence, as in the
Hohne case the evidence had not been unlawfully obtained.
(There are several High Court decisions which have found that a
civil court may exclude improperly obtained evidence. See Shell
SA (Edms) Bpk & andere v Voorsitter, Dorperaad van die
Oranje-Vrystaat & andere 1992 (1) SA 906 (O); Lenco Holdings
Ltd & others v Eckstein & others 1996 (2) SA 693 (N); Fedics
Group (Pty) Ltd & another v Matus & others; Fedics Group (Pty)
Ltd & another v Murphy & others 1998 (2) SA 617 (C); Lotter v
Arlow & another 2002 (6) SA 60 (T). See also Ferreira v Levin NO
& others; Vryenhoek & others v Powell NO & others 1996 (1) SA
984 (CC).)
Willis JA confirmed that in civil matters, a court has a discretion
to exclude improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence (para
[23]). However, he also noted that this discretion would be
exercised very differently in criminal and civil matters, given the
different purpose of the two proceedings and the concomitantly
different statutory provisions applicable to civil and criminal trials.
The provisions set out in sections 219A and 217 of the Criminal
Procedure Act regulating the admissibility of admissions and
confessions do not apply in civil trials. Section 35(5) of the
Constitution, which facilitates the exclusion of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence in criminal trials, does not have equivalent
provisions set out in section 34 for civil trials. Section 34 merely
requires civil litigants to have civil disputes decided ‘in a fair
public hearing before a court’ (para [25]). Willis JA indicated that
these discrepancies were a product of the coercive and unequal
relationship between the parties in criminal proceedings, and the
greater equality between parties in civil proceedings (paras [24]
[25]). The court appeared to accept that the primary rationale for
the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings was ‘to deter
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unlawful police conduct’ and that this rationale was not relevant in
civil proceedings (para [26], the court quoting United States v
Janis 428 US 433 (1976)).
The court concluded that the evidence on the quantum of the
theft had not been obtained by a threat of considerable harm or
duress that was unlawful, and that an employer is obliged to
confront an employee when wrongdoing comes to light. The court
went on to consider prior cases founded in both delict and
contract to determine whether a threat of prosecution would
render the acknowledgement of debt voidable. (See Machanick
Steel & Fencing (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Cold Rolling (Pty) Ltd 1979
(1) SA 265 (W); Arend & another v Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd 1974
(1) SA 298 (C); Ilanga Wholesalers v Ebrahim & others 1974 (2)
SA 292 (D).) It concluded that where there is no dispute regard-
ing the liability of the debtor, a threat of prosecution would not
constitute legally recognised duress. The appellant, having failed
to discharge the onus of proving the existence of operative or
legally recognised duress which would prevent the acknow-
ledgement of debt being enforced against him, lost his appeal
(para [35]).
Leach JA (Petse JA concurring) reached the same conclusion
as Willis JA as regards the dismissal of the appeal, but found the
discussions of admissibility in terms of the Criminal Procedure
Act and section 35(5) of the Constitution unnecessary for the
purposes of reaching a conclusion. They found that the appel-
lant’s failure to testify was a ground from which a negative
inference could be drawn, specifically that his own evidence was
likely to damage his case (para [49]). This again highlights the
difference between civil and criminal trials, as in the constitutional
era it appears that the courts in criminal cases have gone no
further than to state that silence at trial can have negative
consequences as there is nothing to contradict the state’s prima
facie case.
The judgment indeed highlights the paucity of case law and
legal analysis on the appropriate way in which a civil court should
develop the common-law discretion to exclude improperly
obtained evidence in line with constitutional values. Willis JA’s
attempt to do so should be applauded, but it leaves a few
questions unanswered. These include: is the rationale for exclu-
sion in criminal trials not much wider than that of deterring police
from unlawful activities? Is it appropriate not to interrogate the
equality of arms justification in civil trials? Would constitutional
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values be useful in determining what constitutes an unconscio-
nable threat? Does the bar of voluntariness in criminal trials really
set the standard too high for civil trials?
WITNESSES
Calling of witnesses by presiding officer
In S v Qhayiso 2017 (1) SACR 470 (ECB), Mbenenge J found
that the trial in the magistrate’s court had been a travesty of
justice due to a number of departures from the type of conduct
expected of a presiding officer. These included interfering with
cross-examination, not giving the prosecutor or defence an oppor-
tunity to question witnesses on issues raised during the court’s
questioning of the witnesses, and failing to allow the accused to
present highly relevant evidence.
Irregularities on the part of the conduct of a judicial officer were
also in issue in Longano v S 2017 (1) SACR 380 (KZP). The
unfortunate presiding officer in this case found herself, through
no fault of her own, in possession of a report by an expert witness
whom the state intended to call but never did. The accused
applied for her recusal on the basis that there was a reasonable
perception of bias as a consequence of her having knowledge of
the contents of the report. The presiding officer dismissed the
application for recusal and failed to give reasons therefor in her
final judgment. Shortly after dismissing the recusal judgment, she
exercised her powers in terms of section 186 of the Criminal
Procedure Act and called the author of the report as a witness.
The accused was convicted of murder and appealed against his
conviction and sentence.
The appeal court set aside the conviction on the basis that it
was irregular for ‘the presiding judge not to recuse herself, to call
a witness not essential for the just determination of the case, and
to not give reasons for any of the rulings’ (para [30]). The appeal
court, in reaching this conclusion, chose a very restrictive inter-
pretation of ‘essential to the just decision of the case’ – it could be
argued that in the circumstances of the case, the state, in
handing the report to the judge, made the calling of the witness
essential for the just determination of the case. In fact, there was
no possibility of a just decision ensuing without the witness being
called. The witness’s evidence was essential to combat percep-
tions of bias. However, the approach of the appeal court regard-
ing what is essential for the just determination of a case is
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perhaps irrelevant in light of the presiding officer’s failure to give
reasons and take the parties into her confidence as to why she
was calling the witness.
Identification of child witnesses
The case of Centre for Child Law & others v Media 24 Ltd &
others 2017 (2) SACR 416 (GP) is dealt with briefly, as although
described as an evidence case by the law report editors, it is
more appropriately dealt with under criminal procedure. The
constitutionally appropriate interpretation of section 154(3) of the
Criminal Procedure Act was considered by the court. The rel-
evant section reads as follows:
(3) No person shall publish in any manner whatever any information
which reveals or may reveal the identity of an accused under the age
of eighteen years or of a witness at criminal proceedings who is under
the age of eighteen years: Provided that the presiding judge or judicial
officer may authorize the publication of so much of such information as
he may deem fit if the publication thereof would in his opinion be just
and equitable and in the interest of any particular person.
The basis of one constitutional challenge to the subsection was
that it did not cover child victims who were neither complainants
nor witnesses. Hughes J, taking into account related provisions –
section 153(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and section 63(5) of
the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 – held that on a purposive
interpretation, the provisions of section 154(3) applied to the child
participant in a criminal trial, whether it be as an accused, a
witness, a complainant, or a victim (para [56]).
The central point of contention between the parties was
whether the protection afforded by section 154(3) continued
once a child reached the age of eighteen. The court held that the
age limit specified by the legislature was eighteen, its purpose
was to protect children, and once they ceased to be children
there was no justification for the continued infringement of other
rights, such as freedom of expression. The court showed an
appreciation of the importance of the rights enshrined in section
28 of the Constitution and an appropriate caution to extending the
paramountcy of the best interests of the child beyond childhood.
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FAMILY LAW
CHRIZELL STOOP*
LEGISLATION
There was no new legislation affecting this area of the law
during the period under review.
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
The fees payable to accredited child protection organisations
or social workers in respect of adoptions were amended on
31 March 2017 (Reg 107 of the General Regulations Regarding
Children, 2010, issued under the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, as
amended by GN 282 GG 40733 of 31 March 2017).
The Minister of Home Affairs extended the period for the
registration of customary marriages in terms of section 4(3)(a)
and (b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of
1998 to 30 April 2019 (GNs 483 and 484 GG 40883 of 2 June
2017).
Regulation 5 of the Regulations relating to Maintenance pub-
lished under the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 (GN R 1361 in
GG 20627 of 15 November 1999) was amended on 6 September
2017 (GN R966 in GG 41096 of 6 September 2017). Regulation 5
regulates subsistence and travel allowances to which any person
against whom a maintenance order is made is entitled.
Sections 2, 11 and 13(b) of the Maintenance Amendment Act 9
of 2015 came into operation on 5 January 2018 (Proc R 44
GG 41352 of 21 December 2017). These regulations deal with
electronic communications, service providers and credit rating
respectively. The other provisions of the Maintenance Amend-
ment Act came operation on 9 September 2015 (Proc 821
GG 39183 of 9 September 2015). See the discussion of the
provisions of the Maintenance Amendment Act (the Bill at that
time) in Jacqueline Heaton ‘Family Law’ 2014 Annual Survey
394–9.
* LLB LLM (Pret) LLD (Unisa). Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile
Law, Unisa.
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DRAFT LEGISLATION
The Draft Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill
was published in General Notice 517 in Government Gazette
40970 of 10 July 2017. The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy
Amendment Bill 34 of 2017 was also tabled for approval during
2017. However, the Bill was rejected by the National Assembly on
4 September 2018.
CASE LAW
ACCRUAL SYSTEM
Legality of clauses in an antenuptial contract
W v H 2017 (1) SA 196 (WCC), [2016] 4 All SA 260 concerned
the legality of a clause in an antenuptial contract. The antenuptial
contract incorporated a foreign accrual system to govern the
marriage which was entered into between the plaintiff wife
(W) and defendant husband (H) in a foreign country. The ante-
nuptial contract provided that in consideration of certain dona-
tions, W waived any present or future right to claim maintenance
for herself should the marriage be dissolved. H sought to rely on
this clause to counter W’s claim for personal maintenance in a
subsequent divorce action instituted against him. The court held
that the enforcement of the waiver of maintenance clause in the
antenuptial contract was unreasonable and contrary to public
policy. It infringed constitutional values including the right to
dignity, equality, the enhancement of human rights and freedoms,
and the rule of law. The clause was therefore declared unenforce-
able and voidable (para [28]). See too the discussion in Jacque-
line Heaton ‘Family Law’ 2016 Annual Survey 366–74.
RM v BM 2017 (2) SA 538 (ECG) also centred around the
validity of clauses in an antenuptial contract. Clause 4 of the
antenuptial contract listed the assets making up the defendant’s
estate, while clause 5 excluded the same assets from his estate.
The plaintiff sought an order declaring the antenuptial contract
void for vagueness, or in the alternative, for its rectification. In
a counterclaim, the defendant also sought rectification, but in a
different way, and in the alternative an order that the antenuptial
contract be interpreted in accordance with section 4(1)(b)(ii) of
the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. The court held, with
reference to JK v RK [2014] ZAGPPHC 242 and Bath v Bath
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unreported case GNP 8681/10 (5 November 2012), which was
confirmed on appeal in Bath v Bath [2014] ZASCA 14 (24 March
2014), that clauses 4 and 5 contradicted each other materially
and irreconcilably. Therefore, the antenuptial contract was void
for vagueness. In effect, the parties were married in community
of property (paras [9]-[13]). Based on the conflict between the
two clauses, the court held further that an alternative interpreta-
tion of the conflicting clauses offered no solution to the problem
(para [14]). See too the discussion of this case in the chapter
‘Law of Contract’.
CHILDREN
Care and contact
VN v MD & another 2017 (2) SA 328 (ECG) was an appeal
against a ruling of the Children’s Court in Grahamstown in which
a parenting plan was revised. The respondent was dissatisfied
with his rights of access in terms of a parenting plan entered into
between the parents. He subsequently approached the Chil-
dren’s Court, which ordered that a revised plan which he had
presented be made an order of court. The appellant appealed
against the decision, and the appeal was upheld, mainly because
of the absence of inputs from a family advocate, social worker, or
psychologist in the preparation of the revised parenting plan.
The court noted that section 33(5) of the Children’s Act does
not specifically stipulate that the variation to the parenting plan
must be prepared with the assistance of the family advocate,
social worker, or psychologist. Nevertheless, it is clear from Part 3
of Chapter 3 that, in pursuing any agreement with regard to the
exercise of parental rights and responsibilities, the parties must,
before approaching a court, confer with a family advocate, social
worker, or a psychologist who is qualified to provide the neces-
sary guidance to ensure that the best interests of the minor child
prevail ([para [19]).
The court proceeded to say that it must be borne in mind that
section 33(2) of the Children’s Act provides that where parents or
other co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights are required
to reach consensus, they must be assisted by a family advocate,
social worker, or psychologist (see also J Heaton ‘Parental
responsibilities and rights’ in Trynie Boezaart Child Law in South
Africa 2ed (2017) 97–8; LI Schäfer ‘Who has parental responsibili-
ties and rights?’ in Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic
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and International Perspectives (2011) 255–6; J Heaton and
H Kruger South African Family Law 4ed (2015) 327–8). Similarly,
where the parenting plan is to be varied because the parties
experience difficulties in exercising or executing their responsibili-
ties and rights, parties must seek the assistance and services of
such a qualified person before seeking the intervention of a court
(para [19]). In this case, the assistance and guidance services of
the family advocate, social worker, or a psychologist were
essential as a significant period had lapsed since the previous
parenting plan had been endorsed, and because the parties had
failed to reach consensus (para [19]).
The High Court concluded that the magistrate had erred in
concluding that the Children’s Act did not require further consul-
tation for an amendment to a parenting plan as envisaged in
section 34(5) (para [19]). The High Court, correctly, set aside the
order of the magistrate and upheld the appeal. The magistrate’s
court had failed to apply the law correctly: for example, it failed
to consider the best interests of the minor child. It is important to
bear in mind that the best interests of the child must also prevail
when a parenting plan is prepared. That is why the guidance and
involvement of the family advocate, social worker, or psychologist
are crucial during the preparation of the plan. No child ought to
be the victim of quarrels and disagreements between his or her
parents (JA Robinson ‘Divorcing parents and the best interests of
their child’ (2018) 81 THRHR 299–305; Marici Corneli Samuelson
‘Parenting coordinators: What is classified as their decision-
making powers?’ (2018) September De Rebus 37 and ‘The
parenting plan as legal instrument’ (2018) October De Rebus 48).
For a detailed discussion of the case, see the chapter ‘Law of
Persons’.
Maintenance
In AG v DG 2017 (2) SA 409 (GJ), the applicant brought an
urgent application against the respondent, from whom she was
divorcing, to compel him to pay to her arrear interim mainte-
nance. The applicant also requested the court to hold the
respondent, a multimillionaire, in contempt of court and to have
him arrested if he continued to fail to pay maintenance. The
reason for taking these drastic steps was that, despite several
court orders against him, the respondent had failed serially to
meet his maintenance obligations in respect of his two minor
children (para [5]). The respondent had also jeopardised the
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children’s constitutional rights in terms of section 28 of the Consti-
tution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the right to parental or
family care, and giving effect to the best interests of the child)
(para [8]). Spilg J held that it was clear that this application for
arrear maintenance founded on the contempt of a court order was
urgent, as the applicant’s assets were almost depleted and the
respondent was deliberately frustrating the ordinary enforcement
of court orders (para [15]). The judge proceeded to find that the
respondent was concealing his assets intentionally, and that his
conduct was wilful and mala fide (paras [28] [29]). The court,
therefore, granted the urgent application, holding the respondent
in contempt of court for non-payment of arrear maintenance. A
warrant was to be issued for the respondent’s arrest and imprison-
ment for a period of five days for contempt of court. However, the
implementation of the warrant was postponed to the seventh day
after the granting of the order and it was to be executed if, by that
time, the respondent had not yet made the necessary payment
(paras [40.1]-[40.5]). The court’s findings can, therefore, not be
faulted in that the respondent deliberately made use of unaccept-
able tactics in order to evade his maintenance obligations.
Surrogacy
In Ex Parte HP & others 2017 (4) SA 528 (GP) (also reported as
Ex Parte HPP & others; Ex Parte DME & others [2017] JOL 37415
(GP)), the court was confronted with two applications for confir-
mation of surrogate motherhood agreements. Both applications
involved couples who approached a so-called surrogacy co-
ordinator who introduced them to potential surrogate mothers
and charged them a fee for her services. The court had to decide
whether this payment violated section 301 of the Children’s Act,
and whether the surrogacy facilitation agreements are lawful and
enforceable. The court held that no payments may be received
by the surrogate mother in terms of the agreement since section
301 of the Children’sAct stipules that the commissioning parent(s)
are permitted to pay for costs directly related to the artificial
insemination, pregnancy, birth, and confirmation of the mother-
hood agreement, as well as professional medical and legal
expenses. In short, the surrogate mother cannot earn any form of
income simply by being a surrogate mother (paras [45]-[47]). The
court held that the purpose of section 301 was to prevent
commercial surrogacy as such prevention is in the public interest
and therefore a justifiable and admissible limitation to the co-
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ordinator’s right to practise her chosen occupation. Allowing
commercial surrogacy/surrogacy-facilitation agreements would
open floodgates and most probably lead to the abuse of vulner-
able people – exactly what section 301 is aimed at preventing
(para [52]). The court also had to consider the extent to which the
surrogacy mother agreements and the surrogacy facilitation
agreements are linked, as well as the vulnerability of the surro-
gate mothers. The court confirmed the validity of the surrogate
motherhood agreements entered into between the parties since
the surrogate mothers were not vulnerable women and the
applicants had the desire to have children (para [71]). However,
the surrogacy facilitation agreements were declared unlawful and
unenforceable (para [72.1]). For a detailed discussion of this
case, see the chapter ‘Law of Persons’.
DIVORCE
Effect of divorce on a will
In Louw NO v Kock & another (14270/2015) [2016] ZAWCHC
165, 2017 (3) SA 62 (WCC), the court was required to decide the
impact of the death of a husband on a joint will if the death
occurred within three months after divorce. The court confirmed
that an ex-spouse no longer has a claim for inheritance from the
testator if he or she has divorced the testator less than three
months before the testator’s death. For a detailed discussion of
this matter, see De Waal ‘Law of Succession (including Adminis-
tration of Estates)’ 2016 Annual Survey 969–71; cf Michael
Cameron Wood-Bodley ‘Wills, divorce, and the provisions of
section 2B of the Wills Act: Louw NO v Kock’ (2018) 3 SALJ
418–32.
Forfeiture of patrimonial benefits
The parties in KT v MR 2017 (1) SA 97 (GP) had been married
in community of property under customary law. The respondent
claimed the forfeiture of the plaintiff’s patrimonial benefits in terms
of section 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. In deciding whether
to make the order, the court, in terms of section 9(1), had to
consider ‘the duration of the marriage, circumstances which gave
rise to the breakdown thereof and any substantial misconduct on
the part of either of the parties’. Furthermore, in having regard
to these factors, the court had to be satisfied that if the order
of forfeiture was not made, the one party would, in relation to
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the other, be ‘benefited’. It was common cause that the plaintiff
would benefit in relation to the respondent in the event of an equal
division. The main question, therefore, was whether the benefit
the plaintiff would derive was ‘undue’.
The court investigated the three factors in section 9(1) of the
Divorce Act. As regards the duration of the marriage, it was
common cause that the marriage was stormy and lasted approxi-
mately twenty months. As a general rule, the longer the marriage
subsists, the more likely it is that the benefit derived would be due
and proportionate. On the flipside, the shorter the marriage, the
more likely it is that the benefit will be undue and disproportionate
(paras [20.1] [20.19]). The second factor was the circumstances
that gave rise to the breakdown of the marriage. The main reason
for the breakdown of the marriage relationship was that both
spouses had spent a considerable amount of time outside of the
marital home during the marriage. Both parties were at fault and
incapable of finding a suitable way to deal with the constant
tension and conflict in the marriage (para [20.4]). The third factor
was substantial misconduct. Kollapen J stated that the factors
relating to substantial misconduct and the circumstances which
gave rise to the breakdown of the marriage were not decisive and
convincing in determining whether a benefit was undeserved. As
a result, it was decided that the only ground on which a forfeiture
claim stood to be considered in this case was a fault-neutral
factor: the duration of the marriage (paras [20.7] [20.18]). It
should be borne in mind that misconduct is not the only consider-
ation in a forfeiture order, and that all three factors need not be
present for the forfeiture order to be granted (Wijker v Wijker 1993
(4) SA 720 (A); see also Jacqueline Heaton ‘Family Law’ 2016
Annual Survey 361–3; cf J Heaton and H Kruger above 135–7).
However, it appears that when there is evidence of substantial
misconduct which led to the breakdown of a marriage, courts
tend to order forfeiture.
In the case under consideration, in order to determine what is
meant by ‘undue benefit’, the court referred to the South African
Concise Oxford Dictionary (2005 ed), which defines ‘undue’ as
‘unwarranted or inappropriate because excessive or dispropor-
tionate’. The court noted that the marriage had been short-lived,
lasting only twenty months, and that the defendant had built up
a substantial part of the joint estate before the parties married
(para [20.17]).
The court concluded that the plaintiff would benefit unduly if an
order for forfeiture was not made. The court, correctly, referred to
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Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht 1989 (1) SA 597 (C), in which it was
decided that if the parties did not make exactly equal contribu-
tions either before or during the marriage, the party who contri-
buted less would, on the dissolution of the marriage, be benefited
over the other party if forfeiture is not granted (para [18]).
The court, therefore, ordered, and correctly so, that the plaintiff
should forfeit all the patrimonial benefits of the marriage entered
into between herself and the defendant on 2 May 2011, save for
any benefits that arose from the property known as ‘Erf XXX’. The
plaintiff was entitled to 50 per cent of the net value of that
property.
Interim relief
On the failure to comply with an interim maintenance order, see
the discussion of AG v DG 2017 (2) SA 409 (GJ) above.
Pension interests on divorce
In GN v JN 2017 (1) SA 342 (SCA) (also reported as Ndaba v
Ndaba [2017] 1 All SA 33 (SCA)), the Supreme Court of Appeal
had to decide whether the pension interest of a member spouse
formed part of the joint estate of the divorcing parties, and
whether the non-member spouse was entitled to the member
spouse’s pension interest. The appellant obtained a divorce
order in the regional court against the respondent to whom she
had been married in community of property. The settlement
agreement was incorporated in the divorce order, and included a
term providing for the equal division of the joint estate. The High
Court refused the appellant’s application for a declaratory order
that she and the respondent were equally entitled to 50 per cent
of each other’s pension interest. The key aspect considered on
appeal was the respondent’s argument that, in terms of section
7(7)(a) read with section 7(8) of the Divorce Act, a spouse
married in community of property is only entitled to the pension
interest of the other spouse in circumstances where the court
granting the divorce has made an order declaring the pension
interest part of the joint estate. In other words, the main issue on
appeal was the proper interpretation of section 7(7) and (8) of the
Divorce Act (para [1]). Section 7(7)(a) reads:
In the determination of the patrimonial benefits to which the parties to
any divorce action may be entitled, the pension interests of a party
shall, subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), be deemed to be part of his
assets.
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It is important to refresh one’s memory regarding the High
Court’s ruling: it came to the conclusion that, in the absence of a
court order by the divorce court declaring the pension interest of
the member spouse to be part of the joint estate, the pension
interest did not form part of the joint estate (para [6]; cf Sigwadi
‘Pension Funds Law’ 2016 Annual Survey 1109–13).
Petse JA, writing for the majority, referred to various judgments
in which the import of the provisions of section 7(7)(a) and (8) of
the Divorce Act had been considered (para [14] ). He noted that
the interpretation of these provisions in those judgments had
been conflicting and dissonant (para [14]). Only brief summaries
of certain of the cases referred to by Petse JA are given below.
The court referred to Maharaj v Maharaj 2002 (2) SA 648
(D&CLD), in which it was concluded that it was proper to take
account of the value of a pension interest held by one of the
spouses married in community of property at the date of divorce
(para [17]; see also Jacqueline Heaton ‘Law of Persons and
Family Law’ 2015 Annual Survey 423–4).
Reference was also made to Fritz v Fundsatwork Umbrella
Pension Fund (2323/2011) [2012] ZAECPEHC 57, 2013 (4) SA
492 (ECP). In Fritz, no order under section 7(7) of the Divorce Act
had been made when the divorce decree was granted (para
[18]). Here the court concluded that as the joint estate had
already been divided pursuant to the decree of divorce, ‘an order
the effect of which is to deem a pension interest to be part of the
joint estate’ would be inappropriate (para [19]; see also Jacque-
line Heaton ‘Law of Persons and Family Law’ 2015 Annual Survey
423–4).
In contrast, in Kotze v Kotze & another [2013] JOL 30037
(WCC), the court concluded that despite the fact that the division
of the joint estate had already been made, the wife was entitled to
a share of the pension benefit which had accrued to her (ex-)
husband. The court held that the sharing of the pension benefit
fell to be determined as at the date of divorce in terms of section
7(7)(a) of the Divorce Act (para [22]).
The view that a non-member spouse becomes entitled to a
share of his or her member spouse’s pension interest only if the
court makes such a declaration in terms of section 7(8)(a) of the
DivorceAct when granting the decree of divorce, was rejected by
the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case under discussion (ie GN
v JN) (para [25]).
The court held that section 7(7)(a) is self-contained and does
not depend on a section 7(8) order, which deals with endorse-
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ment of pension interest after a decree of divorce has been
granted. Section 7(7)(a) deems a pension interest to be part of
the joint estate for the limited purpose of determining the value of
the joint estate at the time of divorce (para [25]). The settlement
agreement in this case, therefore, automatically included the
value of both parties’ pension interests (paras [25] [26]; cf
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae ‘The law regarding pension
interest in SouthAfrica has been settled! Or has it? With reference
to Ndaba v Ndaba (600/2015) [2016] ZASCA 162’ (2017) 20
PER/PELJ). The legislature’s intention when including section
7(7)(a) was to improve the non-member spouse’s patrimonial
benefits, because such benefits had been available at common
law before its inclusion (para [26]).
Section 7(8) creates a mechanism in terms of which the
member spouse’s pension fund is statutorily obliged to pay
the assigned pension interest (as at the date of divorce) directly
to the non-member spouse, consequently relieving the member
of the obligation to effect payment (para [27]).
The court held that the ‘joint estate in this case must necessar-
ily include the pension interest of either party as contemplated in
section 7(7)(a) of the Act’ (para [34]).
Makgoka AJA, who wrote the minority judgment, stated that
pension interest is neither immovable nor movable property. In
the context of a divorce action and section 7(7) and (8) of
the Divorce Act, any suggestion that ‘immovable and movable
property includes pension interests is untenable’ (para [51]). The
core of his reasoning is that, if the settlement agreement made
provision for pension interest, that interest would certainly not be
included under the immovable or movable property sections of
the settlement agreement. Consequently, if the settlement agree-
ment specifically provides for a ‘pension interest section’, it would
form part of the joint estate. However, if no separate provision is
included, it amounts to a waiver of a right to claim the pension
interest (para [39]; cf Marumoagae above).
The importance of this case is that the Supreme Court of
Appeal concluded that when marriages in community of property
are dissolved by divorce, each party’s pension interest is auto-
matically included in the settlement agreement that is made an
order of court. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out
clearly that if spouses wish a retirement fund to make a deduction
and payment to the non-member spouse in terms of section
37D(1)(d)(i) of the Pension Funds Act, a specific order in terms of
section 7(8) of the Divorce Act is still required.
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This judgment is welcome as it answers some of the questions
with which various divisions of the High Court have previously
struggled. This judgment notwithstanding, it is advisable rather to
plead specifically for the division of the pension interest in terms
of sections 7(7) and 7(8).
Taking trust assets into account on divorce
In REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) (also reported as Mills v
Mills [2017] 2 All SA 364 (SCA)), the Supreme Court of Appeal
considered whether trust assets should be taken into account for
purposes of calculating the accrual in a spouse’s estate upon
divorce. The two main questions in this case were whether, on a
proper interpretation of the exclusion clause in the antenuptial
contract concluded between the parties, certain assets in which
the appellant had an interest fell to be excluded from the accrual
system; and, if the assets were not to be excluded, whether the
trust veil had to be pierced so that the trust assets would form
part of the appellant’s estate for purposes of the accrual system.
The relevant clause in the antenuptial contract excluded the
appellant’s beneficial interest in a trust from any accrual, and also
excluded ‘any other asset acquired by such party by virtue of the
possession or former possession of such asset’.
The case of Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) is
a good starting point for a discussion of this topic. In Badenhorst,
the Supreme Court of Appeal shed light on the issue of shielding
assets using the separate legal personality of a trust. In Baden-
horst, it was clearly stipulated that the value of assets in the trust
could be taken into account for purposes of a redistribution (of
assets) order. This was applicable to all marriages entered into
before 1 November 1984 when the Matrimonial Property Act
came into force.
For purposes of the discussion of the REM case, two important
principles in Badenhorst deserve mention. First, one of the
grounds for taking the value of the assets of the trust into account
was that the respondent maintained actual and full control over
the trust, and by so doing, disregarded the difference between
trust assets and his own assets. Simply put, the trust was abused
by using it as his alter ego (Badenhorst para [11]). Secondly, the
court was ‘obliged’ to take the value of the assets of the trust into
account as the trust property had been ‘validly transferred to the
trustees of a legally created trust’ (Badenhorst para [13]). It
therefore acquired the characteristics of trust assets (Bradley
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Smith ‘Trust assets and accrual claims at divorce: The SCAopens
the door’ (2017) August De Rebus 22). Consequently, the value of
the trust assets was taken into account in determining the extent
of the redistribution order in the Badenhorst case. This led to the
enforcement of the common-law power of ‘piercing’ the trust’s veil
(veil piercing), although the court never referred to this remedy.
Several other authors were also of the view that the court applied
this common-law power, since the court added ‘the value of
the trust assets to the value of the respondent’s estate for the
purposes of the redistribution order’ (see M de Jong, J le
Roux-Bouwer and TA Manthwa ‘Attacking trusts upon divorce
and in maintenance matters: Guidelines for the road ahead (1)’
(2017) 80 THRHR 205–8. See also the discussion of WT & others
v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) in Jacqueline Heaton ‘Family Law’
2015 Annual Survey 424–8).
In the REM case, the court was required to decide whether, for
purposes of the accrual system, the assets of certain trusts
legitimately formed part of the assets of these trusts and were not
part of the appellant’s estate (para [10]). This meant that the court
had to establish whether these trusts were simply the alter egos
of the appellant. The court found that the trusts were not simply
alter egos of the appellant. The Supreme Court of Appeal
acknowledged
. . . an equitable remedy in the ordinary, rather than technical, sense of
the term; one that lends itself to a flexible approach to fairly and justly
address the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of the trust
form in given circumstances. It is a remedy that will generally be given
when the trust form is used in a dishonest or unconscionable manner
to evade a liability, or avoid an obligation (para [17]).
An important issue in this case was whether the trust-creating
spouse had attempted to prejudice the other spouse’s monetary
claim by managing and administering the trust in such a manner
that it amounted to an abuse of the trust form. The court, correctly,
held that this would occur in marriages involving the accrual
system, where the trust-creating spouse had set up the trust,
transferred personal assets to the trust, and dealt with these
assets as if they were trust assets in a fraudulent or deceptive
attempt to secrete them and, therefore, prejudice the aggrieved
spouse’s accrual claim. In such cases, the court held that trust
assets could be used to calculate the accrual of the aggrieved
spouse’s estate, to satisfy any personal liability of the aggrieved
spouse, and to satisfy any payment owed under the accrual
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system to the other spouse (paras [19]–[20]; cf Bradley Smith
‘Trust assets and accrual claims at divorce: The SCA opens the
door’ (2017) August De Rebus 22).
It is therefore clear from the REM judgment that the assets of an
alter ego trust can now be taken into account in marriages
concluded under the accrual system. By taking the assets of the
alter ego trust into account, the prejudiced spouse’s accrual
claim can be calculated.
To conclude: in the REM case, the court held that trust assets
can be included in a spouse’s estate. This will happen if it is
proved that a spouse transferred personal assets to the trust, and
dealt with them as if they were trust assets. This must be
accompanied by the fraudulent or dishonest purpose of evading
the obligation properly to account for the accrual of his or her
estate in order to evade paying what was due to the other spouse
under the accrual claim (para [20]; see also Jacqueline Heaton
‘Family Law’ 2016 Annual Survey 366).
This judgment is to be welcomed, as it provides certainty
regarding trust assets and marriages involving the accrual sys-
tem. For a detailed analysis of the judgment, see also Bradley
Smith ‘Perspectives on the juridical basis for taking (the value of)
trust assets of alter-ego trusts into account for the purposes of
accrual claims at divorce: REM v VM’ (2017) 4 SALJ 715–28. This
case is also discussed in the chapter ‘Law of Trusts’.
Maintenance
Post-divorce spousal maintenance
On the legality of a clause in an antenuptial contract providing
for the waiver of any present or future right to claim maintenance
upon divorce, see W v H 2017 (1) SA 196 (WCC) above.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
WG SCHULZE*
LEGISLATION
PRIMARY LEGISLATION
General
Two pieces of primary legislation that are of considerable
importance to financial institutions were promulgated and/or
came into operation during 2017. These are the Financial Sector
Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (the FSR Act) and the Financial
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017 (the Amendment
Act). The first part of the discussion under ‘Primary Legislation’
will be devoted to selected aspects of the FSR Act; while the
Amendment Act will be discussed in the second part.
The South African financial sector has been overhauled exten-
sively. For a more detailed explanation of what exactly this
process entailed, see WG Schulze ‘Financial Institutions’ 2015
Annual Survey (Schulze 2015) 435ff.)
In 2011, the Minister of Finance released a discussion docu-
ment ‘A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better’ (see
www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/, accessed on 12 March 2017).
This document outlined the government’s strategy to reform the
South African financial sector.
Most of the initiatives outlined in the 2011 discussion document
have since come into force, including the Financial Markets Act
19 of 2012 (in 2012); Basel III (in 2013); the Banks Amendment
Act 3 of 2015 (in 2015); and the FSR Act (in 2018). (On the
Financial Markets Act in general, see Stephanie Luiz & Kathleen
van der Linde ‘The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012’ (2013) 25 SA
Merc LJ 458ff.)
A number of other regulatory reforms have also been imple-
mented. These reforms all form part of the ‘twin peaks’ model of
reform. This model consists of a prudential peak, and a market
conduct peak (Schulze 2015 above 436).
* BLC LLB (Pret) LLD (Unisa). Professor of Banking Law in the University of
South Africa, Pretoria.
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The twin peaks model formally became operational when the
main part of the Financial Sector Regulation Act came into force
on 1 April 2018.
Under the previous regulatory dispensation, all banks in South
Africa were regulated by the Banking Supervision Department of
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). All non-bank financial
institutions (financial services providers, long- and short-term
insurers, pension funds, collective investment schemes and
market infrastructures) were regulated by the Financial Services
Board (FSB). (For a broad overview of the role of the SARB in
ensuring financial stability in South Africa, see Gerda van Niekerk
& Corlia van Heerden ‘twin peaks: The role of the South African
central bank in promoting and maintaining financial stability’ (Van
Niekerk & Van Heerden) 2017 (80) THRHR 636 644ff.) For a
discussion of the role and status of the SARB, see Johann de
Jager ‘The South African Reserve Bank: An evaluation of the
origin, evolution and status of a central bank. Part 1’ 2006 (18) SA
Merc LJ 1 passim.
Under the new dispensation, the FSR Act has created two new
regulators: the Prudential Authority and the Financial Sector
Conduct Authority. These two regulators represent the two regu-
latory ‘peaks’ in terms of the ‘twin peaks’ model. The twin peaks
model entails the establishment of two primary financial regula-
tors (‘peaks’) – a prudential regulator is regarded as a ‘peak’ and
a market conduct regulator as another ‘peak’. The rationale
behind two distinct regulators is, among other things, based on
the inherent conflict between the business interests of financial
institutions and the interests of consumers. Through a twin peak
model of regulation, the interests of each group are regulated
separately. On the one hand, a prudential regulator is designed
to maintain and enhance the safety, soundness and solvency of
financial institutions, and on the other hand, a market conduct
regulator oversees consumer protection by protecting consum-
ers of financial services and by promoting confidence in the
financial system. The objectives of the twin peak model are to
strengthen consumer protection and market conduct in the
financial services sector and to create a more resilient and stable
financial system (Van Niekerk & Van Heerden above 639).
The FSR Act is a detailed and wide-ranging statutory instru-
ment. It consists of seven parts, divided into seventeen chapters.
These chapters, in turn, contain 305 sections. For a broad
overview of the structure of the FSR Act, including the main
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provisions contained in each chapter, see WG Schulze ‘Financial
Institutions’ 2016 Annual Survey 279 (Schulze 2016) 381-94.
(The present discussion of certain key chapters from the FSR Act
should be read in conjunction with the discussion in Schulze
2016 above.)
In addition to the FSR Act, the Financial Sector Regulations,
2018 have been published and became effective as from 29 March
2018. The regulations relate to, among other things, management
of the transitional process to establish the Financial Sector
Conduct Authority and the Financial Services Tribunal (GN 405
GG 41550 of 29 March 2018). A discussion of these regulations
falls beyond the ambit of the present chapter.
For purposes of the present discussion, only selected aspects
of the FSRAct will be discussed. First, a brief background and an
explanation of the events leading up to the global financial crisis
of 2008 are considered. This is followed by an explanation as to
why the ‘twin peaks’ model of regulation has become the pre-
ferred model of regulation of the financial industry. Thirdly, it is
explained how the twin peaks model, and in particular, the FSR
Act, is structured. Fourthly, particular sections of Chapter 2 of the
FSR Act, which deal with ‘Financial Stability’, are dealt with.
Thereafter, the main provisions of Chapter 3 (which deals with the
‘Prudential Authority’) and Chapter 4 (which deals with the
‘Financial Sector Conduct Authority’) are discussed. This is
followed by a explanation of the co-operation and collaboration
between financial sector regulators and the SARB (which are
provided for in Chapter 5). Finally, the ombud system in terms
of the FSR Act (which is provided for in Chapter 14) and the
Financial Services Tribunal (which is regulated in terms of Chap-
ter 15 of the FSR Act) are scrutinised.
Chapters of the FSR Act that are not discussed (chaps 6–13,
16–17) address the following: Administrative actions; Regulatory
instruments; Licensing; Information gathering, supervisory on-
site inspections and investigations; Enforcement; Significant own-
ers; Financial conglomerates; Administrative penalties; Finances,
levies and fees; and Miscellaneous.
The Financial Sector Regulation Act
Introduction
Financial sector regulation covers a broad scope of legal and
financial principles applicable to the financial services sector.
This includes banks, insurance companies and other financial
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institutions that provide financial services. The financial services
sector plays an essential role in supporting the economy of a
country as it enables economic growth, job creation and building
vital infrastructure and sustainable development. It also allows
people to conclude daily economic transactions, and to save and
insure their wealth in order to meet their future aspirations and
retirement needs. Effective regulation of the financial services
sector is important to maintain confidence in the sector, to
maintain the safety and soundness of financial institutions, to
provide for consumer protection and to assist with enforcing
applicable laws (see Anon ‘Financial Sector Regulation Bill.
Impact study of the twin peaks reform’ available on www.treasury.
gov.za, accessed 1 July 2018 (Anon ‘Impact study’).
The financial crisis of 2008
During 2007 and 2008, a global financial crisis occurred which
originated from the major financial sectors of developed coun-
tries. The financial crisis had a severe impact on financial sectors
globally. The root causes of the financial crisis are: the emer-
gence of macroeconomic imbalances (such as current account
imbalances and unsustainable external indebtedness) and the
inadequate regulation of the financial services sectors (Anon
‘Impact study’ above).
In the United States (US) in particular, a lack of proper financial
services regulation (‘light-touch regulation’) caused an excessive
increase of lending, which in turn caused household debt to rise
to unacceptable levels. The financial crisis peaked in 2008 due to
the collapse of the global US financial services firm Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. The firm collapsed mostly due to its
involvement in a mortgage crisis, excessive risk-taking and
allegations of negligence. The collapse resulted in extreme
financial uncertainty to the extent that financial institutions refrained
from lending to each other. A significant disruption was caused in
the flow of credit to business and consumers. Worldwide, stock
markets collapsed, household wealth was reduced, and lending
was brought to a standstill. Governments were forced to bail out
distressed businesses and buy billions of dollars’ worth of debt to
assist financial institutions (see www.thebalance.com, accessed
20 August 2018).
The impact of the crisis was not felt equally in all countries and
regions as the crisis affected global economies in different ways
and over different periods. The general effect of the financial
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crisis is regarded as the most severe economic disaster since the
Great Depression of 1929. Despite the fact that the financial
services sector in South Africa mostly withstood the impact of the
financial crisis, it led to approximately one million job losses
(Ravinder Rena & Malindi Msomi ‘Global financial crises and its
(sic) impact on the South African economy: A further update’
(2014) 5 Journal of Economics 17ff).
To fulfil South Africa’s commitment to global financial regulatory
reform and to establish a stronger regulatory framework, a
National Treasury policy document titled ‘A safer financial sector
to serve South Africa better’, was released by the Minister of
Finance on 23 February 2011. This policy document introduced a
financial sector reform strategy, particularly the introduction of a
‘twin peaks’ model of regulation for South Africa.
The twin peaks model is regarded as a more effective model of
regulation. One of the reasons for favouring this model is the
countries that use it, specifically the Netherlands and Australia.
These countries, although not totally immune, during the financial
crisis were considered better off. The twin peaks model of
regulation has also been proposed for the European Union (Olivia
Johanna Edéli twin peaks for Europe: State-of-the-Art Financial
Supervisory Consolidation (2015) 226ff).
South Africa’s structure of the twin peaks model comprises the
Prudential Authority, which will operate within the administration
of the South African Reserve Bank (the SARB) as the prudential
regulator to maintain and enhance the soundness of regulated
financial institutions; and the Financial Conduct Authority, which
would be the market conduct regulator responsible for the protec-
tion of consumers of financial services and for the promotion of
confidence in the financial system. The SARB also plays a promi-
nent role in the South African twin peaks model, to the extent that
academic commentators refer to the SARB as an ‘extra’ peak as
the primary guardian of financial stability (Van Niekerk & Van
Heerden above 640 642. For a detailed discussion of the role of
the SARB in ensuring financial stability, see Martha Gertruida van
Niekerk The Role of the Central Bank in Promoting and Maintaining
Financial Stability in South Africa–A comparative analysis (unpub-
lished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria September 2018).
The twin peaks model differs from South Africa’s previous model
of fragmented regulation. Previously, different sectors of the
South African financial markets were regulated by different regula-
tors. In other words, the Republic followed a ‘silo-based’ approach
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to regulation. Banks were regulated by the Banking Supervision
Department of the SARB while non-banking institutions were
regulated by the Financial Services Board (the FSB). Other regula-
tors were regulated by various sectors of the financial markets. A
shift away from the fragmented regulatory model reduces the
possibility of regulatory arbitrage, ie the ability of financial institu-
tions to act beyond the reach of regulators by taking advantage of
loopholes in the system. Moreover, the new model excludes the
possibility of forum shopping where complainants select a forum
which they believe would give them the most favourable or lenient
consideration for their matter. In addition, gaps in the regulatory
system are closed by the twin peaks model (Van Niekerk & Van
Heerden above 641).
In contrast to the ‘silo approach’ or fragmented model, the twin
peaks model establishes two regulators to separate prudential
and market conduct regulation. The twin peaks model is regarded
as more effective in streamlining and simplifying the South
African regulatory structure.
The FSRAct generally applies to financial institutions rendering
‘financial services’ (s 4) and providing ‘financial products’ (s 2) in
the South African ‘financial system’ (s 2). For purposes of the FSR
Act, ‘financial institution’ means a financial product provider; a
financial service provider; a market infrastructure; a holding
company of a financial conglomerate; or a person licensed or
required to be licensed in terms of a financial sector law (Van
Niekerk & Van Heerden above 644).
The overarching aim of the FSR Act and the twin peaks model
is to maintain financial stability in the South African financial
sector. Next, how the FSRAct aims to maintain financial stability is
discussed.
Financial stability
Introduction
Chapter 2 of the FSR Act aims to address and promote
financial stability. ‘Financial stability’ is defined in section 4(1) to
mean that
• financial institutions generally provide financial products and
financial services, and market infrastructures generally per-
form their functions and duties in terms of financial sector
laws, without interruption;
• financial institutions are capable of continuing to provide
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financial products and financial services, and market infrastruc-
tures are capable of continuing to perform their functions and
duties in terms of financial sector laws, without interruption
despite changes in economic circumstances; and
• there is general confidence in the ability of financial institu-
tions to continue to provide financial products and financial
services, and the ability of market infrastructures to continue
to perform their functions and duties in terms of financial
sector laws, without interruption despite changes in economic
circumstances.
For the sake of brevity, certain sections dealing with ‘financial
stability’ have not been included in the discussion. These include
the establishment of a Financial Stability Oversight Committee in
terms of section 20(2) and the regulation thereof; and the Financial
Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) established in terms of section
25 of the FSR Act. As reference is made to the committee, the
primary objectives of the Financial Stability Oversight Committee
should be mentioned. They are to support the SARB when it
performs its functions in relation to financial stability, and to
facilitate co-operation and collaboration between, and co-ordina-
tion of action among the financial sector regulators and the SARB
in respect of matters relating to financial stability (s 20).
The powers and functions of the SARB (ss 11–13) and the roles
of financial sector regulators and other organs of state in maintain-
ing financial stability (ss 26–28) are discussed in more detail
below.
Powers and functions of the SARB
In terms of section 11 of the FSR Act, the SARB takes
responsibility for protecting and enhancing financial stability. In
the event that a systemic event occurs or becomes imminent, the
SARB must restore or maintain financial stability. A ‘systemic
event’ is defined in section 1(1) as an event or circumstance,
including one that occurs or arises outside the Republic, that may
reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on
the financial system or on economic activity in the Republic. This
includes an event or circumstance that leads to a loss of
confidence that operators of, or participants in, payment sys-
tems, settlement systems or financial markets, or financial institu-
tions, are able to continue to provide financial products or
financial services.
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In terms of Schedule 4 to the FSR Act, an amendment has also
been effected to section 3 of the South African Reserve Bank Act
90 of 1989, which now reflects an addition to its objective of
protecting and maintaining financial stability as envisaged in the
Reserve Bank Act.
As a point of departure, the SARB is required in terms of
section 12 to monitor and keep under review the strengths and
weaknesses of the financial system, and any risks to financial
stability and the nature and extent of such risks. Risks of systemic
events occurring, and any other risks anticipated in matters
raised by members of the Financial Stability Oversight Commit-
tee, or risks reported to the SARB by a financial sector regulator,
must also be monitored and be kept under review. Further,
sections 17 and 18 require the SARB
• to take steps to mitigate risks to financial stability, including
advising the financial sector regulators and any other organ of
state, of the steps to be taken to mitigate those risks; and
• on a regular basis to assess the observance of principles
in the Republic developed by international standard-setting
bodies for market infrastructures and report its findings to the
financial sector regulators and the Minister of Finance. Regard
must be had to the circumstances and the context within the
Republic.
Financial stability review
Section 13 of the FSR Act requires that the SARB must, at least
every six months, assess the stability of the financial system. This
assessment is known as a ‘financial stability review’. The financial
stability review involves the following:
• the SARB’s assessment of financial stability in the period
under review;
• its identification and assessment of the risks to financial
stability in at least the next twelve months;
• an overview of steps taken by it and by the financial sector
regulators to identify and manage risks, weaknesses or
disruptions in the financial system during the period under
review and that are envisaged to be taken during at least the
next twelve months; and
• an overview of recommendations made by it and the Financial
Stability Oversight Committee during the period under review
and progress made in implementing those recommendations
(s 13(2)(a)–(d)).
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A financial stability review may not include information that may
materially increase the possibility of a systemic event occurring if
published. A copy of each review must be submitted to the
Minister of Finance and the Financial Stability Oversight Commit-
tee for information and comment. After taking any comments into
account, the SARB must publish the review (s 13(4)). For further
information regarding the function of the SARB in relation to
systemic events, see Van Niekerk & Van Heerden above 649.
Section 14(1) provides that the Governor of the SARB, after
consultation with the Minister, may declare a specified event or
circumstance, or a combination of events or circumstances, to be
a systemic event.
Section 15 empowers the SARB to prevent, manage or mitigate
a systemic event. One of the SARB’s functions in case of a systemic
event is to keep the Minister informed of the event (s 16).
Roles of financial sector regulators and other organs of state in
maintaining financial stability
The financial sector regulators are required to co-operate and
collaborate with the SARB and with each other in order to
maintain, protect and enhance financial stability. Upon request
by the SARB or the Financial Stability Oversight Committee, they
may be required to provide assistance and information to the
SARB and the Financial Stability Oversight Committee to maintain
or restore financial stability. The financial sector regulators must
also promptly report to the SARB any matter of which the financial
sector regulator becomes aware that poses or may pose a risk to
financial stability. Financial regulators must also gather informa-
tion from, or about, financial institutions concerning financial
stability. Co-operation and collaboration between the SARB and
the financial sector regulators are provided for in sections 76–86
of the FSR Act, which are discussed below.
The Prudential Authority
Establishment, objectives and functions of the Prudential Authority
The establishment, objectives and functions of the Prudential
Authority are addressed in Chapter 3 of the FSR Act (ss 32–34).
The Prudential Authority is established as a juristic person
operating within the administration of the SARB (s 32(2)). The
objective of the Prudential Authority is to –
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• promote and enhance the safety and soundness of financial
institutions that provide financial products and securities
services;
• promote and enhance the safety and soundness of market
infrastructures;
• protect financial customers against the risk that those finan-
cial institutions may fail to meet their obligations; and
• assist in maintaining financial stability (s 33(a)–(d)).
In order to achieve its objective, the Prudential Authority must
perform the following functions:
• regulate and supervise, in accordance with the financial
sector laws, financial institutions that provide financial prod-
ucts or securities services and market infrastructures;
• cooperate with and assist the SARB, the Financial Stability
Oversight Committee, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority,
the National Credit Regulator and the Financial Intelligence
Centre, as required;
• cooperate with the Council for Medical Schemes in the
handling of matters of mutual interest;
• support sustainable competition in the provision of financial
products and financial services, including through co-operat-
ing and collaborating with the Competition Commission;
• support financial inclusion;
• regularly review the perimeter and scope of financial sector
regulation;
• take steps to mitigate risks identified to the achievement of its
objective or the effective performance of its functions; and
• conduct and publish research relevant to its objective
(s 34(1)(a)–(g)).
Section 34(2) requires the Prudential Authority to perform any
other function conferred on it in terms of any other provision of the
FSR Act or other legislation. The Prudential Authority may do
anything else reasonably necessary to achieve its objective,
which includes co-operating with its counterparts in other juris-
dictions and participating in relevant international regulatory,
supervisory, financial stability and standard-setting bodies
(s 34(3)). Finally, the Prudential Authority must perform its func-
tions without fear, favour or prejudice (s 34(5)). For a discussion
of the implications of housing the prudential regulator within
the SARB, see Andrew J Godwin & Andrew D Schmulow ‘The
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financial sector regulation bill in South Africa, second draft:
lessons from Australia (2015) 132 SALJ 756.
Legal nature of and departments of the Prudential Authority
The Prudential Authority is a juristic person operating within the
administration of the SARB. The Prudential Authority consists of
the following four departments: the Financial Conglomerate Super-
vision Department; the Banking, Insurance and Financial Market
Infrastructure Supervision Department; the Risk Support Depart-
ment; and the Policy, Statistics and Industry Support Department.
The responsibilities of these four departments are briefly dis-
cussed below (for further information also see www.resbank.
co.za).
(a) Banking, Insurance, Market Infrastructure and Co-operative
Financial Institutions Supervision
The Banking, Insurance, Market Infrastructure Supervision and
Cooperative Financial Institutions Department is responsible for
the prudential supervision of stand-alone banks (including co-
operative and mutual banks), insurance companies, financial
market infrastructures and co-operative financial institutions.
(b) Financial Conglomerate Supervision
The Financial Conglomerates Supervision Department is con-
cerned with the consolidated prudential supervision of those
financial institutions that are designated as financial conglom-
erates. This department is also responsible for anti-money laun-
dering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
regulation and supervision.
(c) Risk Support
The Risk Support Department is responsible for providing
regulatory and supervisory support on credit risk, operational risk
and market risk. It also provides quantitative analysis, actuarial
analysis, and financial institution statistics to be used by the
Prudential Authority.
(d) Policy, Statistics and Industry Support
The Policy, Statistics and Industry Support Department is
charged with formulating policy, developing supervisory frame-
works, providing operational and regulatory support, providing
industry analyses, the enforcement and resolution of prudentially
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regulated financial institutions, and industry technical support on
capital and accounting.
Governance of the Prudential Authority
The governance of the Prudential Authority is addressed in
sections 35 to 49 of the FSR Act. The overall governance
objective of the Prudential Authority is that it must manage its
affairs in an efficient and effective way. It is also, when doing so,
required to establish and implement appropriate and effective
governance systems and processes and to take into account,
among other things, internationally accepted standards and
practices (s 35).
Section 36 provides for the appointment of a Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the Prudential Authority. The CEO is responsible
for the day-to-day management and administration of the Pruden-
tial Authority. He or she must also perform the functions of the
Prudential Authority, which include exercising the powers and
carrying out the duties associated with the functions of the
Prudential Authority (s 37). The CEO is appointed for a maximum
term of five years (s 38). Section 39 provides in detail for the
circumstances under which the CEO may be removed from
office.
Section 41(1) establishes a Prudential Committee for the
Prudential Authority. The committee consists of the Governor of
the SARB, the CEO of the Prudential Authority and other Deputy
Governors of the SARB (s 41(2)).
The role of the Prudential Committee is generally to oversee the
management and administration of the Prudential Authority in
order to ensure that it is efficient and effective (s 42(a)). The
Prudential Committee is also required to act for the Prudential
Authority in the following matters:
• authorising the CEO of the Prudential Authority to sign, on
behalf of the Prudential Authority, a required memorandum of
understanding and any amendment to such a memorandum;
• delegating powers of the Prudential Authority to the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority in terms of a memorandum of
understanding;
• adopting the regulatory strategy of the Prudential Authority,
and any amendment to the strategy;
• making prudential standards or joint standards, and any
amendments to those standards;
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• adopting the administrative action procedures of the Pruden-
tial Authority, and any amendment to those procedures;
• appointing members of subcommittees of the Prudential
Authority required or permitted by the Act or a specific
financial sector law, and giving directions regarding the
conduct of the work of any subcommittee;
• making regulatory instruments under financial sector laws for
which it is the responsible authority;
• making determinations of fees in terms of a financial sector
law; and
• any other matter assigned in terms of a financial sector law to
the Prudential Committee (section 42(b)(i)-(viii)).
The Prudential Committee must adopt a regulatory strategy for
the Prudential Authority to give general guidance to the Prudential
Authority on how to achieve its objective and perform its regula-
tory and supervisory functions (s 42(b)(iii).
Section 47 provides in detail what the aim and guiding prin-
ciples of the regulatory strategy must entail. In terms of section
47(2), a regulatory strategy must describe the regulatory and
supervisory functions for the Prudential Authority for the next
three years, and the intended key outcomes of the strategy.
Further, a regulatory strategy must set guiding principles for the
Prudential Authority on
• the manner in which it should perform its regulatory and
supervisory functions;
• the matters to which it should have regard in performing those
functions;
• its approach to administrative actions; and
• how it should give effect to the requirements applicable to it
with respect to transparency, openness to consultation, and
accountability (s 47(2)(b)(i)–(iv)).
A regulatory strategy must be consistent with relevant interna-
tional principles, and reviewed annually by the Prudential Com-
mittee (s 47(3)). The Prudential Committee must seek, to the
extent that is practicable and appropriate, to minimise inconsis-
tencies between the Prudential Authority’s regulatory strategy
and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority’s regulatory strategy
(s 47(6)).
Section 48 allows the Prudential Committee to delegate its
powers. Section 49 requires members of the Prudential Commit-
tee, at a prescribed forum and in a prescribed manner, to
disclose any interest of that member or a relative.
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Part 3 of Chapter 3 contains a number of provisions dealing
with administrative and logistical matters relevant to the Pruden-
tial Authority, including its staffing and resources (s 50); resources
which are provided by the SARB (s 51); the duties of staff
members (s 52); the financial management duties of the CEO
(s 53); the duty on the CEO to provide information to the
Prudential Committee (s 54); and annual reports and financial
accounts (s 55).
Financial Sector Conduct Authority
Introduction
Countries across the globe, including the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands and Australia, have taken different approaches to
the twin peaks model, all aimed at strengthening prudential and
market conduct oversight and stronger consumer protection (Van
Niekerk & Van Heerden above 640). (For a crisp discussion of the
twin peaks model in the Netherlands, see Marcel CA van den
Nieuwenhuijzen Financial Law in the Netherlands (2010) 23–5.
For an explanation of the United Kingdom’s response to the credit
crisis, see Anu Arora Banking Law (2014) 123ff. And finally, for an
explanation of the financial regulatory model in Poland, see
Zdzislaw Brodecki (ed) Polish Business Law 2003) 258ff.)
The two-tier approach of separating prudential and market
conduct regulation is becoming more prevalent with jurisdictions
customising the two-tier approach to cater for their particular
economic needs and development goals.
Twin peaks will allow for a more dedicated focus on market
conduct issues informed by the Treating Customer Fairly (TCF)
framework. Under the previous legislative framework, banks
were, in the main, not regulated for market conduct. In the
pre-twin peaks era, there was regulatory oversight over interme-
diary services and advice provided in relation to banking prod-
ucts, but other than in relation to credit provision, none over the
product or product provider. Under twin peaks, all aspects of
banking products and services will be regulated by the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority (Van Niekerk & Van Heerden above
639).
The regulator and supervisor of financial products is the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority.
Establishment, objectives and functions of the Financial Sector Conduct
Authority
The establishment, objectives and functions of the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority are addressed in Chapter 4 (ss 56–58)
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of the Act. The Financial Sector Conduct Authority is established
in terms of section 56(1) of the FSR Act as a juristic person. It is
considered a national public entity for the purposes of the Public
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (the PFM Act).
The objective of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority is to
enhance and support the efficiency and integrity of the financial
system, and to protect financial customers. The objective of
protecting financial customers is to be achieved, firstly, by
promoting fair treatment of financial customers by financial
institutions. Secondly, the objective is to be achieved by provid-
ing financial education programs for current and prospective
financial customers in order to promote financial literacy. Assis-
tance must be provided to support these customers to make
sound financial decisions and to maintain financial stability (s 57).
To achieve its objective, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority
must perform the following functions:
• regulate and supervise, in accordance with the financial
sector laws, the conduct of financial institutions;
• cooperate with, and assist, the SARB, the Financial Stability
Oversight Committee, the Prudential Authority, the National
Credit Regulator, and the Financial Intelligence Centre, as
required in terms of the FSR Act;
• cooperate with the Council for Medical Schemes in the
handling of matters of mutual interest;
• promote, to the extent consistent with achieving the objective
of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, sustainable compe-
tition in the provision of financial products and financial
services, including through co-operating and collaborating
with the Competition Commission;
• promote financial inclusion;
• regularly review the perimeter and scope of financial sector
regulation, and take steps to mitigate risks identified to the
achievement of its objective or the effective performance of its
functions;
• administer the collection of levies and the distribution of
amounts received in respect of levies;
• conduct and publish research relevant to its objective;
• monitor the extent to which the financial system is delivering
fair outcomes for financial customers, with a focus on the
fairness and appropriateness of financial products and finan-
cial services and the extent to which they meet the needs and
reasonable expectations of financial customers; and
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• formulate and implement strategies and programs for finan-
cial education for the general public (s 58(1)(a)–(j)).
Further, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority may not regu-
late and supervise credit agreements without consent from the
National Credit Regulator. However, it may regulate and super-
vise financial services provided in relation to a credit agreement
(s 58(2)). The Financial Sector Conduct Authority must also
perform any other function conferred on it in terms of any other
provision of the FSR Act or other legislation (s 58(3)). The
Financial Sector Conduct Authority may do anything else reason-
ably necessary to achieve its objective, including
• cooperating with its counterparts in other jurisdictions; and
• participating in relevant international regulatory, supervisory,
financial stability and standard-setting bodies (s 58(4)).
When performing its functions, the Financial Sector Conduct
Authority must
• take into account the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the NCA)
and regulatory requirements for financial institutions that are
authorised and regulated under the NCA;
• take into account the need for a primarily pre-emptive,
outcomes-focused and risk-based approach, and prioritise
the use of its resources in accordance with the significance of
risks to the achievement of its objective; and
• to the extent that it is practicable, have regard to international
regulatory and supervisory standards set by relevant interna-
tional regulatory, supervisory, financial stability and standard-
setting bodies and circumstances prevalent in the Republic
(s 58(5)(a)–(c)).
Finally, section 58(6) provides that the Financial Sector Con-
duct Authority must perform its functions without fear, favour or
prejudice.
Governance of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority
Chapter 4, Part 2 of the FSR Act addresses the governance of
the Prudential Authority from sections 59 to 72 of the Act. The
Financial Sector Conduct Authority must manage its affairs in an
efficient and effective way. It must also in performing these
functions establish and implement appropriate and effective
governance systems and processes and take into account,
among other things, internationally accepted standards and
practices (s 59).
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ACommissioner of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority must
be appointed together with Deputy Commissioners. The Commis-
sioner is responsible for the day-to-day management and admin-
istration of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (s 62(1)). He or
she is to perform the functions of the Financial Sector Conduct
Authority, including exercising the powers and carrying out the
duties associated with the functions. The Commissioner may
assign specific responsibilities to a Deputy Commissioner (s 61).
The FSR Act establishes an Executive Committee for the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority. The Executive Committee
consists of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioners.
The Commissioner is the chairperson of the Executive Commit-
tee. The Executive Committee is required to generally oversee
the management and administration of the Financial Sector
Conduct Authority to ensure that it is efficient and effective
(s 60(3)(a)). Further, the Committee must act for the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority in the following matters:
• authorising the Commissioner to sign, on behalf of the Finan-
cial Sector Conduct Authority, a required memorandum of
understanding and any amendments to such a memorandum;
• delegating powers of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority
to the Prudential Authority in terms of a memorandum of
understanding;
• making conduct standards or joint standards, and any amend-
ments to those standards;
• adopting the regulatory strategy of the Financial Sector Con-
duct Authority, and any amendments to the strategy;
• Adopting the administrative action procedures of the Finan-
cial Sector Conduct Authority, and any amendments to those
procedures;
• appointing members of subcommittees of the Financial Sector
Conduct Authority required or permitted by a law, and giving
directions regarding the conduct of the work of any subcom-
mittee;
• Making determinations of fees in terms of a financial sector
law;
• making regulatory instruments in terms of specific financial
sector laws for which it is the responsible authority; and
• any other matter assigned in terms of a financial sector law to
the Executive Committee (s 60(3)(b)(i)–(ix)).
The Executive Committee must adopt a regulatory strategy for
the Financial Sector Conduct Authority. The regulatory strategy
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must provide general guidance in the achievement of the Finan-
cial Sector Conduct Authority’s objective and the performance of
its regulatory and supervisory functions (s 60(3)(b)(iii)). A regula-
tory strategy must state the regulatory and supervisory priorities
for the Financial Sector Conduct Authority for the next three years
and the intended key outcomes of the strategy (s 70). Further, a
regulatory strategy must set guiding principles for the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority on
• the manner in which it should perform its regulatory and
supervisory functions;
• the matters which it should have regard to in performing those
functions;
• its approach to administrative actions; and
• the manner in which it should give effect to the requirements
applicable to it with respect to transparency, openness to
consultation and accountability (s 70(2)(b)(i)-(iv)).
The regulatory strategy must also be aimed at consistency with
relevant international principles and be reviewed annually by the
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee to the extent that
it is practicable and appropriate must seek to minimise inconsis-
tencies between the Financial Sector Conduct Authority’s regula-
tory strategy and the Prudential Authority’s regulatory strategy
(s 70(7)).
Like the Prudential Authority, the Executive Committee of the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority is allowed to delegate its
powers under certain prescribed circumstances and in accor-
dance with certain procedures (s 71). There also rests a duty of
disclosure of interest on the members of the Executive Committee
of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (s 72).
In Part 3 of Chapter 4, the appointment of staff and resources
(s 73); the duties of staff members (s 74); and a duty of the
Commissioner to provide information (s 75), are explained.
Co-operation and collaboration between financial sector regulators and the
SARB
The twin peaks structure of financial sector regulation requires
close coordination between the Prudential Authority and the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority. This is given effect to through
provisions in the FSR Act that introduce various formal coordinat-
ing mechanisms, such as a requirement to enter into memoranda
of understanding. There is also a general principle of cooperation
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and coordination entrenched in the FSR Act, which anticipates a
culture of ongoing collaboration (Van Niekerk & Van Heerden
above 650–51).
The cooperation and collaboration between the financial sector
regulators and the SARB is contained in sections 76 to 86 of the
FSR Act. For purposes of these sections, reference to financial
sector regulators includes the Prudential Authority, the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority, the National Credit Regulator and the
Financial Intelligence Centre. (For an overview of the interaction
between consumer credit and a ‘twin peaks’ model of regulation,
see Gail Pearson ‘Making prudence: Consumer credit and twin
peaks, a comparison of Australia and South Africa’ (2016) 27
JBFLP 223.)
The financial sector regulators and the SARB must cooperate
and collaborate when performing their functions in terms of
financial sector laws, the NCA and the Financial Intelligence
Centre Act 38 of 2001 (the FICA) (s 76(1)). To facilitate coopera-
tion and collaboration, the financial sector regulators and the
SARB are required to
• generally assist and support each other in pursuing their
objectives in terms of financial sector laws, the NCA and the
FICA (s 76(1)(a));
• inform each other about, and share information about, matters
of common interest (s 76(1)(b));
• strive to adopt consistent regulatory strategies, including
addressing regulatory and supervisory challenges (s 76(1)(c));
• coordinate, to the extent appropriate, actions in terms of
financial sector laws, the NCA and the FICA, including in
relation to –
– standards and other regulatory instruments, including
similar instruments provided for in terms of the NCA and
the FICA;
– licensing;
– supervisory on-site inspections and investigations;
– actions to enforce financial sector laws, the NCA and the
FICA;
– information sharing;
– recovery and resolution; and
– reporting by financial institutions, including statutory report-
ing and data collection measures (s 76(1)(d)(i)-(vii));
• minimise the duplication of effort and expense, including by
establishing and using, where appropriate, common or shared
databases and other facilities (s 76(1)(e));
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• agree on attendance at relevant international forums
(s 76(1)(f));
• develop, to the extent that is appropriate, consistent policy
positions, including for the purpose of presentation and
negotiation at relevant South African and international forums
(s 76(1)(g)).
The financial sector regulators and the SARB, at least annually
as part of their annual reports or on request, must report to the
Minister of Finance, the Cabinet member responsible for adminis-
tering the NCA, and the National Assembly, on measures taken to
co-operate and collaborate with each other (s 76(2)). They must
also enter into one or more memoranda of understanding to give
effect to the above obligations (s 77).
Financial Services Tribunal
The implementation of the FSR Act set the ball rolling for the
Financial Services Tribunal (the Tribunal), which has been estab-
lished to reconsider decisions of, or omissions to take such
decisions by, a financial sector regulator, authorised financial
services provider, statutory ombud, or market infrastructure as
outlined in section 218 of the FSR Act.
The Tribunal is an adjudication forum similar to the old FSB
Appeal Board, except that it has a wider mandate than that of the
old FSB Appeal Board.
The Tribunal is an independent body. Its members are appointed
by the Minister of Finance. The Tribunal may consist of as many
members as the Minister may determine. However, at least two of
the members must be retired judges and two other members
must be experienced or knowledgeable in respect of financial
products, services and instruments as well as market infrastruc-
tures or the financial system.
Retired Justices Yvonne Mokgoro and Louis Harms respec-
tively have been appointed by the Minister as the Chairperson
and Deputy Chairperson of the Tribunal together with sixteen
additional Tribunal members. On 21 May 2018, the Chairperson
of the Tribunal issued rules in accordance with section 227 of the
FSR Act, and the Ministerial regulations were published on
29 March 2018. They are published on the FSCA website
(www.fsca.co.za).
Ombud of the Financial Services
Chapter 14 of the FSR Act has introduced a new ombud
structure. An Ombud Council is established as a national public
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entity for the purposes of the PFM Act. The Chairperson of the
Ombud Council is the accounting authority of the Ombud Council
in terms of the PFM Act (s 175 of the FSR Act). The Ombud
Council must oversee the recognition, cooperation and promo-
tion of public awareness of ombuds and ombud schemes (s 176
of the FSR Act contains the objectives of the Ombud Council).
The Ombud Council must also protect the independence and
impartiality of ombuds and resolve overlaps of jurisdictional
coverage of different ombud schemes, while also monitoring their
performance and their compliance with the requirements of the
FSR Act. This is expected to result into a more harmonised and
consistent approach to adjudicating customer complaints by
ombuds. A Chief Ombud must be appointed by the Minister to
oversee the day-to-day management and administration of the
Ombud Council.
The objective of the Ombud Council is to assist in ensuring
that financial customers have access to, and are able to use,
affordable, effective, independent and fair alternate dispute
resolution processes for complaints about financial institutions in
relation to financial products and services, and services provided
by market infrastructures. The Ombud Council must establish
and operate one or more centres, which may incorporate a call
centre, to facilitate financial customers’ access to appropriate
ombuds. The purpose of the centre is to provide a place, staff
and facilities to assist financial customers to formulate complaints
and to identify for them the appropriate ombud to deal with their
complaints.
Absent a recognised industry ombud scheme or statutory
ombud scheme that makes provision for the resolution of com-
plaints about financial products and services of a particular kind,
the Ombud Council may, after consulting with the relevant
Ombud schemes, designate an ombud scheme, or two or more
ombud schemes, to deal with and resolve the complaints. The
designation of an ombud scheme may be made by the Ombud
Council on its own initiative or on application by a scheme or a
financial institution that provides or proposes to provide financial
products or services of the particular kind. Currently, the banking
sector, short-term and long-term insurance, retirement funds and
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) all have their
own Ombuds. (For a broad overview of the functions of financial
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ombuds, see Daleen Millard ‘Bespoke justice? On financial
ombudsmen, rules and principles’ 2011 De Jure 232ff.)
Conclusion
The twin peak model of financial regulation is expected to be a
more effective model of financial regulation than South Africa’s
previous regulation framework. Ultimately, the goal is to achieve a
safer financial sector that promotes financial stability and increases
the ability to manage and mitigate the effects of a financial crisis.
It is anticipated that the Financial Sector Regulation Act will assist
in obtaining this goal.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017
The Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017
(the Amendment Act) has been promulgated. The Amendment
Act serves to amend the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of
2001 (the FIC Act). (For a detailed discussion of the FIC Act, see
Louis de Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror
Financing Law 2015 ed (2014) 15ff.) The aim of the Amendment
Act is to enhance South Africa’s ability to combat financial crimes
by proposing measures to address threats to the stability of South
Africa’s financial system posed by money laundering and terror-
ism financing (GN 396 GG 40821 of 2 May 2017. For a discussion
of the provisions of the Amendment Act, see Charl Hugo &
Wynand Spruyt ‘Money laundering, terrorist financing and finan-
cial sanctions: South Africa’s response by means of the Financial
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017’ 2018 (2) TSAR
227ff).
The Amendment Act and regulations promulgated in terms of
the FIC Act are the most authoritative sources that need to be
considered by accountable institutions in implementing their
obligations under the Amendment Act (s 77 of the FIC Act as
amended by s 56 of the Amendment Act). These are supple-
mented by authoritative guidance notes which are issued by the
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). Although the guidance notes
do not constitute binding law, non-compliance with them may
lead to administrative sanctions (Hugo & Spruyt above 253. See
Hugo & Spruyt above passim for a discussion of the most
important of these guidance notes.)
Any reference below to the ‘principal Act’ refers to the FIC Act.
Objects of the Amendment Act
The primary objective of the Amendment Act is to establish a
stronger anti-money laundering (AML) and combating of terrorist
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financing (CTF) regulatory framework. This will be achieved by
enhancing the customer due diligence requirements; providing
for the adoption of a risk-based approach in the identification and
assessment of AML and CTF risks; providing for the implementa-
tion of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to
the freezing of assets; dissolving the Counter-Money Laundering
Advisory Council (the CMLAC); extending the objectives and
functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre (the FIC) in relation
to the sharing of information as well as the functions of the FIC in
respect of suspicious transactions; and, finally, by enhancing
certain administrative and enforcement mechanisms.
The Amendment Act is an attempt to align South Africa’s
anti-money laundering legislation with international standards
(Hugo & Spruyt above 227).
Certain of the provisions of the Amendment Act came into
operation on 13 June 2017, others on 2 October 2017, while
others will come into operation on a date yet to be determined,
but before the end of 2018 (see www.fic.gov.za/Documents/,
accessed on 14 March 2018; and Hugo & Spruyt above 228 n10).
The Amendment Act addresses the following three main mat-
ters: first, it enhances the customer due diligence requirements
for accountable institutions. Customer due diligence refers to the
knowledge that an accountable institution has about its customer
and the accountable institution’s understanding of the business
that the customer is conducting with it. The Amendment Act
broadens and enhances the elements of customer due diligence
requirements, namely the determination of the customer’s iden-
tity, the duty to keep records, identifying the beneficial owner, and
understanding the purpose and the intended nature of the
business relationship. The Amendment Act introduces two new
concepts under customer due diligence requirements: the ongo-
ing due diligence of the customer’s transaction records and the
enhanced measures for persons entrusted with prominent public
or private sector functions, whenever accountable institutions
establish business relationships with customers (see Hugo &
Spruyt above 235–36).
Secondly, it provides for the adoption of a risk-based approach
to customer due diligence. The risk-based approach is the
antithesis of a rules-based approach (see Guidance Note 7 on
the Implementation of Various Aspects of the Financial Intelli-
gence Centre Act 38 of 2001 available on https://www.fic.gov.za/
Compliance/Pages/Guidance-Notes.aspc, accessed 3 August
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2018. See too Hugo & Spruyt above 229. Provision is made in the
Amendment Act for the application of a risk-based approach to
customer due diligence, which entails that an accountable institu-
tion should identify, assess, and understand its AML and CTF
risks. The effective implementation and application of the risk-
based approach is largely dependent on an accountable institu-
tion’s AML and CTF Risk Management and Compliance
Programme. The Amendment Act places a responsibility on
accountable institutions to develop, document, maintain and
implement AML and CTF Risk Management and Compliance
Programmes. The responsibility for complying with the FIC Act
and the Risk Management and Compliance Programme is placed
on the board of directors and the senior management of account-
able institutions (Hugo & Spruyt above 235ff).
Thirdly, it provides in sections 26A to 26C of the Amendment
Act for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council
resolutions relating to the freezing of assets. The Amendment Act
empowers the FIC to administer the measures adopted by the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in its Resolutions, which
require accountable institutions to freeze property and transac-
tions pursuant to financial sanctions imposed in the UNSC
Resolutions. Mechanisms for the implementation of the UNSC
Resolutions include the publication in the Government Gazette,
by the Minister of Finance, of a notice of the adoption of the UNSC
Resolution, and the publication of a notice by the executive head
of the FIC of persons who are subject to the sanction measures
(the sanctions list). These notices may be revoked if they are no
longer considered necessary to give effect to the applicable
UNSC Resolutions (Hugo & Spruyt above 235–36 249–51).
The acquisition, collection or use of the property of persons or
an entity whose name/s appear in the sanctions list will be
prohibited. It is also impermissible to provide financial services
and products to those persons or entities. Access to financial
services and products by persons identified in the sanctions list
will only be for ordinary and necessary expenses, such as food,
rent or mortgage and medical treatment. For compliance pur-
poses an obligation is placed on an accountable institution to
report to the FIC the property in its possession or under its
control, which is owned or controlled by or on behalf of a person
or an entity identified in the sanctions list (s 26C).
Fourthly, theAmendmentAct dissolves the CMLAC. TheAmend-
ment Act repeals Chapter 2 of the FIC Act, which establishes the
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CMLAC. It is envisaged that collaboration will be facilitated at the
policy level between the public sector participants in the coun-
try’s AML and CTF framework with the structures that will be
implemented to direct the application of risk assessments and
the management of identified AML and CTF risks (Hugo & Spruyt
above 230–31. For a discussion of the structure and aim of the
CMLAC, cf De Koker above 89ff).
The decision to dissolve the CMLAC was informed by the fact
that a number of platforms exist within the country to discuss
matters of concern and of mutual interest. This obviates the need
for consultations by a platform such as the CMLAC. Consequen-
tial amendments have also been effected to remove reference to
the CMLAC in other provisions of the FIC Act (Hugo & Spruyt
above 230–31 n21).
Fifthly, it lists the objectives and functions of the FIC. The
Amendment Act extends the ability of the Centre to share
information held by it. In addition, the Amendment Act confirms
explicitly that the functions of the FIC include the analysis of
suspicious transactions based on information in its possession or
information received other than by means of reports made to the
FIC. The Amendment Act also mandates the FIC to provide
information and guidance to accountable institutions, which will
assist the FIC to meet the requirements to freeze property and
transactions pursuant to the sanctions list. In addition, the
Amendment Act extends the ability of the FIC to share information
held by it to support other government entities more effectively in
carrying out their mandates (see Hugo & Spruyt above
227 230 251–52).
Sixthly, the Amendment Act enhances and strengthens the
AML and CTF regulatory framework, by effecting amendments to
place an obligation on accountable institutions to ensure that
their employees are trained to comply with the FIC Act, as well as
their respective Risk Management and Compliance Programmes.
The FIC is empowered to issue directives, after consultation with
the relevant supervisory body, in instances of general application
of the Act, or in specific instances set out in the Amendment Act
(see Hugo & Spruyt above 248–49).
The Amendment Act ensures that proper safeguards are put in
place in respect of the information in the possession of the FIC, in
compliance with the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of
2013. It is important to note that the Amendment Act also gives
effect to the Constitutional Court’s decision in the matter of Estate
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Agency Affairs Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd & others 2014
(3) SA 106 (CC), 2014 (4) BCLR 373. Section 45B of the FIC Act
was declared by the Constitutional Court to be unconstitutional,
as it allows for the inspector to conduct inspections, for the
purpose of determining compliance with the FIC Act, without a
warrant in certain instances. (For a discussion of the Estate
Agency case, see Jason Brickhill & Michael Bishop ‘Constitu-
tional Law’ 2014 Annual Survey 127 156–8.) The Amendment Act
amends section 45B of the FIC Act, to provide for a warrant
requirement, and to state in which circumstances a warrant
would not be required.
Seventhly, theAmendment Act enhances certain administrative
and enforcement mechanisms in the FIC Act. The aim of these
enhancements is to encourage compliance with the Act, and to
assist in combating money laundering and terrorism financing.
The Amendment Act provides for financial penalties paid in
respect of financial sanctions to be paid into the National
Revenue Fund, instead of into the Criminal Assets Recovery
Account as before (ss 35–50 of the Amendment Act).
The quorum of the adjudication panel has been reduced for
practical reasons, and the Appeal Board will be empowered to
condone delays, on good cause shown, in the lodging of
appeals. Certain criminal sanctions in the offence provisions will
be replaced, by making non-compliance with certain sections of
the Act subject to administrative sanctions. These changes in
sanctions are only in respect of an accountable institution’s
obligations regarding customer due diligence and record-
keeping measures. Certain penalty fines have been increased by
theAmendment Act (see ss 45D–E of the FICAct, as amended by
ss 33 and 34 of the Amendment Act).
Section 1: Definitions
Section 1 contains a number of definitions. A definition of
‘administrative sanction’ provided for in section 45C, and referred
to in a number of new or amended provisions, has now been
inserted in section 1 of the principal Act.
The definition of ‘authorised officer’ has been amended to
expand the scope of the persons who may request information
from the FIC.
A definition of ‘beneficial owner’ was inserted in the FIC Act, to
define a beneficial owner, in respect of a legal person, to mean
the natural person who, independently or together with another
person, owns or controls the legal person directly or indirectly.
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New definitions for ‘client’ and ‘prospective client’ have also
been inserted.
Definitions have been inserted into the Amendment Act to
describe ‘domestic prominent influential person’, ‘executive officer’
and ‘foreign prominent public official’.
A definition of ‘legal person’ has been inserted. The definition
covers any person, other than a natural person, that establishes a
business relationship or enters into a single transaction with an
accountable institution, and includes a person incorporated as a
company, close corporation, foreign company or any other form
of corporate arrangement or association, but excludes a trust,
partnership or sole proprietor.
The definition of ‘non-compliance’ has been amended, to make
a distinction between what constitutes non-compliance that
attracts an administrative sanction and non-compliance that is
subject to a criminal sanction.
A definition of ‘Risk Management and Compliance Programme’
has been inserted in the FIC Act. More details regarding this
change are provided in section 25, which amends s 42 of the FIC
Act.
A definition of ‘trust’ has been inserted in the FIC Act. The
definition is the same as the definition used in the Trust Property
Control Act 57 of 1988, except that trusts established by virtue of
a testamentary writing; by virtue of a court order; for persons
under curatorship; or by the trustees of a retirement fund in
respect of benefits payable to the beneficiaries of that retirement
fund, are excluded.
Definitions of ‘Independent Police Investigative Directorate’,
‘Intelligence Division of the National Defence Force’, ‘investiga-
tive division in an organ of state’, ‘Public Protector’ and ‘Special
Investigating Unit’ have been inserted to make it clearer with
whom the FIC may share information held by it.
Section 2: Objectives of the Amendment Act
The objectives of the FIC, provided for in section 3 of the
principal Act, have been extended to enable the FIC to share
information held by it with other authorities in order to help
other government entities to carry out their mandates more
effectively.
As a member state of the United Nations, South Africa must
implement targeted financial sanction measures to comply with
the UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
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United Nations. These resolutions often, in conjunction with other
forms of sanctions, such as arms embargoes and travel bans,
require countries, without delay, to freeze the funds or other
assets of, and to ensure that no funds or other assets are made
available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, any person
or entity designated by the UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter.
The FIC Act is best placed to provide the mechanism for the
implementation of financial sanctions pursuant to the UNSC
Resolutions, taking into account the current obligations placed on
accountable institutions under the FIC Act. Section 2 of the
Amendment Act extends the objectives of the FIC to include
administering measures requiring accountable institutions to
freeze property and transactions pursuant to financial sanctions
that may arise from UNSC Resolutions.
Section 3: Functions
The functions of the FIC, dealt with by section 4 of the principal
Act, are extended to allow explicitly for it to initiate an analysis
based on information in its possession or on information it has
received. This makes it clear that the FIC can conduct an analysis
which is not predicated on the receipt of a suspicious transaction
report.
The functions of the FIC have been extended in order to enable
the FIC to share information held by it with other authorities to
help other government entities to carry out their mandates more
effectively.
In addition, section 4 of the principal Act makes provision for
the FIC to provide information and guidance to accountable
institutions that will assist in meeting requirements to freeze
property and transactions pursuant to UNSC Resolutions.
Section 4: Appointment of director
Section 6(3) of the principal Act, which required consultation
with the CMLAC, has been deleted. This relates to paragraphs
2.2.4 and 3.5 regarding the abolition of the CMLAC.
Section 5: CMLAC
Chapter 2 of the FIC Act, relating to the CMLAC, has been
repealed. Collaboration at a policy formulation level between the
public sector participants in the country’s framework to combat
money laundering and terrorism financing can be better facili-
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tated if it is linked with structures that will be implemented to
direct the application of risk assessments and the management
of identified money laundering and terrorism financing risks.
The implementation of risk-based processes in the AML and
CTF framework will greatly reduce the need for policy advice to
be provided to the Minister on matters such as the detailed
content of regulations and the granting of exemptions from AML
and CTF requirements. Instead of relying on rigid requirements in
regulations and exemptions granted at the executive level,
financial and other institutions will have greater discretion to
determine the appropriate compliance steps to be taken in given
instances, in accordance with their internal AML and CFT compli-
ance and risk management programmes.
The maturity of the country’s framework to combat money
laundering and terrorism financing has increased to the point
where a number of fora exist for the discussion of matters of
mutual interest or concern. This has obviated the need for a rigid
platform in the form of a statutory body for purposes of consulta-
tions.
Sections 7, 8 and 9: Identifications of clients and other persons
These sections amend Chapter 3, insert section 20A and
amend section 21 of the principal Act.
Customer due diligence refers to the knowledge that an
accountable institution has about its customer and the account-
able institution’s understanding of the business that the customer
is conducting with it.
A customer due diligence programme, if properly imple-
mented, enables an accountable institution better to manage its
relationships with customers, and to identify possible attempts by
customers to abuse the accountable institution’s products and
services for illicit purposes.
Section 8 of the Amendment Act prevents an institution from
entering into a business relationship or concluding a single
transaction with an anonymous client.
Section 9 of the Amendment Act provides for a risk-based
approach to customer due diligence. The application of a risk-
based approach entails that an accountable institution should
identify, assess, and understand its money laundering and
terrorism financing risks. The notion of ‘money laundering and
terrorism financing risks’, in this context, refers to the risk that an
accountable institution’s products or services may be abused by
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its customers in order to carry out money laundering or terrorism
financing activities. These risks emanate from a combination of
factors, including the customers, countries, products and deliv-
ery channels involved in a given scenario. An accountable
institution must apply its knowledge and understanding of its
money laundering and terrorism financing risks in the develop-
ment of control measures to prevent or mitigate the risks identi-
fied.
By adopting a risk-based approach, both the supervisory body
and accountable institutions can ensure that measures to prevent
or mitigate money laundering and terrorism financing are com-
mensurate with the risks identified. This will ensure that resources
are directed in accordance with priorities, so that the greatest
risks receive the highest attention. Where lower risks are identi-
fied, the requirements to identify and verify are lowered, creating
opportunities for accountable institutions to explore more innova-
tive ways of offering financial services to a broader range of
customers, and bring previously excluded sectors of society into
the formal economy. This will improve the efficacy of measures to
combat terrorism financing and money laundering, while also
promoting financial inclusion.
Section 10: Understanding and obtaining information on business
relationship
Section 10 has inserted a new section 21A in the principal Act.
This section requires accountable institutions to ascertain from a
prospective client what the purpose and intended nature of the
business relationship will be, and to obtain information regarding
the source of the funds that the prospective client anticipates
using in the course of the business relationship.
Section 10: Additional due diligence measures relating to legal persons,
trusts and partnerships
Section 10 has inserted a new section 21B in the principal Act.
A key component of customer due diligence measures is the
identification of beneficial owners. In many instances, including in
cases of corruption, where criminals wish to obscure the owner-
ship or control of funds in the financial system, they make use of a
corporate vehicle to transact with financial and other institutions
‘at arm’s length’.
Requiring the identification of the beneficial ownership of
customers that are not natural persons is a key step to promote
523FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 31 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/16−Financial−Institutions
transparency in a financial system. Not only does it enhance the
ability of accountable institutions to assess customer-related
risks in the course of managing business relationships; the ability
of authorities to detect, investigate and prosecute abuses of
financial and other institutions for money-laundering and terror-
ism financing purposes is also greatly improved.
Closely linked to identifying the beneficial owner is the respon-
sibility of a country to ensure that accurate and current informa-
tion on the beneficial ownership and control of companies and
other legal persons is accessible in a timely fashion by the
relevant authorities. Consultations with the relevant departments
will be necessary to ensure that the mechanisms to achieve this
objective are in place.
Section 10: Ongoing due diligence
Section 10 has inserted a new section 21C in the principal Act.
This section provides for ongoing due diligence measures. These
measures include the scrutiny of transactions undertaken through-
out the course of a relationship. The purpose is to ensure that the
transactions being conducted are consistent with that account-
able institution’s knowledge of the customer, and the customer’s
business and risk profile, including the source of funds. The
provision further requires accountable institutions keep updated
and accurate information on its clients.
Section 10: Doubts about veracity of previously obtained information
Section 10 has inserted a new section 21D in the principal Act.
This section indicates measures that accountable institutions
must take if doubts arise regarding the veracity or adequacy of
previously obtained customer due diligence information, or where
a suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing is formed
at a later stage.
Section 10: Inability to verify identity
Section 10 has inserted a new section 21E in the principal Act.
The FIC Act as it was did not expressly prohibit an accountable
institution which is unable to comply with the identification and
verification requirements from commencing with business or
performing transactions. The FIC Act also did not specifically
state that a suspicious transaction report ought to be made if the
accountable institution is unable to comply with the identification
and verification requirements in suspicious circumstances. Sec-
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tion 21E, as inserted by section 10 of the Amendment Act, now
makes provision for those circumstances.
Section 10: Persons entrusted with prominent public or private sector
functions
Section 10 has inserted new sections 21F, 21G and 21H in the
principal Act.
The starting point for the effective implementation of measures
relating to persons who are entrusted with prominent public or
private sector functions is for all financial and other institutions
(referred to as ‘accountable institutions’ in the FIC Act) to have
effective measures in place regarding who their customers are,
and to understand their customers’ business.
Typically, this process happens when an institution takes on a
new customer. The institution must establish who the prospective
customer is, by using reliable and independent source docu-
ments. In instances where the customer is a business, the
institution will need to make sure that, among other matters, it
knows who the beneficial owner is, what the ownership and
control structure of the business is, and the what the nature of the
business is. Over the lifetime of the relationship with the cus-
tomer, the institution must monitor the customer’s ongoing trans-
actions to ensure that they fit the profile of the customer.
The current South African legislation lacks some of these
elements. For instance, it does not require financial and other
institutions to identify their customers’ beneficial owners, to apply
ongoing due diligence to their relationships with their customers,
and to determine if they are dealing with a prominent person in a
given instance.
If an institution discovers that it is dealing with a foreign
prominent public official, senior management approval, among
other requirements, is needed to establish the business relation-
ship. If a customer is viewed as being a domestic prominent
influential person, then the accountable institution will have to
decide whether higher risk attaches to the customer. If so, the
accountable institution will need to determine, among other
things, the source of wealth and funds, and thereafter monitor the
account to spot transactions that seem anomalous given the
recognised customer profile. The amendments also apply to
immediate family members of prominent persons, and their
known close associates.
Section 11: Obligation to keep customer due diligence records
Section 11 of the Amendment Act amends section 22 of the
principal Act to allow accountable institutions more flexibility in
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the manner in which records are kept for purposes of identifica-
tion and verification. This will improve the ease of compliance
with the obligations in terms of the FIC Act, and reduce compli-
ance costs for accountable institutions.
Section 12: Obligation to keep transaction records
A new section 22A is inserted in the principal Act by section 12
of the Amendment Act, relating to the accountable institution’s
obligation to keep records in respect of a customer’s transaction
activity. This will ensure that adequate information will be cap-
tured in an accountable institution’s records to be able to
reconstruct a trail of transactions to assist investigators in the
reconstruction of transaction activities and flows of funds when
performing their investigative functions.
Section 13: Period for which records must be kept
Section 13 of the Amendment Act amends section 23 of the
principal Act to provide clarity regarding the period for which
records must be kept in instances where an accountable institution
has made a suspicious transaction report. Suffice it to mention here
that the period referred to in sections 22, 22Aand 29 of the principal
Act is now a standard period of five years.
Section 14: Records may be kept in electronic form and by third parties and
must be kept in the Republic
Section 24 of the FIC Act is amended to provide for account-
able institutions that have outsourced the keeping of records to
third parties, to make the records readily available to the FIC and
the relevant supervisory bodies. In addition, records may be kept
in electronic form, and in a manner that will enable the account-
able institution to reproduce them in a legible format. The
Amendment Act also makes provision for the records to be kept
in the Republic.
Section 15: Admissibility of records
Suffice it to mention here that section 15 of the Amendment Act
provides for a technical amendment insofar as the admissibility of
records has now also been extended to records kept under
section 22A. Previously this section only referred to records kept
under sections 22 and 24.
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Section 16: Access of authorised representatives of the Financial
Intelligence Centre to records
Section 26 has been repealed from the principal Act, and this
issue is subsequent to an insertion regulated under the provi-
sions relating to reporting obligations forthwith.
Section 17: Financial sanctions
Section 17 of the Amendment Act inserts Part 2A (ss 26A to
26C) in the principal Act. It sets out the mechanisms to identify
and initiate proposals for designations of persons and entities
targeted by UNSC Resolution. When a UNSC Resolution is
adopted, the Minister must publish a notice of the adoption of the
resolution in the Government Gazette and another appropriate
publication. This does not apply to resolutions of the UNSC
contemplated in section 25 of the Protection of Constitutional
Democracy against Terrorist and RelatedActivities Act 33 of 2004
(the POCDATARA).
Following the notice published by the Minister, the Director of
the Financial Intelligence Centre, from time to time and by
appropriate means of publication, must give notice of persons
and entities being identified by UNSC Resolutions; and decisions
of the UNSC no longer to apply Resolutions to previously
identified persons or entities.
Section 17, in addition, enables the Minister to revoke a notice
if the Minister is satisfied that the notice is no longer necessary to
give effect to financial sanctions pursuant to a UNSC Resolution.
Section 17 provides that no person may, among other things,
acquire, collect, use property or provide or make available, or
invite a person to provide or make available, any financial or other
service, intending that the property, financial or other service will
be used for the benefit of or on behalf of a person or an entity
identified pursuant to a UNSC Resolution.
In terms of section 17, the Minister may permit a person to
conduct financial services or deal with property if it is necessary
to provide for basic expenses, including, among other things,
foodstuffs, rent or mortgage and medicines or medical treatment.
Provision is made for the Director of the FIC to publish a notice of
the Minister’s permission for the provision of financial services or
dealing with property.
Section 18: Accountable institutions, reporting institutions and persons
subject to reporting obligations to advise the FIC of clients
Section 18 of the Amendment Act, which replaces section 27 of
the principal Act, makes provision for accountable institutions,
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reporting institutions, and any person required to make a report in
terms of the FIC Act, to advise the FIC whether a specified
account number corresponds with a client, as well as the type
and status of the business relationship. The amendments are
necessary to enhance the FIC’s analysis capability.
Section 19: Authorised representative’s access to records in respect of reports
required to be submitted to the FIC
Section 26 of the FIC Act has been moved and inserted as
section 27A. It is more appropriate to deal with access to
information relating to reports submitted to the FIC under Part 3 of
Chapter 3 of the FIC Act. The section was also amended to
provide for instances where a report ought to have been made,
but the accountable institution had failed to make a report as
envisaged in the Act.
Sections 20 and 21: Property associated with terrorist and related activities
and financial sanctions pursuant to UNSC Resolutions
These sections amend sections 28A and 29 of the principal
Act. Provision is made for an accountable institution to report to
the FIC property in its possession or under its control that is
owned or controlled by or on behalf of a person or an entity
identified pursuant to a UNSC Resolution.
An accountable institution, after publication of a notice by the
President under section 25 of the POCDATARA, or receiving
notice from the Director of the FIC, must scrutinise its information
concerning clients with whom it conducts business, in order to
determine whether a client qualifies as a person or entity identi-
fied in the notice.
Section 21: Reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions
Section 21 contains a technical amendment to section 29(1) of
the principal Act. It also includes a new provision requiring, in
addition to the requirement to report to the FIC, reporting of
suspicious and unusual transactions to the SARB and the Finan-
cial Services Board, as the key financial sector regulators. The
FIC remains responsible for analysing the reports submitted, and
if it is deemed necessary, for the referral of the matter to the
applicable enforcement agencies.
Section 22: Reporting procedures and furnishing of additional
information
Section 22 contains amendments to section 32 of the principal
Act, to enhance the FIC’s analysis capability in respect of the
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information provided by persons making a report to the FIC. It
requires that additional information be provided in the prescribed
manner and within the prescribed period.
Section 23: Intervention by FIC
Section 23 amends section 34 of the principal Act by increas-
ing the number of days during which an accountable institution
may be prevented from continuing with a transaction based on a
report submitted to the FIC from five to ten days. This amendment
allows more time for the FIC and investigating authorities to make
the necessary inquiries in respect of a transaction.
Provision is also made for the intervention by the FIC to be
extended to include property owned or controlled by or on behalf
of, or at the direction of a person or entity identified pursuant to a
UNSC Resolution contemplated in a Notice.
Section 24: Monitoring orders
Section 24 amends section 35 of the principal Act to allow for
the monitoring order issued by a judge to be extended to include
property owned or controlled by or on behalf of, or at the direction
of a person or entity identified pursuant to a UNSC Resolution
contemplated in a Notice.
Section 25: Access to information held by the Centre
Section 25 amends section 40 of the principal Act by extending
the ability of the FIC to share information held by it to support
other government entities more effectively in carrying out their
mandates.
Section 26: Protection of personal information
Section 26 inserts section 41A in the principal Act, to ensure
that proper safeguards are in place in respect of the information
in the possession of the FIC, and to comply with the Protection of
Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (the PoPI), the FIC Act was
amended to make provision for measures to be taken to prevent
the loss of, or damage to information. Provision is also made to
prevent unlawful access to or processing of information, other
than in accordance with the FIC Act or the PoPI.
Section 27: Risk management and compliance programs
The customer due diligence measures mentioned above are
linked to an accountable institution’s application of a risk-based
529FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 37 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/16−Financial−Institutions
approach through the institution’s AML and CTF compliance and
risk management programme. Section 42 of the principal Act, as
substituted by section 27, provides that accountable institutions
must develop, document, maintain and implement a Risk Manage-
ment and Compliance Programme.
Section 28: Governance of AML and CTF compliance
Section 28 of the Amendment Act inserts sections 42A and 42B
in the principal Act, setting out the governance obligations for
accountable institutions. The board of directors or the senior
management of an accountable institution is responsible for
ensuring compliance with the FIC Act and its Risk Management
and Compliance Programme.
Section 29: Training relating to AML and CTF compliance
Section 29 amends section 43 of the principal Act by placing
the obligation on the accountable institution to ensure that its
employees are trained to enable them to comply with the FIC Act
as well as its Risk Management and Compliance Programme.
Section 30: Directives
Section 30 of the Amendment Act amends section 43A of the
principal Act. In terms of the amendment the FIC is allowed, after
consultation with the relevant supervisory body, to issue a
directive concerning the general application of the Act, or in
specific instances as set out in section 43A. In addition, the
section expands the Centre’s as well as a supervisory body’s
ability to issue a directive which may reasonably be required to
give effect to the Centre’s objectives.
Section 32: Inspections
The Constitutional Court, in the matter of Estate Agency Affairs
Board v Auction Alliance (Pty) Ltd & others (above), made a ruling
declaring parts of section 45B of the FICAct unconstitutional. The
fact that the section allowed for inspections without a warrant in
certain instances was found to be at odds with the Constitution.
The declaration of invalidity was suspended for 24 months, to
allow Parliament to amend the section. Section 32 gives effect to
the Constitutional Court’s judgment, by amending section 45B to
provide for a warrant requirement, and to state under which
circumstances the requirement would not apply.
Section 33: Administrative sanctions
Section 33 amends section 45C of the principal Act, to provide
for the financial penalties paid in respect of a financial sanction to
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be paid into the National Revenue Fund instead of into the
Criminal Assets Recovery Account as was required previously.
Section 34: Appeals
Section 45D of the FIC Act provides that an appeal must be
lodged within 30 days. However, the legislation did not make
provision for condonation of the late filing of an appeal. Section
34 of the Amendment Act provides for the appeal board to
condone delay in lodging an appeal, on good cause shown.
The FIC Act makes provision for the chairperson of the appeal
board to determine any procedural matter relating to the appeal
process. Section 45D, as amended by section 34 of the Amend-
ment Act, provides that the chairperson may also make rules in
respect of procedures relating to an appeal.
To ensure that the appeal board is not burdened with irrelevant
and frivolous information, the FIC Act was amended to provide
that an appeal is decided on the written evidence, factual
information and documentation which was submitted to the FIC or
supervisory body before the decision was taken.
Section 45D, as amended, further, provides that the appellant,
the FIC, or the supervisory body may, on application to the
appeal board and on good cause shown, introduce evidence
which was not given to either party prior to a decision being
taken.
The provisions in the FIC Act that provided that the decision of
the majority the appeal board would constitute the decision of the
appeal board had proven to be impractical. There are currently
nine members appointed to the appeal board. Effectively, at
every appeal hearing, all nine members would be required to
hear the appeal. To address this shortcoming, section 45D, as
amended, further provides for the establishment of an adjudica-
tion panel consisting of no fewer than three members of the
appeal board. The decision of the majority of the panel will
prevail. The chairperson is given a deciding vote in the case of an
equality of votes.
Sections 35 to 49: Replacement of sanctions
Sections 35 to 49 replace the criminal sanctions in the offence
provisions, by making non-compliance with certain sections of
the FIC Act subject to administrative sanctions. The sections that
provide for purely administrative sanctions relate to the account-
531FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 39 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/16−Financial−Institutions
able institution’s obligations regarding customer due diligence
and record-keeping measures.
Sections 51 to 57: Technical amendments
Section 56 increases the fine for a failure to comply with the
regulations from a maximum amount of R100 000 to R1 000 000,
or such administrative sanction as may apply.
Section 60: Long title of principal Act
Section 60 amended the long title of the principal Act to align it
with the changes to the mandate of the FIC concerning the
implementation of financial sanctions imposed by the Security
Council of the United Nations and also to provide for the
introduction of the new risk management and compliance require-
ments.
Finally, following the inclusion of the administrative sanctions,
provisions in the previous amendments to the FIC Act, it was
proposed that certain acts of non-compliance in respect of the
obligations in the FIC Act should carry a purely administrative
sanction (see Hugo & Spruyt above 253).
SECONDARY LEGISLATION
What follows is a solitary example from the vast body of
subordinate legislation, and other ‘soft law’ principles relevant to
financial institutions, which was promulgated or circulated during
2017.
Banking Regulations
General
The Bank Supervision Department of the SARB (the Registrar)
continues striving to ensure that the legal framework for the
regulation and supervision of banks and banking groups in South
Africa remains relevant and current.
As part of the internationally agreed regulatory reforms to
promote the safety and soundness of the international financial
system, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee) has issued various new or revised frameworks or
requirements during recent years for implementation by member
jurisdictions.
In this regard, the Registrar has drafted amendments to the
Regulations relating to Banks (the Regulations) which came into
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force on 1 September 2017 (see www.resbank.co.za, accessed
on 10 January 2018).
Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis that commenced in
2007, the Group of Twenty (G-20) initiated a reform programme in
2009 to strengthen the International Financial Regulatory System.
As part of the internationally agreed regulatory reforms, the
Basel Committee has issued for implementation by member
jurisdictions:
• a revised framework for margin requirements for non-centrally
cleared derivatives;
• a capital standard for bank exposures to central counterpar-
ties;
• a standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit
risk exposures;
• capital requirements for banks’ equity investments in funds.
During the past few years the Registrar held extensive discus-
sions with all relevant key players regarding the implementation
in South Africa of the relevant internationally agreed regulatory
reforms, including margin requirements for non-centrally cleared
derivatives and capital requirements for banks’ exposures to
central counterparties.
In this regard, on 22 November 2016, the Registrar issued a
proposed directive related to the proposed implementation on
1 January 2017 of margin requirements for non-centrally cleared
derivatives, inviting comments to be submitted to the Registrar by
no later than 2 December 2016.
On 20 December 2016, the Registrar issued Guidance Note
8/2016 informing all banks that, based on the comments received
by it from various key players, it had decided to delay the
implementation of margin requirements for non-centrally cleared
derivatives to a date later than 1 January 2017.
The key matters communicated by the Basel Committee in
respect of the aforementioned documents and requirements,
other than the margin requirements for non-centrally cleared
derivatives, are summarised below.
Ideally, the legal framework pertaining to banking regulation
must reflect local and international market developments and
comply with the applicable international regulatory and supervi-
sory standards and best practices. This ideal situation is
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approached in a manner that duly takes into consideration
domestic economic and financial system conditions.
Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties
On 10 April 2014, the Basel Committee published the revised
standard for calculating the required regulatory capital for banks’
exposures to central counterparties (CCPs).
The revised standard replaces the interim capital requirements
that were published in July 2012.
The revised standard was developed to simplify the underlying
policy framework and to complement the relevant initiatives
undertaken by other supervisory bodies, including the Committee
on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) CPSS-IOSCO
Principles for financial market infrastructures. The Basel Commit-
tee also aimed to support broader policy efforts advanced by the
G-20 leaders and the Financial Stability Board, particularly those
relating to central clearing of standardised OTC derivative con-
tracts.
Although many of the interim requirements have been retained,
the revised standard differs from the interim requirements as
follows:
• The final standard includes a single approach for calculating
capital requirements for a bank’s exposure that arises from its
contributions to the mutualised default fund of a qualifying
CCP (QCCP);
• The standard uses the standardised approach for counter-
party credit risk, as opposed to the Current Exposure Method,
to measure the hypothetical capital requirement of a CCP;
• The standard caps the capital charges applicable to a bank’s
exposures to a QCCP;
• It specifies the treatment of multi-level client structures whereby
an institution clears its trades through intermediaries linked to
a CCP; and
• It incorporates responses to frequently asked questions posed
to the Basel Committee while finalising the standard.
Standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures
On 31 March 2014, the Basel Committee published a revised
standard for the measurement of banks’ exposures to counter-
party credit risk in respect of derivatives-related transactions.
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The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit
risk exposures replaces both the Current Exposure Method and
the Standardised Method in the Basel II capital framework.
The revised standard includes a risk-sensitive methodology
that appropriately differentiates between margined and unmar-
gined trades and provides a more meaningful recognition of
netting benefits than either of the existing non-modelled
approaches.
The revised standard also reduces the need for discretion by
national authorities, limits the use of banks’ internal estimates,
and avoids undue complexity by drawing upon prudential
approaches already available in the capital framework. Further-
more, the revised standard is calibrated to reflect the volatilities
observed over the recent stress period, while also taking account
of incentives for centralised clearing of derivative transactions.
Capital requirements for banks’ equity investments in funds
On 13 December 2013, the Basel Committee published a
revised standard in respect of the capital requirements for banks’
equity investments in funds.
The revised policy framework applies to banks’ equity invest-
ments in all funds, that is, hedge funds, managed funds and
investment funds not held for trading purposes. Furthermore, the
framework applies to all banks, irrespective of whether they apply
the Standardised Approach or an Internal Ratings-Based (IRB)
approach for credit risk.
The revised framework includes three approaches for setting
capital requirements for banks’ equity investments in funds:
• the ‘look-through approach’ (LTA);
• the ‘mandate-based approach’ (MBA); and
• the ‘fall-back approach’ (FBA).
The hierarchy of approaches provides varying degrees of risk
sensitivity and has been adopted to incentivise due diligence by
banks and transparent reporting by the funds in which they
invest.
The revised framework will also help address risks associated
with banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities by ensuring
that exposures to funds engaging in shadow banking activity are
supported by adequate capital.
Proposed amendments to the Regulations
To ensure that the legal framework for the regulation and
supervision of banks and banking groups in South Africa remains
535FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 43 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/16−Financial−Institutions
relevant and current, the Registrar has drafted the following
seven amendments to the Regulations.
First, to amend the provisions of regulation 23(15), among
other things, to amend the enabling provisions related to the
substitution of the Current Exposure Method and the Standard-
ised Method in the capital framework with the standardised
approach for the measurement of counterparty credit risk expo-
sures; and to make provision for a separate regulation, regulation
23(16), to deal with matters related to banks’ exposures to central
counterparties arising from any OTC derivative instrument,
exchange-traded derivative instrument, securities financing trans-
action or long settlement transaction, as set out in Annexure A.
Secondly, to amend regulation 23(16), as set out in Annexure
B, to incorporate the relevant requirements issued by the Basel
Committee in respect of banks’ exposures to central counterpar-
ties.
Thirdly, to amend regulation 23(18), as set out in Annexure C, to
incorporate the relevant requirements issued by the Basel Com-
mittee in respect of the standardised approach for the measure-
ment of banks’ exposures to counterparty credit risk.
Fourthly, to amend the form BA200, as set out in Annexure D, to
incorporate the relevant reporting requirements related to the
standardised approach for banks’ exposures to counterparty
credit risk appropriately.
Fifthly, to amend the provisions of regulations 31(6) and 31(7),
as set out in Annexure E, to incorporate the relevant requirements
issued by the Basel Committee in respect of banks’ equity
investments in funds appropriately.
Sixthly, to amend the forms BA340 and BA610, as respectively
set out in Annexures F and G, to incorporate the relevant
reporting requirements related to banks’ equity investments in
funds appropriately.
Seventhly, to amend regulation 67, as set out in Annexure H, to
incorporate the relevant required new or amended definitions.
Directive
Based on the above, and in accordance with the provisions of
section 6(6) of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 (the Banks Act), banks,
controlling companies and branches of foreign institutions were
directed to commence with the preparation for the implementa-
tion of the proposed amendments to the Regulations with effect
from 1 September 2017.
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CASE LAW
Bank-client relationship
In Minister of Finance v Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd & others;
Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd & others v Director of the Financial
Intelligence Centre [2017] 4 All SA 150 (GP), 2018 (3) SA 515, the
court confirmed the constitutional principle that state organs or
officials, in this case the Minister of Finance, are only empowered
to act to the extent that their powers are defined and conferred by
the Constitution and/or by statute. It further confirmed that there is
no statute that empowers the Minister to intervene in a private
bank-client dispute. The present discussion of the Oakbay case
will focus on the latter issue.
The facts were as follows. The first main application, the
application for declaratory relief which turned out to be the only
relevant application for present purposes, was brought by the
previous Minister of Finance (the Minister) in the public interest,
against the first respondent (Oakbay) and its associated entities
(respondents two to 14) (paras [2]-[4]).
In December 2015, respondents 15 to 18 (the banks) notified
Oakbay of their intention to close Oakbay’s bank accounts. The
Banks alleged that they did so in compliance with their obliga-
tions in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001
(para [12]).
Oakbay approached the Minister to intervene and to assist it in
having its banking facilities restored on the basis that it was in the
national interest to prevent job losses in Oakbay if it became
unbanked (para [13]).
The Minister upon legal advice resisted Oakbay’s request
(para [14]).
The Minister approached the court seeking a declaratory order
to the effect that by law he is not empowered or obliged to
intervene in the relationship between Oakbay and the banks
regarding the closing of Oakbay’s bank accounts (para [2]).
The court confirmed that the basis for the relief that the Minister
sought was section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013. This provision deals with the aspect of persons over whom,
and matters in relation to which, the High Court has jurisdiction. It
provides that a court has jurisdiction over all persons residing in
or being in, and in relation to all causes arising within its area of
jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which it has the power in
terms of its discretion to have jurisdiction over (para [51]).
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The application of section 21(1)(c) involves a two-legged
enquiry (para [52]). This two-prong approach in the application of
section 21(1)(c) was first explained in Durban City Council v
Association of Building Societies 1942 AD 27 32, and subse-
quently confirmed in Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler
Financial Services (Pty) Ltd [2006] 1 All SA 103 (SCA), 2005 (6)
SA 205 paras [15]–[17]).
First, the court must be satisfied that the applicant is a person
interested in an existing, future or contingent right or obligation.
Secondly, the court must decide whether the case is a proper one
for the exercise of its discretion (para [53]).
The first leg of the enquiry involves establishing the existence
of the necessary condition precedent for the exercise of the
court’s discretion. An applicant for the declaratory relief satisfies
this requirement if he or she successfully proves that he or she
has an interest in an existing, future or contingent right or
obligation. Only if the court is satisfied accordingly does it
proceed to the second leg of the enquiry (ibid).
In the present case, the first stage of the enquiry relates to
whether the Minister is authorised or legally obligated to intervene
in the dispute between the Oakbay Group and the banks. This
legal question has been determined previously by the courts (see
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg
Transitional Metropolitan Council & others 1999 (1) SA 374
(CC)). In answering the first stage of the enquiry the court held
that state organs or officials, in the case under scrutiny the
Minister of Finance, are only empowered to act to the extent that
their powers are defined and conferred by the Constitution and/or
by statute (para [54]).
Neither the Constitution, nor any other statute empowers the
Minister to intervene in a private bank-client dispute (para [55]).
In answering the second leg of the section 21(1)(c) enquiry, the
court referred with approval to the decision in Bredenkamp &
others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4) SA468 (SCA), 2010 (9)
BCLR 892, [2010] 4 All SA 113 in which it was held that the
bank-client relationship is contractual in nature. The court noted
that the bank may terminate the relationship at its discretion, on
reasonable notice to the client, provided the reasons for terminat-
ing the account do not violate public policy or constitutional
values (para [56]).
The court refused to grant the declaratory relief sought by the
Minister on the basis that it would serve no purpose. Oakbay
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conceded both in its papers and in argument to the legal position
which the Minister sought to confirm. The court pointed out that
none of the parties had requested the court to determine the
propriety or impropriety of the decision by the banks to terminate
their bank-client relationship with the entities in the Oakbay
Group (para [57]).
The application by the Minister was, therefore, clearly unneces-
sary in the circumstances of this case. The circumstances
mentioned in the second leg of the section 21(1)(c) enquiry do
not warrant that the court exercises its discretion to grant the
declaratory relief by pronouncing itself on an undisputed legal
question, which has been confirmed in earlier judgments (paras
[59]–[60]).
The application for declaratory relief was dismissed with costs.
The decision by the court in Oakbay is correct. The case was
indeed not a proper one for the exercise of the court’s discretion
to grant declaratory relief.
However, notwithstanding the court’s refusal to grant the
declaratory relief, its confirmation of the correctness of the
Minister’s determination not to intervene in the bank-client relation-
ship between Oakbay and the banks will be welcomed by
commercial banks.
The very reason why the court refused the declaratory relief
was based on the fact that the court confirmed that the Minister
and/or any other state organ lacks the power to intervene in the
bank-client relationship.
The Minister, during an earlier meeting with Oakbay, advised
Oakbay to seek a resolution of its dispute with the banks through
the courts (paras [15] [65]). However, Oakbay disregarded the
advice.
Nevertheless, provided that the banks followed the guidelines
laid down in the Bredenkamp case (which on the face of it, they
did) it is highly unlikely that Oakbay (or for that matter, any other
client of a bank) will be successful in a potential future application
to compel banks to accept them as clients.
As mentioned, in Bredenkamp the Supreme Court of Appeal
confirmed the contractual nature of the bank-client relationship.
In that case, the court held that a bank has the right unilaterally to
cancel the agreement between it and its customer. Before this
case reached the Supreme Court of Appeal, two lower courts had
been required to pronounce on the same question (see Breeden-
kamp & others v Standard Bank of South Africa & another [2009]
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3 All SA 339 (GSJ), 2009 (5) SA 304 (‘Bredenkamp interim
application’); Breedenkamp & others v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd & another 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ) (‘Bredenkamp main
application’. Bredenkamp’s name was spelt incorrectly in the
citation of both the interim and main applications but spelt
correctly in the citation of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision.
For a discussion of the decisions handed down in both the interim
and main applications, see WG Schulze ‘Financial Institutions’
2009 Annual Survey 487 495; IM Rautenbach ‘Cancellation
clauses in bank-customer contracts and the Bill of Rights’ 2010
TSAR 637 638 et seq. For a discussion of the decisions in the
interim and main applications, as well as the decision by the
Supreme Court of Appeal (Bredenkamp appeal), see IM Rauten-
bach ‘Constitution and contract: The application of the Bill of
Rights to contractual clauses and their enforcement – reasonable-
ness as hard law’ ABLU 2011 (‘Rautenbach 2011’) (paper deliv-
ered at the 2011 Annual Banking Law Update on 4 May 2011) 31;
L Hawthorne ‘Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2009 (5)
SA 304 GSJ; and Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2009
(6) SA 277 (GSJ); Bredenkamp v Standard Bank 2010 (4) SA 468
SCA’ (2010) 73 De Jure 395; WG Schulze ‘The bank’s right to
cancel the contract between it and its customer unilaterally –
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468
(SCA)’ (‘Schulze 2011’) 2011 Obiter 211 215ff; and WG Schulze
‘Financial Institutions’ 2011 Annual Survey 497 523ff.)
‘Business of a bank’
In Kruger v Joint Estate Trustees of the Insolvent Estate of
Paulos Bhekinkosi Zulu & another [2017] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) the
Supreme Court of Appeal was asked to determine the powers of a
repayment administrator who was appointed in terms of section
83 of the Banks Act. Such an appointment is made for the
administrator to manage and control the repayment of money
taken from the general public by someone who accepted the
money, but who was not registered to conduct the ‘business of a
bank’.
The facts in the Kruger case were as follows. Zulu was a
‘distributor’ for an entity, Travel Venture Institute (‘TVI’) in New-
castle, KwaZulu-Natal. TVI conducted the business of obtaining
money by marketing and selling bogus electronic travel vouchers
(para [2]).
The business was a pyramid scheme, and the Registrar found
that Zulu had conducted the business of a bank without being
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registered or authorised to do so as envisaged in the Banks Act
(para [4]).
The appellant (Kruger) was appointed as a repayment admin-
istrator. In terms of section 83 of the Banks Act, money which had
been paid to Zulu would be repaid to the persons from whom it
was obtained (para [7]).
In addition, in terms of section 84(1A)(b)(i) of the Banks Act,
Kruger was to recover and take possession of all Zulu’s assets
(para [8]).
Zulu opposed the application to take possession of his posses-
sions, contending that Kruger’s powers to take possession of his
assets were limited to assets which had been acquired through
the conduct of the unlawful banking business. He argued that
Kruger had no authority to attach fixed property which he (Zulu)
co-owned with his wife and six other people. The contention was
that Zulu’s wife and her siblings had inherited the immovable
properties from their parents, who acquired them before he
contravened the Banks Act. Zulu further argued that he had
bought the fourth immovable property in 2007, prior to the
contravention of the provisions of the Banks Act. Therefore, he
contended, these assets were not subject to attachment in terms
of section 84. It was not in dispute, however, that Zulu and his wife
were married in community of property to each other (para [11]).
Zulu argued further that no reason existed for Kruger to
approach the High Court as the matter lacked urgency and
Kruger had failed to give him notice of his intention to approach
the court (para [9]).
The central issue was the extent of the powers of a repayment
administrator under section 84(1A)(b)(i) of the Banks Act when
recovering and taking possession of assets belonging to the
unregistered persons in managing the repayment process. The
KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg agreed
with Zulu’s contention regarding the lack of urgency. The court
noted that Kruger and Zulu had had previous interactions and
had cooperated with one another, and that Kruger knew that Zulu
would not dissipate the assets (para [1]).
In the result, the High Court dismissed Kruger’s application.
However, it granted leave to appeal to Kruger (para [1]).
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that in
considering urgency of a matter, a court must be mindful of the
nature and purpose of the application. In the present case,
Kruger sought an anti-dissipation order, and he had explained
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why he anticipated resistance by Zulu. It was submitted, on
behalf of Kruger, that the relief that he sought was comparable to
preservation orders provided for under section 38 of the Preven-
tion of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (the POCA), rather than
the common-law anti-dissipation relief. This comparison was
made to illustrate that the law provides for applications for
anti-dissipation orders of this nature to be made on an urgent, ex
parte basis. The court agreed with this analogy insofar as it
demonstrated the intrinsic urgency in attachments made in terms
of section 84(1A)(b)(i). However, so the court reasoned, for a full
appreciation of the basic nature of the powers and duties of the
repayment administrator under that section, a further analogy
had to be made. The powers and duties of a repayment adminis-
trator are comparable with those of trustees or liquidators of
insolvent estates. These powers and obligations arise by opera-
tion of the law (ex lege), rather than by means of a court order.
Just as the assets in an insolvent estate vest in the Master
immediately upon sequestration or liquidation and thereafter in
the trustees or liquidators (s 20 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936)
by operation of law, the assets of a person who is the subject of
the registrar’s directive vest in the repayment administrator
immediately on his or her appointment. In the same manner that a
trustee, on appointment, assumes control of an insolvent estate,
the repayment administrator, on appointment, forthwith takes
control and possession of the assets of a person under a
directive (para [31]).
The court concluded that the present application was urgent,
and that giving notice would have defeated the purposes of the
application (para [28]).
A duly appointed repayment administrator is entitled to attach
property of which the transgressor is the co-owner, provided that
notice is given to the co-owner(s) of such attachment. Because
Zulu and his wife were married in community of property, their
joint interest in the fixed assets is indivisible. Therefore, the
properties had been properly attached. However, Mrs Zulu
should have been joined as a respondent in the application
(paras [33]–[34]).
The interests of the six other persons were divisible from those
of Zulu and his wife, and were not subject to attachment (para
[34]).
The court held that there was no merit in Zulu’s argument that
Kruger’s powers were limited to assets acquired through the
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conduct of the unlawful business. The wording of section
84(1A)(b)(i) of the Banks Act is clear in this regard (para [36]).
The court a quo, therefore, had erred in discharging the rule
nisi. Kruger had made out a proper case for the relief that he
sought. In fact, he had been entitled, even without the court order
he sought, to take the steps in respect of which he sought the
court’s pronouncement. Because Zulu’s estate was seques-
trated, and the trustees were placed in control of the insolvent
estate, the court could not grant an order that Kruger could take
possession of all Zulu’s assets. The court concluded that the
powers of the trustees took precedence over those of the
repayment administrator (Kruger). The court held that the role of a
repayment administrator is different in essence from that of a
trustee. The functions of the former are limited to repayment of
money unlawfully obtained in the conduct of an unregistered
banking business. The role of a trustee is much wider. It entails
the administration of all different facets of an insolvent estate. In
this case, therefore, once the order of sequestration or liquidation
was granted, the powers of the trustees, upon appointment, took
precedence over those of the repayment administrator (para
[37]).
The appeal was accordingly upheld and the order of the court
a quo set aside and replaced with one in terms of which the
points in limine were dismissed (para [38]).
The decision in Kruger v Joint Trustees is correct, but merits
comment. First, banks and other creditors will welcome the
finding that once an order of sequestration or liquidation is
granted, the powers of the trustees, upon appointment, take
precedence over those of the repayment administrator.
Secondly, assets under control of the trustee of an insolvent
estate will be subject to the concursus creditorum and secured
creditors’ claims will enjoy preference over claims by unsecured
creditors, such as those of persons who had participated in a
pyramid scheme.
It will be in the interest of creditors to act expeditiously in
obtaining a sequestration or liquidation order, especially where
there is a looming application in terms of section 84(1A)(b)(i) of
the Banks Act.
Thirdly, the Kruger v Joint Trustees case also laid down other
important guidelines regarding the powers of a repayment admin-
istrator.
Banks and other creditors will welcome the court’s decision
that the property of owners with an interest that is divisible from
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that of the alleged transgressor of the provisions of the Banks Act
cannot be attached in terms of section 84(1A)(b)(i).
For the same reason, the property of a spouse of the alleged
transgressor of the BanksAct, who is married out of community of
property with the latter, will also not be attachable in terms of
section 84(1A)(b)(i).
Fourthly, the court held that it is not necessary to join creditors
of the estate of someone whose assets are attached in terms of
section 84(1A)(b)(i). They are served with a copy of the court
order in the same manner as in insolvency proceedings.
Fifthly, the court pointed out that where parties are married in
community of property, like Mr and Mrs Zulu, their shares in the
property are combined and indivisible, and may be attached and
realised in respect of Mr Zulu’s transgressions. Mrs Zulu (assum-
ing that she is an innocent party) will be given her proportionate
share of the proceeds if the interest is realised to raise funds for
repayment. As to the rest of the co-owners, the relevant principle
is that ordinary co-ownership rights are capable of being sepa-
rated because they are held separately by the owners (para
[34]).
Our law in this regard is settled. In Mazibuko & another v
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (6) SA 479 (SCA),
[2009] 3 All SA 548, the court considered the effect of a
preservation order made in terms of section 38(2) of the POCAon
the estate of the innocent spouse who was married in community
of property to the guilty spouse. The court distinguished between
divisible and indivisible co-ownership and found that whereas
ordinary rights of co-ownership are capable of being separated
from one another, because they are held separately by the
co-owners, the co-ownership rights of spouses who are married
in community of property (‘tied co-ownership’) are not divisible
(Mazibuko para [48]).
In summary, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the
administrator is entitled to attach also property which the trans-
gressor is the co-owner of, provided that notice is given to the
co-owner of such attachment.
Payment
The decision in Absa Bank Limited v Moore & another 2017 (1)
SA255 (CC), 2017 (2) BCLR 131 straddled a number of important
legal principles. However, only one of these, the question of what
constitutes payment, merits our attention here.
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The Moores and Absa were both victims of the now infamous
fraudulent Brusson scam. Brusson preyed on over-indebted
consumers who owned fixed properties by offering them a way
out of their debt. The scheme consisted of Brusson offering to
lend the consumers an amount of money against the security
of their home. However, the underlying documents signed by
the consumers were not for loans, but were sales contracts for the
sale of their homes against payment of the money loaned.
Brusson and a so-called investor would then obtain a mortgage
bond loan from a bank against security of the property so bought.
That loan would then be used to pay the consumers’ indebted-
ness to the bank, and the rest of the funds they could use for their
own purposes (para [3]).
In the meantime, the property would be transferred to the
investor and the consumer’s old bond would be cancelled. The
first notice of the fraud that the unsuspecting consumer received
was when the bank applied for their ejection and the sale of the
property at auction as the investor invariably failed to make
payments on the new bond (para [4]).
Many homeowners and banks were taken in by it. A number of
decisions were handed down dealing with this scam (see, eg,
Moore & another v Sheriff, Vereeniging [2014 ZAGPJHC 230
(26 Sept 2014); and Absa Ltd v Moore & another 2016 (3) SA 97
(SCA)). In most it was held that the scheme was fraudulent, and
that the contracts concluded under it were either void or voidable
(para [6]). In the present case, the court of first instance held that
the agreements were void, and that the transfer of ownership was
void because the Moores never had the intention to transfer
ownership, as they believed the transaction involved a loan. The
trial court ordered that the property be retransferred to the
Moores, but against reregistration of the original bonds. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed that the agree-
ments were void, but held that the condition imposed by the High
Court to reinstate the bonds was not competent. The Supreme
Court of Appeal ordered that the property must be restored to the
Moores free of the bonds (para [9]).
In a subsequent appeal to the highest court, Absa argued that
because all the agreements were void due to the fraud, the
cancellation of its bonds was also void and had to be undone.
Alternatively, the bank argued that the Moores were unjustifiably
enriched at its expense by having the bonds cancelled without
having repaid them (para [16]). Absa further contended that
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cancellation of the Moores’ existing mortgage bonds was an
integral part of the fraud (para [17]). As a result, so Absa argued,
the discharge of the Moores’ debt to it (Absa) was invalid
because it was part of the scheme and was tainted with fraud. As
the discharge of the existing bonds was invalid, the Moores’ debt
remained intact (para [18]). At the time of the fraud, the Moores
had owed the bank R145 000, but now they owed the bank
nothing (para [20]). Absa concluded that the High Court was right
to order that the Moores’ bonds must be reinstated (para [18]).
Cameron J held that, in opposing the application by the
Moores, Absa provided very little information about all the trans-
actions involved. As a result, it was not clear from the available
evidence whether or not the Moores’ bond had been discharged
(para [25]).
The payment of the Moores’ indebtedness and the cancellation
of their bonds were not invalid as both the debtor and the creditor
agreed to the payment and its effects. There is long-standing
authority that a debt can effectively be paid by a third party (para
[33]).
Generally, payment is a bilateral act – one that, in the absence
of agreement to the contrary, requires the cooperation of payer
(usually the debtor) and payee (the creditor) (para [36]). Equally
generally, discharge of a debt requires an agreement between
the debtor (or party acting in the name of the true debtor) and
creditor to that effect. But, even assuming that the debt-
discharge agreement was between Absa, as the Moores’ credi-
tor, and one Kabini, who, acting on their behalf, paid off their
bond debt, it does not follow that the discharge was ineffectual
because Kabini was a crook (para [32]). This is because, in
contrast to some other systems, our law is extraordinarily gener-
ous in how a debt may be paid. It allows payment of a debt
without the consent – and even without the knowledge – of the
debtor. This contrasts with the position of the creditor, whose
knowledge of and assent to payment are required (para [33]).
Even a deposit into an account of a fraudster is effectual to
transfer ownership in the money. The victim is left with only a
personal claim against the fraudster – and a concurrent claim
against the fraudster’s curators in the case of a sequestration. In
this regard the court referred with approval to the decision in
Trustees, Estate Whitehead v Dumas & another 2013 (3) SA 331
(SCA) paras [13]–[15] [23][24]; (para [34]).
Consistent with this position is that a debt is paid when the
creditor/payee receives the money from the bank, whether pay-
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ment was authorised or not (see B & H Engineering v First
National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (AD), [1995] 1 All SA 545
(para [34]).
By way of an analogy, the court reasoned that a thief who pays
his or her own debts with stolen funds extinguishes those debts,
provided the creditor who receives and accepts payment is
innocent. In this regard the court relied on the reasoning in Absa
Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Company Ltd, Firstrand Bank Ltd
v Lombard Insurance Company Ltd 2012 (6) SA 569 (SCA),
[2012] 4 All SA 485 (para [35]).
The court further pointed out that, provided the payee/creditor
is innocent, payment of another’s debt, even by a thief, with
stolen funds, operates to extinguish the debt. In this regard the
court referred with approval to the decision in Commissioner for
Inland Revenue v Visser 1959 (1) SA 452 (A) (para [35]). (More
about the requirement of ‘innocence’ on the part of the receiver of
the money, below.)
The payment of the Moores’ debt by Brusson was effective to
discharge their debt, even if the ‘investor’ did so fraudulently with
funds provided by Absa (para [37]).
A person induced to contract by the fraudulent representations
of another may either stand by the contract or claim its rescission.
The agreement is voidable, not void. Unless the Moores chose to
rescind the agreement because of the fraud, Brusson remains
bound by it (para [38]).
So did ‘fraud unravel’ in the present case? Put in the context of
the present proceedings: did the Brusson fraud unravel the
cancellation of the Moores’ bonds? The court answered this
question in the negative. It, correctly, held that the Moores’ main
obligation, the loan, was validly cancelled, and so was the
accessory obligation, the mortgage agreement (para [40]).
Absa also pursued an alternative argument. It argued that its
security under its agreement with the Moores should be restored
to it because it provided the funds from which the Moores are
now benefitting. Further, so Absa argued, it never intended to
expose itself to debt, whether to the Moores or Kabini, minus the
security of the Moores’ property (paras [41] [42]). The court
rejected this argument for three main reasons. Suffice it to
mention here that it held that the SCA was right when it said that
the court cannot make a new agreement for the parties. A new
agreement would be the only way to reinstate the bank’s mort-
gage bond (para [44]).
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Next, the court held that neither the investor nor Brusson would be
entitled to claim anything from the Moores as any claim could be
met with the par delictum defence. Although the trustees or liquida-
tors of those parties should in principle be in the same position as
the parties, overriding considerations of public policy may conceiv-
ably entitle the trustees or liquidators to claim back from the Moores
the benefit they gained in the fraud despite the par delictum
defence (paras [47] [48]). (See Afrisure CC v Watson NO 2009 (2)
SA 127 (SCA) para [7], in which the court relaxed the par delictum
rule and declared the liquidators in that case eligible to recover, in
the light of public policy considerations, notwithstanding the turpi-
tude on the part of the claimant company.)
Finally, the court held that Absa’s contention that an enrichment
claim should be developed to restore it to the security it previ-
ously enjoyed over the Moores’ property, on the facts of the
Moore case, could not be sustained. There may be circum-
stances in which it could. Each case has to be decided on its own
facts (paras [55] [56]).
The decision in Absa v Moore is correct, but merits comment.
First, the confirmation of the line of cases in the Supreme Court
of Appeal dealing with fraud, payment and enrichment by the
Constitutional Court is to be welcomed. It affords legal certainty in
an uncertain area.
Secondly, it is also encouraging that the court did not fully
exclude the possibility that the common law of enrichment may
be developed to afford a creditor or bank a remedy in situations
like these. It is unfortunate that the enrichment claim by the bank
could not properly be assessed due to the lack of evidence
before the court. In this regard, it has been submitted that
properly pleaded and proven, a creditor (bank) may well have an
enrichment claim in cases like this against the consumer in so far
as the consumer has been enriched. This would address the
difficulty of third-party interpositions that was first raised in Gouws
v Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 563 (T) and later left open in
Buzzard Electrical (Pty) Ltd. v 158 Jan Smuts Avenue Invest-
ments (Pty) Ltd & another 1996 (4) SA 19 (SCA), [1996] 3 All SA 1.
For a discussion of the application of the principles of enrichment
in the recovery of unauthorised electronic funds transfers, see
Robert Sharrock (ed) The Law of Banking and Payment in South
Africa (2016) 317 382–84.
Thirdly, the court’s reference to and reliance on the decision in
Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Company Ltd (above)
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merits comment. The Lombard case constituted an important
milestone in the law of payments and the question regarding the
ownership of money in a bank account. Although Lombard did not
deal with the reversal of an electronic transfer, it is still important to
the law of money payments and the ownership of stolen money in a
bank account. Lombard turned on whether the receipt of stolen
funds by a bank which is unaware of the tainted nature of the money
operates as a discharge of the thief’s debts to the bank. (For a
general discussion of the recovery of unauthorised electronic funds
transfers, see Sharrock above 377–82.).
In this regard it is worth noting that the positive law in regard to
the payment of moneys tainted by fraud or theft is not always
clear or consistent (Chris Pretorius ‘The use of stolen funds to
discharge a debt and enrichment: Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard
Insurance Co Ltd’ (Pretorius ‘Stolen funds’) (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ
589 596–97). This uncertainty is caused by two factors. First,
payment in the banking context often involves complex issues
(see, generally, FR Malan & JT Pretorius ‘Credit transfers in South
African law (1)’ (2006) 69 THRHR 1; WG Schulze ‘Countermand-
ing an electronic funds transfer: The Supreme Court of Appeal
takes a second bite at the cherry’ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 667. The
second factor which may cause uncertainty is the fact that one is
often dealing with multiple parties. This, in turn, renders it difficult
at times to determine inter-related issues of ownership, including
the question of who has the right to the funds, the discharging of
obligations, the appropriateness of a remedy (including one in
enrichment), and whether the requirements for a particular remedy
have been met (see Pretorius (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 596 and the
authorities referred to there; cf CJ Nagel & JT Pretorius ‘Owner-
ship and appropriation of funds deposited in a bank account’
(2017) 80 THRHR 308 310 for a discussion of the general rule that
money which is deposited in a bank account becomes the
property of the bank, and the exceptions to the general rule).
The decision in Lombard has also attracted criticism. In this
regard it has been argued that the decision in Lombard rests
largely on the promotion of certainty and the protection of the
bona fide receiver of money, but potentially does so at the
expense of the true owner (see Pretorius ‘Stolen funds’ 603). As a
result, it may so happen that a bank which in good faith receives
stolen money may benefit from the proceeds of theft or fraud,
especially in circumstances such as those present in Lombard.
To counter this potential unsatisfactory situation, it has been
549FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 57 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/16−Financial−Institutions
suggested that a bank (as creditor) should only be legally
permitted to retain stolen money to discharge the debt of its
customer (as debtor) where the bank’s belief in the legitimacy of –
and its consequent entitlement to – the funds is reasonable
(Pretorius (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 604). Put differently, the bank’s
belief must be plausible and justifiable in the light of all the
circumstances. The question in each case should be whether a
reasonable banker in the position of the bank-creditor in question
would have held a bona fide belief as to the untainted origins of
the money so deposited into the account.
Finally, and for a case which dealt with a related issue, namely
which of the bank or its client bears the risk of theft from a bank
account as a result of internet fraud, see the decision in Roestoff v
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc 2013 (1) SA 12 (GNP). And for a
decision in which the court was asked to pronounce on the place
of payment in the case of an electronic transfer, see Bush and
others v BJ Kruger Inc & another [2013] 2 All SA 148 (GSJ). One
of the issues in the Bush case was whether the South Gauteng
High Court in Johannesburg (SGJ) had jurisdiction to hear the
present matter. The aspect of jurisdiction, in turn, hinges on
whether payment by the defendant to the plaintiffs took place in
Pretoria or in Johannesburg (paras [2]–[17]). The court held that it
is the receipt of money in the bank account of the recipient (here:
the plaintiffs) that constitutes payment. Payment by EFT only
occurs when the party entitled to receive such payment receives
it in his bank account. Payment would, therefore, be made and
completed only when the money becomes available in the
plaintiffs’ Johannesburg bank account (para [67]).
South African Reserve Bank
In South African Reserve Bank v Public Protector & others 2017
(6) SA 198 (GP) the Gauteng North High Court confirmed that the
primary function of the SARB is to protect the value of SouthAfrica’s
currency. This function is entrenched in section 224 of the Constitu-
tion. The Public Protector does not have the power to instruct
Parliament to amend section 224 in order to change the primary
function of the SARB. (For a broad overview of the role of the SARB
as the systemic regulator of the South African financial system, see
Sharrock above 63 65; and Johann de Jager ‘The South African
Reserve Bank: Blowing winds of change (Part 2)’ (De Jager
‘Blowing winds: Part 2’) (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 492 499ff.)
The facts were as follows. Two issues were raised in a report
issued by the Public Protector (Report 8 of 2017/2018). The first
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was the finding and remedial action recommended for the
government to recover ‘misappropriated public funds’ after the
SouthAfrican Reserve Bank (‘SARB’) in 1985 extended a ‘lifeboat’
involving millions of rands to Bankorp (which has since been
absorbed by ABSA) (para [1]).
Secondly, the Public Protector directed the Portfolio Committee
on Justice and Correctional Services to initiate a process that
would result in the amendment of section 224 of the Constitution.
In terms of this directive section 224 had to be amended to
change the primary function of the SARB from ‘the protection of
the value of the currency’ to ‘the promotion of balanced and
sustainable economic growth’ in the Republic (para [5]).
The present application by the SARB was concerned solely
with the second issue, namely the Public Protector’s order to
Parliament to amend section 224 of the Constitution. The SARB
sought urgent relief to set this order aside (para [7]).
The court held that the Public Protector’s direction to amend
section 224 of the Constitution was illegal and ultra vires for the
following reasons.
First, the Public Protector, without any notice to any affected
person, illegally broadened the scope of her investigation regarding
the alleged ‘misappropriation of public funds’ to include an investi-
gation into the primary function of the SARB and a directive to
Parliament to amend the Constitution. She offered no reasons for
expanding the scope of the investigation in this manner (para [31]).
The Public Protector’s order that the Constitution be amended to
strip the SARB of its primary function of protecting the value of the
currency fell outside the powers granted to the Public Protector in
terms of section 182(1)(a) of the Constitution. The latter provision
empowers the Public Protector to investigate improper conduct in
state affairs or in the public administration (para [41]).
Because the Office of the Public Protector derives its powers
from the Constitution, the Public Protector has no power to
recommend that the Constitution be amended (para [42]).
Further, the Public Protector’s order regarding the amendment
of the Constitution was entirely unrelated to the so-called improper
conduct that she had found to be have been committed with
regard to the ‘lifeboat’ to Bankorp (para [40]).
The Public Protector’s recommended remedial action was set
aside in terms of section 6(2)(a)(i) of the Promotion of Administra-
tive Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA) because she was not
authorised by section 182(1) of the Constitution to make such an
order (para [42]).
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Secondly, the Public Protector’s direction to Parliament to
amend section 224 of the Constitution was also irrational and
unreasonable. In this regard, the court reasoned that the Public
Protector’s order trenched unconstitutionally and irrationally on
Parliament’s exclusive authority. It is trite that the enactment of
national legislation is within the exclusive constitutional domain of
Parliament. Sections 43 and 44 of the Constitution vest legislative
authority in Parliament, including the power to amend the Consti-
tution; and sections 55(1) and 68 vest the National Assembly and
the National Council of Provinces, respectively, with the exclusive
responsibility to initiate or prepare legislation and to consider,
pass, amend or reject legislation. The Public Protector does not
have the power to prescribe to Parliament how to exercise its
discretionary legislative powers. The Public Protector is a crea-
ture of the Constitution. Her remedial powers are derived from the
Constitution, and consequently she operates under the Constitu-
tion and not over it. She therefore has no power to order an
amendment of the Constitution. Section 74 of the Constitution
prescribes the conditions for its own amendment. Section 74(3)(a)
of the Constitution provides that section 224 can only be amended
with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly (para [43]). The remedial action recom-
mended by the Public Prosecutor therefore violated the doctrine
of the separation of powers entrenched in section 1(c) of the
Constitution (para [44]).
Based on expert evidence adduced by the SARB, it is a
generally accepted principle of economics that the primary
function of central banks world-wide is to protect the value of the
local currency (para [48]). For a broad overview of the important
and independent role that central banks should play in ensuring
financial stability, see De Jager ‘Blowing winds: Part 2’ 494ff. For
a discussion of another of the functions of the SARB, namely to
establish, conduct, monitor, regulate and supervise a payment,
clearing or settlement system in South Africa, see FR Malan, CJ
Nagel & JT Pretorius ‘Operational aspects of the National Pay-
ment Systems Act 78 of 1998’ 2018 (81) THRHR 1 2ff.)
The protection of a country’s currency has a close bearing on
aspects such as the inflation rate and ensuring the competitive-
ness of South African goods and services in export markets.
These aspects are crucial, also for the marginalised and the poor
(para [49]).
The Public Protector’s order to amend the Constitution would
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change all this. The Public Protector’s order is both unscientific
and irrational and consequently also, for this reason, invalid (para
[50]).
Thirdly, the Public Protector’s direction to amend section 224 of
the Constitution was procedurally unfair and had to be set aside
in terms of section 6(2)(c) of PAJA because she failed to honour
an agreement with the SARB in terms of which she undertook to
make her report available to it before making it public (para [58]).
In the result, the Public Protector’s order to Parliament to
amend the Constitution was set aside with costs (paras [59] [60]).
Although the court’s decision is sound and correct, it merits
comment.
It confirms that a creature of statute (here the Office of the
Public Protector) derives its powers from the law. It does not enjoy
rights or privileges which are not accorded to it by the laws of the
state, including the right to change the law in terms of which it has
been created and empowered.
The SARB and South African banks alike will welcome the
decision because it brings clarity and calm after the turmoil which
was caused in financial markets after the Public Protector had
released her report on 19 June 2017.
The court’s decision reaffirms the recognition of the SARB’s
independence and of the important function that it plays as the
central bank of South Africa, including the function of ensuring
economic stability that it exercises in terms of the South African
Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989. The SARB, too, is a creature of
statute. When the 1996 Constitution was promulgated on
18 December 1996, section 223 of that Act established the SARB
as the central bank of South Africa. (For a general overview of the
role of the SARB as central bank, including the continuous
evolution and changes faced by the SARB, see Johann de Jager
‘The South African Reserve Bank: Blowing winds of change. Part
1’ (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 342 343ff.)
Finally, it must be pointed out that on 10 July 2017, after the
SARB had lodged the present application, but before the matter
was heard, the Public Protector filed an answering affidavit in
which she consented to the order sought by the SARB (para [9]).
Although the Public Protector agreed that her powers were
subject to the Constitution (and that she, therefore, has no power
to order that the Constitution be amended), she did not consent
to the allegation made by the SARB in its application that she had
acted unreasonably and irrationally (ibid]).
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For this reason, and also because of the importance of the
issues at stake, the SARB requested the court to give full
considerations to the issues, including an explanation of the
powers and functions of the Public Protector.
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INSOLVENCY LAW
AL STANDER*
LEGISLATION
The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 was amended by the Financial
Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (date of commencement: 1 April
2018) (GN 169 in GG 41549 of 29 March 2018).
Item 1 of schedule 4 to Act 9 of 2017 amends the definition of
‘market infrastructure’ in section 35A(1) by adding paragraphs
(d) and (e) (Date of commencement of item 1: 29 March 2018.)
The paragraphs inserted read:
35A Transactions on exchange
(1) In this section ‘market infrastructure’ means
. . .
(d) a central counterparty as defined in section 1 of that Act and
licensed under section 49 of that Act; or
(e) a licensed external central counterparty as defined in section
1 of that Act;
Item 2 amends section 83, as follows: paragraph (a) substi-
tutes subsection (2); paragraph (b) substitutes subsection (3);
and paragraph (c) substitutes subsection (8)(a). (Date of com-
mencement of item 2: 29 March 2018.)
83 Realisation of securities for claims
(2) If such property consists of securities as defined in section 1(1)
of the Financial Markets Act, 2012 (Act 19 of 2012), a bill of
exchange or a financial instrument or a foreign financial instru-
ment as defined in section 1(1) of the Financial Sector Regulation
Act, 2017, the creditor may, after giving the notice mentioned in
subsection (1) and before the second meeting of creditors,
realise the property in the manner and on the conditions men-
tioned in subsection (8).
(3) If such property does not consist of securities or a bill of
exchange, the trustee may, within seven days as from the receipt
of the notice mentioned in subsection (1) or within seven days as
from the date which the certificate of appointment issued by the
Master in terms of subsection (1) of section eighteen or subsec-
tion (2) of section fifty six reached him, whichever be the later,
take over the property from the creditor at a value agreed upon
* B Iuris (PU for CHE) LLB (PU for CHE) LLM (UNISA) LLD (PU for CHE).
Professor, Faculty of Law, NWU Potchefstroom Campus.
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between the trustee and the creditor or at the full amount of
the creditor’s claim, and if the trustee does not so take over the
property the creditor may, after the expiration of the said period
but before the said meeting, realise the property in the manner
and on the conditions mentioned in subsection (8).
(8) The creditor may realise such property in the manner and on the
conditions following, that is to say –
(a) if it is any property of a class ordinarily sold through an
authorised user or an external authorised user, on an exchange
or an external exchange, each defined in section 1 (1) of the
Financial Markets Act, 2012 (Act 19 of 2012) or, where
applicable, a person prescribed by the Minister of Finance
as a regulated person in terms of section 5 of that Act, the
creditor may, subject to the provisions of that Act and
applicable standards and rules in terms of that Act, immedi-
ately sell it through an authorised user, external authorised
user or such regulated person, or if the creditor is an
authorised user, external authorised user or regulated per-
son, also to another authorised user, external authorised user
or regulated person;
CASE LAW
SEQUESTRATION OF TWO OR MORE INDIVIDUALS IN SINGLE
APPLICATION
Strutfast (Pty) Ltd v Uys & another 2017 (6) SA 491 (GJ) was an
application for the sequestration of the first and second respon-
dents. The applicant’s founding affidavit contained no allegations
to show that the sequestration of the estates of the two individuals
was sought in a single application based on an identity of
interests between the respondents or their estates. It was,
however, stated that the respondents were married, but not in
community of property (para [1]).
The application, therefore, violated the long-standing practice
in the Gauteng courts that one should not seek the sequestration
of numerous respondents in a single application, ‘save where
parties are married in community of property or in the otherwise
very unusual circumstance of a complete identity of interests’
(para [2]).
Before discussing Gauteng court practice of not including
multiple respondents in a joint application, Rome J referred to the
following important fundamental principles with regard to seques-
trations. This was a vital aspect in guiding the final decision of the
court.
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The court emphasised that, like an application for the appoint-
ment of a curator bonis for a patient, an application for sequestra-
tion should relate solely and specifically to that debtor’s
circumstances. The sequestration of an individual’s estate is
aimed at reducing that debtor’s legal status and ability to act
based on a specific reason (para [3]).
The court agreed with the view in Ferela (Pty) Ltd v Craigie &
others 1980 (3) SA 167 (W) that, as regards the specific statutory
requirements for proof in a compulsory sequestration, the seques-
tration of more than one respondent seldom relates to the
determination of essentially the same factual questions (para [7]).
Ferela explained that the purpose of sequestration proceedings
is to achieve a concursus creditorum. It is, therefore, inadvisable
that two separate estates should be dealt with together, as each
estate leads to its own and totally separate concursus credi-
torum. As to the likelihood of an advantage to creditors regarding
that particular debtor, one deals with two diverse sets of asset,
two diverse sets of creditor, and two diverse situations or
circumstances, each of which must be examined (para [7]). The
court, correctly, supported these remarks (para [10]).
In the Ferela case, the court noted the decision by Coetzee J
as authority for the practice against joining multiple respondents
in a single joint application for their individual sequestration.
However, recently, and contrary to this practice, Ferela was
not followed in Maree & another v Bobroff & another [2017]
ZAGPJHC 116 on the basis that it had been incorrectly decided
(para [4]). Briefly, Bobroff allowed a single application for the
sequestration of partners in a law firm. The court’s view was that
in the matter of Business Partners Ltd v Vecto Trade 87 (Pty) Ltd &
others 2004 (5) SA 296 (SE), it was held that this was the
preferable way of dealing with such a situation. In Business
Partners it was suggested that the qualification for allowing
multiple respondents in a single sequestration application should
be only a ‘substantial coincidence of interests’, rather than a
‘complete identity of interests’ (para [12]).
This situation prompted the court to ask two questions (para
[5]): Was the ‘established practice’ still good insolvency law? In
terms of the rules of stare decisis, the court in Bobroff was entitled
to depart from Ferela – a decision of a court of the same division –
only if the latter was ‘clearly, plainly or palpably wrong’. Had this
standard then been met?
In Ferela the applicant applied for sequestration orders against
three respondents. The first two respondents were alleged to be
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partners in the third respondent, which was cited as a partner-
ship. However, no case was made as to ‘why the partnership fell
within the purview of an application for its sequestration’ (para
[5]). This, in effect, means there was no essential information in
the application regarding the cited partnership, and so no case
had been made out for its sequestration.
Consequently, the question in Ferela was whether the estates
of the first and second respondents (the two partners above)
could be sequestrated jointly in a single application. The issue of
joinder was considered in the context of the requirements for
compulsory sequestration set out in sections 9(1) and 10(c) of the
Insolvency Act (para [6]).
In paragraph [7] it is clear that Rome J’s view corresponds to
Coetzee J’s statement that as far as each of the facta probanda
is concerned, the court may be faced with two entirely different
cases (para [7]). Rome J indicated that support for Coetzee J’s
viewpoint was to be found in Breetveldt & others v Van Zyl &
others 1972 (1) SA 304 (T), and some four decades later, in Brack
& another v Front Runner Racks 2000 (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC
34 (4 May 2011) paragraph [7]. Boruchowitz J remarked that
Breetveldt has ‘stood the test of time’ (paras [8] [9]).
Rome J, in the matter under discussion, was convinced that the
judgment in Ferela had similarly, and for sound reason, withstood
the passage of time. He declared that the judgment’s ‘authorita-
tive force has grown, not diminished, over the years’ (para [11]).
The court also stated that Business Partners (above) had
expressed doubts as to the Ferela and Breetveldt practice (para
[12]). In discussing this situation, Rome J drew attention to the
following:
• Firstly, Business Partners explicitly validated the approach in
Ferela and Breetveldt (para [13]), but then qualified this.
• This qualification ‘was one expressed as to kind, namely that
the strictness of the rule be reduced from a complete identity
of interest to a somewhat more flexible substantial coinci-
dence of interest’ (para [14]).
• This qualification was also somewhat tentative using the word
‘perhaps’ (para [14]).
• That case in fact concerned an application for liquidation in
terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the 1973 Companies
Act). It was not an application for the sequestration of
individuals under sections 9 and 10 of the Insolvency Act.
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Therefore, the qualification as it relates to the sequestration
proceedings was clearly obiter (para [15]).
• Business Partners did not address a central aspect of Ferela’s
reasoning, namely that the rules of practice play a greater role
in sequestration proceedings because of the statutory neces-
sity to prove a probable benefit to the creditors of a particular
debtor.
Rome J consequently concluded that the practice established
in Ferela remains unaffected by the verdict in Business Partners.
Then came Maree & another v Bobroff & another [2017]
ZAGPJHC 116 (7 March 2017), which rendered the continued
application of the practice established in Ferela uncertain (para
[16]). The court explained that in Bobroff there was an application
for the sequestration of two attorneys, a father and son, who were
partners in the same law firm. Again, it did not appear from the
judgment that the law firm itself had been sequestrated or
liquidated. Therefore, the facts in Bobroff fall squarely within the
ambit of the Ferela precedent. Relying on Ferela, the respon-
dents contended that their joinder was improper (para [17]).
Theron AJ dismissed the objection on the basis that Ferela was
‘clearly wrong’ (para [17]).
In Bobroff, Theron AJ clearly relied on the qualification of the
general rule in Business Partners. This meant that the court in
Strutfast, per Rome J, had to decide whether the judgment in
Ferela constituted a clear judicial error (para [18]).
Relying on the Constitutional Court case of Gcaba v Minister of
Safety & Security 2010 (1) SA238 (CC), 2010 (1) BCLR 35, [2009]
12 BLLR 1145, the following principles were identified by the
court for purposes of deciding the legal question (para [21]):
• Precedents must be respected in order to ensure legal
certainty and equality before the law.
• Law cannot rule unless it is reasonably predictable.
• A highest court of appeal – and this court in particular – must
be especially cautious as far as adherence to, or deviation
from, its own previous decisions is concerned.
• As a jurisprudence develops, understanding may increase,
and interpretations may change.
• At the same time, however, a single source of consistent,
authoritative, and binding decisions is essential for the devel-
opment of a stable constitutional jurisprudence and for the
effective protection of fundamental rights.
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• This court must not easily and without coherent and compel-
ling reason deviate from its own previous decisions or be seen
to have done so.
• One exceptional instance where this principle may be invoked,
is when this court’s earlier decisions have given rise to
controversy or uncertainty, leading to conflicting decisions in
the lower courts.
In another Constitutional Court case, Camps Bay Ratepayers’
and Residents’ Association & another v Harrison & another 2011
(4) SA 42 (CC), further constitutional confirmation for the contin-
ued principled application of stare decisis was given:
• The doctrine of precedent binds not only lower courts.
• It also binds courts of final jurisdiction to their own decisions.
• These courts may depart from a previous decision of their own
only when satisfied that that decision is clearly wrong.
• Stare decisis is, therefore, not simply a matter of respect for
courts of higher authority. It is a manifestation of the rule of law
itself, which, in turn, is a founding value of our Constitution
(para [22]).
In paragraph [23], the court pointed out that the applicant in
Strutfast, after joining two respondents in a single application,
offered no basis as to why the established practice might be
constitutionally suspect.
In paragraph [24] the court took the view that the established
rule of practice ‘chimes with important constitutional values’. It then
gave a very good example of what might happen if applicants
were allowed to deviate from the rule in Ferela: it would enable
large financial institutions, ‘for reasons of their own commercial
convenience, to join numerous debtors as multiple respondents in
an application for their sequestration, with the inevitable blurring
between the estates, creditors and the specific circumstances of
each debtor that such an application would entail’.
From paragraphs [27]–[31] the court made the following points.
The stare decisis doctrine is, accordingly, summarised by the
notion that a court may ignore its own recognised precedent only
in circumstances where the precedent was crystallised in a
judgment that is not merely wrong, but ‘clearly’ wrong. Further,
the deviating court must be quite satisfied that it is wrong; and
that it is plainly wrong. In this regard, the court referred to R v
Jansen 1937 CPD 294 297; Duminij v Prinsloo 1916 OPD 83 84;
S v Tarajka Estates (Edms) Bpk & andere 1963 (4) SA467 (T) 470;
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and National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman & another
1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1101B.
Although it concluded that there appears to be no clearly
articulated or precise test as to when a decision is not only wrong
but clearly wrong, the stare decisis doctrine requires more than a
mere conclusion that a previous judgment was incorrectly
decided. Whatever the precise test, a clearly or patently wrong
judgment is a judgment where the error is so profound that it
amounts to a ‘judicial blunder’, or results in a ‘manifest and
unsustainable absurdity or injustice’ (para 30]). The reason
offered in Bobroff for declining to follow Ferela and preferring the
qualification as set out in Business Partners – that it was almost
impossible to conceive of a situation where there would be a
complete identity of interests – did not indicate a palpable error in
Ferela (para [31]). Consequently, Ferela was not wrong, and still
less, clearly or palpably wrong (para [32]).
The established approach was appropriate, given (1) that an
application for sequestration involved a reduction in the status of
a particular debtor; and (2) the difficulty of establishing, in a
single application for the sequestration of multiple respondents,
whether there was a likelihood of advantage to creditors in
respect of each debtor (para [32]).
Blurring the distinction between the affairs of the respondents
In Strutfast there was a judgment debt obtained against each
of the respondents. It was based on a settlement agreement that
was made an order of court. However, there was no identity of
interests between the respondents, and particularly as regards
the requirement of advantage to creditors (para [33]).
The court declared that the failure to differentiate, or even
attempt to distinguish, between the creditors and the assets
of each of the respondents for the purposes of identifying a
potential dividend to the creditors in each separate estate,
rendered the application fatally defective (para [34]).
The court expressly held (para [34]) that it is not satisfactory for
an applicant merely to comfort himself with a reassuring assertion
that he has very little knowledge of the affairs of the respondents.
Even if this is true, the applicant should still distinguish between
the affairs of each of the respondents. The applicant should not
merely merge the creditors of each respondent into one com-
bined body of creditors and cannot merely state that the respon-
dents’ sequestration would be to the advantage of the general
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body of creditors. His founding affidavit should contain allega-
tions from which it can be established that there is an identical
group of joint creditors for each of the respondents.
It was the court’s view that even were the test to be the less
strict formulation of ‘a similarity or coincidence of interests’ which
would justify joinder, the court would be unable to conclude that
the joinder in this matter was justified. The court explained that
while the founding affidavit set out that the second respondent
was vested with ownership of two bonded immovable properties,
there was no allegation as to whether the relevant mortgagees
were creditors of the first respondent, the second respondent, or
of both (para [34]). Therefore, the court emphasised that where
there is such a blurring of the distinction between the affairs of the
respondents (as in this case), this shows ‘why the joinder of
respondents in an application for their sequestrations is an
ill-advised practice’ (para [35]).
Decision
The decision in Bobroff to disregard the earlier judgment in
Ferela was itself an error of such a nature that it had to be held to
be clearly wrong and should be departed from (para [32]). The
‘established practice’ is still good insolvency law; the required
standard of ‘clearly, plainly or palpably wrong’ had not been
sufficiently met in this case to justify deviating from the Ferela
rule. The application was dismissed with costs as there was no
rationale for having launched sequestration proceedings against
both respondents in a single application (para [36]).
ADVANTAGE TO CREDITORS: BODY CORPORATE MUST PROVE
PECUNIARY BENEFIT TO GENERAL BODY OF CREDITORS
Section 10(c) of the Insolvency Act provides:
If the court to which the petition for the sequestration of the estate of a
debtor has been presented is of the opinion that prima facie –
(a) . . . . .
(b) . . . . .
(c) there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of
creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated,
it may make an order sequestrating the estate of the debtor provision-
ally.
In Body Corporate of Empire Gardens v Sithole & another 2017
(4) SA 161 (SCA), the interpretation of the requirement of ‘advan-
tage to creditors’ as contemplated in section 10(c) of the Insol-
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vency Act again took centre stage. The issue in this case was
whether, in an application for the provisional sequestration of one
its members, the body corporate of a sectional title development
is required to prove that there is reason to believe that it will be to
the advantage of the concursus creditorum if the debtor’s estate
is sequestrated (para [1]).
The appellant was the body corporate of Empire Gardens (EG
Body Corporate). It was established in accordance with section
36 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. The first respondent,
Sithole, was the joint registered owner of unit twelve of the
sectional title scheme. She was, therefore, in terms of section
36(1) of this Act, one of the members of the EG Body Corporate.
The other registered owner of the unit was the first respondent’s
sister. She was not cited as a party in the proceedings (para [2]).
In terms of section 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act, a body
corporate is obliged to establish a fund for administrative expenses
for the repair, upkeep, control, management, and administration
of the common property; for the payment of rates and taxes and
other local authority charges for the supply of electric current,
gas, water, fuel, and sanitation; for other services to the buildings
and land; for insurance premiums; for the discharge of any other
obligation of the body corporate; etcetera (para [37]).
In terms of section 37(1)(b) the body corporate must require
the owners of the units (and thus members of the body corporate)
to make contributions, where necessary, to this fund to satisfy any
claims against the body corporate. Section 37(1)(c) and (d)
further provide that the body corporate must, from time to time,
determine amounts to be raised from each member, and must
raise the amounts by levying contributions on the owners in
proportion to the quotas of their respective sections (para [3]).
As joint owners of one of the units in the scheme and thus
members of the EG Body Corporate, the Sithole sisters had to
pay levies, but defaulted. Two default judgments were granted
against them, in the amounts of ± R13 385 and ± R99 300
respectively. At the behest of the body corporate, their movable
assets were attached and sold at an auction in order to satisfy the
judgments. This only realised an amount of ± R3 200. There was
not even enough money to settle the sheriff’s fees and costs
(para [4]).
A further attempt to satisfy the judgments was made by the EG
Body Corporate which thereafter obtained a warrant of execution
against the sisters’ immovable property. Their unit in the sectional
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title scheme was attached and sold at auction. Unfortunately, the
sale had to be abandoned as Nedbank refused to accept the
sale price of R170 000. Nedbank had a mortgage bond regis-
tered in its favour over the unit. The EG Body Corporate then
launched the application for the sequestration of Sithole’s estate.
It alleged that Sithole appeared to be factually insolvent as she
had not paid her levies. Further, her movable assets had realised
a totally inadequate amount. EG Body Corporate also referred to
another judgment in favour of Amazing Properties CC in the
amount of approximately R31 000. This debt, they contended,
had also not yet been paid (para [5]).
The EG Body Corporate stated in its founding affidavit that a
body corporate need not show a pecuniary benefit when it
applies for the sequestration of its members. Because of the
nature of a sectional title development, a body corporate (and,
therefore, EG Body Corporate) enjoys a certain preference over
other creditors. It relied on section 89 of the Insolvency Act (read
with s 15B of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986). This section
states that a body corporate is a preferential creditor for any
unpaid levies or contributions. Reference was made to Barnard
NO v Regspersoon van Aminie & ’n ander 2001 (3) SA 973 (SCA).
According to EG Body Corporate, the current position is that
where a body corporate applies to have the estate of a member
sequestrated, ‘the guiding principle should be the removal of the
defaulting member from the scheme in order to bring the
negative effect of her actions to an end’ (para [6]).
Intervening creditor
As a secured creditor, Nedbank obtained leave to intervene in
the sequestration proceedings. It opposed the application princi-
pally on the basis that EG Body Corporate had not proved that
the sequestration would be to the advantage of any creditor other
than itself. Nedbank revealed that its bond instalments were up to
date. It further criticised the fact that the application was against
Sithole alone, and not against her sister, the co-owner of the unit.
Nedbank claimed that if an order of sequestration were granted
in respect of only one co-owner, ‘the trustee would face practical
difficulties in dealing with half of the value of the unit’ (para [8]).
TRIAL COURT
The court a quo dismissed the application and held as follows:
• Such an order would only benefit the body corporate and not
the general body of creditors (para [8]).
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• The purpose and effect of the sequestration process are ‘to
bring about a convergence of the claims in an insolvent estate
to ensure that it is wound up in an orderly fashion and that the
creditors are treated equally’ (para [9], referring to Investec
Bank Ltd & another v Mutemeri & another 2010 (1) SA 265
(GSJ)).
• It cannot appropriately be described as an instrument to be
used by a creditor to claim a debt due by the debtor to a
single creditor (para [9], referring to Collett v Priest 1931 AD
290 at 299).
• The moment a sequestration order is made, a concursus
creditorum comes into being, with the effect that the rights of
the creditors as a group are preferred to the rights of an
individual creditor (para [9]).
• The phrase ‘advantage to creditors’ means that ‘there should
be a reasonable prospect of some pecuniary benefit to the
general body of creditors as a whole’ (para [10], referring to
Lynn & Main Inc v Naidoo & another 2006 (1) SA59 (N) and Ex
Parte Bouwer and Similar Applications 2009 (6) SA 382
(GNP)).
• This condition is fulfilled where it is determined that there is
reason to believe that there will be advantage to a ‘substantial
proportion’ or the majority of the creditors reckoned by value
(para [10], referring to Fesi & another v Absa Bank Ltd 2000
(1) SA 499 (C) 505–6; Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty)
Ltd v Mackan 1954 (2) SA 109 (N); Samsudin v De Villiers
Berrange NO [2006] SCA 79 (RSA)).
• ‘Advantage to creditors’ is not a rigid concept (para [10],
referring to Stratford & others v Investec Bank Ltd & others
2015 (3) SA 1 (CC)), but it needs proof of a tangible benefit to
the general body of creditors.
The High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria, subsequently
granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (para
[8]).
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal the EG Body
Corporate argued as follows:
• Bodies corporate do not merely act to protect their own
financial interests but have a statutory obligation to protect the
interests of all the members who are prejudiced when a single
member fails to pay his or her arrear levies (para [11]).
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• A deviation from the trite principle of concursus creditorum is,
therefore, justified so that it will be unnecessary for bodies
corporate to prove actual or prospective pecuniary benefit to
the general body of creditors (para [11]).
• Abody corporate needs to establish only that it has exhausted
all reasonable execution remedies in respect of the movable
assets and immovable properties of one of its members
(para [11]).
Counsel for EG Body Corporate admitted that he was not
asking the court to develop the common law and acknowledged
that no such case had been made out in the papers. He was also
forced to concede that the insolvency law and the Sectional Titles
Acts do not provide for the distinction sought (para [11]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal indicated the following elements
as part of a ‘fundamental problem’ with the proposition (paras
[12] [13]):
• The difficulty experienced by bodies corporate in collecting
arrear levies was part of a socio-economic problem (Body
Corporate of Geovy Villa v Sheriff Pretoria Central Magistrate’s
Court & another 2003 (1) SA 69 (T) 73 and Barnard NO v
Regspersoon van Aminie & ’n ander 2001 (3) SA 973 (SCA)
981).
• The legislature has since 1986 effected several amendments
to the Sectional Titles Act. However, in doing so it has not
accorded bodies corporate any preferential treatment beyond
that provided through the provisions of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa)
of the Sectional Titles Act and section 89(1) of the Insolvency
Act.
• All that section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) provides is that a sectional title
unit cannot be transferred into the name of a new owner
unless a clearance certificate is obtained from the body
corporate and provision is made for the payment of all arrear
contributions.
• In terms of section 89(1) of the Insolvency Act, outstanding
levies due to the body corporate are treated as part of the cost
of realisation (Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways
Building & another 1996 (1) SA 131 (A) 140 and First Rand
Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 (3) SA 362
(SCA)).
The Supreme Court of Appeal further indicated elements of
other ‘fundamental problems’ EG Body Corporate was facing
(para [14]):
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• The debt allegedly owed to Amazing Properties CC had not
been proved.
• Nedbank, which is both a major and preferential creditor, had
objected to the application on the basis that its monthly
instalments were being paid regularly.
• It was not clear on the papers how Sithole was able to pay for
the mortgage bond, but there was no basis to conclude that a
sequestration order would be to Nedbank’s advantage, and
hence to the advantage of the general body of creditors.
Taking all of this into account, the Supreme Court of Appeal
found that it could not usurp the functions of the legislature and
grant the immunity from the Insolvency Act being sought. There
was thus no basis on which to make the distinction between
bodies corporate and other creditors (para [13]). The court held
that EG Body Corporate was seeking to obtain a preference that
neither the Sectional Titles Act nor the Insolvency Act conferred
upon it. It stated that this would require an amendment of the
statutes concerned, which was a matter for the legislature (para
[14]). The appeal was dismissed by Tshiqi JA (Wallis, Petse,
Mbha JJA and Nicholls AJA concurring (para [15])).
APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES: POLICY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE,
GENDER, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY IN TERMS OF SECTION 9(2) OF
THE CONSTITUTION
Section 18(1) of the Insolvency Act provides:
As soon as an estate has been sequestrated (whether provisionally or
finally) or when a person appointed as trustee ceases to be trustee or
to function as such, the Master may, in accordance with policy
determined by the Minister, appoint a provisional trustee to the estate
in question who shall give security to the satisfaction of the Master for
the proper performance of his or her duties as provisional trustee and
shall hold office until the appointment of a trustee.
In Minister of Justice & another v SA Restructuring and IPS
Association & others 2017 (3) SA 95 (SCA), the appeal con-
cerned the constitutionality of a policy that sought to regulate the
appointment of Insolvency Practitioners (IPs), primarily as provi-
sional trustees and liquidators, but also as co-trustees and
co-liquidators, as well as appointments to certain other compa-
rable positions under various statutes (para [1]). Because the
Minister is also empowered, in terms of section 10(1A)(a) of the
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and section 368 of the 1973
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Companies Act, to determine the policy for the appointment of
liquidators and provisional liquidators, the policy concerned
applied to these appointments as well (para [16]).
The first respondent (Sasria) challenged the policy in a two-
part application. Part A was an interim interdict preventing
implementation of the policy; and Part B, review proceedings in
an attempt to have it set aside. In the Western Cape Division of
the High Court, Gamble J dealt with the urgent application in
respect of Part A and interdicted the appellants from implement-
ing the policy. The review application in Part B came before Katz
AJ. The fundamental allegation was that the policy’s rigid race
and gender-based categories and ratios amounted to the imposi-
tion of quotas as opposed to numerical targets, rendering it
unconstitutional. To succeed with this allegation, the applicants
raised four arguments. The policy (1) unlawfully fettered the
discretion of the Master; (2) infringed on the right to equality
provided for in section 9 of the Constitution; (3) was ultra vires the
Act; and (4) was irrational (para [2]).
Acting in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, the High
Court declared the policy inconsistent with the Constitution and
invalid. An application for leave to appeal was refused. The
current appeal was with the leave of the Supreme Court of Appeal
([para 3]). The appellants were the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development (the Minister) and the Chief Master of
the High Court of South Africa (the Chief Master) (para [4]).
The appellants’ argument was that the policy was intended to
form the basis for transformation of the insolvency industry. The
respondents, on the other hand, contended that the policy would
not achieve the transformation objectives and would weaken the
transformation already achieved in the industry by substantially
reducing the business of skilled, previously disadvantaged prac-
titioners (para [21]).
The appellants further argued that the policy was a method
contemplated by section 9(2) of the Constitution in that it endorsed
the achievement of equality and was designed to protect and
develop persons (and categories of persons) previously disad-
vantaged by unfair discrimination (para [22]).
The appointment of provisional trustees and co-trustees
The policy under discussion essentially involved section 18(1)
of the Insolvency Act (quoted above), which deals with the
appointment of provisional trustees and co-trustees. In terms of
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this subsection the Master has the power to appoint provisional
trustees. The Master’s discretion is to be exercised in accor-
dance with the policy determined by the Minister under section
158(2) of the Insolvency Act. Once a provisional sequestration
order has been granted, the Master may appoint a provisional
trustee. The provisional trustee will administer and control the
estate until such time as the trustee is appointed at the first
meeting of creditors. Nevertheless, the Master may still be
involved inasmuch as he or she is authorised by section 57(5) of
the Insolvency Act to appoint a co-trustee whenever he or she
considers it necessary (paras [5] [16]).
The policy
The current policy was the first of its kind promulgated under
section 158 of the Act (para [6]). The policy was published in
Government Gazette 37305 of 7 February 2014. The Chief Master
has also issued several directives in terms of the policy to deal
with its application. He issued three such directives in 2014
(paras [10] [14]).
In terms of clause 6.1 of the policy, every Master’s list must be
divided into various categories. Clause 6 reads (para [12]):
6.1 IPs on every Master’s List must be divided into the following
categories:
CategoryA: African, coloured, Indian and Chinese females who
became South African citizens before 27 April 1994;
Category B: African, coloured, Indian and Chinese males who
became South African citizens before 27 April 1994;
Category C: White females who became South African citizens
before 27 April 1994;
Category D: African, coloured, Indian and Chinese females and
males, and white females, who became South African citizens
on or after 27 April 1994 and white males who are South African
citizens,
and within each category be arranged in alphabetical order
according to their surnames and, in the event of similar surnames,
their first names. IPs added to the list after the compilation thereof
must be added at the end of the relevant category.
6.2 A Master’s List must distinguish between senior practitioners,
being IPs who have been appointed at least once every year
within the last five years and junior practitioners, being IPs who
have not been appointed as such at least once every year within
the last five years but who satisfy the Master that they have
sufficient infrastructure and experience to be appointed alone.
The senior and junior practitioners must be arranged where they
fit alphabetically in Category A to D on the same Master’s List.
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Clause 7.1 of the policy sets out a formula, based on race and
gender, for the appointment of IPs from the Master’s list of
practitioners (para [13]). Clause 7.3 gives the Master a discre-
tion: he or she might, having regard to the complexity of the
matter and the suitability of the next-in-line IP, appoint a senior IP
jointly with the next-in-line IP. Clause 7 reads as follows:
7.1 IPs must be appointed consecutively in the ratio A4:B3:C2:D1,
where –
A represents African, coloured, Indian and Chinese females
who became South African citizens before 27 April 1994;
B represents African, coloured, Indian and Chinese males who
became South African citizens before 27 April 1994;
C represents white females who became South African citizens
before 27 April 1994;
D represents African, coloured, Indian and Chinese females
and males, and white females, who have become SouthAfrican
citizens on or after 27April 1994 and white males who are South
African citizens,
and the numbers 4:3:2:1 represent the number of IPs that must be
appointed in that sequence in respect of each such category.
7.2 Within the different categories on a Master’s List, IPs must,
subject to paragraph 7.3, be appointed in alphabetical order.
7.3 The Master may, having regard to the complexity of the matter
and the suitability of the next-in-line IP but subject to any
applicable law, appoint a senior practitioner jointly with the junior
or senior practitioner appointed in alphabetical order. If the
Master makes such a joint appointment, the Master must record
the reason therefor and, on request, provide the other IP there-
with. . . .’
The court explained the meaning of these clauses, namely that
the Master must appoint IPs consecutively in the ratioA4:B3:C2:D1
across all classes of appointment. In other words, the Master
must appoint four practitioners from category A, then three from
category B, then two from category C, and finally one from
category D. Only then may he or she return to category A to
appoint another four practitioners, and so forth. Even when
appointing within a category, the Master must proceed down the
alphabetical list until the end is reached and then start again at
the top. An important factor is that there is no power to depart
from this. The only discretion that the Master has is, in the
circumstances set out in clause 7.3, to appoint an additional
trustee (para [13]).
The court pointed out that the policy principally implicated the
provisions of the Insolvency Act that deal with the appointment of
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provisional trustees and co-trustees (para [15]). It indicated that
unlike a final trustee appointed at the first meeting of creditors,
the provisional trustee takes instructions from the Master, who in
terms of section 18(2) stands in the place of the creditors of the
insolvent estate (s 18(2)). The provisional trustee may be autho-
rised by the Master or the court to sell property belonging to the
estate (s 18(3)). Experience in the High Court suggests that this
authority is frequently sought and granted (para [17]). In para-
graph [19] the court stated that the policy does not provide for the
wishes of creditors to be taken into account in these discretionary
appointments.
The High Court’s reasoning
Very briefly the core of the High Court’s view regarding this
policy was (para [20]):
• The Master becomes a rubber stamp.
• The policy creates a mechanical application.
• The Master is compelled to appoint designated persons by
rote from the Master’s list.
• This list is arranged alphabetically on a race and gender
basis.
• It fails to appreciate and provide for the skills, knowledge,
expertise, and experience of the practitioner.
• It fails to allow the Master the discretion to take these factors
into account when appointing a trustee.
• The policy thus constitutes an unlawful fettering of his or her
discretion.
• The policy must ensure that there is a correlation between the
individual’s skills set and the requirements for the role.
• The policy fails to provide clear time-lines or targets to
determine whether it is likely to achieve its intended objective.
• There is insufficient evidence that the policy is likely to
achieve its aim of transforming the industry within a specific
period, if at all.
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
Equality
To comply with the principle of equality as in section 9(2) of the
Constitution, any remedial measure must not only benefit the
previously disadvantaged, but must also not be ‘arbitrary, capri-
cious or display naked preference’. The court indicated that a
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form of arbitrariness, caprice or naked preference was the
implementation of a quota system (paras [29] [32]).
A very strict distribution of appointments in accordance with
race and gender was regulated in clause 7 and the Master was
obliged to make an appointment according to this – therefore a
‘rigid quota’. Clause 7.3 did not improve this rigidity. Clause 7.3
simply
provides the Master with a mechanism, in an ill-defined range of
cases, to compensate to some degree for the fact that the policy
dictates the appointment of someone not qualified to undertake the
task, either because of its complexity, or because of their unsuitability
– the two are not mutually exclusive. . . . After all, the unqualified
person is still to be appointed and to have their share in the fees
accruing from the administration of the estate, even though the reason
for invoking clause 7.3 is that they are not qualified or unsuitable to
perform that task. The Master’s ability to insert a backstop into the
process does not detract from the need in every case to comply with
clause 7.1. The system is arbitrary and capricious (para [34]).
This procedure was rigid and unavoidable and therefore
unconstitutional as arbitrary, capricious, and incapable of practi-
cal application. Though this was sufficient for a declaration of
invalidity, the court nevertheless chose to make the following
findings on the other challenges to the policy (paras [36]–[38]).
The fettering of the Master’s discretion
According to the appellants, the Master still has an unfettered
discretion under the policy because he must establish whether
the next-in-line practitioner is suitable. The argument advanced
was that before any appointment is made, the Master considers
issues such as the complexity of the matter, because the list
contains categories – junior practitioners and senior practitioners.
He or she must also consider whether the next-in-line practitioner
has the infrastructure to deal with complicated insolvent estates
(para [39]).
Respondent Saripa’s submission was, among other things, that
the policy goes beyond merely providing a recommendation to
the Master. It serves to regulate the result of the exercise of the
Master’s powers as it serves to ‘predetermine the outcome of the
exercise of the master’s powers, thus binding his decision-
making powers inflexibly’ para [40]). Respondents Cipa and
Nama’s submission was, inter alia, that no allowance is made for
the skills relevant to the industry, and the needs or biddings of the
creditors, and no provision is made for other persons with
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interests. By excluding creditors from giving their view as to
whom to appoint as provisional trustees or liquidators, creditors
are potentially prejudiced. Respondent Solidarity pointed out that
under the policy, the Master would ‘disregard all other factors and
allocate work on the basis of race and gender’. This prevents
the Master’s from exercising a proper discretion. Accordingly, the
policy was inconsistent with section 9(2) of the Constitution
(paras [40]–[43]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the parties’ argu-
ments were misconceived in that they assumed that the Master
had an unfettered discretion that had been improperly fettered by
the policy. However, the Master’s only discretion in terms of
section 18(3) is to make appointments in accordance with the
policy. By leaving it to the Master to determine whether an estate
is complex and to distinguish between the capabilities of different
IPs, clause 7.3 contains a limited residual discretion sufficient
to find that the Master’s discretion was not improperly fettered
(paras [44]–[45]).
Rationality
‘Rationality’ requires a rational connection between the policy
and its objectives. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
this connection was absent in the present case. What needed to
be shown was that the policy lacked a rational connection to the
objectives it was directed at achieving. In paragraph [46] the
court indicated that there was no explanation in the affidavit of the
Chief Master’s – who also spoke for the Minister – as to the basis
on which the policy had been formulated. It was the court’s view
that the explanation of the 4:3:2:1 ratio and how it was arrived at
was unsatisfactory, and no reliable figures were put forward to
support the Minister’s justification. In light of this, ‘one cannot say
that the policy was formulated on a rational basis properly
directed at the legitimate goal of removing the effects of past
discrimination and furthering the advancement of persons from
previously disadvantaged groups. The absence of any explana-
tion at all for its manifestly discriminatory impact on young people
is telling. The impression is given that the ratio is arbitrary and
cobbled together with no apparent justificatory basis’ (para [47]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal indicated other rationality weak-
nesses, namely the lack of a proper explanation by the appellants
as to what constituted a ‘complex estate’ or an ‘unsuitable
practitioner’; the definition of ‘senior practitioner’ and the obliga-
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tory appointment, without more ado, of the next IP in line (paras
[48]–[50]).
Legality
Wallis JA, in complete agreement with the judgment of Mathopo
JA above, wrote an addendum ‘to deal with my concern that in
formulating and publishing the policy the Minister has disre-
garded a significant constraint on his powers and thereby
infringed the principle of legality or, as it was said in the past,
acted ultra vires’ (paras [3] [53]).
According to Wallis JA, the Minister’s promulgation of the
policy was contrary to the principle of legality because it deliber-
ately disregarded the interests of the creditors of sequestrated
estates or liquidated companies, which are at the heart of this
insolvency legislation. The promulgation made use of a power
given for a specific purpose to achieve a different, albeit legiti-
mate, purpose (paras [53]–[66]). The court was dealing with
insolvency legislation with regard to insolvent estates, compa-
nies, and close corporations. However, the Minister and the Chief
Master had submitted no argument on that fact.
Wallis JA observed that the purpose of the insolvency legisla-
tion (summarised in paras [55]–[56]) necessarily affects the basis
upon which trustees and liquidators are to be appointed. The
principle thought must be the interests of the creditors. Serving
those interests is important. A very relevant remark by the judge
was that ‘(i)f the appointment of trustees and liquidators occurred
speedily as contemplated by the relevant statutes this understand-
ing of the situation would be even clearer, because there might
not even be a need for the appointment of a provisional trustee or
liquidator. Neither statute requires such an appointment to be
made. Both contemplate that the first meeting of creditors will be
speedily convened.’ Section 40(1) explicitly provides that the
Master shall immediately convene a first meeting of creditors. The
Master has, in addition, only a limited basis for declining to
appoint the person chosen as trustee or liquidator by the
creditors (para [57]).
The problem, according to Wallis JA, was that provisional
appointments had become more significant precisely because of
(1) delays in progressing from a provisional to a final sequestra-
tion or winding-up order; and (2) delays in the various Masters’
Offices. It was the court’s view that in the past these delays had
not really been a significant issue as under the requisition system,
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creditors were able to play a considerable part in the selection of
the provisional trustee or liquidator. There was usually a smooth
transition from the provisional trustee or liquidator to the person
elected or nominated for final appointment, who was usually the
same person. With the system envisaged by the policy, the voice
of the creditors had deliberately been removed from the process
of appointment (para [58]).
In paragraph [59], the court pointed out that the relevant
statutes make it clear that they exist to serve the interests of
creditors. Therefore, it is not open to the Master to act in a manner
that conflicts with these interests. Where the appellants had
contended that no provision in the insolvency legislation obliges
the Master to take the wishes of the creditors into account, the
court turned this argument around and indicated the other side of
the coin, namely that nothing in the statutes empowers the Master
to disregard the interests of creditors. The policy explicitly
empowers the Master to appoint on a roster basis, persons who,
in terms of the policy itself, he or she may regard as unqualified
for such appointment (either because of the complexity of the
estate, or because they are unsuitable). This is not acceptable.
The court agreed that ‘the most critical aspect of insolvency
appointments’ is to determine the persons to be appointed in a
particular case, especially so since the delays in reaching the
stage of final sequestration or winding-up and delays in conven-
ing the first meeting of creditors result in a growing volume of the
work of liquidation or winding-up being assumed by the provi-
sional trustee or liquidator. The reality, therefore, is that under the
policy these appointees are ‘able to do this without any directions
from the creditors and solely on the basis of the directions of the
Master’. The court found this clearly problematic (para [60] [61]).
In the court’s view any policy put in place for the appointment of
trustees and liquidators must be consistent with the object of the
insolvency legislation and be focused on attending to the inter-
ests of creditors. In articulating the policy under discussion,
taking creditors’ interests into account at any point before the first
meeting of creditors had deliberately been ignored. That was
impermissible (paras [62] [63]).
The court (para [64]) relied on the essential principle sum-
marised in Gauteng Gambling Board & another v MEC for
Economic Development, Gauteng (2013 (5) SA 24 (SCA) paras
[46] [47]). In brief: to admit that a power which is given by law for
one purpose alone is used for another purpose is to act in
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fraudem legis. Such a use is merely an excuse. ‘In present-day
jurisprudence acting with an ulterior motive or purpose is sub-
sumed under the principle of legality’ (para [64]). In the court’s
view it was precisely this type of breach of the principle of legality
that had occurred here (para [65]).
For this reason, and for the reasons set out in his judgment,
Wallis JA concurred in the order proposed by Mathopo JA (para
[66]). Mathopo JA (Mpati P, Wallis, Swain, and Van der Merwe JJA
concurring) dismissed the appeal with costs (para [52]).
TRUSTEE: SALE OF PROPERTY AND AUTHORISATION OF MASTER
Section 18(3) of the Insolvency Act provides:
A provisional trustee shall have the powers and the duties of a trustee,
as provided in this Act, except that without the authority of the court or
for the purpose of obtaining such authority he shall not bring or defend
any legal proceedings and that without the authority of the court or
Master he shall not sell any property belonging to the estate in
question. Such sale shall furthermore be after such notices and
subject to such conditions as the Master may direct.
Section 80bis of the Insolvency Act provides:
(1) At any time before the second meeting of creditors the trustee
shall, if satisfied that any movable or immovable property of the
estate ought forthwith to be sold, recommend to the Master in
writing accordingly, stating his reasons for such recommenda-
tion.
(2) The Master may thereupon authorise the sale of such property, or
of any portion thereof, on such conditions and in such manner as
he may direct: Provided that, if the Master has notice that such
property or a portion thereof is subject to a right of preference, he
shall not authorise the sale of such property or such portion,
unless the person entitled to such right of preference has given
his consent thereto in writing or the trustee has guaranteed that
person against loss by such sale.
Section 82(1) of the Insolvency Act provides:
Subject to the provisions of sections eighty-three and ninety the
trustee of an insolvent estate shall, as soon as he is authorised to do
so at the second meeting of the creditors of that estate, sell all the
property in that estate in such manner and upon such conditions as
the creditors may direct: Provided that if any rights acquired from the
State under a lease, licence, purchase, or allotment of land is an asset
in that estate, the trustee shall, in his administration of the estate, act in
accordance with those provisions (if any) which by the law under
which the rights were acquired, are expressed to apply in the event of
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the sequestration of the estate of the person who acquired those
rights: Provided that if the creditors have not prior to the final closing of
the second meeting of creditors of that estate given any directions the
trustee shall sell the property by public auction or public tender. A sale
by public auction or public tender shall be after notice in the Gazette
and after such other notices as the Master may direct and in the
absence of directions from creditors as to the conditions of sale, upon
such conditions as the Master may direct.
Section 82(8) of the Insolvency Act provides:
If any person other than a person mentioned in subsection (7) has
purchased in good faith from an insolvent estate any property which
was sold to him in contravention of this section, or if any person in
good faith and for value acquired from a person mentioned in
subsection (7) any property which the last mentioned person acquired
from an insolvent estate in contravention of that subsection, the
purchase or other acquisition shall nevertheless be valid, but the
person who sold or otherwise disposed of the property shall be liable
to make good to the estate twice the amount of the loss which the
estate may have sustained as a result of the dealing with the property
in contravention of this section.
The facts in Swart v Starbuck & others 2017 (5) SA370 (CC) are
briefly: Swart’s estate was provisionally sequestrated and the
Master advised Starbuck, Van Rensburg, and Matsepe that he
would appoint them as provisional trustees. A month later a final
sequestration order was granted, and the Möller Trust (the Trust)
made three offers to purchase immovable properties from the
insolvent estate. The offers were subject to the Master’s consent.
The trustees had by then not yet been formally appointed as
provisional trustees. Each of the three offers to purchase was
accepted two weeks later by Starbuck, who signed them as the
‘seller’ (paras [4]–[6]).
In early January 2006 (before their formal appointment), the
trustees submitted a written application to the Master in terms of
section 80bis read with section 18(3) of the Insolvency Act for the
extension of their powers to enable them to sell the properties by
private treaty and before the second meeting of creditors. It
included consent from the two secured creditors. A circular was
sent to all known creditors regarding the decision to sell the
properties. Some two weeks later the Master (the fourth respon-
dent) appointed Starbuck, Van Rensburg and Matsepe as provi-
sional trustees. No creditor objected to the anticipated sale of
the properties. Before the second meeting of creditors, but after
formally appointing the provisional trustees, the Master autho-
rised the sales under section 80bis (paras [7]–[8]).
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The trustees received payment and authorised the transfer of
the properties to the Trust. Registration of the transfers took place
shortly thereafter (para [8]). The first meeting of creditors was
then held (in September 2006), and one month later, the second
meeting (in October 2006), which approved the trustees’ report
reflecting the sales and transfers (para [8]). All of these events
happened before the appointment of Starbuck, Van Rensburg
and Matsepe as the final trustees. The final trustees were only
appointed about a year later.
The insolvent’s case
Almost ten years had passed before the insolvent decided to
institute proceedings against the trustees on behalf of the estate.
His assertions were (paras [9] [10]):
• The trustees lacked the necessary capacity to accept the
offers to purchase made by the trust.
u Although section 18(3) authorises trustees to sell proper-
ties, the trustees had at that stage not yet been appointed
as provisional trustees.
• The section 80bis authorisation was invalid.
u The section allows the Master to authorise a sale only
when a trustee requests the authorisation.
• The sale and the resultant transfer of the properties to the trust
were irregular and constituted maladministration.
u When they requested authorisation from the Master, they
had not yet been formally appointed as provisional trust-
ees.
• The sale of the properties could consequently take place only
under section 82(1) of the Act.
u This section provides that on the authorisation at the
second meeting of creditors, the trustees shall sell an
estate’s property in the manner and on the conditions that
the creditors direct. The trustees had failed to follow the
prescripts of this subsection.
• They were liable in terms of section 82(8) to make good to the
insolvent estate twice its loss as a result of the contravention.
u The properties could have been sold at a higher price.
The trustees’ plea
The trustees put forward the following facts (para [11]):
• They admitted that Starbuck had signed and accepted the
offers to purchase.
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• They emphasised that the acceptance had been subject to
the permission of the Master (by implication – according to
them – subject to their formal appointment. Formal appoint-
ment as provisional trustees took place, although only some
two weeks later).
• One week after their formal appointment they had been
granted authority to sell in terms of section 80bis.
• Therefore, the properties had been validly transferred to the
trust on 14 June 2006.
• They accordingly denied any maladministration on their part,
and disavowed liability for the payment of any damages.
HIGH COURT
The trial court held that the trustees had been granted the
necessary authorisation by the Master in terms of section 80bis to
sell the properties to the trust. Consequently, compliance with
section 82 was not required. As to the allegation that the
properties could have been sold at a much higher price, the High
Court found that there was no basis for such an allegation (but
see the view of the minority decision in the Constitutional Court
below). Consequently, there was no connection between the
alleged loss which the insolvent may have suffered and the
conduct of the trustees. The court dismissed the claim with costs
but granted the insolvent leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal (paras [12] [13]).
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the Master’s authori-
sation under section 80bis constituted a valid administrative act
with legally valid consequences until set aside, which had not
been sought or done. Section 82 did not apply because the sale
had taken place pursuant to the Master’s authorisation. In the
event, the court found that since the sale had been subject to a
suspensive condition, it became binding only on the fulfilment of
the condition. Therefore, it did not matter that the trustees had not
yet been appointed when the offer to purchase was accepted by
Starbuck. It accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs (see
paras [15]–[19]).
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
After the dismissal of his appeal by the Supreme Court of
Appeal, the insolvent again sought leave to appeal. He sought
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condonation, which was granted ‘in the interests of justice’ (paras
[23] [24]). In addition to damages, he claimed that sections 18(3)
and 80bis were unconstitutional (paras [1] [20]). More relevant
here is his persistent argument that section 82 should apply, and
that the Master’s section 80bis authorisation had been irregular
(para [20]).
The first to third respondents were the trustees of the insolvent
estate, Starbuck, Van Rensburg and Matsepe. The fourth respon-
dent was the Master of the High Court, Pretoria. Starbuck was the
only respondent participating in the matter (para [3]).
The applicability of s 82(1) read with s 82(8) (para [2])
The majority of the Constitutional Court (Khampepe, Cameron,
Froneman, Madlanga, and Mhlantla JJ, with Mogoeng CJ, Nkab-
inde ADCJ, and Pretorius AJ concurring) decided that both
earlier judgments were well motivated and could not be ques-
tioned. The insolvency claim, based on the applicability of
section 82(1) read with section 82(8), depended on the absence
of a valid authorisation of the sale by the Master (para [26]). It was
clear that the Master had authorised the sale of the properties in
terms of section 80bis. This authorisation, as a binding adminis-
trative act, had legally valid consequences until set aside and
had at no point been challenged by the insolvent. Consequently,
section 82 did not apply (para [26]). The court continued that no
claim for damages had been proven, and even if the insolvent’s
claim was delictual, the trustees could, on this basis, not be held
liable – or not in terms of the Insolvency Act. The court stated that
a mere allegation that the properties could have been sold at a
higher price was insufficient (para [28]).
The constitutional challenge
Starbuck submitted that the insolvent’s challenge to the consti-
tutionality of insolvency law in general, and sections 18(3) and
80bis in particular, must fail as a claim of constitutionality cannot
be raised for the first time in the court of final appeal (para [21]).
Having regard to the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, the
majority of the court felt that it would be imprudent to consider the
insolvent’s constitutional challenge (para [31]). In note 28 refer-
ence was made to Prince v President, Cape Law Society & others
2001 (2) SA 388 (CC), where Ngcobo J stated the following:
Parties who challenge the constitutionality of a provision in a statute
must raise the constitutionality of the provisions sought to be chal-
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lenged at the time they institute legal proceedings. In addition, a party
must place before the Court information relevant to the determination
of the constitutionality of the impugned provisions. . . . I would empha-
sise that all this information must be placed before the Court of first
instance. The placing of the relevant information is necessary to warn
the other party of the case it will have to meet, so as [to] allow it the
opportunity to present factual material and legal argument to meet that
case (para [22]).
Other cases referred to (in paras [39] [40]) were: Maphango v
Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC) and
Phillips & others v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006
(1) SA 505 (CC).
Validity of the section 80bis authorisation
Starbuck submitted that the sale of the properties had been
authorised by the Master and was valid as the authorisation had
been neither challenged nor set aside by a court of law (para
[21]).
The majority of the court indicated that the authorisation in
terms of section 80bis was an administrative act within the
meaning of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
Therefore, even if the Master’s authorisation was unlawful, it
remained valid and binding with fully legal consequences until
set aside – the sale of the properties was one of those conse-
quences (para [33]).
The majority reiterated that the sale agreements were subject
to the suspensive condition that the sales would come into effect
only once the Master’s section 80bis authorisation had been
secured. This meant that once the Master’s authorisation had
been obtained, legally binding sale agreements came into effect
and would stand, irrespective of the validity of the Master’s
authorisation, until set aside by a court (paras [34]–[36]).
The court emphasised:
[T]he procedural safeguards applicable to mounting a review applica-
tion perform an important role in ensuring that interested parties are
given proper notice of the review application, and an adequate
opportunity to be heard on whether the decision should be set aside.
Further, they ensure that the full record of the relevant decision is
placed before the court, so that the court has all the relevant facts
against which to consider the lawfulness of the decision (para [38]).
Further, the founding affidavit set out no grounds of review
(para [39]). What the insolvent should have done was to take the
Master’s decision on review. To do this he had to apply the Rule
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53 process – failure to do so would be unfair on the respondent.
To require the insolvent to adhere to the process prescribed in
Rule 53 was not undue formalism (paras [37] [38]).
The court also indicated other principles applicable to the
review of administrative action:
(a) The principle of finality
The court stated that an application for review must be brought
within a reasonable time. Even if there had been a proper review
application before the court, it would have been ten years
overdue. Engaging with this application in spite of this time lapse
and in the absence of any acceptable explanation for the delay,
would, according to the majority, not only have a detrimental
effect on the principle of finality, but would also ignore the
potential disadvantage to the Master, the trustees, and possibly
the creditors of the applicant’s formerly insolvent estate (paras
[41] [42]).
(b) Section 157(1)
In the view of the majority an additional obstacle to the
insolvent’s attack is section 157 of the Insolvency Act, which
shields the Master’s conduct from invalidity based on a formal
defect. Subsection (1) makes it clear that nothing that has been
done by the Master or the trustees pursuant to the provisions of
the Insolvency Act can be deemed invalid simply because of a
formal defect. This is the case unless, in the opinion of a court, it
has resulted in substantial injustice that cannot be rectified by an
order of court. In the present case, the insolvent had claimed but
not proved that the farms could have been sold at a higher price,
and had failed to point to any other substantial injustice (paras
[43]–[45]).
(c) Section 157(2)
Subsection 157(2) provides that no defect or irregularity in the
appointment of the trustees will invalidate anything done by them
in good faith. The insolvent had not alleged bad faith on the part
of the trustees – rather, the court found, the facts pointed to their
good faith. The sale had been authorised by the Master and the
trustees had obtained the consent of the two secured creditors.
They had also issued a notice informing all the insolvent estate’s
creditors that the farms were to be sold (para [46]).
The majority decision
For the above reasons the majority felt that it would not be in the
interests of justice to consider whether the Master’s section 80bis
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authorisation was valid or not, and leave to appeal was therefore
refused (para [47]).
Zondo J’s concurring judgment
Justice Zondo agreed that leave to appeal should be refused in
the interests of justice (para [117]). Briefly, when the first, second,
and third respondents were appointed as trustees, their applica-
tion for authority to sell the farms was pending before the Master.
The application remained in place after their appointment. Fur-
ther, when the Master considered and decided the application for
authority to sell the farms, he knew that they had not changed
their minds about their application.
Justice Zondo then asked what the trustees stood to do after
their appointment if they wished to avoid the alleged non-
compliance with the Insolvency Act. For him the only answer was
that they ought to have withdrawn the application and resubmit-
ted it, but he emphasised that this would constitute the ‘height of
formalism’ (para [120]). It was in order, therefore, that they had
not done so (para [120]). He held that, to the extent that the first,
second, and third respondents’ application to the Master may not
have been lawful before their appointment, it became lawful once
they had been appointed as it had not been withdrawn. Conse-
quently, granting them authority to sell the properties on 31 Janu-
ary 2001 was lawful in that they were by then already trustees and
still sought the Master’s authorisation (para [121]).
Dissenting judgment of Jafta J (Mojapelo AJ concurring)
The minority felt that leave to appeal should be granted and the
appeal upheld (paras [51] [75]). Further, they felt that the matter
did in fact raise a constitutional issue. According to them the
matter involved the exercise of public power conferred by section
80bis (para [75]). The Supreme Court of Appeal had defined the
exercise of power by the Master under this section as administra-
tive action. The insolvent sought to challenge the validity of the
Master’s approval. This was pivotal to the outcome of the case. If
that approval was invalid, the purported sale of the applicant’s
property was unlawful. Whether the sale remained intact despite
the invalidity of the approval was a matter that might be deter-
mined only if leave to appeal should be granted (para [75]).
Apart from this, the minority identified the following issues that
needed to be determined (para [78]):
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(a) Whether it is competent to adjudicate the constitutional
challenge raised for the first time in the Constitutional Court.
(b) Whether the Master’s approval to sell the applicant’s farms
complied with section 80bis as regards the trustees’ recom-
mendation.
(c) If section 80bis were not complied with, what was the effect
of that non-compliance on the Master’s approval in the light
of section 157(1) of the Insolvency Act?
(d) Whether the applicant had locus standi to challenge the
Master’s approval on review.
With regard to (a) (para [81])
The minority agreed that the applicant’s case did not satisfy the
test for entertaining a constitutional challenge raised for the first
time in a court of final instance (para [81]).
With regard to (b) (paras [82]–[94])
The basis for the minority’s view that leave to appeal should be
granted and the appeal upheld was that a provisional trustee may
not sell property belonging to the insolvent estate without the
authority of a court or the Master. The authority contemplated in
section 18(3) was a valid authority. Section 80bis outlines a
process to be followed in obtaining valid authority from the Master.
Briefly, this section prescribes a jurisdictional fact (a condition
precedent) which must be in place before the Master grants
approval. It requires the trustee to furnish the Master with a written
recommendation incorporating reasons why authority to sell is
sought (also see para [55]). In casu, when the trustees submitted
the purported recommendation, they had not yet been appointed
as provisional trustees and this meant, in the minority’s view, that
there was no recommendation.
The question the minority felt needed to be considered was
whether section 80bis contemplates the present ‘recommenda-
tion’ (by non-trustees) as being a jurisdictional fact for the
granting of an approval. They were of the view that on the crucial
issue relating to compliance with section 80bis and the effect of
non-compliance on the validity of the Master’s approval, there
were prospects of success. In these circumstances leave to
appeal must be granted (also see para [77]).
The minority further pointed out that the Master knew when he
received the so-called ‘recommendation’ that those who submit-
ted it were not yet trustees as he had not yet appointed them. The
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Master was, therefore, aware when he granted the approval,
purportedly in terms of section 80bis, that he was doing so
without the necessary ‘recommendation’. There had, therefore,
been no compliance with section 80bis (paras [89]–[94]).
With regard to (c) (paras [95]–[105])
In the minority’s view, as there was no recommendation by duly
appointed trustees, the purported approval by the Master was
invalid. Non-compliance with section 80bis was therefore fatal as
regards the Master’s approval (para [98]). However, the minority
acknowledged that it was important to determine whether section
157(1) of the Insolvency Act had any effect on this non-
compliance.
The minority made the following observations on this section
(para [102]):
• The heading ‘Formal defects’ suggests that the section was
designed to regulate non-compliance with formalities.
• The word ‘formal’ qualifies both the defect and the irregularity.
• This reveals that Parliament sought to condone formal defects
and irregularities.
• Even then, the defect must not cause substantial injustice
which cannot be remedied by a court order.
• If the defect is not formal, this provision does not apply.
• A distinction must be drawn between the preservation of what
has been done in non-compliance with formalities, on the one
hand, and the wrongful consequences of the non-compli-
ance, on the other.
• Section 157(1) does not protect functionaries who cause
damage by not following its requirements from liability for their
irregular conduct.
• Its focus is the protection of the act wrongly performed.
• It insulates the sale from invalidity.
• There are no reasons of principle or public policy which
militate against holding those who do not follow the Act liable
for any damage they cause.
However, the minority concluded that given the nature and
extent of the non-compliance with section 80bis, the irregularity in
this case could not be described as a formal defect; it did not
concern a failure to follow formalities. Jafta J explained that the
appointment of a trustee is a substantive matter which vests
the insolvent’s entire estate in the trustee. The act of appointing
585INSOLVENCY LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 32 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/17−Insolvency−Law
a trustee alone confers on the appointee extensive powers with
far-reaching consequences. Accordingly, he held that section
157(1) did not apply here (para [103]).
Nonetheless, even if it were to apply, the defect would, to Jafta
J’s mind, give rise to a substantial injustice which could not be
remedied by any order of court. The minority had no problem
accepting that the insolvent had succeeded in proving damage.
For this he accepted the insolvent’s contention that if the farms
had been sold after the second meeting of the creditors, they
could have realised a much higher price. This was borne out by
the fact that some of the properties had been resold at a higher
price before the second creditors’ meeting was held (para [104]).
With regard to (d) (para [110])
The applicant had legal standing to challenge the Master’s
approval on review. Further, his claim for damages did not
depend on a successful review of the approval.
TRUSTEE TAKING POSSESSION OF IMPORTED GOODS
Section 47 of the Insolvency Act provides:
If a creditor of an insolvent estate who is in possession of any property
belonging to that estate, to which he has a right of retention or over
which he has a landlord’s legal hypothec, delivers that property to the
trustee of that estate, at the latter’s request, he shall not thereby lose
the security afforded him by his right of retention or lose his legal
hypothec, if, when delivering the property, he notifies the trustee in
writing of his rights and in due course proves his claim against the
estate: Provided, that a right to retain any book or document of
account which belongs to the insolvent estate or relates to the
insolvent’s affairs shall not afford any security or preference in
connection with any claim against the estate.
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Van der
Merwe NO & others 2017 (3) SA 34 (SCA) concerns an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Appeal against a High Court order that the
appellant (the Commissioner) clear certain imported equipment
in its custody and control for release to the first to sixth respon-
dents – the liquidators of an importer company, Pela Plant (Pty)
Ltd, which had been placed in liquidation. The Commissioner
had refused to do so as the company was unable to pay the
value-added tax and duties due for the importation of the
equipment.
Pela Plant (the company and sixth respondent) had been
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liquidated as it was unable to pay its debts. The effective date of
the commencement of the winding-up in terms of section 348 of
the 1973 Companies Act was 18 July 2014 (para [1]).
The company had sent equipment to the value of some
R25 million to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for
operations in that country. Some of this equipment was subject to
credit sale agreements concluded between the company and
Absa Bank Ltd, FirstRand Bank Ltd, and Bidvest Bank Ltd, the
fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, respectively, in the court a quo
(the banks). As such, those items were subject to the usual
reservation of ownership. On liquidation, these items immediately
became the property of the company by virtue of section 84(1) of
the Insolvency Act. The banks obtained a hypothec over the
equipment to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
The remaining nine items had always belonged to the company
(para [2]).
When the company’s operations in the DRC were complete the
equipment was returned to South Africa. As a result, customs
duty became payable in terms of section 39(1) of the Customs
and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (the Customs Act) and VAT in terms of
section 7(1)(b) of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (the VAT
Act). UTI South Africa (Pty) Ltd (UTI), the seventh respondent,
was appointed by the company as its clearing and forwarding
agent for the importation of the equipment. When the equipment
arrived in the country during March and June 2014, it was placed
in a warehouse belonging to UTI’s subagent. Customs duty and
VAT were postponed in terms of section 20(1)(a) of the Customs
Act and section 13(6) of the VAT Act respectively (para [3]).
While in this warehouse and under the control of UTI, the
freight, disbursements, and storage charges costs escalated to
almost R6 million. The duty and VAT said to be payable ‘to clear’
the equipment were R8,5 million. This was, however, disputed by
the liquidators (para [4]).
On the basis of their statutory duty (in terms of s 391 of the
1973 CompaniesAct, and s 61 read with s 83(3) of the Insolvency
Act) the liquidators attempted, unsuccessfully, to take posses-
sion of the equipment and secure its release from UTI and the
Commissioner. They instituted proceedings in the court a quo for
the equipment to be released to them without paying the duty and
VAT. The Commissioner and UTI opposed the application, claim-
ing that the equipment could be released to the liquidators only
after compliance with certain provisions of the Customs Act. The
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Commissioner claimed that specific sections in this Act pre-
cluded him from releasing the equipment (and the court from
making an order that he do so) unless and until the customs duty
and VAT owing had been paid in full. In the court a quo, UTI
aligned itself with the SARS’s contention. They did not, however,
join in the current appeal (para [5]).
The liquidators’ application in the court a quo was successful.
The Commissioner appealed to this court with the leave of the
court a quo (para [6]). The parties agreed that the question on
appeal would be whether, in such circumstances, a liquidator
may take possession of and deal with the property concerned
under insolvency law, or instead is prevented from doing so by a
statutory ‘embargo’ – said to be created in favour of the Commis-
sioner by sections 20(4), 38, and/or 39 of the Customs Act, and
section 7(1)(b) of the VAT Act – unless duty and/or value-added
tax has been paid (para [7]).
Reasoning of the trial court ((para [9]) SCA)
The court a quo considered the scope and purpose provided
for by the provisions relating to the winding-up of companies
unable to pay their debts in terms of the 1973 Companies Act; the
Insolvency Act; the Customs Act; and the VAT Act. The court took
cognisance of the following principles:
• All creditors are subject to the provisions of the Insolvency
Act, save in exceptional cases where statutes specifically
provide otherwise.
• This principle is given effect to in two ways:
u First, by the creation of a concursus creditorum in terms
of which the claims and rights of all the creditors of an
insolvent company are determined.
u After the date of the concursus, one creditor is not entitled
to improve its position in relation to others.
u Second, by ensuring that the liquidator realise every asset
belonging to the insolvent company.
u Thereafter the proceeds must be distributed amongst the
company’s creditors in the order of preference dictated by
the insolvency law and determined at the concursus.
• For this reason a liquidator is obliged (by s 391 of the 1973
Companies Act) to recover all the assets and property of the
insolvent company.
u ‘All’ has the widest possible meaning.
• The purpose of the Insolvency Act, as recorded in its Pre-
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amble, is to consolidate and amend the law relating to
insolvent persons and their estates.
• The aim of consolidation suggests that the Insolvency Act is
intended to deal comprehensively with what will happen upon
insolvency.
• Consolidation reflects and gives effect to the fundamental
principle of insolvency law and encompasses an array of
detailed provisions concerning the ranking of claims and how
security claimed in respect of claims must be dealt with (para
[9]).
The court a quo came to the conclusion that the ranking of
claims within the Insolvency Act does not allow any creditor to be
granted a preference such as that contended for by the SARS.
Arguments of the Commissioner on appeal
1. The Commissioner contended that he was not simply a
creditor of the company. The Customs Act is a means of
promoting the state’s economic and other interests, above
and beyond being principally a fiscal measure. Therefore,
duty is imposed on imported goods not only for fiscal pur-
poses, but also to protect local manufacturers. He referred to
provisions in the Customs Act which deal with antidumping,
countervailing, and safeguard duties. He maintained that the
Customs Act is used to implement state policy, for example,
the power of the national executive to conclude agreements
with the government of any territory in Africa for the imposition
of environmental levies (para [8]).
2. He further submitted that the CustomsAct creates an embargo
on the relief sought by the liquidators. The Commissioner
argued that there was nothing in the Customs Act that entitled
liquidators of companies to be exempted from these provi-
sions (para [10]).
3. The Commissioner accepted that the payment of customs
duty and VAT could be deferred under certain circumstances
(ss 20(1), 39(1)(b), and 107(2)(A)(i)). He nevertheless argued
that this duty had to be paid in full at some stage in the future
(para [11]).
4. Finally, if an ‘embargo’ was not inferred, this would result in an
anomaly, since he could still hold UTI (as the licensee of the
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warehouse) liable for payment of the duty and VAT under
section 19(6) of the Customs Act (para [23]).
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
The effect of the relevant provisions of the Customs Act
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that whether there was an
embargo (preventing the liquidators from taking possession of
the equipment without first having to pay duty and VAT thereon),
lies in sections 20(4)(a), 38, 39 and 114 of the CustomsAct (paras
[12]–[19]):
• Section 20(4)(a) deals with the prohibition on removing goods
from a customs and excise warehouse unless certain rules
and obligations have been complied with.
• Section 38(1)(a) involves the entry of goods to be made within
seven days of the date of importation.
• Section 38(4)(a) gives the Commissioner the right to permit
someone to remove certain goods from a customs and excise
warehouse after compliance with specified conditions.
• Section 39(1)(a) requires a bill of entry and declaration with
full particulars by the person entering goods.
• Section 39(1)(b) deals with the Commissioner’s right to allow
the deferment of payment of the duties due in respect of such
relevant bills of entry.
• Section 39(2A)(a) specifies the requirements for removing
goods from a customs and excise warehouse and stipulates
the payment to the Controller of duties due on the goods.
• Section 114 (1)(aC) provides for the creation of a lien as
security for the duty on such goods.
• Section 114(1)(a)(iv)(aa)(A) provides that the SARS has the
right to exercise a lien over goods which are subject to a duty
whenever they may be found as further security for its debt.
• Section 114(1)(b)(i) stipulates that the SARS’s claim over the
property subject to a lien has priority over the claims of all
other persons.
• Section 114(1)(b)(iii) involves the execution over goods sub-
ject to the SARS’s lien.
The Supreme Court of Appeal indicated that all of these
provisions address the ordinary situation where goods are brought
into the country and attract a liability to pay customs duty. They
are focused on the responsibility of the importer and others liable
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to pay duty. They do not address the special situation of
insolvency (para [20]).
The situation of insolvency is dealt with in the Insolvency Act.
This is ‘a general statute intended to deal with all cases of
insolvency. In brief, when one looks at the liability to pay customs
duty in the ordinary course, one looks to the provisions of the
Customs Act alone. When insolvency intervenes one turns to the
Insolvency Act’ (para [20]).
The effect of the relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act (para [29])
Where insolvency intervenes, the following principles apply:
• In terms of the common law, a trustee must realise all the
assets of an insolvent.
• These include those subject to a lien.
• The trustee is then entitled to demand their delivery.
• If it were otherwise, the lienholder would be able to frustrate
the winding-up of the estate. (The court aptly referred to Roux
& andere v Van Rensburg NO 1996 (4) SA 271 (A) 276E–
277C.)
• The common-law position is preserved in section 47 of the
Insolvency Act.
• The common law is somewhat altered by section 83 of the
Insolvency Act. This section permits a creditor who holds any
movable property as security for his or her claim to realise that
security before the second meeting of creditors.
• This section is not relevant in this appeal, however, as the
Commissioner was relying solely on an ‘embargo’.
The court did not determine whether the statutory liens afforded
by the Customs Act constitute security as specially defined in the
Insolvency Act. It was unnecessary for the purposes of this
judgment (para [21]).
The court concluded that there is nothing in either the Customs
Act or the Insolvency Act which expressly (or by necessary
implication) provides that goods subject to a lien in favour of the
SARS are expressly excluded from the provisions of the Insol-
vency Act (para [22]).
The embargo argument
The court did not agree that an anomaly arises if an embargo is
not inferred (para [23] and see point 3 of the Commissioner’s
arguments above). The court stated that the trustee is entitled to
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demand delivery of the imported goods under the Commission-
er’s custody and control, despite non-payment.
The court agreed with the court a quo’s explanation of this
view:
• Section 19(6) must be read with sections 19(7) and 19(8).
• Section 19(6) sets out the liability of the licensee of a customs
and excise warehouse for unpaid duty and his obligations in
this regard.
• Section 19(7) provides when such liability ceases.
• Section 19(8) spells out the consequences if the licensee fails
to comply with the latter exemption (para [23]).
The court indicated that the purpose and effect of these
sections are to give the Commissioner additional security. These
sections do not apply where the SARS itself is obliged to release
the goods from its statutory lien as prescribed by the insolvency
law (para [24]).
The court also agreed with the court a quo’s finding that section
114 of the Customs Act was not intended to create an embargo
against clearance unless duty and VAT were first paid in full. This
is so because section 114(1)(aC) serves only to provide the
Commissioner with additional security, and is not a bar to the
relief sought by the liquidators. The court a quo was thus correct
when it stated that the SARS had the limited preference afforded
by section 99 of the Insolvency Act, and, in addition, the
protection afforded by sections 83 and 95 of the Insolvency Act
because of the statutory lien created by section 114(1)(aC). This
‘serves only to provide SARS with additional security and is not a
bar to the relief sought by the liquidators’ (para [24]).
Motivation: Legitimate property expectations of all creditors are protected
The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the following
interpretation (para [25]):
• Interpreting section 47(1) of the Customs Act as an embargo
provision would probably cause injustice to other creditors of
the insolvent estate of the company.
• Ordinarily there would be no prospect of the liquidators being
able to pay customs duty and VAT from the insolvent compa-
ny’s own resources before disposing of the equipment.
• The proceeds of the sale of the equipment itself would
ordinarily be the logical source of funds to pay customs duty
and VAT.
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• Few purchasers would be willing first to pay the SARS before
being able to take delivery of the equipment they had bought.
• No purchaser would be prepared to pay the SARS if the
outstanding duties and VAT exceeded the value of the equip-
ment itself.
• If the Commissioner’s interpretation of the legislation were
correct, the goods would probably never be realised because
there would not be enough money to overcome the embargo.
• The equipment would then end up in a state warehouse to be
sold by the SARS in terms of section 43 of the Customs Act.
• The purpose of the insolvency regime was to realise all the
property of the company in the interests of all creditors and at
the best value.
• The Commissioner’s interpretation resulted in the anomaly
that assets which form part of the insolvent estate are dealt
with not by the liquidators, but by the SARS (which need not
even prove a claim) without any contribution or control by the
liquidators or other creditors.
• It could not have been the intention of the legislature that
assets of an insolvent estate, in respect of which other
creditors also have real rights, should be dealt with com-
pletely outside the machinery of insolvency (para [25]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal gave one final reason for
rejecting the Commissioner’s claims. It explained that a specific
order of preference is provided for in the Insolvency Act (ss 95–
102). Specific provision (in section 99(1)(cA) and (cD)) is made
for the preference that the claims in issue in this case are to enjoy
in the event of insolvency. If the Commissioner is correct that an
embargo is created against clearance for home consumption,
unless duty and VAT are first paid, this will nullify the effect of the
preference sections and especially s 99(1)(cA) and (cD). It will
give the Commissioner a right to payment in preference to all
other creditors, even though the Insolvency Act specifically
confers on such claims a priority over the claims here in issue.
The court stated that this is neither a sensible nor a realistic
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions (para [26]).
Decision (Theron JA and Lewis JA, Wallis JA, Petse JA and Dambuza JA
concurring)
Section 47 of the Insolvency Act preserves the common-law
position that a trustee must realise all the assets of an insolvent –
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including those subject to a lien. There is nothing in either the
Customs and Excise Act or the Insolvency Act which expressly
(or by necessary implication) provides that goods subject to a
lien in favour of the SARS does not fall to be dealt with under the
laws of insolvency. As such, a trustee of an insolvent company is
entitled to demand delivery of the insolvent company’s property
retained by the Commissioner. The appeal from the KwaZulu-
Natal Division of the High Court, Durban (Annandale AJ) was
dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel (paras
[27] [28]).
LATE PROOF AND EXPUNGING OF CLAIMS IN WINDING-UP
Section 44 of the Insolvency Act provides:
(1) Any person or the representative of any person who has a
liquidated claim against an insolvent estate, the cause of which
arose before the sequestration of that estate, may, at any time
before the final distribution of that estate in terms of section one
hundred and thirteen, but subject to the provisions of section one
hundred and four, prove that claim in the manner hereinafter
provided: Provided that no claim shall be proved against an
estate after the expiration of a period of three months as from the
conclusion of the second meeting of creditors of the estate,
except with leave of the Court or the Master, and on payment of
such sum to cover the cost or any part thereof, occasioned by the
late proof of the claim, as the Court or Master may direct.
Section 366 of the 1973 Companies Act reads:
(1) In the winding-up of a company by the Court and by a creditors’
voluntary winding up
(a) the claims against the company shall be proved at a meeting
of creditors mutatis mutandis in accordance with the provi-
sions relating to the proof of claims against an insolvent
estate under the law relating to insolvency;
(b) a secured creditor shall be under the same obligation to set a
value upon his security as if he were proving his claim
against an insolvent estate under the law relating to insol-
vency, and the value of his vote shall be determined in the
same manner as is prescribed under that law;
(c) a secured creditor and the liquidator shall, where the com-
pany is unable to pay its debts, have the same right
respectively to take over the security as a secured creditor
and a trustee would have under the law relating to insol-
vency.
(2) The Master may, on the application of the liquidator, fix a time or
times within which creditors of the company are to prove their
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claims or otherwise be excluded from the benefit of any distribu-
tion under any account lodged with the Master before those debts
are proved.
Section 407 of the 1973 Companies Act provides:
(1) Any person having an interest in the company being wound up
may, at any time before the confirmation of an account, lodge with
the Master an objection to such account stating the reasons for
the objection.
(2) If the Master is of opinion that any such objection ought to be
sustained, he shall direct the liquidator to amend the account or
give such other directions as he may think fit.
(3) If in respect of any account the Master is of the opinion that any
improper charge has been made against the assets of a com-
pany or that the account is in any respect incorrect and should be
amended, he may, whether or not any objection to the account
has been lodged with him, direct the liquidator to amend the
account, or he may give such other directions as he may think fit.
(4) . . .
(a) The liquidator or any person aggrieved by any direction of
the Master under this section, or by the refusal of the Master
to sustain an objection lodged thereunder, may within four-
teen days after the date of the Master’s direction and after
notice to the liquidator apply to the Court for an order setting
aside the Master’s decision, and the Court may on any such
application confirm the account in question or make such
order as it thinks fit.
(b) If any such direction given by the Master under this section
affects the interests of a person who has not lodged an
objection with the Master, such account as amended shall
again lie open for inspection in the manner and with the
notice as prescribed in section 406, unless the person
affected consents in writing to the immediate confirmation of
the account.
In Wishart NO & others v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa
(Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (4) 152 (SCA), the court first indicated that
even though the 1973 Companies Act was largely repealed when
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act) came into
force in 2011, those provisions regulating the winding-up of
insolvent companies remain in force (para [1]). The issue in this
appeal was the interpretation of provisions of the 1973 Compa-
nies Act, read with those of the Insolvency Act, in relation to
the late proof of claims and the expungement of claims in the
winding-up of a company.
The fourth appellant (Penguin Mining & Plant) and the fifth
appellant (Colt Mining) were the plaintiffs in the court a quo. They
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had sought the High Court’s leave under section 44(1) of the
Insolvency Act, to prove a late claim in the winding-up of the
second respondent and had claimed the expungement of a claim
from the liquidation and distribution account. The Gauteng Local
Division of the High Court upheld two exceptions to their particu-
lars of claim, and the appellants then sought to appeal this
decision. The court a quo gave leave to appeal. The first to third
plaintiffs in the court a quo (trustees of a trust) abided by the
decision of the court on appeal. There were several respondents
involved, but only two played an active role. The first respondent,
BHP Billiton Energy Coal SA (Billiton), submitted a claim to proof
in the insolvent estate of the second respondent, Euro Coal (in
liquidation) (Euro Coal). The other respondents who played no
role were the liquidators of Euro Coal, the Master of the Gauteng
Local Division, and the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission (para [2]).
The first exception
The appellants objected to the first liquidation and distribution
account of Euro Coal, and sought leave to prove a late claim
(respectively) in the winding-up of the company in terms of
section 44(1) of the Insolvency Act (para [4]). The exception
raised to this claim was that section 44(1) does not apply in the
winding-up of a company; further, that section 366 of the 1973
Companies Act, governs proof of claims in a winding-up (para
[5]).
To be able to find an answer, the court looked at section 339 of
the 1973 Companies Act (para [5]), which provides:
In the winding up of a company unable to pay its debts the provisions
of the law relating to insolvency shall, insofar as they are applicable,
be applied mutatis mutandis in respect of any matter not specially
provided for by this Act.
The court explained that section 366(1) regulates the proof of
claims in a winding-up, and section 366(2) gives the Master a
discretion to fix a time within which creditors are to prove their
claims (para [6]). On the other hand, section 44 of the Insolvency
Act regulates proof of liquidated claims against an insolvent
estate (para [7]).
The court referred to Mayo NO & others v De Montlehu 2016 (1)
SA 36 (SCA), where it was held that section 44(1) of the
Insolvency Act directs the time period within which claims can be
lodged and a late claim be proved in a winding-up. In contrast,
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section 366 governs the procedure for participating in a distribu-
tion in the liquidation of a company. There the court decided that
these sections are complementary rather than mutually exclusive,
and consequently section 44(1) is applicable to claims against a
company’s being wound up (para [9]).
On appeal, Billiton agreed that section 44(1) did apply to
claims in a winding-up but argued that the ratio of the De
Montlehu decision was limited to the time period and did not
affect the rest of the proviso to section 44(1). That part of the
proviso permits a late claim to be proved with the consent of the
Master or the court (para [11]).
Nevertheless, the court agreed with the following principles
laid down in De Montlehu (para [12]):
• A plain reading of section 366(2) does not affect the applica-
bility of the three-month time period in section 44(1).
• In both instances (ss 44(1) and 366(2)) the lodging of claims
needs momentum driven by the factor of time.
• In the absence of the fixing of a time period, there would be no
formal time period within which creditors would be required to
lodge and prove their claims.
• The risk of tardiness, if not inertia, would be ever present.
• This would not be in the interest of either the creditors or the
general public.
• Section 44(1)’s three-month period for the proof of claims thus
remains the standard in both sequestrations and liquidations.
Billiton argued that section 366(2) itself provides for a time limit
in that the subsection expressly indicates that the Master may fix
a time within which creditors are to prove their claims or otherwise
be excluded. On its argument that the decision of this court in De
Montlehu was confined to the application of only three aspects of
section 44(1) – the time period; the fixing of costs; and the
payment of costs by a creditor that submitted a claim after the
three-month period had expired – the Supreme Court of Appeal
agreed with the following principles (paras [13]–[15]):
• Section 366(2) relates to participation in a distribution under a
particular account, and not to the late proof of claims in
general (principle spelled out by the De Montlehu case).
• The predecessor to the 1973 Companies Act (s 179(2) of the
Companies Act 46 of 1926) did not prevent a creditor from
proving a claim after the date fixed by the Master (principle
spelled out by Trans-Drakensberg Bank Ltd & another v The
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Master, Pietermaritzburg & another 1966 (1) SA 821 (N)) (thus
for a later account).
• The predecessor section did not exclude debts proved after
the date from the benefit of the distribution (principle spelled
out by Trans-Drakensberg Bank above).
• There was no discrepancy between section 44(1) of the
InsolvencyAct and section 366(2) of the 1973 CompaniesAct.
• The two sections concerned are practically dissimilar and
have diverse aims.
• The aim of section 366(2) is to invalidate an attempt by a
creditor to delay proving his or her claim until a lodged
account shows that a distribution is to occur.
• The object of the proviso to section 44(1) is to warrant that the
administration of the estate is concluded promptly (principles
spelled out by the court a quo in De Montlehu and endorsed
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in that case).
Accordingly, Lewis JA (Cachalia, Mathopo, and Mocumie JJA,
with Makgoka AJA concurring) decided that the appeal against
the order upholding the first exception must succeed.
Objecting to a liquidation and distribution account
The fourth and fifth appellants approached the court directly
and requested, in addition, the expungement of a claim in the
liquidation and distribution account (Billiton’s claim in the winding-
up). In the court a quo the respondents had again successfully
excepted (paras [17] [19]). Therefore, the issue on appeal was
whether a party could bypass section 407 of the 1973 Companies
Act and approach a court directly to expunge a claim. Section 407
regulates who may object to the account and the procedure for
doing so.
The respondents’ objection was that the appellants’ particulars
disclosed no cause of action. A creditor must first object to the
liquidation and distribution account at the Master. Only once the
Master has made a decision, can that decision be reviewed by a
court (para [18]).
The appellants’ case relied on Millman & another NNO v
Pieterse & others 1997 (1) SA 784 (C), held that the court has the
jurisdiction to review a decision at common law and that section
151 of the Insolvency Act does not oust that jurisdiction. In
paragraph [20] the court cited what was said in Millman: ‘There is
a strong presumption against the ouster or curtailment of the
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Court’s jurisdiction. . . The mere fact that the Legislature has
created an extra-judicial remedy is not conclusive of the question
whether the Court’s power has been restricted’ (788G–I). The
reasoning was that as the Insolvency Act did not explicitly ‘oust’
the court’s jurisdiction, it had the authority to reject the creditors’
claims in an action brought by the liquidators (para [21]).
To the Supreme Court of Appeal, it was not clear, however, what
power the court had that it regarded as having been ousted (para
[21]). Referring to The Master of the High Court (North Gauteng
High Court, Pretoria) v Motala NO & others 2012 (3) SA 325 (SCA)
paragraph [5], it stated that ‘insolvency administration is wholly a
creature of statute’. Further, the different statutes regulating the
insolvency of companies and individuals have always positioned
the power to reject a claim on the Master. It is only once the
Master decided, one way or another, that the court may review his
or her decision (para [21]).
The respondents relied on Standard Bank of South Africa v The
Master of the High Court & others 2010 (4) SA 405 (SCA)
paragraph [93], where this court held that, before resorting to
review proceedings in terms of section 151 of the Insolvency Act,
a liquidator is obliged to follow the procedures set out in section
45 of the Act. That section is peremptory. The Supreme Court of
Appeal then dissected section 45 and identified that it provides
for the following (para [24]):
• To be delivered to the trustee:
u every claim proved against an insolvent estate at a meet-
ing of creditors
u all documents supporting such claims.
• The trustee must examine all available books and documents
to establish whether the estate owes the claimant the amount
claimed.
• If a trustee disputes a claim after proof at a meeting he or she
must report on this to the Master.
• He or she must then explain why the claim is disputed.
• The Master may
u confirm the claim, or
u after affording the claimant an opportunity to substantiate
the claim, reduce or disallow it.
• It is this decision that triggers the review procedure under
section 151 (para [25]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal remarked that the court’s
jurisdiction is not ousted: ‘the trustee has first to comply with s 45
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before a decision can be reviewed, but that hardly amounts to an
ouster of jurisdiction, if ever the court had the power to expunge a
claim’ (para [26]). Further, the court cautioned that it should not
be forgotten that a review under section 151 is one where the
court has the powers of appeal and review, and can hear further
evidence, and decide the matter de novo. The court indicated
that Millman had not taken this aspect fully into consideration
(para [26]).
It was the view of the court that the appellants should have
invoked the procedures set out in section 407 of the 1973
Companies Act. The power to expunge a claim or to reduce it is
conferred on the Master alone. Only when the Master has made
a decision in this regard may an interested person approach a
court to review it. The second exception had therefore been
correctly upheld by the court a quo (para [27]).
Accordingly, the first exception to the particulars of claim was
dismissed with costs. The appeal against the order upholding the
second exception was dismissed with costs including those of
two counsel (para [30]).
SUSPENSION OF LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS WHEN A BUSINESS RESCUE
APPLICATION IS MADE
Section 131(6) of the Companies Act provides:
If liquidation proceedings have already been commenced by or
against the company at the time an application is made in terms of
subsection (1), the application will suspend those liquidation proceed-
ings until –
(a) the court has adjudicated upon the application; or
(b) the business rescue proceedings end, if the court makes the
order applied for.
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Gas 2 Liquids (Pty) Ltd
2017 (2) SA 56 (GJ), the applicant Bank obtained a provisional
liquidation order against Gas 2 Liquids (G) in October 2015. A
provisional liquidator was appointed. On 29 February 2016 (the
return date) the Bank sought a final liquidation order. However, at
the end of argument G presented an application by a third party
asking for business rescue proceedings to commence and
placing G under supervision (para [2]). Ordinarily, this would
suspend the liquidation proceedings. However, the Bank resisted
the suspension. After it had been only partially argued, the
proceedings were stood down. The court requested both parties
to prepare written argument. The question was whether or not the
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mere issuing, out of court, of the business rescue application was
sufficient to suspend the liquidation proceedings (para [3]).
This business rescue application had been lodged with the
court on the return day (29 February 2016). There was no
indication of any service of this application on G, either on the
company in liquidation or on the provisional liquidator who had
been appointed in October 2015 (para [8]). The application was
served on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission
(CIPC) only at 07h00 on the morning of 2 March 2016 – ie, after
Satchwell J had heard the applicant argue the application for final
liquidation, and after the application for business rescue had
been presented to the court (on 29 February 2016) as a ground
for suspending the liquidation proceedings (para [7]).
Satchwell J had to decide on the meaning and application of
section 131(6) of the Companies Act, which provides that an
application for an order placing a company under supervision
and commencing business rescue proceedings will suspend
those liquidation proceedings at the time that the business
rescue application is made (para [1]). Especially relevant was the
meaning of the word ‘made’ in section 136(6). G argued that the
application was ‘made’ when it was lodged with the court, while
the Bank’s view was that for the application to have been ‘made’,
it had to have been served on both the company (including the
provisional liquidator) and the Commission, and all reasonable
steps had to have been taken to identify affected persons and
their addresses and to deliver the application to them (para [11]).
Intention to avoid liquidation
Paragraph [5] is important. The court pointed out, referring to
Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) and Blue Star
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v West Coast Oyster Growers CC 2013 (6) SA
540 (WCC), that there is always ‘the possibility that a business
rescue application might be used by an obstructive debtor intent
on avoiding the obviously inevitable liquidation as part of its
ongoing strategy to hinder a creditor from pursuing its lawfully
permissible goal of procuring the liquidation of the debtor. It
seems to me that these three matters which were attempted to be
placed before me, of which I am dealing only with the Gas 2
Liquids liquidation, is one such case.’ This fact obviously had an
effect on the court’s subsequent approach to the matter.
Affected persons and the rescue application
The court referred to section 131, in terms of which an affected
person may apply to a court for an order commencing business
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rescue proceedings. The applicant is obliged to serve a copy of
the application on the company and the Companies and Intellec-
tual Property Commission, and to notify each affected person of
the application (para [6]).
In addition, regulation 124 (Company Regulations, 2011 (pub-
lished under GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26April 2011) necessitates
a copy of the rescue application to be delivered ‘to each affected
person known to the applicant’. In paragraph [9] the court
identified ‘affected persons’ in section 128(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) as
creditors of the company, shareholders, and any registered trade
union representing employees, or each of the individual employ-
ees. The court then noted that in the case under discussion the
third-party applicant in the business rescue proceedings was
aware of at least six named creditors, ‘other miscellaneous
service providers’, at least seven fulltime employees, and numer-
ous consultants. Nevertheless, it appeared that emails with the
application attached had been sent to some but not all of the
creditors and employees (para [9]).
Making of the business rescue application in terms of section 131(6)
The respondent referred the court to Blue Star Holdings (Pty)
Ltd v West Coast Oyster Growers CC 2013 (6) SA 540 (WCC)
(para [13]). In that case it was found that ‘made’ must be given its
ordinary meaning in the context in which it appears in the
statutory setting. That court indicated that a functional approach
to section 131(6) leads to the obvious conclusion that ‘the lodging
of the application with the registrar for the issue thereof consti-
tuted the making of the application and the commencement of
proceedings to place the company under business rescue (as
opposed to the commencement of business rescue per se)’.
However, in paragraph [14] this court correctly distinguished that
no application for provisional liquidation had been heard in Blue
Star; no provisional order had been granted; and no provisional
liquidator had been appointed.
The court also considered Taboo Trading 232 (Pty) Ltd v Pro
Wreck Scrap Metal CC & others 2013 (6) SA 141 (KZP), which
also considered when an application can be said to have been
made for the purposes of section 131(6) of the Act. Again, the
court drew a distinction between the facts in Taboo Trading and
the case under discussion, and indicated, correctly, that in Taboo
Trading no application for provisional liquidation had been heard;
no provisional order granted; and no provisional liquidator
appointed (para [16]).
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In paragraph [17] the court examined Absa Bank Ltd v
Summer Lodge (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 90 (GP), where it was held
that ‘the mere issue and service of a business rescue application
in terms of section 131(1) of the Act would suspend the liquida-
tion process’. In that case the judge required both issue and
service for the business rescue application to trigger the suspen-
sion of the liquidation proceedings. In the present case there had
been no service on either the company or the liquidator (para
[18]).
The role of provisional liquidators
The application for business rescue had not been served on
the company or the provisional liquidator. The court explained the
role of liquidators (provisional and final) (para [8]):
• In certain instances the liquidator steps into the shoes of the
company in that he or she ‘is entrusted with the functions to
control and administer the property and affairs of the com-
pany and to liquidate it’.
• The acts of the provisional liquidator are ‘the acts of the
company itself’.
• But, regarding certain of his or her statutory powers, the
liquidator does not take the place of the company.
• The reason for this is that he or she may have certain duties to
creditors which the former board of directors would not have
had.
With regard to the duties of provisional liquidators, the court
explained (para [22]) that they have:
• those powers statutorily granted to them;
• those which the Master may specially confer; and
• those powers which they are granted by the court.
These duties cover a wide range of activities, which may
include:
• the carrying on of a business;
• the institution or defence of legal proceedings; and
• the sale (or even the acquisition) of assets.
In implementing these powers, the provisional liquidator:
• may operate banking accounts;
• receive and expend funds;
• remunerate employees;
• conclude contracts; and
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• generally, carry out the duties of the directors of the company
in liquidation.
The effect on the provisional liquidator and the company
The court correctly indicated that if it were to find that the
lodging of papers at court and the issuing of a case number (ie,
the mere issue of an application out of court) instantly interrupted
and postponed the provisional liquidation, ‘the impact upon the
work of, status of and person of the provisional liquidator and the
impact upon the company itself’ would be matters of grave
concern (para [21]):
Where there is no service upon the provisional liquidator of the
application for business rescue, the provisional liquidator may have
absolutely no knowledge of that business rescue application. In fact,
knowledge alone would be insufficient. The provisional liquidator is
entitled to service in terms of s 131 of theAct. Absent such service, the
provisional liquidator does not officially know that he or she is
‘suspended’ in his or her duties and powers, if such suspension of the
liquidation proceedings were to eventuate solely by reason of lodge-
ment of papers at court and issue of a case number (para [23]).
Absent service of the application on the provisional liquidator,
he or she would be carrying out his or her duties in ignorance
(para [24]). He or she would be acting without authority (and
perhaps unlawfully) in a multiplicity of respects, a consequence
which the legislature could not have intended (para [25]).
Ultimately, the court agreed with the views of Makgoba J in
Summer Lodge and Hartzenberg AJ in Taboo Trading that there
must be service and notification before it can be said that the
business rescue application has been ‘made’ as required by
section 131, and that the liquidation proceedings had been
suspended. Therefore, the court concluded as follows:
(a) The launch of the business rescue application on 29 Febru-
ary 2016 did not suspend the liquidation proceedings; and
(b) the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the opposed
application (on Monday 29 February, and Wednesday
2 March 2016 (paras [26]–[28]).
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INSURANCE LAW
DALEEN MILLARD*
LEGISLATION
AMENDMENTS TO THE LONG-TERM INSURANCE ACT 52 OF 1998 AND
THE SHORT-TERM INSURANCE ACT 53 OF 1998
LONG-TERM INSURANCE ACT 52 OF 1998
The penalty determined for failure to furnish the Registrar with
returns, information or documents for the purposes of section
68(1)(a) of the Act was published and Board Notice 4 GG 39718
of 19 February 2016 was repealed with effect from 28 February
2017 (Board Notice 14 GG 40637 of 24 February 2017 95).
Notice of the proposed replacement of the Policyholder Pro-
tection Rules was published for comment (Board Notice 153
GG 41089 of 1 September 2017 4).
The draft determination on ‘equivalence of reward’ was pub-
lished for comment (Board Notice 181 GG 41237 of 10 November
2017 296).
The Replacement of the Policyholder Protection Rules was
published (GN 1407 GG 41321 of 15 December 2017 109).
SHORT-TERM INSURANCE ACT 53 OF 1998
The Replacement of the Policyholder Protection Rules was
published (GN 1433 GG 41329 of 15 December 2017 4).
The penalty determined for failure to furnish the Registrar with
returns, information or documents for the purposes of section
66(1)(a) of the Act was published and Board Notice 3 Govern-
ment Gazette 39718 of 19 February 2016 was repealed with
effect from 28 February 2017 (Board Notice 13 GG 40637 of
24 February 2017 94).
INSURANCE LAWS AMENDMENT ACT 27 OF 2008
The date of commencement of sections 1(f) and 27(a) was set
at 1 April 2017 (GN 298 GG 40749 of 30 March 2017 4).
* BIur LLB LLM (Pret) LLD (UJ). Professor of Private Law, University of Johannes-
burg.
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Sections 1(1) of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and
1(1) of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 were amended.
FINANCIAL SERVICES LAWS GENERAL AMENDMENT ACT 45 OF 2013
The date of commencement of section 264 (in so far as it
amends s 1 of the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998) was set at
1 April 2017 (GN 298 GG 40749 of 30 March 2017 4).
Section 1 of the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 was
amended by substituting the definition of ‘business of a medical
scheme’.
FINANCIAL ADVISORY AND INTERMEDIARY SERVICES ACT 37 OF 2002
An amendment notice on the Determination of Recognised
Qualifications for Financial Services Providers and Compliance
Officers, 2017, was published (Board Notice 51 GG 40785 of
13 April 2017 188).
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION ACT 9 OF 2017
The Act was published in GG 41060 of 22 August 2017 but the
date of its commencement is to be proclaimed. It is an essential
part of the legislation that will pave the way for the twin-peaks
system of financial regulation. As a result, it effects essential
changes to a variety of statutes and repeals those statutes that
regulated the pre-twin-peaks dispensation.
The Act repeals the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990;
the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation Act 141 of
1993; the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 80 of 1998; and
the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004.
It further amends, inserts or repeals sections in the following
Acts:
* Insolvency Act 24 of 1936: sections 35A and 83 are amended.
* Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956: sections 1, 2, 18, 19, 26, 30C,
30Q–30T, 36 and 37 and the arrangement of sections are
amended; sections 1A, 1B, 30AA are inserted; sections 3, 25, 33,
33A and 34 are repealed; and section 30D is substituted.
* Friendly Societies Act 25 of 1956: sections 1, 3, 33, 47–48 and
the arrangement of sections are amended; sections 1A and 1B
are inserted; sections 4, 32, 44–45 are repealed; and the word
‘Authority’ is substituted for the word ‘Registrar’, wherever it
occurs.
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* South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989: sections 3 and
10–12 are amended.
* Banks Act 94 of 1990: sections 1, 4–6, 23, 52, 69A, 84, 90–91
and the arrangement of sections are amended; section 1A is
inserted; sections 3, 8–10, and 91A are repealed; and the word
‘Authority’ is substituted for the word ‘Registrar’, wherever it
occurs.
* Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act 8 of 1993:
section 1 is amended.
* Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993: sections 1, 3, 4, 21, 91–92 and
the arrangement of sections are amended; section 1A is inserted;
and sections 2, 6–8 are repealed.
* Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998: sections 1, 4, 9–11, 22, 26,
62, 66–67, Schedule 1, and the arrangement of sections are
amended; sections 1A and 1B are inserted; sections 5 and 68 are
repealed; and section 2 is substituted.
* Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998: sections 1, 4, 9–11, 21, 25,
55, 65, Schedules 1 and 3, and the arrangement of sections are
amended; sections 1A and 1B are inserted; sections 5 and 66 are
repealed; and section 2 is substituted.
* Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001:
sections 1 and 5 are amended and sections 4A, 6, 6A-6I, 7, 9 and
9A are amended.
* Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001: section 45E is
amended.
* Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002:
sections 1, 3, 4, 6A, 8, 9, 13, 20–23, 35 and 45, and the
arrangement of sections are amended; sections 1A, 1B and 20A
are inserted; sections 2, 14A, 26, 32, 41 and 44 are repealed; and
sections 6, 14 and 39 are substituted.
* Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002: sections
1, 15, 15A, 63, 66, 99, 112, 114 and 115 and the arrangement of
sections are amended; sections 1A and 1B are inserted; sections
7, 14, 15B, 18, 22–24 are repealed.
* Co-operative Banks Act 40 of 2007: sections 1, 2, 4, 5, 44,
48–49, 55 and 57 and the arrangement of sections are amended;
sections 1A and 1B and Chapter VIIA (ss 40A-40F) are inserted;
sections 41, 43, 75 and 76 are repealed; and sections 3, 45–47,
50, 77–79, 82, 85 and 87, the word ‘Authority’ for the word
‘supervisor’, wherever it occurs, and the long title are substituted.
* Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: sections 1, 3–12, 17, 25,
27–30, 33, 35–36, 39, 47–51, 53–58, 60–67, 71, 74–78, 82, 90, 91,
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96, 98, 105, 108–110 and the arrangement of sections are
amended; the heading preceding section 99 is deleted; sections
1A, 6A–6C, 49A and 56A are inserted; sections 86, 95, 97 and 99
are repealed; and sections 52, 59, 69, 83–85, 88 and 94, the long
title and the headings preceding sections 47, 50 and 94, and of
Chapter VIII, and the word ‘Authority’ for the word ‘registrar’,
wherever it occurs, except in s 1 (1) and 1A (1), are substituted.
* Credit Rating Services Act 24 of 2012: sections 1, 5, 23, 24 and
34 and the arrangement of sections are amended; sections 1A
and 1B are inserted; and sections 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31
and 33 are repealed.
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION ACT 9 OF 2017
The draft regulations in terms of sections 61(4) and 304 of the
Financial Sector Regulation Act, 2017, are published for public
comment (GN R1449 GG 41340 of 18 December 2017 4).
CASE LAW
JOINDERS IN INSURANCE CLAIMS
Generally speaking, joinders serve to ensure that all parties to
a dispute are before the court and that litigants can ensure that a
case does not run its course without the benefit of the evidence
and participation of a key role player. The Uniform Rules of Court
provide detailed rules on how joinders are to be effected. Rule
10(1) states as follows:
Any number of persons, each of whom has a claim, whether jointly,
jointly and severally, separately or in the alternative, may join as
plaintiffs in one action against the same defendant or defendants
against whom any one or more of such persons proposing to join as
plaintiffs would, if he brought a separate action, be entitled to bring
such action, provided that the right to relief of the persons proposing
to join as plaintiffs depends upon the determination of substantially the
same question of law or fact which, if separate actions were instituted,
would arise on each action, and provided that there may be a joinder
conditionally upon the claim of any other plaintiff failing.
In insurance litigation, it is customary for the insurance com-
pany and the policyholder to be parties to litigation. However,
where insurers, agents, underwriters, and other role players are
involved in insurance contracts, instances may arise where it is
not quite so clear who the actual insurer is. This is particularly true
where agents or underwriters fail to make a full disclosure during
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the negotiations running up to the litigation. This was the issue in
Huyser v Quicksure (Pty) Ltd & another [2017] ZAGPPHC 2,
[2017] 2 All SA 209 (GP), 2017 (4) SA 546 (GP).
The applicant (and plaintiff in the main action), Huyser, entered
into a written agreement with the first respondent (defendant in
the main action) in terms of which the first respondent undertook
to insure the applicant’s motor vehicle. One of the risks insured
against was accidental loss of or damage caused to the vehicle.
The risk materialised when the applicant was involved in a motor
vehicle accident on 1 October 2010. At the time, the value of the
motor vehicle was R630 000. There was no doubt that the policy
was valid at the time of the accident, and the plaintiff gave due
notice of the loss. Despite all other obligations in terms of the
policy having been met, the defendant refused to pay (para [6]).
In addition to these crisp facts, the policy was a ‘lengthy affair in
fine print’ ‘Quicksure Personal Insurance Policy’ (para [7]). The
heading is followed by this text:
Issued and administered by Quicksure (Pty) Ltd, an authorised
Financial Services Provider (FSP number 16902), on behalf of the
insurance companies named in the schedule which forms part of this
policy. We agree to provide insurance in terms of this policy during
any period for which a premium has been paid. The proposal and
declaration made by you are the basis of and form part of this policy
(para [8]).
There was no schedule attached to the policy, but the definition
section did provide that ‘we/us the insurer’ referred to the
insurance company named in the schedule. Each of the seven-
teen pages of the contract contained a logo consisting of a large
Q, followed by the name ‘Quicksure’ (para [10]). On 8 February
2013, following the plaintiff’s summons, the defendant (first
respondent) entered an appearance to defend and the plea was
served on the plaintiff’s attorney on 20 March 2013. It is para-
graph 3 of the plea which prompted the applicant to launch the
application that forms the basis of this case. It stipulates:
The Defendant denies that it entered into a written agreement with the
Plaintiff as alleged or at all. The Defendant denies that it undertook to
insure Plaintiff’s motor vehicle being a 2010 Toyota Landrover Prado
3.0VX with registration number ZHJ [. . .] GP against the risks mentioned
in the contract, one of them being accidental loss of . . . or damages
caused to the vehicle. At all material times hereto the Defendant and its
agents acted as insurance administrators on behalf of New National
Assurance Co Ltd (registration number 1971/10190/03).
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The rest of the plea consists of bare denials and, in the final
paragraph, an admission by the defendant/first respondent that it
refused to make any payment to the plaintiff (para [12]).
On 17 October 2013 the applicant launched the current
application to join the second respondent, New National Assur-
ance Co Ltd, as a defendant in the action, and for all costs in
the application to be reserved. This application was served on
the second respondent on 27 November 2013 (para [14]). The
applicant’s motivation in joining the second respondent was that
‘the second respondent has a direct and substantial interest in
the subject matter of the action and the determination of the
dispute involves substantially the same question of law and fact
as against the first respondent’ (para [15]). This is a direct result
of the first respondent’s (defendant’s) plea that it merely acted as
‘insurance administrators’ on behalf of the second respondent.
The applicant had no knowledge of the identity of the second
respondent until the first repondent’s plea was served on 20 March
2013 (para [16]). Importantly, paragraph [7] of the founding
affidavit states as follows:
7.1 It is essential to join the second respondent as second defendant
in the main action as the second respondent has a direct and
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action and the
determination of the dispute involves substantially the same
issues of law and fact as against the first respondent.
7.2 In light of the aforementioned it would be convenient as well as
cost effective, were the second respondent to be joined in the
main action.
7.3 I respectfully state that to refuse this application would substan-
tially prejudice the applicant/plaintiff and that to grant it could not
cause any prejudice to the respondents in any manner.
7.4 I accordingly request the Honourable Court that an order be
granted as set out in the Notice of Motion’ (para [17]).
In February, the manager of the second respondent’s legal
department opposed the action on the basis that the applicant’s
claim ‘has already prescribed and it will serve no purpose to
join the second respondent as second defendant in the action’
(para [19]). In support he argued that the applicant’s Toyota
Prado had been included in the insurance contract in May 2010,
some months before the accident occurred. As the damage to
the motor vehicle occurred on 1 October 2010, it prescribed on
30 September 2013 under section 11(d) of the PrescriptionAct 68
of 1969.
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In addition, the second respondent rejected the applicant’s
allegation that he had been unaware of the identity of the debtor
until the plea was served on his attorney, as unfounded as the
applicant had allegedly been aware of the second respondent’s
identity much earlier. It was also alleged that the applicant could
have established the debtor’s identity from Quicksure (the first
respondent) in view of the reference in the Quicksure policy to
insurance companies listed in the schedule. Among other things,
the second respondent relied on a letter from Quicksure
addressed to the applicant purportedly enclosing the Policy
Schedule, which was also attached to the answering affidavit.
This letter bears the Quicksure logo but does not refer to the
second respondent under the heading ‘Quicksure welcomes
you’. This certificate of insurance contains a reference, in very
fine print, which reads ‘Underwritten by New National Assurance
Co Ltd’. Other than this, there is no clear reference in the policy to
the second respondent being the insurer. Also attached as an
annexure to the answering affidavit was the 2010 amendment to
the policy schedule containing wording identical to the other
schedule under the same heading. The court noted that the
replying affidavit was dated February 2016, two years after the
answering affidavit, but offered no explanation for the delay (para
[25]). The court further noted the lengthy process preceding the
court proceedings, during which numerous complaints were
made to the insurance ombudsman, again without mention of the
involvement of the second respondent. The applicant’s replying
affidavit was, therefore, correct in that the only issue in dispute
was whether the claim against the second respondent had
prescribed. However, the applicant confirmed that the first time
he became aware of the ‘legal nexus’ between himself and the
second respondent was when the plea was received on 20 March
2013. Before then there was no correspondence with the second
respondent that could have led the first respondent to believe
that there was any connection whatsoever. As he became aware
of the ‘legal nexus’ between himself and the second respondent
on or around 20 March 2013, the current application had been
launched within the three-year period after he became aware of
the identity of the particular debtor. The claim could, therefore,
not have prescribed (para [27]). In stating this, the applicant
relied on section 11(d) of the Prescription Act, which provides
that, save where an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, the
period of prescription shall be three years. In addition, section
12(3) is also relevant. It provides:
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Adebt shall not be deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge
of the identity of the debtor and of the facts from which the debt arises:
Provided that a creditor shall be deemed to have such knowledge if he
could have acquired it by exercising reasonable care.
The crisp issue was, therefore, whether the claim against the
second respondent had prescribed, which would preclude the
second respondent from being joined in the action.
Counsel for the second respondent made three concessions.
First, that the applicant’s allegation that he had no knowledge of
the second respondent’s identity as a debtor until receipt of the
latter’s plea on 20 March 2013 was correct. Second, the argu-
ment in the answering affidavit, that the applicant could have
established the identity of the second respondent as a debtor at
an earlier stage by making enquiries with the first respondent,
was abandoned; and third, it was accepted that the allegations in
the replying affidavit, that the applicant never received the
documents referred to in the answering affidavit, were correct.
In deciding the matter, Prinsloo J considered the second
defendant’s argument that prescription started running on
20 March 2013, when the plea was received. Three years later –
on 19 March 2016 – the claim prescribed in accordance with
section 11(d) of the Act. The matter was only heard on 25 July
2016, which was indeed after the three-year period had expired.
In addition, the fact that the joinder application had been served
in November 2013 did not assist the applicant in that service of
the joinder did not interrupt the running of prescription under
section 15(1) of the Act (para [29]).
Prinsloo J referred to section 15, headed ‘Judicial interruption
of prescription’, which reads as follows:
(1) The running of prescription shall, subject to the provisions of
subsection (2), be interrupted by the service on the debtor of any
process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt.
(2) Unless the debtor acknowledges liability, the interruption of
prescription in terms of subsection (1) shall lapse, and the
running of prescription shall not be deemed to have been
interrupted, if the creditor does not successfully prosecute his
claim under the process in question to final judgment or if he does
so prosecute his claim but abandons the judgment or the
judgment is set aside.
(3) If the running of prescription is interrupted as contemplated in
subsection (1) and the debtor acknowledges liability, and the
creditor does not prosecute his claim to final judgment, prescrip-
tion shall commence to run afresh from the day on which the
debtor acknowledges liability or, if at the time when the debtor
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acknowledges liability or at any time thereafter the parties post-
pone the due date of the debt, from the day upon which the debt
again becomes due.
(4) If the running of prescription is interrupted as contemplated in
subsection (1) and the creditor successfully prosecutes his claim
under the process in question to final judgment and the inter-
ruption does not lapse in terms of subsection (2), prescription
shall commence to run afresh on the day on which the judgment
of the court becomes executable.
(5) If any person is joined as a defendant on his own application, the
process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt shall be
deemed to have been served on such person on the date of such
joinder.
(6) For the purposes of this section, ‘process’ includes a petition, a
notice of motion, a rule nisi, a pleading in reconvention, a third
party notice referred to in any rule of court, and any document
whereby legal proceedings are commenced.
The applicant’s argument revolved around section 12(3) of the
Act, which stipulates that a debt shall not be deemed due until
the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the
facts from which the debt arises. This means that, in the spirit of
this provision, the debt only became due when the answering
affidavit was filed in February 2014 as no details or documenta-
tion was conveyed to the applicant before then. She argued that,
if the issue were to be ventilated before a court by means of
evidence, such a conclusion could well be reached. That would
lead to a finding that the three-year period would only run its
course by February 2017. The judge made no pronouncement on
this argument and stated that evidence could well be led at a
later stage (if the matter went to trial) as to whether the ‘proverbial
penny dropped on 20 March 2013 when the plea was filed’ (para
[31]).
In dealing with whether the institution of the joinder application
interrupted prescription, the judge referred to several authorities:
notably Cape Town Municipality v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd 1990
(1) SA 311 (C); Naidoo v Lane 1997 (2) SA 913 (D); Waverley
Blankets Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 166 (C);
and Peter Taylor and Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd 2014 (2)
SA 312 (SCA). The latter was the case on which the second
defendant relied in arguing that the joinder application did not
interrupt prescription.
Prinsloo J pointed out that in the first of these cases, Allianz
Insurance, the defendant argued that for judicial interruption of
prescription to have occurred, the process served upon it by the
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plaintiffs would have to have been one whereby payment of the
debt was claimed. However, as the plaintiffs had not claimed
money but a declaratory order, the summons in question had not
been one for ‘payment of the debt’ within the meaning of section
15(1) of the Act, and prescription had not been interrupted. The
court dismissed the special pleas with costs and stated that
section 15 should be given ‘a wide and general meaning,
consistent with a legislative intention to speak broadly rather than
to define, and having regard to the spirit, scope and purpose of
the Act’ (334G–335B). This led the court to conclude that it ‘is
sufficient for the purposes of interrupting prescription if the
process to be served is one whereby the proceedings begun
thereunder are instituted as a step in the enforcement of a claim
for payment of the debt’. The particular case also states that
when interpreting the Prescription Act, it should be considered
that there is ‘a discernible looseness of language’ when com-
pared to the predecessor of the Act, the Prescription Act 18 of
1943 (330C-J) (para [36]).
Prinsloo J further considered Naidoo v Lane (above), where it
was common cause that in the case of each of the plaintiffs the
debt, for purposes of the PrescriptionAct, became due on 23 July
1992 and prescribed at midnight on 22 July 1995. It was argued
on behalf of the plaintiffs that service on 24 January 1995 of the
application to join the Minister of Safety and Security as second
defendant in casu was in fact a process as prescribed by section
15(1) of the Act. This was based on the argument that by its
reference to ‘debt’ in the Act, the legislature intended ‘to refer to
the obligation co-relative to the particular right of the creditor
concerned, whether such obligation be one to pay money or to
perform some act’. Prinsloo J stated that reference in section
15(1) of the Prescription Act to a process whereby the creditor
‘claims payment of the debt’ denotes ‘a process by which the
creditor purported to enforce the right co-relative to such obliga-
tion’. This means that the application in question should in fact
have been recognised as a process for purposes of section
15(1). Prinsloo J distinguished the application in Naidoo (where
the court held that service of an application for joinder did not
interrupt prescription) from the straightforward joinder of the
second defendant in casu and pursued this line of reasoning by
submitting that the distinction between Naidoo’s application and
a simple joinder application was also recognised in Waverley
Blankets (above), where it was held that a joinder application
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indeed interrupted prescription. Prinsloo J quoted from Waverley
Blankets 174E–I:
In Naidoo and Another v Lane and Another 1997 (2) SA 913 (D) it was
held that service of an application for joinder did not interrupt
prescription. Meskin J held that it was not ‘process whereby the
creditor claims payment of the debt’ in terms of section 15. I respect-
fully disagree. In that case the applicant sought leave to join. Leave
was granted and directions were given for implementing the joinder. In
the present matter the plaintiff sought joinder, and the order of the
court, granted by consent, was that the second defendant be joined in
the action. No directions were given. On this narrow and technical
basis it is possible to distinguish Naidoo’s case. But my disagreement
is more fundamental than that. The notice of motion seeking joinder
was undoubtedly ‘process’, see section 15(6). It can also be regarded
as a ‘document whereby legal proceedings [were] commenced’
against the second defendant (para [53]).
Prinsloo J proceeded to endorse the view in Waverley Blankets
that Howie J in Cape Allianz (above) was correct in ruling (at
334H) that ‘[i]t is sufficient for the purposes of interrupting
prescription if the process to be served is one whereby the
proceedings begun thereunder are instituted as a step in the
enforcement of a claim for payment of the debt’. The judge was at
pains to stress that the present application is a ‘straightforward
application for joinder of the second respondent as a second
defendant in the action’ (para [41]). He relied on SA Steel
Equipment Co (Pty) Ltd v Lurelk (Pty) Ltd 1951 (4) SA 167 (T),
where the plaintiff was not certain who should be held liable for
his damages. Overall, a joinder application is a ‘process’ in the
spirit of section 15(6) of the Act (para [41])
More specifically, Prinsloo J stated that the process of joinder
was served on the second respondent ‘only months after the
commencement of the running of the three-year prescription
period in March 2013’. As it is a process aimed at joining the
second respondent as a co-defendant in the trial, it would have
led to interruption of prescription. If this were not the case, the
plaintiff should in fact have served a fresh summons on the
second defendant instead of filing a joinder application. There-
fore, while the fresh summons would have interrupted prescrip-
tion, the joinder application would not have had the same effect.
The judge reiterated that the joinder application did not solve
issues of liability but merely ensured that the correct parties were
joined in the action (para [43]).
Finally, the court referred to Peter Taylor and Associates v Bell
Estates (above). Prinsloo J summarised that the causes of action
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against the two proposed defendants were quite different, as the
cause of action against the insurer was for indemnification in
terms of an insurance contract between the insured and the first
defendant, while the claim against the broker (Peter Taylor) was
for damages on the ground that he had failed to advise his client
properly. Prinsloo J pointed out that this had also been the case in
Naidoo.
However, in the present case, the causes of action are identical
– indemnification based on the same contract of insurance – and
the only question is the identity of the real insurer. Prinsloo J
correctly remarked that this was a matter that must be resolved
by evidence. On this basis, the case of Bell Estates (above) can
be distinguished from the present case and is similar to Waverley
Blankets (above). Therefore, the joinder in Bell Estates was
correctly said not to be a ‘process’ for purposes of the Prescrip-
tion Act. Prinsloo J also distinguished Bell Estates from the
present matter, as the joinder application did not ‘finally dispose’
of some elements of the claim. Clearly, in the present matter the
joinder simply brought the correct parties to court without com-
menting on the liability of any one of them. In matters such as
Naidoo and Bell Estates, where the insurer and an intermediary
are actors vis-à-vis a policyholder, it may be possible to deter-
mine liability at joinder stage. In fact, the party to be joined will
specifically argue against such joinder with reference to contrac-
tual liability (para [53]).
It follows that as the present case is distinguishable from the
Bell Estates case, the joinder had the effect of interrupting
prescription as it can be seen as a process within the wide and
general meaning of section 15 of the Prescription Act. Prinsloo J
concluded that ‘it would be appropriate, and in the interests of
justice, to grant the joinder application in the present matter’(para
[54]). Due to the complexity of the matter, the judge further
ordered that the costs of the application should be costs in the
cause (para [55]).
The present matter is complex indeed. In fact, the difference
between joining a defendant in an action where the causes of
action are similar or dissimilar goes to the very essence of liability
of the respective parties and the detailed development of case
law is described with conviction. It is submitted that the decision
is correct and fair.
The fairness of joining the second defendant is an aspect that
deserves further discussion. It is noted with some concern that
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the information given to the policyholder was in fact such that no
reasonable policyholder would immediately have known that
Quicksure was not in fact the insurer, or at the very least not the
only party who was capable of being sued. The way in which the
policy, and the subsequent correspondence, was presented
does not do much to enhance transparency. This, coupled with
Quicksure’s subsequent shenanigans before the Ombudsman
for Short-term Insurance, creates the impression that both Quick-
sure and New National Assurance Co Ltd relied on the policy-
holder’s confusion to avoid being sued. In the absence of any
information pointing to any alternative grounds for avoiding the
action, it is clear that both the respondents used delaying tactics
to avoid settling a claim that should have been paid. It is
suggested that the Policyholder Protection Rules should include
rules on transparency that stipulate, very clearly, who the parties
to an agreement are. Further, where any policies are ‘issued and
administered’ by someone other than the insurer, that administra-
tor has a duty at claim stage to disclose to the policyholder the
identity of any insurer on whose behalf it issues or administers
policies. Although it can perhaps be argued that insurers and
administrators are no different from other litigants, and that a
proper interpretation of the stipulations of the Prescription Act
aided the plaintiff/applicant in casu, it remains alarming that
insurers (and their administrators) still conduct themselves in so
deplorable a way.
CLAIMS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS
In insurance, the aim of the contract is for the insurer to carry
the risk in return for payment of a premium (Lake v Reinsurance
Corporation Ltd 1967 (3) SA 124 (W)). Failure by either party to
perform in terms of the contract is breach of contract, which
entitles the aggrieved party to an action to enforce the contract
(Walker v Santam Ltd 2009 (6) SA 224 (SCA)). The reciprocal
nature of the insurance contract and claims for specific perfor-
mance is highlighted in Mashele v Momentum Insurance &
another [2017] ZAGPJHC 33, 2 March 2017.
The rather uncontentious facts of this case were that the
applicant and the first respondent entered into a contract of
insurance on 2 September 2014, in terms of which the first
respondent undertook to provide short-term insurance to the
applicant for indemnity in the event of the loss of or damage to the
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vehicle. The applicant and the second respondent were involved
in a motor vehicle accident on 16 November 2014, and the first
respondent determined that it was uneconomical to have the
vehicle repaired. Despite the fact that all premiums were up to
date, the first respondent repudiated the claim, and the main aim
of the present application was to compel the first respondent to
perform in terms of the insurance contract. The relief sought
against the second respondent in the alternative depended on
the court refusing the main relief (para [1]).
Although, at first glance, the matter deals with procedural
issues, it is submitted that it has important implications for
insurance claims for reasons that will be highlighted below. But
first, the arguments before the court: the first respondent argued
that the matter should have proceeded to court as an action since
there was a dispute of fact. Overall, the first respondent’s affidavit
was ‘very scanty’ (para [2]). Ratshibvumo AJ remarked that the
replying affidavit consisted mainly of denials and this was not
helped by the two-page-long heads of argument. It was this
abrupt response by the respondent that prompted the court to
remark that ‘not every bare denial constitutes a dispute of fact’
(para [3]). The court, before it can conclude that there is a dispute
of fact warranting oral evidence, must be convinced that there is
a real, genuine, or bona fide dispute, and that the dispute is one
that cannot be decided on the papers (ibid). Here, the court
relied on Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty)
Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) 634H–635A and Miele et Cie GmbH & Co
v Euro Electrical (Pty) Ltd & another 1988 (2) SA 583 (A).
It emerged from the parties’ affidavits that the first respondent’s
affidavit contained an assessor’s report which formed the basis
for the repudiation of the specific claim. This report was compiled
by one ‘Etienne’. It appears that the applicant was asked for
information pertaining to ‘beacons and billings; consent letter to
obtain the police, hospital and tracker records; contact details of
people to confirm his movements prior to the accident; PQ for
the Nokia phone he bought at Edgars after the accident . . . and
copies of his bank statement’ (para [4]). The applicant was not
told why he needed to provide the information and he in fact
declined to provide the information as he felt that it was an
invasion of his privacy (ibid). In addition, the assessor was given
the details of the applicant’s brother who collected him from the
accident scene, but could not make contact with him. The
assessor did have access to the police’s accident report, and this
618 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 15 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/18−Insurance−Law
enabled him to confirm that the car was towed by one ‘Johnny’
and that the accident was caused by the other driver, a lady who
confirmed that the accident had been her fault (ibid).
It appears that there was an amount of discomfort around the
alleged presence of a lady in the applicant’s car as she was listed
as a passenger in the police report. When questioned by the
assessor, she denied that she was a passenger and stated that
she was taken to the scene afterwards. Despite the admission of
guilt from the other driver, and the fact that the premiums were up
to date, the claim was repudiated on the basis of the applicant’s
failure to comply with a reasonable request. He, however, received
no repudiation letter (para [6]).
The applicant also attached the details of the police accident
report, together with sketches, a charge sheet, and an admission
of guilt, and a copy of the charge sheet that shows that the
second respondent appeared in court several times before she
paid an admission of guilt fine for reckless driving (para [7].
In light of these facts, the court stated that ‘there is no real,
genuine or bona fide dispute of fact on whether the applicant was
involved in a collision. In the alternative, should it be that there is,
such dispute is one that can easily be determined on filed
papers.’ This means that the only remaining dispute was whether
there had in fact been non-compliance with a reasonable request
to furnish further information. It appears that after his initial refusal
to provide further information, the applicant had a change of
heart and did in fact comply with the first respondent’s reason-
able request. He furnished a signed affidavit on a Vodacom
letterhead in which he gave permission to Vodacom to make all
the information on his cell phone available, a letter directed to
Tracker in which he gave permission to make the tracking
information available, and his ABSA bank statements in which he
indicated that he had bought a cell phone from Edgars stores
(para [9]).
Following this, the first respondent acknowledged receipt of
these documents in an e-mail and confirmed that they had
identified the discrepancies which they needed to clarify and that
they would meet with the applicant in person. These discrepan-
cies were never explained and the respondents did not elaborate
on them in their replying affidavit (para [13].
The question in casu is whether the alleged dispute of fact is
about whether there had been a collision in which the car was
damaged beyond repair, and whether the applicant had com-
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plied with his obligations (other than the payment of his premi-
ums) in terms of the contract (para [4]).
In canvassing whether there was a dispute of fact as to the
applicant’s non-compliance, the court remarked that it is unclear
why bank statements were in fact requested and it appears that
the first respondent was in fact looking for a reason to repudiate
the claim. Unfortunately, counsel for the first respondent remarked
that there was a possible misrepresentation in that the applicant
had alleged that he was alone in the vehicle, while the police
accident report suggested that he was accompanied by a
passenger. This reliance on misrepresentation took the court on a
lengthy and seriously misguided discussion of the legal position
in South Africa regarding misrepresentation in insurance.
Misrepresentation is a pre-contractual statement that is false or
misleading and occurs during the pre-contractual phase, and
which is material to the risk (MFB Reinecke, JP van Niekerk and
PM Nienaber South African Insurance Law (2013) 134–5). The
court quoted section 53(1)(a) of the Short-term Insurance Act 53
of 1998, but erroneously referred to it as section 1 of the Act (para
[14]). Ratshibvumo AJ then embarked on a lengthy discussion of
misrepresentation that hailed back to the Insurance Act 27 of
1943, and referred, among other things, to Qilingele v South
African Mutual Life Assurance Society 1993 (1) SA 69 (A), only to
state that these authorities were merely cited to illustrate that the
first repondent’s preoccupation with the applicant’s initial failure
to provide information, which had since been provided, was a
‘non-issue’ (para [17]).
The court proceeded to state that this was clearly a contractual
claim and the policy document made it clear that when a claim
was lodged, the insurer could take measures to ensure that
damage was not incurred in circumstances which would have
been excluded by the agreement. In doing so, a reasonable
request could have been made to the policyholder to assist with
information (para [21]). The contract further stipulated that the
insurer had the duty to ensure the market value, pay the credit
provider, and if there is a surplus, pay that amount to the
applicant. The relevant clause in the policy was as follows:
Our responsibilities:
We have the choice to settle your claim in any of the following ways:
• Paying out cash to you,
• Repairing the damage at the repairer of our choice,
• Replacing the item at a supplier of our choice,
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• Any combination of the above.
Where any item claimed for is financed, we will first pay the finance
company. Where a claim is settled for lost or damaged items, these
items become ours.
If we elect to repair, we will only do so up to the maximum insured
value noted on your schedule for the specific section you are claiming
under.
The Insured Value
The insured value noted on your schedule is the maximum amount we
will pay in the event of a claim, less the excess and any dual
insurance, betterment or any depreciation.
If the vehicle is financed, we will first pay the outstanding settlement
amount to the finance company up to the maximum amount of the
insured value, excluding
• Any early settlement penalties,
• Additional finance charges,
• Any arrear instalments and interest.
We will pay you the difference if the settlement amount is less than
the insured value, less the applicable excess and the charges stated
above.
The insured value of your vehicle and its accessories is determined
by the Auto Dealers’ Guide . . . . (para [20])
The court concluded as follows:
[F]rom the Net Assess document compiled by the first respondent and
filed by the applicant, the value is reflected as R405 000.00. I am not
sure if this is the insured value or not. I have noted that the applicant’s
counsel indicated that the applicant accepts the value determined by
the first respondent. The relief sought by the applicant confuses this
acceptance in that R455 576.73 is claimed from the first respondent.
This appears to be the closing balance owed to Mercedes Benz
Financial Services as of 29 February 2016. A further R113 263.85 is
claimed as a reimbursement and there is no basis laid for this. The
order for specific performance sought requires that the first respon-
dent complies with the contract entered into with the applicant, and
the order shall be in those terms (para [22]).
The court therefore ordered the first respondent to determine
the insured value of the car in accordance with the insurance
contract. In addition, the first respondent was ordered to pay the
amount of the insured value (less the necessary and agreed
charges) to Mercedes Benz Financial Services within 30 days of
the order and to pay the balance, if any, into the applicant’s
account. Finally, the first applicant was ordered to ‘hand over,
deliver or make available the damaged motor vehicle (insured
property) in the condition it was after the collision within 15 days
of this order, failing which, the first respondent would be entitled
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to deduct its value as per assessment report from the insured
value’ (para [23]). The first respondent was ordered to pay the
costs of the application.
It is submitted that most insurance claims involve some form of
factual dispute. It is the duty of the insured to ‘bring his claim
within the four corners of the promise made to him’ (Eagle Star
Insurance Co Ltd v Willey 1956 (1) SA 330 (A) 334B) and this
inevitably means that, apart from the fact that the risk must have
materialised and the premiums must be up to date, it is also of
paramount importance to prove that all conditions have been
complied with. If the policyholder can prove this, the claim
against the insurer is one for specific performance (Walker v
Santam Ltd 2009 (6) SA 224 (SCA)).
It is further customary for insurers to investigate the circum-
stances that gave rise to the materialisation of the risk and, in
instances such as the present one, an insurance company would
have been well within its rights to repudiate a claim where the
vehicle in question was, for example, not roadworthy (as this
might have constituted breach of warranty), or where there was in
fact a pre-contractual misrepresentation that materially affected
the risk, as was explained in this judgment. In the latter instance,
an example of a material misrepresentation would have been that
the policyholder had never been in an accident while the
opposite had in fact been the case. On the actual claims process
and the furnishing of information, Reinecke et al Insurance Law
357, remark as follows:
Arguably the often technical reliance by insurers on the breach of
terms regulating the claims process, especially in cases where the
insured acted reasonably and is blameless, provides good examples
of the need for reform in this area of the law. The need for such reform
to alleviate the harsh consequences of forfeiture of the insurance
benefits in the event of non-compliance with terms regulating the
claims procedure has been commented on judicially.
It does seem that this particular case is a typical instance where
the insurer did not follow a transparent process in handling the
claim. Where there was no specific reason for repudiating (save
perhaps the hunch of a well-paid assessor) there was clearly no
reason for the insurer simply to withhold its performance.
This brings us to the next important point that was made,
namely, that in the absence of a factual dispute there is nothing
that prevents a matter from proceeding by way of notice of
motion. This is in fact confirmed by cases such as Plascon-Evans
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Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A),
and has been followed in several others. (See Burnkloof Caterers
Ltd v Horseshoe Caterers Ltd 1976 (2) SA 930 (A) 938A–B;
Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A)
430–431; and Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx
& Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd & andere 1982 (3) SA 893 (A)
923G–924D.) As the court has rightly stated, mere denial by the
respondent of a fact or facts does not create a factual dispute
(Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949
(3) SA 1155 (T) 1163–65 and Da Mata v Otto NO 1972 (3) SA 858
(A) 882D–H).
The plaintiff’s entitlement to specific performance in such
instances can, therefore, be granted unless it becomes evident
that there is a factual dispute, or if the parties could have
anticipated that a factual dispute would develop. Specific perfor-
mance as a contractual remedy is always available to contract
parties (Farmers’ Co-op Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343 350)
and is to be distinguished from a claim for breach of contract
(Gibson’s Ltd v Woodhead Plant Ltd 1918 AD 308). In the latter
instance a claim for damages is instituted as opposed to a claim
for specific performance.
In claims for specific performance, the court always has an
option to exercise its discretion against the granting of specific
performance (Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101 106–7; Baragwanath v
Olifants Asbestos Co (Pty) Ltd 1951 (3) SA 222 (T) at 227–8;
Thompson v Van der Vyver 1954 (2) SA 192 (C) 194F). It is
submitted that it is this discretion, together with the fact that a
factual dispute might develop, that should guide litigants to opt
for action proceedings instead of motion proceedings when
bringing a matter to court.
Overall it is submitted that save for the obvious mistakes in the
particular judgment, it is a case where there was clearly no
dispute of fact. The insurer’s foolhardy refusal to pay the claim (of
which the quantum was easily determinable) is baffling. Were
there valid reasons for such refusal, the replying affidavit failed to
bring these to the court’s attention. It is therefore submitted that
the case again illustrates that there is a clear lack of fairness in
the way in which insurance companies handle claims. Reforms
are necessary, and it is hoped that the introduction of new and
improved policyholder protection rules will in fact curtail arbitrary
repudiations such as the one in question.
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN INSURANCE
In Nkungwini v Old Mutual Assurance Co SA Ltd [2017] ZAEC-
MHC 10 (17 May 2017), one of the very fundamental issues in law of
contract: offer and acceptance, formed the essence of the dispute.
The case is an appeal against the judgment of the magistrate
for the district of Mthatha. The magistrate upheld the special plea
of jurisdiction raised against the appellant’s claim and dismissed
the claim with costs. Consequently, the main ground of appeal
was that the magistrate erred in finding that the cause of action
had not arisen within the jurisdiction of the court a quo (para [1]).
In addition, in his amended particulars of claim, the appellant
sued the respondent for R51 523,16, the amount being a refund
of premiums deducted from the appellant’s personal banking
account (para [2]). It appears that the appellant attempted to
enter into a written agreement for an insurance policy in favour of
his sister, Nonesi Nkungwini. The appellant paid monthly premi-
ums until the death of the insured. As the risk insured against had
materialised, he lodged a death claim with Old Mutual (para [3]).
As no payment was forthcoming, he pursued the matter and
Old Mutual disclosed the policy contract. It transpired that, in
terms of the contract, the insured was one Nomanesi Nkungwini,
someone he did not know at all (para [4]). In addition, the contract
showed that Nomanesi Nkungwini’s late sister was the policy-
holder, and that the appellant was a sponsor of sorts whose
signature did not appear on the contract. The appellant therefore
averred that the documents had been fraudulently altered by the
employees of the respondent. Furthermore, he alleged that the
contract was void ab initio, which meant that he was entitled to a
full refund of the premiums paid with interest (para [5]).
The respondent’s special plea raised the issue of jurisdiction,
after having initially attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to join the
unknown Nomanesi (para [6]). The respondent persisted in its
stance that its principal place of business is Pinelands, Cape
Town, which means that the contract was entered into in Pine-
lands, Cape Town. In addition, the respondent maintained that
the contracting party was not the appellant but his late sister, and
in support of this, the unsigned document was annexed. The
document fails to state where the contract was entered into and
as the appellant was not the nominated beneficiary, the respon-
dent had no obligation to pay (para [7]).
The crisp question before the court was whether the magistrate in
the court a quo erred in finding that the court lacked jurisdiction.
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In answering the question, Majiki J, with whom Jolwana AJ
concurred, referred to section 28(1)(d) of the Magistrates’ Courts
Act 32 of 1944, which provides as follows:
(1) Saving any other jurisdiction assigned to a court by this Act or by
any other law, the persons in respect of whom the court shall, subject
to subsection (1A), have jurisdiction shall be the following and no
other: . . .
(d) any person, whether or not he or she resides, carries on business
or is employed within the district or regional division, if the cause
of action arose wholly within the district . . . .
The magistrate found that the appellant had not alleged that
the entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of that court.
According to Majiki J, this was incorrect, as paragraph 15 of the
particulars of claim averrred that ‘the cause of action (fraudulent
misrepresentation) arose within its area of jurisdiction’(para [8]).
According to the judge, the magistrate did quote the appli-
cable case law when referring to Ndlovu v Santam Ltd ([2005]
ZASCA 41 (13 May 2005)), where Mthiyane JA stated:
In my view the starting point of the enquiry, when dealing with a
challenge to jurisdiction under s 28(1)(d) of theAct, is to determine the
presence or absence of facts which have to be proved by the plaintiff
to succeed in his or her cause of action (facta probanda) as opposed
to facts tending to prove such facta probanda (facta probantia).
Thereafter one has to establish whether facta probanda arose wholly
within the particular magisterial district (para [11]).
The magistrate evaluated the submission on behalf of the
appellant that the contract was void ab initio, and in the absence
of a contract, his claim was based on fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion. The magistrate found that the plaintiff had failed to aver
where the misrepresentation had been initiated and concluded
and that there were no averments supporting fraudulent mis-
representation as a cause of action. The judge did not deem it
necessary to address further findings of the magistrate with
regard to the necessity of a prayer by the appellant to rescind the
contract (para [12]).
The attorney for the respondent argued that there was in fact a
contract but finally conceded that the document disclosed by the
respondent did not meet the requirements for a valid contract.
Majiki J’s reason for finding it invalid was that ‘it is not signed by
the contracting parties’. The judge also mentioned that there was
no indication that the contract had been concluded in Pinelands,
Cape Town, ‘as the respondent would have wanted us to believe’
(para [13]).
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The judge deduced that in the absence of a valid contract, ‘we
have to accept Mr Vutula’s submission that the appellant’s claim
is that of repayment of monies the appellant paid’ (para [14]). The
judge further stated that the appellant’s entitlement to a refund
was therefore based not on contract, but on the fact that there
was no contract. The following is a verbatim quote from the
judgment:
He [the appellant] did not even require to allege misrepresentation,
alteration or fraud. These are merely what he must have suspected
happened, which he would not be able to prove in any case.
What this means is not clear. Nevertheless, the judge states
that the necessary averments are contained in the particulars of
claim.
On 6 September 2006, in Mthatha he (sought to insure the life of his
sister) and entered into an insurance contract. The contract is void ab
initio. He is entitled to the refund of all monies deducted from his bank
account in terms of that invalid contract. It is common cause that the
deductions were made from his personal bank account, also held in
Mthatha (ibid).
This was, according to the judge, the crux of the matter, which
meant that the magistrate was wrong in ruling that the required
facta probanda, as was held in Ndlovu, were absent (para [15]).
All the facts which the appellant would have to prove at trial to
succeed in his cause of action were present. This means,
according to the judge, that the court a quo had jurisdiction and
the appeal succeeded. The respondent was ordered to pay the
costs of the appeal.
The issue in casu was clearly whether there was in fact a valid
contract between Old Mutual and the appellant, and the strange
facts appear to imply that there was a misunderstanding from
the outset as to the identity of the parties. It appears that the
appellant intended to insure his sister’s life, which means that
the contract was supposed to be between himself and Old
Mutual. It is in fact possible to enter into a contract insuring the life
of another. As the law currently stands,
[t]he life insured is the object of the insurance on whose life the
contract hinges. The life insured, not being the policyholder, is not a
party to the contract. He has no rights and no obligations under the
policy (PM Nienaber & MFB Reinecke Life Insurance in South Africa
(2009) 195).
It is also true that the life insured does not have to give the
policyholder permission to insure his or her life (Nienaber &
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Reinecke 196). It stands to reason that it can be extremely
problematic, as the safety of the life insured can be threatened by
a policyholder who has less than pure motives. Furthermore, a
person’s life may only be insured by someone who has an interest
in the non-occurrence of the event insured against (ibid). For
instance, a husband has an interest in the longevity of his wife, or
partners in that of each other. Whether siblings have such an
interest is an open question, and that was not in fact part of the
present dilemma. What is evident is that the appellant had every
intention of insuring his sister’s life.
As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the court had to determine
the exact cause of action, namely, whether there was a contract
between the parties, or whether there had been fraudulent
misrepresentation. There appears to be an absence of informa-
tion on exactly how the contract came into existence. In insur-
ance, policies are sold either via an intermediary or by direct
marketing. Conventional wisdom has it that insurance contracts
come into existence through offer and acceptance. Reinecke et
al hold that ‘an ‘‘offer’’ is a declaration of intention stating the
terms upon which the person making it (the offeror) is prepared to
contract with the person to whom he has addressed his offer (the
offeree)’. In order to constitute an offer, the declaration must
contain sufficient and clear particulars to ‘enable the offeree to
conclude an agreement with a determinable content by simply
accepting the offer’ (Reinecke et al Insurance Law 96). That
means that the offer must, for instance, state the nature of the
cover required, the object to be insured, and the period of cover
(ibid). Another important aspect is that in insurance contracts, the
law normally does not prescribe formalities such as writing, and a
valid insurance contract will, in fact, come into existence when
the insurance company accepts the proposer’s (prospective
insurer’s) offer (ibid). In theory, the same principles apply to
so-called ‘telesales’ where offers and acceptances take place
orally (ibid). Unfortunately, there was no information as to how the
sale took place, and this all-important aspect was presumably not
argued before the court.
In the absence of such evidence it is also not possible to
establish the time and place when the particular contract came
into existence. For contracts in general, and insurance contracts
in particular, a contract comes into existence when and where the
offeror learns of the acceptance (Reinecke et al Insurance Law
103). That means that in the case under discussion, the appellant
627INSURANCE LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 24 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/18−Insurance−Law
would have learned of the acceptance of the contract where he
was situated at the time, which was, in the absence of facts to the
contrary, Mthatha. This refutes the argument by Old Mutual
regarding jurisdiction.
Whether there was in fact a contract is, however, the second
issue. It is evident, from the policy scrutinised by the court, that
the life insured was in fact someone other than the appellant’s
deceased sister. This means that there was no consensus on the
exact nature of the contract and, in the absence of consensus, it
is clear that that the basis for reclaiming the monies paid would
be something other than contract. In the circumstances it stands
to reason that the court relied on the fact that the payment was
made sine causa and should be refunded to the appellant.
PROOF OF LOSS IN INSURANCE
So-called claim-stage fairness is an aspect that has been
neglected in insurance. It must be stated at the outset that in as
much as policyholders are entitled to insurers who apply their
minds, insurers are also entitled to receive the correct informa-
tion, and where policyholders act in a way that is less than
honest, this is to the detriment of the entire insurance pool and
should not be tolerated. In Cohen v Mutual and Federal Insurance
Company Ltd ([2017] ZAGPJHC 231 (18 August 2017)) this fine
balance became abundantly clear.
The straightforward facts of the matter were that the plaintiff,
Ms Cohen, instituted a claim against the defendant in terms of an
insurance policy held with them for an amount of R497 973, which
represented the value of jewellery that was stolen from her flat on
4 June 2012 (para [1]). According to the plaintiff, on 5 July 2012
she discovered that her jewellery was missing. As the only
witness in the case, she testified that the jewellery had been
stolen by three plumbers who allegedly worked in her flat on 4
and 5 June 2012 (para [2]). The three plumbers, all three from
MT Water Wise Plumbing, denied having stolen the jewellery
(para [3]). The defendant called an independent loss adjustor,
Ms Harmse, and a member of the defendant’s internal special
investigation unit, Mr Meyer, to testify to alleged contradictory
statements by the plaintiff (para [5]).
The plaintiff, a widow, resided in two-bedroomed flat with a
partner. She occupied one bedroom, and her partner the other.
The room used by her partner had two metal boxes bolted to the
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floor inside the cupboard. One of these boxes contained docu-
ments (the blue one) and the other one cash and jewellery. These
boxes were locked and the plaintiff kept the keys in one of the
wardrobes in her room. The wardrobes were locked with pad-
locks and she kept these keys on her person (para [6]).
The plumbers were employed to install a shower and wash-
basin in her bedroom and to do so, they laid water pipes from the
bathroom along the passage and into ther bedroom. Ms Cohen
was there when the work was carried out, but she did not
supervise the plumbers (para [7]). On the first day of the work the
plaintiff had to buy certain components required for the job. She
went out to buy these and locked the plumbers out of the flat
(para [8]).
Later in June 2012, the plaintiff decided to update her insur-
ance on her jewellery under her policy with Mutual & Federal, and
to this end obtained a quotation from Charles Greig Jewellers.
The certification of valuation stated that the valuation was updated
‘using a previous valuation certificate’, which means that the
jewellery itself was not seen. The plaintiff sent the valuation to her
brokers with a request to update the policy. The brokers issued
an updated policy schedule with effect from 25 June 2012,
increasing the value of some items and adding new ones that
were not insured before (para [9]).
On 5 July 2012, the plaintiff opened the black box to take out
some cash, only to discover that the cash and all the jewellery
were missing. She reported the theft to the Bramley police station
on 6 July 2012. In her affidavit she accused the plumbers of the
theft (para [11]). The police compiled an affidavit based on a
hand-written statement by the plaintiff and both her statement
and affidavit indicated that the plumbers worked at her flat on
28 June 2012 and not on 4 and 5 June, which was actually the
case (para [12]). The plaintiff reported the loss to her brokers on
6 July 2012 and she completed a claim form on 16 July, together
with the handwritten statement (para [13]).
The defendant appointed Ms Harmse as assessor together
with Mr Francis, assisted by Mr Meyer. There were four interviews
with the plaintiff on 20 July, 5 August, and 4 December 2012, and
10 January 2013 (para [14]). The defendant’s claims department
interrogated queries about the plaintiff’s loss and these were
addressed in a letter to the plaintiff on 14 December 2012, to
which she responded on 21 December 2012. Mr Francis’s report
was dated 25 January 2013, and the defendant rejected the
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claim on 1 February 2013, after which Ms Harmse reported to the
defendant on 4 February 2013 (para [16]). The two matters for
decision were whether the jewellery had in fact been stolen, and
whether the plaintiff’s claim was subject to certain limitations.
The first issue was the theft of the jewellery. According to
Trengove AJ, the plaintiff consistently blamed the plumbers for
the loss and made a case against them. Her affidavit and
statement related that on 28 June 2012 the plumbers came to
install the shower and wash basin, and when they started
working, she locked her wardrobe but lost one set of keys that
she could not find again. Her account implied that the plumbers
must have found the lost key to her wardrobe. The tale continues
that the plumbers left rubble in the other bedroom where they
must have seen the security boxes. She further claimed to have
seen one of the plumbers talking quietly in the other bedroom,
after which he put something in the back of his truck and left
(ibid).
This accusation was repeated in the claim form dated 16 July
2012, in her interviews with Harmse, Francis, and Meyer, and
again in her evidence at the trial. This, despite the fact that there
were also electricians and other tradesmen in the flat during that
time (para [20]).
Trengove AJ stated that the main inconsistency in the plaintiff’s
evidence was the date erroneously given as 28 June 2012 and
not 4 and 5 June. This could not be explained under oath. One
explanation was that she could not in fact remember the date,
despite the fact that she had reiterated the date to the insurers as
28 June 2012 and went as far as to furnish an affidavit from her
partner, Standton, confirming that the plumbers had been at her
home on 28 June 2012 (para [22]). These conflicting versions
point to the fact that the plaintiff’s error as regards the date could
not have been a true and honest mistake. The plaintiff’s motive for
the mistake, according to the court, was that she was under-
insured on 4 June 2012 before she updated her insurance on
25 June 2012 (para [24]).
Another issue that reflected badly on the plaintiff’s credibility
was the fact that she confused the colours of the two boxes, first
stating to Harmse and Meyer that the jewellery was taken from the
blue box, but later alleging that it had in fact been taken from the
black box (para [26]). When pressed, the plaintiff did not explain
why she contradicted herself and merely stated that she had
been mistaken (para [26]).
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The court also canvassed the issue of the plaintiff’s lost keys
and summarised the account of the plumbers discovering a lost
key in the garden and figuring out that it belonged to the
wardrobe as implausible (para [34]). The plaintiff’s explanation of
the black box did indeed describe how she discovered the
broken box and then used her keys to unlock it, only to find the
jewellery had been taken (para [35]). The plaintiff even produced
a seriously damaged box in court, demonstrating that it was so
damaged that it took two men to open it (para [36]). The court
stated that even though that may be the case, the box was
allegedly not as damaged when Harmse photographed it on
20 July 2012. Trengove AJ conceded that Harmse’s picture of the
box was of ‘such poor quality’ that the court could not attach any
weight to it as evidence proving the state of the box on 20 July
(para [37]).
Trengove AJ also stated that the plaintiff’s evidence could not
be accepted, as the damage (however severe) must have been
apparent to her when she first laid eyes on the box. This would
then not have necessitated the use of keys at all. On this third
aspect of the evidence it is also clear that the plaintiff’s evidence
was ‘inconsistent and fanciful’ (para [38]).
Regarding the plaintiff’s demeanour, the court observed that
the plaintiff was a poor witness who seemed ‘incapable or
unwilling’ to respond directly to questions put to her (para [40]).
Two of the plumbers testified. The court heard from Messrs
Sibanda and Dube that they did not set foot in the second
bedroom, had never seen the boxes, and had not taken anything
from them (para [42]). Sibanda further testified that he did not
have the opportunity to steal anything from the plaintiff as she sat
in the kitchen and watched them all the time. Dube confirmed
this, and the two witnesses were found credible by the court
(paras [43] [44]). The court also remarked that the two plumbers
had been vindicated by the police as the fingerprints on the black
box did not match theirs (para [46]).
Overall, the court found that the plaintiff had not discharged the
onus of proving that her jewellery had been stolen and dismissed
the action with costs (para [48].
The second issue, whether the claim was subject to certain
limitations, needed no discussion as there was no valid claim in
the absence of theft.
Although the term is not used in so many words, it does appear
that the plaintiff instituted a fraudulent claim. Due to lack of a
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statutory definition of insurance fraud, the common-law concept
of insurance fraud refers to three kinds of deceitful behavior:
fabricated claims; fraudulently exaggerated claims; and valid
claims accompanied by fraudulent means (Reinecke et al Insur-
ance Law 375–7). The plaintiff’s behaviour in casu is an example
of a fabricated claim in that she had attempted to obtain a benefit
for a claim that never arose. This instance may be distinguished
from the case of Harikasun v New National Assurance Company
Limited ((190/2008) [2013] ZAKZDHC 67 (12 December 2013),
where there was in fact a valid claim, but it was accompanied by
fraudulent means (D Millard (2014) 17 Juta’s Insurance L Bul
23–31; D Millard ‘PK Harikasun v New National Assurance
Company Ltd (unreported case High Court, KwaZulu Natal no
190/2008 (12 December 2013): Of red herrings, sardines, and
insurance fraud: Something’s fishy!’ 2016 De Jure 155–67).
As far as the burden of proof is concerned, it is clear that the
plaintiff had to prove that the loss had in fact occurred. The
evidence suggests that she was unable to do so, which led to the
rejection of the claim. The present case may be distinguished
from Renasa Insurance Company Limited v Watson ((32/2014)
[2016], ZASCA 13 (11 March 2016)), where the plaintiff was able
to show that the risk had in fact materialised (a fire), and that there
had been resultant loss (damage to property as a result of the
fire). Following this, the claim was rejected and the insurance
company alleged that the plaintiff had acted fraudulently by
setting fire to the building. As the insurance company could not
prove arson, and therefore fraud, the court stipulated that the
plaintiff should be compensated (D Millard (2016) 19 Juta’s
Insurance L Bul 21ff). The present case, however, clearly required
the plaintiff to prove that she had in fact incurred a loss upon the
realisation of an insured risk (theft). As she was incapable of
doing so on a balance of probabilities, the claim could not
succeed.
It is submitted that the case was decided correctly.
MISREPRESENTATION IN INSURANCE LAW
Misrepresentation is one of the most prevalent issues in
insurance law and is the subject of frequent litigation. It refers to
pre-contractual misrepresentation of facts that affect the assump-
tions upon which insurers take on specific risks. As such, a
misrepresentation is essentially a statement of fact which is false
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or misleading. It constitutes wrongful conduct and is therefore
delictual in nature (Reinecke et al Insurance Law 134).
In Absa Idirect Ltd v Valoyi [2017] ZAGPPHC 601 (22 August
2017), misrepresentation was again up for discussion.
The present case is an appeal against the decision of Kubushi
J in the Gauteng Local Division, Pretoria, handed down on
12 June 2014 (D Millard (2014) 17 Juta’s Insurance L Bul 55–60).
The uncontested facts were that the plaintiff (respondent in casu)
based his claim on the defendant’s (appellant’s) alleged breach
of an insurance contract. The appellant repudiated his claim and
failed to compensate him in the amount of R297 990, the value of
the cover over his motor vehicle.
More specifically, on 13 July 2010 the parties entered into a
written insurance agreement for cover in respect of the respon-
dent’s BMW 525i motor vehicle. The motor vehicle was insured for
R297 990. The respondent further alleged that he had complied
with the terms of the agreement which required him to pay
monthly premiums of R2 112,98. The motor vehicle was involved
in an accident and damaged beyond repair. In the proceedings
before the court a quo, the appellant pleaded that it was the
respondent who had breached the terms of the insurance
agreement because he had failed to disclose to the appellant that
his previous insurance policy in respect of a BMW 330i motor
vehicle had been cancelled as his previous insurer had found
that the respondent presented an unacceptably high risk. In
addition, the appellant also alleged that the respondent had
breached the terms of the agreement by misrepresenting to the
appellant that his previous policy had not come into being as a
result of his high insurance risk profile.
According to the appellant, the non-disclosure and the misrep-
resentation by the respondent were material in that they had a
direct bearing on the risk assessment in respect of the respon-
dent’s motor vehicle. Accordingly, had the respondent disclosed
the fact that his previous insurer had cancelled his policy due to
an unacceptable risk, the appellant would not have entered into
the insurance contract with the respondent on the terms it had.
For this reason, the appellant was entitled to repudiate the claim.
The court a quo ruled in favour of the respondent, stating that it
accepted the respondent’s (Valoyi’s) version that when entering
into the contract, he did disclose that his previous insurer did not
wish to insure his vehicle because he was a ‘high risk’. He also
stated that he did not know what this meant, but informed the
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appellant’s agent that they were welcome to contact the previous
insurer to find out what they meant by ‘high risk’. On the basis of
the two telephone conversations where the ‘high risk’ was can-
vassed with the respondent, the court a quo ruled that there were
no facts within the respondent’s knowledge at the time of the
conclusion of the contract that had not been disclosed to the
appellant, as it was quite clear that the respondent regarded
‘high risk’ and ‘unacceptable risk’ as synonymous. On appeal, the
legal question remained unchanged: whether the respondent
had breached the terms of the insurance contract by failing to
disclose to the appellant a material fact, namely, that his previous
insurance policy had been cancelled by a previous insurer as a
result of the respondent presenting an unacceptably high risk
(para [6]).
Louw J, for the full court, considered the transcript presented to
the court a quo as part of the respondent’s evidence in chief.
From this transcript it was evident that the respondent’s previous
insurance company, Auto and General, had not in fact cancelled
the respondent’s previous insurance policy, and did pay out for
the loss of the hijacked vehicle. Auto and General was not
prepared to insure the BMW 525 which the respondent wanted to
purchase to replace the hijacked vehicle (para [10]).
The court considered the respondent’s testimony under cross
examination and pointed out that it was clear that the respondent
did not understand why his previous insurer was in the process of
paying him out for his stolen BMW 330i, but was not prepared to
insure the BMW 525 he intended to purchase. He, therefore, had
not misrepresented any facts to the appellant and had, in fact,
indicated that the appellant’s representative could contact his
previous insurer to fill in the blanks (para [11]). The court
furthermore evaluated the evidence of the other witnesses as to
whether the insurance with Auto and General had in fact been
cancelled. The court was in agreement with the findings of the
court a quo that on the facts, the policy with Auto and General
had not been cancelled, but had terminated upon their payment
to the respondent (para [17]). This means that the respondent
could not have misrepresented facts regarding the cancellation
of a policy which had not been cancelled in the first place.
The court reiterated that in its judgment the court a quo had
asked whether the respondent had ‘failed to disclose what was in
his knowledge at the time he concluded the agreement with the
appellant’ (para [20]). On the facts, the court agreed with the
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court a quo that on the basis of the telephone conversations with
the respondent, ‘high risk’ and ‘unacceptable risk’ meant the
same to the respondent, and that he had not, in fact, failed to
disclose any material facts to the appellant. The respondent had
also not misrepresented any facts to the appellant (ibid).
Based on the above, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
It is trite law that the duty to disclose is a pre-contractual one,
which is why breach of this duty amounts to the delict of
misrepresentation and not to breach of contract (Reinecke et al
Insurance Law 144–5; see also the writers’ reference to Pereira v
Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1975 (4) SA 745 (A) 755;
Rabinowitz v Ned-Equity Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (1) SA 403 (W)
407–8; Pillay v SA National Life Assurance Co Ltd 1991 (1) SA363
(D) 145 n89). This means that the insured acts by disclosing the
wrong information or by failing to disclose material information.
Where there is in fact a misrepresentation, this wrongful and
culpable act causes the insurer to act to his detriment. This is
because the insurer would not have contracted on the terms it
did, or at all, but for the misrepresentation.
It is submitted that insurance companies should stop hiding
behind the doctrine of disclosure where they have sufficient
information at their disposal to undertake a simple investigation.
In a sense, the ruling on appeal vindicates this view as it echoes
the judgment of the court a quo that it is evident from the
transcript that the respondent had not attempted to hide any
information, and that the appellant could easily have established
the reason for Auto and General not being keen to insure the
respondent’s new BMW. If insurance companies employed the
same vigour in establishing facts before entering into contracts
as they do when finding reasons to repudiate claims, fewer
disputes would reach the High Court.
PREMIUM DETERMINATIONS
In what is in all respects a novel case, Flemming v MMI Group
([2017] ZAGPPHC 650 (2 October 2017)) examined how insur-
ance companies determine premiums.
This particular case came before the court as an application. In
the founding affidavit, the applicant (Flemming) sought a declara-
tory order from the court with the following terms: that three of the
applicant’s policies each contained a number of tacit terms, each
compelling the respondent to disclose to the applicant how the
increase in premium was calculated and who decided on these
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terms; that Momentum did not have the right to increase the
premium unless this duty to disclose had in fact been observed;
that Momentum had no right to increase the premium for as long
as there was no disclosure; and that Momentum would not have
the right to impose any further premium increases after the date
of the court order.
The notice of motion on the disclosure was very detailed. It
asked the court to compel Momentum not only to disclose informa-
tion, but also to indicate which facts and considerations were
taken into account in deciding the premium increase and the
amount of the increase; how Momentum arrived at the facts and
the decisions the weight and numerical value attached to each
fact; what methods and reasoning were used; how these numeri-
cal weights and values were put together; how and why each fact
and consideration differed from the characteristics of the same
considerations at the inception of the policies; and who decided,
and on which grounds, to impose an increase in the premiums
(para [1]). The notice of motion was in Afrikaans, and the transla-
tion was somewhat complicated, but even so, the notice of motion
seems overly repetitive and drafted with a view to confuse.
Be that as it may, the gist of the applicant’s case was that he
relied on certain implied or tacit terms that should be read into the
insurance contract (para [3]). The respondent’s case was that
the applicant did not make a proper case for the inclusion of
these ‘implied/tacit’ terms in the contract, with the result that the
application should fail.
In a somewhat roundabout way, Rautenbach AJ stated that the
issue to be decided was whether the applicant may rely on the
incorporation of certain ‘implied/tacit’ terms (para [9]). The judge,
in an interesting turn of events, also stated that ‘the enquiry does
not end here’ and that the court would also have to consider
‘whether in terms of the General law of Contract [or] the Common
Law, the development of the Common Law through the Constitu-
tion and other factors that may be present’ would allow the court
to grant relief to the applicant (ibid).
This second consideration was incorporated into the dispute in
reliance upon Du Toit obo Dikeni v Road Accident Fund 2016 (1)
SA 367 (FB), where the court made the following observation:
The object of pleading is to define the issues so as to enable the other
party to know what case he has to meet. The parties are, therefore,
limited to their pleadings: a pleader cannot be allowed to direct the
attention of the other party to one issue, and then at the trial attempt to
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canvass another. However, since pleadings are made for the court . . .
it is the duty of the court to determine what are the real issues between
the parties and, provided no possible prejudice can be caused to
either party, to decide the case on these real issues . . . . The general
principle is that the parties will be held to the issues pleaded unless
there has been a full investigation of the matter falling outside the
pleadings . . . . (para [43]).
In considering the matter at hand, the court first considered the
insurance contract. Various provisions were quoted but the most
important clause was the one dealing with premium reviews. The
relevant clause stipulated that premiums would be reviewed on a
regular basis to ensure that they covered the costs of all benefits.
The contract proceeded to stipulate that if the premium was
insufficient to cover the benefits, the policyholder would be
required to increase the premium so as to ensure that the benefits
would be payable. The contract further stated that the policy-
holder was not obliged to pay the premium, but if he did not pay
it, benefits would cease at the end of the guaranteed period. In
addition, failure to pay these benefits would have an influence on
the investment account which meant that the policyholder would
not have a cash value on the policy for a considerable period of
time (para [20]). The judge remarked that the only interpretation
of this part of the insurance contract was that at the end of the
guarantee period of ten years, the respondent may review the
premium and increase it. The applicant’s failure to pay any
premium whatsoever would lead to the termination of death
benefits (para [21]).
On 23 October 2015 the respondent wrote to the applicant
about a review that was due on 1 February 2016 that would affect
his capital protector. As regards one of the three policies in
particular, the applicant was informed that he had four options
with regard to the increased premium, and if he selected any one
of these, the guarantee period would be extended by a further ten
years (para [24]). The review simply meant that the applicant
faced paying double his premium on the particular policy to
which the letter referred, as well as on the other two policies (para
[26]).
Correspondence ensued between the applicant and the respon-
dent and the issue from the outset was the factors that were taken
into account when the premiums were calculated. The court did
not discuss the correspondence any further, but drew attention to
the respondent’s answering affidavit in which the following is
stated:
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Each insurance company adopts its own unique methodology in this
regard, and the market will determine whether it conducts its business
efficiently. The actuarial methods used are determined by qualified
actuaries with many years of technical studies and experience.
Premium determination constitutes a discretionary decision by the
insurer concerned (para [28]).
The court explained that the legal position is clear: a contrac-
tual party is allowed to determine the performance in terms of the
contract, and the insurance contract in question did exactly that
(para [32]). The court further stated that the respondent did not
rely on an unfettered discretion. Rather, the respondent relied on
the fact that various factors were taken into account when
exercising the discretion to increase the premiums. If a contrac-
tual, discretionary power was ‘clearly intended to be completely
unfettered, an exercise of such a discretion must be made
arbitrio bono viri’ (para [33]. To exercise this discretion not
arbitrarily but in good faith and reasonably is, in other words, the
test, and according to the court, the real issue was therefore the
actual discretion exercised by the respondent. As a result, it was
not necessary to determine whether the relief sought by the
applicant could be established by imposing an implied and/or
tacit term (para [35]).
In determining whether the respondent exercised its discretion
in a way that is arbitrio bono viri, it had to be borne in mind that
each case is different and that all contracts are governed by
good faith (para [37]). In this regard, the court referred to NBS
Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC; Deeb v Absa Bank
Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA).
Having decided that the question was actually whether the
respondent had exercised its discretion in good faith, the court
next stated:
When the Applicant was initially expected to make an election as to
whether he would purchase the product of the Respondent or any
other product, he knew exactly what he was in for, for at least the next
ten years. The question arises as to whether the Applicant could have
expected to be fully informed of how his premiums would be affected
when the review period arises ten years on. I am of the view that when
the time came when the Respondent exercised its discretion in
relation to the increasing of the premium, there was at least a tacit term
to the effect that he would be properly informed as to how the
Respondent arrived at calculating the new premium. If I am wrong in
this regard, I have to take into account to what extent the Constitution
and Constitutional values apply to Private Law (para [38]).
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This appears to be an about-turn from the initial statement that
the actual legal question related to whether the discretion had
been exercised freely. The court then referred to Uniting Reformed
Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa
2013 (5) SA 205 (WCC). This reference appears unrelated to the
issue at hand as the Uniting Reformed Church case dealt with
competing interests which should be borne in mind ‘in consider-
ation of the fairness of provisions of a lease’ in paragraphs [32]
and [34] (para [39]). Following on this reference, the court
remarked:
Although individuals should be left free to conclude contracts, the role
of the Courts was not merely to enforce contracts but there is a public
policy consideration which recognises that all persons have the right
to seek judicial redress and that the role of the Court is not merely to
enforce contracts but also to ensure that the minimum degree of
fairness, which will include consideration of the relevant positions of
the contracting parties as well (para [40]).
According to Rautenbach AJ, the court was faced with an
individual and an insurance company, and the insurance com-
pany had exclusive knowledge of the reasons for increasing the
insurance premium. This meant that ‘as a matter of public policy,
an insurance company with the absence of a contractual provi-
sion to the contrary, is entitled to increase its premiums without
any explanation regarding the calculation of such increase’ (para
[42]).
The court referred to Juglal NO v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd
t/a OK Franchise Division 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA), where the court
stated as follows:
What the learned judge of appeal appears to have said is that a
contractual provision may not itself run counter to public policy but
that the implementation may be so objectionable that it is sufficiently
oppressive, unconscionable or immoral to constitute a breach of
public policy in which case public policy can be invoked in justifica-
tion of a refusal to enforce such a provision (paras [12] [13]).
The next reference reverted to the determination of perfor-
mance. The court quoted Erasmus v Senwes Ltd 2006 (3) SA 529
(T) to support the view that there is no objection to a contractual
clause conferring a right on one of the parties to determine its
own performance, provided that ‘it is subject [to] an objective
standard and thus fettered’ (para [44]).
The court concluded that as the insurance contract itself made
provision for an increase in premiums, this was not in fact an
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unfettered discretion. Surprisingly, the court concluded that the
applicant was entitled to some relief, this being limited to the
prayers pertaining to the disclosure of the facts, figures, and
information that informed the decision to increase the premiums.
However, this would not mean that the premium may not be
increased ‘unless all of the information has been made available
to the Applicant’. This meant that further monetary claims would
depend on the outcome of the information disclosed (para [49]).
It seems that the judgment oscillates between assisting the
applicant on some extra-contractual basis, while at the same time
assisting the respondent based on its contractual rights, by
concluding that the respondent owed the applicant ‘some answers
especially in respect of the information he required in respect of
prayer 4.1’ (para [50]). By way of explanation, the court stated as
follows:
Should the Respondent make available the data and calculations as
required by the Applicant, it will at least guide the Applicant as to
whether the increase in his premiums were properly considered and
based on rational and actuarial principles. Should this be the case, the
Applicant may find himself in a situation where he either is satisfied
with the Respondent’s calculations and explanations, or in a position
where he may be of the view that he has a proper case attacking the
Respondent’s calculation in coming to a decision of an increase of his
premiums. In such event he may decide to take the matter further or
not (para [51]).
The respondent was therefore ordered to inform the applicant
about what information it took into account ‘when it decided to
increase the premiums and the extent of the increases for
policies 089560601, 099671567 and 20052330’; to explain the
method of calculation and any other information that was used to
arrive at the new premiums; and to explain in which respect the
facts and circumstances were different ‘to those which existed at
the commencement of the policies’. The court also ordered the
respondent to pay the cost of the application (para [53]).
The obligation to pay an insurance premium is one of the
essentialia of the insurance contract (Reinecke et al Insurance
Law 86). Without a premium, there is no contract. This, however,
was not the issue in the present case. The applicant’s concern
was about the basis upon which the proposed (and rather
drastic) premium increase was arrived at by the insurer.
The determination of insurance premiums is by no means a
straightforward business. They are determined largely by the
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expected claim payments over the time period of the insurance
contract (Nienaber & Reinecke Life Insurance 103). To this,
margins are added for administrative costs, commissions for
brokers, and profit. The authors further clarify the process by
explaining that actuaries use assumptions based upon claim
incidence to determine expected future claim payments. That
means that if 30 men over the age of 60 died during the previous
year, there is an assumption that at least 30 men over 60 will die
during the following year. More specifically:
By grouping similar lives together into homogenous risk groups
assumptions can be made that are more appropriate for that risk
group. For example, statistical evidence has shown that the life
expectancy of females and males are different, with females typically
living longer than males . . . The factors that are used to group similar
risks are called rating factors (that is, factors by which premium rates
differ) (Nienaber & Reinecke Life Insurance 104).
Typical rating factors include age, gender, socio-economic
class, educational qualifications and income, smoking status,
health status, occupation and lifestyle, and leisure pursuits (ibid).
Premiums may be loaded in circumstances where an individual
exhibits an extraordinary risk. This explains how initial premiums
are calculated. A more business-oriented view is provided by
Benfield. The author states as follows:
[I]nsurance works because the losses of the few are borne by the
many. In its simplest form therefore, the life insurance risk premium is
calculated by dividing the expected death claims for a particular year
by the number of people in that age group.’ (Benfield BM Life
Insurance Company Management: A Universal Primer (2004) 38.)
Benfield summarises the life insurance equation as: ‘[P]re-
miums + interest = mortality = expenses’ (ibid). For whole life
insurance, the year-by-year premium rate is relatively stable for
the first twenty years if the life insured purchased the policy at, for
instance, age 30. After that, the year-by-year premium rises
steeply, and after 50 years the premium is nearly ten times that of
the originally charged level premium rate (Benfield Life Insurance
Company Management 42).
This explains why insurance premiums increase. If one then
bears in mind that the most elementary life insurance is written on
a term insurance or year-to year basis, it stands to reason that
increases in premiums will at first be lower, but will increase over
time (BM Benfield Life Insurance Company Management 38).
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Other factors that may influence premiums relate to mortality
tables. Benfield explains as follows:
Based upon the expected mortality experience, a group of insureds of
a given age will each be charged a premium sufficient to provide a
sum that is adequate to meet all the group’s death claims for the year.
Each succeeding year the premium will be higher because the
survivors will be older and will have a higher expected death rate
(ibid).
This very simplified exposition explains why a policy such as
the one in question could guarantee a specific premium over a
period of ten years, but was bound to attract a significantly higher
premium for the next couple of years. It is supposedly infinitely
more complicated when commissions, profit, and administrative
fees must be factored into the premium.
It is therefore concluded that even though there needs to be
some transparency in how premiums are initially calculated and
subsequently adjusted, this case opens the proverbial can of
worms by compelling the insurer to provide a detailed explana-
tion of an increase in premium. To expect an insurer to disclose
detailed actuarial calculations will seriously hamper business,
and will likely be too complicated to be understood by the
average policyholder. It is submitted that it is sufficient to disclose
to a prospective policyholder at sale stage, which factors are
taken into account when calculating a premium, where there is an
increased premium due to extraordinary risks such as chronic
illness or lifestyle factors, and that the premium will be increased
annually or after a period of time. Those who literally beat the
odds, will in due course pay more for life insurance.
To return to the issues raised in the case: it is difficult to follow
the argumentation as the court jumps from ‘implied/tacit’ terms to
the insurer’s ‘unfettered discretion’ to increase premiums. Even
though the court attempts to argue along the lines of a deter-
mined or determinable performance, or, as it so strangely puts it,
‘a prestation’, it is submitted that there is a sound basis in
insurance for imposing increases in premiums and this has to do
with risk, which is inextricably linked to policy benefits. Risks
change over time and so must premiums. In this respect insur-
ance contracts must be distinguished from other contracts, and
to state that the insurer should provide a detailed explanation
such as the one ordered in casu, is problematic to say the least. It
stands to reason that price determinations and increases in a
commercial contract such as lease or hire-purchase should be
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made in good faith and arbitrio bono viri. Apart from the intricate
link between risk, premiums, and benefits, there is yet another
argument for stating that insurance contracts are different in this
respect from other commercial contracts: the legislative control of
insurance premiums. Section 46(1)(a) of the Long-term Insurance
Act 52 of 1998 states that an insurer may enter into a long-term
policy only if the statutory actuary is satisfied that the premiums,
benefits, and other values are actuarially sound. In addition,
section 46(1)(b) stipulates that a long-term insurer may not
distinguish between premiums, benefits, or other values of differ-
ent long-term policies unless the statutory actuary is satisfied that
the distinction is actuarially justified (Reinecke et al Insurance
Law 281). It is therefore submitted that in light of the fact that
long-term insurers are under strict statutory obligations as far as
premiums are concerned, additional, long-winded explanations
to policyholders place a burden on insurance companies that
goes beyond good faith.
A further point of criticism against the case is that the court
seemingly sets out to consider ‘whether in terms of the General
Law of Contract [or] the Common Law, the development of the
Common Law through the Constitution and other factors that may
be present’ allows the court to grant relief to the applicant, but
fails to state whether this was in fact necessary. As already
indicated, it is doubtful that the insurer’s failure to provide the
applicant with intricate formulas is in any way mala fide, and that
the law should be developed for this or any other reason. The
relief granted somehow does not demonstrate a sound legal
principle (or argument).
DUTIES OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS AND THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL
INSURANCE
Financial advisors and intermediaries have a number of duties
towards clients. These duties stem from the common law, and
include the duty to act with care and skill (D Millard and W Hattingh
The FAIS Act Explained (2016) 76–77). With the introduction of
the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002
(the FAIS Act), these duties were codified, and while the FAIS Act
did not materially change common law, it did provide a statutory,
minimum standard of care and skill with which all providers must
comply (Millard & Hattingh The FAIS Act 86). This became all too
evident in Oosthuizen v Castro (Centriq Insurance Company Ltd
as Third Party) [2017] 4 All SA 876 (FB), 2018 (2) SA 529.
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The plaintiff in this case was Marisa Vogel Oosthuizen, and the
defendant was Jose Fransisco Castro, a financial services pro-
vider. The third party to the litigation was Centriq Insurance
Company Ltd (Centriq or the insurer), who provided professional
indemnity insurance to the defendant as a member of the
Financial Intermediaries Association of South Africa (para [6]).
According to the plaintiff’s particulars of claim, she and the
defendant entered into a written agreement in terms of which the
defendant advised her generally in respect of investment, and in
particular, to invest R2 million in the form of an investment offered
by Sharemax Investments (Pty) Ltd (Sharemax) in respect of a
scheme described as The Villa Retail Park Holdings 2 held in
a company, The Villa Retail Park Holdings 2 Ltd (the Villa)
(para [8]). Following the failure of the Sharemax investment, and
the fact that there were no prospects of recovering any of the
money, the plaintiff claimed damages in the form of loss of capital
of R2 million together with mora interest on the capital amount
from date of investment, less an amount of R1 400 received. In
the alternative, the plaintiff claimed R2 838 600, being the capital
of the investment and a yield based on seven per cent per annum
over a period of six years, together with mora interest from 27 July
2016 to the date of payment, and costs (para [9]).
The plaintiff’s alleged cause of action was breach of contract.
More specifically, she alleged that the defendant had failed to act
honestly and fairly in her interest in recommending the Sharemax
investment; that the defendant ‘misrepresented to [the] plaintiff
that media criticism of investments in Sharemax was motivated
by envy insofar as the criticism was intentional, negligent and not
honest and fair’; that the Sharemax investment was not in keeping
with her risk profile as she required minimal risk, whereas the
Sharemax investment was a high-risk one; that the defendant had
failed to furnish her with objective financial advice in accordance
with her needs; that the defendant knew that she required a safe
investment but advised her to invest in Sharemax when he ought
to have known, by taking reasonable care, that the Sharemax
investment was a very high-risk investment; and finally, that the
defendant had failed to exercise the degree of skill, care, and
diligence expected of an authorised financial services advisor
furnishing investment advice (para [10]).
The defendant admitted the agreement between him and the
plaintiff in terms of which he was to provide financial advice, but
pleaded that the plaintiff chose the Sharemax investment despite
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his having ‘drawn her attention to a recent negative article
pertaining to Sharemax in the Rapport newspaper’ (para [11]).
Accordingly, he denied any breach of contract.
The third party, Centriq, was joined in the action at a late stage.
The defendant joined Centriq as indemnity insurer on the basis of
a written insurance contract between Centriq and the defendant
(para [12]). Centriq admitted the contract, but averred that the
defendant’s behaviour fell within an exclusion clause, more
specifically clause 3(ii) (para [13]). This clause specified as
follows:
The Insurers shall not indemnify the Insured in respect of any loss
arising out of any claim made against them . . . (ii) in respect of any
third party claim arising from or contributed to by depreciation (or
failure to appreciate) in value of any investments, including securities,
commodities, currencies, options and futures transactions, or as a
result of any actual of alleged representation, guarantee or warranty
provided by or on behalf of the Insured as to the performance of any
such investments. It is agreed however that this Exclusion shall not
apply to any loss due solely to negligence on the part of the Insured or
Employee of the Insured in failing to effect a specific investment
transaction in accordance with the specific prior instructions of a client
of the Insured.
Counsel for the plaintiff (Mullins) stated that the defendant was
not in a position to admit liability because of condition 5 of the
insurance contract entered into between him and the insurer,
which provided that the insured ‘shall not make any admission in
respect of any claim against him without the written consent of the
insurer. However, [the] defendant would not contest [the] plain-
tiff’s evidence’ (para [17]). The submission was for the third party
to waive such condition ‘so that the trial could continue in order
for the court to adjudicate whether the insurer is liable to
indemnify defendant and nothing else’. This invitation was
declined. Furthermore, Mullins contended that if the insurer was
not prepared to waive condition 5, the plaintiff would ask the court
to award punitive costs against the insurer. Zietsman, for the
defendant, confirmed that the defendant ‘could not, and therefore
did not, concede liability, but that defendant would not contest his
liability any further’. Watt-Pringle, for the third party, stated that
the third party had only learned that morning that the defendant
would not put up a defence against the plaintiff’s claim, but that
the insurer was still not prepared to waive condition 5 (para [18]).
The parties concluded a written agreement regarding the quan-
645INSURANCE LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 42 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/18−Insurance−Law
tum of the plaintiff’s damages, and this was made an order of
court by consent. The full agreement reads as follows:
The parties (Plaintiff; Defendant; Third party) agree as follows on the
Plaintiff’s damages as against the Defendant:
1. They agree that the capital investment is lost, ie that there are no
prospects of recovery thereof;
2. They agree further that the Plaintiff has suffered damage (if
breach of contract or of duty of care is proven, which is still in
dispute) as follows:
2.1 The capital of R2 000 000,00;
2.2 With reference to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Rule 36(9)(b)
summary of Mr Heystek (pp 34–35 of the Experts Bundle),
the return which the Plaintiff would have made had she
invested the capital in a relatively safe investment for the
mean period of 6 years, at the mean rate of the returns
mentioned by Mr Heystek (6%–8%), ie 7% less the R1 400,00
received on 3 August 2010.
3. Questions of mora interest are for the court to determine. (Para
[19].)
Daffue J then proceeded to canvass the facts that were
common cause between the parties and pointed out that the
plaintiff’s evidence was largely uncontested (para [20]). As a
result, it was common cause that the plaintiff was the holder of a
diploma in higher education, that she had taught for approxi-
mately twelve years, that she married a farmer, Oosthuizen, and
had one child. It was further common cause that Oosthuizen was
killed in a shooting accident on 13 March 2010 and that a policy
of R3,4 million was paid out to her, of which she set aside
R2 million to invest for the future, kept R300 000 as a reserve
fund, and used the balance to purchase calves. The plaintiff
experienced financial hardship following the death of her hus-
band, and on 27 July 2010, four and a half months after she had
been widowed, she had a meeting to obtain advice on how to
invest the R2 million. It was agreed that the plaintiff had no
experience regarding financial products and relied on the defen-
dant for advice. It appeared from the needs analysis that the
plaintiff needed a safe, high-income investment. She admitted
that she understood that the capital was not guaranteed but that
the advisor would do his utmost to make a safe investment on her
behalf. The plaintiff also told the defendant that she could not
afford to lose any money as she needed to raise her child. The
defendant referred her to a Sharemax article in Rapport, but told
her that ‘the investment was ‘‘in property’’ and that ‘‘property
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cannot disappear’’ ’. It was also common cause that the defen-
dant did not explain any further products to the plaintiff (para
[20]).
The court provided some detail on the Sharemax issue, and
this portion is best quoted:
Several prominent writers on financial matters, including the award-
winning journalist, the late Mr Deon Basson, criticised the Sharemax
investment strategy over many years. As early as 26 May 2004 Basson
wrote for the Beeld, an Afrikaans daily newspaper, based on queries
received from investors who invested in Sharemax schemes and had
lost their capital. He warned against property syndication schemes
such as Sharemax and PIC and any person reading financial maga-
zines and the business sections of newspapers will know what
eventually happened to these schemes. Another negative article was
written in Moneyweb of 22 November 2007. Noseweek published an
article in January 2008, mainly relying on the late Mr Basson’s
investigations wherein he referred to the apparent lack of transpar-
ency in respect of Sharemax property syndications. Mr Vic de Klerk,
an eminent author on investment products, wrote an article in Finweek
of 8 July 2010, a weekly publication which every FSP should read,
under the heading ‘House of cards collapsing’. He specifically tar-
geted investments in The Villa and wrote, based on prospectuses
received, that Sharemax as promotor had received R1,44 billion from
the public over two years and that another R2,25 billion was needed to
complete the shopping mall, hopefully by the end of September 2011.
He also referred to the instructions of the Registrar of Banks to
Sharemax to discontinue its method of financing which was in violation
of the Banks Act as deposits were taken from investors. The cut-off
date was 15 July 2010. De Klerk had the following advice for FSPs: ‘To
the marketers of the shares on behalf of Sharemax – of course, you’re
all registered with the Financial Services Board (FSB) – also just a
small warning. The Reserve Bank and the registrar aren’t too happy
with the product you’re offering. Everyone knows that now . . . For your
own future careers it may just be a good thing to mention that to your
clients, even if it reduces your chances of earning that attractive 6%
commission.’ Mr Jacques Pauw also wrote a similar article for the City
Press of 25 July 2010 and he and Ms Anna-Maria Lombard’s article to
the same effect appeared in the Rapport of 24 July 2010, the article
which defendant was well aware of, stating that tens of thousands of
investors might have lost their investments in Sharemax. In his
evidence the financial expert, Mr Magnus Heystek confirmed the
figures received and still needed to complete the shopping complex.
This was never contested (para [21]).
The court further notes that the defendant decided not to testify
and, therefore, his responses to some of the plaintiff’s requests
for further particulars were significant. In response to a question
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whether the defendant offered any comment or observation
regarding the newspaper article in Rapport, the respondent
answered that she need not worry as it was another unfounded
attack on Sharemax. In addition, he advised that few options
could contend with Sharemax and maintained that it was a
low-risk, safe investment (para [22]).
It was also common cause between the parties that the plaintiff
invested an amount of R2 million on the advice of the defendant,
and apart from the R1 400 that she received in August 2010, she
received no further interest and/or dividends. In addition, the total
amount of the capital had been lost. The court further pointed out
that the defendant was appointed as a representative of the
Unlisted Securities South Africa FSP Network (Pty) Ltd (t/a USSA)
in order to render financial services regarding unlisted securities,
such as the financial instruments provided by Sharemax, and
was also a licensed financial services provider with the Financial
Services Board in terms of section 8 of the FAIS Act, with effect
from 10 June 2008 (para [23]). The defendant then entered into
a professional indemnity insurance contract with the insurer,
which included ‘professional indemnity to the limit of liability of
R2,5 million per claim, subject to payment of an excess in the
amount of R10 000.00’. This agreement contained the exclusion
clause in question (para [25]).
Two legal questions arose from these facts: first, whether the
defendant was liable to the plaintiff for having rendered incorrect
advice so causing the plaintiff’s loss; and second, whether the
defendant’s resultant claim against the third party as professional
indemnity insurer, fell within the exemption clause in the policy.
After having dealt with the facts that were common cause
between the parties, the court proceeded to state the legal
principles and authorities regarding the liability of a financial
advisor and in this respect, the locus classicus remains Durr v
Absa Bank Ltd 1997 (3) SA448 (SCA), where (at 453D) Schutz JA
warned that ‘[h]indsight is not vouchsafed the common man as
he picks his course through life. This must be kept constantly in
mind in a case like this one, where all is so obvious now.’
The judge correctly stated that although Durr preceded the
FAIS Act by several years, the principles in Durr were still relevant
and to a great extent accepted by the legislature if the wording of
the FAIS Act is considered (para [27]). Schutz JA dealt with the
duties of a financial advisor or broker, and the court in casu
quoted the appellate judge at 460F–462D:
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What did the law expect of Stuart and ABSA?
Imperitia culpae adnumeratur, says D 50.17.132 – lack of skill is
regarded as culpable. That much is accepted by the respondents. But
how much skill, they say. We have shown all the skill that an ‘ordinary’
or ‘average’ broker, or a bank employing such a one, need show. What
more can be asked of us? Two questions arise in this case. (1) In
general, what is the level of skill and knowledge required? (2) Is the
standard required in judging that level that of the ordinary or average
broker at large, or is it that of the regional manager of the broking
division of a bank professing investment skills and offering expert
investment advice?
In answering the question, Schutz JA quoted Innes CJ in Van
Wyk v Lewis (1924 AD 438 at 444) with reference to medical
practitioners, and repeated the old adage that the court must
consider ‘the general level of skill and diligence possessed and
exercised at the time by the members of the branch of the
profession to which the practitioner belongs’. Referring to bro-
kers, Schutz JA, as quoted in casu, stated that it was more
complicated but that the average broker would not ask for
financial statements and would also not know how to assess what
is known as ‘institutional risk’, which refers to the soundness or
creditworthiness of a prospective debtor. On the other hand,
‘product risk’ was different, as it fell within the broker’s know-
ledge. In Durr, Schutz JA proclaimed that ‘the appropriate
standard is that of the regional manager of the broking division of
a bank professing investment skills and offering investment
advice’ (at 464). The court drew further parallels between the
current case and Durr, and quoted Schutz JA at 469H–I, where
the judge pronounced:
Either he had to forewarn the Durrs where his skills ended, so as to
enable them to appreciate the dangers of accepting his advice
without more ado, or he should not have recommended Supreme.
What he was not entitled to do was to venture into a field in which he
professed skills which he did not have and to give them assurances
about the soundness of the investments which he was not properly
qualified to give (para [30]).
The court proceeded to quote several sources, including
Jackson and Powell (para 15–022), Simpson (M Simpson (ed)
Professional Negligence and Liability (2016)), and several por-
tions of the FAIS Act, including section 16 (principles of code of
conduct), and the definition of ‘advice’. Unfortunately, the court
did not deem it necessary to canvass the actual provisions of the
general code of conduct in terms of the FAIS Act (para [33]) and
this point will be discussed later.
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Having disposed of the rules governing the duties and respon-
sibilities of FSPs, the court moved to the rules of construction of
contracts in general, and insurance contracts in particular. On
interpretation of contracts, the court quoted Wallis JA in Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (2012 (4)
SA 593 (SCA) para [18]):
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used
in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or
contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a
whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into exist-
ence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be
given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of
grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the
apparent purpose to which it is directed; and the material known to
those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is
possible, each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these
factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning
is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike
results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document (para
[35]).
Thus, the matter must be approached holistically and context
and language must be considered together, with neither predomi-
nating over the other. See also Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms)
Bpk v S Bothma en Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494
(SCA) at paras [10]–[12].
The court further quoted BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Mahmood Investments (Pty) Ltd [2010] 2 All SA 295 (SCA), where
Lewis JA stated:
It is settled law that the contractual provision must be interpreted in its
context, having regard to the relevant circumstances known to the
parties at the time of entering into the contract . . . . It is also clear that the
position must be given a commercially sensible meaning . . . (para [11]).
Daffue J further referred to Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil
Trading (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA518 (SCA), where Lewis JA stated at
paragraph [28] that a court must ‘examine all the facts – the
context – in order to determine what the parties intended. And it
must do that whether or not the words of the contract are
ambiguous or lack clarity. Words without context mean nothing.’
For some reason, the court referred to Hardy Ivamy General
Principles of Insurance Law 6 ed (1993) and Birds et al
MacGillivray on Insurance Law 13 ed (2015) on the construction
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of contracts (paras [37] [39]), but then stated that the locus
classicus on construing insurance contracts in South Africa was
still the unanimous judgment authored by Smalberger JA in
Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33 (A). Daffue J
quoted Smalberger JA at 38A–E:
The ordinary rules relating to the interpretation of contracts must be
applied in construing a policy of insurance. A court must therefore
endeavour to ascertain the intention of the parties. Such intention is, in
the first instance, to be gathered from the language used which, if
clear, must be given effect to. This involves giving the words used their
plain, ordinary and popular meaning unless the context indicates
otherwise . . . . Any provision which purports to place a limitation upon
a clearly expressed obligation to indemnify must be restrictively
interpreted [. . .] for it is the insurer’s duty to make clear what particular
risks it wishes to exclude . . . . A policy normally evidences the
contract and an insured’s obligation, and the extent to which an
insurer’s liability is limited, must be plainly spelt out. In the event of a
real ambiguity the contra proferentem rule, which requires a written
document to be construed against the person who drew it up, would
operate against the insurer as drafter of the policy . . . (para [39]).
The relevance of the interpretation of contract lay in the
difference of opinion between the plaintiff and the defendant
regarding the real meaning to be attributed to the exclusion
clause (para [40]). In discussing the prevalence of exclusion
clauses in insurance, the court referred inter alia to the work of
Enright and Jess Professional Indemnity Insurance Law 2 ed
(2007); Merkin (ed) Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 6 ed; as well as
Fedgen v Leyds (above), in which case the court held that
exclusion clauses must be restrictively interpreted. At paragraph
[45] the court referred to Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG
Europe Insurance Ltd ([2017] Lloyd’s Rep IR 60 (SC), [2016]
UKSC 57), where the English Supreme Court found that exclusion
clauses do not necessarily have to be narrowly construed but
rather must be given a proper meaning. A narrow meaning would
often be given in the event of ambiguity or if the context
suggested this. The court quoted Lord Hodge (for the majority)
at 63:
An exclusion clause must be read in the context of the contract of
insurance as a whole. It must be construed in a manner which is
consistent with and not repugnant to the purpose of the insurance
contract. There may be circumstances in which in order to achieve
that end, the court may construe the exclusions in an insurance
contract narrowly.
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The court then considered the argument of Watt-Pringle based
on the New Zealand Court of Appeal judgment in Trustees
Executors Ltd v QBE Insurance (International) Ltd [2010] NZCA
608 (14 December 2010), which case also aimed to interpret an
exclusion clause, as the only example of a case that dealt with
such a clause. The court said that there was no South African
case law dealing with exclusion clauses in indemnity insurance.
In evaluating the case against the defendant, the court consid-
ered the words of Schutz JA in Durr v Absa Bank Ltd (above),
where the judge of appeal said: ‘Hindsight is not vouchsafed the
common man as he picks his course through life. This must be
kept constantly in mind in a case like this one, where all is so
obvious now.’
Having quoted Durr, the judge remarked that the insurer did
not try to show that the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff.
Rather, the insurer aimed to invoke the exclusion clause (para
[50]). The evidence presented by the plaintiff was undisputed, as
there was a definite case against the defendant. More specifi-
cally, the investment that the defendant induced the plaintiff to
make was a property syndication investment. The Sharemax
investment known as ‘The Villa’ was, in fact, a dangerous
investment due to the inherent pitfalls involved in property
syndication. Heystek testified as to the dangers involved and
stressed that a financial services provider ‘should not advise an
investment in something which he is not himself able to fully
understand’ (para [55]). The court also quoted several articles
that appeared in the press at the time, and stated that the
defendant should have investigated the claims made in these
articles. He should have realised the enormous costs involved in
completing the property in question and, therefore, should have
realised that the plaintiff could not possibly have earned interest
on the investment immediately after having invested the money
(para [55]). The court therefore accepted Heystek’s evidence
and referred to an Ombud decision in which the FAIS Ombud
referred to the Sharemax syndication as a ‘Ponzi scheme’ (para
[57]). Overall, the court ruled that there were remarkable parallels
between the facts in casu and those in the Durr case. To
summarise:
Defendant acted contrary to the provisions of s 16 of the FAIS Act and
the Codes of Conduct published since then in accordance with the
provisions of s 15 and what the law expects of FSPs when he provided
the financial advice that led to the R2 million investment . . . Much
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more may be said of the defendant’s actions and/or inactions, but I
conclude by finding that defendant was negligent, and even dishon-
est, when he advised plaintiff, by placing no credence on the negative
articles in the press and failing to objectively investigate the criticism.
He failed to exercise the degree of skill, care and diligence which one
is entitled to expect from a FSP. The facts in casu are very similar to
that in Durr supra and the result should be the same (paras [59] [60]).
Having disposed of the first question, the court turned to the
exemption clause. In this respect there was a serious difference
in opinion between Mullins for the plaintiff and Watt-Pringle for the
third party (insurer) (para [61]). The latter’s argument was that
the insurer could only grant indemnity to the defendant where the
loss was ‘solely as a result of the negligence of the insured (or
his/her employee) in failing to effect a specific investment trans-
action in accordance with the specific prior instructions of the
insured’s client’ (para [66]). But Mullins differed completely from
the third party (insurer), stating that the insurer who relied on the
exclusion had to prove that it applied (para [69]). In addition, the
plaintiff’s claim was not one arising from or contributed to by
depreciation or a failure to appreciate in value of the Sharemax
investment.
The court considered Watt-Pringle’s submissions carefully but
ruled that ‘he placed too much emphasis on the wording of the
exclusion clause and in doing so, disregarded the purpose of
the insurance contract entered into between defendant and the
insurer’ (para [72]). The court stated that the heading of the policy
was instructive. It read: ‘Professional Indemnity Insurance for
Members of the Financial Intermediaries Association’. The court
noted that the main purpose of an indemnity policy is to permit
the insured to recover for negligence and, referring to Merkin,
concluded that ‘an indemnity policy presumes that there will have
been some misconduct on the insured’s part’ (ibid).
The court also remarked as follows:
Brokers and financial advisors are now regulated by legislation as is
the case with, for example, attorneys. Professional indemnity insur-
ance for FSPs is now a reality. Insurers are comforted in that they know
that FSPs who apply for indemnity insurance are professional people
who have to pass stiff examinations before they may become regis-
tered as FSPs in terms of the FAIS Act. Also, insurers do not have to
provide indefinite cover and may limit their potential liability as
happened here. The other insured events in the particular policy,
except the first, to wit professional indemnity, apply to any employer
who wants to insure against such events. It is not uncommon in the
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marketplace for a shop owner to take out insurance in respect of
employee dishonesty, computer crime, defamation and like issues.
However, the shop owner will not take out professional indemnity
insurance. FSPs on the other hand, most definitely need cover insofar
as they often have to give advice that may later be found to have been
given negligently. The chances of being sued for huge amounts for
wrong and/or negligent advice by far exceed financial losses pertain-
ing to the other insured events. It is thus not a valid argument to submit
that defendant will not be robbed of cover if the exclusion clause is
interpreted in the way contended for by the insurer (para [73]).
The court remarked that the insurer’s undertaking in the policy
in question was to indemnify the defendant against losses arising
out of ‘any legal liability arising from claims first made against the
defendant and reported during the period of insurance for breach
of duty in connection with his business by reason of any negligent
act, error, or omission, committed in the conduct of the defen-
dant’s business’. This was evident from ‘Insured Events’ on page
2 of the policy. The insurer admitted this in its plea and the scope
of cover was, therefore, the starting point in establishing the
meaning of the contract and other clauses such as the exclusion
clause. The exclusion clause did not mention anything about
negligence, error, or omission, save insofar as the proviso
stipulated that the insured would be covered if a specific
investment instruction of a client was not carried out due to the
insured’s negligence. This was exactly the crux of the insurer’s
argument, namely that the exclusion should apply because the
defendant (broker) had been negligent (para [74]). The court
thus pronounced as follows:
In my view the exclusion clause must be interpreted restrictively so
that it makes business sense, ie in the eyes of both insurer and
insured. It cannot be applicable where the insured advised a client to
invest in a scheme that was a hopeless ‘investment’ from the onset,
contrary to legislation and probably a fraudulent and unlawful Ponzi
scheme. The purpose of the first leg of the exclusion is to prevent an
insured from claiming indemnification if his client has filed a claim
because his/her investment had not grown by, for example, 20% over
a three-year period as expected, but only by 15%, or remained static,
or worse, depreciated by 5% or 10%. We all know that financial
markets are volatile, that several unforeseen market forces may affect
investments and, therefore, it would be ‘businesslike’ for the insurer to
exclude indemnification in such events. Surely, it cannot be expected
of a prudent insurer to become embroiled in litigation between the
client and the insured FSP in such instances. The same applies to the
second leg. An eager FSP should not be heard to admit that he/she
has represented or guaranteed to an investor that a particular
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investment will increase by 100% in a year’s time. The insurer will be
fully entitled to rely on the exclusion clause and refuse to indemnify the
insured if the representation later appears to be off the mark. Again,
this is not what occurred in casu (para [76]).
Furthermore, the court ruled that the defendant had ‘breached
all principles upon which a skilled and honest FSP is supposed to
conduct himself’ (ibid).
The court therefore ruled that the plaintiff had made out a
proper case against the defendant and that the quantum as
calculated by Mullins was not disputed (para [77]). It also found
that the insurer should indemnify the plaintiff, subject to the limit
of R2,5 million and deduction of the excess of R10 000. The
insurer was ordered to pay the costs of the defendant as the
successful party in the third-party action.
This case canvasses two issues: what constitutes negligence
on the part of an investment broker; and what is in fact covered
by indemnity insurance.
The case between Mrs Oosthuizen and the broker is, in a
sense, and as the judge correctly points out with the wisdom of
hindsight, quite clear-cut. The evidence shows that property
syndication such as that involved in the Sharemax scheme can
never be low-risk and can, in fact, be equated with a Ponzi
scheme. The court seemingly relied more on common-law prin-
ciples than on the stipulations of the FAISAct, but in this particular
case the outcome is the same: the broker failed to provide
appropriate advice in the circumstances. Moreover, the broker
was in actual fact motivated by the commission that was payable
on an investment such as the one in question. Durr v Absa Bank
Ltd (above) indeed provides an exposition of the law on this
aspect, as does the general code of conduct in terms of the FAIS
Act. More specifically, section 2 of the general code of conduct
stipulates that a provider must at all times render financial
services honestly, fairly, with due skill, care and diligence, and in
the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services
industry. Section 3(1)(a) contains a number of very specific
provisions and stipulates as follows:
(1) When a provider renders a financial service–
(a) representations made and information provided to a client by the
provider–
(i) must be factually correct;
(ii) must be provided in plain language, avoid uncertainty or
confusion and not be misleading;
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(iii) must be adequate and appropriate in the circumstances of
the particular financial service, taking into account the factu-
ally established or reasonably assumed level of knowledge
of the client;
(iv) must be provided timeously so as to afford the client reason-
ably sufficient time to make an informed decision about the
proposed transaction;
(v) may, subject to the provisions of this Code, be provided
orally and, at the client’s request, confirmed in writing within a
reasonable time after such request;
(vi) must, where provided in writing or by means of standard
forms or format, be in a clear and readable print size,
spacing and format;
(vii) must, as regards all amounts, sums, values, charges, fees,
remuneration or monetary obligations mentioned or referred
to therein and payable to the product supplier or the pro-
vider, be reflected in specific monetary terms: Provided that
where any such amount, sum, value, charge, fee, remunera-
tion or monetary obligation is not reasonably predeterminable,
its basis of calculation must be adequately described; and
(viii) need not be duplicated or repeated to the same client unless
material or significant changes affecting that client occur, or
the relevant financial service renders it necessary, in which
case a disclosure of the changes to the client must be made
without delay . . . . (emphasis added)
Close scrutiny reveals that the defendant failed the plaintiff and
that his failure to recommend a low-risk investment did in fact
constitute a breach of these statutory duties. What is not so clear
from the case is what the cause of action was. If it was in fact
breach of contract, this would simply have entailed the court
evaluating the broker-client relationship and concluding that
conduct short of what is required in the FAIS Act constitutes a
breach of the duties of the broker, which in turn constitutes
breach of contract. The second enquiry is the one that seeks to
establish negligence in an attempt to invoke the indemnity
insurance clause. It appears that the court automatically equated
the defendant’s failure to provide proper advice with negligence,
thereby not applying the proper test for negligence as formulated
in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430, where it is stated
that for negligence to exist, the plaintiff must prove that the
reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have
foreseen that his actions could cause harm and, in addition,
should also have prevented the harm. It therefore seems that the
case was in fact decided on the basis of breach of contract, and
that the defendant negligently breached his duties towards the
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defendant, although this is not stated in so many words. It is then
this negligent conduct which caused the liability insurance policy
to come into play.
The fit and proper requirements (para 8(7) of Board Notice 106
GG 31514 of 15 October 2008) and the General Code of Conduct
(para 13 of Board Notice 80 GG 25299 of 8 August 2003; Ch 1
para 8 of Board Notice 79 GG 25299 of 8 August 2003 ‘Notice on
Codes of Conduct for Administrative and Discretionary FSPs’;
and s 7 of Part 2 of Board Notice 79 GG 25299 of 8 August 2003)
provide that financial services providers must hold adequate
professional indemnity and fidelity insurance cover as deter-
mined by the registrar from time to time. The minimum cover
required is prescribed by statute and is in accordance with the
kind of service that is rendered (Millard & Hattingh The FAIS Act
116). This case is the first in which the court has attempted to
interpret such an insurance policy, and it is submitted that a
policy of this nature is the same as any other which provides
professional indemnity cover. This means that exclusion clauses
should be interpreted in exactly the same way as any other
exclusionary clause.
The apparent confusion on the issue of negligence aside, it is
submitted that the court was correct in finding that the defendant
had breached his contractual duties towards the plaintiff. In
addition, if one considers that the purpose of professional
indemnity insurance is to safeguard against the negligence of a
broker in situations such as this one, the judgment may be
supported.
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Dictionaries
Media 24 Books (Pty) Ltd v Oxford University Press Southern
Africa (Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) SA 1 (SCA) was discussed in the 2016
Annual Survey at 563ff.
PATENTS
Infringement and purposive construction
The judgment in Orica Mining Services v Elbroc Mining Products
(233/2016) [2017] ZASCA 48 (31 March 2017) (Dambuza JA
writing for a unanimous court) does not add much to the existing
jurisprudence relating to patent infringement, and particularly to
the interpretation of the patent claims. The issue was whether the
word ‘between’ should be read as ‘linearly between’.
The court held that the dictionary meaning ‘with something on
each side’ was preferable, as it accorded with the relational
nature of the word ‘between’, and did not depend on the
configuration of the objects being compared (para [18]). This
meaning was preferred to the alternative of reading ‘between’ as
connoting ‘linearly between’, which would have restricted the
term to a situation where the objects compared were of a similar
configuration (ibid).
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The appellant also sought to invoke a purposive construction of
the claims in its favour. Unlike literalism, this approach consid-
ered the practical knowledge and experience of the person
skilled in the art in which the invention was intended to be used
(para [21], with reference to Selas Corporation of America v
Electric Furnace Co 1983 (1) SA 1043 (A) at 1052-53). It asks
whether a person skilled in the art would have understood
whether strict compliance with a particular word or phrase was
intended, and whether a variant of a word would have an effect
upon the way the invention worked, so that the impugned object
would fall outside the monopoly protected in the claims, and
there would accordingly be no infringement (para [21], with
reference to Aktiebolaget Hässle & another v Triomed (Pty) Ltd
2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA) para [8]). Dambuza JAquoted extensively
(para [29]) from Kirin-Amgen Inc & others v Hoechst Marion
Roussel Ltd & others; Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd & others v
Kirin-Amgen & others [2005] 1 All ER 667 (HL) at 680:
Construction, whether of a patent or any other document, is of course
not directly concerned with what the author meant to say. There is no
window into the mind of the patentee or the author of any other
document. Construction is objective in the sense that it is concerned
with what a reasonable person to whom the utterance was addressed
would have understood the author to be using the words to mean.
Notice, however, that it is not, as is sometimes said, ‘the meaning of
the words the author used’, but rather what the notional addressee
would have understood the author to mean by using those words. The
meaning of words is a matter of convention, governed by rules, which
can be found in dictionaries and grammars. What the author would
have been understood to mean by using those words is not simply a
matter of rules. It is highly sensitive to the context of and background
to the particular utterance. It depends not only upon the words the
author has chosen but also upon the identity of the audience he is
taken to have been addressing and the knowledge and assumptions
which one attributes to that audience (original emphasis).
Dambuza JA held that Kirin-Amgen did not help the respon-
dent. Purposive interpretation was not an undue extension of the
wording of the patent claims. To the judge, to interpret the word
‘between’ as ‘linearly between’ was not in line with a purposive
interpretation of the specification, as delineated by the claims
(para [30]).
The appeal was accordingly upheld with costs.
Powers of the registrar
Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd &
another 2017 (5) SA 283 (SCA) concerned the discretionary
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powers of the registrar to grant an extension of time in respect of
the time periods within which any act is required to be done
under the Patents Act 57 of 1978. In particular, section 16(2)
states: ‘Whenever by this Act any time is specified within which
any act or thing is to be done, the registrar or the commissioner,
as the case may be, may save where it is otherwise expressly
provided, extend the time either before or after its expiry.’
Here, Trustco, a patent holder, had failed to pay the prescribed
patent renewal fees on time. As a result, the patent lapsed on
26 November 2011. Trustco then applied for the restoration of the
patent under section 47(1). The restoration application was
advertised in the Patent Journal on 26 June 2013 (as required by
s 47(2) read with regs 49 and 50 of the Patent Regulations
(GN R2470 in GG 6247 of 15 December 1978)). (Section 47(2)
provides that ‘[i]f the registrar is satisfied that the omission was
unintentional and that no undue delay has occurred in the making
of the application, he shall advertise the application in the
prescribed manner, and thereupon any person . . . may within
such period as may be prescribed, give notice in the prescribed
manner of opposition to the restoration of the patent’.) Vodacom
opposed the restoration application. It filed its notice of opposi-
tion on 26 August 2013. Regulation 83 was central to Vodacom’s
submissions. It provides that ‘[w]ithin two months of the filing of
service of the notice of opposition the applicant shall file and
serve a counterstatement in the form of a plea. If such counter-
statement is not lodged within the said period or within such
further period as the registrar may allow the application shall be
deemed to be abandoned and the opponent may apply to
the commissioner for an order as to costs’. Trustco’s counter-
statement would ordinarily have been due on 26 October 2013;
as this was a Saturday, the statement had to be filed on or before
28 October 2013. On 30 October 2013, Trustco requested the
registrar for a two-month extension of time within which to file the
counter-statement. The registrar granted the extension.
Vodacom appealed against the grant of the extension. It did
not allege any prejudice. It submitted that the provisions of
regulation 83 were peremptory, and that failure to comply with the
set time limits triggered the deeming provision. When that
happened, the application for restoration could be considered to
have been abandoned. The deemed abandonment then pre-
cluded the registrar from exercising the power of extending the
time limit in this regulation.
660 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 4 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/19−Intellectual
Makgoba J, sitting as the Commissioner of Patents, agreed
with Vodacom. He held:
The regulations . . . are to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively
with the Patents Act. Reading section 16(2) of the Act conjunctively
with reg 83 would then mean that the registrar cannot just grant an
extension of time in terms of section 16(2) without having regard to the
peremptory and deeming provisions of reg 83.
Consequently, the discretion conferred upon the registrar to
extend a time period in terms of section 16(2) cannot override a
specific declaration of abandonment as set out clearly in reg 83
(quoted in para [10]).
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, NavsaADP (writing
for a unanimous court), disagreed.
In the first instance, the court held that regulation 83 did not,
expressly or otherwise, limit or in any way impinge on the
registrar’s express remedial power as provided for in section
16(2) (para [13]). So the regulation did not fall within the provision
of this subsection – ‘[i]t is doubtful that it could’ (ibid). The court
referred with apparent approval to Rossouw & another v First-
Rand Bank Ltd 2010 (6) SA 439 (SCA) (para [24]), where the
court stated that ‘. . . it is generally impermissible to use regula-
tions created by a minister as an aid to interpret the intention of
the legislature in an Act of Parliament, notwithstanding that the
Act may include the regulations. . .’ (quoted in para [14]).
Secondly, a remedial power (such as the power to extend time
periods) aimed at avoiding harsh results should be extended as
far as the wording of a statutory provision will allow (para [15],
with reference to Slims (Pty) Ltd & another v Morris NO 1988 (1)
SA 715 (A) 734D-F).
Thirdly, the rule of statutory interpretation that a specific
provision overrides a general provision applied to provisions
within the same legislative instrument. Thus, a specific provision
in a regulation could not override a general provision in a statute.
To read the Patents Act ‘conjunctively’ with the regulations (as the
Commissioner did), and to construe the regulations in the manner
that the Commissioner did, would ‘have the tail wag the dog’, held
Navsa ADP (para [16]).
The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs (para [21]).
TRADE MARKS
Endorsements
Cochrane Steel Products (Pty) Ltd v M-Systems Group [2017]
ZASCA 189 is the latest decision in the ongoing dispute between
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fencing manufacturers. Previously, the Supreme Court of Appeal
had held that the use of adwords by M-Systems did not infringe
Cochrane’s common-law rights to its as yet unregistered trade
mark for the name CLEARVU (Cochrane Steel Products v M-Sys-
tems Group & another 2016 (6) SA 1 (SCA); see 2016 Annual
Survey 584ff). Cochrane had to rely on passing off as a ground for
this litigation, as M-Systems had vigorously opposed registration
of Cochrane’s mark CLEARVU. The decision discussed here
flows from that opposition.
Cochrane had applied for the registration of the mark CLEARVU
in two classes – class 6, essentially for metal products, and class
37 for various services in the building and construction field.
M-Systems alleged that the mark was not registrable, as, in terms
of section 10(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, the mark
‘consists exclusively of an indication which may serve in trade to
designate the kind, quality, intended purpose or other character-
istics of the goods or service’. Also, it was not ‘capable of
distinguishing the goods or services for which it is to be used’
(ss 9(1) and 10(2)(a)).
In the court of first instance, Cochrane successfully showed
that not only was the mark CLEARVU capable of distinguishing
(M-Systems Group (Pty) Ltd v Cochrane Steel Products (Pty Ltd)
[2016] ZAGPPHC 677 (here, M-Systems) para [40]), but it had in
fact become distinctive through use (para [51]). M-Systems had,
as an alternative to its request that the registration be refused,
asked for endorsements to be entered in respect of the words
‘clear’, ‘view’, and ‘vu’ (para [6]). The court (Basson J) made the
following order:
1.1. The registration of this mark shall give no right to the exclusive
use of the word ‘clear’ and ‘view’ separately and apart from the
mark; [and]
1.2. The trademark registrant admits that the registration of this mark
shall not debar others from the bona fide descriptive use in the
course of trade of the words ‘clear view’ and ‘view’ (para [55]).
As Navsa ADP said on appeal, the reasons given by the court
of first instance were ‘exceptionally brief’ and consisted merely of
a statement that the court agreed with M-Systems’ submission
that Cochrane should not be entitled to any exclusive right to the
word ‘clear’ or ‘view’ (para [4], quoting M-Systems para [53]).
Cochrane appealed the order of the court of first instance. The
liquidators of M-Systems elected to abide by the court’s decision
(para [5]).
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The order requested by M-Systems in the court of first instance
was for the refusal of the registration of Cochrane’s marks;
alternatively, for ‘an order entering appropriate endorsements
against both these trade marks to the effect that the applicant
would not, by virtue of the registration of the marks, obtain the
exclusive right to use the words ‘‘CLEAR’’, ‘‘VIEW’’, or ‘‘VU’’
separately and apart from the trade mark CLEARVU’ (M-Systems
para [6]).
Basson J’s order contains, in trade-mark terminology, both a
disclaimer and an admission – the trade-mark proprietor both
disclaims that it has exclusive rights to the words and admits that
others may use them in the course of trade. Surprisingly, the
order is also drafted in terms wider than those sought by
M-Systems: while the company asked only for the separate words
to be disclaimed, the added admission relates also to the phrase
‘clear view’, over and above the two separate words ‘clear’ and
‘view’. This has serious implications for Cochrane in any future
infringement litigation.
On appeal, NavsaADP included in his judgment an overview of
the SouthAfrican practice in respect of endorsements. Section 15
of the Trade Marks Act states:
If a trade mark contains matter which is not capable of distinguishing
within the meaning of section 9, the registrar or the court, in deciding
whether the trade mark shall be entered in or shall remain on the
register, may require, as a condition of its being entered in or
remaining on the register –
(a) that the proprietor shall disclaim any right to the exclusive use of
all or any portion of any such matter to the exclusive use of which
the registrar or the court hold him not to be entitled; or
(b) that the proprietor shall make such other disclaimer or memoran-
dum as the registrar or the court may consider necessary for the
purpose of defining his rights under the registration:
Provided that no disclaimer or memorandum on the register shall
affect any rights of the proprietor of a trade mark except such as arise
out of the registration of the trade mark in respect of which the
disclaimer is made.
Navsa ADP described paragraph 1.1 of the order made by the
court of first instance as a disclaimer, corresponding to section
15(a). He pointed out that while such an entry did not allow the
proprietor of the registered mark to bring an infringement action
in respect of the disclaimed matter, it did not prohibit any
common-law action for passing off (para [13]).
Paragraph 1.2 of the order is in the form of an admission, ‘a
practice which is unique to South Africa’ (para [14]). Navsa ADP
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relied on CE Webster & GE Morley Webster & Page South African
Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition, Company Names and
Trading Styles 4 ed (Webster & Page) (looseleaf, service issue 19
§ 9.18) for his statement that an admission is used when a word
forming part of the relevant trade mark is misspelt, although the
admission relates to the word in its ordinary meaning. (In prac-
tice, the admission is entered in respect of the ordinary spelling of
the word, not the misspelling.) An admission is frequently required
by the registrar even when ‘the word is only remotely one which
others may wish to use descriptively or whether it is in fact wholly
descriptive or otherwise non-distinctive’ (para [14]).
Navsa ADP’s further discussion of the practice of endorse-
ments relied at some length on quotations from Cadbury (Pty) Ltd
v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates (Pty) Ltd & another 2000 (2) SA
771 (SCA) and Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v SA Breweries Ltd
& another; Oude Meester Groep Bpk & another v SA Breweries
Ltd 1976 (3) SA 514 (A) (paras [15]–[20]).
He concluded by holding that the VU in CLEARVU is not an
invented word but a misspelling of the ordinary word ‘view’, and
so an admission is appropriate in respect of the word (para [21]).
In addition, because no trader is entitled to appropriate the
ordinary English words ‘clear’ and ‘view’, a disclaimer is appro-
priate (para [22]). The order of the court of first instance is
accordingly warranted, ‘save that para 1.2 should be amended
by the deletion of the words ‘[t]he trademark registrant admits
that’ (para [22]).
Unfortunately, this judgment does not serve to clarify the
position in respect of endorsements any further. As regards
disclaimers, Webster and Page explain,
the principle is firmly established that disclaimers should not be
entered indiscriminately, but only for good reason. Matter should
be disclaimed where it is likely to become in use an essential feature
of the mark as a whole. Where it is obvious that no exclusive rights can
be obtained in a particular element of a trade mark there is no need for
a specific disclaimer (§ 9.11 and cases cited there).
As the disclaimed words are clearly an essential feature of the
mark, a disclaimer in respect of the two separate words is
appropriate. But if the words have been disclaimed, an admis-
sion of the word ‘view’ becomes unnecessary. The authors add
that ‘[w]here the feature is a word which per se is not descriptive
of the goods or services but is one which in advertising or other
reference to the goods may conceivably be used by other
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traders, an admission would probably be appropriate’ (§ 9.20
and cases cited there). They also point out that ‘the strictures
against unnecessary disclaimers apply equally to the entry of a
memorandum since in each case the result would be that the
Register would be cluttered by unnecessary endorsements’
(ibid). Seen this way, it would be correct to disclaim both
separate words; alternatively, to disclaim the word ‘clear’ and
enter an admission in respect of the word ‘view’. But the entry of
two endorsements is clearly unnecessary. Also, as we mentioned
earlier, the admission recorded in respect of the phrase ‘clear
view’ was not requested, is uncalled for, and has serious implica-
tions for the viability of the trade mark concerned.
Passing off
It is not clear why the judgment in Herbal Zone (Pty) Ltd &
others v Infitech Technologies (Pty) Ltd & others [2017] 2 All SA
347 (SCA) was marked reportable. The dispute concerned
distribution of an imported herbal product. The product name,
Phyto Andro For Men, had not been registered as a trade mark.
The first appellant (Herbal Zone SA) imported the product from
the alleged manufacturer Herbal Zone International, which was
not a party to the action. The first respondent (Infitech) had been
the sole distributor in South Africa. When this agreement termi-
nated, Infitech commenced import of a similar product and
marketed it under the same name. As was to be expected, the
appellant objected. It placed advertisements in newspapers
branding the opposition product as counterfeit, and sent warn-
ings to pharmacies and outlets stocking its product to warn them
against the ‘counterfeit’ product (paras [3] [4]). It also attempted
to have the Infitech product seized in terms of the Counterfeit
Goods Act 37 of 1997. This led Infitech to institute proceedings
against Herbal Zone, seeking various interdicts on the basis that
Herbal Zone’s allegations were defamatory. Herbal Zone SA
counterclaimed that Infitech was passing off its product as theirs
(paras [7] [8]). The court of first instance granted some of the
interdicts requested by Infitech and dismissed the counterclaim.
On appeal, the passing-off claim was viewed as the principal
issue requiring determination. Wallis JA set out the essentials
required for a successful passing-off action. He emphasised that,
provided Herbal Zone SA could show that it had the necessary
reputation in SouthAfrica, its passing-off claim would be success-
ful, as both misrepresentation and damage were present (para
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[10]). After a lengthy analysis of the facts, the court found that any
reputation in South Africa vested in the foreign company, Herbal
Zone International, not in Herbal Zone SA (paras [11]-[27]). The
court held that this was not the type of situation where a
distributor or importer could acquire a reputation, as all the
marketing and labels indicated that the product originated from
the foreign company, not the first appellant (paras [28] [29]).
As regards the defamation claim, the court held that a final
interdict is granted only if damages will not be an adequate
remedy. As the respondents had not shown irreparable harm,
they were not entitled to the interdicts granted by the court of first
instance (para [36]).
Similarity of marks
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with two matters
where the similarity of marks was in issue. As mentioned in the
2016 Annual Survey 582ff, there has been some criticism of this
court’s previous decisions on the similarity of marks. This included
a decision where the court held that YUPPIECHEF was not similar
to YUPPIE GADGETS (Yuppiechef Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Yuppie
Gadgets Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZASCA 118), and another
where it was found that that KNIGHTS and KNIGHT’S GOLD were
not similar to BLACK KNIGHT (Distell Ltd v KZN Wines and Spirits
CC [2016] ZASCA 18), as the words YUPPIE and KNIGHT,
respectively, were not the ‘dominant’ word in the trade marks
concerned.
Lucky Star Limited v Lucky Brands (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (2)
SA 588 (SCA) was decided on a corresponding basis.
The appellant (Lucky Star) is a large producer of canned fish;
the respondents (Lucky Brands) are a group of restaurants
selling fish and chips, under the trading name of either ‘Lucky
Fish’ or ‘Lucky Fish and Chips’, coupled in each instance with the
area or street name where the specific restaurant is located.
Lucky Star holds a number of registrations for the mark LUCKY
STAR; the earliest dates from 1959 in class 29 for fish and
fish products. Subsequent registrations are for a device mark
covering the same goods, for another class 29 mark for goods
other than fish and fish products, and, finally, in class 42 for retail
services ‘concerned with or relating to the provision and supply of
foodstuffs’.
The respondents have no trade-mark registrations but have a
registered company name, Lucky Brands (Pty) Ltd. Lucky Star
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alleged trade mark infringement in terms of all three sub-
paragraphs of section 34(1). It lost in the court of first instance.
On appeal, Swain JA reiterated the various tests used to
determine whether infringement has occurred, in particular those
applied to determine whether marks are so similar as to cause
confusion or deception (paras [6]–[9]). Turning to the facts, he
stated that the only common element in the parties’ respective
marks was the word LUCKY, which word he considered to be ‘an
ordinary word in everyday use, as distinct from an invented or
made-up word, and it cannot follow that confusion would prob-
ably arise if it is used in combination with another word’ (para
[10], quoting from Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC & another 2001
(1) SA 844 (SCA) also at para [10], where the word ‘power’ was in
issue). He then held that the common element LUCKY was of
‘minor significance’ when the marks were looked at as a whole, as
‘“[t]he word ‘‘Fish’’, as opposed to the word ‘‘Star’’, is distinctive
and cannot be ignored’ (ibid). When the marks are compared
side by side, and ‘the main or dominant features of the marks are
considered, namely the words ‘‘Star’’ and ‘‘Fish’’, there is no
likelihood of deception or confusion’ (ibid).
He disagreed with the appellant’s argument that the distinctive-
ness of the word ‘fish’ is diminished because it is used in the
context of the sale of fish. The judge stated that this does not
occur merely because the word also serves to describe the
product sold (ibid). Accordingly, as the marks did not resemble
each other so closely that deception or confusion would arise,
infringement in terms of section 34(1)(a) did not occur (ibid). The
claims in terms of sections 34(1)(b) (para [12]) and (c) (para [13])
were unsuccessful for the same reason – the ‘distinct lack of
similarity’ between the marks (ibid).
Interestingly, Swain JA had previously concurred with Wallis
JA’s judgment in Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Bothaville Milling (Pty)
Ltd [2014] 2 All SA 282 (SCA), where the court stated that ‘the
word ‘‘STAR’’, and the device of a star as such, are common
features of marks registered in the same class’ (class 29 for
foodstuffs, here maize meal) (para [21]). Why the word ‘star’ has
now become less common, and how the word ‘fish’ can be
distinctive in respect of the sale of fish, are not explained in the
Lucky Star decision.
It appears that the court, in the various decisions referred to
above, has misapplied the general principle that a word in
common use cannot be distinctive or comprise the dominant
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feature of a mark. The ‘dominant feature’ concept was most
famously articulated by Corbett JA in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v
Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A), where he
stated that ‘if each of the marks contains a main or dominant
feature or idea the likely impact made by this on the mind of the
customer must be taken into account’ (641B-D). The question
then arises as to whether a word in common use can be the
dominant or main feature of a mark. This was answered by
Nugent JA in Orange Brand Services Ltd v Account Works
Software (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZASCA 158, where he held as follows
regarding the word ‘orange’ in respect of computer software:
I accept that ‘orange’ is an ordinary English word, in wide use to
describe a colour or a fruit, and is not a constructed word finding its
distinctiveness in the word itself. But to my mind the dominant feature
of the word when used as a mark in this context, is that in its ordinary
meaning it has no association with computer software or computer
technology. It is precisely the absence of any natural association that
makes the mark distinctive and catches attention (para [15]).
Once again, Swain JA formed part of the bench that concurred
in this judgment.
The same construction can be applied to the mark LUCKY
STAR in respect of tinned fish. While the word ‘lucky’ might be in
common use in respect of games or gambling, it is not a word
that is commonly used in respect of food products, unlike the
words ‘star’ and ‘fish’. ‘Lucky’ would then be the dominant feature
of both marks.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pepsico Inc v
Atlantic Industries (983/16) 2017 ZASCA 109 on the similarity of
marks, concerning the word ‘twist’, is more persuasive. The
respondent (Atlantic) is a subsidiary of the Coca-Cola Company
and the South African proprietor of the registered trade marks
TWIST, LEMON TWIST, and DIET TWIST, all in class 32, which
includes mineral and aerated waters and non-alcoholic drinks.
The appellant (Pepsico) is the registered proprietor in South
Africa of various trade marks in the same class comprising or
containing the word PEPSI. Pepsico applied for the mark PEPSI
TWIST in class 32, which was, unsurprisingly, opposed by
Atlantic. Pepsico countered this by applying for the expungement
of Atlantic’s various TWIST registrations on the basis that they
were wrongly remaining on the register as they offended sections
10(2)(a) and (b).
The expungement application was dealt with first. Pepsico
contended that the word ‘twist’ is a common English word that is
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descriptive of the goods to which the mark is applied and not
inherently capable of distinguishing them from the goods of other
proprietors. The company based this assertion on dictionary
definitions, which included ‘a curled piece of lemon peel used to
flavour a drink’ and ‘a drink consisting of a mixture of two different
spirits. . .’ (para [6]). The court pointed out that these definitions
are described as slang by the dictionaries cited, and as obsolete
slang by a 1961 dictionary of slang (para [7]). For South African
consumers, the word ‘twist’ would be viewed as an arbitrary
brand name. As the court held: ‘Like a made-up word, a common
word which is arbitrary when applied to a particular product is the
exemplar of a mark inherently capable of distinguishing’ (para
[8], citing Orange Works above with approval). So the marks
were not vulnerable to expungement as they were inherently
capable of distinguishingAtlantic’s beverages from those of other
parties (para [13]).
The court then considered whether Pepsico’s proposed mark
could be registered, in the light of Atlantic’s opposition in terms of
section 10(14). This subsection prohibits the registration of a
mark that ‘is identical to a registered trade mark belonging to
a different proprietor or so similar thereto that the use thereof in
relation to goods or services in respect of which it is sought to be
registered and which are the same as or similar to the goods or
services in respect of which such trade mark is registered, would
be likely to deceive or cause confusion. . .’.
As the court emphasised, the proposed mark PEPSI TWIST
would not be identical to the mark TWIST, and the issue is then
whether the marks are sufficiently similar to cause deception or
confusion (para [17]). The court stated that, when testing for
deception or confusion, it will usually identify the features of the
marks, if any, which are dominant as, if they share a dominant
feature, there is ordinarily a greater likelihood of deception or
confusion (para [20]). As authority for this proposition, the court
cited the following statement in Distell Ltd v KZN Wines and
Spirits CC [2016] ZASCA 18 para [10], ‘the visual, aural and
conceptual similarities of the marks must be assessed by refer-
ence to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in
mind their distinctive and dominant components’. (In this deci-
sion, which has been criticised (see 2016 Annual Survey 583ff),
the court had held that KNIGHT was not the dominant element in
the marks KNIGHTS, BLACK KNIGHT, and KNIGHTS GOLD.)
After an analysis of the notional use to which Pepsico could put
its mark, the court concluded that TWIST was the ‘sole distinctive
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feature’ of all Atlantic’s marks (para [24]). A long discussion on the
effect of the insertion of the mark PEPSI before the mark TWIST
concluded by finding that some confusion is likely, as consumers
might assume that any TWIST beverage is connected with the
various PEPSI beverages (paras [24]–[31]).
Other than the court’s finding on the effect of linking an
extremely well-known mark with another mark, the importance of
this decision to the more general question of confusing similarity
between marks is the court’s recognition that even common
words may be distinctive in a trade-mark sense, provided that
they are not generally used on the products concerned. In the
decisions reached over the past two years, the court might
accordingly have considered whether YUPPIE, KNIGHT, LUCKY,
and TWIST were used, or might be ‘legitimately desired to be
used’, by other traders in the same field, rather than dismissing
these words as common or descriptive. In the decision under
discussion, the court quoted the following test with approval:
‘[W]hether other traders were likely, in the ordinary course of their
business and without any improper motive, to desire to use the
same mark . . . in connection with their goods’ (Registrar of Trade
Marks v W & G Du Cros Ltd [1913] UKHL 588, [1913] AC 624 at
634). Had this test been applied, it is possible that some of the
decisions referred to here might have had a different outcome.
Use
Westminster Tobacco Co (Cape Town and London) (Pty) Ltd v
Philip Morris Products SA& others [2017] 2All SA389 (SCA) dealt
with the concept of ‘bona fide use’ in relation to an application for
expungement due to non-use of a registered trade mark. Section
27(1)(b) states that
. . . a registered trade mark may, on application to the court, . . . by
any interested person, be removed from the register in respect of any
of the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, on the
ground . . . that up to the date three months before the date of the
application, a continuous period of five years or longer has elapsed
from the date of issue of the certificate of registration during which the
trade mark was registered and during which there was no bona fide
use thereof in relation to those goods or services by any proprietor
thereof or any person permitted to use the trade mark as contem-
plated in section 38 during the period concerned.
At issue here was whether the use that had been made of the
mark concerned was bona fide. Both parties form part of large
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tobacco manufacturing companies. The appellant, Westminster,
is a subsidiary of the British American Tobacco Group (BAT) while
the respondent, Philip Morris, forms part of Philip Morris Inter-
national (PMI). PMI is the international owner of the trade mark
PARLIAMENT, which is used elsewhere in the world on one of its
premier cigarette brands. However, it is unable to do so in South
Africa, as Westminster has registrations dating from 1952 and
1997 for the mark PARLIAMENT for cigarettes and related
tobacco products. PMI attempted to register the mark PARLIA-
MENT for the same goods in 2006, but was unsuccessful as a
result of the presence of the two Westminster marks. As a result, it
sought removal of these two marks on the ground of actual
non-use for five years. According to the pleadings, the cut-off
date by which any bona fide use had to take place was 22 July
2008. The burden of proving such use rested on Westminster
(para [4]).
BAT obviously became aware of PMI’s attempt to register the
PARLIAMENT mark in South Africa, and so, after having never
used the mark, had a million cigarettes manufactured in South
Africa in September 2007 with the intention of launching ciga-
rettes bearing this mark in late October 2007. This was delayed
and a very minor launch took place in Upington in January 2008.
Some few further sales occurred before the cut-off date, although
after that time relatively more sales took place until use of the
mark ceased in 2012. (Interestingly, the high point of sales in
2010, of 15 million cigarettes, was described by the court as ‘tiny
in relation to the market’ (para [9]).)
Refreshingly, Wallis JA said that as the courts had considered
the concept ‘bona fide use’ on previous occasions, there was no
need ‘to rehearse the jurisprudence in this regard’ and limited
himself to a brief quotation from the most recent decision on this
issue (AM Moolla Group Ltd v The Gap Inc 2005 (6) SA 568
(SCA)) (para [5]).
The court’s summary of what comprises bona fide use is
valuable. Wallis JA emphasises that while use need not be
extensive, it must be genuine. Such use is not mere token use
although the line is a fine one, as the use may be minimal.
Importantly, he holds that, while use ‘for an ulterior purpose,
unassociated with a genuine intention . . .’ is not permissible, the
fact that use is also prompted by fear of removal, or to prevent the
mark falling into the hands of a competitor, does not invalidate
such use, provided it is ‘principally directed at promoting trade in
the goods’ (para [7]).
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As the court said, whether use is bona fide must be determined
from the facts of the case (para [7]). What follows is a lengthy
analysis of the evidence presented to the court of first instance.
It appears that although BAT commenced use of the mark
PARLIAMENT when it realised that it was vulnerable to expunge-
ment, such use was also an attempt to launch a cigarette brand
into what is termed the ‘low priced segment of the market’ to
determine its viability (para [46]). The court of first instance had
relied on Gulf Oil Corporation v Rembrandt Fabrikante en Hande-
laars (Edms) Bpk 1963 (2) SA 10 (T) to hold that bona fide use
was ‘with the object or intention of protecting, facilitating or
furthering trade in those goods. . . . If a mark is used on goods
not with the object of promoting trade in those goods as an end in
itself, but with an ulterior purpose such as disrupting the business
of a competitor, or protecting its trade in other goods, such use
does not . . . constitute bona fide use of the trade mark. . .’ (para
[47]).
Although not explicitly stated, the court of first instance appears
to have viewed the fact that the use made of the mark was partly
to prevent expungement, although other considerations were
also present, as an indication that such use was not bona fide.
The appeal court adopted a different approach. As Wallis JA had
said earlier, the fact that use was prompted also by a fear of
removal did not render it automatically invalid; neither did the fact
that the use was limited. This would ‘introduce a quantitative and
qualitative element to the enquiry into bona fide use of a mark’
which would be inconsistent with previous authorities (para [48]).
On the facts, then, the use that Westminster had made of the
mark was found to be bona fide. Although this decision once
again emphasises the difficulties in proving the presence or
otherwise of bona fide use and illustrates the fact-based approach
to such a determination, the principles enunciated by Wallis JA
prior to his assessment of the evidence are important and will be
valuable in future litigation.
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LABOUR LAW: COLLECTIVE
MONRAY MARSELLUS BOTHA*
LEGISLATION
There was no legislation dealing with collective labour law
during the period under review.
CASE LAW
TRADE UNIONS
Names and acronyms
In Independent Municipal & Allied Trade Union v Municipal &
Allied Trade Union of SA (2017) 38 ILJ 1283 (LAC), the Municipal
and Allied Trade Union of South Africa (the MATUSA), which was
formed by disenchanted members of the South African Municipal
Workers Union (the SAMWU), appealed to the Labour Court in
terms of section 111(3) of the Labour RelationsAct 66 of 1995 (the
LRA) against the decision of the Registrar of Labour Relations not
to register it as a trade union in terms of sections 95 and 96 of the
LRA on the basis that it had not satisfied the requirements of
the LRA, and was not a genuine trade union. The Independent
Municipal and Allied Trade Union (the IMATU) was joined as a
respondent in the appeal because of its interest in a determina-
tion as to whether the MATUSA’s name offended the provisions of
section 95(4) of the LRA. The IMATU objected to the MATUSA’s
registration because its name and acronym could be confused
with its own. The Labour Court had found that it was ‘most
unlikely’ that the acronym ‘MATUSA’ would be confused with the
acronym ‘IMATU’ given the distinct pronunciation of the acronyms
(para [11]). The court added that the full names of the MATUSA
and the IMATU could also be distinguished by the prefix ‘Indepen-
dent’ in the IMATU’s name. The court said that this prefix was an
important signifier of the IMATU being independent of any
affiliation, and that the descriptive words ‘municipal’ and ‘trade
* BLC LLB LLM BCom (Hons) (UP) MCom (UJ) LLD (NWU) Advanced
Diploma in Insolvency and Practice (AIPSA) (UP) Advanced Diploma in Corporate
Law (UJ) Advanced Diploma in Alternative Dispute Resolution (AFSA/UP). Profes-
sor and Head of Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria.
673
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 2 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/20−Labour−Law−Collective
union’, and the generic words ‘Allied Trade Union of South Africa’
also appeared in the names of many other trade unions. The
court found the MATUSA to be a genuine trade union. It upheld
the appeal, set aside the registrar’s refusal to register the
MATUSA, and ordered the registrar to register the MATUSAwithin
fourteen days. The IMATU appealed against the part of the
judgment and order which dealt with whether the MATUSA’s full
name and its acronym so closely resembled those of the IMATU
that they were likely to mislead or cause confusion as contem-
plated by section 95(4) of the LRA. The IMATU relied on its
substantial reputation as a trade union within the local govern-
ment sector and among the broader public, where it is known by
its full name and acronym. The IMATU further based its appeal
on: the fact that four of the five words in the MATUSA’s name –
‘Municipal and Allied Trade Union’ – are identical to four of the
words in the IMATU’s name; that the last four letters in IMATU’s
acronym (MATU) are duplicated in four letters of the acronym
‘MATUSA’; and that the name MATUSA would, therefore, mislead
or cause confusion. It was also disputed that the words ‘Allied
Trade Union of South Africa’ are generic, or conflict with the
name’s dominant message which is to identify a ‘Municipal and
Allied Trade Union’. It was also contended that ‘Independent’ was
not a signifier peculiar to the IMATU’s name, given that section
95(1)(d) requires a trade union to be ‘independent’ as intended
by section 95(2).
The Labour Appeal Court, in determining whether the name
‘the MATUSA’ so closely resembled that of ‘the IMATU’ that it
could mislead or cause confusion as contemplated by section
95(4), referred to the issues set out in Staff Association for the
Motor and Related Industries v Motor Industries Staff Association
& another (1999) 20 ILJ 2552 (LAC) with reference to Plascon-
Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A). In
Plascon-Evans (641C-D), the following factors were taken into
account:
(i) the names when compared side by side and separately, including
their sense, sound, and appearance, their distinctive, main, or domi-
nant components, and their similarities and differences, without peering
too closely in order to find such similarities or difference; (ii) the impact
and the overall impression created by the names on the average
person likely to encounter them, or the notional customer of average
intelligence, having normal eyesight and adopting ordinary caution,
and allowing for imperfect recollection and that names or marks are
remembered by general impression, or by some significant or striking
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feature, and not by a photographic recollection of the whole; (iii) the
context in which the names would be encountered and used, consid-
ered against the background of relevant surrounding circumstances;
and (iv) the reasonable likelihood of a substantial number of interested
people being misled or confused by the names, whether for a shorter or
longer period of time, in a manner that would induce in their minds an
erroneous belief, impression, doubt, or uncertainty, that the entities
identified are the same entity or are connected with one another, with
the reputation attached to an established name being a relevant
consideration (para [18]).
This requires that if both names ‘are to be used together in a
normal and fair manner, in the ordinary course of business’ (ibid),
a value judgment must be made ‘dictated by the overall impres-
sion created by the marks, given their respective characteristics,
and the circumstances in which they are likely to be encountered,
instead of being drawn into excessive analysis’ (ibid; cf Orange
Brand Service v Account Work Software [2013] ZASCA 158 para
[14]). The court held that when the two names were compared,
both side by side and separately, it was apparent that in their long
form four of the five words used in the IMATU’s full name –
‘Municipal and Allied Trade Union’ – also appeared in the
MATUSA’s name, with a similar repetition occurring in their
respective acronyms. The court added that, when regard was
had to the sense, sound, and appearance, distinctive and
dominant components, and similarities and differences between
the names, it was apparent that there were strong distinguishing
features between the names, particularly in the use of the word
‘Independent’ as a prefix to the IMATU’s name, and the words
‘South Africa’ as a suffix to the MATUSA’s name. The result was
that the sense, sound, and appearance of the two names were
distinct despite the common words used; this was more so when
the dominant impression created by the word ‘Independent’ in
the prefix to the IMATU’s name is that of an independent trade
union in the sector. The court added that the dissimilar acronyms
used by the IMATU and the MATUSA, in an environment in which
acronyms are commonly used, did not allow for a reasonable
likelihood of confusion. The visual appearance of the names did
not create confusion given the use of the prefix ‘Independent’.
Given their different acronyms, and with due allowance for
imperfect recollection, the probabilities supported a conclusion
that what is likely to remain in the mind of an average person are
the words ‘Independent’ and ‘IMATU’, compared with ‘Municipal’
and ‘South Africa’ and ‘MATUSA’. The difference between them
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would be noted by the average person, and the similarities
between four words in their names do not permit a conclusion
that there was a reasonable opportunity to cause confusion. The
appeal was accordingly dismissed.
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
Extension of collective agreements
The matter of Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union
v Chamber of Mines of SA (2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC), 2017 (3) SA
242, [2017] 7 BLLR 641, concerned the extension of collective
agreements in terms of section 23(1)(d) of the LRA. The Chamber
of Mines of South Africa (first respondent), acting on behalf of its
members in the gold mining sector (including Harmony Gold
Mining Company Ltd, AngloGold Ashanti Ltd, and Sibanye
Gold Ltd – the second, third and fourth respondents), began
negotiations on wages and working conditions with unions
(National Union of Mineworkers (the NUM), Solidarity and United
Association of South Africa (the UASA) (the fifth, sixth and
seventh respondents) who represented the majority of workers in
the sector. The Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union
(the AMCU) was not a party to the negotiations, and did not
consider itself bound to them. On 20 January 2014, the AMCU
notified the three companies that its members would strike as
from 23 January 2014. In response, the Chamber successfully
applied to the Labour Court to interdict the strike. On 30 January
2014, the Labour Court granted an interim interdict against the
AMCU and its members which was confirmed on the return day.
The AMCU then appealed to the Labour Appeal Court but was
unsuccessful. On further appeal to the Constitutional Court, the
AMCU contended that the definition of ‘workplace’ does not apply
to the reference in section 23(1)(d)(iii) to ‘the majority of employ-
ees employed by the employer in the workplace’ in that the
statute’s definitions only apply ‘unless the context otherwise
indicates’ (para [11]). The AMCU further argued that if the
definition does apply, it can be interpreted in what it calls a
‘broad’ way – with the effect that ‘workplace’ means an individual
mine and not all of an employer’s operations taken together (para
[11]). It followed from AMCU’s argument that its members were
entitled to strike at least at the individual mines where they
enjoyed a majority, and also that section 23(1)(d)(iii) of the LRA
limited the rights to strike, fair labour practices, and freedom of
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association of its members. The court rejected the AMCU’s
arguments and held that the definition of ‘workplace’ focuses,
first, on employees as a collective and, second, on the relative
unimportance of location. Both signal that ‘workplace’ has a
special statutory meaning. The court added that the focus in the
definition of ‘workplace’ is on workers as a collective rather than
as separate individuals. The definition encompasses one or more
‘place or places where employees of an employer work’ which
means that ‘the place or places’ where workers work may
constitute a single workplace (para [26]). This implies the intrinsic
possibility of locational multiplicity for a single ‘workplace’ which
excludes, from the outset, any notion – which the ordinary
meaning of ‘workplace’ might encourage – that each individual
location where a worker works is a separate ‘workplace’ (para
[26]). The court emphasised that regardless of at how many
places employees work, different ‘operations’ may be different
workplaces only if they meet the criteria set in the definition. The
key question is whether an operation is independent and not
where it is located, as each independent operation which consti-
tutes a separate ‘workplace’may itself be at one or more separate
locations. The court also stated that both features of the definition
have ‘a practical bite’ because they signal that for purposes of the
LRA ‘workplace’ does not have its ordinary meaning: the legisla-
ture has assigned a special meaning to the term (para [29]). The
question was whether each AMCU-majority mine constituted a
separate ‘workplace’. This depends not on the mines’ geographic
locations or where the individual workers work, but on the
functional signifiers of independence in the definition. It requires
one to determine whether the employer companies conduct two
or more operations ‘that are independent of one another by
reason of their size, function or organisation’ (paras [4] [5] [28]
[30]). The Constitutional Court reiterated that both the Labour
Court and the Labour Appeal Court had found that each mining
house operated integrally as a single workplace, and that no
AMCU-majority mine qualified as an independent operation. It
further emphasised that even if the AMCU’s argument that the
application of the statutory definition does not involve a purely
factual enquiry were to be upheld, it would not result in a different
finding (para [37]). The court also stated that there was no reason
for it to intervene, against the grain of the statutory language, to
impose what the AMCU called ‘the broad interpretation’ of
workplace. It follows that the agreement had been validly extended
to AMCU members at the five AMCU-majority mines.
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The AMCU further contended that section 23(1)(d) of the LRA
infringes the right to freedom of association, the right to collective
bargaining, and the right to strike (para [41]). Its argument, both
on the papers and at the hearing, focused on the right to strike. At
the core of the AMCU’s challenge was the LRA’s endorsement of
the principle of majoritarianism. The court stated in this regard
that some form of majority rule in the workplace must apply if
there is to be orderly and productive collective bargaining (para
[44]). Section 23(1)(d) gives greater power to a majority union
within a workplace, as defined; and it does so for powerful
reasons that are functional to enhancing employees’ bargaining
power through a single representative bargaining agent. The
court pointed out that counsel for the NUM rightly noted that to
object to section 23(1)(d) purely on the basis that it applies
majoritarianism is something of a phantom, in that theAMCU itself
sought to enforce a form of majoritarianism. Although the AMCU
complained of the constitutional propriety of applying majoritari-
anism to a sector-wide agreement under section 23, it sought to
have majoritarianism apply at each individual mine (with the
result that its majority at five mines could prevail) (para [45]).
The court acknowledged that the AMCU was correct in stating
that the codification of majoritarianism in section 23(1)(d) limits
the right to strike. However, the key question was whether the
principle provided sufficient justification for that limitation, and the
best justification for the limitation was that majoritarianism, in this
context, benefitted orderly collective bargaining (para [50]). The
court added that the task of judges is not to pick and choose
between the rights and wrongs and advantages and disadvan-
tages of different constituency models, but that their responsibil-
ity is much narrower – to determine whether the model Parliament
has in fact chosen passes scrutiny under the Bill of Rights (para
[51]). The court added that the statutory structures that enforce
the majoritarian system nevertheless allow minority unions free-
dom of association. Minority unions have recruiting rights, organi-
sational rights, deduction rights, recognition of shop stewards,
time off for union office-bearers to do union work, and bargaining
rights (all of which the AMCU had). The court further stated that
although the AMCU and its members did lose the right to strike
while the agreement was in force, none of the non-signatory
unions or employees lost any of their organisational and collec-
tive bargaining entitlements. This means that the LRA, though
premised on majoritarianism, is not an instrument of oppression;
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it does not entirely suppress minority unions as its provisions
allow ample scope for minority unions to organise within the
workforce (para [55]). The appeal was dismissed.
In National Union of Metalworkers of SA obo Members v SA
Airways SOC Ltd (2017) 38 ILJ 1994 (LAC), [2017] 9 BLLR 867
SA Airways SOC Ltd (the SAA, the respondent) embarked on a
massive retrenchment drive after suffering a loss of R2,6 billion in
the 2013/2014 financial year. This resulted in many job losses.
The appellant trade union (the NUMSA), after lengthy facilitation
in terms of section 189A of the LRA, requested information on the
SAA’s financial state. The request was opposed by the SAA and
was not supported by the other union’s party to the consultation
process, who represented the vast majority of employees
employed by the SAA. The NUMSA referred an application to the
CCMA. After further consultation regarding the economic ratio-
nale for the proposed retrenchments (which was not attended by
the NUMSA), an agreement was reached between the SAA and
the remaining unions who jointly represented 80 per cent of the
SAA’s employees. In this agreement, the need for retrenchment
was accepted, and agreement was reached on issues including
severance pay, selection criteria, and retraining of retrenched
employees. The agreement was extended to non-parties under
section 23(1)(d) of the LRA and a further agreement dealing with
the SAA’s organisational structure was also extended to non-
parties (para [15]). The NUMSA then launched an urgent applica-
tion in the Labour Court, seeking orders declaring that the SAA
had not complied with a fair procedure and setting aside the
collective agreements with the majority unions. The court held
that while it may seem objectionable that section 23(1)(d) may be
used in a way that appears to deprive individuals and their unions
of the right to challenge a retrenchment process, it permits all
collective agreements to be extended (para [19]). The court
added that section 23(1)(d) is not limited to agreements that do
not involve deprivation of rights, and that most collective agree-
ments extended in terms of this section involved depriving
non-party employees of some or other right (eg, the right to
strike). The fact that this is permissible is underscored by section
189(1)(a) of the LRA, which has been interpreted as meaning that
an employer and a majority trade union may enter into a collective
agreement upfront to the effect that, in the case of a retrenchment
exercise, the employer will only consult with the majority union
(para [19]). The court added that such a collective agreement
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can be extended in terms of section 23(1)(d) if the requirements
are met. The Labour Appeal Court agreed with the Labour Court
and, with reference to Association of Mineworkers & Construction
Union v Chamber of Mines of SA (2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC), [2017] 7
BLLR 641, found that the retrenchment agreement met the
requirements as set out in the LRA and was a collective agree-
ment capable of extension in terms of section 23(1)(d) of the LRA
(paras [38] [39]). The appeal was dismissed.
Cancellation of collective agreements
Imperial Cargo Solutions v South African Transport and Allied
Workers Union & others (Road Freight Association as amicus
curiae) (2017) 38 ILJ 2479 (LAC), [2017] 12 BLLR 1189 dealt with
whether drivers would perform work previously done by assis-
tants whose positions had been abolished by the appellant. The
appellant concluded a collective agreement with the respondent
union, the SATAWU, in terms of which the drivers would fulfil these
functions in return for additional payment over and above their
normal salaries. During negotiations, the SATAWU sought an
increase in the additional amount, and when the appellant
refused to meet the demand, the SATAWU informed it that it was
cancelling the collective agreement on one month’s notice, and
that the drivers would no longer perform the ancillary duties
provided for in the collective agreement (para [5]). The appellant
viewed the cancellation of the collective agreement and the
refusal to perform ancillary duties as unprotected strike action
and sought urgent interim relief directing the drivers to perform
these ancillary duties on the basis that their refusal to do the work
amounted to unprotected strike action (para [6]).
The court held that the ancillary duties did not form part of the
drivers’ terms and conditions of employment given the absence
of any other agreement obliging the employees to perform
the ancillary duties. As the drivers were entitled to cancel the
collective agreement on notice, the obligation fell away upon
cancellation of the agreement and consequently the obligation of
the employer to pay the employees in lieu of ancillary functions in
terms of the collective agreement also fell away (para [20]). The
court added that the obligation relating to ancillary duties was
based solely on the collective agreement and not on the main
collective agreement. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Interpretation of collective agreements
In Public Servants Association & others v Minister of Correc-
tional Services & others [2017] 4 BLLR 371 (LAC), the appellant
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union and others concluded an ‘Occupation Specific Dispensa-
tion’ (OSD) regarding salaries which was made a collective
agreement of the General Public Service Sectional Bargaining
Council (the GPSSBC). The OSD was to be implemented in two
phases. Phase one entailed that all employees not previously
accommodated by the OSD would be moved from their old
(existing) salary scales and notches to new scales and notches
provided that they would not be worse off than before the transfer.
Phase two entailed financial recognition of past experience in the
Department of Correctional Services, with a notch increase for
each five years worked ‘based on the new notch of the OSD’
(para [6]), giving rise to two competing views of interpretation
and, therefore, the implementation of phase two of the OCD. The
General Public Service Sectional Bargaining Council arbitrator,
after repeating the different arguments, held that the interpreta-
tion advanced by the appellants properly set out the intention of
the drafters, and found that the ‘new notch of the OSD’ meant the
new OCD notch to which the employees had been transferred
during the first phase (para [10]). On review, the Labour Court
found that the arbitrator was supposed to interpret the words
‘new notch of the OSD’ but that he did not give any meaning to the
words and only repeated the arguments and reached a conclu-
sion without giving proper reasons and so failed to carry out his
duties (para [13]). The court noted that the factual matrix is
important because each agreement must be placed in proper
context as agreements are not made in a vacuum; they are
products of a particular background, context, and knowledge of
the parties – words without context mean nothing and context
means everything (para [17]). The court also stated that the
absence of a factual plinth on which to build his interpretation
rendered the arbitrator’s conclusion unreasonable because he
could not apply his mind properly to the issue before him without
a factual substratum (para [19]). The appeal was dismissed.
ORGANISATIONAL RIGHTS
The appeal in SA Correctional Services Workers Union v Police
and Prisons Civil Rights Union (2017) 38 ILJ 2009 (LAC), [2017] 9
BLLR 905 concerned the question of whether an employer is
precluded from according certain limited organisational rights to
a minority union when it falls short of the representation threshold
agreed upon between the employer and a majority trade union in
the workplace in terms of section 18(1) of the LRA. The Police and
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Prisons Civil Rights Union (the POPCRU), as the majority union in
this matter, concluded an agreement establishing representation
thresholds with the Department of Correctional Services (the
DCS) for the acquisition of section 12, 13 and 15 organisational
rights by minority trade unions in the workplace. Thereafter, the
DCS concluded a collective agreement with the SA Correctional
Services Workers Union (the SACOSWU, the appellant) a minority
union which had not attained the stipulated representativeness
threshold, granting the union stop order facilities for a limited
period and the right to represent members in grievance and
disciplinary proceedings. The POPCRU referred a dispute on the
interpretation and application of its collective agreement with
the DCS to the GPSSBC for conciliation and then arbitration. The
arbitrator (third respondent) found that by virtue of section 20,
the employer was entitled to enter into a collective agreement
with a minority union despite a representation threshold having
been agreed upon under section 18(1) (para [1]). The arbitrator
relied on NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd (2003) 35 ILJ 1037 (LC)
and concluded that the LRA should not be interpreted to pre-
clude non-representative trade unions from obtaining organisa-
tional rights, either by agreement with the employer or through
industrial action (para [10]). The arbitrator stated that as the
statute is capable of a broader interpretation which does not limit
fundamental rights, the broader interpretation which entitled the
SACOSWU to organisational rights in terms of sections 12 to 16 of
the LRA should be followed. The arbitrator found that the collec-
tive agreement between the SACOSWU and the DCS was valid
and enforceable (para [11]).
The Labour Court on review set aside the arbitration award
on the basis that the threshold agreement was binding on
the employer, and found that the collective agreement with the
minority union was invalid and unenforceable as it was entirely
incompatible with the threshold agreement entered into between
the DCS and the POPCRU. The court reiterated that an employer
may decide whether it wishes to bargain with a minority union, the
extent to which it will do so, and whether it will conclude a
collective agreement. The LRA does not prohibit bargaining with
a minority union on such matters, nor does the employer breach
an existing section 18(1) collective threshold agreement by doing
so (paras [14] [15]). The court added that the effect of an agreed
section 18(1) threshold is to oblige the employer to confer section
12, 13 and 15 organisational rights on unions that have met that
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threshold, but not to constrain the employer’s entitlement to
bargain with unions that have not. The court added that the
employer’s election to bargain with the minority union in such
circumstances may have consequences for the relationship with
the majority union. Such a consequence, the court stated, may
play out either in the course of the collective bargaining relation-
ship, or through the exercise of other legal remedies (paras [17]
[18]). The court further stated that the threshold agreement did
not provide a bar to the conclusion of a section 20 collective
agreement with the minority union regarding section 12, 13 or 15
organisational rights, and that the existence of the threshold did
not distinguish the matter from Bader Bop (para [34]). In light of
this, the court added that minority unions are entitled to co-exist,
to organise members, to represent members in relation to indi-
vidual grievances, and to seek to challenge majority unions. It
followed that the Labour Court had erred in approaching the
matter on the basis that section 18 seeks to avoid the proliferation
of minority trade unions in a workplace through regulating the
admission of trade unions to the bargaining relationship and that
the provision would serve no purpose if section 20 were permit-
ted to override it (para [36]). The Labour Appeal Court stated that
an agreed threshold does not absolutely bar a minority trade
union from access to the workplace because the majoritarian
system is compatible with the right to freedom of association,
provided that minority unions are not prevented from functioning,
making representations on behalf of their members, and repre-
senting members in individual grievance disputes (paras [37]
[40]). The court further held that the section 18(1) agreement had
been correctly interpreted by the arbitrator to permit the conclu-
sion of the agreement with the SACOSWU in order to serve
members’ interests by representing employees in disciplinary
and grievance hearings, as well as the right to have subscriptions
deducted for a limited period (para [43]). The appeal succeeded.
In Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union v Commis-
sion for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others [2017] 6
BLLR 613 (LC), the MATUSA was formed as a breakaway trade
union from the SA Municipal Workers Union. The MATUSA
referred a dispute in terms of section 21(8C) of the LRA to the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation andArbitration (the CCMA)
after the Stellenbosch Municipality refused to grant it organisa-
tional rights. At the time of referral of the dispute the MATUSA
enjoyed fifteen per cent representation of the municipality’s
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workforce, whereas the SAMWU and the IMATU respectively
enjoyed 25 per cent and 29 per cent representation. A collective
agreement stipulated (at the time of the dispute) that a member-
ship threshold of fifteen per cent for the acquisition of organisa-
tional rights was required in the municipal sector nationally, a
requirement which the MATUSA failed to meet. The commissioner
held that in view of the new section 21(8C) (inserted by the 2014
amendments to the LRA) the MATUSA should be granted organi-
sational rights in terms of sections 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA. The
arbitrator considered the new section 21(8C) and stated:
The rationale for the new amendments of section 21 of the LRA is an
attempt to adopt a more holistic approach by broadening/adjusting
the scope to grant organisational rights to unions that do not enjoy a
majority at the workplace. The amendments give effect to the prin-
ciples of freedom of association in that employees have the right to
choose their representation and that minority unions can approach the
CCMA where they have not been granted organisational rights. The
amendments are also an attempt to provide for the recruitment and
protection of workers in atypical forms of employment taking cog-
nisant [sic] of the ideal of decent work (para [10]).
The IMATU contended that the commissioner had miscon-
strued the issue by failing to consider whether the MATUSA was
‘sufficiently representative’ in terms of the criteria as set out in
section 21(8) of the LRA. The court noted that the MATUSA’s
quest to secure organisational rights should be considered in
context of the LRA and the collective bargaining regime in the
local government sector and that the current parties to the South
African Local Government Bargaining Council (the SALGBC) are
the SALGA (which represents the employers) and the IMATU and
the SAMWU (para [15]). The SALGBC agreed in its constitution
that another registered trade union (such as the MATUSA) could
be admitted only if it met the threshold of not less than fifteen per
cent of the total number of employees falling within the scope of
the SALGBC. The court was of the view that the commissioner’s
decision to grant the MATUSA organisational rights was based
solely on the fact that the MATUSA had a ‘significant interest’ in
the municipality (the workplace) and that he had disregarded the
considerations as set out in section 21(8C) of the LRA (para [18]).
The court further noted that the requirement of section 21(8C)(b)
of ‘a significant interest or a substantial number of employees’
serves as a basis for granting minority unions organisational
rights (para [19]). The court added that a commissioner may only
grant organisational rights in terms of sections 12, 13 and 15 if he
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or she has considered other factors set out in section 21(8) (para
[20]). These include that the commissioner should have (i) sought
to minimise the proliferation of trade union representation in a
single workplace; (ii) sought to minimise the financial and admin-
istrative burden on the municipality to grant organisational rights
to a third trade union; (iii) considered the nature of the workplace,
being a single municipality within the local government sector;
(iv) considered the nature of the organisational rights that the
MATUSA sought to exercise (eg, the deduction of trade union
subscription fees in a workplace where there is already an
agency shop agreement in place); (v) considered the nature of
the local government sector; (vi) considered the organisational
history at the workplace (eg, the Municipality and the SALGA’s
agreements with the IMATU and the SAMWU); and (vii) consid-
ered the composition of the workforce. The court held that none of
these factors had been considered by the commissioner and the
award, therefore, was reviewable (para [21]). It held further that
the review should be set aside, but noted that it was not in a
position to substitute its decision for that of the commissioner. The
court ordered that a different commissioner would have to be
appointed to consider afresh the evidence and submissions of
the MATUSA, the SAMWU, the IMATU and the municipality before
applying his or her mind to all the factors set out in section 21(8)
and 21(8C).
INDUSTRIAL ACTION
Strike notice
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v South
African Municipal Workers Union & others [2017] 12 BLLR 1244
(LC) the applicant municipality transferred 94 bus drivers to other
positions pending disciplinary action against them. The SAMWU
referred a dispute to the SouthAfrican Local Government Bargain-
ing Council, claiming that the municipality had unilaterally changed
the employees’ contracts of employment and that it should,
therefore, restore the terms and conditions. After failure to resolve
the dispute the SAMWU issued a five-day strike notice of its
commencement with strike action. The municipality launched
an urgent application for an order interdicting the strike on
the following grounds: (1) insufficient notice had been given
to the municipality, as a state organ which requires at least seven
days’ notice of a strike in terms of section 64(1)(d) of the LRA;
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(2) where section 64(4) is invoked, it is not competent to strike
after the lapse of the period referred to in section 64(1)(a); (3) the
precautionary transfer does not constitute a unilateral change to
terms and conditions of employment; (4) the precautionary
transfer involved a contractual dispute between the parties which
the SAMWU has the right to refer to court in terms of section 77(3)
of the BCEA, which means that the strike was hit by the section
65(1)(c) limitation to the right to strike; and (5) the dispute
amounted to an unfair labour practice in terms of section 186(2)(b)
of the LRA with the result that the strike was once again hit by the
limitation in section 65(1)(c) (para [3]). The court stated that
section 64(1)(d) applied to the municipality as it fell within the
phrase ‘the State is the employer’ (para [4]). The question was
whether the strike would only be unprotected until the seven
days’ notice ran out, or whether SAMWU was obliged to give the
municipality seven days’ notice afresh in order for the strike to be
protected. The court added that a fresh notice would have to
be issued as the municipality was entitled to know when the strike
would start, and the time for the commencement of the threat-
ened strike – which was unlawful – had come and gone (para [5]).
The court then stated that it should be noted that section 65(1)(c)
of the LRA had been amended by 2014 amendments to the LRA
to read (the amendment is in italics) ‘the issue in dispute is one
that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour
Court in terms of this Act or any other employment law’. The court
added that this would cover the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA), and section 77(3) thereof, which
grants the court (employment) contractual jurisdiction.
The court considered two conflicting approaches by different
judges: the first by Murphy AJA in Mawethu Civils (Pty) Ltd &
another v National Union of Mineworkers & others (2016) 37 ILJ
1851 (LAC), and the second by Van Niekerk J in Sibanye Gold Ltd
v AMCU & others (2017) 38 ILJ 1193 (LC) (Sibanye (2)). Although
for present purposes, the court was of the view that the munici-
pality had succeeded in at least establishing a prima facie right to
relief on this ground, it is still worth noting the two approaches for
purposes of this discussion. The court pointed out that the
approach of Murphy AJA in Mawethu (albeit tentative and at best
obiter) is that the strike herein is unprotected because, although
styled as a dispute about a unilateral change to terms and
conditions of employment, the dispute is actionable in terms of
section 77(3) of the BCEA as a breach of contract. The result
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of this approach is that the strike is hit by the section 65(1)(c)
limitation of the right to strike. On the other hand, the approach of
Van Niekerk J in Sibanye (2) must also be considered. The fact
that the SAMWU might otherwise have characterised the dispute
as a breach of contract does not detract from the fact that the
actual nature of the dispute was a dispute about a unilateral
change to terms and conditions of employment. This approach
means that there was nothing that provides that such a dispute
may be referred to arbitration, or to the present court for
adjudication; the strike was, accordingly, not hit by the section
65(1)(c) limitation of the right to strike. The court found that the
municipality had prima facie established that the strike was
unprotected on the first and fourth grounds mentioned above.
Strike interdicts
In South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Professional Transport &
Allied Workers Union of SA aka PTAWU & another (2017) 38 ILJ
2463 (GJ), SA Breweries (the SAB) had a contract with truck
owners to transport its products from its depots to retail outlets.
The truck owners in turn employed crew members to fulfil their
obligations. The crew members, who included the second respon-
dent, were members of the first respondent (the Professional
Transport & Allied Workers Union (the PTAWU)). After a labour
dispute arose, the truck owners’ drivers and crew embarked on
violent strike action which resulted in the SAB’s products being
destroyed by protesting members of the PTAWU. The SAB
approached the court seeking an interdict against the PTAWU
members. The second respondent raised a point in limine,
contesting the jurisdiction of the High Court and arguing that the
Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction over this matter as it
concerned a strike by employees (para [7]). The High Court
agreed with the SAB that the application was aimed at protecting
the applicant’s property against damage by the employees of the
truck owners and preventing financial loss to the business. The
application had nothing to do with the strike to compel the truck
owners to meet the demands of their employees (para [8]). The
court noted that section 239(2) of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) read with section 17
provides for a peaceful strike or protest and that the reason is to
protect the rights which are provided in section 12(1)(c) of the
Constitution and to ensure that public and private property is not
damaged or destroyed by those participating in the strike (para
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[28]). The court rejected the second respondent’s argument that
the members of the first respondent could not be held liable for
the damage to the SAB’s products which occurred outside the
workplace, as any valuable property needs protection whether at
the workplace or elsewhere. The court emphasised that the SAB’s
products had often been destroyed en route to customers, and
that the SAB had incurred substantial financial costs arising from
the employment of a private security firm to protect its products.
The court granted an interdict against the strikers.
Secondary strikes
Nyambi & others v HC Shaik Investment CC & another (2017)
38 ILJ 2806 (LC) dealt with a referral by the applicant employees
of a dispute concerning their employment status to arbitration
under section 198D of the LRA. They claimed that they had
become ‘deemed’ employees of the first respondent’s client
(Nampak). In terms of section 198D of the LRA, any dispute as to
the employment status of employees in relation to a temporary
employment service (TES) or the client of such a service may be
referred to arbitration. The object of the application is to preserve
the ability of the applicants to engage in protected strike action
against the true employer or employers in terms of section 64(4)
of the LRA. The applicants argued that even though there was no
question as to whether the first respondent (HC Shaik) was their
employer, it was, pending the outcome of the arbitration, uncer-
tain whether the second respondent was also their employer. By
obtaining an interdict, the applicants would be able to prevent the
respondents from implementing any changes until they were in a
position to know what the ambit of potential strike action under
section 64(4) was. They therefore wished to be able to exercise
their rights under section 64(4) only once there was certainty
about whether or not the second respondent was their employer.
The Labour Court held that if the second respondent (Nampak)
was also the applicants’ employer, they would have a clear right
to embark on primary strike action against it by utilising the
procedure under section 64(4) if the changes intended by the
first respondent amounted to changes to their terms and condi-
tions of employment (para [8]). The court noted that a primary
strike against Nampak would allow employees of Nampak who
were not applicants to participate in the strike in support of the
applicants’ demands. It added that it was well established that it
is not only employees who are directly affected by strike demands
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made on an employer who may participate in a protected strike in
support of those demands (para [9]). Nampak and HC Shaik
argued that nothing prevented the applicants from initiating a
primary strike against HC Shaik, provided they followed the
procedural requirements of section 64(4) and then gave Nampak
seven days’ notice of a secondary strike in accordance with
the requirements of section 66(2)(b) of the LRA (para [10]). The
court added that provided these procedural requirements and
the requirements of section 66(2)(c) were also satisfied, other
employees of Nampak would be entitled to participate in the
strike action in support of the applicants’ demands even if
the applicants were not employees of Nampak. The court held
that, when regard was had to the inextricably close connection
between the work performed by the applicants as employees of
HC Shaik, and the operations of Nampak, there could be little
doubt that such strike action would be reasonable having regard
to the direct and material impact on the operations of Nampak,
and would fulfil the requirements of section 66(2)(c) (para [11]).
The court also noted that the economic pressure that such a
strike would bring to bear on Nampak would be indistinguishable
from the economic effect of a primary strike by the same
employees in support of the same demands. It noted further, that
the applicants had advanced no grounds why this was not a
reasonably suitable alternative to a primary strike against Nam-
pak. The court saw no reason for the applicants to await the
outcome of the pending arbitration award in order effectively to
exercise the right to strike in support of demands made pursuant
to a referral made under section 64(4) and in order to afford the
employees of Nampak the right to participate in a strike in
support of those demands. The court held that the applicants had
a suitable alternative remedy (the secondary strike) and the
application failed on that basis.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Interest arbitration: Essential services
National Union of Mineworkers & another v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others [2017] 4 BLLR
405 (LC) was an application to set aside an unusual arbitration
award following an arbitration to settle a wage dispute. It involved
a dispute of interest in an essential service that may, if conciliation
has failed, be referred to arbitration by either party in terms of
section 74(4) of the LRA. The respondent commissioner upheld
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the final wage offer by Eskom (the respondent employer) of
5,6 per cent and, in a subsequent ‘variation ruling’, a further offer
that approved changes in other conditions of service proposed
by Eskom. The applicant unions (the NUM and the NUMSA)
contended on review that the commissioner has misconceived
the nature of the enquiry and ignored his terms of reference
because he had declined to consider an increase beyond that
offered by Eskom, had incorrectly found that the unions had
advanced ‘insufficient reasons’ for their proposed increase, and
had also ignored factors such as affordability and comparability
as well productivity and disparities in the wage gap. The Labour
Court noted that the arbitrator had considered two main
approaches to interest arbitrations: the ‘hypothetical approach’
and the ‘fairness approach’ (para [7]). In terms of the ‘hypotheti-
cal approach’ an estimate is made of where the parties might
have settled had they engaged in industrial action, while the
‘fairness approach’ requires the parties to justify their respective
positions in order to allow the arbitrator to choose between the
two positions or decide on a different position regarding an
increase. The court noted that the arbitrator had adopted the
‘fairness approach’, even though his terms of reference required
him to follow the ‘hypothetical approach’ (para [9]). Although he
had considered the ‘hypothetical approach’ he had rejected it.
The court further noted that on the issue of affordability, the
commissioner had accepted that Eskom was facing severe
financial restraints and that the union’s expert had only focused
on inflation and productivity. He had also accepted that Eskom’s
general conditions of service (even without the proposed increase)
compared favourably with the rest of the market and that produc-
tivity was in fact decreasing (para [15]). The court further noted
that in neither of the awards which were used to extract the
‘hypothetical’ and ‘fairness’ approaches to interest arbitrations
was the arbitrator bound by any agreed terms of reference, as the
LRA does not prescribe any specific approach or methods of
evaluation when dealing with interest arbitrations. The court
noted that the special provisions dealing with interest arbitration
disputes in section 139 of the LRA only deal with the conduct of
the proceedings and not with the approach an arbitrator should
adopt in dealing with an interest dispute (para [20]). The parties
are, however, expressly invited to determine the terms of refer-
ence for the arbitration under section 135(6)(ii) of the LRA. The
court noted that the parties had agreed to terms of reference and,
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accordingly, the correctness of the arbitrator’s approach
depended primarily on the correct interpretation of those terms;
he was not at large simply to elect which approach to adopt as
the arbitrators had done in the two cases he cited (para [20]). The
court noted that on a very superficial reading of the terms of
reference it might be argued that both the fairness and hypo-
thetical approaches had been equally weighted by the parties in
drafting the terms of reference and, therefore, the terms of
reference clearly identified values and objective factors as well
as the hypothetical approach. Consequently, the court noted, the
commissioner could not determine where the parties might have
settled had they both been forced to compromise using the
‘hypothetical approach’, but had to assess which of the respec-
tive offers he found most reasonable. At best, the ‘hypothetical
approach’ could only have been an indirect aid in deciding
whether it was more likely that the parties might have settled
closer to one offer rather than others, but it could not be applied in
the sense normally intended, namely, to craft the outcome at
which the parties ought to have arrived (para [23]). The court
found that the commissioner had not misconstrued the issue in
the manner alleged, as he had been deprived of the choice of a
via media, and was required to choose between the parties’
respective proposals which was effectively the final-offer arbitra-
tion. The review failed.
‘Once-and-for-all’ rule
In Shozi & others v Petcon Investments CC t/a Petcon Out-
sourcing Solutions & another [2017] 1 BLLR 54 (LC), the first
respondent (Petcon) supplied labour to the second respondent
(Unilever) in terms of a temporary employment contract. The
second respondent informed the first respondent that it was no
longer prepared to pay the employees at the prevailing hourly
rate, and offered to pay them at a reduced rate. The employees’
wages were reduced accordingly and the applicants sub-
sequently referred a ‘mutual interest’ dispute to the CCMA and
embarked on strike action. The second respondent subsequently
cancelled its TES contract with Petcon after which Petcon termi-
nated the employees’ services. The applicant referred a dis-
missal dispute to the CCMA. On review, the Labour Court found
that the dismissal should have been referred to it for adjudication.
An appeal was lodged against the review judgment and the
applicants sought relief that predated their dismissal. They
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sought to enforce payment of the higher wage rates up until the
date of their dismissal and, therefore, wished to cast the reduc-
tion in wages not as an unfair labour practice, but as a breach of
contract. The first respondent contended that the true dispute
concerned an alleged unfair labour practice, over which the
Labour Court lacked jurisdiction, and that the applicants should
have realised their present claim in their unfair dismissal dispute.
The Labour Court held that the pleaded dispute was one that fell
within its jurisdiction by virtue of section 77(3) of the BCEA and
that a litigant was entitled to frame a dispute in terms of the
statutory provision which he thinks will best assist him (para [10]).
It was not persuaded that the ‘once-and-for-all’ rule applied in this
matter as it was undesirable that disputes be decided in a
piecemeal fashion; and as the CCMA (which determined the
dismissal dispute) did not have jurisdiction to entertain a contract
law dispute in terms of section 77(3) of the BCEA, the applicants
could hardly be expected to have brought this claim ‘once-and-
for-all’ (para [12]).
The court noted that a further issue was whether the applicants
should be denied the right to pursue their contractual claim
because they had referred a mutual interest dispute to the
CCMA. A rule against changing a cause of action mid-stream is
closely related to the once-and-for-all rule in terms of which a
party who elects to pursue a matter in a particular manner is held
to that election and is confined to the fruits his or her chosen route
may yield. In light of this, the court noted that because the
applicants had been dismissed in the midst of their mutual
interest dispute, the court would have found that their ‘changing
tack was impermissible’ (para [18]). However, a countervailing
policy issue arises in cases where a dismissal interrupts the
pursuit of a matter of mutual interest. The case at hand repre-
sented one exception where allowing a party to reframe its case
mid-stream would be in the interests of fairness, as one cannot
meaningfully engage in industrial power play if already dis-
missed. The court held that it is permissible for a party who
initially sought to resolve a dispute by means of power play to
change tack and seek adjudication of the same dispute (para
[19]). The court further noted that this exception is necessary to
prevent dismissal being used cynically to avoid dealing with
demands to reverse a unilateral variation of terms and conditions,
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‘especially when a TES is involved’ (para [19]). The respondents’
points in limine were dismissed with costs.
Prescription of arbitration awards
In Myathaza v Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus Services (SOC)
Ltd t/a Metrobus & others (2017) 38 ILJ 527 (CC), 2017 (4) BCLR
473, [2017] 3 BLLR 213, the applicant employee was dismissed
for allegedly receiving money from passengers without issuing
them with tickets. After declining an invitation to plead guilty and
accept a final written warning, the employee was called to a
disciplinary hearing and dismissed in absentia. A bargaining
council arbitrator found the dismissal to be unfair and ordered the
first respondent employer to reinstate him. The employer launched
an application for review, but the matter was still pending seven
years later. When the employee finally launched an application to
enforce the award, the employer contended that the claim had
prescribed. An appeal to the Labour Appeal Court failed (para
[10]).
The employee’s application for leave to appeal to the Labour
Appeal Court was heard in two matters. In Concor Holdings (Pty)
Ltd v Mazibuko & others [2013] JOL 30655 (LC), the Labour Court
held that claims on arbitration awards prescribe after three years,
while in Cellucity (Pty) Ltd v Communications Workers Union obo
Peters [2014] 2 BLLR 172 (LC) it was held that they do not. After
the Labour Appeal Court concluded that an arbitration award is
considered to be a ‘debt’ as envisaged in the Prescription Act 68
of 1969, it proceeded to consider whether the LRA made
provision for time limits within which an award should be enforced
(para [15]). The court had to determine whether the arbitration
award is a judgment debt that will prescribe after 30 years, or a
simple debt that will prescribe after three years. The court
concluded that it was a simple debt which prescribed after three
years. Referring to section 15 of the Prescription Act, the court
came to the conclusion that the lodging of review proceedings
does not interrupt the running of prescription because review
proceedings are not considered to be a process where a creditor
claims the payment of a debt (para [16]). The court, therefore,
concluded that the arbitration award had prescribed and dis-
missed the appeal.
In order to consider whether the Prescription Act and the LRA
are inconsistent, one needs to look at section 16 of the Prescrip-
tion Act. This section recognises that there is legislation that
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regulated prescription before the implementation of the Prescrip-
tion Act. Jafta J held that the core issue raised by the appeal was
whether the award in favour of the employee had prescribed
under the Prescription Act, and the subsidiary issues were
whether the award constituted a ‘debt’ as envisaged by the
Prescription Act, and whether the running of prescription had
been interrupted by the filing of the review application (paras [19]
[21]). Jafta J emphasised that the differences between the
Prescription Act and the LRA run deep and that the twoActs differ
in what they seek to achieve and how they operate. The Prescrip-
tion Act recognises only civil courts as forums where debts may
be enforced, while the LRA recognises the CCMAand bargaining
councils as forums to resolve disputes more timeously than the
courts. The Prescription Act bars creditors from instituting legal
action within a certain period if they fail to enforce the debt, and
these periods are longer than those provided for in the LRA.
Lastly, an arbitration award issued by the CCMA or bargaining
council is considered an outcome that settles a dispute between
the parties, while the Prescription Act is applicable to a claim that
is still be determined by the court (para [21]). The Prescription
Act will not apply where the claim has been settled between the
parties, and the outcome is not binding on the parties before it is
made an order of court. The three-year period provided for in the
Prescription Act is aimed at disputes that should be determined
by a court (paras [43] [44]). It is also difficult to determine when
prescription will start to run. In terms of section 12 of the
Prescription Act it starts the moment the debt becomes due. It is
clear that section 12 of the Prescription Act is not applicable to
arbitration awards because the debt becomes due before the
dispute has been conciliated and arbitrated (para [47]). The pre-
scription, also, cannot start to run from the date of the arbitration
award because the party against whom the award was made is
afforded six weeks in which to challenge the award in terms of
section 145 of the LRA (para [47]). The judge added that section
15 of the Prescription Act supports the fact that judicial interrup-
tion relates to claims that are awaiting final judgment, or where a
judgment has been set aside, which does not accord with an
arbitration award which itself is a final and binding decision (para
[49]). Jafta J also stated that the LRA makes provision for shorter
periods within which to enforce awards. The arbitration award
may be enforced within a stipulated period as provided for in the
award, unless the award is taken on review. In terms of section
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145 of the LRA the review application should be lodged within six
weeks and heard within six months. This period may be extended
by the Labour Court on good cause shown. Where a review
application is unsuccessful the award should be enforced within
one year (para [51]). If the Prescription Act were applicable, Jafta
J added, the award could not have been enforced within that
period. The party in whose favour the award was made may then
wait three years and only enforce the award to interrupt the
running of prescription. The party may then discover that the award
may no longer be enforced under the LRA because of the long
delay. This will be the position despite the award not prescribing.
There would be no sense in applying the Prescription Act to
arbitration awards that are not enforceable under the LRA. These
awards are not enforceable (para [51]). If the Prescription Act
were to be applied to arbitration awards it would defeat the
purpose of the LRA, which makes provision for the expeditious
resolution of labour disputes. This also means that the party that
failed to challenge the arbitration award by a review application
may still rely on the Prescription Act to avoid the obligations
imposed by the arbitration award. This further undermines the
provision of six weeks within which a review application should
be made (para [52].
Jafta J emphasised that the purpose of the LRA is not to
regulate the time limits that apply to the enforcement of debts, but
rather is to give effect to sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution
(para [53]). One of the primary objects of the LRA is to resolve
labour disputes effectively, and both the CCMA and bargaining
councils are considered to be organs of state and were estab-
lished to realise the objectives of the LRA speedily and cheaply.
Awards issued by the CCMA and bargaining councils resolve
labour disputes and do not enforce debts (para [53]). Jafta J
added that a debt as provided for in the Prescription Act cannot
be reviewed or appealed against unless it is a judgment debt. A
debt in terms of the Prescription Act (save for a judgment debt)
does not earn interest unless it is by agreement between parties
to a contract, whereas an arbitration award earns interest from
the date it is made and can be reviewed under section 145 of the
LRA or appealed against under section 24(7) of the LRA (para
[55]). Jafta J held that all these differences confirmed that the
LRA is not consonant with the Prescription Act. This inconsis-
tency, Jafta J added, does not flow solely from the LRA and the
Prescription Act prescribing different prescription periods, but
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also from the fact that section 158 of the LRA empowers the
Labour Court to make an arbitration award an order of court in
order to enforce it. The application of the Prescription Act to such
awards effectively achieves the opposite outcome (para [56]).
Jafta J added that once awards prescribe they become unenforce-
able, and the Labour Court may not exercise its power to make
the award an order of court. In these circumstances, the Prescrip-
tion Act defeats the LRA process that was specifically designed
to enforce the right to fair labour practices (para [57]). Jafta J
further stated that this problem is resolved by section 210 of the
LRA, which provides that the LRA will take precedence over any
other legislation that is in conflict with it on the basis of the LRA’s
aim of promoting section 23 of the Constitution. The Prescription
Act will also prevent the Labour Court from exercising its juris-
diction established under section 158(c) of the LRA. Jafta J
reiterated that the LRA established the CCMA and bargaining
councils as some of the mechanisms for enforcing the right to fair
labour practices, and that it prescribes remedies which may be
granted to vindicate the right to fair labour practices (para [58]).
He added that if an arbitrator finds – as in the current matter – that
a dismissal was unfair, he or she must issue an award in terms of
which reinstatement of the dismissed employee may be ordered.
This award constitutes the means of enforcing the employee’s
right to fair labour practices. Jafta further stated that the LRA
requires a further step to be taken before the award may be
enforced, namely, making it an order of court. Once it has been
made an order of court, execution can be effected which
constitutes the last stage in the enforcement chain (para [58]). He
added that the Prescription Act (which is apartheid-era legisla-
tion) should not be invoked to frustrate the wishes of the
democratic Parliament set out in the LRA (para [58]). Even if the
Prescription Act were to apply, the main award granted in favour
of the applicant could not prescribe as there was no obligation to
pay money, deliver goods, or render services by Metrobus to the
applicant (para [59]). The Labour Appeal Court’s reliance on
Desai NO v Desai & others NNO 1996 (1) SA 141 (SCA), where it
was held that the word ‘debt’ means that something should or
should not be done, was overruled in Makate v Vodacom 2016 (4)
SA 121 (CC).
Jafta J then moved on to the last point to consider: section
145(9) of the LRA, which came into force in January 2015. This
section provides that an application to set aside an award will
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interrupt the running of prescription. This provision does not
apply to the present arbitration award, which was made and
challenged on review long before section 145(9) was enacted.
Jafta J noted that it was doubtful that the amendment sufficiently
supported an indication that the Prescription Act was intended to
apply to arbitration awards, and that it appeared that the amend-
ment constituted a response by Parliament to numerous deci-
sions by the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court which
had applied the Prescription Act to labour disputes and arbitra-
tion rewards (para [61]). Section 145(9) of the LRAdoes not apply
to the present proceedings and therefore the appeal to the
Constitutional Court succeeded. The review application was not
prosecuted to finality and the pleadings were closed. The Consti-
tutional Court proceeded to make the award an order of court.
Froneman J agreed with the judgment of Jafta J but disagreed
with the finding that the Prescription Act was inconsistent with the
LRA. Froneman J was of the opinion that the two Acts may very
well complement each other in a way that protects the right to
access to justice and the expeditious resolution of labour dis-
putes under the LRA (para [66]). Froneman J was also of the
opinion that it would be unfair towards an applicant if review
proceedings were instituted and the respondent then relied on
prescription. This unfairness may be resolved by the principle
that prescription will only start to run once the court proceedings
have been finalised. Both Acts may be accommodated by a
re-interpretation of the Prescription Act. The re-interpretation will
rely on four building blocks: (i) in terms of the Prescription Act
prescription will only be interrupted by the start of adjudicative
proceedings and will be interrupted until it has been concluded;
(ii) the CCMA and bargaining councils are considered to be
independent and impartial forums that may resolve matters by
applying the law; (iii) the institution of claims before the CCMA is
considered to be adjudicative proceedings and will interrupt
prescription; and (iv) review proceedings are considered to fulfil
the same role to finalise court proceedings as an appeal (para
[68]). In terms of section 15(1) of the Prescription Act, it is
important to determine whether the commencement of proceed-
ings in the CCMA is regarded as a ‘process’ in terms of the LRA,
and whether a claim before the CCMA is considered a ‘debt’. It is
difficult to determine the meaning of ‘debt’. According to Frone-
man J the word should be considered in close harmony with the
demands set out in section 34 of the Constitution. In light of this
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section, the starting point will be that it should be a claim that can
be resolved by the application of the law. In other words, this
means that in order to qualify as a ‘debt’ it should be a claim for
the enforcement of any legal obligation (para [78]). These
obligations are generally regarded as an obligation to do some-
thing, or an obligation not to do something. They usually entail an
execution by warrant of execution for outstanding amounts,
contempt of court proceedings, or an order to do or refrain from
doing something. As regards whether a referral of an unfair
dismissal dispute constitutes a ‘debt’ as envisaged in section
15(1) of the PrescriptionAct, the court held that a claim to enforce
a legal obligation will qualify as a ‘debt’ as envisaged by the
Prescription Act (para [79]). An unfair dismissal may place three
possible legal obligations on an employer: compensation, re-
employment, or reinstatement. In each of these cases there is an
obligation on the employer to do something. Therefore, they can
be considered to fall within the meaning of the word ‘debt’ as
envisaged by the Prescription Act (para [79]). According to
Froneman J, the process commencing the proceedings in the
CCMA serves to interrupt the running of prescription as envis-
aged in section 15 of the Prescription Act. It is a common
principle that the running of prescription should not commence
until court proceedings have been finalised. It may then also be
considered that the institution of review proceedings extends the
finalisation of the judgment (para [83]). There is no statutory time
limit for the lodging of a common-law review as is the case with
appeals. The position for the review of arbitration awards under
the LRA differs vastly from the common-law position. The lodging
of a review application interrupts prescription as envisaged by
section 15(1) of the Prescription Act. Until the review application
has been finalised, prescription cannot run. According to Frone-
man J, the new section 145(9) of the LRA provides that the
lodging of a review application will interrupt the running of
prescription (para [88]). An alternative may be that an opposition
to the review application may be considered as a further interrup-
tion of the running of prescription, as the respondent may have a
defence to the claim. A defence to a claim is also considered to
be the commencement of a process for the payment of a debt as
envisaged by section 15(1) of the Prescription Act. An arbitration
award may further be considered a judgment debt. Irrespective
of which way the arguments are directed, the applicant’s claim
cannot prescribe until the review application has been finalised.
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The 30-day time period for the referral of unfair dismissal disputes
is a time-bar clause and is not the same as the normal prescrip-
tion periods in the Prescription Act. These time-bars are not seen
as replacing the prescription periods in the Prescription Act. To
replace the time limits as envisaged in the LRAwill undermine the
speedy resolution of disputes. There is no reason why these
situations under the LRA should be reinvented (para [96]).
Zondo J (concurringwith Jafta J) consideredwhether the Prescrip-
tion Act applied to unfair dismissal disputes under the LRA. If the
answer is that it does not apply, the appeal in the matter should
succeed. If the answer is that it does apply, the next question is
whether the arbitration award should be deemed a ‘debt’ as
envisaged by section 11(d) of the PrescriptionAct. If not, that would
be the end of thematter and the appeal must succeed. If the answer
was positive, the next question is whether that debt had prescribed
by the time the applicant instituted an application in the Labour
Court to have the arbitration award made an order of that court. If it
had prescribed, the appeal fell to be dismissed, and if it had not
prescribed, the appeal stood to succeed (para [99]).
Zondo J also considered whether an arbitration award is
considered to be a ‘debt’. If section 11 of the Prescription Act is
properly read, it is clear that all the debts listed are debts where
there has as yet been no judgment to determine whether the
debtor has any liability for the debt. This means that debts other
than a judgment debt are in respect of instances where no
proceedings have been instituted to determine the liability of the
debtor for the debt. For prescription to start running, the debt
should be due, and the debt should be due before the proceed-
ings may be instituted to recover it. For example, a summons
cannot be issued before the debt becomes due and payable.
Section 15 of the Prescription Act is vitally important to the
application of the Prescription Act to unfair dismissal disputes.
This section clearly deals with judicial interruption. Consequently,
it must involve a judicial process, which we understand to mean a
court process. From this section, it can be seen that the running
of prescription will only be interrupted by a court process that will
lead to a judgment by a court. According to Zondo J prescription
can only be interrupted in one of two ways: either by the debtor or
by the creditor. Interruption by the debtor will take place where he
or she acknowledges liability, and by the creditor when he or she
institutes proceedings and claims payment from the debtor (para
[112]).
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In the current matter, it was contended that the applicant had
failed to lodge the review application within three years which
would have interrupted the prescription of the arbitration award.
Section 15(1) of the Prescription Act, however, is not a true
reflection because a review application in terms of section
158(1)(c), is not a process where the applicant claims payment of
a debt. The debt as envisaged by section 11(d) of the Prescrip-
tion Act is a debt which will be interrupted by the service of a
process in which payment is claimed. The three-year period will
also apply to such a debt. This debt does not include an
arbitration award. The Prescription Act reveals three important
principles. The first is that once the debt is due the prescription
will start to run. Secondly, the running of prescription should be
interrupted before it runs for the entire period of prescription.
Thirdly, in the event that the creditor fails to interrupt the running
of prescription and the debtor does not acknowledge his or her
liability, the debt will be considered to have prescribed. The debt
will then be extinguished by the running of prescription. Zondo J
did not agree with Froneman J that the Prescription Act plays a
role in the LRA dispute resolution system (para [131]). The LRA
dispute resolution system is a special stand-alone dispute resolu-
tion system with its own prescribed periods within which various
steps are required to be taken. It is a system for specific disputes
and is based on special processes and principles underlying the
LRA, which were specially created for their appropriateness to
that system (para [131]). The Prescription Act, with its own
prescription periods, has no application between the dismissals
and the handing down of a judgment if the Labour Court makes
an arbitration award an order of that court. When an employee
is dismissed and seeks to institute civil action for wrongful
or unlawful dismissal in the civil courts to secure damages or
reinstatement, or for an order declaring that the dismissal is
unlawful, invalid and of no legal force and effect, the Prescription
Act may be applicable. It, however, finds no application if the
employee seeks to refer a dismissal dispute to the CCMA or a
bargaining council for conciliation.
There are a number of reasons why the Prescription Act
does not apply between the dismissal and the final step in the
LRA dispute resolution system. The first statutory step in the LRA
dispute resolution system concerning dismissal disputes is the
referral of a dismissal dispute to either the CCMA or a bargaining
council for conciliation, and the last step is either a judgment of
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the Labour Court in regard to a dismissal dispute in respect of
which that court has jurisdiction, or an order of the court making
an arbitration award an order of that court if the dispute is one that
has to be referred to arbitration after an unsuccessful conciliation
process (paras [131] [132]). Zondo J added that a dismissed
employee has no right to sit back and do nothing about his or her
dismissal dispute until just before the expiry of three years. If the
Prescription Act applies to the LRAdispute resolution system, but
a dismissed employee is not able to enjoy this benefit which a
creditor in the civil courts enjoys, namely, of not needing to do
anything for close on three years before commencing proceed-
ings, what benefit does the application of the Prescription Act to
the LRA dispute resolution system bring for employees? This
comparison of the situation of a dismissed employee who wishes
to sue in the civil courts to recover his or her debt shows a clear
conflict between the LRA and the Prescription Act, at least in
respect of the period from the date of dismissal to the date of the
judgment or order of the Labour Court (para [139]).
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LABOUR LAW: INDIVIDUAL
JACQUI MEYER*
LEGISLATION
The proposed National Minimum Wage Act, 2017, the Labour
Relations Amendment Bill, 2017, and the Basic Conditions of
Employment Amendment Bill, 2017, were all tabled for delibera-
tion and public comment in 2017. The most salient amendments
that have been proposed are set out briefly below.
National Minimum Wage
During February 2017, an agreement was reached to set a new
national minimum wage at R20 per hour worked or approximately
R3 500 for an employee who works 45 hours per week. The
purpose is both to protect vulnerable employees and, at the
same time, to avoid job losses. Other interventions include a new
code of good practice for collective bargaining, industrial action
and picketing, and other measures aimed at mitigating violent
and lengthy strikes. Section 51 of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA) provides that the Minister
of Labour may make a sectoral determination establishing basic
conditions of employment for employees in a sector and area.
This includes minimum wages. Sectoral determinations are in
place in areas of economic activity where labour has been
deemed vulnerable. Once the Minimum Wage Act becomes
operational, sectoral agreements, collective agreements, bargain-
ing council agreements, and employment contracts must comply
and be aligned with the Minimum Wage Act, 2017.
To accommodate entrepreneurship, the Basic Conditions of
Employment Amendment Bill, 2017, provides for exemptions of
up to twelve months from the national minimum wage for start-up
businesses and small and medium-sized enterprises.
Labour Laws Amendment Bill
This is the first private member bill to be passed by the South
African Parliament. The Labour Laws Amendment Bill, 2017
* LLB (UP) LLM (UNISA). Programme Manager of the School of Law of Varsity
College of the Independent Institute of Education (Pty) Ltd, registered with the
Department of Higher Education and Training as a private higher education
institution under the Higher Education Act 1997 (reg no 2007/HE07/002), com-
pany registration number 1987/004754/07.
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(B 29–2017), was passed by the National Assembly in November
2017. It provides for unpaid paternity leave, adoption leave, and
surrogacy leave for all employees who do not qualify for maternity
leave.
As this Bill is gender neutral it is of great significance in terms of
recognising the rights of the Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
and Intersex communities. The Bill also seeks to limit strike action
to prevent violent strikes. It makes provisions for the resolution of
strike disputes through arbitration awards at the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA).
Unemployment Insurance Amendment Bill
The Unemployment Insurance Amendment Bill (the UI Bill) was
passed in January 2017 but is yet to come into operation. The UI
Bill aims to improve service delivery by the Unemployment
Insurance Fund (the UIF). Under the UI Bill, persons employed
under learnerships as contemplated in the Skills Development
Act 97 of 1998, and their employers, government employees, and
fixed-term workers who are required to leave South Africa on
expiry of their terms of employment, will now benefit from the UIF
as it is unconstitutional to do otherwise.
The UI Bill will also enable the Minister of Labour to vary both
the minimum and maximum Income Replacement Rates without
the need to approach Parliament.
CASE LAW
WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE?
The applicant in National Bargaining Council for the Clothing
Manufacturing Industry (KZN) v Glamour Fashions Worker Primary
Co-operative Limited & others (2017) 38 ILJ 1849 (LC) was a
bargaining council (BC) registered in terms of section 29 of the
Labour RelationsAct 66 of 1995 (the LRA). The respondents were
worker co-operatives, registered in terms of section 7 of the
Co-OperativesAct 14 of 2005 (the COA). Whitcher J was required
to determine whether the COA enjoys precedence over the
provisions of the LRA because of the operation of section 210 of
the LRA. If indeed this was found to be the case, it would mean
that the members of worker co-operatives who would otherwise
fall outside of the definition of ‘employee’ in section 213 of the
LRA would be employees for the purposes of the LRA, and that
the co-operatives and their members are bound by the LRA. The
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necessity for the declarator arose from a dispute after the
proliferation in the registration of worker co-operatives in the
clothing manufacturing industry falling within the BC’s registered
scope. This affected individuals who had previously been engaged
as employees by companies that were converted into worker
co-operatives, but that for all other purposes operated no differ-
ently from the way they did before. This raised a jurisdictional
question: Did the proliferation have the effect of circumventing
the application of the LRA, and the BC’s main collective agree-
ments?
Whitcher J held (para [21]) that looking at the definition of
‘employee’ in the LRA, it is not self-evident that all members of
workers’ co-operatives are employees. Also, the judge held that
any declaration she might make regarding the LRA’s precedence
over the COA would apply to those members of sham co-
operatives who are in fact employees as defined in the LRA only.
The COA appears to regulate work of another variety: the mere
fact that co-operative members are employed, or receive remu-
neration, is not sufficient for the LRA to cast its net over them. The
nature of the relationship between the parties performing co-
operative work on the one hand, and directing and paying for it
on the other, must be considered (para [22]). If the relationship
between the parties to production transcends the traditional
employment hierarchies, where those providing their labour also
jointly own the enterprise, share in any surplus, and have a
democratic say in the running of the operation, then the labour
legislation should not, and does not, apply (para [22]). Should the
situation arise where the termination of the membership of a
member is sought, that member has democratic channels at his
or her disposal to resist this outcome. He or she also has the right
to be heard in terms of the COA (Items 4 and 5 of Sch 1, Part 2).
Given that the nature of a member’s relationship with others in a
legitimate co-operative is based on voluntary association under-
pinned by democratic decision-making, the substantive and
procedural protection in the LRA against unfair dismissal is out of
place. Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), illustrates that sensitivity to the
spirit, purport, and object of the Bill of Rights does not inexorably
lead to an interpretation of ‘employee’ in the LRA which extends
the reach of labour law over as many varieties of work as
reasonably possible. A countervailing freedom is also at play in
declaring that joint owners of a workers’ co-operative are not, in
substance, employees (para [32]).
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Whitcher J found that members of a legitimate workers’ co-
operative do not fall under the definition of ‘employee’ in the LRA
for reasons arrived at on a constitutionally sound interpretation of
the statutes concerned. The Labour Court held that a court is
unable to issue a blanket declaratory order stipulating that all
workers’ co-operatives are subject to the LRA. The LRA applies
only to ‘employees’, as defined. There is also no direct a priori
conflict between the LRA and the COA, as these laws serve
different purposes: the COA seeks to create and regulate a new
variety of economic enterprise in which members work with
others for mutual gain; while the LRA is not suited to regulate this
form of enterprise and does not apply to them (para [39]).
Whether Uber drivers qualify as ‘employees’ for purposes of
the application of the LRA was also considered in 2017. In Uber
South Africa Technological Services (Pty) Ltd and NUPSAW and
SATAWU obo Morekure & others [2018] 4 BLLR 399 (LC), (2018)
39 ILJ 903, it was found that Uber drivers are indeed ‘employees’.
The respondent employees, Uber drivers, after having been
‘deactivated’, referred unfair dismissal disputes to the CCMA for
conciliation and arbitration. However, before the merits could be
heard, Uber South Africa Technological Services (Pty) Ltd (Uber
SA), the alleged ‘employer’, raised a point in limine challenging
the CCMA’s jurisdiction to hear the disputes on the basis that the
Uber drivers were not ‘employees’ of either Uber BV, its holding
company, which is registered in the Netherlands, or its subsidiary,
Uber SA.
The court applied the ‘realities of the relationship’ test which
includes the ‘dominant impression’ test. The court noted that this
approach is underscored by the ‘Code of Good Practice: Who is
an employee?’ (para [9]). In applying the test, the presiding
officer must consider all the circumstances and reach a conclu-
sion based on the realities of the relationship between the parties.
Having considered the facts, the court concluded that Uber
drivers are economically dependent on the use of the app and on
their ability to drive para [48]).
The agreement concluded between each driver and Uber SA
indicates that the driver is an ‘independent contractor’. Therefore,
several factors indicative of and opposing the premise that Uber
drivers are ‘employees’ had to be weighed up. Factors in favour
of a conclusion that they are employees include: (a) Uber drivers
are expected to perform their services personally; (b) the fare is
paid by the passenger to Uber, who then pays the driver; (c) Uber
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SAmonitors the performance of the drivers and requires a certain
performance standard (if the performance standards are not
improved after Uber’s instructions to do so, the driver is after a
simple notification, ‘deactivated’ para [3]); (d) Uber controls the
drivers’ performance and there is a negotiated incentive scheme.
Factors indicative of a relationship other than an employment
relationship include: (a) the drivers control their own level of
activity; (b) there are no minimum hours that the drivers are
required to drive per day; (c) the drivers are free to accept or
reject potential rides; and (d) the drivers are not required to drive
an Uber vehicle at all times.
The agreement concluded between Uber SA and each driver
indicates that the law of the Netherlands applies to the relation-
ship, and that disputes must be arbitrated by the International
Chamber of Commerce for Mediation and Arbitration. Moreover,
the Uber app is provided to the drivers by the holding company.
This, Uber SA argued, bolsters its argument that as subsidiary of
Uber in the Netherlands, it is not the employer of the employees in
South Africa.
The appellant in Vermooten v Department of Public Enterprises
& others (2017) 38 ILJ 607 (LAC), [2017] 6 BLLR 606 appealed
against a judgment of the Labour Court delivered by Fourie AJ.
He had reviewed and set aside an award providing that the
appellant was an employee of the Department of Public Enter-
prises (the DPE).
During the interview it was stated by the DPE that the Personnel
and Salary Information System (the remuneration system applied
by a state department such as the DPE, known as PERSAL) did
not allow for the remuneration amount that appellant sought. The
appellant suggested that the remuneration issue could be solved
by approaching it as a specialist function because the DPE had
in its service several specialists who operated outside of the
formal structure. The appellant would be obliged to submit a
monthly invoice to receive payment and be paid in accordance
with the rules set for the PERSAL system (para [10]). The
appellant accepted the contract. The appellant testified that he
took the lead for the DPE in several transactions, including routine
matters and those relating to the annual business plan of the
South African Airways (the SAA). He was engaged in the monthly
monitoring of the SAA and of its quarterly reports. He was also
involved in financial transactions. He reported to the Deputy
Director-General of the DPE. His reports were supervised and
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edited by the Deputy Director-General. He was provided with a
cell phone, a 3G card, and a computer. Staff and files were
allocated to him and he was required to apply for leave. He did
not receive a pension or medical aid, but income tax at 25 per
cent was deducted from his remuneration. He was at times
designated as an acting Deputy Director-General in submissions
to Parliament.
The appellant referred a dispute to the Bargaining Council
concerning a unilateral variation of his employment contract, but
in the arbitration, he alleged that he had been unfairly dismissed.
At the commencement of the arbitration, the DPE raised a point in
limine that the appellant was not an employee of the DPE, but an
independent contractor, and that the Bargaining Council lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The question whether an
applicant is an employee is a jurisdictional fact that must be
determined, in the event of a dispute, by a competent court. On
what facts must this decision be made? In referring to Distinctive
Choice 721 CC t/a Husan Panel Beaters v The Dispute Resolution
Centre (Motor Industry Bargaining Council) & others (2013) 34
ILJ 3184 (LC), Landman JA held that the Labour Court deter-
mines the question of jurisdiction based on the evidence before it
(para [7]).
Landman JA observed that, unlike the private sector, a state
department like the DPE may not remunerate employees as it
sees fit. The doctrine of legality and legislation dictate that only
the prescribed remuneration may be paid. A civil servant may
only be remunerated through the PERSAL system. The PERSAL
also functions as a means of ensuring that state departments
abide by the law as regards the remuneration of their officials.
There were several legitimate ways for the DPE to utilise the
special knowledge and experience of the appellant. The two
methods that the DPE considered were: to employ the appellant
as an employee on a contract basis; or as a consultant on a
different contract (para [21]). The appellant declined the first
option because he was still not satisfied with the amount of the
remuneration that he would receive given his qualifications and
level of expertise. The DPE wished to acquire his labour and
expertise, but it was not legally possible to remunerate him on a
salary scale other than the one prescribed by the PERSAL
system. The DPE accepted the appellant’s suggestion that he be
appointed as a consultant at a higher rate than that applicable to
the post envisaged. The appellant was clearly in a good bargain-
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ing position and able to influence his rate of remuneration. Finally,
there can be no doubt that the appellant and the DPE consciously
and deliberately elected to structure their relationship as one
other than an employment relationship. And there is nothing
wrong with this (Universal Church of the Kingdom of God v Myeni
& others [2015] 9 BLLR 918 (LAC), (2015) 36 ILJ 2832 para [25]).
See, too, LL Kubjana & B Khumalo ‘A rose by any other name
would smell as sweet: Universal Church of the Kingdom of God v
Myeni and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 2832 (LAC)’, (2017) 29/1 SAMerc
LJ 140.
The court confirmed that where the employer and employee
are in a relatively equal bargaining position and elect one
relationship over another, legal effect should be given to their
choice. The appellant now sought to be defined as an employee,
but this election did not correlate with the reality. The appellant
wished to become part of an organisation which could not, and
still cannot, accommodate him at his desired remuneration level
(para [26]).
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
Incorporation of terms in a collective agreement in employment contracts
The question before Tlaletsi AJP in the Labour Appeal Court
matter of Imperial Cargo Solutions v SATAWU & others (2017) 38
ILJ 2479 (LAC), [2017] 12 BLLR 1189, was to determine whether
ancillary duties, contained in a collective agreement, were incor-
porated into the employment contracts of employees and sur-
vived cancellation of that collective agreement. Tlaletsi AJP held
that to hold employees to the ancillary obligations in these
circumstances, the parties must have specifically agreed to it.
This had not been done, so the ancillary duties fell away, as did
the employer’s duty to pay the workers for performing these
duties when the collective agreement was cancelled.
As to whether the obligation to perform the ancillary duties
terminated with cancellation of the collective agreement, Imperial
Cargo relied on SA Municipal Workers Union v City of Tshwane &
another (2014) 35 ILJ 241 (LC) (SAMWU). It was argued that the
ancillary duties had been incorporated in the individual employ-
ment contracts. In any event, it was argued, the ancillary duties
were not additional to the duties of the employees in the main
agreement. It was contended that in accordance with the SAMWU
judgment, the ancillary duties would form part of the employees’
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contracts of employment and remain applicable unless it was
provided, expressly or by implication, that upon cancellation an
obligation would fall away. Without deciding the correctness of
the ratio in SAMWU, Tlaletsi AJP noted that the case was
distinguishable from the case under consideration in both its
facts and circumstances.
The ancillary duties were not additional. On the evidence they
were not part of the normal duties of the employees who were
remunerated separately for performing them. There was no other
agreement creating an obligation to perform the ancillary duties
(para [20]). The employees were entitled to cancel the collective
agreement on notice. The obligation to perform ancillary duties
was based solely on the collective agreement. Therefore, the
Labour Court had correctly held that the employees were not
obliged to perform the ancillary duties. The appeal was dis-
missed with costs.
Breach of contract
The employees, in-house counsel representing the employer in
litigation upon briefings of the State Attorneys, had to be moved
to different positions in the employer’s various departments
pursuant to a transformation process. The employees were not
comfortable with the proposed move. After they failed to fill the
new posts that they were transferred to, they were informed that
the employer would be deducting certain amounts from their
salaries as they had not manned their new posts. The employees
subsequently initiated the application in Mpanza & another v
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Correc-
tional Services & others (2017) 38 ILJ 1675 (LC), [2017] 10 BLLR
1062. The Labour Court was required to determine whether the
placement made by the employer was lawful in terms of section
15 of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 (the PSA), and whether
the deductions made by the employer followed section 34 of the
BCEA read with section 34 of the PSA. The employer contended
that the employees were not entitled to remuneration because
they had not reported for duty at the material times. Therefore, it
claimed, the corresponding duty to pay remuneration did not
apply. On the evidence, the deductions were made solely on the
basis that the employees had failed to honour their secondment
or temporary placements to the new units. Therefore, they were
absent from duty. The employees argued that they had always
honored their contractual obligations, but that their contracts of
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employment had been changed unilaterally by the employer
through its secondment or temporary placement. In the process
of balancing the probabilities and selecting one conclusion which
seemed to be the more natural and plausible, Cele J found that
the employer’s version was compelling and that the employees
had failed to tender their services as regularly as they had to in
terms of their contract of employments (para [29]); Coin Security
(Cape) v Vukani Guards & Allied Workers’ Union, 1989 (4) SA 234
(C) 230I). The employees were not legally entitled to refuse to
carry out their side of the employment contract. In fact, they were
in breach of their employment contract by unlawfully failing to
perform their obligations. As to whether the employer could
deduct amounts from the employees’ salaries, Cele J considered
the procedure that the employer had followed against the pre-
scripts in the BCEAand the PSA. He concluded that the employer
had indeed followed a fair procedure. It had provided the
employees with a reasonable opportunity to show why the
deductions should not be made, to which they had responded
(para [35]). Consequently, the employers had followed a fair
procedure in making the deductions against the salaries of the
applicants (para [36]).
Dispute resolution mechanism in contract
Professional football is conducted internationally under the
auspices of the International Federation of Association Football
(FIFA) and the South African Football Association (SAFA). SAFA is
an affiliate of FIFA. The National Soccer League of South Africa
(the NLS) is the Association of Professional Clubs and a special
member of SAFA. The employer in the matter of SAFPU & others v
Free State Stars Football Club (Pty) Ltd (2017) 38 ILJ 1111 (LAC)
is a member of the NSL and was at all material times bound by its
constitution, read with the constitutions of SAFA and FIFA (the
Football Rules). The appellants were professional football players
who had concluded fixed-term contracts of employment with the
employer, a professional football club. They were employees as
defined in terms of the LRA and professional footballers as
contemplated in the ‘Employee Handbook’ and the Football Rules
were incorporated into their contracts. The employees referred a
dispute to the CCMA alleging that they had been unfairly dis-
missed for operational reasons. Meanwhile, they referred an
application to the Labour Court claiming outstanding and owing
payments. The employer contended that the dispute should have
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been referred to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the NSL (the
Chamber) as agreed to in their contracts of employment, and that
the employees were not entitled to the any of the payments they
claimed or, in the alternative, that they had referred the dispute to
the Labour Court prematurely. The employer sought an order for
the stay of the proceedings in the Labour Court pending the
outcome of proceedings in the Chamber. In this regard, and for
purposes of determining the appropriate forum for a dispute, the
employer intended to rely on the NSL Constitution, the National
Soccer League Football Rules, the employment contracts of the
applicant employees, and the Constitution of the South African
National Bargaining Chamber for the Sport of Professional Foot-
ball.
Landman JA of the Labour Appeal Court found that the Labour
Court had considered aspects which arose from the contractual
obligation (para [23]). The Labour Appeal Court judge stayed the
employees’ referral and ordered them to refer the dispute to
arbitration in the dispute resolution forum as indicated in their
contract of employment. The court reasoned that only in excep-
tional circumstances may a Labour Court exempt the employees
from complying with an agreement to refer a dispute to the
dispute resolution forum agreed upon. The Labour Court has a
discretion in this regard, and the Labour Appeal Court may only
interfere with the decision if the exercise of the discretion is
irrational, capricious, or unreasonable (Trencon Construction
(Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South
Africa Limited & another 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC), 2015 (10) BCLR
1199 para [83]; and Clipsal Australia (Pty) Ltd & others v Gap
Distributors & others 2010 (2) SA 289 (SCA)). Landman JA
pointed out that the evidentiary burden rests on the party who
institutes the legal proceedings (Kathmer Investments (Pty) Ltd v
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 1970 (2) SA 498 (A) 504H; Universiteit van
Stellenbosch v JA Louw (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 321 (A)). The
discretion of the court to refuse arbitration may only be exercised
when a ‘very strong case’ is made out (Rhodesian Railways Ltd v
Mackintosh 1932 AD 359, 375; National Bargaining Council for
the Road Freight Industry & another v Carl Bank Mining Contracts
(Pty) Ltd & another (2012) 33 ILJ 1808 (LAC) para [34]).
Moreover, there should be ‘compelling reasons’ for refusing to
hold a party to a contractual undertaking to have a dispute
resolved by arbitration (Metallurgical and Commercial Consult-
ants (Pty) Ltd v Metal Sales Co (Pty) Ltd 1971 (2) SA388 (W)). The
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court must also be satisfied that ‘there is no sufficient reason why
the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with
the agreement’ (Metallurgical and Commercial Consultants (Pty)
Ltd v Metal Sales Co (Pty) Ltd relying on Bristol Corporation v
John Aird & Co 1913AC (HL (E)) 241, 252–257, 260). It was found
that in casu the process prescribed for dispute resolution before
the Council was more onerous and prejudicial to the individual
employees than is a referral to the Labour Court. Making use of
the dispute resolution mechanisms as provided for in the LRA is
not only cheaper for the employees, but resolving the dispute in
this fashion would also be far more expedient than following the
process before the Council. For these reasons, the Labour Court
was found to be more suitable than the dispute resolution forum
prescribed in the agreements. This was deemed sufficient to
qualify as exceptional circumstances warranting interference in
the exercise of its discretion by the Labour Court. Landman JA
upheld the appeal and the employees were directed to proceed
with their dispute in the Labour Court.
Collective agreements
Tlaletsi DJP in Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd v National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo Members (2017) 38 ILJ
926 (LAC) had to decide whether the employees in this case
were bound to the terms of the Main Agreement concluded
between the parties to the Metal and Engineering Industries
Bargaining Council (the MEIBC). The consequences of a finding
that they were bound would be that the employer had acquired
the right to implement lay-offs and short-time affecting the
workers (paras [1] [12] [18]). A finding to the contrary would
mean that the employer would not be in a position to do so.
The Labour Court (Nkutha-Nkontwana AJ) essentially found
that the employer’s business operation was clearly excluded
from the MainAgreement and, as a result, its unilateral implemen-
tation of the lay-off and short-time provisions was unlawful. On
appeal, the Labour Appeal Court considered whether the Main
Agreement expressly excluded enterprises engaged in the pro-
duction of iron and/or steel and/or ferro-alloys from its applica-
tion. As the employer’s operations fell within these exclusions, the
Main Agreement would not be applicable to it. However, in other
proceedings between the same parties unrelated to the case
under consideration, it had been assumed that the employer was
bound by the Main Agreement. In addition, the parties had
712 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 12 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/21−Labour−Law−Individual
concluded a collective agreement, termed ‘Agreement on Condi-
tions of Employment’, which expressly marked the provisions of
the Main Agreement relating to the conditions, as well as those
relating to wage increases, applicable to the parties. Tlaletsi DJP,
after considering subsequent documents concluded between
the parties which spoke to the Main Agreement and collective
agreement, decided that the parties were bound by the terms of
the Main Agreement and the Labour Court had misdirected itself
in finding to the contrary.
Restraint of trade
The urgent application in Aquatan (Pty) Ltd v Janse Van Vuuren
& another (2017) 38 ILJ 2730 (LC) concerned an order to enforce
a restraint-of-trade agreement in terms of which the employee
agreed to refrain from accepting employment from a competitor
of the employer for a period of three years after termination of his
employment. The restraint that the employer sought to enforce
was unlimited in practical terms, notwithstanding that the restraint
agreement referred to defined territories: the Republic of South
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.
Ultimately, Whitcher J found that the degree of restriction was not
reasonable and rational (paras [27] [43]). The question, however,
was whether the information that the employee had acquired
while working at Aquatan (Pty) Ltd was worthy of protection and
qualified as trade secrets, and whether the information that he
had at his disposal would place him in a position to take
advantage of the employer’s trade connections.
Whether knowledge acquired constitutes trade secrets worthy
of protection was considered in Experian SA (Pty) Ltd v Haynes &
another (2013) 34 ILJ 529 (GSJ). In Experian SA it was held that
this is a question of fact. For information to qualify as confidential,
it must ‘be capable of application in the trade or industry, that is, it
must be useful and not be public knowledge and property; known
only to a restricted number of people or a close circle; and be of
economic value to the person seeking to protect it’ (para [19]).
The employee’s technical skills, and the experience he had
gained whilst employed, enabled him to give whoever employs
him next a competitive advantage in marketing their services and
drafting attractive tender proposals. This ability, however, has a
value without reference to any of the employer’s secrets. It is an
ability to apply general technical knowledge and experience
strategically to the advantage of an employer and does not
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belong to the employer. As stated by the Labour Appeal Court in
Labournet (Pty) Ltd v Jankielsohn & another (2017) 38 ILJ 1302
(LAC), [2017] 5 BLLR 466:
Even if an employer spent time and effort and money to train or ‘skill’
an employee in a particular area of work the employer has no
proprietary hold on the employee, or his, or her, knowledge, skills and
experience, even if those were acquired at that employer.
Turning to the issue of customer connections, in Rawlins v
Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) it was held that
whether there is an attachment between an employee and
customers to an extent that the employee would be able to
induce those customers to follow him or her to another company,
is a question of fact. Each case differs and various factors come
into play, including the particular employee’s duties, his or her
personality, the frequency of his or her contact with clients, the
duration of such contact, what knowledge the employee gained
of their requirements and business, the general nature of the
relationship the employee had with clients, whether the employee
is involved in canvassing of customers, and whether any custom-
ers were lost after the employee left his or her employment. This is
clearly not a closed list (para [24]). See also Northern Office
Microcomputers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein [1981] 4 All SA 509, 1981
(4) SA 123 (C); Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson [1992] 4 All SA 275
(W), 1992 (3) SA 520). In Automotive Tooling Systems (Pty) Ltd v
Wilkens 2007 (2) SA 271 (SCA) 282E–G, it was held that, even
though it is difficult to distinguish between the employee’s use of
his or her own knowledge, skill, and experience, and of his or her
employer’s trade secrets, it is accepted that an employee cannot
be prevented from using what is in his or her head. Whitcher J
found that the employer in the case under consideration had a
protectable interest on the ground of confidentiality in that he had
knowledge of the company’s products and costings. including its
mark-up or margin policies, overhead costs, and supplier-pricing
arrangements (para [23]). Nonetheless, the application was
dismissed with costs as it was found that the employee had
discharged the onus of showing that the restraint of trade
provisions in his contract were unenforceable. Even on the
request for only partial enforcement of the restraint period,
Whitcher J referred to Henred Freuhauf (Pty) Ltd v Davel &
another (2011) 32 ILJ 618 (LC), where Lagrange J correctly
cautioned against the development of a practice in terms of
which wide-ranging restraints are drafted, only to be reformulated
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into more reasonable restrictions when the matter comes to court
(para [23]).
In another case heard in 2017, the High Court had to consider
whether a restraint of trade agreement is transferrable in terms of
section 197 of the LRA after a business has been sold as a going
concern. Pillay J, presiding in Laser Junction (Pty) Ltd v Fick
(2017) 38 ILJ 2675 (KZD), found that section 197 of the LRA does
not permit a transfer of agreements other than contracts of
employment, unless they are favourable to the employee. The
reasoning is that the purpose of section 197 is to protect
employees (para [29]).
Laser CNC (Pty) Ltd employed Fick (the employee) from 2010
as an internal sales clerk. After he had completed three months’
probation, the employee signed a Memorandum of Agreement of
Secrecy and Restraint. Three months later, the parties concluded
a contract of employment which also prohibited the employee
from using confidential information ‘not only for the currency of
[that] agreement, but for an indefinite period after its termination
as well’ (para [2]). Laser Junction (Pty) Ltd purchased the
business of Laser CNC as a going concern, Laser Junction (Pty)
Ltd (Laser Junction). The employee signed a new contract of
employment with Laser Junction. Later he was promoted from a
sales position to a position in procurement. After employees
working at Laser Junction were offered voluntary retrenchment
packages and it became evident that the business was going
under, the employee started sending out his curriculum vitae to
secure alternative employment. By the beginning of February
2017, although having received no job offers, the employee
resigned. In his letter of resignation, he indicated that his services
would end on 28 February 2017, and that he would take eighteen
days’ leave. On the same day, the employee accepted an offer for
a position at Pinion and Adams (Pty) Ltd with effect from 1 March
2017. Laser Junction contacted the employee again in May 2017
and made him an improved offer of employment, which he
rejected. In retaliation, Laser Junction sought an order in the High
Court preventing the employee from acting in contravention of the
restraint of trade agreement, arguing that when it bought the
business from Laser CNC, all the contracts, including the restraint
agreement, were transferred to it.
The employee argued that the new contract of employment he
had signed with Laser Junction superseded the previous agree-
ment with Laser CNC, and that the new contract did not contain a
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restraint of trade. Although the employee was unable to provide
the full terms of the new contract of employment, the court noted
that this did not prove that no contract existed. Significantly,
Laser Junction failed to prove that any of its other serving and
departed employees were under a restraint, which fortified the
impression that the employee was not restrained. Moreover,
the restraint agreement applied specifically to the employee in
his position of internal sales clerk as he then was. Therefore, no
restraint agreement was in force in February 2016. As a limitation
of fundamental rights, a restraint agreement must be strictly
construed. The restraint of trade lapsed either when the business
was transferred as a going concern and a new contract was
concluded, or when the employee was promoted from a sales
position to procurement. In the result, the application was dis-
missed with costs.
In Labournet (Pty) Ltd v Jankielsohn & another (2017) 38 ILJ
1302 (LAC), [2017] 5 BLLR 466, Coppin JA heard an appeal
against an order handed down by Prinsloo J in the Labour Court.
Prinsloo J had dismissed an urgent application brought by the
appellant to enforce a restraint agreement against its employee
at the time, and to interdict the second respondent from employ-
ing the employee. On appeal, the Labour Court’s judgment was
upheld, and the appeal dismissed on the following grounds.
Coppin JA reiterated the principles laid down in Magna Alloys
and Research SA (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1994 (4) SA 574 (A). A restraint
of trade is reasonable and enforceable only if it serves to protect
an interest. Consequently, the reasonableness and enforceability
of a restraint depends on the nature of the activity sought to be
restrained, the purpose of the restraint, the duration of the
restraint, the area of the restraint, and the parties’ respective
bargaining positions. Because the right of a citizen freely to
choose a trade, occupation, or profession is constitutionally
protected, the onus to prove the ‘reasonableness’ of a restraint
might well have been affected.
In this case the employee held a junior position, which meant
that he could not have access to confidential documents and
tools used for work, besides those available to the public via the
internet. Also, the employee had no special attachments to the
employer’s clients. The employer could not prove that its relation-
ship with its clients was being endangered as the employee had
started working for the competitor. Overall, the employer could
not prove that it had any interests requiring protection. The court
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restated that an employee cannot be interdicted or restrained
from taking away his or her experience, skills, or knowledge, even
if they were acquired through training provided by the employer
(Northern Office Microcomputers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein [1981] 4
All SA 509 (C), 1981 (4) SA 123; Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson
[1992] 4 All SA 275, 1992 (3) SA 520; Automotive Tooling Systems
(Pty) Ltd v Wilkens 2007 (2) SA 271 (SCA) 282 E–G). Lastly, the
Plascon-Evans rule dictates that disputes of fact must be resolved
in favour of the employee. In terms of that approach, where there
are genuine disputes of fact as to the reasonableness of a
restraint of trade, they must be resolved in favour of the party
sought to be restrained by applying the Plascon-Evans rule as
laid down in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints
(Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) 634; cf Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v
Numsa & others [2003] 2 BLLR 140 (LAC); Ball v Bambalela Bolts
(Pty) Ltd & another (2013) 34 ILJ 2821 (LAC) para [14]. If on the
facts the restraint is reasonable, the applicant must succeed, but
if they show that the restraint is unreasonable, the respondent
must succeed (Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd
2007 (2) SA406 (SCA) 496B–D; Ball v Bambalela Bolts (Pty) Ltd &
another para [14]).
In 2017, the Labour Appeal Court (Sutherland AJ) considered
the enforceability of a restraint of trade agreement in circum-
stances where the employer was unable to produce proof of the
existence of the restraint agreement, in the matter of TIBMS (Pty)
Ltd t/a Halo Underground Lighting Systems v Knight & another
(2017) 38 ILJ 2721 (LAC).
The Labour Court considered the application by TIBMS (Pty)
Ltd t/a Halo Underground Lighting Systems (Halo) for an interdict
against two of its former employees (the employees) to protect its
confidential information and customer connections as envisaged
in alleged restraint of trade agreements concluded between Halo
and the employees. Halo contended that in terms of the restraint
of trade agreements the employees were prohibited from being
involved with competitors in any manner for a period of two years.
The employees had attempted to hijack Halo’s business by
setting up a new business in direct competition. But the employ-
ees alleged that no such restraints of trade existed. Halo was
unable to produce the restraint of trade agreements but argued
that this was because the employees had taken the documents
from the company records and destroyed them. As proof of the
theft and destruction, Halo adduced two affidavits from one of the
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employees in which he had admitted to these actions. It was also
emphasised that in 2013 fresh contracts for all staff were drafted
but that Halo was able to provide to the court a draft template of
the restraint of trade which had allegedly been concluded
between it and the employees. However, no acceptable proof
was adduced that such a document was ever signed by the
employees. The court considered Halo’s contention that the
reason for this was confidentiality, implausible. Halo’s failure,
despite being requested to do so, to produce other staff mem-
bers’ restraint of trade agreement did not bode well. Had this
been done it would have added weight to the claim that the
restraint of trade existed. Rejecting Halo’s contention that on the
facts as deduced from the papers, the existence of restraint of
trade agreements had been proved, the Labour Court dismissed
the application and ordered Halo to pay the employees’ costs.
Halo lodged an appeal against the decision.
On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court noted that this dispute of
fact could not have been resolved on the papers. Consequently,
the Labour Court had been correct in dismissing the application.
However, the employees did not come with clean hands. Due to
their conduct, the cost order that had been made by the Labour
Court in favour of the employees was set aside in the interest of
equity and they were ordered to pay their own costs.
BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
Unlawful termination of an employment contract
The employee party in Vakalisa v South African Weather
Service & others [2017] ZALCJHB 320 sought an order of
specific performance of his employment contract and the terms
incorporated in it as contained in the employer’s disciplinary
policy. The disciplinary policy set out procedural rights for an
employee. The employee pleaded his case based on breach of
contract in terms of sections 77(3) and 77A(e) of the BCEA. In
terms of these provisions, the Labour Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the civil courts to hear and determine any matter
concerning a contract of employment. The Labour Court is
empowered to make any determination it considers reasonable,
including an order for specific performance. The employer opted
to convene a formal disciplinary process before an independent
chairperson. The hearing was suspended and never recon-
vened. When the hearing was suspended, the employee had not
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closed his case. Therefore, he had not had the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the employer’s witnesses and he had not
opened his case. On the day the enquiry was suspended, the
employer applied for the termination of the disciplinary enquiry, a
finding on the charges against the employee, and a finding on the
appropriate sanction. The application was supported by an
affidavit drafted by another employee (employee B) who had
levelled the charges against the employee.
On receipt of this application, the chairperson decided to
suspend the disciplinary hearing and to follow the route of written
submissions. At that stage no final decision was made regarding
the termination of the enquiry. In response, the employee indi-
cated that since employee B and the employer had both requested
that the enquiry be terminated, the charges against him had
fallen away. He sought confirmation that in light of the request to
terminate the enquiry, the charges levelled against him had been
abandoned.
The chairperson replied that the purpose of allowing the
employee to respond to the submissions of the employer is to
state which aspects of the employer’s submissions the employee
disputes and why. Moreover, employee B had the opportunity to
place any other information before the chairperson that he might
consider relevant to the determination of the matter. The chair-
person noted further that the charges against the employee had
not been dropped, and that the opportunity to make submissions
was still open in that no final decision on the question of the
disciplinary enquiry had been taken. In reply to this communica-
tion, the employee stated, among other things, that the hearing
had been initiated to prove their respective cases and that the
termination of the enquiry had denied the parties this right. The
decision was made to conclude the enquiry, and the employee
was found guilty of the charges against him and summarily
dismissed.
On review, Rabkin-Naicker J was required to decide whether a
contractual right falling outside the auspices of the LRA is
enforceable. The contractual clause provided that the employee
had to be conversant with the employer’s policies and proce-
dures as amended from time to time. The employee submitted
that the clause was relevant to disciplinary policy. Reference was
made to Ngubeni National Youth Development Agency & another
(2014) 35 ILJ 1356 (LC), in which the applicant had brought his
case precisely on the grounds pleaded in casu and had suc-
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ceeded. However, in Ngubeni the contract of employment con-
tained a clause which Van Niekerk J was guided to interpret by
the principles as set out in the obiter dictum of Wallis JA in Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4)
SA 593 (SCA) paragraphs [18] and [26], which provide that
interpretation is the objective process of attributing meaning to
the words used in a document having regard to the context
provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the
light of the document as a whole, together with the circumstances
attendant upon its coming into existence. Cognisance must be
taken of the language used, in the light of the ordinary rules of
grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears;
the apparent purpose to which it is directed; and the material
known to those responsible for its production. If more than one
meaning is possible, each possibility must be weighed in the light
of all these factors. Preference is given to a sensible meaning as
opposed to a meaning that is not sensible or unbusinesslike; or
which undermines the apparent purpose of the document.
In applying this obiter dictum to the contractual provisions in
the case under discussion, Rabkin-Naicker J held that the
interpretation of the clause advocated by the employee – that it
incorporates the disciplinary policy by reference – must also
mean that it incorporates all of the employer’s policies as
amended from time to time by reference as no single policy is
specifically mentioned. The court felt that, considering that
‘conversant with’ means ‘having knowledge or experience with’,
this was not the correct interpretation of the clause in question.
The approach to statutory interpretation favoured by our courts
originates in from English law, which emphasises loyalty to the
text of a commercial contract, instrument, or document read in its
contextual setting. But in the process of interpreting the language
of a commercial document, the court ought generally to favour a
commercially sensible construction (para [11]) as this approach
results in a commercial construction which is likely to give effect
to the intention of the parties. Words ought, therefore, to be
interpreted in a way in which a reasonable commercial person
would construe them, and the reasonable commercial person
can safely be assumed to be unimpressed by technical interpre-
tations and undue emphasis on niceties of language. (Lord
Clarke SCJ in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50,
[2012] Lloyd’s Rep 34 (SC) para [21], referred to in Novartis SA
(Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA 518 (SCA) para
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[29]). Therefore, the commercial construction of the clause in
issue is that the employee was expected to be familiar with the
policies and procedures of the employer and keep abreast of any
amendments to them. Further, the use of the disciplinary policy
did not amount to the employer ‘electing’ to be bound by it as
submitted by the employee. The application of the disciplinary
policy by the employer is mandatory in its own terms. For these
reasons, the clause of the contract did not incorporate the
disciplinary policy by reference, and a claim for specific perfor-
mance of the policy’s terms was, therefore, unsustainable.
PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE
Delays in finalisation of the dispute
The Labour Appeal Court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality & others v Independent Municipal and Allied Trade
Union & others LAC (2017) 38 ILJ 2695 (LAC) considered the
factors that the Labour Court should consider when deciding if
proceedings should be dismissed based on inordinate delay in
finalisation of the dispute. The court held that even if there is a
very lengthy delay, it may still be in the interests of justice to
proceed with the hearing of the dispute.
This case concerned a dispute between trade unions and the
local government employer’s organisation regarding the validity
and enforceability of a settlement agreement. The Labour Court
dismissed the application for an order declaring that the settle-
ment agreement entered into and an arbitration award, in terms of
which the settlement agreement had been made an award, were
not binding. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the
applicants ‘have been less than diligent in pursuing’ the applica-
tion, and rejected the explanation for the delay in finalising the
dispute. The dispute was caused by events that had occurred
more than seven years earlier, and the application was launched
more than six years before the hearing. The matter had been ripe
for hearing since May 2008, but no progress had been made in
its finalisation. Following an unsuccessful application for leave to
appeal, leave to appeal was granted on petition. On appeal, the
Labour Appeal Court was required to determine whether dismiss-
ing the application on the ground of delay was merited.
The Labour Appeal Court noted that the LRA and the rules of
the Labour Court set time limits in order to avoid unreasonable
delays. If no time period is stipulated for the bringing of certain
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kinds of proceeding, the requirement is that they must be brought
or prosecuted within a reasonable time. The court noted that no
time limit is stipulated for the bringing of this application. The
Labour Court had applied the six-week period within which an
application for the review of an arbitration award in terms of
section 145 of the LRA may be filed (para [54]). Whether using a
six-week period as a benchmark for the reasonable time within
which to bring such an application was reasonable, was not
considered by the Labour Appeal Court. Instead, the Labour
Appeal Court held that the Labour Court has inherent power to
protect and regulate its own process and to develop the common
law, taking into account the interests of justice. This implies that it
can dismiss proceedings on the basis of delay. However, this
power should be used sparingly and in exceptional circum-
stances only. Factors to be considered in deciding whether it is
apt include: the right of the parties to access to justice under
section 34 the Constitution; the importance of the matter; the
prospects of success; the potential prejudice to the parties; the
consequences of granting or not granting the relief sought; and of
not finalising the matter on its merits. The Labour Appeal Court
held that the Labour Court had erred by ignoring that adjudica-
tion of the merits of the dispute was in the public interest, and by
not considering that dismissing the application would prejudice
members of the SALGA. Moreover, it was in the public interest to
hear the matter. In the result, the Labour Court had failed properly
to exercise its discretion when it decided to dismiss the applica-
tion on the ground of delay (para [47]). Despite the unreasonable
delay, the Labour Court ought to have considered the application
on its merits. The court had erred by viewing the delay in isolation,
without considering the potential prejudice to affected parties,
the possible consequences of granting the relief sought, and the
effect of not granting it or not dealing with the matter on its merits.
The nature and importance of the matter, and the prospects of
success, made it necessary for the court to consider the merits of
the application despite the delay. The appeal was upheld.
This is one of two cases decided by the Labour Appeal Court
on the same day concerning dismissal of an application on the
ground of delay, although the cases are distinguishable based on
their particular facts. Although the outcome is different from that
in NUMSA & Others v Paint and Ladders (Pty) Ltd & Another
(2017) 38 ILJ 2285 (LAC); [2017] 11 BLLR 1105 (Paints &
Ladders), the factors applied by the court are the same. The fact
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that there is no closed list of factors to be considered is stressed
(para [51]), as is the public interest element in determining
whether a case should be dismissed. Both this case and the
Paints & Ladders decision make it clear that the interests of all
parties involved in the resolution of a dispute – employers,
employees and the public, where applicable – should be consid-
ered by the court when deciding whether the case should be
determined on its merits.
In another application for the retrieval of an archived file,
Samuels v Old Mutual Bank [2017] 7 BLLR 681 (LAC), (2017) 38
ILJ 1790, the Labour Court (Whitcher J) had dismissed the
application by an employee who sought to have her file on an
application for review reinstated. The employee’s court file had
been archived in terms of clause 11.2.7 of the Practice Manual of
the Labour Court of South Africa. In order for a file to be
reinstated, an interested party must bring an application on
affidavit in terms of clause 16.2, for the retrieval of the file on
notice to all other parties. The provisions of Rule 7 apply to such
an application. In the Labour Court, the judge had rejected the
employee’s contention that the Practice Manual should not apply
to her case because the manual only came into operation in April
2013 whereas her review application was filed in May 2011.
Whitcher J reasoned that the Manual is based on the Rules of the
Labour Court and on principles established by case law before
the Manual came into effect. Further, even if the 60-day period
operated only from April 2013, the record was still filed a year
late. Whitcher J was further concerned that the dismissal had
occurred seven years earlier, and that the entire purpose of the
review application was to secure reinstatement; that for the
appellant to succeed with the application she was required ‘to
prove an exceptional explanation, exceptional prospects of suc-
cess, a material injustice and no prejudice to the respondent’
(para [11]). The judge accepted that the CCMA was partly to
blame for the delay in that it had failed to provide the full record
on time, and the employee had to conduct a search for parts that
were missing. However, her legal representatives could have
approached the employer’s representatives for collaboration on
‘crafting an appropriate record’. Further, there had been various
stages of inactivity during which no steps had been taken by the
employee and she had provided no real explanation for this. The
present application had also only been brought almost two
months after being directed to do so. Therefore, the employee
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had not complied with the requirements in the Practice Manual.
The employee then lodged an appeal before Tlaletsi DJP.
The Labour Appeal Court noted that the Practice Manual is
aimed at, among other things, providing access to justice for all
those whom the Labour Court serves; promoting uniformity
and/or consistency in practice and procedure; and setting guide-
lines on standards of conduct expected of those who practise
and litigate in the Labour Court. Its aim is to improve the quality of
the court’s service to the public and promote the statutory
imperative of expeditious dispute resolution (para [14]), and not
to change or amend the existing Rules of the Labour Court, but to
enforce and give effect to these rules, the LRA, and various
decisions by the courts. Its provisions, therefore, are binding
(para [15]). The Labour Court’s discretion in interpreting and
applying the provisions in the Practice Manual remains intact,
depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular matter
before it (Tadyn Trading CC t/a Tadyn Consulting Services v
Steiner & others (2014) 35 ILJ 1672 (LC) paras [10] [11]; Edcon
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others: In re Thulare & others v Edcon (Pty)
Ltd (2016) 37 ILJ 434 (LC) paras [23] [24]). An application for the
retrieval of a file from the archives is a form of the application for
condonation of failure to comply with the court rules, timeframes,
and directives. Showing good cause demands that the applica-
tion be bona fide; that the applicant provide a reasonable
explanation which covers the entire period of the default; and
show that he or she has reasonable prospects of success in the
main application (Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital & another 2008 (4)
BCLR 442 (CC) para [22]; Superb Meat Supplies CC v Maritz
(2004) 25 ILJ 96 (LAC) paras [19]–[23]; Edcon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA
(above) para [26]). Lastly, it must be in the interest of justice to
grant the order.
Tlaletsi DJP held that the applicant need not deal fully with the
merits of the dispute to establish reasonable prospects of suc-
cess; it is sufficient to set out facts. Ultimately, the decision to
grant or refuse condonation is a discretion to be exercised by the
court after hearing the application (para [17]). The Labour Appeal
Court held that the court below had misdirected itself in dismiss-
ing the application to retrieve the file from the archives. It would
be in the interest of justice and fairness that the non-compliance
be condoned in this instance. The appeal, therefore, succeeded.
Jurisdiction of the Labour Court
Jurisdiction is determined with reference to the allegations in
the pleadings and not the substantive merits of the case. The
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court must scrutinise the founding affidavit to establish the legal
basis of the claim. To identify the true and real issues in dispute,
the substance of the dispute must be considered over the form in
which it is presented. The Labour Appeal Court in Rukwaya & 31
others v The Kitchen Bar Restaurant (2018) 39 ILJ 180 (LAC),
[2018] 2 BLLR 161 confirmed the decision of the Labour Court
that it had no jurisdiction in matters which must be referred to
another forum under a collective agreement.
In this case, the appellant employees were waiters who worked
at the Kitchen Bar Restaurant. They approached the Labour
Court under section 77(3) of the BCEA claiming payment of
outstanding wages and weekly bonuses, and a refund of certain
deductions, purportedly owing to them. The parties were bound
by a collective agreement regulating all wages and conditions of
employment in the industry (the collective agreement). The
employees contended that the employer had contravened cer-
tain clauses of the collective agreement. After considering the
true nature of the dispute – the interpretation and application of
the collective agreement, and not a breach of the employees’
employment contracts – the Labour Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction. In terms of the collective agreement, the matter ought
to have been referred to the Bargaining Council for the Restau-
rant, Catering and Allied Trade Industry.
On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court noted that section 24(1) of
the LRA requires that collective agreements provide for a proce-
dure to resolve any dispute on the interpretation and application
of the collective agreement through conciliation, and if the
dispute remains unresolved, through arbitration dealt with by the
Bargaining Council. The clause in the collective agreement is
peremptory and is not intended to be an alternative to other
procedures. The aim is to ensure a speedy and cost-effective
resolution to a dispute arising from a contravention of the
collective agreement.
From the pleadings it was evident that the Labour Court had
been correct in finding that the employees’ claims were based on
the collective agreement, which ultimately also provided the
dispute resolution processes. Accordingly, the appeal was dis-
missed.
Absolution of instance
In Commercial Stevedoring Agricultural and Allied Workers
Union v Robertson Abattoir [2016] 12 BLLR 1163 (LAC), (2017)
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38 ILJ 121, abattoir employees (the employees) were dismissed.
The respondent (employer) conceded that it had dismissed the
employees but alleged that this was for misconduct in the form of
insubordination. By contrast, the employees claimed that they
had been dismissed as contemplated in section 187(1)(c) of the
LRA. The court a quo found that the appellants had presented no
evidence upon which a court ‘could or should’ find that they had
been dismissed and that the dismissal, therefore, fell within the
scope of section 187(1)(c) of the LRA. Consequently, absolution
from the instance was granted in favour of the employer. How-
ever, in the Labour Appeal Court, Davies JA found that an alleged
automatically unfair dismissal claim could possibly be proven by
the trial court which should decide on the merits of the section
187(1)(c) claim.
During a meeting discussing among other things slaughtering
targets, the employer requested the employees to increase the
targets for the number of carcasses to be slaughtered, and in
return, proposed to pay an increase subject to 100 per cent
attendance from the employees. To meet this increased number
of carcasses, the employees had to work overtime. After this
meeting, the employees completed their work in accordance with
their contracts, and not, as requested, with the increased number
of carcasses. They were of the opinion (as declared by their trade
union) that no particulars had been written down or agreed upon
during or after this meeting.
The employees received no written notices of, or written
charges from the respondent to report for a disciplinary hearing.
This notwithstanding, the employees reported for duty at the
respondent’s premises but were locked out and not permitted to
start working. The employees were ultimately disciplined and
found guilty of insubordination by refusing to slaughter the
agreed number of carcasses or to work overtime. The employees
claimed automatically unfair dismissal by the employer.
In the Labour Court, the respondents applied for absolution
from the instance as there was no ground for an automatically
unfair dismissal as alleged by the employees. The test for
absolution from the instance involves determining whether, first,
there has been a dismissal, and second, whether the appellant
has provided evidence which raises a credible possibility that the
dismissal in question falls within the scope of section187(1)(c) of
the LRA. This approach was confirmed by the Labour Appeal
Court in Kroukamp v SAAirlink (Pty) Ltd 2005 (26) ILJ 2153 (LAC)
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paragraph [28], read with the approach to be followed when
absolution from the instance is sought at the close of the plaintiff’s
case, as set out by Harms JA in Gordon Lloyd Page and
Associates v Rivera & another 2001 (1) SA 88 (SCA). Judge
Harms held that ‘in the ordinary course of events, absolution will
be granted sparingly but when the occasion arises, a court
should order it in the interest of justice’ (paras [2] [92]–[93]).
Ultimately, had the appellants produced evidence on which a
court, applying its mind reasonably, could or might have found a
sufficient credible possibility that there had been an automatically
unfair dismissal? Davies JA found that, reading the evidence of
witnesses within the broader context of the dispute – how many
carcasses the employees had to slaughter daily – the conclusion
was justified that the appellants had negotiated the initial eviden-
tial hurdle, and that absolution from the instance could not be
granted. Further, the so-called ‘termination lockout’ is now part of
section 187(1)(c) of the LRA and must be interpreted within the
framework of two fundamental propositions (para [31]). These are
that: the LRA distinguishes between a dispute of interest and a
dispute of right; and the concept of dismissal in section 186(1) of
the LRA means that the employer has terminated employment
with or without notice. However, the present case dealt with
absolution, and the question of automatically unfair dismissal had
to be left for the trial court. The Labour Court’s judgment was set
aside and the appeal upheld.
Reinstatement as primary remedy
The Labour Appeal Court (Sutherland JA) in Glencore Holdings
(Pty) Ltd & another v Sibeko & others (2018) 39 ILJ 138 (LAC),
[2018] 1 BLLR 1, confirmed the finding of the Labour Court that
reinstatement as the primary remedy for unfair dismissal can be
deviated from only in the instances envisaged in section 193(2) of
the LRA. In determining whether the circumstances surrounding
the dismissal of the employee rendered reinstatement inappro-
priate or impracticable, only events leading up to the dismissal
may be considered, and not the conduct of the employee during
the subsequent arbitration proceedings.
The employee in this case was a dozer driver. After he refused
to wear the required earmuffs while working, he was charged
with: misconduct for refusing to comply with a reasonable
instruction; insubordination; and dishonesty. He was dismissed.
During an arbitration regarding his alleged unfair dismissal, the
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arbitrator agreed with the employee that the dismissal had been
substantively unfair. But during the arbitration the employee was
disruptive, alleged bribery and that the employer’s representa-
tives were prompting one another and the arbitrator; and declared
that the battle between himself and the employer had only just
begun. Consequently, the arbitrator decided not to order retro-
spective reinstatement as sought by the employee as he was of
the view that the employee’s behaviour during the arbitration
proceedings had demonstrated a breakdown in the employment
relationship which rendered reinstatement inappropriate. On
review the Labour Court noted that the arbitration award made no
reference to which part of section 193(2) the arbitrator had relied
on to justify his ‘deviation’ from the primary remedy. The decision
was set aside and substituted with an order of reinstatement. On
appeal, it had to be determined whether this substitution was
appropriate.
The Labour Appeal Court reiterated the reasoning of the
Labour Court (above) and found that the Labour Court had
correctly held that section 193(2)(b) was excluded because the
phrase ‘circumstances surrounding the dismissal’ was limited to
events up to the point of dismissal but not afterwards. That the
employee had acted badly during the arbitration was not unusual
in adversarial proceedings, or valid reason for excluding his
reinstatement. His reinstatement was also not, as imagined by
the arbitrator, ‘impracticable’ under section 193(2)(c) as his
functional role as dozer driver in the employer’s organisation, and
the rapport or lack therefore with his superiors, had not been
adversely impacted by his conduct as envisaged in section 193
of the LRA. The lower court’s finding was correct, and the appeal
was dismissed with costs.
Reasonable apprehension of bias
During 2017, in Grindrod Logistics (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU obo
Kgwele & others (2018) 39 ILJ 144 (LAC), the Labour Appeal
Court considered whether granting a postponement to allow one
of the parties to a labour dispute the opportunity to call further
witnesses, which it had never intended calling, pointed to bias on
the part of the commissioner.
In 2006, the employee started working at Grindrod Logistics
(Pty) Ltd (Grindrod) as a carrier truck driver. In 2013, he was
assigned a carrier truck to deliver vehicles at two destinations in
Namibia. On his way to Walvis Bay the employee was stopped by
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police at a roadblock. The police gave him directions and
informed him that a portion of the road ahead was under
construction. The employee took a calculated risk by crossing a
drift where he got stuck. The carrier and some of the cargo were
damaged. Consequently, the employee was charged for driving
off-route and for driving recklessly and negligently and in a
manner that resulted in substantial loss. He was found guilty on
the charge of reckless and negligent driving and dismissed. The
South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (the SATAWU)
referred the employee’s unfair dismissal dispute on his behalf to
the CCMA.After Grindrod had called its first witness, the commis-
sioner enquired from Grindrod’s representative whether he had
further witnesses to call to which he replied in the negative. On
resuming the arbitration after a brief adjournment, the commis-
sioner again enquired whether Grindrod would be calling further
witnesses, whereupon its representative replied that it intended
to do so. The SATAWU contended that the commissioner had
adjourned the arbitration proceedings in order to afford Grindrod
an opportunity to call a further witness. After hearing further
testimony, the commissioner concluded that the employee had
failed to exercise the standard of care and skill that could be
expected of an employee in his position, and that he had
breached the relationship of trust. Consequently, he ruled the
dismissal substantively fair.
On review, the Labour Court reasoned that the commissioner’s
conduct in adjourning the arbitration sent a clear message to
Grindrod’s representative to call a further witness. The court held
that in so doing the commissioner had advanced Grindrod’s case
and given it an unfair advantage. In addition, the Labour Court
perceived the questions the commissioner posed to the employee
as falling outside the powers of the commissioner as they were
not clarity-seeking questions. This was dispositive of the matter
and the award stood to be reviewed and set aside on this ground
alone. In order to avoid further delays in finalising the dispute, the
Labour Court did not remit the matter to the CCMA to be heard
afresh before a different arbitrator, but itself considered the
merits. Ultimately, the Labour Court set the award aside, declared
the employee’s dismissal substantively unfair, ordered retrospec-
tive reinstatement, and issued a final written warning valid for a
period of six months. The employer lodged an appeal.
The Labour Appeal Court noted that the test for bias is whether
a reasonable, objective, and informed person would, on the
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correct facts, reasonably apprehend bias. To succeed on these
facts, it had to be proven that when he adjourned the arbitration,
the commissioner had acted mala fide and in breach of his duties
by affording Grindrod an unfair advantage. The Labour Appeal
Court held that the court below had erred in concluding that the
employee reasonably perceived or reasonably apprehended
bias. The commissioner’s questioning was not aimed at advanc-
ing Grindrod’s case. Overall, there was nothing sinister in the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings. Generally, after finding
bias on the part of the commissioner, the arbitration proceedings
would be nullified, and the matter would be referred to be heard
afresh before a different arbitrator. Instead, the Labour Court had
proceeded to hear the matter on the merits, which was another
clear misdirection.
The employee’s dismissal was found to have been substan-
tively unfair for reasons other than those which formed the basis
of the Labour Court’s decision. Nevertheless, the outcome was
left unchanged. In the result, the appeal was dismissed with no
order as to costs.
Condonation
The LabourAppeal Court’s 2017 ruling in G4S Secure Solutions
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Gunqubele NO & others [2017] 12 BLLR 1181
(LAC), (2018) 39 ILJ 131, considered what qualifies as a ‘reason-
able time’ for a review application under section 158(1)(h) of the
LRA, and when a condonation application is appropriate in both
arbitration and review proceedings. The facts of the case were
briefly as follows.
The employee was employed by G4S Secure Solutions (SA)
(Pty) Ltd (G4S) as a Supervisor grade B. During August 2013, he
was demoted to Supervisor grade D. G4S alleged this was done
by agreement in order to avoid his retrenchment. However, the
employee referred a dispute to the CCMA. After a failed attempt
at conciliation, the matter was enrolled. G4S failed to attend the
arbitration, as it had allegedly not received the notice of set down.
An award was issued which the employee served on G4S’s
receptionist on 13 December 2013. Shortly after this, G4S’s
offices closed. In 2014, G4S delivered an application to rescind
the award. The date of delivery was disputed. It also appears that
the employee was not aware of the rescission application. The
commissioner dismissed the rescission application, noting that
G4S had received the award on 13 December 2013 but only
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applied for its rescission on 7 January 2014 which, by her
calculations, fell outside of the fourteen-day period in which the
application should have been brought. As G4S did not apply for
condonation, the commissioner concluded that the CCMAhad no
jurisdiction to entertain the application. G4S took the matter on
review. The Labour Court held that although an application
should be brought within a reasonable time, an applicant should
apply for condonation if the application was made after six
weeks. The Labour Court observed that G4S had filed an
application for condonation so late that counsel had to hand up
the application in court. For this reason, the Labour Court
declined to condone G4S’s late application and dismissed it. On
appeal, the Labour Appeal Court considered: whether condona-
tion for the late filing of the entire record should be condoned;
whether the late filing of the notice of appeal should be con-
doned; whether the application to review the refusal by the
commissioner to rescind the award was indeed brought out of
time; and if so, whether the Labour Court ought to have condoned
the late application with due regard to the facts of the case, and
rescinded the commissioner’s award.
Regarding the late filing of the section 158(1)(h) application,
the court reiterated the principles used to establish whether an
application has been brought within a ‘reasonable time’. It stated
that it is not a set time, but that after six weeks as required for
section 145 applications has elapsed, a condonation application
should accompany the application. The court held that where
there is an unreasonable delay, an application for condonation is
appropriate, and it must then be made at the earliest opportunity.
Whether a delay is unreasonable depends on the facts of the
particular case. The purpose of the LRA is to provide a mecha-
nism for speedy resolution of labour disputes, including applica-
tions for review, which must be brought within a reasonable time
in terms of section 158(1)(h). This section does not set a
particular time. The delay in this case was less than two months,
which the court did not consider unreasonable. In any event, the
court accepted the reasons for the delay as sufficient and the last
issue that stood to be determined was the prospect of success.
As for the late filing of the entire record, the court considered
the explanation that G4S provided for the late filing satisfactory. If
G4S could show that there were good prospects of success, the
condonation should be granted. The Labour Court had not been
satisfied with the reason for the delay and so had failed to
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consider the prospects of success. The Labour Appeal Court felt
that the Labour Court’s approach was too strict, because there
was a reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and it
should have considered the prospects of success. This depends
on whether the rescission application should have been granted
by the commissioner. The reason why the commissioner declined
to rescind the award was that the application for rescission was
late, and there was no application to condone this defect.
However, on the facts, the application was not late due to the
recess period stipulated in the CCMA rules between 16 Decem-
ber and 7 January.
G4S provided a sound reason for not attending the arbitration
proceedings. On the facts it did not receive the notice of set
down. Consequently, the decision of the commissioner was
unreasonable, and she should have rescinded the award. Conse-
quently, G4S’s failure to file the entire record was condoned and
the appeal reinstated. Moreover, the late filing of the notice of
appeal was condoned and the Labour Court’s order set aside
and replaced with an order that on reviewing the commissioner’s
award the arbitration award should be rescinded with no order as
to costs.
Dispute of right or interest
The distinction between ‘rights disputes’ and ‘interest disputes’
was not addressed conclusively in the matter of Department of
Home Affairs v Public Servants Association & others (2017) 38 ILJ
1555 (CC), 2017 (9) BCLR 1102, a judgment penned by Frone-
man J. Rather, the judges, in a unanimous judgment, concluded
that disputes as to matters of mutual interest referred for concilia-
tion must be conciliated, whether they are disputes involving
‘rights’ or ‘interest’. It is not the function of the conciliator to
pronounce on whether the dispute is one of ‘rights’ or one of
‘interest’.
During March 2015, two public sector unions referred a dispute
of alleged mutual interest to the bargaining council for concilia-
tion. The second respondent, also a union, joined the application
(the unions). The dispute arose when, in February 2015, the
Department of Home Affairs (the DHA) proposed changes to the
scheduling of working hours for employees by introducing Satur-
day work days. It adopted the position that the proposal was
open to consultation, but not to collective bargaining (para [3]).
The unions opposed the proposed changes and contended that
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they should be allowed to bargain collectively. The parties could
not reach agreement and the DHAsubsequently issued a circular
confirming that the proposed new arrangement would come into
effect on 23 March 2015.
At the hearing, the DHA challenged the bargaining council’s
jurisdiction on the basis that the alleged dispute did not involve a
matter of mutual interest. The panellist agreed, finding that the
matter referred to conciliation ‘is not a matter of mutual interest;
consequently, the Bargaining Council lacks jurisdiction in this
matter’ (para [4]). The unions took this decision on review to the
Labour Court. The review application was successful. The Labour
Court held that the dispute did involve a matter of mutual interest
and that it had to be conciliated. Leave to appeal to the Labour
Appeal Court was refused, and the application for leave to
appeal to the Constitutional Court was the final step in the
process.
The court noted that what constitutes a matter of mutual interest
is not defined in the LRA. The term ‘serves to define the legitimate
scope of matters that may form the subject of collective agree-
ments, matters which may be referred to the statutory dispute-
resolution mechanisms, and matters which may legitimately form
the subject of a strike or lock-out’. ‘Interest’ and ‘rights’ disputes
are both matters of mutual interest. Whether the matter is a
dispute of interest or of right, and, therefore, whether it may
legitimately form the subject of a strike, is irrelevant for the
determination of whether it may trigger conciliation under the LRA
(para [7]). It is the failure to make this distinction that led the then
counsel for the DHA and, in turn, the conciliator at the bargaining
council, astray.
The union had ticked the ‘matters of mutual interest’ box when
asked to describe the nature of the dispute as the unions
considered the dispute to be one over which a protected strike
can be called a ‘strike’ in terms of section 213 of the LRA (para
[8]).
In the bargaining council the DHA framed its case as a
jurisdictional one: that the dispute was not one of mutual interest.
The conciliator agreed, stating that the dispute was merely about
a ‘work practice’ in the employer’s prerogative. The Labour Court
concluded that disputes about matters of mutual interest may be
referred to conciliation by a commissioner or a bargaining
council. In similar vein, disputes concerning employment prac-
tices and their alteration by management would qualify as
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matters of mutual interest capable of being referred to concilia-
tion under the LRA.
In the subsequent appeal in the Constitutional Court, the DHA
conceded, in concurrence with the bargaining council, that the
dispute concerned a matter of mutual interest. But the justices
considering the argument that the efficacy of conciliation is
dependent on a correct characterisation of the dispute dis-
agreed. The DHA argued (para [12]) that conciliating a ‘rights
dispute’ that can be resolved by law differs from conciliating an
‘interest dispute’ which depends on economic power play, and
that without that clarity beforehand, the purpose and the effective-
ness of conciliation would be undermined. The Constitutional
Court held (para [13]) that this submission could not be sus-
tained, and that the LRA does not differentiate between ‘rights
disputes’ and ‘interest disputes’. Although a strike about a matter
of mutual interest may not be protected, it does not mean that a
conciliator lacks jurisdiction to conciliate the dispute.
Qualified privilege during arbitration proceedings
During 2017, Mbenenge J had to decide on the issue of
qualified privilege which our law confers on witnesses and
litigants in respect of defamatory statements made during quasi-
judicial proceedings. The appeal in Clover SA (Pty) Limited &
another v Sintwa (2017) 38 ILJ 350 (ECG), [2016] 12 BLLR 1265,
succeeded against the following background.
The respondent employee had been in the employ of the
employer as a team leader tasked, among other things, with
conducting checks on machines and products to ensure that
they passed the health and safety standards. To that end, the
employee had to certify on the relevant form that the necessary
checks had been completed. The employee was charged with
and found guilty of misconduct and dismissed, as he had
allegedly signed the form certifying that certain products passed
the health and safety standards without having performed the
requisite test. The employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute
to the CCMA. The arbitrator agreed with the employee that the
employer had failed to substantiate that the employee was guilty
of fraud. Instead, the arbitrator concluded that he had been guilty
of negligence. The dismissal was ruled substantively unfair, and
the employer was ordered to pay compensation to the employee.
The employee lodged an application in which he sought to
recover damages in the amount of R100 000. This was founded
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on the contention that during the arbitration proceedings the
employer had wrongfully and unlawfully alleged that the employee
had committed fraud.
The employer contended that the allegations complained of
were made in quasi-judicial proceedings and, therefore, enjoyed
qualified privilege. It was found that the employer had exceeded
the bounds of qualified privilege, and that he was liable for the
damages as claimed (para [10]). The statement implicating the
employee as having committed fraud was irrelevant and uncon-
nected to the arbitration proceedings and the employee could
easily have been referred to as negligent.
On appeal, what had to be determined was whether the
defamatory utterance made by the employer was privileged, and
whether there were facts supporting of an inference of malice on
the employer’s part.
The court noted that it is trite that publication of defamatory
material in privileged circumstances is justified and lawful. As this
case concerned qualified privilege, it was necessary for
Mbenenge J to draw a distinction between ‘discharge of a duty or
furtherance of an interest’ and ‘judicial and quasi-judicial proceed-
ings’ as part of the categories of qualified privilege in our law
(para [14]). In both categories, the plaintiff may, even if the
defendant establishes provisional protection, show that the defen-
dant exceeded the limits of the privilege because he acted with
an improper motive (malice).
‘Discharge of a duty or furtherance of an interest’ is where a
person has a legal, moral, or social duty, or a legitimate interest,
in making defamatory assertions to another person who has a
corresponding duty or interest to learn of the assertions. If it is
proved by means of the reasonable man test that both parties
had a corresponding duty, the defendant must prove that he or
she acted within the limits of the privilege by proving that the
defamatory assertions were relevant to, or reasonably connected
with, the discharge of the duty or furtherance of the interest (para
[15]).
In an instance of defamatory statements made during judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, however, the position is signifi-
cantly different. To enjoy protection, the defendant need only
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the statements were
relevant to the matter at hand; the onus then shifts to the plaintiff
to prove that, notwithstanding the statements’ relevance (para
[16]), they were not supported by reasonable grounds.
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Even though the CCMA is an administrative tribunal and,
therefore, not part of the judiciary, its proceedings are quasi-
judicial in nature (Phalaborwa Mining Company Ltd v Chectam &
others [2008] BLLR 553 (LAC)). On answering the question of
whether the statements made by the employer were indeed
necessary during the arbitration, it was found that the employer
had to prove that the employee had been dismissed for commit-
ting fraud. This was indeed relevant to the issue for determination
by the arbitrator and covered by qualified privilege. The court a
quo’s finding that ‘the statement of fraud made was irrelevant,
unconnected to the matter and it was unnecessarily dragged into
the matter that could easily be referred to negligence’ (para [27])
was accordingly incorrect.
To answer whether the employee had proved that, notwithstand-
ing its relevance, the impugned statement was not supported by
reasonable grounds, Mbenenge J referred to Joubert & others v
Venter [1985] 1 All SA 443 (A), where it was held that alternative
grounds on which the plaintiff can do this is by proving that the
defendant did not have ‘some foundation’ in the evidence or the
surrounding circumstances for making the statement in issue
(704B-C), that the defendant knew that his statement was false,
that there was no evidence to substantiate it, or that the defen-
dant’s real motive was personal spite or ill-will. In casu the
employee had not proved that the impugned statement was not
supported by reasonable grounds (para [28]).
The final question was whether the employee had shown that
the employer exceeded the limits of the privilege by acting with
malice. Here, too, it is evident from the answers given by the
employee during cross-examination that the employer acted out
of a sense of duty or was bent on protecting an interest. The court
a quo assumed the existence of malice by inference (para [32]);
the fact that the operator who had also signed the relevant form
had not been charged was, according to the court a quo, a basis
for inferring malice. The Labour Appeal Court found this conclu-
sion to be illogical as a proper cause of action in such an instance
would have been for the employee to complain of unequal
treatment or discrimination.
Vicarious liability
Having held that the victim (M) had been constructively dis-
missed in that she had been sexually harassed by a manager in
the workplace on four different occasions, and that, after the
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harassment had been reported, the employer had failed to take
the necessary steps, the Labour Court (Sono AJ) held the
employer vicariously liable in terms of section 60 of the EEA for
unfair discrimination. The Labour Court’s decision was taken on
appeal in Liberty Group Limited v M (2017) 38 ILJ 1318 (LAC),
[2017] 10 BLLR 991.
The Labour Appeal Court held that there is a positive duty on
management and human resources to ensure that employees
who have been subjected to sexual harassment receive support
on a confidential basis as soon as possible after the event is
reported. This duty includes seeking to clarify whether the
offending behaviour in fact constitutes sexual harassment. This
involves discussing alternatives and providing advice regardless
of the course of action the employee chooses to take. Moreover,
employers must react swiftly should an employee resign for
having been sexually harassed. If the employer cannot show that
these steps have been taken it might very well be found vicari-
ously liable for the sexual conduct as envisaged in section 60 of
the EEA and the 2005 Amended Code on the Handling of Sexual
Harassment Cases in the Workplace.
The Labour Appeal Court held that, while it is clear that section
60 imposes liability on an employer where a provision of the EEA
has been contravened, in its construction and wording there are
some grey areas resulting in confusion regarding what a victim
must prove. In Matambuye v MEC for Education & others [2015]
ZALCJHB 455 paragraph [22], the Labour Court noted that it was
not required to decide whether section 60(2) of the EEA refers to
steps the employer must take immediately following a report of
harassment, and whether section 60(4) refers to reasonable
steps that the employer must take beforehand to eliminate and
prevent acts of unfair discrimination. Two other similar matters
may provide clarity on which interpretation of section 60 should
be followed.
A narrow approach was followed in Mokoena & another v
Garden Art (Pty) Ltd & another [2008] 5 BLLR 428 (LC), (2008) 29
ILJ 1196 paragraphs [42] [43]. In that case it was concluded that
liability arises only where the harassment is repeated after an
initial complaint has been lodged, and then only where the
employer has failed to take reasonable steps to prevent further
harassment. This view has been widely criticised. This narrow
interpretation is disconnected from the purpose of the EEA, ie,
providing equal opportunities and eliminating unfair discrimina-
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tion in any employment policy or practice on one or more
grounds, including harassment. That this approach is not correct
is supported by section 6(3) of the EEA, which confirms that such
conduct is contrary to the achievement of substantive equality in
the workplace, as it creates an arbitrary barrier to the full and
equal enjoyment of an employee’s rights, violates the person’s
dignity, and limits his or her right to equality at work. The preferred
approach may be found in Biggar v City of Johannesburg,
Emergency Management Services [2011] 6 BLLR 577 (LC),
(2011) 32 ILJ 1665. The court found that the employer had failed
to take all steps necessary to eliminate racial abuse perpetrated
by its employees and failed to do everything reasonably practi-
cable to prevent continued harassment. As regards the factors
that must be proved in order to hold an employer vicariously
liable for sexual harassment in particular, the Labour Appeal
Court referred to Potgieter v National Commissioner of the SA
Police Service & another (2009) 30 ILJ 1322 (LC) paragraph [46].
After applying these criteria to the facts under scrutiny, Savage
AJA found that the employer in this case was indeed vicariously
liable due to lack of evidence that it had complied with its duty to
the employee. The Labour Court’s decision was confirmed.
Sanction for misconduct
The employer, CVO School, sought to review and set aside two
arbitration awards in terms of section 145 of the LRA. The first
award concerned dismissal of a husband for misconduct, and
the second the dismissal of his wife for operational reasons. The
couple had been employed by the same employer and were
dismissed simultaneously. Two separate unfair dismissal dis-
putes ensued in the CCMA and were heard by two different
arbitrators. Individual arbitration awards were handed down in
favour of each of the two employees, and two separate review
applications were referred to the Labour Court. Ultimately, the
matter was entertained as a consolidated dispute in CVO School
Vivo v Pretorius & others; CVO School Vivo v Pretorius & others
[2017] ZALCJHB 412.
The facts leading to the dismissals are as follows. The husband
was summoned for a disciplinary hearing on charges of miscon-
duct as he had allegedly failed to attend to his duties as
caretaker. He was reminded by the employer that he was
employed in a combination post with his wife. This meant that if he
was guilty on the charges and dismissed, his wife’s employment
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would also be terminated based on operational requirements.
The husband was found guilty at the disciplinary hearing and the
school governing body had to vote whether to dismiss him. The
husband was not given an opportunity to address the school
governing body, or the chairperson, on the issue of an appro-
priate sanction. In a letter, the husband was informed that it had
been decided to terminate his employment with immediate effect,
and that his wife’s employment would also terminate based on
operational requirements. Subsequently the wife was informed in
person of the decision against her husband and that he had been
dismissed. It was explained to her that she held a combination
position which terminated simultaneously with that of her hus-
band. The two arbitration awards handed down in the CCMA
were in favour of the employees. The employer sought to review
the two awards in the Labour Court
SnymanAJ considered the reasonableness test as laid down in
the watershed matter of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum
Mines Ltd & others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC). The judge high-
lighted the dictum of Navsa AJ that, when applying the reason-
ableness standard, the standards as contemplated by section 33
of the Constitution must be encapsulated into the review grounds
in section 145(2) of the LRA. Therefore, for the review to succeed,
the error or failure during the arbitration must affect the reason-
ableness of the outcome to the extent of rendering the award
unreasonable. To determine whether this is the case, all the
evidence and issues before the arbitrator must be considered to
assess whether the outcome that the arbitrator arrived at can
nonetheless be sustained as a reasonable outcome, even if it
may be for different reasons or on different grounds.
In considering the husband’s case, which was heard by
Commissioner Maake, Snyman AJ had to determine whether the
departure from what must be complied with in order to ensure
procedural fairness may competently spill over into the substan-
tive fairness consideration as well, rendering the dismissal sub-
stantively unfair for this reason (para [30] and SA Revenue
Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
& others (2016) 37 ILJ 655 (LAC) (para [33]). With reference to De
Villiers v Fisons Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 1087 (IC)
1092G–I, the Labour Court confirmed the stance taken by
Commissioner Maake that the manner in which a dismissal was
brought about, even if it could later be said that the employee
may have deserved to be dismissed, could still render the
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dismissal substantively unfair. This entails a critical enquiry into
the extent and manner in which the employer departed from what
was required for procedural fairness, to ultimately determine
substantive fairness (Moodley v Fidelity Cleaning Services (Pty)
Ltd t/a Fidelity Supercare Cleaning (2005) 26 ILJ 889 (LC) para
[36]). A value judgement on procedural fairness can only be
made where it can be justifiably said that the employee was
indeed guilty of misconduct. And this can only take place with full
participation of the employee. Further, and in the exercise of this
value judgement, the totality of the evidence must be considered,
with specific reference to a number of pertinent factors, such as
the importance of the rule breached, the reason why the employer
is seeking dismissal, the harm caused by the employee’s con-
duct, whether additional training and instruction may result in the
employee not repeating the misconduct, the effect that the
dismissal would potentially have on the employee, the employ-
ee’s length of service and his or her service record, the issue of
the breakdown of the trust between the employer and employee,
the existence of dishonesty, the possibility of progressive disci-
pline, the existence or absence of remorse, the job function, and
the employer’s disciplinary code and procedure. Snyman AJ
referred to Satani v Department of Education, Western Cape &
others (2016) 37 ILJ 2298 (LAC) paragraph [16], where it was
stated that abiding by the principle of audi alteram partem is
essential in order to ensure that the rules of natural justice prevail.
Failure to afford an employee such an opportunity, where it
comes to imposing a sanction, would constitute a procedural
irregularity and result in procedural unfairness which would have
a direct and material impact on the decision to dismiss. A finding
that dismissal is unfair because the sanction of dismissal is
inappropriate, harsh, or unfair, is an issue of substantive fairness
(Baloyi v Member of the Executive Committee for Health and
Social Development, Limpopo & others (2016) 37 ILJ 549 (CC)
paras [24] [25]).
The grounds for procedural unfairness considered by Commis-
sioner Maake were confirmed in the Labour Court. The court
noted that where there was a reasonable apprehension or
‘outward perception’ of bias, the actual existence of bias need not
be proven (BTR Industries SA (Pty) Ltd & others v Metal andAllied
Workers Union & another (1992) 13 ILJ 803 (A) 817F–I). The
husband was not made aware of the guilty finding at the internal
disciplinary hearing, nor was he informed that the decision on the
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sanction had been delegated to the school governing body and
that they had decided on dismissal. All of this had taken place
without providing him an opportunity to argue for an appropriate
sanction. Lastly, dismissal as sanction was not justified on the
evidence. The dismissal of the husband had, therefore, been
substantively and procedurally unfair.
Turning to the award of Arbitrator Ramotshela, who decided on
the fairness of the wife’s dismissal for operational reasons,
SnymanAJ commented that the dismissal was for a sound reason
relating to operational requirements, as her appointment was
accessory to that of her husband. However, in dismissing her, the
employer did not follow a fair procedure as contemplated in
section 189 of the LRA. She should, at the very least, have been
given proper notice of termination and the opportunity to prepare
for the consultations and the opportunity to address the employer
on these issues in a meaningful manner. This was in line with
Arbitrator Ramotshela’s ruling. Snyman AJ in the Labour Court
agreed with the finding that there had been a complete failure of
process as contemplated in section 189 of the LRA. Among other
things, the employer’s reasoning that it was not required to follow
section 189 of the LRA as the termination took place in accor-
dance with a contractual stipulation was incorrect. The wife’s
employment contract did not provide for automatic termination of
her employment if her husband lost his job. This would have been
impermissible as parties to employment contracts are prohibited
from contracting out of their rights afforded by the LRA (SA Post
Office Ltd v Mampeule (2010) 31 ILJ 2051 (LAC) (para [23]. See
too J Geldenhuys ‘The effect of changing public policy on the
automatic termination of fixed-term employment contracts in
South Africa’ (2017) 20 PER/PELJ DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/
1727-3781/2017/v20i0a1704). The contention that following a
process was irrelevant as the retrenchment was inevitable, and
that this constituted an ‘exceptional circumstance’ justifying
departure from the process required by section 189, has no
merit. The ‘no difference’ principle was rejected by the Labour
Appeal Court in Kotze v Rebel Discount Liquor Group (Pty) Ltd
(2000) 21 ILJ 129 (LAC) paragraph [29], and the court was
obliged to follow that decision. The fact that the wife did not
contest her retrenchment also did not absolve the employer from
following a fair procedure. Snyman AJ, referring to Adams v
DCD-Dorbyl Marine (Pty) Ltd (2011) 32 ILJ 2472 (LC) paragraphs
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[71] [72], rejected the argument. In the result, the wife’s dismissal
was found to have been procedurally unfair.
Review of arbitration award: appropriateness of sanction
During 2017, the Labour Appeal Court pronounced on the
fairness of a sanction of unfair dismissal. The court confirmed that
what sanction is justified depends on the facts of each case, and
that the sanction must be individualised. In Sasol Nitro v National
Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry & others [2017] 9
BLLR 883 (LAC), (2017) 38 ILJ 2322, the court held that an
important factor that the commissioner ought to have considered
was the employee’s unblemished 18-year work record.
Briefly, the employee, Reddy, in an internal hearing and subse-
quent internal appeal conducted by the employer (Nitro), was
found guilty on the grounds of dishonest conduct, gross negli-
gence, and disorderly conduct. Reddy referred a dispute based
on alleged unfair dismissal to the bargaining council. The arbitra-
tor accepted that Reddy’s conduct was wrong, but considering
that he had eighteen years of service, held that Reddy had been
unfairly dismissed. The arbitrator felt that the misconduct did not
warrant his dismissal. He ordered that Reddy be reinstated
without back pay. The effect was that Reddy was without pay from
the date of his dismissal until the date of his reinstatement, some
ten months, as a fine for his conduct. The Labour Court agreed
that the conduct of which Reddy was guilty did not constitute
dishonesty and dismissed Nitro’s review application. On appeal,
Sutherland JA in the Labour Appeal Court had to consider
whether the arbitrator’s award stood to be reviewed.
The test for review as laid down in Sidumo & another v
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097
(CC) is whether a reasonable arbitrator could not have reached
the same conclusion. In applying this test, the Labour Appeal
Court concluded that the arbitrator’s sanction had been reason-
able. Although he had got the facts wrong, this did not amount to
a procedural ‘irregularity’ which rendered the award reviewable.
The alleged confusion and mistakes had not affected the out-
come.
The court reiterated that reinstatement as primary remedy in
case of unfair dismissal must be ordered unless the employer
proves that, considering the circumstances and the nature of the
misconduct, continued employment has been rendered intoler-
able (see, too, J Geldenhuys ‘The reinstatement and compensa-
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tion conundrum in SouthAfrican labour law’ (2016) 19 PER/PELJ –
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2016/v19i0a1172). Nitro
did not show that it was impracticable or intolerable to continue
employing Reddy. The misconduct did not amount to acts of
‘dishonesty’. Nitro was ordered to pay Reddy back pay for the
six-year period that elapsed while the appeal was pending. The
appeal was for the remainder, dismissed with costs.
Recusal application
In Premier Foods (Pty) Ltd (Nelspruit) v Commission for Concili-
ation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2017) 38 ILJ 658 (LC),
Snyman AJ had to decide whether an application in terms of
section 145 of the LRA for the review and setting aside of an
arbitration award should succeed. The basis of the application
was that the CCMA commissioner who presided in the arbitration
had allegedly been guilty of misconduct in conducting the
arbitration proceedings, and in so doing had deprived the
employer of a fair hearing. After an attempt at conciliation had
failed, the Commissioner made statements which alluded to the
fact that he had already made up his mind in the matter and
decided against the employer. He also did not allow the employer
to bring a recusal application. The transcript showed that the
employer had at no point agreed to continue with the arbitration
after having requested the Commissioner’s recusal.
With reference to the test for review as confirmed in Sidumo &
another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others (above),
SnymanAJ confirmed that, considering the constitutional require-
ment contained in section 33(1) of the Constitution, everyone has
the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and
procedurally fair. The reasonableness standard should suffuse
section 145 of the LRA. The judge went further to state that the
judgment in Sidumo does not contemplate that the review
grounds listed in section 145(2)(a) have been abolished – a
review application can still succeed even if the applicant has not
proved that the outcome arrived at by the arbitrator is unreason-
able, where the review grounds are founded on the text of section
145(2)(a) itself (para [14]). The determination of review grounds
in section145(2)(a) was articulated in Baur Research CC v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others
(2014) 35 ILJ 1528 (LC) paragraph [18]; Naraindath v Commis-
sion for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2000) 21
ILJ 1151 (LC) paragraph [27]. Against the principles and the test
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laid down in the jurisprudence, the Labour Court held that the
commissioner, when he was confronted with the application for
recusal, should have considered the relevant principles appli-
cable to deciding this type of application (President of the
Republic of SA & others v SA Rugby Football Union & others 1999
(4) SA 147 (CC) para [48] as cited in SA Commercial Catering
and Allied Workers Union v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods
Division Fish Processing) (2000) 21 ILJ 1583 (CC) para [14]). The
court added that the the test for recusal imports a double
requirement of reasonableness. Not only must the person appre-
hending bias be a reasonable person, but the apprehension itself
must, considering the circumstances, also be reasonable. As to
how this test must be applied, Snyman AJ referred to Irvin &
Johnson (above) paragraph [14]:
[T]he court superimposes a normative assessment on the litigant’s
anxieties. It attributes to the litigant’s apprehension a legal value, and
thereby decides whether it is such that should be countenanced in
law.
As the commissioner had not even allowed the issue to be
properly ventilated, Snyman AJ concluded that the apprehension
of bias was reasonable and justified recusal. For a judicial officer
deciding a matter during a CCMA dispute resolution proceeding
to say from the very outset to a litigating party that they would
lose, and then in effect prevent the issue from being ventilated on
the commencement of the arbitration, satisfies the double reason-
ableness requirement of recusal. The court also noted that in his
award the commissioner had given, as one of the reasons for
refusing the recusal application, that the employee would be
prejudiced by the delay in resolving the dispute that would result.
This, of course, is not part of the test to determine whether recusal
is appropriate. Prejudice caused to the other litigant is irrelevant
in this assessment. If it is justified for a presiding officer to recuse
him- or herself, that should be the end of it, as the presiding
officer is simply not competent to decide the matter.
Snyman AJ concluded that the events during the conciliation
part of the conciliation/arbitration proceedings had deprived the
employer of a lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair hearing in
the arbitration that followed. The situation was exacerbated by
the way in which the commissioner, virtually arbitrarily, disposed
of the concerns raised by the employer in the form of a recusal
application. He had also recorded in his award that the arbitration
proceeded by agreement, which had not been the case. This all
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constituted misconduct by the commissioner as contemplated by
section 145(2)(a)(i) of the LRA. This meant that the arbitration
award itself was vitiated, and the award was set aside.
Postponement of arbitration
The central issue before Myburgh J in Wade Walker (Pty) Ltd v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others
(2017) 38 ILJ 2842 (LC) was whether the commissioner had
committed a reviewable irregularity by refusing the employer a
postponement during a CCMA arbitration. Ultimately, the Labour
Court reviewed and set aside the arbitration award for the
following reasons.
Following his dismissal by the employer, the employee referred
a dispute to the CCMA. The commissioner first attempted to
conciliate the matter and after having issued a certificate of
non-resolution, proceeded to the arbitration phase. At this point,
the employer applied for a postponement. It justified its applica-
tion for postponement by stating that the notice of set down had
not come to the attention of the persons dealing with the matter,
and that the employer was unprepared. The employee had also
agreed to the postponement. Nevertheless, the commissioner
refused the postponement, and stated that he would give rea-
sons in his award (para [3]). In his award the commissioner held
that the proof before him indicated that the employer had been
notified of the date of set-down some 21 days before the hearing,
and that no evidence indicating the contrary had been submitted.
The arbitration then proceeded, but the employer was unable to
call any witnesses or produce the documentation it needed
properly to defend the matter. The commissioner found in the
employee’s favour, ruled the dismissal substantively unfair, and
ordered retrospective reinstatement.
On review, the Labour Court rejected the commissioner’s brief
explanation of why no postponement should be granted as
without merit or substance. The Labour Court noted that consid-
erations of prejudice will ordinarily constitute the ‘dominant
component’ in the evaluation of an application for a postpone-
ment (Insurance & Banking Staff Association & others v SA
Mutual Life Assurance Society (2000) 21 ILJ 386 (LC) para [44]).
The commissioner should weigh the prejudice which will be
caused to the respondent in such an application if the postpone-
ment is granted, against the prejudice which will be caused to the
applicant if it is not (para [6]). When assessing prejudice, the
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commissioner should consider whether any prejudice caused by
the postponement can be compensated by an order of costs or
any other ancillary mechanism. Cognisance must be taken of the
fact that the function of a commissioner is less open to the
granting of postponements than is the case in a court of law
(Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others (1998) 19 ILJ 1425
(LAC) para [57] (Carephone)). However, as found by Van Niekerk
AJ (as he then was) in Fundi Projects & Distributors (Pty) Ltd v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others
(2006) 27 ILJ 1136 (LC) paragraph [14], commissioners had very
limited powers when Carephone was heard. Since the amend-
ments to the LRA in 2002, commissioners have been empowered
to address the policy concerns.
Reverting to the facts in the case under consideration, Myburgh
J held that while the dominant component of the commissioner’s
evaluation of the application for a postponement ought to have
been the issue of prejudice, the commissioner had failed to
consider that the balance of prejudice favoured the granting of
the postponement. This was so, particularly, because the
employee had agreed to a postponement. In failing to allow the
postponement, the commissioner had committed a material
misdirection in three respects: first, his actions were procedurally
unfair (Arends & others v SA Local Government Bargaining
Council & others (2015) 36 ILJ 1200 (LAC) para [19]); secondly,
he misconceived the nature of the enquiry as he failed to
undertake an assessment of the balance of prejudice which
ought to have been the dominant component in the evaluation
(para [9]; cf Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (COSATU as Amicus Curiae)
(2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA) para [25]); and thirdly, the commis-
sioner acted unreasonably (see the test for reasonableness laid
down in Sidumo above para [110]).
Hearsay evidence
The employee in Minister of Police v M & others (2017) 38 ILJ
402 (LC) was employed in the VIP protection unit of the South
African Police Services (the SAPS). In a disciplinary hearing the
presiding officer found the employee guilty. Mitigating and aggra-
vating factors were then presented, and the presiding officer
decided that the employee should be dismissed. The entire
disciplinary hearing was recorded electronically. The employee
launched an internal appeal which failed. He proceeded to refer
an unfair dismissal dispute to the Safety and Security Sectoral
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Bargaining Council and the matter was set down for arbitration. At
this point the victim (K) ceased cooperating with the SAPS.
Despite the employer requesting subpoenas for the victim and
the other two witnesses to attend the arbitration, these subpoe-
nas could not be served owing to insufficient information regard-
ing their whereabouts. The employer representative, however,
did manage to speak to K over the telephone. However, she
refused to divulge her new address or to agree to testify at the
hearing. Consequently, the employer found itself in a situation
where the only material it had to place before the bargaining
council to prove the substantive fairness of the employee’s
dismissal were the transcripts of the internal disciplinary hearing.
It applied, in the interests of justice, to have these transcripts
admitted as hearsay in terms of the Law of Evidence Amendment
Act 45 of 1988. The commissioner granted the application.
However, he then proceeded to find that the weight of the
evidence derived from the transcripts was minimal without ‘addi-
tional testimony or documents substantiating the allegations’
(para [7]). Consequently, as the arbitration was a hearing de
novo, the commissioner found that the employee’s dismissal was
substantively unfair and ordered the SAPS to reinstate him. The
employer approached the Labour Court seeking for the award to
be reviewed and set aside.
The transcripts of the internal hearing revealed that the presid-
ing officer had conducted the hearing in a fair and professional
manner. Representatives were afforded more than sufficient time
to prepare for the case and to cross-examine witnesses. The
questions posed to witnesses were relevant and probing. In the
result, there were no noticeable, glaring, and possibly exculpa-
tory omissions in the questions asked of witnesses in the tran-
script of the internal hearing. None of the witnesses were sworn
in. However, the Labour Court noted that in labour law not much
turns on this. The witnesses were clearly aware that they were
expected to narrate their experiences truthfully. The record of the
internal hearing had been transcribed by a professional transcrip-
tion service and accompanied by a signed certificate. The
commissioner further noted that there was no evidence extrane-
ous to the transcripts that showed the hearsay evidence to be
‘clear and consistent’ – differently stated, that it would prejudice
the employee if only the hearsay evidence (not taken under oath)
were to be relied upon without corroborating evidence.
The Labour Court noted that the reviewing court must have
regard to the nature of the competing interests affected by the
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decision. With reference to the review test as laid down in Head of
the Department of Education v Mofokeng [2015] 1 BLLR 50
(LAC), Whitcher J determined that where a commissioner ignores
material, relevant facts, issues, and/or considerations, the award
will be reviewable if the distorting effect of this misdirection
renders the result of the award unreasonable (para [32]).
The Minister of Police argued that the commissioner had
committed a reviewable irregularity by failing to apply her mind to
the evidence. She had found that there was no corroborating
evidence for the hearsay transcripts in the form of additional
witness testimony or documents with proof against the employee.
She had also found that in not submitting additional testimony, the
employee had been prejudiced as he had been deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses. This, the Minister
of Police submitted, caused the commissioner to reach an
unreasonable conclusion, ie, that the SAPS had failed to prove its
case on a balance of probabilities. The SAPS arrived at the
hearing de novo only with transcripts of the internal hearing and
an explanation that the SAPS’s main original witness, the victim,
could not be traced to serve a subpoena. In deciding the ensuing
application to have the transcripts admitted as hearsay, the
commissioner noted that section 138 of the LRA frees arbitrators
from having slavishly to imitate the procedures adopted in a court
of law (Naraindath v CCMA & others (2000) 21 ILJ 1151 (LC),
[2000] 6 BLLR 716). As the transcripts were plainly relevant to the
issue in dispute, and the employer had a good reason for the
absence of its main original witness, the commissioner had
correctly admitted the transcripts as hearsay evidence.
However, concerning the weight to be attached to the hearsay
evidence, the Labour Court disagreed with the commissioner’s
ruling that it was of ‘minimal’ value merely because there was no
other evidence before the bargaining council to substantiate the
claims made in the transcripts. Should too much, or too little,
weight be given to the transcripts, the award may be reviewable.
Whitcher J declared that the commissioner had not appeared to
realise that the transcripts before her were no ordinary hearsay,
but rather of a special type. Considered in full, they comprised a
bi-lateral and comprehensive record of earlier proceedings in
which the victim’s evidence against the employee had indeed
been corroborated by other confirming witnesses. The substan-
tiation survived competent testing by way of cross-examination.
Moreover, the employee’s own defence had been ventilated and
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exposed as implausible. The evidence of witnesses in the internal
hearing, once admitted, should have been considered holistically
to establish what weight it deserved. A reasonable commissioner
would, by reading the transcripts, have found K’s testimony
credible and persuasive. The main argument against affording
weight to hearsay is that it cannot be subjected to cross-
examination and is prejudicial to the party against whom the
hearsay is tendered. Naturally, a witness statement simply handed
up in an arbitration leaves an accused employee at a distinct
advantage. Absent other hard evidence to back it up, it should
have very little weight.
Since this may be a departure from the norm in how hearsay is
weighed, the Labour Court set out a few guidelines on when, in
arbitration proceedings conducted in terms of the LRA, a single
piece of hearsay, such as a transcript, might constitute prima
facie proof of an allegation. The hearsay should
(1) be contained in a record which is reliably accurate and
complete;
(2) be tendered on the same factual dispute;
(3) be bi-lateral in nature. In other words, the hearsay should
constitute a record of all evidence directly tendered by all
contending parties;
(4) in respect of the allegations, demonstrate internal consis-
tency and some corroboration at the time the hearsay record
was created;
(5) show that the various allegations were adequately tested in
cross-examination;
(6) have been generated in procedurally proper and fair circum-
stances (para [45]).
Consequently, the commissioner had erred in unreasonably
assigning minimal value to the transcripts. For this reason alone,
the award was set aside.
Prescription of claims under the Labour Relations Act
During 2017, the Constitutional Court considered the relation-
ship between prescription as envisaged in terms of the Prescrip-
tion Act 68 of 1969 and the LRA in two cases, Van Tonder v
Compass Group (Proprietary) Limited & others (2017) 38 ILJ
2329 (LAC), [2017] 10 BLLR 1024 and thereafter Myathaza v
Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus Services (SOC) Ltd t/a Metrobus
& others 2017 (4) BCLR 473 (CC) (Myathaza). The judgment in
749LABOUR LAW: INDIVIDUAL
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 49 SESS: 13 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/21−Labour−Law−Individual
Van Tonder hinged on the decision in Myathaza v Johannesburg
Metropolitan Bus Service (Soc) Limited t/a Metrobus; Mazibuko v
Concor Plant; Cellucity (Pty) Ltd v CWU obo Peters (2016) 37 ILJ
413 (LAC), [2016] 1 BLLR 24 (LAC), 2016 (3) SA 74 (LAC). In Van
Tonder the employee had been dismissed for dishonesty. While a
safe key was in his possession, an amount went missing from the
employer’s safe. Ultimately, in the arbitration, the dismissal was
ruled procedurally fair but substantively unfair. The employer
brought an application for review and setting aside of the award.
On review, the Labour Court referred to a passage in the
appellant’s answering affidavit which requested the court to
dismiss the review application ‘and confirm the arbitration award
as an order of court’ (para [7]). The key question posed by
Steenkamp J was whether this prayer interrupted prescription. In
Myathaza (LAC) Coppin JA referred to section 15(1) of the
Prescription Act, which provides that the running of prescription
shall, subject to the provisions of section 15(2), ‘be interrupted by
the service on the debtor of any process whereby the creditor
claims payment of the debt’ (para [7]). Applying this dictum to the
present dispute, Steenkamp J found that the filing of an answer-
ing affidavit by the successful party in an arbitration award which
was not the subject of a review application against the arbitrator’s
decision did not amount to taking a legal step to recover the
‘debt’ owing in terms of the award, sufficient to interrupt the
running of prescription in terms of section 15(1) of the Prescrip-
tion Act. The judge observed that the LRA was amended pursu-
ant to section 145(9), which provides that an application to set
aside an arbitration award in terms of the section interrupts the
running of prescription under the Prescription Act in respect of
that award (para [10]; see too J Grogan ‘As time goes by:
Prescription under the LRA’ (2017) 33.3 EL 7). However, the
commencement date for this amendment was such that it applied
to arbitration awards issued after 1 January 2015 and, therefore,
could not come to the aid of the appellant in the present dispute.
Subsequently, Coppins JA’s decision in the Labour Appeal
Court in Myathaza (LAC) was overruled by the Constitutional
Court. Two judgments were delivered by the Constitutional Court,
each supported by four justices of the court, which leaves the
ratio somewhat uncertain. In the first judgment, Jafta J held that
prescription periods determined by section 11 of the Prescription
Act are at odds with the LRA in that even the shortest period of
three years is way out of line with the periods within which the
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LRA requires disputes to be resolved (para [32]); further, that the
Prescription Act does not cater for a situation where the dispute
has been adjudicated and an outcome binding on the parties has
been reached, but that outcome has not yet been made an order
of court (s 143 of the LRA provides that a certified arbitration
award is deemed to be an order of court and is enforced as if it
were an order of the Labour Court, except an arbitration award for
payment of money, which is executed as if it were an order of a
magistrate’s court). Since an award is a final and binding remedy,
it is difficult to determine a prescription period applicable to it
under the Prescription Act. The three-year period is intended for
claims or disputes which are yet to be determined and in respect
of which evidence and witnesses may be lost if there is a long
delay (para [44]). Jafta J observed that the structure of section 15
of the Prescription Act is predicated on the idea that the judicial
interruption envisaged in this section must relate to claims that
are yet to be prosecuted to final judgment, or where judgment is
abandoned or set aside. Therefore, once prescribed, an award
becomes unenforceable and the Labour Court would not be able
to exercise its power to make the award an order of court. In this
context, the Prescription Act would trump the LRA-designed
process that was specifically crafted to enforce the right to fair
labour practices (para [56]).
By contrast, Froneman J, supported by three justices, although
finding that the appeal had to succeed, held that the relevant
provisions of the two pieces of legislation could complement
each other in a way that best protected the fundamental right of
access to justice, but still preserved the objective of a speedy
resolution to labour disputes in terms of the LRA. In Froneman J’s
view, a claim for the enforcement of legal obligations should
qualify ‘as a debt’ in terms of the Act (para [22]). An unfair
dismissal claim under the LRA seeks to enforce three possible
legal obligations against an employer: reinstatement; re-employ-
ment; and compensation. All three remedies impose legal obliga-
tions on an employer that fall within the scope of the concept
‘debt’ as used in the Prescription Act.
The question arose as to why prescription should run before
the finalisation of court proceedings as there is little reason to find
that instituting review proceedings does not also have the effect
of extending the finalisation of the judgment until the review has
been decided (para [83]). There is no plausible reason why a
statutory review under section 145 of the LRA is not to be
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regarded as a judicial process that interrupts prescription until
finality has been reached; so too should prescription apply to the
right of appeal. To the argument that the LRA provides that unfair
dismissal referrals must be instituted within 30 days of the date of
dismissal, Froneman J classified this as a time bar rather than a
true prescription period which ‘may admit of amelioration through
condonation’ (para [94]). Accordingly, the 30-day period for the
referral, being a time bar, can be interpreted to be congruent with
the normal prescription periods provided for under the Prescrip-
tion Act (para [96]. See too the judgment of the Constitutional
Court in Mogaila v Coca Cola Fortune (Pty) Ltd [2017] 5 BLLR 439
(CC) (Mogaila), in which it was held that on either of these
approaches, the appeal must succeed). Regrettably, the court in
Mogaila (above) did not resolve the difference between the eight
justices. On Jafta J’s approach, the Prescription Act does not
apply. Accordingly, the debt is owed by respondent to the
appellant. On the approach adopted by Froneman J, the review
has not been finalised and consequently prescription has been
interrupted. The appeal was upheld by Davis JA and it was
concluded that the arbitration award had not prescribed.
Appropriate relief for unfair dismissal
In Jonas v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitra-
tion & others [2016] 12 BLLR 1222 (LC), (2017) 38 ILJ 376,
Lagrange J was required to determine if the relief awarded in the
arbitration award in terms of which the employee’s dismissal was
found to be substantively and procedurally unfair, was reviewable
and stood to be set aside. The employee party was aggrieved by
the fact that in terms of the award he was awarded ten months’
remuneration as compensation but was not reinstated. In the
alternative, he claimed that the compensation ought to have been
higher as his remuneration had been incorrectly calculated.
Lagrange J agreed that there was an irregularity in how the
choice of remedy had been made.
The Labour Court noted that before deciding against the
primary remedy of reinstatement, an arbitrator must have suffi-
cient reason in terms of section 193(2) of the LRA to award
compensation instead.Although the arbitrator in casu had referred
to section 193(2)(b) and concluded that it was not reasonably
practicable to reinstate or re-employ the employee, it was appar-
ent on the facts that his real finding was that it would be
intolerable to reinstate him. Accordingly, the arbitrator’s reference
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to section 193(2)(b) was misplaced and he had applied the
incorrect test. However, the relief that was ultimately ordered was
justifiable in terms of 193(2)(a) and, consequently, not unreason-
able in the final analysis.
The intolerability ground as established was founded on Dun-
well Property Service CC v Sibande (2011) 32 ILJ 2652 (LAC), in
which the facts corresponded largely to those in the case under
discussion, and in which the Labour Appeal Court had found that
the trust relationship between the employer and employee had
broken down irretrievably.
The employer had based the contention of a breakdown in the
employment relationship on facts unrelated to the actual dis-
missal. Evidence was produced that the employee had instituted
civil proceedings against subordinates, and that he was not
amenable to discipline. The court noted that it is not necessarily a
requirement that the reason for reinstatement being intolerable
must emanate from the same events which gave rise to the
disciplinary enquiry. However, arbitrators should be careful not to
refuse the primary remedy of reinstatement because there might
have been other grounds for disciplining the employee which
could ultimately have led to his dismissal (DHL Supply Chain
(Pty) Ltd v De Beer NO & others (2014) 35 ILJ 2379 (LAC) para
[2]; cf M Bekink ‘Minister of Police v M 2017 38 IJL 402 (LC)’
(2017) 50/1 De Jure 186–94).
Compensation
Pharmaco Distribution (Pty) Ltd v Weideman [2017] ZALCJHB
258 involved an appeal and cross-appeal before Kathree-
SetiloaneAJAagainst the judgment of the Labour Court (Lagrange
J) where it was found that the dismissal of the respondent by the
appellant constituted an automatically unfair dismissal as envis-
aged in section 187(1)(f) of the LRA. The Labour Court concluded
that the employee had been unfairly discriminated against on
account of her disability when the employer singled her out to
undergo psychiatric assessment because she suffered from
bipolar disorder. Lagrange J also found the dismissal constituted
an act of unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA.
He ordered the employer to pay compensation to the employee
for her automatically unfair dismissal, and to pay an additional
amount in terms of section 50(2)(b) of the EEA, as damages for
the unfair discrimination. The compensation awarded to the
employee was the subject of the cross-appeal.
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The Labour Appeal Court held that section 194(3) of the LRA
confers a wide discretion on the Labour Court to award compen-
sation to an employee whose dismissal is found to be automati-
cally unfair. The legislation requires only that the compensation
awarded ‘must be just and equitable’ in all the circumstances, but
not more than the equivalent of 24 months’ remuneration calcu-
lated at the employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of
dismissal (s 194(3) of the LRA). The power of a court to interfere
with compensation awarded by the Labour Court on appeal is
circumscribed. This discretion can only be interfered with on the
narrow grounds that the judge in the lower court acted capri-
ciously, or applied the wrong principle, or acted with bias, or
based on improper reasons, or that the decision-maker adopted
an incorrect approach.
The purpose of awarding a dismissed employee compensation
in terms of section 187(1)(f) of the LRA is for the restitution of his
or her dignity which has been violated by being unfairly discrimi-
nated against by the employer. In determining what is just and
equitable compensation in these circumstances, the court must
have regard to, among other things: the nature and seriousness
of the injuria; the circumstances in which the infringement took
place; the behaviour of the employer; the extent of the employ-
ee’s humiliation or distress; the abuse of the relationship between
the parties; and the attitude of the employer after the injuria took
place. These factors are by no means exhaustive (Minister of
Justice & Constitutional Development & another v Tshishonga
(2009) 30 ILJ 1799 (LAC) para [18]).
In determining the quantum of compensation to be awarded
under the LRA, the Labour Court considered the employee’s
length of service and the humiliation she had suffered due to the
employer’s conduct. The court concluded that the employer
should have recognised the stigmatising effect of its conduct and
realised that the employment contract did not afford it a right to
act as it wished. However, the trial court had failed to take
account of the fact that the employee had performed at a superior
level for the extent of her employment and that she enjoyed her
work, was brilliant at it, and interacted well with other members of
staff. The employer had used her bipolar condition to intimidate
her into submitting to its demands insofar as her grievance
relating to her commission was concerned. When considering the
appropriate award to make under section 194(3) of the LRA, the
court must also take into account that employers should be
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deterred from automatically unfairly dismissing their employers
(De Beer v SA Export Connection CC trading as Global Paws
(2008) 29 ILJ 347 (LC) para [53]). The employer in the case under
scrutiny had used the employee’s medical condition as reason to
dismiss her. The compensation awarded in terms of the LRA was
to address the impairment of the employee’s dignity arising from
the automatically unfair dismissal. The damages awarded to her
in terms of section 50(2)(b) of the EEA were also awarded for the
impairment of her dignity arising from the self-same act of unfair
discrimination against her on the ground of her disability. The
respondent’s dismissal was, therefore, also an act of discrimina-
tion under section 6 of the EEA (ARB Electrical Wholesalers (Pty)
Ltd v Hibbert (2015) 36 ILJ 2989 (LAC) (ARB) (para [29]).
Retrospective effect of reinstatement as employee after remittal for rehearing
Sampson v South African Post Office Soc Limited (2017) 38 ILJ
2368 (LC) concerned the effect of a successful review by an
employee against a pre-dismissal arbitration award in terms of
section 188A of the LRA, in circumstances where the review court
ordered that the matter be remitted to the arbitration tribunal for a
rehearing. The question posed, and answered in the affirmative,
was whether this order revives the contract of employment
retrospectively, so that the employee continues to be employed
as if he or she had never been dismissed. The salient facts of the
case were as follows.
The employee was suspended with pay by his employer
pending an investigation into allegations of misconduct. On
conclusion of the investigation, he was charged with breaching
his fiduciary duty. This was followed by a pre-dismissal arbitration
where the employee was found guilty and dismissed with imme-
diate effect. The employee applied for the arbitration award to be
reviewed and set aside. The employer was not represented at the
review hearing, and the Labour Court granted a default order
reviewing and setting aside the award. The matter was remitted
back for a rehearing before a different arbitrator. The employer
submitted that the effect of the court order was that the dismissal
stood until the outcome of the reconvened arbitration. But the
employee launched an application claiming that the court order
had the effect of reviving the contract of employment retrospec-
tively as if he had never been dismissed. Consequently, no
reason existed for a disciplinary hearing to be heard anew (para
[12]).
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The employer contended that when matters are remitted for a
rehearing by the review court, employees do not become rein-
stated based on their interpretation of section 188A. This section
provides that an arbitrator in a process bears the status of the
chairperson of an internal disciplinary hearing and also of an
arbitrator. When a pre-dismissal arbitration award is reviewed
and set aside, the dismissal ruling stands as the court generally
does not review and set aside outcomes of internal disciplinary
hearings. If, in law, the setting aside of the award automatically
retrospectively revived the contract of employment and the
employee continued in employment as if he had never been
dismissed, the court would have expressly ordered the retrospec-
tive reinstatement of the employee – albeit on suspension with
pay – pending the outcome of the new arbitration (para [12]). In
the review application, the court in casu did not substitute the
award of the arbitrator or reinstate the employee; it simply
reviewed and set aside the award and ordered the matter to be
arbitrated afresh. This does not equate to retrospective reinstate-
ment. Whitcher J made short shrift of the contention with refer-
ence to section 188A(8) of the LRA, which provides that the ruling
of the arbitrator in an inquiry has the same status as an arbitration
award.
As to the consequence of a court order setting aside a
dismissal award and ordering a rehearing of the disciplinary
matter, Whitcher J agreed with the employee that ultimately the
status quo ante is restored. Once the dismissal has been
reviewed and set aside it cannot remain in force. The new
arbitrator is not asked to confirm or set aside any existing
dismissal (para [14]). The act of setting aside a dismissal award
is the act of setting the ‘conviction’ aside (para [14]). It is a
rescission in which the situation is restored to the state which
previously existed. In casu, the court order set aside the original
decision to dismiss the employee and that decision effectively
‘vanished’ (para [15]) and it is as if he had never been dismissed.
The order revived the contract of employment which must be
implicit in an order setting aside a decision to dismiss retrospec-
tively. The employee, therefore, reverts to his or her status as an
employee on precautionary suspension. This conclusion is forti-
fied by a consideration of the powers granted to the court under
section 145(4) of the LRA, which expressly gives the court the
power to ‘determine the matter in the manner it considers
appropriate’ or to ‘make any order it considers appropriate about
the procedures to be followed to determine the dispute’ (para
[16]).
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As for the damages claim, the employee mitigated the dam-
ages by finding employment elsewhere. However, he did not
tender his services to the respondent-employer, but still claimed
certain payments, calculated from the date of his dismissal to the
date of this application. The employee claimed that, but for his
dismissal, he would have been entitled to receive remuneration.
The employer opposed this claim by stating that the employee
said, on the one hand, that he was its employee and must be
paid, but on the other hand, he was not tendering his services
and, in fact, was working for a different employer. The review itself
revolved around procedural errors which had denied him a fair
hearing on the merits and thus impacted on the substantive
fairness of his dismissal. This had to be heard de novo by a
different arbitrator.
Given that a review court’s setting aside of an arbitrator’s
award revives the employment contract, there was nothing
irregular in paying the employee back pay [the use of the term
damages is incorrect] for the period between his dismissal and
the date of the review court’s decision. This, the court held, was to
be calculated as an amount equivalent to the difference between
what he would have earned as an employee of the respondent
employer, and what he in fact earned from his new employer
(para [23]). Whether he tendered his service at the respondent
employer for this period is irrelevant because, although this
decision was later overturned, the legal position at the time was
that there was no extant contract between him and the respon-
dent employer after he had been dismissed. As to whether the
employee should be paid for any period after the review court’s
decision, Whitcher J declared that it would be artificial to expect
the employee to resign from the new employer where he had
been able to mitigate his losses after his unfair dismissal from the
respondent-employer, so that he could fully press his claims
arising from that unfair dismissal (para [25]). The respondent-
employer regarded the legal position to be that the employee
remained dismissed and consequently would not have accepted
a tender of services. Therefore, the employee was also entitled to
remuneration and accrued leave calculated as the difference
between what he would have earned at the respondent- employer
had he not been dismissed, and what he earned at the new
employer.
Review on ground of legality
After reiterating that the Labour Court’s urgent roll is inundated
with applications to interdict disciplinary enquiries from taking
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place, Myburgh AJ again had to adjudicate such an application
in the matter of Magoda v Director-General of Rural Development
and Land Reform & another [2017] 12 BLLR 1267 (LC), (2017) 38
ILJ 2795. This application had been found on its merits to be
urgent in a previous ruling. The applicant, a civil servant, had
been subjected to a disciplinary enquiry presided over by the
second respondent on charges of serious misconduct. The issue
before Myburgh AJ was to determine whether interim relief
interdicting continuation of the disciplinary enquiry pending
review of procedural rulings made by the second respondent
qualifies as prima facie right to review.
The applicant relied on section 158(1)(h) of the LRA, which
provides that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to review depend-
ing on the nature of the decision (Khumalo & another v Member of
the Executive Council for Education: KwaZulu-Natal (2014) 35 ILJ
613 (CC) para [28] n12). Referring to the legality review, Myburg
AJ held that insofar as the decision constitutes administrative
action, a review on the grounds set out in section 6 of the PAJA is
possible; and insofar as the decision does not qualify as adminis-
trative action, but nonetheless involves the exercise of a public
power, a review based on the principle of legality, encompassing
legality and rationality, can ensue (Hendricks v Overstrand
Municipality & another (2015) 36 ILJ 163 (LAC) para [29] read
with para [21]). However, the court also warned that it does not
follow that because a ground for review exists in either of these
circumstances, it will always be entertained or found permissible
(Public Servants Association of SA on behalf of De Bruyn v
Minister of Safety & Security & another (2012) 33 ILJ 1822 (LAC)
(De Bruyn)). The applicant’s grounds of review in casu were that
the procedural rulings were allegedly unlawful, irrational, and
unreasonable. All of these issues constitute grounds for review of
administrative action, while the first two grounds are a basis for
legality review, but unreasonableness is not (Public Servants
Association of SA & another v Minister of Labour & another (2016)
37 ILJ 185 (LC) para [58]). It was not explicitly pleaded by the
applicant that the procedural rulings constituted administrative
action, or that the second respondent exercised a public power
in making them.
Addressing the applicant’s plea for legality review, MyburghAJ
agreed with the applicant that the procedural rulings did not
constitute administrative action. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others
(2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC) paragraphs [142] and [150], it was found
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that neither procedural rulings made during a disciplinary hear-
ing, nor the dismissal of a public servant constitutes administra-
tive action. Notwithstanding, the difficulty with the construct of the
applicant’s case was that it had been assumed that the proce-
dural rulings constitute the exercise of a public power, which is a
prerequisite for legality review. While the dismissal of a public
servant involves the exercise of a public power, on the analysis
provided by the Constitutional Court in Association of Minework-
ers & Construction Union & others v Chamber of Mines & others
(2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC) (AMCU) paragraphs [74]–[83], Myburgh
AJ was not persuaded that the procedural rulings constituted a
public power. The second respondent was performing the role of
management in chairing the disciplinary enquiry, and this is
regulated by an internal disciplinary code and procedure under
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (Sch 8 to the LRA). In the
alternative, a review in terms of section 158(1)(h) could not be
permitted – otherwise a separate legal framework would apply to
public and private sector employees (De Bruyn paras [29] [34]).
Further, Murphy AJA in Hendricks (para [30]) held that section
158(1)(h) reviews should be confined to legitimate challenges
where no other remedy is available under the LRA. It is also trite
that where another remedy exists under the LRA, a review as
envisaged in section 158(1)(h) is impermissible. This was the
case in Booysen v Minister of Safety & Security & others (2011) 32
ILJ 112 (LAC), which involved an application for an interdict/
declarator to vindicate the right to procedural fairness. However,
in the case under discussion, the applicant submitted that the
alleged unlawfulness could only be remedied by bringing a
legality review. MyburghAJ disagreed with the contention that the
review could be permitted on this basis. The principle developed
in Hendricks is that legality review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of
the LRA is a remedy of last resort. This principle cannot be
overridden by simply claiming that review is brought on the basis
of lawfulness. The LRA provides for a remedy in fairness and it is
the existence of this remedy that renders the review impermis-
sible.
Lastly, even if a legality review is available, despite the
existence of an alternative remedy under the LRA, to succeed
with an application for interim relief, the applicant had to establish
exceptional circumstances for a review in medias res, and the
commission of a gross irregularity was not a basis for such a
review. The applicant must go further and show that the gross
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irregularity will lead to a miscarriage of justice during partly-heard
or incomplete disciplinary enquiries, before interim relief will be
granted (Zondi & others v President, Industrial Court & others
(1991) 12 ILJ 1295 (LAC) 1300, 1303). The court will only
intervene in incomplete disciplinary hearings in exceptional cir-
cumstances (Jiba v Minister: Department of Justice & Constitu-
tional Development & others (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) para [17]).
The policy underlying this approach was explained in Trustees for
the time being of the Bioinformatics Network Trust v Jacobson &
others (2009) 30 ILJ 2513 (LC), [2009] 8 BLLR 833 paragraph [4].
The court held that it will only intervene in ongoing labour matters
where to do so would not undermine the informal nature of the
system of dispute resolution established by the LRA and frustrate
the expeditious resolution of labour disputes. This stringent test
(ie, of exceptional circumstances for intervention in a part-heard
disciplinary enquiry) had not been met in casu.
UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION
Listed and analogous grounds
During 2017, the Labour Court considered how the amended
sections 6 and 11 of the EEA should be interpreted. The court
clarified that the phrase ‘or any other arbitrary terms’ in sections
6(1) and 11 did not create a new category of unfair discrimination
in addition to the two categories recognised before the amend-
ments to the EEA (ie, listed grounds and analogous or unlisted
grounds). Were it otherwise, the legislature would have provided
for the burden of proof in respect of three categories of ground.
Coetzee AJ in Ndudula & others v Metrorail PRASA (Western
Cape) [2017] 7 BLLR 706 (LC), (2017) 38 ILJ 2565 (Ndudula),
confirmed that the burden of proof is determined by establishing
whether the matter at hand concerns one of the listed grounds or
an analogous ground. If the alleged discrimination is on one of
the listed grounds, there is a presumption of unfairness. If the
discrimination is based on an unlisted or analogous ground, this
presumption does not apply. In the case of an unlisted or
analogous ground, the applicant employee bears the evidentiary
burden of proving that there was discrimination and that the
discrimination had a negative effect on his or her dignity, or that it
had some other negative effect.
The facts in Ndudula were briefly as follows. The applicants
were section managers employed by Metrorail. They were upset
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because Metrorail had appointed two new section managers, but
on a salary higher than they received. They referred a dispute to
the CCMA, whereafter Metrorail informed the two new section
managers that they had been appointed on an incorrect scale
and that their salaries would be reduced as of the following
month. However, the extra amount that had been paid to them in
error would not be recovered from them. In effect, they received a
higher salary for some twenty months. The aggrieved section
managers, who felt done in, proceeded to refer a dispute based
on unfair discrimination to the Labour Court seeking to be paid
the same as the new section managers retrospectively from the
date on which the new section managers were appointed. The
applicants did not rely on a listed ground in section 6(1) of the
EEA, or on a ground analogous to the listed grounds. Instead
they claimed under the new amendment to section 6 on ‘. . .or on
any other arbitrary ground’. They argued that it is unnecessary to
specify a specific ground, and that Metrorail’s conduct in paying
the two new section managers more than they were paid for no
particular reason, was inherently arbitrary.
The Labour Court noted that the applicant employees bore the
evidentiary burden, in terms of section 11(2) of the EEA, to prove
that the conduct constituted discrimination and that the discrimi-
nation was unfair. Unfair discrimination on a listed or unlisted
ground must affect human dignity or have a similar serious
consequence. No differentiation may be ‘arbitrary’ or irrational; it
must be rationally connected to a legitimate purpose. To consti-
tute unfair discrimination, the underlying basis is that the differen-
tiation is arbitrary, that it impacts upon human dignity, and has no
legitimate purpose. The court confirmed that the phrase ‘arbitrary
ground’ refers to an unlisted or analogous ground. This is
apparent from the purpose of the inclusion of the phrase by
means of the amendment. According to the explanatory memo-
randum for the amendments to the EEA, Parliament intended to
align section 187(1)(f) of the LRAand section 11 of the EEAby the
amendments; the purpose was not to create a third category of
unfair discrimination. The legislature did not introduce a new
category of grounds of unfair discrimination. The effect of the
amendment is that discrimination on any arbitrary ground affect-
ing human dignity constitutes unfair discrimination. In the result,
the application was dismissed.
This is the first case in which the court has considered how the
amended provisions in sections 6 and 11 of the EEA should be
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interpreted. This case clarifies that in an unfair discrimination
claim based on equal pay under section 6(4) of the EEA, the
employee must plead a case of discrimination, and link the
unequal pay to either a listed ground or an analogous ground.
The court acknowledged that ‘or any other arbitrary ground’ is
capable of two possible interpretations. A wide interpretation in
terms of which the phrase creates an almost blanket extension of
the scope of the discrimination protection; or a narrow, more
restricted, definition which means that little has changed since
the amendment. The narrow construct afforded by the Labour
Court makes it clear that the impact of the inclusion of ‘or on any
arbitrary ground’ impacts on the scope of the equal treatment
provision in a much more limited sense than the open-ended
terminology suggests. Only instances eiusdem generis to the
listed grounds will be covered.
Pregnancy
In Impala Platinum Ltd v Jonase & others (2017) 38 ILJ 2754
(LC), Steenkamp J heard an appeal in terms of section 10(8) of
the EEA, against an arbitration award made in terms of section 6
of the EEA. The appeal was ultimately upheld, and it was
declared that the employer had not discriminated unfairly against
the employee.
In this case, two employees referred a dispute to the CCMA in
terms of section 10(6)(a)(ii), alleging discrimination on the ground
of pregnancy. Conciliation having failed, the arbitrator found in
their favour and awarded them compensation and required the
employer to amend its policy to accommodate pregnant women
(para [3]). The policy in question provided that the company
would attempt to place pregnant women in suitable alternative
employment on the surface ‘where reasonably practicable’ to
prevent any risk to the health and safety of pregnant women
working underground or their unborn children (para [4]).
The two employees were amongst those who were moved to
the surface, but the employer could not find alternative places for
them (and several others). Of 21 pregnant employees, only two
had the requisite skills for available administrative posts. The
other employees were instructed to take their four months paid
maternity leave, with a further choice of unpaid maternity leave of
up to six months. Before going on maternity leave, the two
complainants were accommodated in the union offices and paid
their salaries for about three months – although they were
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performing no work for the company – while the company still
sought alternative positions.
The two employees approached the CCMA alleging that the
employer had discriminated unfairly against them. The arbitrator
found that a duty rests on the employer to provide a safe working
environment. However, that does not mean that employees
should be prejudiced or disadvantaged in the process. An
employer cannot direct employees to take unpaid leave where it
is unable to secure an alternative position to accommodate them.
The employer’s failure to find alternative positions was unfair to
the two employees and amounted to discrimination as the sole
reason for the failure of the employer was the employees’
pregnancy. Moreover, the arbitrator found that the two employees
had been treated differently from other pregnant employees. In
addition, the maternity policy of the employer was found to be
unfair as it discriminated against pregnant employees.
In a subsequent appeal, the employer argued that the arbitra-
tor wrongly concluded that discrimination had been proven. In
addition, the employer averred that the arbitrator had exceeded
the powers granted to him by ordering the employer to amend its
policy.
Steenkamp J first considered if there had indeed been discrimi-
nation on a listed ground. The test involves determining, first, if
there has been differentiation amounting to discrimination. If
there has been differentiation based on one or more of the listed
grounds, discrimination will have been established. Thereafter it
must be determined whether the discrimination was unfair, focus-
sing on its impact on the complainants and other persons who
are similarly situated (Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para
[54]). In casu, the two employees complained that they had been
treated differently from other pregnant employees. Yet the com-
missioner simply found that the employer had discriminated
against them because they were pregnant. The complaint, con-
trary to what the commissioner found, was negated by their
comparator being other pregnant women. The treatment of some
pregnant women compared to other pregnant women simply
cannot constitute discrimination based on pregnancy. They were
not treated differently because they were pregnant; they were
treated differently from some other pregnant employees who
were given alternative employment because they did not have
the requisite skills. Therefore, Steenkamp J found that the arbitra-
tor had applied the incorrect test in establishing the existence of
discrimination based on pregnancy.
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Secondly, Steenkamp J found that the part of the award
instructing the employer to strike down its policy must be set
aside. The two employees had not complained about the fairness
of the policy applied to pregnant employees per se. The judge
referred to Murphy J’s obiter statement in South African Reserve
Bank v Public Protector 2017 (6) SA 198 (GP) paragraphs
[39]–[42], where it was held in the context of a review application,
that a functionary may not impose a remedy that goes beyond the
original complaint before him or her.
Lastly, regarding the duty resting on an employer to find
suitable alternative employment, Steenkamp J found that the
award was unfounded as the policy itself provides that there is no
duty on the employer to provide such an alternative. The policy
aims to ensure that pregnant employees are not exposed to a
dangerous workplace, ie, to be required to work underground. If
the employer cannot find suitable alternative employment, the
maternity policy kicks in (para [30]). In this case, there were no
suitable alternative positions available for the complainants. No
further duty rested on the employer to create non-existent posi-
tions for them. The employer, therefore, had acted lawfully,
rationally, and in accordance with its own policy.
Employment status
The applicant in Dlala v OR Tambo District Municipality &
another (2017) 38 ILJ 2457 (ECM) was a general assistant who
had been in the employ of the employer for a few years on a
month-to-month employment contract. The employer advertised
a post in which the employee was interested. The advert set as a
requirement that the incumbent must hold a certificate, diploma,
or degree, or have extensive experience. Being the holder of a
diploma and considering himself to have extensive experience,
the employee applied for the post. At the interview, the employee
was informed that, because he was employed from month-to-
month and not permanently, he did not qualify for the appoint-
ment. An internal application for reconsideration failed. The
employee proceeded to approach the High Court seeking an
order setting aside his exclusion from the interview process and
directing the employer to reinstate him as a candidate. In
addition, he sought an interdict to restrain the employer from
employing any other candidate in the advertised post, pending
the finalisation of his application.
The employee’s case was that his exclusion as candidate in the
interview process denied him equal opportunity usually provided
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to the employer’s employees, creating a reasonable and legiti-
mate expectation that he would not be discriminated against
unreasonably in relation to other permanent staff. The employee
protested that his exclusion made no sense in light of the
principle of legality, and that it was contradictory to his constitu-
tional right to pursue a career, trade, and occupation of his
choice.
Mbenenge ADJP found that the matter was urgent as the
interview process was still underway and no appointment had
been made. The judge continued to consider whether the High
Court had the required jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.
Nothing pointed to unfair discrimination as envisaged in the
EEA, nor was the court constituted as an Equality Court in terms
of the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair DiscriminationAct 4 of 2000. The applicant denied reliance
on the LRA. Section 157(2) of the LRA, which acknowledges that
the High Court enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour
Court in respect of any alleged or threatened violation of any
fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution
arising from employment and labour relations, was given the
following interpretation in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others 2008 (4)
SA 367 (CC) paragraph [123]:
The application of s 157(2) must be confined to those instances, if any,
where a party relies directly on the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This
of course is subject to the constitutional principle that we have
recently reinstated, namely, that ‘where legislation is enacted to give
effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not bypass that legislation
and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging that legisla-
tion as falling short of the constitutional standard’.
Mbenenge ADJP cautioned against the attempts by practitio-
ners to fashion cases to suit their clients’ choice of forum (Motor
Industry Staff Association v Macun NO [2016] 3 BLCR 284
(SCA)). It is ineffective for litigants to raise a complaint of unfair
discrimination, which is an area the legislature has made the
subject of specialisation by specific courts, and then to seek to
deny the applicability of the provisions of the relevant legislation.
In the case under discussion, unfair discrimination was sourced
in the LRA. Therefore, the employee’s denial of the application of
the LRA was irrelevant. Section 23 of the Constitution regulates
the employment relationship between employer and employee
and guarantees the right to fair labour practices. The Labour
Court is the proper forum for disputes emanating from a breach of
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the right to fair labour practices (Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS
2014 (2) SA 1 (SCA) and Solidarity & others v SAPS & others
[2015] 7 BLLR 708 (LC)). Reliance by the applicant on the
alleged constitutionally protected right to pursue a career of his
choice does not change the character of his cause of action – it is
an employment dispute, justiciable in the Labour Court after all
other procedures provided for in the LRA have been followed.
The High Court therefore lacked jurisdiction.
UNFAIR DISMISSAL
Unlawful or unfair dismissal
During 2017, in Mhlongo v SARS (2017) 38 ILJ 1334 (LAC),
[2017] 9 BLLR 859, the Labour Appeal Court held that an
employer need not afford an employee a disciplinary hearing
after repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact him or her.
After being arrested at her workplace on allegations of corrup-
tion, of which Ms Mhlongo (the employee) was later acquitted, a
work colleague allegedly confiscated the employee’s access
card and informed her that she had been suspended with
immediate effect. She received no response to a letter addressed
to her employer, the South African Revenue Service (the SARS),
in which she requested confirmation of her suspension and
reasons for her suspension, and she was not paid her salary. Two
months later, the SARS wrote a letter to the employee’s attorneys
indicating that she had been dismissed. The employee brought
an application in the Labour Court in terms of section 77 of the
BCEA, alleging that the SARS had breached her contract by
suspending and dismissing her without adhering to its disciplin-
ary code. She sought, amongst other things, an order of specific
performance for her reinstatement. The SARS denied having
suspended the employee, claiming that she had simply stayed
away from work after her arrest. Furthermore, it was uncontested
that the SARS had sent letters by various means requesting the
employee to report for duty or explain her absence, and after
receiving no response, she had been dismissed. In the Labour
Court, the SARS succeeded in its application for the dismissal of
the application. The Labour Court agreed that the dispute was an
unfair dismissal dispute which had to be referred to arbitration,
because the Code relied upon by the employee did not, in the
court’s view, apply to her.
On appeal, the employee reiterated that the SARS was in
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breach of contract for not affording her a disciplinary hearing
before her suspension and dismissal. However, the SARS suc-
ceeded in its claim arguing that it would serve no purpose to refer
the matter back to the Labour Court, because the employee had
failed to make out a cased based on a breach of contract. The
Labour Appeal Court held that even though the Labour Court had
erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction, it would serve no
purpose to remit the matter back to it. Accordingly, the appeal
was dismissed.
In a contractual claim, the employee bears the evidentiary
burden of proving breach of the contract. The employee’s breach
of contract claim was unsubstantiated by the evidence. The
SARS had taken reasonable steps to deliver/cause delivery of
letters to the correct address. The dismissal had been effected in
compliance with the workplace policy.
The evidence put forward by the employee was contradictory,
and the employer’s version was far more plausible. Conse-
quently, the employee had failed to prove that she had been
suspended. Even if the employee had proven that her suspen-
sion was in breach of the agreement, because she had been
dismissed, the issue of her suspension was academic. She could
not be reinstated in that she had been dismissed for being absent
from work without a good cause.
This case illustrates how important it is to decide properly
between referring a matter as a contractual dispute in terms of
the BCEA, or in terms of the LRA based on unfair dismissal.
Instead of referring the matter based on breach of contract in
terms of the BCEA, the employee should have referred an unfair
dismissal dispute in terms of the LRA. She could then have
claimed reinstatement based on unfair dismissal. The test for
unfair dismissal is fairness. The evidentiary burden of proving the
fairness rests on the employer. Moreover, her use of motion
proceedings, knowing that her principal submission would be
disputed, was questionable.
Sanction of dismissal
In Msunduzi Municipality v Hoskins [2017] 2 BLLR 124 (LAC),
(2017) 38 ILJ 582, the salient facts were as follows. In his
capacity as HR official, the employee advised and represented
other co-employees on employment-related issues in disciplinary
matters. The employee continued to do so even after he was no
longer a member of a trade union. This became a concern for the
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management of the employer as it was viewed as a conflict of
interest with the employee’s responsibilities as a manager. The
newly appointed Municipal Manager instructed the employee to
cease representing fellow employees with immediate effect. In
direct conflict with this instruction, he continued to represent
employees in disciplinary inquiries. The Municipal Manager, after
taking legal advice, delivered a reply noting concern at the
employee’s aggressive, disobedient, and disrespectful approach
to the instruction given him, and further drew his attention to some
five disciplinary hearings and arbitrations at SALGBC he had
handled after the instruction to stop doing so. The employee was
instructed to provide the employer with a list of matters in which
he would defend other employees. The employee failed to
provide the list and continued representing a co-employee at a
disciplinary inquiry. Subsequently, the employer charged the
employee with gross insubordination, gross insolence, and gross
misconduct. He was found guilty on all the charges and dis-
missed.
Aggrieved by his dismissal, the employee referred an unfair
dismissal dispute to the bargaining council. During the arbitra-
tion, the Municipal Manager testified, among other things, that by
virtue of his position, the employee had access to confidential
information and strategies. It was argued further that the employ-
ment relationship had been destroyed and that if the employee
were to be reinstated, it would undermine the entire spirit of the
organisation. His actions were at war with the administration and
he showed no remorse (para [14]). His peers felt a level of
distrust and dishonesty on his part and were unable to work with
him.
The employee testified, among other things, that he had not
been grossly insubordinate because the Constitution, the LRA,
and the collective agreement guaranteed an employee’s right to
be represented; that the instruction of the Municipal Manager
was unlawful and in blatant violation of the employee’s rights; that
there was no conflict of interest as he only assisted in cases that
were not in his unit; and that his ‘forward approach’ caused his
relationship with the Municipal Manager to be acrimonious (para
[16]). The bargaining council arbitrator decided that there was no
need for progressive discipline as the employee appeared
defensive rather than remorseful. The arbitrator also considered
the insolence and insubordination to be wilful and serious, and
amounting to gross insubordination. There was a collective
768 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 68 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/21−Labour−Law−Individual
agreement in the workplace which provided for dismissal for a
first offence of gross insubordination. The employee was given
numerous free get-out-of-jail cards on this count alone. Conse-
quently, the arbitrator found in the employer’s favour. Regarding
the sanction, the arbitrator agreed that the disruptive and rude
demeanour of the employee before and during the disciplinary
hearing, showed that the employment relationship had broken
down and that the work environment could not be productive if
the employee were permitted to remain in this employment.
On review, the Labour Court confirmed the arbitrator’s findings
and held that the employee was guilty in that he had ‘committed a
serious offence which highly impinged on his duty to be respect-
ful to his superior, the head of his employer institution’ (para [21]).
However, the Labour Court concluded that the sanction of
dismissal was too harsh. The arbitrator had not had due regard of
the fact that the employee was over 50 years old, and that his age
militated against future job prospects; there was no evidence of
similar misconduct in the past; the employee had been in the
employer’s employ for over 25 years; there was no evidence that
reinstatement was not practical; and that the employee did not
work directly under the manager. There was no evidence that he
worked closely with the Municipal Manager and received his
daily instructions from him.
In a subsequent appeal, the Labour Appeal Court, after
applying the test for review, found that the arbitrator’s decision
was reasonable. The employee had been found guilty on serious
charges of insubordination and insolence. He had challenged the
authority of the Municipal Manager directly. Therefore, the arbitra-
tor had correctly applied his mind to all of the material facts in
determining the appropriate sanction. He had considered progres-
sive discipline but found that, given, among other things, the
seriousness of the transgression, the lack of remorse, the com-
plete breakdown in the employment relationship, and the respon-
sibility of the municipality to deliver services, it would not be
practicable to reinstate the employee (para [29]). Consequently,
the Labour Court’s decision was overturned.
Incapacity
During 2017, the Labour Court in Exarro Coal (Pty) Ltd t/a
Grootgeluk Coal Mine v Maduma & others (2017) 38 ILJ 2531
(LC), granted a review application setting aside an award in
terms of which the dismissal of the employee on the basis of his
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medical incapacity was ruled procedurally and substantively
unfair and retrospective reinstatement into a different position
was ordered.
The facts were as follows. At the time of his dismissal, the
employee suffered from lung disease. The employer maintained
that this had prevented him from performing his duties as he was
required to work in a dusty area. According to the employer, no
suitable alternative post was available. A medical panel board
had, after performing medical tests and scrutinising reports
received form the employee’s doctors, concluded that the
employee was permanently medically unfit for work, whereupon
the employer dismissed him for incapacity. Before the dismissal,
incapacity meetings had been held with the employee and his
trade union. During the meetings, the evidence showed that none
of the vacant posts which existed at the time were suitable, either
because the employee lacked the minimum qualification for the
vacancies, or because he would in any event still have to work in
dusty areas.
At arbitration, the arbitrator found that the duty to investigate
the employee’s medical condition lay with the employer. The
arbitrator noted that in this case, the employer had failed to
conduct its own medical investigation before the dismissal, and
instead had based its decision on reports obtained from the
employee’s own doctors (para [13]). The employee’s own special-
ist had rendered an incomplete diagnosis because further tests
were required to determine the cause of the illness and the extent
to which it was treatable. This had not been done as the
employee’s medical aid had run out. Consequently, the arbitrator
concluded that at the time of the dismissal, it had not been
determined whether the employee’s incapacity was of a tempo-
rary or permanent nature, and that no conclusion could be
reached on the nature and degree of his ill health. His dismissal
had, consequently, been based on inconclusive reports. The
arbitrator also ruled that the employee ought to have been given
the position of a team assistant, which was on the same level as
his own position, and in which the fact that he did not have a
grade 12 certificate was not material as his own position required
the same qualification, but he had nonetheless been employed in
that post.
As for procedural fairness, the arbitrator found that, in the
absence of obtaining a final medical report, the incapacity
meetings convened by the employer were meaningless (para
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[16]) and that it was merely going through the motions of
conducting a proper procedure.
On review, Lagrange J held that it was not reasonable for the
arbitrator to have reached the conclusion that at the time of his
dismissal the employee was fit to work in an alternative position.
The medical reports, coupled with the dusty conditions, rendered
that premise untenable. However, the arbitrator had been correct
to find that more ought to have been done by the employer to
establish whether the employee’s incapacity was permanent or
temporary before proceeding with the incapacity meetings (para
[37]). The enquiry into incapacity is not concerned solely with an
employee’s inability to perform his or her current duties, but also
with evaluating the prospect of there being feasible alternatives
to dismissal which, in turn, may depend on the medical progno-
sis.
Inconsistency
The decision of Molahlehi J in the trial court was confirmed on
appeal by Phatshoane AJA in Noosi v Exxaro Matla Coal [2017]
ZALAC 3. The Labour Court held, and the Labour Appeal Court
confirmed, that on a balance of probabilities the employee had
been grossly negligent by failing to comply with the workplace’s
safety rules, and grossly insubordinate by refusing to obey
safety-related instructions. The employer’s disciplinary code pro-
vided that the sanction for gross insubordination justified sum-
mary dismissal. The employee argued that this notwithstanding,
he should not have been dismissed as other employees who had
committed similar misconduct in the past were treated differently
and exonerated. Molahlehi J rejected this argument, holding that
a general allegation of inconsistency is not sufficient. A concrete
allegation identifying the persons who were treated differently or
preferentially, and the basis upon which they ought not to have
been so treated, must be set out clearly. Consequently, the
appeal was dismissed.
Opperman v CCMA & others (2017) 38 ILJ 242 (LC) is one of
the rare cases where the sanction in a dismissal is set aside on
review. In the Labour Court, Steenkamp J held that the arbitrator
had made an error in law which rendered the award reviewable.
The facts were briefly that the applicant employee, a nurse who
had been employed for ten years without incident, was requested
to undergo a breathalyser test at work one morning. The test was
positive as she had had some drinks the previous evening. After a
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disciplinary hearing, the employee received a severe written
warning valid for twelve months. She lodged an internal appeal
against the sanction only. The appeal tribunal amended the
sanction to dismissal. The employee proceeded to launch an
unfair dismissal dispute at the CCMA. The commissioner ruled
the dismissal substantively fair, but procedurally unfair and
ordered the employer to pay compensation to the employee. The
employee approached the Labour Court where she applied for
review and setting aside of the finding that her dismissal was
substantively fair. She argued that the arbitrator had perpetrated
an error in law, and grossly misapplied the law pertaining to
consistency in disciplinary measures.
On the issue of consistency in dismissal as sanction, the
arbitrator had considered the employer’s disciplinary code, which
provided for dismissal as a sanction where an employee is found
to be under the influence of alcohol. Three other employees who
had been under the influence of alcohol had previously not been
dismissed. The arbitrator found that the employer had not been
consistent in its application of sanctions for the same miscon-
duct. However, he took into account that the general manager
had issued a memorandum to the effect that dismissal would be
imposed against those who come to work under the influence of
alcohol (para [12]). He found that the employee had been aware
of the memorandum and that the company could not be said to
have been inconsistent in dismissing her.
Even though the award was set aside due to the error in law,
Steenkamp J continued to evaluate whether the matter could also
be reviewable based on inconsistency. The requirement that an
employer must be consistent in the exercise of discipline (the
‘parity principle’; para [27]) has its origin in the requirement that
an employee is entitled to be aware of the standard of conduct
expected by the employer, and is entitled to know, in advance,
what the consequences of non-compliance will be. Referring to
NUMSA v Henred Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 1257
(A); CEPPWAWU v Metrofile (Pty) Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 231 (LAC)
paras [42] [57]–[59]; and Cape Town City Council v Mashito
(2000) 21 ILJ 1957 (LAC) 1961A–F, Steenkamp J confirmed that
inconsistent treatment rendered dismissals arbitrary and substan-
tively unfair. It is for the employer to demonstrate why like cases
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of misconduct should not be treated alike, and to distinguish
between those cases in a fair manner.
Dismissal for participation in short illegal strike
In 2017, the Labour Appeal Court in SACCAWU obo Mokebe &
others v Pick ’n Pay Retailers [2017] 12 BLLR 1196 (LAC), (2018)
39 ILJ 201, considered whether dismissal is the correct sanction
in the context of employees who embarked on a short-duration
unprotected strike.
After wage negotiations reached a deadlock, 61 variable-time
employees (VTEs) working for Pick ’n Pay, the employer, went on
an hour-long unprotected strike at one of the employer’s stores.
Although a certificate of outcome of the dispute had been issued,
and the workers had given notice of the intended strike as
required, the strike was supposed to take place at 19h00, but
commenced at 15h00 instead. The employer dismissed the
VTEs. Their trade union, the South African Commercial Catering
and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) instituted an unfair dis-
missal dispute on their behalf.
In the Labour Court, the employer argued successfully that the
penalty of dismissal was apt. The Labour Court was convinced
that the employees had acted deliberately when going on strike
at 15h00 and had done so against clear instructions from the
employer’s management team. The Labour Court felt that the fact
that the strike only lasted for an hour did not mitigate the
seriousness of the unprotected strike, and that the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The Labour Court
considered as aggravating, that the VTEs were already on final
warning for the same conduct; that the employees had embarked
on the unprotected strike in the last and busiest hour of trading on
a public holiday; that they had clearly intended to cause the
employer damage; that the VTEs had defied numerous instruc-
tions and warnings by management not to strike at that time; that
the VTEs had deliberately tried to mislead the Labour Court by
claiming that due to a miscommunication they thought they were
entitled to strike at 15:00; and that the VTEs showed no remorse.
These factors, the Labour Court felt, rendered a continued
employment relationship intolerable. In the result, the Labour
Court ruled the dismissal of the VTEs substantively and procedur-
ally fair.
On appeal before Waglay JP, the main question was whether
dismissal was justified. The Labour Appeal Court held that when
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determining whether dismissal is the appropriate sanction, it
must be considered whether dismissal is proportionate to the
misconduct. Dismissal should be a last resort. Waglay JP noted
that the court below had erred in finding that the VTEs had acted
in deliberate defiance of the employer’s management. On the
evidence, the employees believed that they were allowed to
strike at 15h00 based on assurances from the union representa-
tives. Moreover, there had been a change in the plans. The strike
was originally supposed to commence at 15h00, but the starting
time was later changed to 19h00 to meet the 48-hour notice
requirement. The union representatives were unable to notify all
the stores of the change. That some of the workers were on a final
written warning for previously participating in a march, did not
warrant dismissal for misconduct for participating in an illegal
strike, which differs materially from the previous misconduct for
which they had been warned. The misconduct was also not
sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal. A written warning would
have been more appropriate given that this was a first contraven-
tion. The employer also did not apply the penalty of dismissal
consistently. Not all the workers who participated in the unpro-
tected strike at that store were dismissed. Those who were not
already on a final written warning only received written warnings.
Similarly, the employees at other stores, even those who were on
written warning, only received further written warnings. This
rendered the VTEs’ dismissals substantively unfair.
The company’s representatives attempted to dissuade the
VTEs from striking before 19h00, but an ultimatum should have
been issued to give the workers an opportunity to reflect on their
conduct and to seek advice before deciding whether or not to
heed the ultimatum. The VTEs apparently believed that the strike
was a protected one. Had they been furnished with a written
ultimatum they probably would not have proceeded. The employer
failed to give the individual employees an opportunity to be heard
before dismissing them. Although the employer held a collective
disciplinary hearing, and an appeal hearing in which the trade
union could participate before the dismissal, individual employ-
ees were not granted an opportunity to submit written representa-
tions. While in strike dismissals a collective hearing may be used,
this must be after consideration of the circumstances so as to
assess the fairness of the procedure followed by the employer.
The trade union had taken steps to legalise the strike.
The court considered whether the employment relationship
between the employer and VTEs had broken down irreparably
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because of the VTEs’ misconduct. It considered that after the
illegal strikes the VTEs had not been suspended, and they had
continued working until their dismissal. This contradicted the
finding that the trust relationship had been destroyed. The
employer had not proved the loss that it claimed to have suffered
in support of substantive fairness. Also, that the trust relationship
with certain employees who participated in the illegal strike had
remained intact, but not the relationship with others, was unten-
able. The Labour Court’s order was set aside and replaced with
an order declaring the dismissal of the VTEs procedurally and
substantively unfair. The employer was ordered to reinstate the
dismissed employees retrospectively with back pay, and to pay
the legal costs.
Dismissal for misrepresenting qualifications in CV
The issue in the section 145 review application in the matter of
LTE Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration & others [2017] 12 BLLR 1259 (LC), (2017) 38 ILJ
2787 (LC), before Myburgh J, was whether the commissioner’s
finding that the employee was not guilty of dishonestly misrepre-
senting his CV was reasonable. The employee was charged and
dismissed on the ground of gross dishonesty in that his CV
provided false information pertaining to his qualifications. A
dispute proceeded to arbitration before the commissioner, which
resulted in an award that the employee’s dismissal had been
substantively unfair. The employer was ordered to pay him
compensation. The employer sought to have this award set aside
on review.
When the employee was appointed as financial manager, he
was turning 82, well beyond the company’s ordinary retirement
age of 65. Although it was not expressly discussed during the
interview, the employee provided a copy of his Curriculum Vitae
(CV) before the interview. It was taken at face value as there was
no reason to doubt the contents. The employee was the preferred
candidate and was recommended based on his CV. The CV
indicated that the employee had a BCom and an MBA degree,
and that he was a qualified chartered accountant. During the
arbitration the employee admitted that he was not a chartered
accountant and that he did not hold a BCom or MBA degree.
However, he sought to deflect his dishonesty either on the basis
of recognition of prior learning, or that he had equivalent qualifi-
cations. He testified that he had written the examination for BCom
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first year accountancy which he argued was equivalent to being
admitted as a chartered accountant.
The commissioner’s award was based on his finding that the
employee’s dismissal was a sham designed to secure the
employee’s retirement which was the reason for the investigation
of his CV in the first place. The commissioner’s view was also that
the representations in question by the employee in his CV were
not material in securing the position of financial manager, and, in
any event, he was convinced that the employee had equivalent
qualifications.
In the Labour Court, Myburgh J disagreed. He stated that even
if the qualifications which the employee had misrepresented were
not a requirement for the job, it did not negate the employee’s
dishonesty in misrepresenting himself as a chartered accountant
(Department of Home Affairs & another v Ndlovu & others (2014)
35 ILJ 3340 (LAC) para [23]). The employee had been grossly
dishonest in making this misrepresentation. He had also lied
about holding degrees which he had not completed and did so
without showing any remorse. In the result, his dismissal was
patently warranted. Taking into account previous judgments of
the Labour Appeal Court (SA Post Office Ltd v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2442
(LAC); Department of Home Affairs & another v Ndlovu & others
(2014) 35 ILJ 3340 (LAC); and G4S Secure Solutions (SA) (Pty)
Ltd v Ruggiero NO & others (2017) 38 ILJ 881 (LAC)) Myburgh J
concluded that the commissioner’s award stood to be set aside.
The commissioner’s finding that the dismissal was a sham was
unreasonable in that it could not be reconciled with the explana-
tion as to how the employer came to learn of the problems with
the employee’s CV. The commissioner’s finding that the misrepre-
sentation regarding the chartered accountant qualification was
immaterial, was wrong and finding that the employee had equiva-
lent qualifications missed the mark. Ultimately, the Labour Court
was convinced that the commissioner’s decision not to uphold
the employee’s dismissal was unreasonable as his dismissal had
been substantively fair.
Dismissal for making derogatory statements
The matter before Kathree-Setiloane AJA concerned a dis-
missal for misconduct for making derogatory comments about an
employee to another employee. The commissioner of the CCMA
found that employer had failed to discharge the onus of proving
that these words were uttered by the employee.
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Kathree-Setiloane AJA, presiding over the matter in South
African Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Hansen & others [2017] ZALAC 33,
held that, where derogatory and racist language is used in the
workplace, the employer bears the evidentiary burden to prove
that the language used by the employee was objectively deroga-
tory. The onus then shifts to the employee who disputes using
such derogatory words. Whether the employee will be absolved
depends on the credibility of the witnesses, the reliability of the
evidence presented, and the probabilities. The Labour Appeal
Court held that in this case the commissioner had deferred his
assessment of the credibility of witnesses to the internal chair-
person’s report, which resulted in an unreasonable award (para
[8]). The court below had erred in upholding the award during the
review proceedings (para [9]). With reference to the Constitu-
tional Court’s finding in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum
Mines Ltd & others (above), Kathree-Setiloane AJA confirmed
that the Sidumo test requires the Labour Court on review to
enquire whether the commissioner’s decision was one that a
reasonable decision-maker could not have reached on the
available evidence. Defective reasoning notwithstanding, an
arbitration award may still pass muster provided that the result is
one that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached. In
Gold Fields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others
(Gold Fields) [2014] 1 BLLR 20 (LAC), the Labour Appeal Court
had refined the Sidumo test by introducing a two-stage enquiry.
In short, this requires the Labour Court to consider two issues:
first, whether the applicant has established an irregularity. This
irregularity could be a material error of fact or law, the failure to
apply one’s mind to relevant evidence, or misconceiving of the
enquiry or assessing factual disputes in an arbitrary fashion.
Secondly, it must be ascertained whether the applicant has
established that the irregularity was material to the outcome by
demonstrating on the evidence before the arbitrator, that the
outcome would have been different but for the defect. An
arbitration award will, therefore, be considered reasonable when
there is a material connection between the evidence and the
result.
Kathree-Setiloane AJA upheld the appeal and declared the
employee’s dismissal substantively and procedurally fair in light
of the seriousness of the misconduct of using the derogatory
words, and the penalties imposed in recent cases featuring
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similar employee utterances in the workplace (South African
Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration & others (2017) 38 ILJ 97 (CC) para [4]; Thembani v
Swanepoel 2017 (3) SA 70 (ECM). See, too, G Devenish ‘A great
triumph par excellence for non-racism in our jurisprudence:
Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 2016 (5) SA 594
(CC)’ (2017) 38/1 Obiter 222.
In another case involving allegedly racist remarks, the Labour
Appeal Court held that not all words that describe race and could
potentially offend a person on that basis should be considered
racist. Whether the term is objectively derogatory or racist
depends on the context in which it is used. This was the concern
addressed in SAEWA obo Bester v Rustenburg Platinum Mine &
another (2017) 38 ILJ 1779 (LAC), [2017] 8 BLLR 764.
The facts were briefly that the employee, Bester, was dis-
missed for making a racist remark by referring to another
employee as a ‘swartman’ when requesting him to move his motor
vehicle. After an unsuccessful internal appeal, the employee
referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA where the
commissioner ruled his dismissal both substantively and proce-
durally unfair and ordered the employer to reinstate him with
retrospective effect. The employer launched an application to
review and set aside the arbitration award. The Labour Court held
that there was no reason to justify the use of race as an identifier
in this instance, and that the employee had committed an act of
serious misconduct which warranted his dismissal. On that basis,
the award was reviewed and set aside.
On appeal, the employer bore the evidentiary burden of
proving that the language used by Bester was objectively deroga-
tory. The Labour Appeal Court noted that the test is an objective
one – the court must examine the entire context in which the
misconduct is alleged to have occurred and decide, on a
balance of probabilities, whether the employee is guilty of
misconduct. Thereafter, the onus shifts to the employee to prove
the existence of a ground of justification, and that the derogatory
or racist remark was not made with the intention to demean (para
[18]).
The impact of a derogatory or racist word on a person to whom
it is addressed, and that he or she felt offended, is only one of the
relevant factors during this assessment. The word uttered must
be proven to have been derogatory and racist in the context.
Using a race descriptor does not mean that the language is
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necessarily derogatory and racist (para [15]). The evidence
showed that the employee had no reason to denigrate his fellow
employee. He used the racial descriptor to identify the other
employee whose name was unknown to him. This could be
considered racist, but that is not the only plausible inference.
The Labour Appeal Court held that the finding in the arbitration
that the dismissal was substantively and procedurally unfair was
one that a reasonable decision-maker could make. Therefore, the
Labour Court had erred by using a subjective test in its assess-
ment and in reviewing and setting aside the commissioner’s
ruling. The Labour Court’s judgment was set aside and replaced
with a decision that the review application be dismissed. The
appeal was upheld with costs and an obiter remark (para [30])
was made that in a racially-charged society, an accusation of
racism has far-reaching and serious consequences and one
should scrutinise the context in which a race descriptor is used
without presuming that the mere use of a race descriptor is
axiomatically derogatory and racist (para [30]).
The Labour Appeal Court’s decision was overturned in a
subsequent appeal to the highest court (Rustenburg Platinum
Mine and SAEWA obo Bester & others [2018] ZACC 13). The
Constitutional Court made it very clear that making racist state-
ments in the workplace will not be tolerated. Even a statement
which appears to be a neutral race descriptor can be dubbed
racially abusive or insulting in the context.
TRANSFER OF A BUSINESS AS A GOING CONCERN
Effect of transfer of a business as a going concern
The Labour Appeal Court in High Rustenburg Estate (Pty) Ltd v
NEHAWU obo Cornelius & others (2017) 38 ILJ 1758 (LAC), was
faced with the question of whether section 197(5) of the LRA
applies to an arbitration award which was reversed and then
substituted by the Labour Court only after the transfer of the
relevant undertaking had taken place. Employees dismissed by
the second respondent, High Rustenburg Hydro (Pty) Ltd t/a
High Rustenburg Hydro (HRH), had instituted unsuccessful unfair
dismissal proceedings against HRH in the CCMA. They then
sought review in the Labour Court. In the Labour Court, Gush AJ
ordered HRH to pay compensation to the dismissed employees.
While the review proceedings were pending, HRH sold its
business as a going concern to iProp (Pty) Ltd (iProp). It
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appeared that iProp purchased 100 per cent of the shares in the
High Rustenburg Estate (Pty) Ltd (the appellant), and then sold
the HRH business as a going concern to the appellant in which it
held 100 per cent of the shares. Consequently, by the time Gush
AJ delivered judgment, the appellant was the proprietor of HRH.
Following the judgment, the sheriff attached property at HRH in
execution of Gush AJ’s judgment. The appellant challenged the
validity of this attachment in the Labour Court. The Labour Court
concluded that in terms of section 197 of the LRA, the employees
were entitled to enforce their claim against the appellant. On
appeal, the Labour Appeal Court held that the appellant had not
been afforded an opportunity to oppose the application which led
to the attachment of its property. Therefore, the Labour Appeal
Court ordered that the matter should be referred back to the
Labour Court as a stated case. The stated case was heard by
Rabin-Naicker J, who found that section 197(5) of the LRA
applied to this scenario. In a further appeal, Davis JA noted that
the purpose of section 197(5) is to ensure that all rights and
obligations between the employer selling the business, and each
employee at the time of the transfer to the purchaser, continue in
force as if they were rights and obligations between the pur-
chaser, the new employer, and each employee. It is the ‘new
employer’ who then bears the duty to fulfil the relevant obligations
(para [14]). Davis JA correctly found the contention that the right
of an employee against the new employer depends on the stage
at which the appeal or review is. The wording of section 197(5) of
the LRA provides clearly that an arbitration award that can be
binding on the former employer immediately before the date of
transfer of the business, binds the new employer. The Labour
Court had merely substituted a correct award for an award which
in its view was incorrect. This does not change the fact that the
award which bound the old employer immediately before the
date of transfer had been transferred to the new employer, as the
substituted award must be deemed to take effect from the date
on which the original award was handed down. The appeal was
dismissed.
Establishing whether a transfer as a going concern occurred
In SVA Security (Pty) Ltd v Makro (Pty) Ltd a Division of
Massmart & others (2017) 38 ILJ 2376 (LC), the Labour Court
confirmed that, even if the operations of a business of an old
service provider appears to continue seamlessly under a new
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service provider, it would not necessarily mean that a transfer of a
business as a going concern as envisaged in section 197 of the
LRA, has taken place.
SVA Security (Pty) Ltd (SVA) was a provider of security ser-
vices. Makro (Pty) Ltd (Makro), a division of Massmart Group,
was the principal provider of a security contract to SVA between
2008 and 1 April 2017. During December 2016, Makro invited
security contractors, including SVA, to bid or re-tender for the
guarding contracts. In January 2017 the tender was awarded to
Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd (Fidelity). This meant that from
1 April 2017, Fidelity would render essentially the same security
services previously rendered by SVA at all the Makro retail
premises but would use its own equipment. SVA approached the
Labour Court seeking a declaratory order that awarding of the
contract to Fidelity constituted a transfer of an undertaking as a
going concern in terms of section 197 of the LRA. That would
mean that the employment contracts of the 89 remaining respon-
dents, additional to some 240 individual respondents that had
been employed by Fidelity in the meantime, must be taken up by
Fidelity as from the date of the transfer. Fidelity opposed the
application.
The Labour Court did not deem the matter urgent and noted
that it stood to be struck from the roll on that ground alone. SVA
had only approached the court some 52 court days after it had
lost the contract. The court held that you cannot create your own
emergency. The longer it takes from the date of the event giving
rise to the proceedings, the more the urgency diminishes. That
Fidelity had refused to take over the employees as part of a going
concern also did not make the matter urgent: the matter could be
resolved amicably. That the remaining employees would lose
their jobs, or that Fidelity had appointed only certain of the
employees, also did not make the matter urgent. There were
other remedies on which the employees who had not been
appointed could rely.
As to whether a transfer as contemplated in section 197 of the
LRAhad occurred, the court considered the following facts. In the
transaction between Makro and Fidelity there was no transfer of
equipment, intellectual property, or tangible or intangible assets,
only cancellation of the contract of service. Although Fidelity
would continue to service the contract with Makro without interrup-
tion, section 197 of the LRA applies only if a business has
changed hands. Even though ‘business’ in section 197(1) includes
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a service, the business that supplies the service must change
hands. Components of the original business must be passed to a
third party. Whether a transfer has occurred, depends on the
facts of each case. A termination of a service contract, and the
awarding of that contract to a third party, does not constitute a
transfer: the service provider whose contract has been termi-
nated loses the contract, but retains its business, and can offer
the same service to other clients with its workforce intact. That
some of the applicant’s employees were appointed, did not mean
that there had been a transfer. That would mean that every time
that a contract of service is taken over by a new service provider,
the new service provider would have to take over all the old
service provider’s employees. This would imply that the old
service provider, after losing a contract, can wash its hands of its
employees. This is not what section 197 of the LRA aims to
achieve. Its purpose is to protect employees’ security of employ-
ment where a genuine transfer as a going concern has occurred.
Where there has been no transfer, the affected employees can
call on section 189 of the LRA, and to the extent that the new
service provider has selectively re-employed the old service
provider’s employees, the workers not appointed have remedies
under the EEA. In the result, SVA’s application was dismissed with
costs.
Unfair dismissal: Reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed-term
contract
Sutherland JA had to decide whether the outcome in Zungu v
Premier, Province of KwaZulu-Natal & another (2017) 38 ILJ 1644
(LAC), [2017] 9 BLLR 949, where the employee alleged that she
had a reasonable expectation that her fixed-term contract would
be renewed, was correct. The employee sought to compel a
renewal of her contract based on a legitimate expectation
premised on a recommendation by a selection panel, and that
the refusal to heed to the recommendation of the selection panel
amounted to an illegality according to the Labour Court juris-
diction.
Sutherland JA found that the dispute fell within the ambit of
section 186(1)(b) of the LRA, and that disguising the dispute as
also exhibiting other characteristics does not negate the validity
of the finding that it fell under section 186(1)(b). Further, where a
clear classification is possible, it is not sensible to force a
different characterisation to facilitate forum shopping (para [20]).
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Aclaim that a fixed-term contract be renewed on the grounds of a
legitimate expectation is a class of ‘dismissal’ as defined in
section 186 and is further regulated by section 191 of the LRA as
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CCMA. The Labour
Court’s judgment was therefore upheld, and the appeal dis-
missed.
Replacement of sanction by employer
In Central University of Technology v Kholoane & others (2017)
38 ILJ 167 (LC), Matyolo AJ was of the view that clauses in
disciplinary procedures and/or codes that allow for senior man-
agement to change the sanctions decided upon by a chairperson
in a disciplinary hearing cannot be understood to give manage-
ment an unfettered discretion. This type of concession serves as
a tool only to address instances where incorrect sanctions that
are wholly or shockingly inappropriate are imposed.
The employee was charged with fraudulent or dishonest con-
duct in relation to misappropriation and/or unlawful possession of
the employer’s property. The employee was found guilty in a
properly constituted disciplinary enquiry and issued with a final
written warning by the chairperson.
However, the employer changed the sanction to dismissal. In
support of the amendment, the employer referred to manage-
ment practice, and not an extant code of conduct, dealing with
review processes. The employer did not believe that the recom-
mended sanction reflected the nature and seriousness of the
misconduct of which the employee had been found guilty.
The employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the
CCMA where an attempt at conciliation proved fruitless. In the
subsequent arbitration, the arbitrator ruled the dismissal substan-
tively and procedurally unfair as the regulatory code of the
applicant lists several sanctions available to the employer to
address infractions like the one of which the employee was found
guilty. The list includes dismissal and alternative sanctions,
including a final written warning. The arbitrator also took into
consideration the time lapse between the misconduct and the
disciplinary hearing and found that this indicated that the trust
relationship had not broken done irrevocably. On procedural
fairness, the arbitrator noted that the employee had not been
afforded an opportunity to make representations on the changes
that led to his summary dismissal. Moreover, the chairperson who
had heard the evidence had not been involved in the changes to
the sanction.
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On review, the Labour Court referred to Kievits Kroon Country
Estate (Pty) v Mmoledi & others [2012] 11 BLLR 1099 (LAC), in
which it was held, among other things, that an applicant in a
review application must demonstrate that both the commission-
er’s reasons and the result of the award are unreasonable, and
that if the reasons are unassailable that brings an end to the
matter.
Matyolo AJ found, in casu, first, that it is a narrow interpretation
of the commissioner’s mandate to argue that the only issue the
arbitrator was to deal with was whether the applicant was
empowered to change the decision of final written warning to a
dismissal, and that in making findings on the unfairness of the
dismissal, the commissioner had exceeded his mandate. The
proper understanding is that the arbitrator was required to look at
whether the employee’s dismissal, based on the changes to the
sanction, was fair. The arbitrator applied a two-stage approach.
He first considered whether the applicant could change the
decision and found that it could; secondly, he considered whether
dismissal for reasons related to those changes was fair and found
that it was unfair.
Regarding the second consideration, the commissioner had to
deal with the effect of the changes and how they had been made
and decide whether the employer acted fairly. As regards whether
the employer had the power to change the decision, the arbitrator
had to deal with the fact that the change led to his dismissal. This
calls procedural and substantive fairness into play. Referring to
Zondo JP in Fidelity Cash Management Services v CCMA &
others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) paragraph [103], the Labour
Court found that there was no satisfactory explanation for the
changes, and the proper process had not been followed in
effecting them. The court further referred to Gold Fields Mining
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA& others [2014] 1
BLLR 20 (LAC), in which review was described as a process to
evaluate whether the commissioner’s award was reasonable in
light of all the evidence before him or her (paras [17] [18]); cf
Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others
above). In deciding how commissioners should determine whether
a dismissal was fair, it is important to bear in mind that security of
employment is a core value in the Constitution which has been
given effect to by the LRA.
It was ultimately found that clauses in disciplinary procedures
and/or codes that allow for employers to change sanctions
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cannot be understood to give employers an unfettered discretion,
but should rather be seen as tools to correct sanctions that are
wholly or shockingly inappropriate (para [32]). Also, it is unlikely
that a sanction listed as an alternative could be viewed as such.
The arbitrator’s award passed the Sidumo and Kloof Gold Mine
tests, and the review application was dismissed.
Sanction of dismissal fair
The Labour Appeal Court in Malungu & another v Rand Water &
others [2017] ZALAC 28 overturned an order by the Labour Court
which had the effect of finding the sanction of dismissal fair, when
in the Labour Court’s view, the commissioner had erred by not
finding the employee guilty on an additional charge warranting
dismissal.
The employee, Mahlungu, worked for Rand Water as a mechani-
cal foreman. He was charged and found guilty of committing four
acts of misconduct and was dismissed. A commissioner found
that Malungu was guilty of only two of the offences, neither of
which justified dismissal, and ordered his reinstatement. On
review, the Labour Court held that the employee was guilty of a
third infraction based on the employer’s procurement policy. This,
in the court’s view, rendered his dismissal fair. The employee
lodged an appeal with the Labour Appeal Court.
The Labour Appeal Court disagreed. In terms of the employer’s
disciplinary code and on the evidence, the employee was not
guilty of the third infraction. As for the sanction, the Labour
Appeal Court held that if the third charge on which Malungu had
been found guilty was indeed found to be an error by the Labour
Court, then the employee was only guilty of the other two charges
of misconduct which did not justify dismissal. In the result, the
commissioner’s sanction was a reasonable one. The Labour
Court’s order was amended to dismiss the application for review
of the commissioner’s award with no order as to costs.
Double jeopardy
During 2017, the LabourAppeal Court also considered whether
a dispute should be remitted back to arbitration if the commis-
sioner had failed to consider a charge against the dismissed
employee at an internal disciplinary enquiry, which did not form
the foundation of, or the true reason for, the dismissal. The result
was a divided judgment in Jorgensen v I Kat Computing (Pty) Ltd
& others [2018] 3 BLLR 254 (LAC), (2018) 39 ILJ 785.
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Since 2005, Jorgensen had worked as a product integration
specialist at I Kat Computing (Pty) Ltd (the employer). Jorgensen
got on well with the employer’s Managing Director (Smith). When
Jorgensen resigned in 2011 to relocate to Durban, Smith offered
him a post at the employer’s Durban office, which Jorgensen
accepted. However, the business at the Durban branch was not
successful. In 2013, Smith requested Jorgensen to send him
monthly reports, which Jorgensen failed to do. Smith then informed
the staff that they would receive no pay until they turned a profit.
Their salaries were halved due to Jorgensen’s alleged failure to
meet any of his performance targets. Jorgensen instructed an
attorney to take the matter up, whereupon he (Jorgensen) was
called to a disciplinary hearing in Johannesburg. Worried that he
would not be afforded a fair hearing, Jorgensen stayed away
from this disciplinary hearing on legal advice. Two disciplinary
enquiries in Durban chaired by an independent chairperson
followed. The first enquiry related to Jorgensen’s alleged gross
insubordination in not attending the disciplinary hearing in Johan-
nesburg. The second concerned Jorgensen’s alleged poor work
performance. The chairperson found Jorgensen guilty of gross
insubordination and recommended his dismissal. The disciplin-
ary chair did not recommend Jorgensen’s dismissal for poor work
performance, as his performance could not be evaluated satisfac-
torily. Jorgensen referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the
CCMA.
The CCMA commissioner noted that the disciplinary chair-
person had not made a finding regarding the alleged poor work
performance or recommend his dismissal. In the result, the
commissioner dealt only with whether Jorgensen was guilty of
gross insubordination and, if so, whether dismissal was the
appropriate sanction. On the evidence, and with reference to
case law, the commissioner found that the employer’s failure to
fulfil its contractual obligations by not paying Jorgensen in full
meant that Jorgensen was not obliged to attend the disciplinary
enquiry. He concluded that Jorgensen’s dismissal for gross
insubordination was substantively unfair. As Jorgensen did not
seek to be reinstated, the commissioner awarded him compensa-
tion equal to nine months’ salary. On review, the Labour Court
held that Jorgensen had purportedly been dismissed for gross
insubordination and poor work performance, and that the commis-
sioner ought to have arbitrated the dismissal dispute with refer-
ence to poor work performance as well.
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The Labour Court agreed with the commissioner’s finding that
Jorgensen had a choice not to attend the disciplinary enquiry,
and that his failure to do so did not amount to gross insubordina-
tion. Therefore, the Labour Court confirmed the findings of the
commissioner relating to the misconduct charge. The dispute
was, however, referred back to the CCMA to be heard by a
different commissioner to determine whether Jorgensen’s dis-
missal for allegedly ‘causing financial loss to the company as a
result of (his) inactivity, actions and mismanagement of the
Branch’ (para [41]) had been procedurally and substantively fair.
Jorgensen was granted leave to appeal the judgment.
On appeal, as regards the insubordination charge, the Labour
Appeal Court agreed unanimously with the commissioner’s ruling
and reasons for finding that Jorgensen’s failure to attend the
disciplinary enquiry did not amount to gross insubordination.
Therefore, the commissioner’s ruling was found to have been
reasonable and his finding was confirmed.
Regarding the remedy, the Labour Appeal Court noted that
Jorgensen had not sought reinstatement. However, the Labour
Appeal Court held that the compensation amount that had been
awarded ignored the fact that Jorgensen was appointed on a
fixed-term contract that had only five months remaining at the
time of his dismissal. The court held that an employee who
succeeds in proving an unfair dismissal should not be awarded
relief in the form of more compensation than his or her actual loss
of income. Jorgensen sought compensation equivalent to six
months’ pay, but in accordance with the award made he would
receive compensation in an amount equivalent to nine months’
remuneration. The award was reduced to an amount equal to
what he would have earned in the five months while employed by
the employer.
As for whether the dispute concerning poor work performance
should be remitted to arbitration, the minority (in the judgment
penned down by Landman JA) agreed with the Labour Court’s
finding that the commissioner ought to have considered the poor
work performance charge despite the independent disciplinary
enquiry not having made a finding on this issue or on Jorgensen
allegedly causing the employer a financial loss. Landman JA
proposed an enabling award to allow Jorgensen, within a limited
time, to pursue the dispute based on his alleged poor work
performance. The majority (in a judgment written by Phatshoane
AJA) rejected this reasoning. Tlaletsi DJP held that remitting the
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poor work performance dispute back to the CCMA would be
incompetent for several reasons: it would subject Jorgensen to
double jeopardy as he had not been found guilty of poor work
performance at the internal disciplinary hearing; the employer
would be provided an opportunity through the back door to
appeal the finding of its own chairperson in arbitration proceed-
ings; the order for remittance proposed by the minority is
impractical as an employee cannot be compelled to refer an
unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA if he or she does not wish to
do so; Jorgensen had long left the employ of the employer and it
would not be sensible to subject him to discipline by the
employer; in effect the CCMA commissioner would be empow-
ered to reconsider the appellant’s alleged poor work perfor-
mance; the referral that was made to the commission was an
unfair dismissal dispute based on misconduct and not incapac-
ity; Jorgensen referred the appeal, not the employer, and he did
not wish to have the dispute concerning his alleged poor work
performance arbitrated.
Dismissal for dishonesty
The employee in Bidserv Industrial Products (Pty) Ltd v Com-
mission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others
(2017) 38 ILJ 860 (LAC) was dismissed by the employer subse-
quent to a disciplinary hearing at which he was found to have
been dishonest in that he had submitted a false statement of
costs (a quotation) from his child’s school for the employer to pay
more than it should in terms of its bursary scheme. Aggrieved, the
employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA,
where it was found that there had been collusion between the
employee and his witness regarding the procurement of the
quotation, and that prima facie the fourth respondent could be
said to be guilty of dishonesty; that the employer was inconsistent
in the application of discipline; and that the employee’s length of
service militated against his dismissal (para [23]). The employer
was ordered to reinstate the employee with limited back pay. The
award was upheld on review by the Labour Court.
On review, the Labour Appeal Court (Phatshoane AJA) found
that the commissioner had failed to determine the primary
question of whether the employee had been dishonest, which
was central to the finding of whether the reason for the dismissal
was fair (para [24]; cf Head of Department of Education v
Mofokeng & others (2015) 36 ILJ 2802 (LAC)). The Labour
788 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 88 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/21−Labour−Law−Individual
Appeal Court was satisfied that it had been proven that the
employee knowingly submitted a false quotation in the hope of
claiming more than he was entitled to. The court held that the
commissioner ought not to have posed the question of inconsis-
tency in the application of discipline by the employer without
having first determined the underlying reason for the dismissal
(paras [29]–[33]; cf Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu & others (2015) 36 ILJ
602 (LAC) para [36]; National Union of Mineworkers on behalf of
Botsane v Anglo Platinum Mine (Rustenburg Section) (2014) 35
ILJ 2406 (LAC) para [39]). Phatshoane AJA, with reference to
case law in point (Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others
(2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC); Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Mabija & others
[2016] 5 BLLR 454 (LAC)) concluded that the misconduct
committed by the employee was serious, notwithstanding his
length of service, and still justified his dismissal. The appeal was
upheld.
Poor work performance
The employer in Damelin (Pty) Ltd v Solidarity obo Parkinson &
others (2017) 38 ILJ 872 (LAC), [2017] 7 BLLR 672 (LAC),
appealed a judgment by the Labour Court. In the Labour Court,
Bleazard AJ had reviewed and set aside an award made by a
CCMA commissioner in favour of the employees, by finding that
they had been unfairly dismissed based on their poor perfor-
mance. The result in casu was that the appeal was dismissed on
the basis that the period for meeting the target issued to the
workers after a warning for poor work performance had been too
short, or alternatively that the target was unattainable. In sum-
mary the facts were as follows.
After being given a target to market and recruit students to its
branch and to conduct research, the employee complained to
the employer that the target set was unrealistic. The manager
replied that the target was the same as in the previous year and
suggested that the employee be creative and canvass a greater
area where he said there were schools and very little tertiary
education. To this suggestion, the employee replied that the
students would rather go to the campuses in that area and,
therefore, the target set by management remained unrealistic
and was setting the employee’s team up for failure. Unsurpris-
ingly, the employee’s team did not meet the target. The employee
was called to attend a disciplinary inquiry based on poor work
performance and dismissed.
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Against the guidelines in the Code on Good Practice: Dismissal
for Poor Work Performance (para [24]), the CCMA commissioner
considered that the employee had been afforded more than six
months to improve his performance. Moreover, during that time
the employee had not communicated that his targets were
unattainable. The commissioner also considered that higher
standards are expected of senior employees. In the result, the
dismissal was ruled to have been the appropriate sanction.
Dissatisfied with the outcome the employee applied to the Labour
Court seeking to review and set the award aside. The Labour
Court did so on the basis that the employer had deviated from its
own disciplinary procedure, and the CCMA commissioner had
allowed the employer to ask its witnesses leading questions
despite objections to this approach (para [25]). The Labour
Appeal Court referred to Palace Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Ngcobo
& others (2014) 35 ILJ 1971 (LAC), in which it was held (para
[24]) that senior employees are expected to assess whether they
are performing on standard. Consequently, they do not need the
same degree of regulation or training that lower skilled employ-
ees require to perform their functions. Nevertheless, an employer
must provide a senior employee with the resources essential to
the achievement of the required standard or set targets (para
[40]). In this instance, the employee was afforded only 27 days
within which, along with his team, to achieve a certain target. The
Labour Appeal Court believed, given all that had been done and
the assistance afforded to the group of workers by the employer,
either the period was too short, or the target was unachievable
(para [41]). Therefore, a reasonable commissioner would have
found that the employer had not met the onus of showing that
there was a fair reason to dismiss the employee and that
dismissal was a fair sanction.
Dismissals of fixed-term employees for operational requirements
An urgent application on the application of sections 189A(13)
and 198B of the LRAwas considered by Steenkamp J in AMCU &
others v Piet Wes Civils CC & another (2017) 38 ILJ 1128 (LC),
[2017] 5 BLLR 501. The employees sought reinstatement pend-
ing a proper consultation process. Piet Wes Civils CC (the CC)
contended that the employees had not been dismissed for
operational requirements, or at all, but rather that they were
employed on fixed-term contracts which had expired because
their services had been terminated by Exxaco. The CC and
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Exxaco had concluded a service agreement – in terms of which
the employees had been working – which was set to expire in
2021, but which expired much sooner and with only one month’s
notice to the CC, whereafter the CC had terminated the employ-
ees’ contracts without consultation.
Steenkamp J considered the wording of section 198B of the
LRA. The section provides that an employer may employ an
employee on a fixed-term contract for longer than three months
only if the employer can prove, among other things, that the
nature of the work is of a limited or definite duration, and that
other justifiable reasons exist to employ the particular worker for a
fixed term only. One of the listed reasons in the legislation is when
the person is employed to work exclusively on a specific project
of a limited or defined duration. The employees’ stance was that
the CC ought to have consulted them as envisaged in section 189
of the LRA as their employment contracts were not governed by
section 198B(4)(d), but rather by section 198B(5). It was argued
by the CC that the agreement was not a fixed-term contract as
contemplated by section 4(d) in the employees’ contracts; there-
fore, it was in contravention of section 198B(3)(a) of the LRA.
Ultimately, as was argued, it was deemed to be a contract of an
indefinite duration. The clause on which the respondents relied
was argued to be against public policy and pro non scripto.
It was not stated in casu that the nature of the work for which
the CC employed the employees was ‘of a limited or definite
duration’ as contemplated by section 198B(3)(a). Instead, the
continued employment of the employees was linked to the CC
being supplied with work by ‘his clients’, Exxaro. Have the
respondents demonstrated that that was a ‘justifiable reason’ for
a fixed term contract as contemplated by section 198B(3)(b)? If
the employers discharge that onus, the contracts would justifiably
be a fixed-term contract, and the respondents’ defence should
succeed. If not, the employment of the employees would be
deemed to be of a fixed duration in terms of subsection (5), and
the respondents would have to consult over any contemplated
dismissals for operational requirements. In Sindane v Prestige
Cleaning Services [2009] 12 BLLR 1249 (LC) and Mahlamu v
CCMA [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC), the Labour Court expressed the
view that ‘event’ in section 198B(1)(a) does not include termina-
tion of a contract by a client of the employer. Steenkamp J stated
that these contracts were not intended to be for a fixed duration,
or to terminate on the occurrence of a specified event, or the
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completion of a specified task or project as contemplated by
section 198B(1). The termination of the Exxaro contracts may well
be a justifiable and fair reason for dismissing the employees for
operational requirements, but a proper consultation process in
the form of a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process as
contemplated by sections 189 and 189A must be undertaken to
determine this. In issuing the order, Steenkamp J followed
Steenkamp v Edcon Ltd (2016) 37 ILJ 564 (CC), [2016] 4 BLLR
335, 2016 (3) SA 251 paragraphs [161]–[164], where Zondo J
discussed section 189A(13) in similar circumstances, but in the
context of large-scale retrenchments, and concluded that the
employees who had been dismissed must be reinstated until the
employer has complied with a fair procedure.
Dismissal for operational requirements
The employee in Viljoen v Johannesburg Stock Exchange Ltd
(2017) 38 ILJ 671 (LC) claimed that her dismissal was both
substantively and procedurally unfair. The employer, on the other
hand, contended that it had never sought to dismiss her, and that
it was her own conduct which had led to her retrenchment. The
employee also claimed that she ought to be paid severance pay,
which the employer refused to do.
The salient facts were that during an extensive restructuring
process to attract more investors, the employer’s board decided
to implement a marketing and rebranding strategy which required
separate marketing and branding managers. Not only had the
position of brand manager expanded to such an extent that two
subordinates had to report to it instead of one as originally
envisaged, the marketing manager position had an additional
three subordinates reporting to it. In the result, two proper and
viable positions were created. For the employee, this meant that
her existing position as marketing manager became redundant,
as it was replaced by the two new positions. Accordingly, she
ought to have been consulted concerning the intended restructur-
ing in terms of section 189(3) of the LRA. The employer made it
clear that, despite the intended restructuring, the primary objec-
tive was not to lose employees, but rather to fill all the new
positions with the existing employees. Even in instances where
there was no proper fit, a development program would be
instituted to train the employee so as to provide him or her with
the skills necessary for the new position. So far as the employer
was concerned, the applicant was competent to fill either of the
new marketing or branch manager positions.
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To ensure due process, the employer applied section 189 of
the LRA. During the consultation process, the employee was
asked several questions, including what positions she would be
interested in, in order of preference. She confirmed that she ‘fully
supported’ the new structure and the dividing of her existing
marketing manager positions into two new positions of branch
manager and marketing manager and took no issue with the
rationale for the restructuring (para [28]). However, the employee
proposed that the employer forego the interview process and
allow her to remain in her current role as marketing manager. She
was satisfied that her role could then be amended by way of
negotiation if the employer was willing to give her an undertaking
that her salary and benefits would not be negatively affected. The
employer felt that a fair restructuring process required that the
employee apply for appointment in the position/s that she wished
to fill, be interviewed, and matched to a position. The employee
refused to budge and requested that she be paid an exit
package. The employer stated that this was not an option, as
there was a reasonable alternative position available for her, and
that in any event the employer did not intend retrenching her. The
employee was warned that if she failed to take up the opportunity
to apply for an available position she would be retrenched without
severance pay (para [36]). The employee maintained her view
and argued that the new brand manager position would be a
demotion for her, and that she was not interested in applying for
the marketing manager position because it was allegedly funda-
mentally different from her existing position. She would agree
only to her suggestion that she remain in her existing position and
be amenable to amendment of her duties. The employer explained
that the brand manager position was not a demotion but a
position on the same grade, but that she could apply for either of
the two positions, or even both, if she wished. After several
unsuccessful attempts to convince the employee to apply for the
position/s, she was presented with a letter of termination of her
employment.
The Labour Court, in deciding whether on the facts the
employee had been unfairly dismissed for operation reasons,
noted that whether a dismissal for operational requirements is
substantively fair is decided by posing a general question –
whether or not there was a fair reason for the dismissal – and a
specific question – whether there was a fair reason for the
dismissal of the specific employees based on fair selection
793LABOUR LAW: INDIVIDUAL
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 93 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/21−Labour−Law−Individual
criteria (para [52]; cf Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others
v Latex Surgical Products (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 292 (LAC) para
[55]). In the case under scrutiny, Snyman AJ accepted that there
indeed existed a proper business rationale for the dismissal, and
that this rendered the dismissal substantively fair (Kotze v Rebel
Discount Liquor Group (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 129 (LAC) para
[36]).
The employer’s case, in simple terms, was that the position of
marketing manager had become redundant when it ceased to
exist. What formerly was a single position had been changed into
two distinct and separate new positions that had not previously
existed. The employee had consistently refused to either apply
for or accept either of these two positions, which would have
avoided her retrenchment. In the result, she had identified herself
as a candidate for retrenchment (see too Van Rooyen & others v
Blue Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2735 (LC)).
The Labour Court noted that in Plaaslike Oorgangsraad van
Bronkhorstspruit v Senekal (2001) 22 ILJ 602 (SCA) paragraph
[27], the court had accepted that redundancy can result from a
reorganisation of a business. SnymanAJ stated that the employee
could not, as she had during negotiations insisted on, choose to
remain in a position that no longer existed and then seek to
negotiate changes to it. In Freshmark (Pty) Ltd v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2003) 24 ILJ 373
(LAC) paragraph [25]), the court expressed the purpose of
employing a specific person as addressing the employer’s need
to employ an employee who is prepared to work, in accordance
with its terms and conditions, to meet its operational require-
ments. When that contract of employment or some of its terms
and conditions can no longer serve, or no longer suits, the
operational requirements of the business, that is a valid reason
for the employer to terminate that contract of employment.
However, if the employer requires an employee who can perform
her functions entirely or in some respects, as those performed by
the terminated employee, or an employee who could potentially
face termination, the employer must offer the new contract to the
employee whose contract of employment has been terminated or
is under threat of termination if he or she is suitable for employ-
ment in the new position. If the employee accepts the offer of a
new contract of employment, he or she would avoid being
dismissed. This does not, however, mean that his or her previous
contract of employment remains in place; it does not, it is
794 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 94 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/21−Labour−Law−Individual
cancelled or amended. In either case, the employment of the
employee by the employer is subsequently governed by terms
and conditions of employment which differ from the terms and
conditions which previously governed his or her employment
(para [69]). Both parties must compromise during the consulta-
tion process if jobs are to be saved during a restructuring
process.
The court noted that the employee’s total unwillingness to
compromise during the consultation process excluded her oppor-
tunities to remain employed. She should have applied for the new
positions of marketing manager or brand manager, or for both. At
the very least, she should have taken up the position of brand
manager in which she was ultimately placed as a compromise by
the employer. Her failure to do so was fatal to her claim of
substantive unfairness of her dismissal. She had left the respon-
dent with no choice but to retrench her when she was in a
risk-free position to avoid her own retrenchment.
As for the employee’s claim based on procedural unfairness,
Snyman AJ reiterated that the employee could have avoided her
retrenchment by simply accepting the alternative position(s) that
were available to her. They were proper alternative positions
which she was fully competent to fill. Moreover, the positions were
of equal status to the position she previously filled, with no
change in her salary and benefits. Ultimately, the question of
procedural unfairness does not even arise in this instance, as the
applicant could have avoided her own retrenchment (Arthur
Kaplan Jewellery (Pty) Ltd v Van De Venter; SA Transport and
Allied Workers Union on behalf of Dube & others v Fidelity
Supercare Cleaning Services Group (Pty) Ltd (2015) 36 ILJ 1923
(LC) para [60]). The manner in which the employee had partici-
pated in the consultations pointed to mala fides as she had
closed her mind to any suggestion other than her own. Her
method of conducting the consultation by using prepared written
scripts and requesting the employer to answer in writing, was not
meaningful participation in the consultation indicative of a proper
consensus-seeking process.
In terms of section 41(4) of the BCEA, and because the
employee had refused to take up alternative employment, she
had forfeited her right to severance pay. The Labour Court
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concluded that the employee’s dismissal was fair, both substan-
tively and procedurally (paras [107] [108]).
Replacement of sanction by employer
In another case heard in 2017, Moodley v Department of
National Treasury & others [2017] 4 BLLR 337 (LAC), (2017) 38
ILJ 1098, Coppin JA considered an appeal against the judgment
of the Labour Court in which Tlhotlhalemaje AJ (as he then was)
reviewed and set aside an arbitration award in favour of the
employee and remitted the matter back to the bargaining council
for hearing de novo.
At the conclusion of a disciplinary hearing in which the
employee was found guilty on charges of misconduct, the
chairperson ruled that the appropriate sanction would be for the
employee to be dismissed or, in the alternative, demoted. The
employee opted for demotion, but the employer informed her that
she was discharged from the Public Service in terms of section
16B(1) of the Public Service Act, 1994 (as amended). The
employee declared an unfair dismissal dispute seeking reinstate-
ment at the bargaining council. The crux of the complaint was
that the employer could not substitute the chairperson’s lesser
sanction of demotion with a dismissal, and that such a substitu-
tion was inherently unfair.
The Labour Court found that the arbitrator’s award did not fall
within the band of reasonableness. According to Tlhotlhalemaje AJ,
arbitrators are required to determine, having regard to a variety of
factors (including those in Schedule 8 to the LRA), whether the
sanction of dismissal was fair. In addition, the court held that what is
required is for the arbitrator to determine what is fair, taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances, and not to defer to the
employer’s decision.
The employee sought leave to appeal Tlhotlhalemaje AJ’s
judgment on the ground that the court a quo had erred in
concluding that the arbitrator’s award was unreasonable; and in
finding, in effect, that an employer may change a sanction
imposed by the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry, even
though that sanction is not merely a recommendation; and in
deciding the review in terms of section 145 of the LRA after the
employer had dropped its reliance on section 158(1)(h) of the
LRA; and in failing to take into account the employer’s ‘wholesale’
disregard for the rules; and in condoning the employer’s failure to
comply with the rules
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The Labour Appeal Court noted that the lower court had
granted leave to appeal, after having had regard to the most
recent judgment of this court on the issue of whether an employer
could substitute the final sanction of a chairperson of a disciplin-
ary enquiry. (See South African Revenue Service v CCMA &
others [2016] 3 BLLR 297 (LAC), (2016) 37 ILJ 655 (Kruger);
Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2003) 24 ILJ 355 (LAC);
South African Revenue Services v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (2014) 35 ILJ 656 (LAC) (para [35];
Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality (2015) 36 ILJ 163 (LAC).)
Coppin JA held that the arbitrator ought to have referred to
section 193 of the LRA. Like the arbitrator in Kruger, the arbitrator
had failed to do so or to consider the seriousness of the
misconduct and its potential impact in the workplace. Had this
been done, ordering reinstatement would not have been seen as
appropriate. The arbitrator’s failure to do so, in circumstances
where she or he was legally obliged to do so, was justifiably
criticised as unreasonable. In the result, the appeal was dis-
missed.
Misconduct
The employee appealed against the judgment of the Labour
Court (Van As AJ) in which he upheld the award of the arbitrator
that the employee’s dismissal for misconduct was procedurally
and substantively unfair but substituted his retrospective reinstate-
ment with an order of twelve months’ pay as compensation. In
Schwartz v Sasol Polymers & others (2017) 38 ILJ 915 (LAC), the
employer cross-appealed against Van As AJ’s finding that the
dismissal was unfair, and the compensation order made. The
employee was charged at a disciplinary hearing with corruption
in obtaining personal advantage in the form of monetary sponsor-
ships/gifts/cash, and in the alternative, with a breach of the
employer’s Code of Ethics in failing to disclose monetary sponsor-
ships, gifts or money received by him from service providers. The
Code of Ethics provided further that non-compliance with the
policy would result in disciplinary action and could lead to
dismissal. After being found guilty at a disciplinary hearing and
dismissed, which dismissal was confirmed at an internal appeal,
an unfair dismissal dispute was referred to the CCMA.
The arbitrator ruled the appellant’s dismissal procedurally
unfair in that he had not received sufficient details regarding his
alleged misconduct, and that the chairperson should have post-
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poned the matter. In addition, the chairperson was found not to
have understood either the onus, or the meaning, of an alternative
charge, which resulted in the appellant being found guilty on both
charges with dismissal as the sanction in both instances. This
was declared to be procedural unfairness by the CCMA. Also, on
substantive unfairness, the arbitrator found that the corruption
charge had not been not proven, but the employee had, neverthe-
less, been found to have failed to disclose the receipt of gifts and
sponsorships from service providers. Somewhat bizarrely, the
arbitrator found that the rule requiring disclosure was not well
known; had not been communicated and was not understood by
the employee; no rule required that gifts to spouses be disclosed;
and no employees had made such disclosures in the past two
years. The arbitrator found the sanction of dismissal inappro-
priate and replaced it with a final written warning and reinstate-
ment.
Aggrieved, the employer sought review in the Labour Court,
where it was found that there was no reason to disturb the
arbitrator’s finding on the basis that the appellant had not been
furnished with sufficient particulars of the charge so as to allow
him properly to prepare for his disciplinary hearing, as corruption
is a complex offence with specific legal requirements (para [11]).
On appeal, Savage AJA found that the arbitrator had adopted
an overly formalistic and technical approach to the issue of
procedural fairness to the extent of committing a reviewable
irregularity. Viewed holistically, the employee had received a fair
hearing as he had been notified in writing of the allegations
against him, albeit in general terms, but with sufficient clarity for
him to understand the misconduct of which he was being
accused (para [12]). The charges had been explained to him by
the chairperson at the outset of the hearing; he clearly under-
stood the misconduct charges as he had secured the attendance
of service providers who had been party to the wrongdoing to
testify on his behalf at the hearing; and he had made no request
for the hearing to be postponed. When he was asked by the
chairperson if he had had time to prepare his defence on the two
charges, he confirmed that he had had sufficient time, and that
his witnesses were present to testify (para [12]). It followed that
the Labour Court had erred in finding that the arbitrator’s conclu-
sion of procedural unfairness was correct. With reference to Avril
Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & others
[2006] 9 BLLR 833 (LC), Savage AJA confirmed that the LRA
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recognises not only that managers are not experienced judicial
officers, but also that workplace efficiencies should not be unduly
impeded by onerous procedural requirements. On the issue of
substantive fairness, Savage AJA found that the court below had
correctly found that the arbitrator had failed to take into account
the appellant’s conduct as it noted that, whilst the arbitrator had
alluded to entrapment when evaluating the taped conversation
between the employee and his ex-wife, the arbitrator had cor-
rectly allowed the evidence yet had not attached sufficient weight
to the various damning statements which the employee had
made. Having been allowed, it was only reasonable that the
evidence be considered by the arbitrator (para [18]). Therefore, a
reviewable irregularity had been committed in that the arbitrator
had failed to attach weight to the damning statements made by
the appellant, and the nature and impact of the misconduct.
However, the Labour Court had misconstrued the proper approach
to such a determination.
The employment relationship obliges an employee to act
honestly, in good faith, to protect the interests of the employer,
and to avoid conflicts of interest that may arise which may breach
this duty. The appellant was employed in a senior position as an
engineering manager. His calculated silence in the face of a duty
to speak amounted to a fraudulent non-disclosure or conceal-
ment of the true state of affairs in circumstances in which gifts and
benefits earned ‘secretly fell to be disgorged by him with little
room to avoid that consequence’ (para [20]; cf Volvo (Southern
Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2009 (6) SA 531 (SCA) para [14]). His
conduct was dishonest in circumstances in which he was obliged
to act with honesty, diligence, and good faith towards his
employer, and not to allow his own interests to prevail over those
of his employer. However, the Labour Court did not properly
apply the review test as set out in Gold Fields Mining SA (Pty) Ltd
(Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA & others (Gold Fields) (2014) 35 ILJ
943 (LAC) with reference to Sidumo & another v Rustenburg
Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC), in replacing the
appellant’s retrospective reinstatement with an order of compen-
sation equal to twelve months’ remuneration. Although the result
was unreasonable taking in consideration the material before the
arbitrator, the Labour Court’s conclusion that the dismissal was
substantively unfair was patently incorrect given its own findings
as to the serious nature of the employee’s dishonesty which
subverted the interests of his employer. It follows that the
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arbitration award was not justifiable in relation to the reasons
given for it and fell outside of the range of decisions which a
reasonable decision-maker could have made on the material
before him (para [31]). In the circumstances, the award was set
aside and replaced with an order that the employee’s dismissal
was both substantively and procedurally fair.
Inordinate delays in finalisation of a dispute
Ultimately, NEHAWU obo Leduka v National Research Founda-
tion (2017) 38 ILJ 430 (LC), serves as an example where a
condonation application failed due to the grossly excessive and
largely unexplained delays.
Even before the referral to the Labour Court, the union repre-
senting the employees was tardy: the applicants had referred the
dispute to the CCMA some four months late and had to apply for
condonation. At the subsequent conciliation in the CCMA, the
dispute was declared unresolved, and the union was instructed
to refer the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication. However,
this was done only four months later, and the union neglected to
attach a condonation application to its statement of claim.
Moreover, the union had made no attempt to convene pre-trial
proceedings after the employer party had filed its answering
statement.
The Practice Manual of the Labour Court (Practice Manual) had
appeared with specific provisions on the archiving of statements
of claim not timeously and diligently prosecuted. The employer
had requested the Registrar to archive the matter, which was
done.
Another four months later, the union served a notice on the
employer requesting it to attend a pre-trial conference, together
with a notice of intention to amend the applicants’ statement of
claim. There was no application made to condone the material
delay – two months short of five years – and no explanation was
offered for that delay. The union amended the statement of claim
as proposed and proceeded to exert pressure on the employer to
attend pre-trial proceedings. The employer was reluctant to do
so, given that the matter had been archived. The union success-
fully approached the Labour Court requesting a directive that the
parties must hold a pre-trial conference and file minutes of the
meeting.
Upon being served with this directive, the employer approached
the court for an order declaring that the matter had been archived
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permanently pursuant to its efforts, as the union ought first to
have brought a substantive application to remove the matter from
from the archives. Lagrange J directed that the directive issued
by Baloyi AJ requiring the holding of a pre-trial conference, be
substituted with a new directive to read that the union must first
bring an application in terms of Rule 7 read with clause 16.2 of
the Practice Manual, before any further steps could be taken in
the matter. The union approached the court to seek condonation
of its lack in prosecuting the matter, and for the non-compliance
with the Labour Court Rules and the Practice Manual, and that the
matter be removed from archives and reinstated. Unfortunately,
the employer lodged its answering affidavit four weeks late,
necessitating the respondent, in turn, to apply for condonation,
which was opposed by the applicant. Snyman AJ considered the
argument on the application for condonation for the late filing of
the respondent’s answering affidavit and condoned the lateness.
As for the union’s application for condonation coupled with the
prayer for the removal of the matter from the archives and its
reinstatement, Snyman AJ considered Khumalo & another v
Member of the Executive Council for Education: KwaZulu-Natal
(2014) 35 ILJ 613 (CC) paragraph [42]; Aviation Union of SA &
another v SA Airways (Pty) Ltd & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2861 (CC)
paragraph [76]; and National Education Health and Allied Work-
ers Union v University of Cape Town & others (2003) 24 ILJ 95
(CC) paragraph [31], and confirmed that the purpose of the LRA
is to ensure speedy and expeditious resolution of labour cases.
In total, it had taken in excess of seven years from referral of the
matter, and some six years since the litigation was initiated,
without the matter even having been ripe for hearing. This kind of
delay can, in itself, lead to a matter being disposed of, simply on
the basis of the excessive delay. Therefore, in the absence of truly
exceptional considerations, the matter must be regarded as
closed. The excuse of not following up on the progress of a matter
is inadequate.
Snyman AJ considered whether the applicants’ application
should be dismissed for an unjustified and undue delay in the
prosecution thereof to finality, and with reference to the maxim
vigilantibus non dormientibus lex subveniunt, the dictum in BP
Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Bargaining Council for the
Chemical Industry & others (2010) 31 ILJ 1337 (LC) paragraph
[10], provided the answer. In terms of this maxim a party may, in
certain circumstances, be debarred from obtaining the relief to
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which it would have been entitled because of an unjustifiable
delay in prosecuting its claim. There are two reasons why the
court may dismiss these claims: as depicted in Radebe v
Government of the Republic of SA 1995 (3) SA 787 (N). First,
unreasonable delay may cause prejudice to the other parties;
and secondly, it is both desirable and important that finality
should be reached within a reasonable time in respect of judicial
administrative decisions. Ultimately, unwarranted delays in litigat-
ing disputes damage the interests of justice and prolong uncer-
tainty.
In addition, the Practice Manual is binding on litigating parties
and must be complied with as was explained in Ralo v Transnet
Port Terminals & others (2015) 36 ILJ 2653 (LC) (para [9]). As for
the applicants’ application for condonation, SnymanAJ had to be
convinced to depart from the normal consequence of a final
dismissal of the matter. SnymanAJ took note of clause 16.2 of the
Practice Manual and Rule 12 of the Labour Court Rules. Should
the application be granted the effect would be that the appli-
cants’ matter would be resurrected and removed from the
archives. Given that archiving has the effect of a dismissal of the
matter, the matter is akin to that of rescission rather than
condonation. The Practice Manual and Rule 12, however, do
render it competent to obtain the relief sought by the applicants
by way of a condonation application (Builders Trade Depot v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others
(2012) 33 ILJ 1154 (LC) para [22]). However, given that this
application for condonation was directed by Lagrange J, Snyman
AJ continued to decide on the relief sought based on the
principles applicable to condonation. In Melane v Santam Insur-
ance Co Ltd (1962) (4) SA 531 (A) 532C–E and Academic and
Professional Staff Association v Pretorius NO & others (2008) 29
ILJ 318 (LC) paragraphs [17]–[18], it was held that, among other
things, the following factors must be considered: (a) the degree
of lateness or non-compliance with the prescribed timeframe; (b)
the explanation for the lateness or the failure to comply with the
timeframe (Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union on
behalf of Zungu v SA Local Government Bargaining Council &
others (2010) 31 ILJ 1413 (LC) para [13]); (c) the prospects of
success or bona fide defence in the main case; (d) the impor-
tance of the case; (e) the respondent’s interest in the finality of the
judgment; (f) the convenience of the court; and (g) avoidance of
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.
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The court concluded that the argument that the merits of the
case have constitutional value and concern also does not justify
approval of condonation, especially considering the degree of
the applicants’ delay in this matter. If the prescribed legal
requirement is not met, condonation cannot be used as a default
simply because the merits of the matter urge it. This emerges
from Seatlolo & others v Entertainment Logistics Service (a
division of Gallo Africa Ltd) (2011) 32 ILJ 2206 (LC) (para [27]).
See also 3G Mobile (Pty) Ltd v Raphela NO & others [2014] JOL
32479 (LC) (above) paragraph [33], where the court held:
It is trite law that condonation should only be granted where the legal
requirements have been met and is not a default option. It remains an
indulgence granted by a court exercising its discretion whilst being
cognizant of the criticism emanating from the Constitutional Court and
the SCA and bearing in mind the primary objective of the expeditious
resolution of disputes articulated in the Act.
In another case dealing with absolution also heard in 2017,
SAMWU & others v Ethekwini Municipality & others [2016] 12
BLLR 1208 (LAC), (2017) 38 ILJ 158, employees who served as
shop stewards were affiliated to the union. During 2008, they had
been charged with misconduct, involving gross insubordination
and dismissed after having been found guilty at a disciplinary
hearing.
The employees were not satisfied with their dismissal and
referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the South African Local
Government Bargaining Council (the SALGBC). The conciliation
process failed, and the employees referred the dispute for
arbitration. In terms of the arbitration award, the arbitrator found
that the dismissal of the employees had been procedurally unfair
(as the employer had appointed a presiding officer who was not
properly qualified, in terms of the disciplinary procedure, to
preside over the disciplinary enquiry), but substantively fair. The
appeal was instituted by the South African Municipal Workers’
Union (the union), in its capacity as the collective bargaining
agent of the employees, and on their behalf as the employees
primarily sought reinstatement. In the result, they took the matter
on review to the Labour Court in terms of section 145 of the LRA.
This resulted in a finding that the arbitration award was not
reviewable. On appeal before Ndlovu JA, the employees criti-
cised the Labour Court for upholding the arbitrator’s finding that
they were indeed guilty of gross insubordination. They submitted
that the arbitrator’s failure to distinguish between insubordination
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and gross insubordination was a misdirection and a gross
irregularity in the proceedings.
For an arbitration award to be reviewed and set aside under
section 145 of the LRA, it must be one falling within the range of
decisions which a reasonable decision-maker could not have
made, given the evidentiary material presented to the presiding
officer (Herholdt v Nedbank Bank (COSATU as amicus curiae)
2013 (6) SA 224 (SCA) restated the Sidumo test).
By referring to applicable sections from a collective agreement
governing the working relationship between employer and employ-
ees, it was found that the employees laboured under a serious
misconception that being in the position of shop stewards, as
they were, gave them the power to domineer and bully the
management as they pleased and with impunity. Being affiliated
to organised labour does not detract from the fact that employees
remain subordinate to their employers and are required to obey
and comply with lawful and reasonable instructions given by the
employers. The decision in Motor Industry Staff Association &
another v Silverton Spraypainters and Panelbeaters & others
(2013) 34 ILJ 1440 (LAC), [2014] JOL 31995 paragraph [31],
which provides for the distinction between insubordination and
gross insubordination, was also restated as follows:
It is trite that an employee is guilty of insubordination if the employee
concerned wilfully refuses to comply with a lawful and reasonable
instruction issued by the employer. It is also well settled that where the
insubordination was gross, in that it was persistent, deliberate and
public, a sanction of dismissal would normally be justified.
In casu it was part of the employer’s essential operational
requirements that a particular gate be opened, and, therefore,
the instruction issued by the employer for the gate to be opened
was a lawful instruction. Further, the instruction was a reasonable
one as the employer’s productive operations had come to a
standstill, having been sabotaged by the employees. The actions
of the employees therefore justified their dismissal.
Jurisdiction of the Labour Court
During 2017, the Labour Appeal Court confirmed that, in the
absence of a successful application for condonation for the late
delivery of a review application, the Labour Court does not have
the power to grant condonation and review an arbitration award.
In Takalasi v Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Coun-
cil & others [2017] ZALAC 61, the employee had suffered an
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injury that was not work-related. The medical practitioner treating
him recommended that he perform only light duties. Having not
been accommodated accordingly, the employee resigned and
referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the bargaining council.
The arbitrator found for the employee and awarded compensa-
tion. The employer launched an application to review and set
aside the award, and an application to stay the execution of the
award. The employee responded by opposing the review appli-
cation and bringing an application to have the review application
dismissed on the basis that it had been launched some six
months late and without an application for condonation. In the
Labour Court there was no appearance for the employer, but the
employee was present. The Labour Court proceeded to adjudi-
cate the review application. Despite acknowledging that the
review had been referred out of time, the Labour Court accepted
that the delay was ‘slight’ and mero motu condoned the lateness.
The Labour Court reviewed and set aside the arbitration award
and the employee took the decision on appeal.
The Labour Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a review application
which is referred late until the delay has been condoned. Any
delay calls for a reasonable explanation, and for proof of good
prospects of success on the merits.
The Labour Court should have heard and decided the applica-
tion to dismiss the review application for lack of prosecution or
struck the review application from the roll with an appropriate
costs order. Alternatively, the Labour Court could have ‘dis-
missed’ the review application with an appropriate costs order,
provided it was made clear that the dismissal of the application
was not made on the merits. The Labour Court’s order was set
aside and replaced by an order that the review application be
struck from the roll with costs.
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES
Unfair promotion
The appeal before Phatshoane AJA in Health and Others
Service Personnel Trade Union of South Africa (HOSPERSA) &
others v Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Health,
Eastern Cape & others (2017) 38 ILJ 890 (LAC), was sought
against the judgment and order of the Labour Court in which
Lallie J granted the application for the review and set aside the
arbitration award. The dispute between the parties concerned an
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alleged unfair labour practice relating to the promotion of the
second and third appellants by the Department of Health,
Eastern Cape (the department).
The department advertised a post with one of the requirements
being registration with the Health Professional Council of South
Africa (HPCSA). Both employees involved in the matter were
registered with the HPCSA and applied for the position, but
neither was successful. The post was eventually filled. The
employees concerned had no problem with the panel scores as
allocated to the competing candidates. However, their grievance
was that the person appointed did not satisfy the requirements for
the position in that she was not registered with the HPCSA but
with the South African Nursing Council (SANC). The department
explained that the position was newly created on the staff
structure and had been identified as critical. The advertisement
was circulated to the relevant managers to ensure that the
requirements set out therein were correct, and during the short-
listing process the panel had regard to the job applicants with
appropriate experience and engaged in a specific field. It also
agreed to consider other candidates registered with other profes-
sional bodies apart of the HPCSA. The appointee scored higher
than all the other candidates interviewed. She had qualifications
in a health-related field as set out in the advertisement and was
registered with the SANC. The arbitrator found that the onus had
been discharged by the concerned employees who had proved
an unfair labour practice on the basis that the department did not
justify why the requirement set in the advertisement was changed
during the selection process. As a result, she ordered the
department to re-advertise the position. However, on review Lallie
J found that the arbitrator had not dealt with the evidence before
her and had given no reasons for being satisfied that the onus of
proof had been discharged. The grounds of appeal turned on the
argument that the court a quo had erred in concluding as it had,
and in setting aside the award which was not only reasonable,
but also correct.
Phatshoane AJA held that not only did this deviation from the
advertisement prejudice applicants for the position, it also disquali-
fied other potential candidates who might have applied but did
not do so because of the requirements set. Put differently, the
department failed to discharge the evidentiary burden that had
shifted to it to justify the departure from the requirements set for
the position. Following the principles laid down in Khumalo &
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another v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 2014 (5) SA 579
(CC), regarding appointment requirements and departing from
them when making the appointment, Phatshoane AJA found that
the decision reached by the arbitrator that the post be re-
advertised was justified on the facts of this case.
Demotion
Nombulelo Mhlekude v South African Airways (Soc) Ltd &
others [2016] ZALAC 59, (2017) 38 ILJ 577 (LAC) was an appeal
before Landman JA in which the appellant employee appealed
against a judgment of the Labour Court (Van Niekerk J) reviewing
and setting aside an arbitration award in terms of which a CCMA
commissioner had ruled that the employer, South African Airways
(Soc) Ltd, had demoted the appellant.
In terms of a collective agreement between the recognised
union, the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
(SATAWU), the union is entitled to have one full-time shop
steward for every 600 members. The collective agreement regu-
lates the termination of a full-time shop steward from the position.
In summary, the employer shall, where practicable and possible,
offer the same, or equivalent, or higher alternative employment to
the full-time shop steward; and the term of office and benefits
shall automatically cease when he or she is dismissed, or his or
her services are terminated. The employee, while still holding her
level 6-9 post, was appointed as a full-time shop steward in terms
of the collective agreement. This entailed her fulfilling the duties
of this office and not those of a customer service agent for the
employer. She was remunerated by the employer in her capacity
as full-time shop steward, on remuneration level 13. She also
received an allowance of R3 000 per month. The union expelled
the employee as a member, which had the immediate effect that
she no longer served as the union’s full-time shop steward.
The employer then redeployed her to the position which she
occupied before becoming a full-time shop steward, namely a
customer service agent. It however continued to remunerate her
on level 13, ie, the salary she had earned as a full-time shop
steward. But, in accordance with the collective agreement, the
allowance of R3 000 ceased. Dissatisfied with the situation, the
employee referred a dispute to the CCMA on the ground of unfair
demotion contrary to collective agreement where there were
alternatives equivalent to her level 13 post available. The commis-
sioner relied on Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate
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Services, Department of Correctional Services & others (Nxele)
[2008] 12 BLLR 1179 (LAC), which concerned the transfer of a
correctional services official. The court held that the transfer
constituted a demotion, even though Nxele’s salary and rank
remained the same, as greater responsibilities and status were
attached to the official’s previous position than to his new
position. This constituted a demotion.
The arbitrator found that the employee had been unfairly
demoted and ordered the employer to offer her the same level 13,
or an equivalent or higher, alternative position. Subsequently, the
employer launched an application in the Labour Court before Van
Niekerk J to review and set aside the award. The Labour Court
concluded that the matter turned upon the correct interpretation
of the collective agreement, and held that, properly construed,
the employer is required to do no more than place the employee
in another position at the level, or one equivalent to, or higher
than, that which she occupied at the time of her appointment – ie,
that of a customer service agent. Therefore, the employee had no
right to remain engaged at level 13 after her dismissal from the
office of full-time union representative, and her placement did
not, therefore, constitute a demotion as it was no more than a
reversion to the status quo. The flawed reasoning of the commis-
sioner caused the application for review to set aside the arbitra-
tion award to succeed.
On appeal, it was reiterated that the commissioner was not
required to interpret the collective agreement as is well within the
CCMA’s jurisdiction, but rather to arbitrate a dispute concerning
an alleged unfair labour practice and, in the course of doing so,
interpret the agreement. This is an important distinction because
the commissioner’s jurisdiction to grant the employee relief was
dependent on his finding of unfair demotion, as no relief could be
granted if she had been wrongly or unfairly refused an equivalent
or higher post than that she occupied prior to becoming a
full-time union representative. The Nxele case is binding concern-
ing what constitutes a demotion; however, in casu, the facts did
not involve the demotion of an employee qua employee. Rather,
the situation in which she found herself was caused by her union
expelling her and, therefore, removing her from her position as a
full-time union representative, which was a union position and not
a position within the employer. Therefore, the interpretation by the
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Labour Court was the correct interpretation and the appeal was
dismissed.
Review in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act
The applicant union on behalf of the employee members
lodged an appeal against the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry
in terms of which the employees had been dismissed in South
African Municipal Workers’ Union obo Cindi & another v South
African Local Government Bargaining Council & others (2017) 38
ILJ 472 (LC). According to the arbitrator, his task was, among
other things, to determine whether the employer’s conduct consti-
tuted an unfair labour practice when it took a decision to stop
paying salaries, pending the outcome of an internal appeal. The
applicant union contested that the appeal stayed the operation of
the dismissal imposed following a disciplinary enquiry, by refer-
ring to of Rule 49(1) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court which
provides that an appeal stays the execution or operation of an
order until the appeal has been concluded (para [9]). The
arbitrator found this to be an incorrect interpretation of the rules
and denied the application. It is against this ruling that the
applicant union launched a review based on error. Notwithstand-
ing that the arbitrator’s finding was labelled an ‘in limine Ruling’, it
remained an arbitration award issued pursuant to arbitration
proceedings. The nature of the dispute that served before the
arbitrator was an unfair labour practice as contemplated by
section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act.
On review, Voyi AJ held that Nchabeleng v University of Venda
& others (2003) 24 ILJ 585 (LC) (Nchabeleng), where suspension
of an order of court due to appeal applications was clarified,
applied: the rules applicable in other courts do not necessarily
apply in the industrial relations environment (Leburu v Voorsitter,
Nasionale Vervoerkommissie 1983 (4) SA 89 (W)). A valid lawful
dismissal does not include any right to an appeal. A ‘right’ to
appeal flows solely from the practice, endorsed in the LRA Code
of Good Conduct: Dismissals, as a ready means by which a
procedurally fair dismissal may be proven. The provision of an
appeal is confined to the arena of unfairness (Nchabeleng (para
[23]).
Also considered by Voyi AJ in casu, was Booysen v National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa [2014] ZALCJHB, where
the Labour Appeal Court held that if an employee is lawfully,
albeit unfairly, dismissed, the employment relationship is termi-
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nated and ‘[u]nlike in legal proceedings where an appeal sus-
pends the operation of a judgment, no such doctrine of suspended
operation is applicable to a dismissal by an employer’ (para [19]).
Therefore, there is no right to payment of salaries pending an
appeal application in the employment realm. The review applica-
tion was dismissed.
Collective bargaining
Whitcher J presided over Popcru & another v Department of
Correctional Services & another (2017) 38 ILJ 964 (LC). She was
required to determine what the outcome may be where an
employer fails to respond to its employee’s application for
temporary incapacity leave within 30 working days, as pre-
scribed by the employer’s Policy and Procedure on Incapacity
Leave and Ill-Health Retirement Policy (the PILIR). The Labour
Court found that it does not translate into entitlement to such
leave and dismissed the application for review for the following
reasons.
The employment policy provided that if an employee had
exhausted his or her normal sick leave, the employer may, at its
discretion, grant temporary incapacity leave (TIL). This policy
was also made a ministerial determination as envisaged in
section 3(3)(c) of the Public Service Act, 1994. The Labour Court
referred to the dictum of Cele J in Public Service Association of
South Africa & another v PSCBC, Gouvea & others [2013] ZALCD
3 (para [20]), where he held that where an application for
temporary incapacity leave is declined outside the 30 day
investigation period, any deduction from an employee’s salary for
the period (outside the 30-day period) during which he or she
was awaiting a decision from the employer, would offend the
prohibition against retrospectivity. Cele J stated, ‘the conse-
quence of a retrospective effect is that it amounts to an unreason-
able and arbitrary exercise of a discretion with unfair
consequences to an employee’ (para [24]). This has been taken
to mean that ‘employees cannot be subjected to leave without
pay/monthly deductions from their salary (in order to recover
salary paid, where an application for TIL/IHR is declined for a
period they have been off work sick) or stoppage of salary, unless
the application is declined within 30 days or unless they have
been given a date to return for work and have failed to do so.’
(See Bezuidenhout / Department of Health: Eastern Cape (2014)
23 PSCBC 4.2.2, unreported.) An employee applying for TIL has
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not yet been granted the leave. A late determination of an
employee’s application for additional leave, and a subsequent
instruction to pay back money to which the employee was not
entitled, do not result in a decision that retrospectively deprives
the employee of a right to the payment in question. An employee
seeking additional sick leave in terms of the PILIR has condition-
ally been paid a salary while his or her application for additional
leave is being considered. This consideration should be finalised
within 30 days. However, if the period the employer takes to
decide on whether to grant the application exceeds the 30 days
as expressed in the PILIR, it is not clear how the conditionality of
payments to an employee, subject to a medical assessment,
hardens into an entitlement after the 30-day investigation period
has lapsed. If the underlying medical condition which prompted
an employee to seek additional sick leave is assessed and found
not to have warranted such leave, this fact must determine what
happens to any payments that the employee received while
applying, and not the employer’s delay in attending to the
application.
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LAW OF LEASE
PHILIP STOOP*
LEGISLATION
There was no new legislation affecting this area of the law
during the period under review.
RENTAL HOUSING AMENDMENT ACT 35 OF 2014
The commencement date for the Rental Housing Amendment
Act 35 of 2014 (GN 876 GG 38184 of 5 November 2014) has not
yet been proclaimed.
CASE LAW
LEGAL POSITION OF THE LESSEE
Extension of lease
Mokone v Tassos Properties CC & another 2017 (5) SA 456
(CC), 2017 (10) BCLR 1261, dealt in the main with issues related
to the law of lease. Mokone, the appellant tenant, had leased
premises from the respondent landlord, Tassos Properties CC.
The written lease agreement entered into by the parties con-
tained a pre-emption clause which secured for Mokone a right of
first refusal if Tassos Properties CC wished to sell the leased
property. In terms of the provision, if the right of pre-emption were
exercised, the purchase price would be open to negotiation. The
initial lease was entered into for one year. After expiry of the term,
the parties entered into an oral agreement on the same terms as
the written lease. When another year had passed, the parties
agreed to a further extension of the lease for eight years. This
extension was effected by means of an endorsement on the face
of the first page of the original written lease agreement which
read: ‘Extend till 31/5/2014 monthly rental R5 500’. However,
during this extended period, Tassos Properties CC entered into a
deed of sale with a third party, the second respondent, and
* BCom LLB LLM (Pret) LLD (Unisa). Professor in Mercantile Law, Department
of Mercantile Law, Unisa.
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transfer took place. After becoming aware of the sale, Mokone
notified Tassos in writing that she wished to exercise her right of
pre-emption. She tendered the same amount as the purchase
price at which Tassos had sold the leased premises to the third
party. Tassos Properties CC declined Mokone’s offer, indicating
that the right of pre-emption was part of the initial lease, but did
not form part of the renewed lease. Mokone proceeded to initiate
action in the High Court against Tassos Properties CC and the
third party, seeking to set aside the sale and transfer of the leased
premises, and an order compelling the sale of property to her, or
in the alternative, an order for the payment of damages for breach
of contract. The question the High Court considered in Mokone v
Tassos Properties CC & another [2015] ZAGPJHC 322 (unre-
ported case no 12229/2012) (25 November 2015) available at
http://www.saflii.org/) was whether the right of pre-emption had
been extended along with the lease. The High Court, after
applying the common-law principles, held that the right of
pre-emption was collateral to the relationship between the land-
lord and the tenant. The court noted that terms that are collateral
to, and independent of, the relationship are not renewed when a
lease is renewed, unless it is clear that the parties intended
otherwise (Mokone v Tassos Properties above para [15]).
On appeal, the Constitutional Court considered the effect of
the common-law rule regarding collateral terms in contracts. The
court reiterated that the common-law rule had the effect that
when parties agree to extend a lease, they intend to extend only
terms incidental to the lease relationship, and not also those
collateral to it. The Constitutional Court disagreed with the High
Court that this rule should be applied in the matter under
consideration, and concluded that development of the common-
law rule was required.
The highest court, with reference to relevant case law, pointed
out that the common-law rule, which is followed in South Africa
and Zimbabwe, is based on English law (Levy v Banket Holdings
(Pvt) Ltd 1956 (3) SA 558 (FC) 563B-C). However, the rule
coincides with the Roman-Dutch position as laid down by Pothier
(paras [20]-[24]). Under both systems, it is clear that an option
and a right of pre-emption are deemed not to be part of the terms
of an extended lease, unless from the circumstances it is clear
that this is the case (para [25]). Therefore, the words in terms of
which an extension has been effected must be interpreted (ibid).
The court cautioned against generalisations. One cannot sim-
ply assume that the parties did not intend to include collateral
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terms in an extended lease agreement. Therefore, a court must
consider the intention of the parties based on the experience of
lay people and not lawyers in the know (para [26]). The court
referred in its ratio to Sherwood v Tucker [1924] 2 Ch 440, 443-4.
In Sherwood the trial judge was of the view that the parties in
the case, as lay persons who had extended a lease without the
assistance of lawyers, must have intended to extend the contents
of the entire agreement. The highest court distinguished the
Sherwood case from the matter under scrutiny, noting that in
Sherwood the court had held that that words should be taken as
they stand, and construed without speculation as to the probable
intention of the parties. However, in Sherwood (above 443-4), the
court was required to decide whether the words had the effect of
extending both the lease and the option or right of pre-emption
(paras [26] [27]).
In respect of the distinction between collateral and incidental
terms, the Constitutional Court agreed with the approach fol-
lowed in Sherwood. If a lease is extended by lay persons by
means of a written endorsement stating ‘we agree’ on the original
written lease, in the court’s view, the parties intended to extend all
of the terms of the written lease. The court, failing to heed the
warning against generalisation, made a broad-stroke finding that
ordinary lay people would not be able to draw a distinction
between terms that are collateral to and independent of the lessor
and lessee relationship, and those that are not (para [28]).
The court referred to Levy v Banket Holdings (Pty) Ltd (above,
564F), in which the opposite was held. In Levy, the court held that
if a lease agreement covers aspects that are not incidental to the
landlord and tenant relationship, and the parties simply agree to
renew the lease, a reasonable person would understand that the
lease and nothing more was to be renewed. The Constitutional
Court held that this approach is unreasonable, because it imputes
the understanding of lawyers to non-lawyers. The Constitutional
Court, therefore, held that it is a reasonable deduction that, when
non-lawyers write ‘extended’ across the face of a written agree-
ment, they mean to extend not only the lease, but everything
contained in the document. It may, however, because the matter
turns on interpretation, be apparent from the nature of certain
(once-off) terms in the document that certain terms were not
meant to be extended (paras [30]-[32]). An example of a term
that would not have been intended to endure beyond the initial
period of the lease, mentioned by the court, would be an option to
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purchase the leased premises at a specified price. This is
because the market-value of the premises may have changed,
and it would be prejudicial to seek to hold the landlord to the
specified price (paras [33] [34]). The Constitutional Court, how-
ever, remarked, and importantly so, that the results of a dispute,
as in this case, are achieved through interpretation and not
through predetermined rules (para [34]).
As to the proper approach to interpretation, the Constitutional
Court held (para [29]) that words must be read in the context of
the document as a whole, and in light of all relevant circum-
stances (Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Munici-
pality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para [24]). The court indicated that
the use of language by non-lawyers who are not deemed to have
knowledge of the distinction between collateral and incidental
terms, forms part of the ‘relevant circumstances’, because lay
people make extensions, as in this case, without involving
lawyers (paras [29] [30]).
The Constitutional Court noted that as it stands, the common-
law rule favours lessors, and that its application is less about
interpretation, and more about laying down a categorical substan-
tive legal rule (para [35]).The Constitutional Court proceeded to
find that where parties extend a lease without stipulating anything
more, generally, the intention is that all the terms in the lease are
extended. However, the nature of certain terms may render it
apparent that the parties could not have contemplated extending
them – either at all, or in the proposed manner. The real issue,
therefore, revolves around the meaning and interpretation of the
words used to extend a lease. If no readily ascertainable mean-
ing can be attached to the words, the ordinary rules of interpreta-
tion must be applied. This ought to be done without denoting
knowledge arising from rules rather than from observation (para
[36]). The court referred to the dissenting judgment in Shenker
Brothers v Bester 1952 (3) SA664 (A), in which Van den Heever JA
had held (677B-C):
In the absence of [an] express stipulation to the contrary in the
renewal of a lease, its collateral pacts are also deemed to have been
renewed. If this is so in the case of tacit relocation, it must also apply to
cases of express renewal (Dig. 19.2.13.11) (para [38]).
On that basis, the Constitutional Court held that the party
against whom the pre-emptive right operates oppressively should
state, expressly or tacitly, at the time of renewal of the lease that
the term will not be extended (para [37]). As the findings of
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Van den Heever JA in Shenker Brothers v Bester (above) had
been rejected in Levy v Banket Holdings (Pty) Ltd (above 564B),
on the basis that this notion was not supported by the authority on
which the applicant sought to rely, the Constitutional Court
referred to foreign law, and in particular the American case of
Tubbs v Hendrickson 88 Misc 2d 917 (NY Misc 1976). In Tubbs
the court was also required to decide whether a pre-emptive right
to purchase a leased property endured a renewal (para [38]).
The court (919) concluded that the position as reaffirmed by the
Court of Appeals was as follows:
[A] holdover tenancy impliedly continues on the same terms and
subject to the same covenants as those contained in the original
instrument . . . The logic behind this rule is that since the parties have
continued in the relationship of [lessor] and tenant it is implied that
they intended no change in the conditions of that relationship. Of
course, the parties are free to prove a changed condition of affairs . . .
(para [38] (emphasis in the original).
The Constitutional Court noted that, in a situation like the one
before it where a party merely stated on the first page of the
agreement: ‘Extend till 31/5/2014 monthly rental R5 500’, this
indicates the duration of the extension and the increased rental.
The common-law rule is contrary to the course the Constitutional
Court wished to follow (para [40]). The court noted that the
common law must be developed only if it is deficient in promoting
the objectives of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996. The court observed that if the deficiency in
the common law is not found to be at odds with the Bill of Rights,
the common law cannot be developed in terms of section 39(2) of
the Constitution. However, in such an event, the High Court,
Supreme Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court all have
inherent jurisdiction to develop the common law to meet the
needs of a changing society (paras [40] [41]). The court strength-
ened this finding by stating that it would be absurd if section
39(2) of the Constitution were to be read as having removed the
power of the courts to develop the common law in instances
where the shortcomings do not involve the Constitution. The court
indicated further that for centuries before the advent of constitu-
tional democracy, courts were permitted to develop the law, and
that section 173 of the Constitution expressly mandates the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the High
Court to develop the common law, taking into account the
interests of justice.
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For the sake of completeness, the Constitutional Court also
considered whether a pre-emptive right must comply with the
formalities set out in the Alienation of Land Act 71 of 1969. The
majority held this to be unnecessary (paras [44]-[63]). However,
Froneman J, in a partially dissenting judgment, disagreed (paras
[80]-[88]).
The decision of the Constitutional Court can be criticised on
various grounds. The court, in the main, based its decision to
develop the common-law rule on two related reasons: that it is
unreasonable to apply the common-law rule as it imposes the
understanding of lawyers on non-lawyers; and that the rule, as it
stands, favours lessors. It appears that the court assumed the
need for a general pro-tenant approach. The finding that lay
persons lack an understanding of all the legal implications of
renewal of a lease was premised on the facts before the court in
the case under discussion. However, the court failed to consider
or to assess other possible circumstances which may present
themselves, and whether the finding regarding lay persons and
non-lawyers holds true in respect of all leases. Nevertheless, the
Constitutional Court’s finding that the outcome rested on interpre-
tation cannot be faulted. The common-law rule clearly provides
that collateral terms will not be extended unless the parties
intended otherwise. The court concluded that, when non-lawyers
write ‘extended’ across the face of a written agreement, they
intend to extend not only the lease, but everything contained in
the document. Despite this statement, which could have sig-
nalled the end of the matter, and the court’s apparent focus on
the intention of the parties, it still did not conclude that, based on
the written endorsement on the first page of the original lease, the
parties intended to extend all the terms of the original lease,
including the collateral terms. Instead, it continued to consider
the development of the common-law rule, and ultimately held that
the common-law rule was deficient. The court did not specifically
mention these deficiencies. Instead, it simply stated that it is
unreasonable to impose the understanding of lawyers on non-
lawyers, and that one should not distinguish between collateral
and incidental terms in a contract of lease. The Rental Housing
Act 50 of 1999 was promulgated principally to set out the rights
and duties of landlords and tenants coherently, to balance the
rights of tenants and landlords, to protect both parties against
unfair practices and exploitation, and to introduce mechanisms
through which conflicts between landlords and tenants could be
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resolved expeditiously and at minimum cost. The Rental Housing
Act has already removed antiquated aspects of the common-law
system from the landlord-tenant relationship and replaced them
with a matrix better suited to modern-day residential leases. It is
my view that, save in the event of identified instances of constitu-
tional deficiencies, the legislator should address further non-
constitutional deficiencies in the common law (see, for example,
the discussion in Christopher Wm Sullivan ‘Forgotten lessons
from the common law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, and the holdover tenant’ (2006) 84 Washington Law
Review 1287-8). In order to remove uncertainty, the legislator
could include, under section 5(2) of the Rental Housing Act,
which regulates information that must be included in a lease, a
provision that requires the parties to a lease to identify clearly the
provisions of the original lease which form part of the extended
lease. Alternatively, the legislator could consider including a
provision in residential rental legislation stating that options or
pre-emptive rights in lease agreements cannot exist in perpetuity,
and should therefore be explicitly renewed after the expiry of the
original lease agreement, or that parties should agree on a
contractual deadline for the exercise of an option or pre-emptive
right in a lease. In respect of the Rental Housing Act, it is highly
unlikely that non-lawyers will be familiar with even the standard
terms which are implicit in all residential lease agreements.
Furthermore, the court’s reliance on foreign law – and more
specifically on the American case of Tubbs v Hendrickson
(above) – can be criticised on several grounds. First, the facts in
that case differed from the facts before the court. The American
case dealt with ‘holding over tenancy’ where a lease agreement
expires, but the tenant remains in possession of the property and
the landlord continues accepting rental. Furthermore, in the
American case the parties had a long-standing relationship as
lessor and lessee spanning some 40 years. In theAmerican case,
the court applied section 232-c of the New York State Real
Property Law, which regulates the effect of acceptance of rent on
holding over by a tenant after expiry of a lease agreement. This
provision determines that where a tenant holds over after the
expiry of a lease, the fact that he or she is permitted to remain on
the leased premises after expiry of the lease does not in itself give
the landlord the option of holding the tenant to a new term. In the
event of holding over by the tenant, a landlord may evict the
tenant, or if the landlord accepts rental for any period after the
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expiry of the lease, the tenancy created by the acceptance of
rental will be on a month-to-month basis commencing on the first
day after the expiry of the lease. The American case can,
therefore, hardly be regarded as authority for the court’s views
regarding extension of a right of pre-emption upon extension of a
lease.
Any dispute which may arise concerning the matter of eliminat-
ing the distinction between collateral and incidental terms, and
the fact that collateral terms would, following this decision,
automatically endure beyond the initial period of the lease upon
extension, could conceivably be resolved through proper interpre-
tation of the terms by a court. However, the court held that if a
pre-emptive right (or option) functions oppressively against a
landlord, he or she should state at the time of renewal, expressly
or tacitly, that the term will not be extended without considering
the prejudice that landlord may suffer.
A related concern is that, although the court held that the
common-law rule is not absolute and leaves room for consider-
ation of the real intention of the parties, the court’s focus rested on
the ‘deficiencies’ in the common-law rule. The court decided on
removal of the rule without considering the consequences.
The first consequence that the court failed to consider is that
the huur gaat voor koop rule – which provides that lease enjoys
preference over sale – functions on the basis of the distinction
between collateral and incidental terms in a lease agreement.
The removal of the distinction between collateral and incidental
terms, therefore, may impact negatively on the application of the
huur gaat voor koop rule. In terms of the this rule, incidental rights
are transferred to the successive owner of a leased property, but
collateral rights in the lease agreement which are unconnected to
the lease will not be transferred to a successive owner of leased
property (Mignoel Properties (Pty) Ltd v Kneebone 1989 (4) SA
1042 (A) 1050–1; Spearhead Property Holdings Ltd v E and
D Motors (Pty) Ltd 2010 (2) SA 1 (SCA), [2009] 4 All SA 417 paras
[48]–[52]). Therefore, the new owner becomes a party to the
lease agreement in the strict sense (see Graham Glover Kerr’s
Law of Sale and Lease 4ed (2014) 526). If no distinction is to be
drawn between incidental and collateral terms in a lease agree-
ment, a third-party purchaser of leased property may be preju-
diced. He or she will then be bound to all of the terms of the lease
agreement, and not only to the terms in the strict sense (ie, the
incidental terms). The Constitutional Court, therefore, unintention-
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ally and without realising it, extended the application of the huur
gaat voor koop rule beyond the scope of the law of lease, to terms
which do not relate to the lease at all and which may even be
onerous to a third-party purchaser. The huur gaat voor koop rule –
an equitable doctrine – was adopted to protect the tenure of
lessees when the leased property is alienated by transferring
rights and obligations that flow from the lease, by operation of
law, to the purchaser. The rule is, therefore, not intended to
enable the transfer of rights that flow from a pre-emptive right or
option to a purchaser. The rights emanating from pre-emptive
rights or options are personal rights granted to the grantee of the
rights. The huur gaat voor koop rule is only intended to protect
security of tenure in the context of the lessee’s occupation,
nothing more (Glover above 529). An extended application of the
huur gaat voor koop rule may eventually mean that, before the
transfer of the leased property, purchasers of leased property
may require the termination of an existing lease agreement
and/or the eviction of lessees from the leased property, in order to
avoid the potential impact of an extended huur gaat voor koop
rule.
Secondly, in order to avoid the consequences of the Constitu-
tional Court’s judgment, landlords would be wise not to extend a
lease, or to be extremely cautious when doing so. Instead of
renewing a lease, landlords could rather enter into a new lease
agreement with their tenants after the period of a lease agree-
ment has lapsed. In residential leases, it is highly likely that the
tenant will bear the cost of every new contract entered into after
the expiry of the initial contract. Furthermore, parties to a lease
will probably, in future, avoid, or be extremely careful when
making, verbal representations with regard to options or pre-
emptive rights relating to immovable property, as the verbal
representations may be construed as the granting of an option or
pre-emptive right. In order to avoid being bound by verbal
representations, it is advisable for the parties to a lease to reduce
any agreement, extension, or variation of the lease, to writing.
Moreover, in the interest of certainty and to circumvent the
consequences of the judgment of the Constitutional Court, lease
agreements should expressly state when a collateral term – such
as an option or pre-emptive right – expires, or that collateral terms
may not be extended unless the parties expressly agree to the
extension in writing. Failing this, landlords could, in future, refuse
to include any collateral rights in lease agreements.
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As mentioned, it is unclear from the ratio decidendi whether the
approach adopted by the Constitutional Court would apply to all
types of lease, including a commercial lease entered into by a
large corporation. The circumstances in respect of the know-
ledge attributable to lay persons and non-lawyers may well differ
from the facts that the court considered. Can the proposed model
be applied equally in respect of all leases? Through its generali-
sations, the court created the impression that parties to a lease
agreement are generally lay persons who are ignorant of the law,
and who need to be protected. The court did not take into
consideration that the law of lease, apart from residential leases,
also applies to commercial leases, movable property leases, and
other non-residential leases concluded by parties who need not
necessarily be regarded as ‘lay’ persons. It is incorrect simply to
assume that all leases are entered into by lay persons, and that
as a result the court should intervene on their behalf.
A final remark is that the Constitutional Court appears to have
blurred the characterisation of contracts of lease. Terms unre-
lated to a lease may, as a result of the judgment, continue to exist
beyond the termination date of the lease as agreed upon or their
intended duration, either through extension of the lease agree-
ment or through the application of the huur gaat voor koop rule.
This is cemented by Froneman J, in his partially dissenting
judgment, where he agreed with the majority decision regarding
the aspect of extension of a pre-emptive right. He held that the
question of whether collateral rights, such as a pre-emptive right,
are extended with a renewal of a lease, should be answered
through interpretation ‘without baggage’ (para [78]). He pro-
ceeded to indicate that ‘to start by calling it a lease agreement
gives it baggage . . . [which] comes with the name, or characteri-
sation. Once one calls it a lease then, surely, all other provisions
superfluous to the necessaries of a lease are collateral to the
lease, not incidents of it? Yes, put that way it does’ (para [78]).
This is unfortunately an over-simplification of the differentiation
between collateral and incidental terms. The court ought to have
applied the clear guidelines the Supreme Court of Appeal laid
down in Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ’n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd &
another 2016 (2) SA 586 (SCA), [2016] 2 All SA 351. In Masstores
(Pty) Ltd, the court indicated how one should go about determin-
ing whether or not rights are collateral. The court stated that a
right, integral to the right of occupancy, cannot be regarded as a
collateral right (para [24]; see too Spearhead above para [52];
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Shalala & another v Gelb 1950 (1) SA 851 (C) 865). One should,
therefore, determine whether a right is integral to the right of
occupancy, which is a factual question and not simply one of
characterisation. Additionally, to apply the huur gaat voor koop
rule, which is an equitable rule, properly, one has no choice but to
distinguish between collateral and incidental terms in a lease
agreement (see PN Stoop ‘The Law of Lease’ 2009 ASSAL 873-5
for a discussion of Spearhead; cf Genna-Wae Properties (Pty) Ltd
v Medio-Tronics (Natal) (Pty) Ltd [1995] 2 All SA 410 (A), 1995 (2)
SA 926, 939, in which the court confirmed the ratio decidendi of
the court in Mignoel Properties above).
TERMINATION OF A LEASE
Cancellation
In Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel
Interests (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 243 (GJ), the agreement between
the lessee, Southern Sun, and Leisure Holdings, the lessor,
contained a cancellation clause. The cancellation clause pro-
vided that if the lessee failed to pay the rental monthly as it
became due and payable, the lessor could cancel the agree-
ment, evict it, and repossess the property. After the lessee’s bank,
due to a technical error, failed for a second time to make a
month’s rental payment when it became due and payable, the
lessor cancelled the lease and applied for the eviction of the
lessee (paras [6]-[17]). The question was whether the cancella-
tion clause was enforceable. Van Oosten J refused to enforce the
cancellation clause on the basis that its implementation would be
contrary to the constitutional value of fairness, implicit in the
concept of ubuntu. The judge referred to Juglal NO & another v
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise Division 2004 (5)
SA 248 (SCA) paragraph [12], in which Heher JA held:
[A] creditor who implements the contract in a manner which is
unconscionable, illegal or immoral will find that a court refuses to give
effect to his conduct, but the contract itself will stand.
This judgment was overturned in December 2017 by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty)
Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314
(SCA). For a further discussion of the High Court decision, see
the chapter ‘Contract: General Principles’.
In Monyetla Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v IMM Graduate
School of Marketing (Pty) Ltd & another 2017 (2) SA 42 (SCA), a
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lease agreement was entered into between the appellant (lessor)
and the first respondent (lessee). The second respondent bound
himself to the lessor as surety and co-principal debtor for the
obligations of the lessee. On 6 March 2000, after the lessee had
breached the agreement, the lessor cancelled the lease. The
lessee, however, disputed the cancellation and remained in
possession of the leased premises. On 16 March 2012, the lessor
claimed damages resulting from the lessee’s breach of the lease
and the cancellation of the lease, from the respondents. The
respondents raised a special plea arguing that the claim had
prescribed. The High Court agreed. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Appeal (Leach JA) held that the claim had arisen on the
date of the cancellation of the agreement, and not when the
lessee vacated the leased premises. The court explained that the
lessor’s loss was suffered irrespective of whether the lessee
vacated or remained in occupation, and it constituted a debt
‘immediately claimable’ (paras [17] [18]). Therefore, the sum-
mons had been served more than three years after the cancella-
tion of the lease. That meant that any claim for damages flowing
from the breach has prescribed as envisaged in section 11 of the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (paras [19] [22]). (For a detailed
discussion of this judgment see the chapter ‘Contract: General
Principles’.)
Reasonable notice to vacate
In Airports Company South Africa Limited v Airports Bookshops
(Pty) Limited t/a Exclusive Books 2017 (3) SA 128 (SCA), [2016] 4
All SA 665, the section of the case dealing with the reasonable-
ness of a notice to vacate premises is relevant. (For a further
discussion of this case see R Sharrock ‘General Principles of
Contract’ 2016 ASSAL 443-5 and cf PN Stoop ‘The Law of Lease’
2016 ASSAL 815-17.) The crux of the case was penned by Lewis
JA on behalf of the majority. The majority held that a lease
agreement becomes terminable on reasonable notice. What is
‘reasonable’ depends on the interpretation of the extension
agreement (para [21]). The majority concluded, on the facts, that
the parties had intended that the respondent would remain in
occupation, on a month-to-month basis, until a new lessee was
awarded a tender in terms of a lawful tender process (para [26]).
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. Glover (above 370–1)
states that in the case of urban property, where parties to a lease
leave the duration of their lease undefined, the law requires
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reasonable notice to be given by one party to the other. He also
indicates that what constitutes reasonable notice is uncertain.
Therefore, determining what is reasonable is left to custom, or to
the discretion of the judge, who must decide the matter accord-
ing to the circumstances of each case (see Tiopazi v Bulawayo
Municipality 1932 AD 317 326–7).
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MINING LAW
HANRI MOSTERT*
LEGISLATION
There were no amendments to the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (the MPRDA) in 2017.
Other relevant developments are discussed below. They provide
safety guidelines, including regulations to prevent fires at mines,
in respect of the installation and modification of lifts and chairlifts,
and for construction work and operating of machinery. Regula-
tions were also introduced to regulate air pollution and waste
resulting from mining, and regulations for environmental impact
assessment were introduced. Further regulatory developments in
2017 comprise revisions to the provisions dealing with black
economic empowerment.
SAFETY ISSUES1
Prevention of fires at mines
The Guideline for the Compilation of a Mandatory Code of
Practice for Prevention of Fires at Mines DMR 16/3/2/4-B3 (the
Guideline) promulgated in Government Notice R1199 in GG 40313
30 September 2016), came into effect on 28 February 2017.
The Guideline must be read together with the provisions in the
Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 (the MHSA). The MHSA
provides for two codes of practice. First, the employer may
prepare a code of practice on matters affecting the health and
safety of employees and other persons affected by activities at
the mine (the MHSA s 9(1)). Secondly, an employer must prepare
* Hanri Mostert, BA LLB LLM LLD (Stell). DST/NRF SARChI Research Chair:
Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town. Assisted by the following members
or fellows of the Chair: Anri Heyns, Godknows Mudimu, Louie van Schalkwyk and
Bernard Kengni (doctoral researchers); Rebecca Pein, Lindokuhle Ntuli and Shamila
Mpinga (postgraduate researchers), and Joseph Mayson, Geoffrey Allsop, Romi-Jean
Martin and Chuma Bubu (student researchers, LLB 2017/2018). Closer details of
authorship are contained in the footnotes below. We are grateful for the financial
support of the National Research Foundation and the University of Cape Town.
Opinions and errors are our own and should not be attributed to these institutions.
1 This section was co-authored with Godknows Mudimu and Louie van
Schalkwyk.
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and implement a code of conduct dealing with matters affecting
the health and safety of employees and other persons by
activities at the mine, if required to do so by the Chief Inspector of
Mines (the MHSA s 9 (2)). The MHSA lists the issuing of guide-
lines as one of the functions of the chief inspector of mines (the
MHSA s 49(6)). This is the basis of the Guideline.
The Guideline aims to assist employers in compiling a code of
practice for the prevention of fires at mines. The purpose is to
remove or to minimise the likelihood of combustion by targeting
three causes of fire: (i) a fuel source; (ii) an ignition or heat; and
(iii) oxygen. These must be the focus in the identification of
hazards. The Guideline must be implemented in conjunction with
regulations 5.1; 8.9; 9.1 and 16.1, which deal with prevention of
fires (Mine Health and Safety Regulations GN R93 in GG 17725 of
15 January 1997). Failure by an employer to prepare and
implement this code of practice is an offence under the MHSA.
Lifts and chairlifts
In August 2017, the regulations to the MHSA were amended by
the addition of two forms relating to lifts and chairlifts (GN R893
GG 41065 of 25 August 2017 Reg Gaz 10751). These forms must
be read together with regulations 8.11 and 8.12. The forms are
prescribed notices to be sent to the principal inspector of mines if
a lift or chairlift is to be installed, modified, or recommissioned at
a mine.
Construction work
Section 43 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of
1993 (the OHSA) empowers the Minister of Labour to make
regulations after consulting the Advisory Council for Occupa-
tional Health and Safety. However, section 1(3) of the OHSA
stipulates that the Act, save for the schedules thereto, does not
apply to a ‘mine’ or ‘mining area’ or ‘works’ as defined in the
Minerals Act 50 of 1991, which was repealed by the MPRDA. The
MHSA excludes the OHSA from application within the mining
sector to the extent that the MHSA regulates the issue in question
(the MHSAs 103). The regulations apply to all persons involved in
construction work (regulation 2).
Driven machinery
In June 2015, regulations were promulgated under the OHSA
to protect employees against the dangers associated with the
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use of driven machinery (GN R540 GG 38905 of 24 June 2015,
Reg Gaz 10454). In March 2017, guidelines were issued to
explain the content of the regulations in simple language (GN R288
GG 40734 of 31 March 2017, Reg Gaz 10703). The guidelines
provide guidance, and emphasise the importance of self-
regulation. They apply to the design, manufacture, operation,
repair, and commissioning of machinery, and aim to ensure that
all driven machines are safe for use.
ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
AIR POLUTION2
The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of
2004 empowers the Minister of Environmental Affairs to declare
any substances contributing to air pollution a priority air pollutant.
In July 2017, various greenhouse gases were declared priority air
pollutants (GN 710 GG 40996 of 21 July 2017). These green-
house gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride.
In line with the requirement of section 29(4) of the National
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, Chapter 2 of the
declaration requires certain persons to submit pollution preven-
tion plans. Any person carrying out production processes listed
under Annexure A must monitor, evaluate, and report on the
implementation of an approved pollution prevention plan. The
processes listed under Annexure A include coal mining; produc-
tion, refining or processing of crude oil and natural gas; iron and
steel production; and cement production.
The Minister of Environmental Affairs also introduced a single
national reporting system for the transparent reporting of green-
house gas emissions (GN 275 GG 40762 of 3 April 2017). The
regulations were issued in accordance with the provisions of
section 53(aA), (o) and (p), read with section 12, of the National
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act. The emissions listed
in Annexure 1 to the regulations must be reported to the compe-
tent authority. The regulations require specifically classified per-
sons to register all facilities where activities exceed the thresholds
listed in Annexure A.
2 This section co-authored with Godknows Mudimu, assisted by Lindokuhle
Ntuli.
827MINING LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 4 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/23−Mining−Law
Regulation 5 deals with the registration of data service provid-
ers on the National Atmospheric Emission Inventory System by
means of a prescribed form. The registration of data service
providers must be completed either within 30 days of the
commencement of these regulations, or within 30 days of under-
taking the activity. Regulation 6 requires that the data provider
must notify the National Inventory Unit in writing, of any changes
in the registration details or ownership.
Regulation 7 deals with the reporting requirements for certain
listed categories of data providers. Category A data providers
must submit the greenhouse data emissions and activitity data as
provided under the Technical Guidelines for Monitoring, Report-
ing and Verification of Greenhouse Gas Emmissions. This must
be done for all relevant greenhouse gases and must be submit-
ted to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Emission
Sources specified in Annexure 1. Similarly, a category B data
provider must submit emissions and activity data collected,
relating to relevant activity when requested to do so by the
National Inventory.
In both categories, the registration must be completed on the
National Atmospheric Emission Inventory System (the NAEIS). If
the NAEIS is unable to meet the registration requirements, the
reporting must be done by submitting information in Annexure 3,
in electronic format.
Regulations 10 and 11 deal with the method, verification, and
validation of information submitted. A competent authority must
review a submission made by a data provider in accordance with
Technical Guidelines for Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and
Validation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Industry for the
method, verification, and validation of greenhouse gas emissions
by the industry. The regulations further include provisions on the
handling of information, keeping of records, and the publication
of data and information.
Lastly, the regulations create offences for certain violations.
These include: providing false information; failure to comply with
regulations relating to the registration as a data provider; failure
to notify the competent authority of changes to registration
details; and failure to comply with the reporting procedures,
including time limits. Any person who is convicted of an offence
under regulation 16 can be fined up to R5 million or imprisoment
for a period not exceeding five years for first offenders, and
R10 million or imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years for
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second and subsequent offenders. In some cases, the offender
can be both fined and imprisoned.
WASTE3
Norms and standards for the sorting, shredding, grinding,
crushing, screening, chipping, or baling of general waste (Norms
and Standards) were set by the Minister of Environmental Affairs
as a schedule to the National Environmental Management Waste
Act 59 of 2008 (GN 1093 GG 41175 of 11 October 2017). The
purpose of the Norms and Standards is to provide a uniform
national approach for the management of waste facilities that sort
or process general waste. These terms are defined under ‘defini-
tions’ in the Norms and Standards. The Norms and Standards
only apply to waste facilities with a minimum operational area of
1000m2. A waste facility with an operational area of less than
1000m2 need only comply with section 4(4) of the Norms and
Standards.
Chapter 2 of the Norms and Standards sets out the require-
ments for facilities that carry out sorting or processing activities.
The requirements include registration of facilities and the construc-
tion and design of a waste facility. Waste facilities carrying out the
applicable activities must be registered within the specified
timeframe. Chapter 2 also sets out considerations to be heeded
when deermining the location of a waste facility. Waste facilities
must be constructed and developed in accordance with regula-
tions and by-laws relating to construction and development of
buildings and structures. Chapter 2 further deals with the manage-
ment and disposal of waste during construction.
Chapter 3 addresses the management of facilities that carry
out the applicable activities. The management aspect of the
Norms and Standards deals with access control and notices;
managing the operational area of a waste facility, emergency
preparedness plans, monitoring and inspection, auditing facili-
ties, the competent authorities for auditing and inspections, and
the requirements for ceasing operations at a waste facility.
Regarding access control, a waste facility must be securely
fenced, gated to prevent unauthorised entry, and guarded by
security personnel at the entry. A notice board should be placed
at the entrance of the facility detailing, among other things, the
3 This section co-authored with Shamila Mpinga and Louie van Schalkwyk.
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type of waste accepted by the facility and emergency contact
details. Operational areas must be screened for hazardous waste
material. Noise levels and emissions that are likely to cause a
nuisance must be kept in check. The facility must adhere to
health and safety requirements. Waste facilities regulated by the
Norms and Standards must have an emergency preparedness
plan that sets out how the facility plans on responding, reacting
and preventing negative environmental impacts.
In respect of auditing, Chapter 3 notes that a waste facility must
conduct an internal and external audit, followed by written
reports. All incidents that occur at the waste facility and that fall
within the ambit of section 30 of the National Environmental
Management Act 107 of 1998 (the NEMA) must be reported to the
competent authority as defined in the Norms and Standards.
Chapter 3 also specifies the minimum requirements to be met by
an owner who wishes to cease operations at a waste facility.
The Minister of Environmental Affairs also announced several
amendments to the list of waste management activities that have,
or are likely to have, a detrimental effect on the environment (GN
1094 GG 41175 of 11 October 2017). The list of amendments is
divided into three categories. Category A deals with waste
management activities that require an environmental impact
assessment in terms of section 24(5) of the NEMA before
commencement. Category B provides that to conduct activities in
this category, a person must conduct a scoping and environmen-
tal impact assessment reporting process set out in the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Regulations under section 24(5) of
the NEMA. Category C sets out the norms and standards that
must be complied with to conduct waste management activities.
Each of the three categories focuses on waste storage; recycling
waste; waste treatment; disposal of waste; construction, expan-
sion or decommissioning of facilities, associated structures and
infrastructure; residue stockpiles; and residue deposits.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT4
The Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations describe
the process to be followed when applying for an environmental
authorisation. The regulations were first published in 2014 (GN 982
GG 3822 of 4 December 2014) and amended in 2017 (GN 326
4 This section was co-authored with Louie van Schalkwyk and Bernard Kengni.
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GG 40772 of 7 April 2017). The amended regulations contain
several references to the Minister of EnvironmentalAffairs’ authority
to gazette protocols or requirements for minimum information in
respect of an application (eg, regs 10(b), 16(3)(a), 17(c), 18,
19(3), 19(8), 21(3), 22(b)(ii), 23(3) and 23(5); Apps 2, 3 and 6).
To align with practical realities, the amended regulations allow
for submission of a combined mine closure plan and financial
provision plan for rehabilitation, closure, and post-closure. The
amendment deletes provisions relating to the period within which
listed activities must commence. While a renewal application is
pending, an authorisation will remain valid past its expiry date. In
the past, authorisations lapsed on the expiry date.
The amended regulations also contain several transitional
arrangements dealing with the implementation of the One Environ-
mental System introduced in 2014. If an environmental authorisa-
tion and mining right were obtained before 8 December 2014 and
the mining activities commenced after this date, it is assumed
that the environmental authorisation and mining right comply with
the requirements of the NEMA (reg 54A(1)). Since 8 December
2014, environmental management programmes approved for
mining activities are subject to the provisions of the Environmen-
tal ImpactAssessment Regulations. The first environmental audits
for these environmental management programmes must, there-
fore, be submitted to the competent authority by 7 December
2019, and every five years thereafter.
These regulations should be read with the three Listing Notices,
listing activities that impact on the environment and for which
environmental authorisation is required. Originally published in
2014, all three notices were amended in 2017 (Amendment of
Listing Notice 1: GN 327 GG 40772 of 7 April 2017; Amentment of
Listing Notice 2: GN 325 GG 40772 of 7 April 2017; Amendment
of Listing Notice 3: GN 324 GG 40772 of 7 April 2017). The
amendments have an impact on prospecting, mining, explora-
tion, and production activities. Activities that require a prospect-
ing right, mining permit, or mining right respectively, now include
the primary processing of mineral resources. However, they
exclude secondary processing activities. Similarly, activities that
require an exploration or production right now include the primary
processing of petroleum resources, but exclude secondary pro-
cessing activities (see activities 20–21 in Listing Notice 1, and
activities 17–20 in Listing Notice 2).
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EMPOWERMENT MATTERS
2017 MINING CHARTER5
On 15 June 2017, then Minister of Mineral Resources, Mose-
benzi Zwane, released the Broad-Based Black Socio-Economic
Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals
Industry 2017 (the 2017 Mining Charter) for comment (GN 581
GG 40923 of 15 June 2017). The 2017 Mining Charter was a
response by the Department of Mineral Resources (the DMR) to
the comments received on the 2016 draft Reviewed Broad-Based
Black Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African
Mining and Mineral Industry (GN 450 GG 39933 of 15 April 2016)
(the draft 2016 Mining Charter), released by the DMR on 15 April
2016 (see the 2016 Annual Survey 1008 ff).
It was expected that, if implemented, the 2017 Mining Charter
would replace the 2010 Mining Charter (Broad-Based Socio-
Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining
and Minerals Industry GN 838 GG 33573 of 20 September 2010)
(the 2010 Mining Charter). Provisions of the 2017 Mining Charter
are compared with the corresponding provisions of the 2010
Mining Charter, to indicate the extent of amendments made.
General comments and changes in definitions
Section 100(2)(a) of the MPRDA provides for the creation of a
broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter, that has
become known as the Mining Charter, to facilitate the empower-
ment of historically disadvantaged South Africans in the mining
industry. One of the reasons for reviewing the Mining Charter is to
align the empowerment framework created in terms of section
100(2)(a) of the MPRDA with other relevant legislation. The
Preamble to the 2017 Mining Charter specifically mentions align-
ment with the Codes of Good Practice (the DTI codes) in terms of
the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003
(the B-BBEE Act) and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (the
EEA). The first indication of this change is the name of the Mining
Charter. Whereas the title of the 2010 Mining Charter refers to
‘broad-based socio-economic empowerment’ the 2017 Mining
Charter is titled the ‘Broad-Based Black Socio-Economic Empow-
erment Charter’.
5 This section was co-authored with Anri Heyns.
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New definitions have been introduced in the 2017 Mining
Charter to facilitate the alignment with the B-BBEE Act. The only
explicit reference to black economic empowerment (BEE) in the
2010 Mining Charter is the definition of ‘BEE entity’, which is an
entity owned by historically disadvantaged South Africans hold-
ing at least 25 per cent of the entity’s share capital, plus one vote
(2010 Mining Charter iii). The 2010 Mining Charter did not make
explicit reference to the B-BBEE Act, as is done in the 2017
Mining Charter. The terms ‘BEE compliant manufacturing com-
pany’, ‘BEE entrepreneur’, ‘BEE partner’, and ‘BEE transaction’
are now all defined in the 2017 Mining Charter in the context of
broad-based black economic empowerment as defined in the
B-BBEE Act. (See Definitions 2017 Mining Charter 1–6.)
A further notable change is the replacement of references to
‘historically disadvantaged South African’ (HDSA) with ‘black
person’. The definition of ‘black person’ corresponds to the
definition of black people in the B-BBEE Act, ie, black Africans,
coloureds and Indians (2017 Mining Charter 2).
The 2017 Mining Charter has as an explicit purpose to align its
provisions with those contained in the Employment Equity Act 55
of 1998 (EEA) (Preamble to the 2017 Mining Charter). Other
instruments with which alignment is sought are the social and
labour plans to be created by a mining right holder in terms of
section 23 of the MPRDA (SLP), the municipal integrated develop-
ment plan prepared in terms of the Local Government Municipal
Systems Act 32 of 2000 (IDP), and the Housing and Living
Conditions Standards for the Mining and Minerals Industry devel-
oped in terms of section 100(1)(a) of the MPRDA.
Special funds or trusts created
The 2010, draft 2016, and 2017 Mining Charters provide for the
creation of special funds or trusts. However, each version of the
Mining Charter describes a different type of fund.
The 2010 Mining Charter creates a ‘social fund’ that is defined
as ‘a trust fund that provides financing for investments targeted at
meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable communities as
informed by commitments made by companies in terms of their
social and labour plans’ (2010 Mining Charter v). Interestingly, the
2010 Mining Charter provisions pertaining to mine community
development did not refer to this social fund. The 2010 Mining
Charter provisions regulating procurement and enterprise devel-
opment referred to an annual contribution by multinational suppli-
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ers of capital goods for the promotion of the socio-economic
development of local communities into a ‘social development
fund’ (item 2.2). As ‘social development fund’ is not defined and
the scorecard refers to ‘social fund’ at procurement and enter-
prise development, it is assumed that ‘social development fund’
and ‘social fund’ are used interchangeably.
Instead of referring to a ‘social fund’ as was done in the 2010
Mining Charter, the draft 2016 Mining Charter provided for the
creation of a ‘Ministerial Skills Development Trust Fund’ and a
‘Social Development Trust’ (draft 2016 Mining Charter viii). The
Ministerial Skills Development Trust Fund is a trust fund created
by the Minister of Mineral Resources with the purpose of develop-
ing skills, and is additional to the mandatory skills levy payable by
any company. As part of human resource development, a mining
company must make investments to the Ministerial Skills Develop-
ment Trust Fund (ibid).
The ‘Social Development Trust’ is another fund to be estab-
lished by the Minister in terms of the draft 2016 Mining Charter,
specifically for the socio-economic development of local commu-
nities, and for building capacity of black suppliers of goods and
services (draft 2016 Mining Charter viii). No mention is made of
the social and labour plan, as was the case under the 2010
Mining Charter (see the definition of ‘social fund’ 2010 Mining
Charter v). Contrary to the 2010 Mining Charter, it is explicitly
stated that the fund is to be created by the Minister. It appears as
if it would have served the same purpose because one per cent
of a mining company’s annual turnover was to be placed in this
fund for socio-economic development of local communities and
capacity building of BEE suppliers of goods. This provision,
however, is not included as part of the mining community
development provisions, but forms part of the provisions pertain-
ing to procurement, supplier, and enterprise development. There-
fore, a further contribution towards socio-economic development
of mine communities in addition to the one per cent, which is
provided for in regard to mine community development, is
envisaged. Both of these funds were to be created by the
Minister, but the 2016 draft Mining Charter did not include any
provisions on how these funds would be regulated or what
powers the Minister would have.
As to special funds, the 2017 Mining Charter does not mention
the ‘social fund/social development fund’ as did the 2010 Mining
Charter. Neither does it refer to the ‘Ministerial Skills Development
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Trust Fund’ or the ‘Social Development Trust’ provided for in the
draft 2016 Mining Charter (draft 2016 Mining Charter viii). Instead,
it appears that, yet again, a new fund is created through the
creation of the Mining Transformation and Development Agency
(see the definition of ‘Mining Transformation and Development
Agency’ 2017 Mining Charter 5). The definition fails to provide
clarity regarding the agency’s purpose, or what its mandate will
be. It merely states that the agency will be created by the Minister
during the transitional period provided for in the Mining Charter.
On the ownership element, from the provisions it can be
deduced that the agency will be tasked with creating and
managing trusts (2017 Mining Charter 2.1.1.9). These trusts must
hold shares in mining companies that must be issued to mine
communities as part of compliance with the ownership element.
The agency is part of the human resource development element
which requires that two per cent of the leviable amount on
essential skills development be contributed towards the agency
(2017 Mining Charter 2.4(d)).
Ownership
In terms of the 2010 Mining Charter, it was required in 2.1 that
26 per cent of the shareholding in all mining companies be held
by historically disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs). The pur-
pose was to ensure the meaningful economic participation of
HDSAs in mining companies (ibid). Meaningful economic partici-
pation requires that there should be clearly identifiable beneficia-
ries with full shareholder rights benefitting from empowerment
initiatives throughout the term of investment.
The draft 2016 Mining Charter maintained the percentage
black or HDSA ownership at 26 per cent, but set out certain
requirements for shares to be issued to workers, black entrepre-
neurs, and communities (2.1). The shareholding was to be held in
a trust created in terms of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of
1988 for the benefit of the community and workers, respectively,
and traditional authorities and unions had to be represented in
these trusts. No indication was given as to who should act as
trustees of these trusts or how the powers of the trustees were to
be limited in dealing with the trust property that would be the
shareholding in the mining company. It was, however, stipulated
that the trusts were to report to the SouthAfrican Revenue Service
and the DMR (2.1(d)). ‘Traditional authorities’ were not defined,
but read together with ‘communities’ it can be deduced that
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reference is to traditional communities as provided for in the
Traditional Leadership Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003.
The 2017 Mining Charter suggests significant changes to
empowerment in terms of the ownership of mining companies.
For the first time, the Charter distinguishes between new mining
right holders, new prospecting right holders, and existing mining
rights holders (2017 Mining Charter 2.1.1). For new mining right
holders, the required percentage of black ownership is increased
to 30 per cent (2017 Mining Charter 2.1.1.2). The holder of a new
prospecting right is required to have more than 50 per cent black
shareholding (2017 Mining Charter 2.1.1.1). Of the 30 per cent
ownership stake in a mining company, eight per cent must be
transferred to employee share-owning programmes (ESOPs),
another eight per cent to a community trust for the benefit of mine
communities. and fourteen per cent to BEE entrepreneurs. BEE
entrepreneurs are black-owned companies or black persons who
acquire an equity interest in the mining right holder in terms of a
BEE transaction (2017 Mining Charter 2.1.1.3).
The definition of ‘mine communities’ in the 2017 Mining Charter
is far broader than its equivalent in the 2010 Mining Charter. The
latter referred to a ‘mine community’ as ‘communities where
mining takes place, including labour-sending areas’ (2010 Mining
Charter v). The 2017 Mining Charter includes in the definition
‘adjacent communities within a local municipality, metropolitan
municipality and/or district municipality’ (definition of ‘mine com-
munity’ 2017 Mining Charter 5). Potentially, persons living in a
very large area stand to benefit from ownership schemes in terms
of the 2017 Mining Charter.
The community trust must be created and managed by the
Mining Transformation and Development Agency (2017 Mining
Charter 2.1.1.9). Other than stating that the Mining Transforma-
tion and Development Agency must report to the Minister on an
annual basis, the mandate of the Mining Transformation and
Development Agency is not clear from the Charter (2.1.1.10). In
addition to an overly broad and vague definition of the mining
community, the uncertainty regarding the functions of the Mining
Transformation and Development Agency may present chal-
lenges in practice when it comes to the distribution of the benefits
of the shareholding.
The 2017 Mining Charter includes other peculiar provisions.
The dilution of shareholders’ shareholding as a result of the issue
of further shares should not affect the shares held by a black
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person. The shareholding of black persons should vest over a
period of ten years, to be paid from the dividends receivable by a
black person. Where the dividends are insufficient to pay off the
outstanding subscription price for the shares to acquire full
vesting, the outstanding amount owed by black shareholders
should be written off. Black shareholders, furthermore, must
receive at least one per cent of the annual turnover of the mining
company before any distribution to the other shareholders is
made, and this is over and above any other distributions to be
made to shareholders of the holder of a new mining right
(2.1.1.7).
As to existing prospecting and mining rights holders, the 2017
Mining Charter acknowledges ‘historical BEE transactions’ con-
cluded before the commencement date of the 2017 Mining
Charter (see the definition in the 2017 Mining Charter 3). This
acknowledgment, however, would have expired once the 2017
Mining Charter was published. After publication, a holder would
have to ‘top up’ – defined as ‘increasing of shareholding of a
Black Person to reach the minimum thresholds required by the
Mining Charter’ (defined in 2017 Mining Charter 6) – the percent-
age shareholding issued to black persons to achieve the 30 per
cent shareholding level (2.1.2.3) within the twelve-month transi-
tional period (2.11). Therefore, the 2017 Mining Charter effectively
rejects what is colloquially known as the ‘once empowered,
always empowered’ principle. This principle entails that, once a
mining company has achieved the set ownership target provided
for in previous Mining Charters, it need not ‘top up’ shareholding
issued to black persons, should a change in shareholding occur.
(Chamber of Mines v Minister of Mineral Resources & another
2018 (4) SA 581 (GP) para [206].)
Whereas the beneficiation of minerals constitutes a separate
element under the 2010 and draft 2016 Mining Charters, it is
included as part of the ownership element in terms of the 2017
Mining Charter. The 2010 Mining Charter confirmed mining
companies’ obligation to facilitate local beneficiation in terms of
section 26 of the MPRDA (2.3). It also allowed a mining right
holder to offset eleven per cent of the value of the beneficiation it
achieved against the Mining Charter’s ownership requirements
(see 2010 Mining Charter 2.3). The 2017 Mining Charter applies
the eleven per cent limitation to any contribution to beneficiation
made in addition to the beneficiation mandated by section 26 of
the MPRDA (2017 Mining Charter 2.1.4). The 2017 Mining Charter
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adds further criteria for the mining right holder to be able to set
off. First, the investment in beneficiation, additional to the invest-
ment made in terms of section 26, must have been made since
2004. Secondly, the activities deemed to constitute beneficiation
must comply with the definition of ‘beneficiation’ in the MPDRA.
Thirdly, the DMR must approve the activities (2017 Mining
Charter 2.1.4; cf 2.1.1.13).
Procurement, supplier, and enterprise development
Empowerment through procurement and enterprise develop-
ment takes place when mining rights holders procure the goods
and services of local businesses owned by black persons. In this
regard, the 2010 Mining Charter stipulates that the holders of
mining rights had, by 2014, to have procured 40 per cent of their
capital goods from BEE entities (2010 Mining Charter 2.2). A BEE
entity is an entity owned by HDSAs holding at least 25 per cent of
the share capital plus one vote (2010 Mining Charter iii). A
multinational mining right holder must contribute 0,5 per cent of
its annual income to the social development fund, which has not
been created (2010 Mining Charter 2.2). By 2014, mining right
holders also had to procure 70 per cent of services and 50 per
cent of consumer goods from BEE entities (ibid).
The 2017 Mining Charter places considerable emphasis on
‘strengthening the linkages between the mining and minerals
industry and the broader economy’ (2017 Mining Charter 2.2). It
includes a definition of ‘South African manufactured goods and
services’, meaning goods of which at least 60 per cent of the
value added during manufacturing or assembly took place in
South Africa (2017 Mining Charter 5). Furthermore, the 2017
Mining Charter stipulates that a mining right holder must procure
goods and services from the community in which it operates.
‘Community’ is not defined in the 2017 Mining Charter, with only
‘mine community’ being defined (2017 Mining Charter 5).
Extensive criteria are set for a mining right holder’s procure-
ment policies. At least 80 per cent of a mining right holder’s
procurement spend must be spent on services sourced from
companies incorporated and having offices in South Africa
(SA-based companies). At least 65 per cent of the services
procured in South Africa must be sourced from companies
owned by black persons holding in excess of 50 per cent of the
share capital. Ten per cent of expenditure on services must go
towards black-owned companies owned and controlled by female
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black persons who enjoy at least 50 per cent shareholding and
one vote; and five per cent must be spent on black-owned
companies owned and controlled by black youth, ie black
persons between the ages of eighteen and 35 years (2017 Mining
Charter 6 read with 2.2).
All mineral samples must be processed by SA-based compa-
nies. The verification of local content must be done by the South
African Bureau of Standards. A company controlled and regis-
tered outside of South Africa which supplies goods and services
to the South African mining industry (a foreign supplier) must
contribute one per cent of the annual income generated from
local mining companies to the Mining Transformation and Devel-
opment Agency (2017 Mining Charter 2.2).
Employment representivity
In terms of the 2010 Mining Charter, employment equity should
ensure diversity and equitable representation, specifically of
HDSAs, on all levels of the mining company (2010 Mining Charter
2.4). The 2010 Mining Charter sets the universal percentage for
representation of HDSAs in mining companies at 40 per cent.
This target had to be achieved by 2014. The 2010 Mining Charter
further identifies the following levels at which representation is
assessed: executive management level; senior management
level; core and critical skills; middle management level; and
junior management level (ibid).
As was done in the draft 2016 Mining Charter, the 2017 Mining
Charter makes specific reference to employment equity as
provided for in the EEAand provides for consistency with the EEA
in the mining industry. It is not clear whether the assessments in
terms of the Mining Charter replace the assessments required
under the EEA, or whether the Mining Charter assessment
constitutes an additional assessment.
The 2017 Mining Charter sets out new representation levels.
The board of a mining right holder must consist of at least 50 per
cent black persons, a minimum of 25 per cent must be female
(notably, the wording of this provision is clumsy and it could be
interpreted to mean that a quarter of the black persons should be
female). At executive or top management level, 50 per cent of the
members must be black persons of whom no fewer than 25 per
cent must be female. Sixty per cent of senior management must
be constituted by black persons, of whom 30 per cent must be
female. At the middle management level, 75 per cent must be
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black persons of whom 38 per cent must be female. Junior
management must be constituted by 88 per cent black persons,
44 per cent of whom must be female. Three per cent of all
employees should be persons with disabilities, to be aligned with
the relevant provincial demographics (2017 Mining Charter 2.3).
‘Core and critical skills’ are defined as skills regarded as
‘high-level technical skills’ required at all the levels of the mining
right holder’s operation. Black persons must constitute 60 per
cent of persons regarded as having or forming ‘core and critical
skills’ (2.3). Alignment with the SLP in identifying the relevant
persons must also be achieved (ibid).
Another new provision in the 2017 Mining Charter envisages
the creation of career progression plans in alignment with the SLP
(2017 Mining Charter 2.3). It is not clear whether separate sets of
career progression plans must be developed in terms of the SLP
and the Mining Charter, respectively, or whether one set of plans
will suffice.
Human resource development
In terms of the 2010 Mining Charter, expenditure on human
resource development had to reach five per cent of the mining
right holder’s annual payroll (leviable amount in terms of the Skills
Development Levies Act 9 of 1999), by 2014 (2010 Mining
Charter 1). The 2017 Mining Charter reiterates that the aim of
human resource development is to improve the employment
prospects of black persons (2017 Mining Charter 2.4). The 2017
Mining Charter retains the requirement that five per cent of the
leviable amount must be spent on human resource development
(ibid). However, additional requirements are set in this regard.
Two per cent of that five per cent must go towards the creation of
artisanal skills training, bursaries, and literacy and numeracy
skills training for both employees and the community (2.4). One
per cent must be contributed to South African historically black
academic institutions. These are higher learning institutions that
were previously attended only by black persons for research and
development initiatives (2.4(c)). At least two per cent must be
contributed to the Ministerial Mining Transformation and Develop-
ment Agency ( 2.4(d)).
Mine community development
In response to the identified shortcomings of the 2010 Mining
Charter, the draft 2016 and 2017 Mining Charters both addressed
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the plight of poor mine communities through broad-based black
socio-economic empowerment. Both charters proclaim as an
objective the promotion of employment and advancements of the
social and economic welfare of mine communities and major
labour-sending areas (2016 draft Mining Charter 1(d); 2017
Mining Charter ii).
The 2010 Mining Charter describes ‘mine community develop-
ment’ as the meaningful contribution to community development
as a means for the holder of a mining right to retain its ‘social
licence to operate’ (2.6). The target set for a mining company in
terms of the 2010 Mining Charter is the implementation of
approved development projects. Value allocated to the project
had to make up at least fifteen per cent of the company’s total
spend on empowerment in terms of the Mining Charter (ibid).
The 2016 draft Mining Charter also dictates that mine commu-
nity development should entail the meaningful contribution by a
mining company towards community development and reference
is also made to the ‘social licence to operate’ (2016 draft Mining
Charter ii). It is stipulated that mine community development
requires ‘meaningful consultation and co-ordination’ between the
mining company, the community, and the local municipality (ibid).
In contrast to the 2010 Mining Charter, the draft 2016 Mining
Charter provides for a specific percentage (1%) of the annual
turnover that should be contributed to community development
and labour-sending areas. The Charter claims that this is ‘consis-
tent with international best practices’ (compare 2010 Mining
Charter 2.6 and draft 2016 Mining Charter 2.6).
Whereas mine community development must make up fifteen
per cent of a mine company’s empowerment spend in terms of
the 2010 Mining Charter, the draft 2016 Mining Charter increased
this percentage to 30 per cent (score card 4).
The 2017 Mining Charter once again refers to the fact that the
holder of a mining right must ‘meaningfully contribute’ to the
development of the mining community but specifies that there
must be ‘a bias towards communities where mining takes place’.
Reference is again made to a company’s social licence to
operate (2.5).
For the first time, the 2017 Mining Charter includes examples of
the kind of development project to which a mining company must
contribute. These are infrastructure projects, income generating
projects, and enterprise development (2.5). None of these three
projects/priorities is defined. Of specific interest is the link with
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enterprise development. It is not clear, however, if enterprise
development (procurement, supplier, and enterprise develop-
ment) and mine community development should operate along-
side each other in this regard.
Whereas the 2010 Mining Charter refers to alignment with
projects identified in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP)
(2010 Mining Charter 2.6), the 2017 Mining Charter specifically
mandates the holder of a mining right to perform mine community
development by contributing to projects ‘by identifying priority
projects as per the approved IDP’ (2017 Mining Charter 2.5). The
2017 Mining Charter is not clear on the value of the mining right
holder’s contribution. It only determines that such a contribution
must be ‘proportionate to the size of the investment’ (2017 Mining
Charter 2.5(a)). In addition to compelling a mining company to
work specifically on the projects identified in the IDP, a holder
must also subsidise mine community development as provided
for in its approved SLP. Other than the ‘social fund/social develop-
ment fund’ provided for in the 2010 Charter which referred to the
SLP, this mention in the 2017 Mining Charter is the first instance
where a direct link is drawn between mine community develop-
ment and the implementation of a mining right holder’s SLP (2017
Mining Charter 2.5(b)-(d)).
Sustainable development and growth of the mining and minerals industry
The 2010 Mining Charter provides for mining right holders to
implement the Stakeholders Declaration on Strategy for the
Sustainable Growth and Meaningful Transformation of South
Africa’s Mining Industry of 30 June 2010 (2.8). Implementation
entails improving the industry’s environmental management, health
and safety performance, and capacity and skills enhancement
(ibid).
The 2017 Mining Charter once again refers to the 2010
stakeholders’ declaration, with specific emphasis on the improve-
ment of environmental management (2017 Mining Charter 2.6).
Reference is made to the environmental management plan to be
created in terms of the National Environmental Management Act
107 of 1998 (2.6.1). With regard to health and safety perfor-
mance, the implementation of the 2016 Occupational Health and
Safety Summit Milestones is emphasised (2.6.2). The Mining
Charter adds further milestones such as the elimination of
occupational lung diseases and noise-induced hearing loss;
prevention and management of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS; the
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elimination of fatalities and injuries; and the promotion of a
cultural transformation framework, within the timelines agreed
upon with stakeholders (2.6.2). Regarding research and develop-
ment spending, the 2017 Mining Charter requires a mining right
holder to undertake to direct 70 per cent of its research and
development expenditure to projects within the Republic of South
Africa. Fifty per cent of the 70 per cent allocation must be spent
on South African historically black academic institutions (2.6.3).
Housing and living conditions
In terms of the 2010 Mining Charter, by 2014 mining rights
holders had to convert hostels into family units, achieve an
occupancy rate of one person per room, and provide home
ownership options for mine employees. These initiatives were
supposed to take place in consultation with organised labour
(2010 Mining Charter 2.7).
The 2017 Mining Charter provides for compliance with the
Housing and Living Conditions Standards for the Mining and
Minerals Industry, as developed in terms of section 100(1)(a) of
the MPRDA (see the definition of ‘Housing and living conditions
standards’ 2017 Mining Charter 4). When it comes to housing, it is
emphasised that the following principles should be pursued: a
decent standard of housing; home ownership by mine employ-
ees; the integration of human settlements; and involvement of
employees in housing administration and security of tenure (2017
Mining Charter 2.7.1). Separate reference is made to working
conditions which include the provision of proper health care
services and tending to the nutritional requirements of mine-
workers (2.7.2).
A mining right holder must submit a housing and living condi-
tions plan to be approved by the DMR after consultation with the
Department of Human Settlements and Housing and organised
labour (ibid).
Reporting, monitoring and compliance
In terms of the 2017 Mining Charter, reporting by mining right
holders must, as is required in terms of the 2010 Mining Charter,
be performed in terms of section 28(2)(c) of the MPRDA (2017
Mining Charter 2.9). The new provision introduced by the 2017
Mining Charter is that ownership, mine community development,
and human resource development, are ring-fenced elements –
these elements must be complied with fully for a mining right
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holder to be regarded as compliant in terms of the Mining Charter
(ibid). Therefore, if a mining right holder’s score for the ring-
fenced elements is between five and eight in terms of the
scorecard, the mining right holder will be regarded as non-
compliant with the Mining Charter in its entirety. As was also
confirmed in the 2010 Mining Charter, non-compliance is dealt
with in terms of section 93 read together with sections 47, 98 and
99 of the MPRDA (2010 Mining Charter 3, 2017 Mining Charter
2.12).
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
The 2017 Mining Charter explicitly states that compliance with
the Charter is required for the entire duration of the mining right.
Therefore, the prospecting and exploration phases will also be
covered (2.10).
The 2017 Mining Charter provides for transitional arrange-
ments (2.11). The transitional arrangements indicate the periods
within which the mining right (and prospecting right) holders must
comply with the new targets set out in the 2017 Mining Charter.
The general period allowed is twelve months from the date of
publication of the Mining Charter. As to the procurement element,
the mining right holder must, within three years after the publica-
tion of the Mining Charter, submit a three-year plan setting out the
progressive implementation of the procurement targets (2.11(c)).
The Minister is expressly authorised to review the Mining
Charter by notice in the Government Gazette (2.13). This inclu-
sion is arguably in response to legal proceedings currently
underway challenging the Minister’s powers in this regard. Once
the 2017 Mining Charter becomes operational, the 2004 and the
2010 Mining Charters will be repealed (2.14). Guidance regard-
ing the proper interpretation of the Mining Charter is also pro-
vided. The 2017 Mining Charter stipulates that the Charter should
be read together with the MPRDA and the B-BBEE Act (2.15).
CASE LAW
The discussion of cases litigated in 2017 is categorised as: (i)
property-related issues in the mining context; (ii) procedural
issues; (iii) environmental issues; (iv) labour matters; (v) adminis-
trative issues; and (vi) matters involving taxation and tariffs.
PROPERTY-RELATED ISSUES
A number of cases decided in 2017 dealt with proprietary
aspects. Ekapa Minerals (Pty) Ltd & others v Seekoei & others
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[2017] ZANCHC 5 (13 January 2017), concerned the enduring
questions surrounding legal treatment of tailings in South Africa,
and serves to illustrate the plight of artisanal and small-scale
miners. In the context of the diamond trade, South African
Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and
Energy & others 2017 (6) SA 331 (CC), emphasises that a mere
interference with business interests of the diamond trade does
not constitute an infringement of rights, nor does it render state
regulation with legitimate purposes unlawful.
Artisanal mining on tailings: Trespassing and illegal mining?6
The dispute in Ekapa Minerals (Pty) Ltd & others v Seekoei &
others (above) arose after the first applicant (Ekapa) purchased a
part of the business of De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd
(De Beers), entailing the reprocessing of tailings (paras [1]–[6]).
The tailings, which were the result of over 130 years of open-cast
mining, consist of the debris remaining after excavation for
diamonds. The debris, which is left in dumps on so-called tailings
disposal sites, or spread on the site surface (the floors), hold
diamondiferous material which can be reprocessed using new
technology and, consequently, can still hold significant economic
value (paras [1]–[6]).
Delivery of the tailings mineral resources (TMRs) from De Beers
to Ekapa took place in January 2016 through traditio longa manu.
Ekapa, along with a group of mining companies participating in
the tailings reprocessing business, sought to interdict the respon-
dent artisanal miners from entering or being on certain immov-
able properties containing tailings, and from illegally conducting
mining activities on those properties (paras [1]–[6]). To succeed
in the application for a final interdict, the applicants had to prove
on a balance of probabilities that they had a clear right that had to
be protected, that current or apprehended irreparable harm
would ensue, and that there was no alternative remedy. In
opposing the application, the respondents raised four defences:
the draft order was too vague to be enforced; the applicants had
failed to prove that they had a clear right for interdictory relief; the
applicant did not approach the court with clean hands; and there
was an alternative remedy available (para [10]).
The alleged vagueness of the original order related to attempts
to identify the respondents and the description of the sizable
6 The case discussion of Ekapa Minerals was co-authored with Joseph Mayson.
845MINING LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 22 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/23−Mining−Law
affected properties. Williams J found that the vagueness of the
original order could be avoided and the property and related
parties clearly identified (paras [11] [12]) once the applicants’
representatives had simplified the property descriptions and
supplied additional names of artisanal miners.
As to the alleged failure to show a clear right, the court
examined whether the applicants had established a ius possi-
dendi (right of possession) over the relevant properties. The
respondents contended that properties not owned by Ekapa
could not be affected by the order. While the properties in
question had not yet been transferred at the time of the court
proceedings, all were subject to an agreement of sale, which
provided that the purchaser ‘shall be entitled free of charge, to
the use and enjoyment of the Immovable Properties as if it were
the owner thereof’ from the effective date of the agreement
(18 January 2016). This convinced Williams J that, on a balance
of probabilities, the applicants had a contractual right of posses-
sion, if not actual possession of the properties (paras [13]–[16]).
A further contention for the ‘clear right’ defence related to the
enduring problem of the tailings and their status in South African
mineral law. The respondents argued that the diamondiferous
material contained in the tailings constitutes ‘minerals’ as defined
in the MPRDA and that consequently the applicants did not have
a right to the mine the minerals, as would be required by section
5A of the MPRDA (paras [17] [19]). The applicants, however,
rebutted this argument by stating that the MPRDA does not apply
to tailings dumps (para [18]). Williams J acknowledged that
‘mineral’ in section 1 of the MPRDA includes ‘any mineral occur-
ring in residue stockpiles or in residue deposits’ and that ‘residue
stockpile’ includes material incidental to a mining operation that
was subject to ‘a mining right, mining permit, production right or
an old order right’. Further, ‘residue deposit’ means ‘any residue
stockpile remaining at termination, cancellation or expiry of a
prospecting right, mining right, mining permit, exploration right,
production right or an old order right’. Williams J stated that ‘[a]n
old order right’ is defined in item 1 of Schedule II to the MPRDAas
‘an old order mining right, old order prospecting right or unused
old order right’. Lastly, ‘[a]n unused old order right’ is defined as
‘any right, entitlement, permit or licence listed in table 3 to [sch II]
for which no prospecting or mining was being conducted imme-
diately before [the MPRDA) took effect’.
The respondents argued that the tailings dumps were created
as a result of De Beers’ unused old order right, that this qualifies
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as an old order right under the MPRDA, and that any incidental
residue stockpiles likewise constitute minerals, and require a
licence for processing (paras [19] [20]).
The court dismissed the argument that there was an unused
old order right as the third applicant had not been processing the
tailings dumps between 1991 and 2008. It could also not be said
that ‘no prospecting or mining was being conducted immediately
prior to the MPRDA’, which is a precondition for the definition of
an unused old order right (para [21]). However, De Beers was the
holder of an old order mining right which had been converted to a
mining right under the MPRDA in May 2010. In Holcim SA (Pty)
Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd & others [2011] 1 All SA 364
(SCA) paragraph [37], it was held that an old order right is only
created if the old order common-law right has been converted
under the transitional provisions of the MPRDA. This position was
confirmed in in XSTRATA SA (Pty) Ltd & others v SFF Association
2012 (5) SA60 (SCA) para [10] and Minister of Mineral Resources
& others v Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd & another 2014 (2)
SA 603 (CC) para [60], where it was held that
[an old order right] is a new right created by statute and which would
be converted into a mining right. A failure to convert that old order
mining right resulted in the right ceasing to exist.
An old order right, therefore, only came into existence after the
enactment of the MPRDA in 2004. The tailings dumps, which
were created long before 2004, were not created by the holder of
an old order right as envisaged in the definition of ‘residue
stockpile’. In the result, Williams J found that the dumps did not
constitute ‘minerals’ in terms of the MPRDA (paras [22]–[24]). The
court proceeded to acknowledge that the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Amendment Bill of 2013 (the Bill), which
is currently before Parliament, aims to amend the definition of
‘residue stockpile’ in the MPRDA to include ‘historic mines and
dumps created before the implementation of the Act’ (s 42A(1) of
the Bill). The judge indicated that the existence of the Bill
bolstered the contention that the tailings dumps do not constitute
residue stockpiles as the contemplated amendments would be
unnecessary if the existing definition included dumps created
before the implementation of the Act. For a discussion of a similar
case and the connection with the relevant proposed MPRDA
amendments, see Candero Mining and Consulting (Pty) Ltd v
Smith & others (GNP) 26 February 2016 (case 7178/16) 2016
Annual Survey 1025–27.
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The respondents contended that the interdict should not be
granted because an alternative remedy – criminal prosecution –
was available. Williams J dismissed this argument on the basis
that criminal prosecution does not offer similar protection to an
interdict. Criminal prosecution would not have been satisfactory
due to the ‘difficulties inherent in charging and prosecuting such
a large number of people together with the inevitable lengthy
delays in bringing such prosecutions to finality’ (para [25]).
As a final plea, the respondents argued that even if all the
requirements of an interdict had been satisfied, the judge had a
discretion to refuse the application, or at least to suspend the
operation of the interdict in the interests of justice, in light of the
prejudice that the respondents who depend on the income they
gain from artisanal mining to support themselves and their
families, would suffer (para [26]). Without answering the question
of whether he had such a discretion, Williams J declined to
exercise the discretion in light of the illegality of the activities,
which he could not condone (para [27]).
The application succeeded, and the interdict was granted in its
entirety.
Free trade and property in the diamond industry7
South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of
Minerals and Energy & others (above) was the sequel to South
African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals
and Energy NO & others (2016) ZAGPPHC 817. (See the
discussion in the 2016 Survey 1020–24.) The issue relates to
diamond trade practices that were abolished by an amendment
of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. One of the key purposes of this
amendment was to promote the local beneficiation of the coun-
try’s diamonds (s 4(b)). The 2007 amendment, section 20A,
seeks to further this aim, as well as to eliminate illegal trading
activities. The effect of the amendment, however, has been a
prohibition on established business practice in the diamond
sector.
The parties to this litigation differed in their opinions as to
whether the business practice is lawful, or whether it exploits a
loophole in the regulatory framework to give unlicensed persons
access to the diamond trade. Members of the South African
7 Chuma Bubu assisted in the discussion of SADPO CC.
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Diamond Producers Organisation (the SADPO) used to offer, on
their licensed business premises, unpolished diamonds from
local producers on a tender basis to other South African dealers.
Non-licensed experts, attending on behalf of prospective foreign
buyers, and often themselves from abroad, assisted the licensed
buyers with purchasing decisions. The sale was ultimately con-
cluded between the producer or licensed dealer and a South
African licensed purchaser, but the established business prac-
tice allowed these purchasers to associate with foreign prospec-
tive buyers to whom the purchased parcels could be sold and
exported.
With the coming into force of section 20A of the Diamonds Act,
the established business practice was effectively terminated:
licensees may no longer be assisted by non-licensed experts
during the viewing, purchase, or sale of unpolished diamonds at
any place where unpolished diamonds are offered for sale under
the Act, save for a Diamond Exchange and Export Centre
(DEEC).
The High Court declared section 20A unconstitutional. To
confirm the court a quo’s order of constitutional invalidity (under
s 172(2)(a) of the Constitution), the Constitutional Court consid-
ered whether section 20A deprives the SADPO’s members of
property contrary to section 25 of the Constitution. Further, it
assessed whether this section violates the right of SADPO
members freely to choose their trade, occupation, and profession
as provided for in section 22 of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court held that there had been no depriva-
tion of property; no legally protectable interest had been removed
by the introduction of section 20A; and this section has not
deprived SADPO’s members of any proprietary right they may
have had in their licences. The court also found that section 20A
is rationally connected to the legitimate government purpose of
monitoring the movement of unpolished diamonds. Conse-
quently, it does not unlawfully limit the practice of a trade,
occupation or profession.
In support of its finding that section 25 of the Constitution had
not been infringed, the Constitutional Court deliberated on the
meaning of ‘property’ in the context of this fundamental right. The
SADPO’s argument was that there are three property rights at
stake: (i) ownership of the diamonds won by the producers and
bought and sold by the dealers; (ii) ownership of the diamond
dealer licences which is connected to the ownership of their
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businesses; and (iii) the rights under diamond exchange certifi-
cates that were replaced by trading house licences.
As to diamond ownership, the Constitutional Court accepted
that corporeal movable objects have long been recognised as
‘property’ for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution (para
[41]). A more difficult question, however, is whether section 20A
deprives producers and dealers of the ownership of their dia-
monds (para [42]). Such a deprivation would require a substan-
tial interference which would have a significant impact on the
rights of the complainants (paras [42]–[48]). To determine whether
there has been such a ‘substantial’ interference, the court asked:
‘Does section 20A interfere with producers’ and dealers’ right to
alienate their diamonds in a legally relevant way?’ and answered
‘[s]urely not’ (para [49]).
The Constitutional Court reasoned that it is impossible to
quantify the loss suffered by SADPO members as a direct result
of section 20A (paras [50] [51]). Even if the 30 per cent loss the
SADPO alleged its members had suffered could be proven, the
court found that there would still be no deprivation: no legally
protectable interest or entitlement has been removed by this
section (para [52]). What section 20A does, is to change how
diamonds may be alienated, and the market conditions determin-
ing the highest price. These changes are not ‘sufficiently substan-
tial’ to amount to a deprivation of property in the Constitutional
Court’s view (para [53]).
As regards the ownership of the diamond dealer licences, the
Constitutional Court accepted that the licences constituted ‘prop-
erty’ (para [57]). Neverthess, it held that, based on the ‘substan-
tial interference’ test, there had been no deprivation of that
property. Acknowledging that what the SADPO was seeking to
protect was their members’ interest in a preferred strategy for
conducting their businesses under their licences, the Constitu-
tional Court held that a government decision to make a particular
business strategy unlawful, cannot be said to deprive persons
who preferred to conduct their business in that way, of their
property. The court held that ‘[f]avourable business conditions,
including favourable regulatory conditions, are transient circum-
stances, subject to inevitable changes’ (para [60]).
The court rejected the SADPO’s argument that the holders of
diamond exchange certificates had been deprived of property
because the amendment abolished diamond exchanges and
replaced them with trading house licences, which did not afford
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the same level of rights. In the court’s view section 20A did not
clearly affect these rights.
In the result, the court concluded that there had been no
deprivation of property or infringement of section 25(1) of the
Constitution.
The SADPO’s further challenge was based on section 22 of the
Constitution. The Constitutional Court noted that although both
the ‘choice’ of trade and its ‘practice’ are protected in terms of this
provision, different levels of inquiry attach to limitations of each of
these aspects (para [65]). The court held that section 20A does
not limit the freedom of SADPO’s members to choose their trade,
profession, or occupation (paras [66]–[70]); it merely regulates
the practice of diamond production and dealing by requiring that
assistance may only be rendered by a licensed person or at a
DEEC.
Applying a rationality test, the Constitutional Court indicated
that the provision would pass constitutional muster if it could be
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose (para [75]).
The court indeed found a rational connection between effectively
creating a ‘one-stop shop’ (para [79]), in the form of state-run
DEECs, for all exports of unpolished diamonds, and the legiti-
mate government purpose of properly monitoring and recording
the movement of unpolished diamonds. A similar rational connec-
tion exists between this government purpose and barring unli-
censed persons from being involved as trade experts during the
sale process. Therefore, the Constitutional Court found that the
right in section 22 had not been limited and declined to confirm
the order of invalidity granted by the High Court.
The Constitutional Court’s finding is in line with the legislature’s
aim. The Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 makes it clear that the
legislature aims to encourage equitable access to and local
beneficiation of diamonds in this country (s 4(a) of the Diamond
Act; Krochmal & Cohen Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd v
Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs & another 2004 JDR 0141
(W) para [15]). SADPO members’ previous business practice
prevented this. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Sadiex (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2011 JDR 0593
(SCA) paragraph [11], to refer to the practice as ‘assistance’ by
unlicensed foreigners, distorts the truth; it was the licensed
dealers who assisted the unlicensed foreign participants and
earned commission by doing so. This practice effectively pre-
vented fair access to and local beneficiation of diamonds.
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The Constitutional Court is correct in finding that the limitation
imposed by section 20A does not deprive SADPO’s members of
their property. The market is an inherently regulated space, and
further government regulation will necessarily have an impact,
including on market value. Even so, there is no legally protectable
interest or entitlement to safeguard against loss of market value.
Moreover, where there are different opinions as to whether a
business strategy borders on the unlawful, achieving clarity
through legislative amendment cannot constitute a deprivation of
property; the interest sought to be protected is nebulous to start
with.
On the section 22 challenge, the Constitutional Court correctly,
and in line with the separation of powers, pointed out that
legislation should not be set aside for infringing the right to
economic freedom simply because there may be other ways of
dealing with the problems. To do so would go against the
principle of separation of powers and the different roles of the
courts and the legislature in our democratic society. Introducing
or reinforcing a licensing process – as section 20A aimed to do –
has the important aim of making those involved in a specific
process – such as the diamond trade process – known to the
state, and so ensures better control and monitoring.
Subdivision of land, zoning, and mining8
Exxaro Coal Mpumalanga (Pty) Ltd and Universal Coal Devel-
opment VIII (Pty) Ltd v Izak Jakobus Gerhardus de Wet in Re: Izak
Jakobus Gerhardus De Wet v Exxaro Coal Mpumalanga (Pty) Ltd
& others (unreported case no 28637/16 (19/09/2017)) concerned
an exception to a main action. The respondent (De Wet), the
plaintiff in the main action, sought a declaratory order that he had
lawfully exercised an option to repurchase certain immovable
property contained in a sale agreement between Exxaro (the first
excipient) and De Wet. Alternatively, De Wet sought an order for
rectification of the written agreement of sale between himself and
Exxaro (para [1]). A further prayer was for an agreement between
De Wet and Exxaro to be declared invalid or, alternatively,
declaring that the agreement ranks after the option. Further, an
interdict was sought against Universal Coal Development (the
second excipient/ defendant), declaring that no mining activities
8 The case discussion of Exxaro v De Wet was co-authored with Joseph Mayson.
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could be conducted on the properties in question without a
permissive zoning certificate (para [2]).
Exxaro and Universal Coal Development took exception against
Dd Wet’s particulars of claim on several grounds, arguing that it
failed to make out a cause of action (para [3]).
The first claim was that it was unclear from De Wet’s particulars
of claim that ministerial consent had been obtained for the lawful
exercise of the option. This point is relevant here because it deals
with how an option in respect of alienation of mine land is to be
exercised. Exxaro relied on section 3(e)(i) of the Subdivision of
Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 (the SALA). Section 3 of the
SALA provides that no portion of agricultural land shall be sold or
advertised for sale, except for the purposes of a mine, unless the
Minister has consented in writing (para [20]). The court confirmed
that the section must be interpreted to include options (para
[21]). Ministerial consent is consequently required before an
option over a portion of agricultural land can be given (para [22]).
De Wet contended that the Minister’s consent was unnecessary
because the option was being exercised over the whole property
in question and not only a portion thereof (para [23]). The court
rejected this argument as factually incorrect (para [42]). On this
point, the particulars of claim were excipiable (para [44]).
Exxaro’s second point that ‘the respondent did not allege that
at the time the agreement of sale came into existence the merx of
the option was clearly established in the agreement of sale as is
required under section 6(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of
1981 (ALA)’ (para [45]) was also upheld (para [52]).
Thirdly, the exception was upheld because De Wet’s particu-
lars of claim failed to show the three requirements for an interdict
to be granted, or a cause of action (para [53]). Consequently, the
exception was upheld in its entirety (para [58]).
Eviction of former mine employee under a contested dismissal9
Mathiba v Samancor Chrome Limited [2017] ZAGPPHC 222
(29 May 2017) concerned the process for obtaining an eviction
order. It is included in this discussion because it draws attention
to the complexity of some of the employer-employee relations in
the mining context. When mining companies provide housing for
9 The case discussion of Mathiba v Samancor was written with assistance by
Geoffrey Allsop.
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their employees, they are placed in the position of both landlord
and employer.
After the High Court granted an eviction order in favour of
Samancor Chrome Limited (Samancor), a mining company, on
whose property Mathiba resided with his wife and young child in
leased accommodation while he was in Samancor’s employ.
When Mathiba was dismissed, Samancor initiated eviction pro-
ceedings in an attempt to remove the family from the mine’s
housing. Mathiba had allegedly fallen into arrears with the rental
as a result of his dismissal. When the eviction order was granted,
Mathiba was contesting the dismissal in the Labour Court, a fact
which had been ignored by the trial court which granted the
eviction order.
On appeal, the High Court (Legodi J) noted that this was a
relevant consideration in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (the PIE
Act). Also of relevance is any prejudice Samancor and Mathiba
would suffer if the eviction proceedings were to be stayed
pending the outcome of the labour dispute. The court a quo’s
decision was overturned on appeal.
The appeal court found (paras [10]–[20]) that the court a quo
had erred in three respects. First, it had adopted a passive as
opposed to an active interrogation of whether the eviction would
be just and equitable. Moreover, the court had assumed that it
was irrelevant to consider the availability of alternative accommo-
dation. Secondly, it was held that the trial court had failed
properly to investigate the consequences of the eviction for
Mathoba’s wife and young child who would possibility be ren-
dered homeless. Thirdly, the court a quo had erroneously excluded
Mathiba’s counter-application as irrelevant to the eviction proceed-
ings. He had instituted separate proceedings challenging his
dismissal in the Labour Court, and the court a quo should have
taken this into account.
The court held that Mathiba would suffer significant harm if the
eviction were to take place (para [21]). This potential harm must
be weighed up against harm that Samancor would potentially
suffer if the eviction proceedings were stayed pending the
outcome of the unfair dismissal application. The court a quo’s
failure to consider these points amounted to a failure of justice.
The High Court noted (para [21]), however, that the employer
could institute new eviction proceedings and supplement its
pleadings after serving a notice in terms of section 4(2) of the PIE
Act.
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Public interest and other legal firms working to protect commu-
nity members’ interests as against mining houses should take
heed of Murphy J’s finding in Langa & others v Ivanplats (Pty)
Limited & others [2017] JOL 37388 (GP). The matter concerned
the joinder of opposing community members in a dispute between
a mine and a community about the relocation of grave sites. It
illustrates possible procedural hindrances in the cases between
communities and mining companies. The exhumation of ances-
tral graves is a sensitive and potentially extremely damaging
process, which requires acknowledgment of the applicants’
rights to culture, tradition, and access to courts, all of which are
affected by this judgment.
MINISTERIAL POWER TO IMPOSE PEREMPTORY REQUIREMENTS ON
MINERAL RIGHT HOLDERS10
Scholes & another v Minister of Mineral Resources (50642/
2015) [2017] ZAGPPHC 303 (30 June 2017) was brought to court
in the context of controversial amendments to the 2017 Mining
Charter. The law firm, Malan Scholes Inc (Scholes), challenged
the powers of the Minister of Mineral Resources to develop a
Broad-Based Socio-Economic Charter (the Mining Charter) under
section 100(a) and (b) of the MPRDA. In essence, the argument
was that upon proper interpretation of the MPRDA, the Minister is
not empowered to impose peremptory requirements with which
mineral rights holders are obliged to comply at all times. This
supported the push for a so-called ‘once empowered always
empowered’ policy, which was the subject matter in Chamber of
Mines v Minister of Mineral Resources & another 2018 (4) SA 581
(GP).
Two alternative challenges were also advanced. First, if the
Minister does have the power to impose peremptory require-
ments under the MPRDA, then the constitutionality of those
provisions was challengeable in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the
Constitution. Secondly, the Minister’s decision to impose the
requirements was challenged as amounting to unlawful adminis-
trative action as envisaged in the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA) and stood to be set aside.
10 The case discussion of Scholes v Minister of Mineral Resources was co-authored
with Geoffrey Allsop.
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The High Court only considered whether the in limine plea of
material non-joinder by the Minister should be upheld. The court
considered the different processes for consolidation of applica-
tions and joinder. This issue was pertinent because the points
Scholes had raised in this matter had also been raised in another
matter initiated by the Chamber of Mines of South Africa (Cham-
ber of Mines v Minister of Mineral Resources & another 2018 (4)
SA 581 (GP)). Scholes had applied, unsuccessfully, for a consoli-
dation of these applications. The dismissal of the application was
then cited as the reason for not joining would-be litigants,
including the Chamber of Mines whose rights and interests may
have been adversely affected by the outcome of Scholes’s
application (paras [14]–[16]).
The High Court decided to uphold the in limine procedural
ground, rejecting the application because parties with a direct
and substantial legal interest in the present application had not
been joined. Therefore, it did not address the substantive chal-
lenges or the Minister’s responses. Some comments are neverthe-
less appropriate in the context of addressing the procedural
issue.
(a) First, the process of enacting the Mining Charter is one
involving various stakeholders within the mining community,
including the Chamber of Mines. These stakeholders must
be involved in challenges brought against the Mining Char-
ter.
(b) Further, the Mining Charter is the outcome of negotiations
between the Minister and various stakeholders in the mining
industry containing their mutual understandings, rights, and
obligations. As part of the rights and obligations, the Charter
contains a mutual understanding regarding the process of
implementing and enforcing its provisions. Scholes’s appli-
cation ultimately aimed to invalidate that Charter, or – at the
very least – amend its provisions.
The draft Mining Charter published by the DMR and the
Minister on 15 June 2017 indeed attracted a considerable
degree of controversy (see https://www.miningreview.com/news/
amended-mining-charter-increase-black-ownership-mining-sec-
tor/ and above). In particular, the provisions requiring holders of
mineral rights to meet increased targets relating to black procure-
ment,employmentequity,andmanagement,havecausedconsider-
able consternation in the mining sector.
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While the substantive challenges in Scholes were not addressed
in the judgment, the case highlights that had the draft Mining
Charter become operational in its 2017 form, further substantive
challenges would have been raised regarding its legality.
JOINDER OF OPPOSING COMMUNITY MEMBERS IN DISPUTES BETWEEN
A MINE AND A COMMUNITY11
In Langa & others v Ivanplats (Pty) Limited & others [2017] JOL
37388 (GP), the applicants were members of a community with
ancestral connections to graves near Mokopane, Limpopo. They
sought confirmation of an ex parte interim interdict. The interdict
prohibited the excavation, removal, and relocation of remains by
the mining company Ivanplats (Pty) Limited (Ivanplats), pending
the review of decisions by the South African Heritage Resources
Authority (the SAHRA). The SAHRA can permit, under section 36
of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the NHRA),
disturbance of graves older than 60 years situated outside a
formal cemetery administered by a local authority.
Murphy J held that the application stood to fail on both
procedural and substantive grounds. The rule nisi was dis-
charged.
Regarding the procedural grounds, Murphy J noted that many
members of the community had consented to grave relocations
as Ivanplats had agreed to cover the costs of relocation ceremo-
nies, tombstones, refreshments, and other expenses. The court
was prepared ‘on this ground alone’ to discharge the rule nisi
(para [12]). However, Murphy J also gave judgment on the merits.
The court placed an onerous evidentiary burden on applicants
seeking to protect the interests of marginalised communities or
individuals. Community members who have consented to the
interventions must be joined in proceedings. This may entail a
large financial burden on applicants to detail the often high
number of prospective respondents that could have an interest in
the matter.
Regarding the substantive grounds, the court appeared to
accept the respondent’s argument that the interdict was final in
nature, as a successful interdict would ‘finally extinguish the right
of Ivanplats to remove the graves in accordance with the permits’
11 The case discussion of Langa v Ivanplats was co-authored with Joseph
Mayson.
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as the permits were due to expire seven weeks after the hearing
date. Alternating between the temporary or final interdict stan-
dards of review, the court was ‘persuaded that the facts do not
establish the existence of any clear or prima facie right under
substantive law’, meaning that the applicants had not even
satisfied the lower standard of temporary interdicts.
In evaluating whether there existed a prima facie or clear right
of review, Murphy J considered the merits of each ground of
review as proposed by the applicants.
As to the first ground (para [15]), the court found that the
SAHRA was entitled to consider and grant Ivanplats’s application
for the permits. On this ground, the applicants had not shown a
prima facie right of review by means of the functus officio doctrine
in so far as it may have related to the SAHRA.
On the second ground (para [17]), the court found that the
consultation processes by the respondents and the agents
conformed to section 36(5) of the NHRA and regulation 40 of the
NHRARegulations (para [19]). The applicants had failed to prove
that they had a prima facie right to review. The court’s reasoning
appears to disregard the requirement in section 36(5)(b) – ie,
the existence of an agreement between the company and the
community and individuals affected. Although the majority of the
community members appeared to have agreed to the relocation
of their ancestor’s graves, on the evidence a number of people
had not consented. Accordingly, the precondition for the granting
of a permit in section 36(5)(b) had not been met. It is likely that a
jurisdictional error of fact occurred. Sufficient evidence of a prima
facie ground of review existed. The applicants’ right to administra-
tive justice in the Constitution (s 33) and the right to access to
justice (s 34) would be compromised if the applicants were not
allowed to challenge the SAHRA’s decision in court.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
The recently implemented ‘One Environmental System’ (OES),
at least in principle, is designed to resolve the long-running ‘turf
war’ between the Department of Environmental Affairs (the DEA)
and the DMR regarding enforcement of environmental legislation
in the mining context. Through the OES: most of the environmen-
tal provisions in the MPRDAwere repealed; ‘mining’ and ‘prospect-
ing’ came into effect as listed activities requiring environmental
authorisation; the Minister of Mineral Resources was identified as
the competent authority for mining and related activities; and the
858 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 35 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/23−Mining−Law
Minister of Environmental Affairs as the competent appeal author-
ity (TL Humby ‘One environmental system: Aligning the laws on
the environmental management of mining in South Africa’ (2015)
33/2 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 110, 115,
123–27).
In Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District
of Vredendal, Kroutz NO & others [2017] 2 All SA 599 (WCC) the
High Court made various important findings on the amendments to
the NEMA and the MPRDA. Mining companies must now obtain
environmental authorisation for mining and ancillary activities.
Even so, cases such as RCL Foods Consumer (Pty) Ltd v Makole
Resources (Pty) Ltd & others (GNP) 8626/2016 show that the
ineptitudes of the earlier, contested regime are still affecting the
intersection between environmental and mining law. The conflict
over prospecting activities in an ecologically and geologically
important area resulted in litigation. The appeal was reported in
2017 as Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency & another v
Barberton Mines (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 62 (SCA).
GROWING PAINS OF THE ONE ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM: CO-OPERATIVE
GOVERNANCE IN MINING MATTERS12
In Mineral Sands Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal
(above) amendments to the NEMA and the MPRDA affecting the
OES were considered. The issues at stake were: transfer of
authority to DMR inspectors for enforcement of environmental
legislation in mining areas; the importance of officials fully
disclosing all material facts in respect of warrant applications to
enforce compliance with environmental legislation; and the con-
stitutional principle of cooperative governance. While the judg-
ment clarifies much uncertainty on these issues which existed
following OES’s initial implementation, various issues remain
unresolved, including the overlapping competency of the DMR
and the DEA, which is likely to result in further litigation.
In 2007, Mineral Sands (MS) applied for a mining right in terms
of section 22 of the MPRDA. To do so, MS had to submit an
environmental management plan (EMP) as envisaged in the
MPRDA (para [9]). However, various ancillary activities necessary
to commence mining fell within listing notices promulgated by the
12 The case discussion of Mineral Sands v Vredendal was co-authored with
Geoffrey Allsop.
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Minister of Environmental Affairs in terms of section 24 of the
NEMA. Environmental authorisation under the NEMAwas required
before MS could commence mining activity.
MS applied to the Department of Developmental Planning
Western Cape (the DPWC) as the Western Cape NEMA compe-
tent authority. Pursuant to section 24N of the NEMA, the DPWC
requested MS to submit an additional EMP as a pre-condition to
considering MS’s application for environmental authorisation.
In November 2008, the DMR granted MS’s mining right after
approving its EMP in terms of the MPRDA. In July 2012, the
DPWC approved the EMP in accordance with the NEMA and
granted the MS environmental authorisation. However, some two
years later, after an inspection performed by the DMR, MS was
notified that it was in violation of its MPRDAEMP and that it had to
amend its EMP in terms of the NEMA.
The OES came into effect while MS’s application to amend in
terms of the NEMA was pending. The OES provided that the
Minister of Mineral Resources (not Environmental Affairs) became
the competent authority to issue the EMP amendment required by
MS, which was approved by the DMR in terms of section 39(6) of
the MPRDA.
Following various complaints, an official from the DEA notified
MS that the DEA would be conducting a routine inspection to
determine compliance with its environmental authorisation under
the NEMA. The authority of the DEA to conduct the inspection
was disputed by MS on the basis that the DMR, and not the DEA,
became the sole authority competent to enforce compliance in
terms of the NEMA in mining areas. A dispute arose regarding the
DEA’s alleged lack of jurisdiction to enforce compliance with
environmental legislation in so far as it pertains to mining areas or
activities. The DEA successfully applied for a warrant to inspect
MS’s mining operation in terms of the NEMA and the National
Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management
Act 24 of 2008 (the Coastal Act). In subsequent review proceed-
ings in the High Court, the core issue for determination was
whether the amendments to the NEMA and the MPRDA meant
that only MPRDA inspectors enjoy jurisdiction to monitor compli-
ance with the NEMA provisions relating to mining activities. A
related issue was MS’s central challenge regarding the validity of
the warrant that had been issued. In addition, MS challenged the
DEA’s authority to conduct an inspection as in their warrant
application the DEA had failed to disclose that the DMR had
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become the competent authority to monitor compliance with MS’s
mining activities under the NEMA.
The court ruled that the DEA lacked jurisdiction to enforce
compliance with the NEMA’s provisions in so far as they related to
mining matters concerning listed activities. Whilst the DEA was
within its authority to apply for a warrant for alleged offences in
contravention of the Coastal Act, the DEA had failed to discharge
the evidentiary burden of proving that reasonable grounds existed
for the allegation that an offence had been committed.
Both MS and the DEA conceded that the charge in respect of
alleged violations of the Coastal Act (‘the dumping charge’) was
exempt from MS’s primary mandate challenge of the DEA. This is
because the Minister of Mineral Resources had no jurisdiction to
grant dumping permits in terms of the Coastal Act, which in turn
means that the DMR inspectors lacked jurisdiction to enforce
compliance with the provisions and/or regulations promulgated
under the Coastal Act. As section 31D(2A) of the NEMA limits the
Minister of Mineral Resources to appointing the inspectors who
monitor and enforce compliance with powers conferred on the
Minister, who had no powers to enforce compliance with the
Coastal Act. The DEA was accordingly within its jurisdiction to
enforce compliance with those provisions.
The court acknowledged that it may be possible, at least in
principle, for the Ministers of Water and Sanitation and of Environ-
mental Affairs to appoint inspectors to enforce compliance with
the provisions of the NEMA in terms of section 31D(1) concur-
rently. However, the court observed that subjecting persons to
overlapping parallel investigations would not only be potentially
unfair, but also administratively inefficient. No strict legal finding
was made to resolve this conflict, but Rogers J suggested that
the solution to overlapping departmental mandates lies in ‘sen-
sible official cooperation rather than strained legal distinctions’
(para [95]).
Despite extensive findings regarding the validity of the search
warrant and respective mandates of the DMR and the DEA, the
court expressly refrained from making any findings as to whether
national inspectors enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with provincial
inspectors to enforce compliance with environmental legislation
administered by the provincial authorities. Whilst the court found
it unnecessary to decide this issue, an obiter dictum strongly
suggests that, based on the cooperative governance provisions
of the Constitution, provincial inspectors could well enjoy exclu-
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sive jurisdiction to implement national legislation within the func-
tional area of the provincial government (para [93]).
The court set aside the warrant in respect of the dumping
charge under the Coastal Act because the affidavits and evi-
dence submitted by the DEA in the warrant application were
insufficient to establish the two-fold requirements of a reasonable
suspicion that an offence has been committed, and that reason-
able grounds exist for believing that things connected with the
offence are on the premises in question (Minister of Safety and
Security v Van der Merwe 2011 (2) SACR 301 (CC) para [39]).
This judgment has made some headway in resolving various
issues regarding the competencies of the DEA and DMR and the
court’s reasoning is sound. The judgment clarifies the role of the
DMR to enforce the NEMA provisions following the implementa-
tion of the OES. Whilst the court expressly refrained from deter-
mining the issue of overlapping jurisdiction between the provincial
and national spheres of government to enforce environmental
legislation, strong obiter dicta suggest that the cooperative
governance provisions of the Constitution mean that provincial
authorities would have exclusive jurisdiction to implement national
environmental legislation. The judgment reiterates the stringent
duties of good faith incumbent upon officials to make full material
disclosure in ex parte warrant proceeding applications.
ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORISATION FOR MINING AND ANCILLARY
ACTIVITIES13
RCL Foods Consumer Pty Ltd v Makole Resources (Pty) Ltd &
others (GNP) 8626/2016 was an application for an interdict
against Makole Resources (Pty) Ltd (Makole Resources), the
owner of land on which coal mining activities were taking place,
by the neighbouring owners of a chicken farm. By obtaining the
interdict, RCL Foods sought to prevent Makole Resources from
conducting coal mining and related activities on certain portions
of their own land. RCL Foods alleged that the mining activities
conducted by Makole Resources were unlawful in so far as they
were undertaken outside the designated mining areas identified
in its mining right, and that Makole Resources did not hold the
additional authorisations, as required by the NEMA, the National
13 The case discussion of RCL Foods v Makole was co-authored with Joseph
Mayson.
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Environmental Management: Waste Amendment Act 26 of 2014,
the National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act
25 of 2014, and the local zoning legislation (paras [1]–[4]).
A factual dispute arose regarding when the offensive activity
had started, which would determine whether the laws as per the
OES were applicable (paras [11] [14]). If they applied, Makole
Resources would have required a waste management licence or
integrated environmental authorisation before commencing min-
ing activities. The amendments to the applicable laws in the OES
did not operate retrospectively.
Despite the importance of determining the actual commence-
ment date of the mining activities, Rabie J held that the dispute
could not be resolved on the affidavits, and that no decision
regarding the lawfulness of the mining operations or the rel-
evance of the various pieces of legislation and subordinate
legislation could be made (para [17]). If activities commenced
prior to the amendments to the OES, they would be compliant
and lawful; all that would be required would be a mining right, an
EMP, and a water use licence, which Makole Resources held
when it alleged that it commenced mining.
A further issue concerned zoning on the second respondent’s
farm, Black Royalty Minerals (Pty) Ltd. Two portions of the farm
were zoned for ‘undetermined use’ under the Tshwane Town
Planning Scheme of 2008. Under the Scheme, mining taking
place in such a zoning requires the consent of the municipality.
RCL Foods alleged that the required consent had not been
obtained and that, therefore, Makole Resources’s mining activi-
ties on Black Royalty Minerals land were unlawful. Makole
Resources alleged that the land was only included in the Scheme
after its revision seven months after the date that the mining
commenced.As a result, they argued, they were exempted under
the Town Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986, from
complying with the Scheme for a period of fifteen years after their
inclusion into the Scheme (paras [15] [16]).
RCL Foods also appealed the granting of Makole Resources’
water use licence. The court was prepared to accept that Makole
Resources may not have had the licence at the time of the
hearing. However, the issue remained undecided as the court did
not view this ground alone to be a sufficient reason to grant the
interdict (paras [18] [19]).
Holding that the requirements for the granting of a final interdict
had not been established, the application was dismissed (para
[23]).
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The RCL Foods judgment is of interest, not so much for its
factual findings, but rather for Rabie J’s legal assumption that the
MPRDAcovered the field for mining-environmental authorisations
until the 2014 amendments. The result is a finding that there was
no need for the second respondent to obtain environmental
authorisation when it commenced its mining activities. This
assumption was not interrogated further in the judgment, despite
its having been the subject of many court cases and political
consternation for at least a decade. (See TL Humby ‘Maccsand in
the Constitutional Court: Dodging the NEMA Issue’ (2013) 24/1
Stellenbosch Law Review 55 for a more thorough assessment.)
The key issue is that while ‘mining’ and ‘prospecting’ were
included as listed activities that require additional environmental
authorisation pursuant to an environmental impact assessment or
basic assessment, respectively, their commencement date was
suspended. However, a number of activities ancillary to mining
were included as listed activities and came into effect from 1 July
2006 (see Regulations GNR 385, 386 and 387 published in
GG 28753 of 21 April 2006). While an EMP certainly sufficed for
the core activities of mining or prospecting, many mining compa-
nies proceeded to apply for environmental authority for their
ancillary activities such as road-building and the temporary
storage of hazardous waste.
The RCL Foods judgment enables an argument that the
second respondent was required to obtain environmental autho-
risation that must have commenced by the time that the applica-
tion for the interdict was brought. In Joint Owner of Remainder
ERF 5216 Hartenbos v MEC of Local Goverment, Environmental
Affairs and Develoment Planning, Western Cape Province &
another 2011 (1) SA 128 (WCC), it was stated that a listed activity
is deemed to have commenced when an activity reasonably
directly connected to that activity has commenced (para [41] of
that judgment).
A weakness in the judgment and, perhaps, a failure by the
applicant’s lawyers to frame the argument, is that mining is
regarded as a single activity. It is not considered whether the
ancillary activities require separate environmental authorisation.
The High Court cannot be faulted for this omission in reason-
ing: the Constitutional Court, in Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape
Town & others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC), too, did not consider the
significance of the need for ancillary authorisation in terms of the
NEMA (Humby 2015 above at 117). The court in Maccsand dealt
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with the issue simply by stating that ‘mining’ was not a listed
activity under the NEMA Regulations and, consequently, there
was no authority on which the competent administrator (identified
as the Minister of Mineral Resources) could base environmental
authorisation for mining. Therefore, a mining company did not
have to obtain environmental authorisation in order to commence
mining (Maccsand para [53]). However, the court did not deal
with whether the ancillary activities required environmental autho-
risation. The question was, therefore, still open to be considered
in RCL Foods.
Many parties have interpreted the legal regime prior to the
‘OES’ as requiring double environmental authorisation – both for
the core mining or prospecting activities, and for their ancillary
activities. Humby (2013 above 66–7) illustrates this in her discus-
sion of the Limpopo Coal example. In that instance, even though
the situation was very similar to both Maccsand and RCL Foods
in terms of timelines and the coming into operation of the OES,
interdict proceedings were launched by a coalition of non-
governmental organisations, almost simultaneously with a compli-
ance notice being issued by the Environmental Management
Inspectorate (Green Scorpions). The notice directed Limpopo
Coal to desist in activities it had commenced without the requisite
the NEMA authorisation. In the end, Limpopo Coal was fined
heavily, and interdicted for almost a year from further developing
the site. This had a negative impact on its share price.
Because of the indeterminate effect of the Maccsand judgment
on the issue of obtaining environmental authorisation for ancillary
activities, there may be space for an appeal of the RCL Foods
judgment.
Mining in environmentally sensitive areas14
The judgment in Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency &
another v Barberton Mines (Pty) Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 62
(SCA) concerned a contested, ecologically important area in
Mpumalanga. The Barberton Mountain Land is home to 2 200
species of plants and 300 species of birds, in addition to having
numerous unique geological features. Nevertheless, Barberton
Mines (Pty) Ltd (Barberton Mines) was granted a right under
14 The case discussion of Mpumalanga Tourism was co-authored with Richard
Cramer.
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section 17(1) of the MPRDA to prospect for gold and silver in the
district of Barberton. The conflict over prospecting activities in
this ecologically and geologically important area resulted in
litigation, first in the High Court, and subsequently in the Supreme
Court of Appeal.
The Member of the Executive Council for Environmental Affairs,
Mpumalanga, issued Proclamation 12 (PG 132 of 29 March
1996), designating the Barberton Nature Reserve a ‘conservation
area’ under section 1 of the Eastern Transvaal Parks Board Act 6
of 1995. A 2014 Proclamation (GN 185 of 2014 PG 2302 of 22 May
2014) amended the boundaries of the reserve.
Baberton Mines’ attempts to begin prospecting operations met
with resistance from the Mpumalanga Tourism and ParksAssocia-
tion and members of the Mountainlands Owners Association (the
appellants). The appellants maintained that the prospecting area
formed part of a protected area. The Director-General of Mineral
Resources dismissed the internal appeal by the appellants and
other interested parties against the granting of the prospecting
right.
Baberton Mines lodged an application seeking a declaration:
that it was entitled to proceed with prospecting operations; and
that the appellants were interdicted from denying it access to the
prospecting area for the purpose of conducting prospecting
operations. In a counter-application, the appellants sought the
setting aside of the decision of the Director-General on the
ground that the properties constitute a nature research or pro-
tected area (paras [3]–[5]). This would mean that, under section
48(1) of the National Environmental Management: Protected
Areas Act 57 of 2003 (the NEMPAA), mining and prospecting
activities are prohibited. It was also contended by the MTPA’s
regional manager that under section 48(1)(c) of the MPRDA, the
properties ‘comprise land being used for public or government
purposes or reserved in terms of any other law’ (para [5]). This
means that a prospecting right could not be granted over the
properties unless the conditions stipulated in section 48(2) of the
NEMPAA had been met.
In the court a quo, Baqwa J found that the prospecting area
was not part of a nature reserve or protected area defined in
section 1 of the NEMPAA. He rejected the provincial Acts –
including the 1996 Proclamation – which were relied on in
support of the contention that the prospecting area was subject
to the prohibition against prospecting in section 48(1) of the
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NEMPAA. In his judgment, he took the view that the 1996
Proclamation was void because the description of the area in
question was vague (paras [6]–[10]).
The key question on appeal was whether the properties over
which the prospecting right had been granted constituted a
‘nature reserve’ or ‘protected area’ as envisaged in the NEMPAA.
The answer here depends on whether the 1996 Proclamation was
valid. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 1996 Proclama-
tion was valid and that the prospecting area fell within a protected
area contemplated by the NEMPAA. As a result, the prospecting
activities in the area were prohibited. The appeal was upheld
(paras [20] [21]) without answering the question of whether
section 48(1)(c) of the MPRDA applied.
As reasons for its decision the Supreme Court of Appeal
considered the definition of ‘nature reserve’ (s 1 of the NEMPAA
read with s 12). A ‘nature reserve’ is defined as ‘an area declared,
or regarded as having been declared, in terms of section 23 as a
nature reserve’ or ‘an area which before or after the commence-
ment of this Act was or is declared or designated in terms of
provincial legislation for a purpose for which that area could in
terms of section 23(2) be declared as a nature reserve’. A
protected area is defined as ‘any of the protected areas referred
to in section 9’. A protected environment is defined as ‘an area
declared, or regarded as having been declared, in terms of
section 28 as a protected environment’ or ‘an area which before
or after the commencement of this Act was or is declared or
designated in terms of provincial legislation for a purpose for
which that area could in terms of section 28(2) be declared as a
protected environment’ (paras [10]–[12]).
Ponnan JA, for the Supreme Court of Appeal, emphasised the
importance of section 12 of the NEMPAA. This section states that
an area which is capable of being declared a protected environ-
ment or a nature reserve under the NEMPAA and was reserved or
protected under provincial legislation for that purpose prior to the
enactment of section 12, is to be regarded a nature reserve or
protected environment for the purposes of the NEMPAA. The
effect of this section must be that areas protected under provin-
cial legislation enjoy the same protection as a nature reserve
under the NEMPAA. Any area falling within the ambit of this
section would consequently be protected under section 48(1) of
the NEMPAA. This means that an area designated under the 1996
Proclamation as reserved or protected will enjoy the protection of
NEMPAA (paras [13]–[15]).
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The remaining question was whether the High Court was
correct in declaring the 1996 Proclamation void for vagueness.
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s found that the High Court had
erred in doing so. Citing Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd
1948 (1) SA 983 (A) 989, the Supreme Court of Appeal indicated
that validity does not require a ‘faultless description. . .couched
in meticulously accurate terms’ (paras [18]–[20]). Simply naming
the designated area suffices, as it enables members of the public
to understand what area is protected. The Supreme Court of
Appeal’s view, therefore, was that the 1996 Proclamation pro-
vides adequate certainty as to the area designated as reserved
or protected and that it is valid. The Proclamation meets the
requirements of section 12 of the NEMPAA and qualifies for
protection. Prospecting activities in the area are prohibited
(paras [18]–[20]).
This case is a cautionary tale for those applying for rights under
the MPRDA to ensure that the area for which they are applying
does not fall under the protection of the NEMPAA. Section 48(1)
of the NEMPAA is clear: the prohibition against mining, prospect-
ing, and related activities ultimately applies regardless of rights
granted under other legislation. This protection extends to areas
designated as protected or reserved under provincial legislation,
including legislation which predates the enactment of the NEM-
PAA.
Furthermore, areas protected under provincial legislation need
not be described with absolute certainty and precise boundaries.
Naming the area so that it is reasonably clear is sufficient.
Applicants for rights under the MPRDA must proceed with care.
Provincial legislation designating areas as reserved or protected
cannot be disregarded, even if the boundaries of such an area
are not described with absolute certainty. Where the require-
ments of section 12 of the NEMPAA have been met, these areas
are subject to the prohibition against mining, prospecting, and
related activities under section 48(1) of the NEMPAA.
LABOUR MATTERS IN THE MINING CONTEXT
Cameron J, in Association of Mineworkers and Construction
Union & others v Chamber of Mines of SA & others (2017) 38 ILJ
831 (CC) paragraph [2], refers to the ‘grievous struggle for better
wages and conditions for the generations of mineworkers who
have laid the foundations for this country’s wealth’. He also
points, eloquently, to the ‘increasingly intense contest between
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unions about which will represent the workers in that struggle’
going forward. A series of 2017 judgments, of which the above
Constitutional Court judgment is probably the most prominent,
considers the struggle of the Association of Mineworkers and
Construction Union (the AMCU) for recognition in various con-
texts.
In the platinum sector, where the AMCU’s membership has
grown significantly, the matter of National Union of Mineworkers &
others v Impala Platinum Ltd & another [2017] 6 BLLR 28 (LC)
illustrates the tensions that arise when shifting allegiances lead to
violence. This judgment confirms the duties of employers to
provide a safe working environment for employees, and how the
standard of ‘reasonableness’ applies in this context. The judg-
ment is also an illustration of the union rivalry between the
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the AMCU which has
engulfed the platinum belt, and records the growing use of
inter-union physical violence and intimidation by unions as a
result of rivalry between AMCU and NUM.
APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT TO MINORITY UNION
MINEWORKERS15
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union & others v
Chamber of Mines of SA & others (2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC)
concerned whether mineworkers may exercise the right to strike
while an agreement prohibiting strikes, to which they are not
party, is in force. The Chamber of Mines (the Chamber) con-
cluded a collective agreement on behalf of various gold mining
companies with the majority trade unions in the gold mining
sector. The AMCU did not represent the majority of employees in
gold mines countrywide and was not party to the agreement.
However, it had the majority of employees working at five mines
as members.
Dealing with wages and working conditions, the collective
agreement extended to all the represented companies’ employ-
ees, including those that were not members of the majority unions
in terms of section 23(1)(d)(iii) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of
1995 (the LRA).
15 The case discussion of AMCU v Chamber of Mines was written with assistance
by Shamila Mpinga.
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The AMCU did not consider itself bound by the agreement and
notified three companies that its members would embark on a
strike. The Labour Court granted an interdict against the AMCU.
The AMCU’s appeal to the Labour Appeal Court failed, and it
approached the Constitutional Court for relief.
In the Constitutional Court Cameron J’s judgment on the
substantive issues identified three matters for consideration:
(1) The first question was whether the definition of ‘workplace’ in
the LRA applies to section 23(1)(d)(iii) (para [11]). The court
held that it does (para [33]). The follow-up question was
whether the definition of ‘workplace’ should be broadly
interpreted to mean an individual mine and not a company’s
collective operations (para [11]). The court held that ‘work-
place’ means the collective operations and not single mines
(para [37]). This means that, as the AMCU does not repre-
sent the majority of employees of the companies involved, it
remains a minority trade union, bound by the terms of the
agreement, which among other things prohibits striking
(para [40]).
(2) The following issue was whether the constitutional rights of
the AMCU’s members are infringed by the provision in the
LRA. In particular, the court considered whether the rights to
freedom of association, collective bargaining, and strike
were contravened (para [41]). The court held that the rights
are limited, but in a reasonable and justifiable manner (para
[42]).
(3) The final question was whether the rule of law is violated by
the provision in the LRA, as it allows private parties to
exercise public power arbitrarily by extending a collective
agreement to non-parties to the agreement (para [60]). The
court rejected this challenge (para [68]), explaining that a
two-phase inquiry determines a breach of the rule of law: (i)
how the exercise of such power will be regulated and what
safeguards exist for its exercise; and (ii) how to ensure a
rational relationship between the private actor’s exercise of
power and achieving legitimate legislative ends (para [70]).
The contested provision clearly had a legitimate legislative
end by promoting collective bargaining (para [71]).
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UNION REPRESENTATIVITY ISSUES16
Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union & others v
Bafokeng Rasimone Management Services (Pty) Ltd & others
(2017) 38 ILJ 931 (LC) also concerned section 23(1)(d) of the
LRA. The AMCU approached the Labour Court seeking an order
declaring sections of the LRAunconstitutional in that they violated
the rule of law, and/or the rights to equality and dignity, just
administrative action, and access to court. The issue here again
was the binding nature of collective agreements with majority
trade unions on non-member employees. In this case, the
collective agreement related to the dismissal of employees for
operational requirements. The AMCU on behalf of its members
argued that section 189(1)(a)–(c) of the LRA should either be
excised from the LRA, or reinterpreted in a way that ensures
consultation with any trade union whose members are affected
by a dismissal. Moreover, the AMCU contended that section
23(1)(d) must be reinterpreted so that a collective agreement
regulating dismissal cannot be extended to bind employees who
are not members of the trade union party to the agreement.
As in AMCU v Chamber of Mines (above), the AMCU was a
minority trade union on the platinum mine of Bafokeng Rasimone
Management Services (BRMS) in Rustenburg (the Mine). It held
no organisational rights and was not a recognised trade union for
bargaining purposes. The NUM held organisational rights and
recognition for bargaining purposes, being the majority trade
union at the mine, together with the UASA, which held similar
rights and recognition historically (paras [8] [9]). The NUM and
the UASA concluded a collective agreement with the Mine
concerning retrenchment. Subsequently, a number of employees
were notified of their retrenchment, effective one day later.
Neither the employees, nor theAMCU, was issued with notices as
envisaged by section 189(3) of the LRA and they were not
consulted during the retrenchment process (paras [11] [12]).
On behalf of its members, the AMCU referred an unfair
dismissal dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration (the CCMA). When it became apparent that the
CCMA lacked jurisdiction, the AMCU turned to the Labour Court,
challenging the procedural fairness of the dismissal. The Mine
16 The case discussion of AMCU v Bafokeng was written with assistance by
Rebecca Pein.
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opposed the claim, raising the collective agreement with the
NUM and the UASA as justification. The Mine argued that it had
followed the process agreed upon with the recognised unions in
the ‘consultation agreement’ – a collective agreement which
bound the AMCU despite its not being party to the agreement
(paras [13]–[17]).
The Mine subsequently concluded a retrenchment agreement
with the NUM and the UASA, which was extended under section
23(1)(d) of the LRA to bind employees who were not members of
these trade unions, and which regulated the employees’ dis-
missal. The employees had no recourse to challenge the fairness
of their dismissal because they were bound to the agreement,
which contained a full and final settlement clause and a waiver of
all claims and rights of action (paras [18]–[20]). When it subse-
quently became clear that the AMCU would not be entitled to the
relief sought under section 189(1)(a) of the LRA, the application
was withdrawn. The constitutionality of the relevant provisions of
the LRA was challenged instead (para [19] [20]).
First, the Labour Court held that section 23(1)(d) is not uncon-
stitutional (paras [97]–[141]). Secondly, the court considered
section 189(1)(a)–(c) of the LRA. The Labour Court assessed
whether fundamental rights could be offended by the current
interpretation of section 189(1)(a)–(c) which permits private par-
ties to take away employees’ individual rights to be heard prior to
dismissal (paras [142]–[157]). The court concluded that the
section was not unconstitutional, nor was the way in which it had
been applied (paras [158]–[214]).
The Labour Court’s carefully reasoned judgment recognises
the importance of considering whether minority representation
should be a consideration for mines when engaging with trade
unions in negotiations about work conditions and retrenchment.
From the frequency of litigated matters in this respect it appears
as if the issue of minority representation is certainly foremost in
the minds of the political constituencies situated at the mines.
Concerns about representativity also influence issues of health
and safety, as the case of National Union of Mineworkers & others
v Impala Platinum Ltd & another [2017] 6 BLLR 28 (LC) illustrates.
872 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 49 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/23−Mining−Law
EMPLOYER’S DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT17
National Union of Mineworkers & others v Impala Platinum Ltd
& another (above) followed in the wake of violent activities in the
platinum mining sector from 2012 onwards (para [3] for the
context). The NUM, which was previously the majority workers’
union in the platinum belt, was replaced by the AMCU at Impala
Platinum Ltd or ‘Implats’ as the majority trade union.
In this matter, the NUM sought to compel Implats to institute
disciplinary proceedings against 21 members of the AMCU, all of
them former NUM shop stewards who had been dismissed after
violent strikes in 2012, but subsequently reinstated when the
AMCU replaced the NUM as the majority union. The shop
stewards did not return to work, and after a series of meetings
culminating in the adoption of an integrated security plan, matters
came to a head when the shop stewards’ disgruntlement with the
lack of disciplinary steps taken against the AMCU members,
became apparent. The contention in the ensuing litigation was
that these former shop stewards had been intimidated and
harassed, and that their rights to freedom of association had
been violated. It was argued that Implats, the employer, was in
breach of its duty to ensure a safe working environment, thereby
violating the NUM members’ conditions of employment (paras
[4]–[9]).
The Labour Court considered whether Implats had breached
its obligation as employer to provide a safe working environment
by failing to institute disciplinary action against the AMCU. It also
considered whether this failure amounted to a breach of the NUM
shop stewards’ contracts of employment.
First, considering the standard of reasonableness incumbent
on employers to provide a safe working environment, the court
ruled that the NUM had failed to discharge the onus of establish-
ing that Implats had committed a breach of contract (para [13]).
While the employer’s obligation extends to taking action to
combat inter-union hostility and labour unrest that could give rise
to violence or threats to personal safety, a contract of employ-
ment cannot guarantee absolute safety. The standard against
which the employer’s obligation is assessed is one of ‘reasonable-
ness’. To determine whether this standard has been met, a
17 The case discussion of NUM v Impala Platinum was co-authored with
Geoffrey Allsop.
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balance must be struck between ‘the employer’s interest in
production and the employee’s in self-preservation’ (para [10]
quoting Brassey Employment and Labour Law vol 1 E4:33 (Juta
1998)). On the facts, the court held that Implats had responded
reasonably and lawfully to all the incidents the NUM cited in
seeking relief through the court process (para [11]).
As the NUM had failed to discharge the evidentiary burden, a
finding that the conditions of the NUM’s employees’ contracts of
employment had been violated by Implats could not be justified.
The application was dismissed.
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
The matter giving rise to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
judgment in Pan African Mineral Development Company (Pty) Ltd
& others v Aquila Steel (S Africa) (Pty) Ltd [2017] ZASCA 165
(29 November 2017) (Pan African) was discussed at length in the
2016 Annual Survey 1045–50. It involves a series of grave errors
on the part of the DMR in the granting of prospecting rights to the
same property to two different mining companies.
Although the subject matter is different, Rustenburg Platinum
Mines v Minister of Mineral Resources (unreported) case 7883/
2007 56189/2010 continues the theme of administrative bung-
ling. Although the case dealt with an applicant whose application
to convert an unused old order right into a prospecting right was
refused, it is relevant to any party wishing to review an administra-
tive decision regarding rights to minerals. This case highlights the
importance of seeking interim relief from the court, pending the
outcome of internal appeals, if an applicant is seeking to prohibit
competing parties from capturing the benefit from resource
extraction.
ADMINISTRATIVE BUNGLING IN THE QUEUING SYSTEM FOR
APPLICATIONS18
PanAfrican Mineral Development Company (Pty) Ltd & others v
Aquila Steel (S Africa) (Pty) Ltd (above) was the next instalment in
the continuing saga involving an erroneously duplicative granting
of prospecting rights under section 16 of the MPRDA, over
18 The case discussions of Pan African v Aquila and Shanduka v WC Nickel were
co-authored with Joseph Mayson.
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certain properties in Kuruman (Northern Cape) to both ZIZA
Limited (ZIZA), which was busy ceding its rights to the appellant,
Pan African Mineral Development Company (PAMDC), and also
to the respondent company, Aquila Steel (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd
(Aquila).
Although ZIZA’s application had been received first, a grant
was made to Aquila and, despite an internal memorandum noting
the conflict between the ZIZA and Aquila applications, the Aquila
prospecting right was executed and registered in the Mineral and
Petroleum Titles Administration Office on 17 July 2007 (paras
[1]–[4]). Subsequently, on 22 December 2010, the regional
manager accepted an application by Aquila for a mining right
over one of the Kuruman properties. On 19 November 2011, a
prospecting right was executed by the DMR in the name of the
PAMDC, ZIZA’s successor, over all the Kuruman properties.
An internal appeal to the Minister, launched by Aquila, in terms
of section 96(1) of the MPRDA, against the decision of the DMR to
grant ZIZA a prospecting right, was dismissed. The Minister’s
reason was that the prospecting right application of Aquila Steel
had been unlawfully accepted, processed, and granted during a
period in which ZIZA should have been afforded exclusivity. The
concomitant mining right application of Aquila Steel could, there-
fore, also not result in a grant of such right because of the
existence of a prospecting right in favour of ZIZA (para [7]).
On review, Tuchten J upheld the review and granted a substitu-
tion order upholding Aquila’s administrative appeal. The judge
found that ZIZA’s prospecting right had been unlawfully granted.
The High Court granted Aquila the mining right for which it had
applied (para [9]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed Tuchten J’s decision on
appeal. Writing for the majority, Ponnan J indicated that all
minerals vested in the state after the MPRDA came into effect.
This is contrary to the interpretation in Agri SA v Minister for
Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). Ponnan J was correct in
stating that a new regime governing the allocation of mineral
rights was created (para [12]), but not as regards the vesting of
minerals. For purposes of the judgment, however, this error is
irrelevant.
Under the MPRDA’s transitional provisions in Schedule II to the
MPRDA, holders of unused old order rights had the exclusive
right to lodge an application for the conversion of those rights
under item 8 of Schedule II. The exclusive right to apply for
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conversion prevailed for so long as the application remained to
be decided, under item 8(3) of the transitional provisions, read
with section 16(2)(b) of the MPRDA. Once the outcome had been
decided, the old order right holder would lose its right to
exclusivity (paras [12] [13]).
Section 9(1) of the MPRDA precludes the state from accepting
a subsequent application until an existing application has been
decided. The amendment to section 16(2) also eradicated any
uncertainty that may have existed on this point: the Regional
Manager may not accept a later application for the same mineral
and the same property while an earlier application is yet to be
determined. Section 19(1)(a) further supplements the position by
providing that a prospecting right holder may exclusively apply
for and be granted a renewal of the prospecting right as regards
a particular mineral and prospecting area (para [14]).
Ponnan JA’s interpretation of these rules was that ZIZA’s
conversion application (of 19 April 2005, accepted by the RM on
17 August 2005 and granted on 26 February 2008) meant that its
old order right over the Kuruman properties prevailed between
August 2005 and February 2008. Considering the Aquila applica-
tion during this time was not appropriate, and granting Aquila’s
application was unlawful, given the exclusivity of ZIZA’s right.
Moreover, as ZIZA (and, by extension, PAMDC) held a prospect-
ing right over the relevant properties, it also had an exclusive
right to apply for mining rights over these properties (paras
[16]–[18]).
What makes this case problematic, is that the court was called
upon to unravel a series of administrative bungles on the part of
the DMR, to ensure a just outcome for the parties. Aquila averred
that ZIZA’s applications did not comply with section 16(1)(b) of
the MPRDA, and for reasons of unlawfulness should, therefore,
never have been accepted. The court a quo saw the ‘return’ of an
application for amendments and additions, under section 16(3),
as tantamount to a rejection of the application. Ponnan JA’s view
here deviated. Pointing to the fact that the DMR can accept an
application and then call for its amendment/supplementation
before determining the outcome of the application, the Supreme
Court of Appeal asserted that ZIZA’s applications were suffi-
ciently compliant for the DMR to accept them, and that unlawful-
ness was not an issue (paras [19]–[25]).
In a cross-appeal Aquila sought a declarator that ZIZA’s
prospecting right had lapsed with effect from 9 November 2010.
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This was the date the court a quo identified as the moment upon
which ZIZA’s right lapsed: the day on which it was deregistered.
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that such a finding would be
at odds with Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral
Resources and Energy & others 2016 (6) SA 121 (SCA). In Palala
it was held that ‘the restoration of a company’s registration
automatically re-vests the company with its property with retro-
spective effective and validates all corporate activities under-
taken during the period of deregistration’ (para [30]). ZIZA’s
prospecting right must be deemed not to have lapsed on
deregistration; and ZIZA was deemed to have held its prospect-
ing right throughout the period of its deregistration until the expiry
of the right (para [32]). This means that ZIZA must be deemed to
have held a prospecting right over the relevant properties, even
while it was deregistered, and that the DMR could not have
validly accepted Aquila’s application under section 22(2)(b) of
the MPRDA during this time. The appeal was upheld, and the
cross-appeal dismissed (paras [31]–[33]).
In a dissenting judgment, Willis JA took issue with the finding of
the substitution of the Minister’s decision to refuse the granting of
a mining licence to Acquila in the majority’s decision, for reasons
pertaining to the administration of justice (para [32]). In his view, a
structural interdict or rule nisi procedure would have addressed
some of the potential practical difficulties that may have resulted
from the formulation of the order (paras [34]–[36]).
Willis JA, in the minority judgment, agreed with the trial court’s
reasoning on the decision to review and set aside the regional
manager’s decision to accept the ZIZA application for prospect-
ing rights, holding that it was a ‘nullity’ from the outset (para [37]).
The interpretation of section 16(3) of the MPRDA is definitive, in
the view of Willis JA. He argued for a purposive interpretation of
the MPRDA, one that ‘requires that the development of a modern
and progressive system of minims is the MPRDA’s first order
priority’ (para [41]). The minority judgment set out the consider-
ations that should inform such an interpretation (paras [42]–[47]).
With this in mind, the minority judgment then held that section
16(3) of the MPRDA is ‘cast in imperative terms’ and that it means
that ‘a defective application is . . . dead’ (para [49]). This reason-
ing stresses that the ‘resources of time and intellectual expertise
of the Minister’ should not be wasted by expecting this office to
‘apply [its] mind to something which is incapable of being
considered’ (para [49]).
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Willis JA also pointed to the ‘clear bargain’ contained in the
MPRDA in terms of which ‘investors are encouraged to prospect
for minerals on the premise that if they are successful, they are
first in line for the issue of a licence to mine. Common sense,
ordinary, everyday morality and first principles of the interpreta-
tion of statutes require that the bargain be respected and
affirmed by the courts’ (para [64]).
Shanduka Resources (Pty) Ltd v Western Cape Nickel Mining
(Pty) Ltd & others 2017 JDR 0285 (WCC) was another judicial
attempt to clean up in the wake of bungling on the part of the
executive. The central issue was whether Shanduka Resources
(Pty) Ltd (Shanduka) or Western Cape Nickel Mining (Pty) Ltd
(WC Nickel) qualified as the first-in-time applicant for prospecting
rights over a particular property. Section 16(2)(c) of the MPRDA
states that the regional manager must accept an application for a
prospecting right if, among other requirements, ‘no prior applica-
tion for a prospecting right, mining right, mining permit or
retention permit has been accepted for the same mineral on the
same land and which remains to be granted or refused’. Section
9(1)(b) of the MPRDA provides that, where the regional manager
receives more than one application on different days, the applica-
tions must be deal with in order of receipt.
Both parties had originally been advised by the second
respondent, the regional manager, that their respective applica-
tions could not be accepted because the fifth respondent,
Hondekloof Nickel (Pty) Ltd (Hondekloof), already held the pros-
pecting rights (para [3]). In 2013, however, the regional manager
was ordered to accept and process Shanduka’s application, and
to deal with the application as if it had been lodged on 11 March
2013, after the regional manager failed to oppose an application
by Shanduka to that effect (paras [5] [6]). The regional manager,
in the same year, applied for that judgment to be rescinded,
citing as one of the reasons that Shanduka’s application could
not be accepted because the rights in question had already been
granted to Hondekloof (para [7]). Shanduka opposed this appli-
cation, claiming that Hondekloof’s prospecting right had lapsed
by effluxion of time on 14 February 2013, and that the renewal
executed later in 2013 in terms of a notarial deed was not legally
competent. Shanduka joined the Minister, the Deputy Director-
General and Hondekloof as additional respondents in the proceed-
ings (para [8]).
A Hondekloof subsidiary applied for leave to intervene as a
respondent in the main application and for substantive relief: that
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it be recognised as the first-in-time applicant regarding prospect-
ing rights over the relevant property; an order declaring that the
regional manager was obliged to accept and process its applica-
tion on 22 February or, alternatively, that Hondekloof was the
holder of a valid prospecting right over the land; and that the
orders in favour of Shanduka be rescinded and its counter-
application be dismissed (para [9]). WC Nickel was admitted as a
party in the proceedings in the trail court (para [10]).
In 2015, before the hearing in the court a quo, the ratio in
Minister of Mineral Resources & others v Mawetse (SA) Mining
Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA 306 (SCA) (Mawetse) made the
government parties (second, third and fourth respondents) drop
their opposition to Shanduka’s claims. The court in Mawetse
reasoned that if a prospecting right’s period of validity were
deemed to begin upon the registration or the coming into effect of
the right, the effect would be to sterilise the right indefinitely until
either event has occurred. This, it argued, would be contrary to
the letter and spirit of the MPRDA (para [20] of Mawetse). The
court found that the commencement date of the prospecting
right’s period of validity is the date on which an applicant is
informed of the granting of the right (para [21] of Mawetse).19 This
ratio made the second, third and fourth respondents drop their
opposition at the hearing in the court a quo (paras [11]–[13]) and
agree to abide the decision of the court a quo (para [14]).
As to which party was first-in-time, between 14 and 22 Febru-
ary 2012, agents of WC Nickel purported to attempt to upload an
application for a new prospecting right as Hondekloof’s right was
about to expire. At the time, this was an essential requirement in
terms of section 16(1) of the MPRDA and regulation 2(1) of its
Regulations for the lodging of prospecting right applications
(para [20]). After a failed attempt on 22 February 2012 to upload
the application at the regional manager’s office in Cape Town, the
information systems manager at the regional manager’s office
advised WC Nickel to leave a hard copy and an electronic copy
on a compact disc at his office and he would upload the
application when he returned the following week. Thereafter
followed a number of failed attempts by agents of WC Nickel to
19 This position has subsequently been amended by the latest Amendment
Act 49 of 2008, with effect from 7 June 2013, which introduced a definition of
‘effective date’ to mean ‘the date on which the relevant permit is issued or the
relevant right is executed’.
879MINING LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 56 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/23−Mining−Law
ascertain whether such submission had occurred. Further, it was
not immediately clear whether the application referred to portion
2 of Nuwefontein 6, the portion of the farm to which the disputed
rights refer (paras [21]–[26]). This factual uncertainty ended up
being irrelevant, as is shown below.
The acting regional manager intimated to WC Nickel that she
could not accept its application as she was of the view that
Hondekloof had already been granted the relevant prospecting
rights and that they had not prescribed as they had not yet been
issued (paras [27]–[32]). WC Nickel faced a dilemma: either it
had to challenge the regional manager’s decision not to accept
its application, or it had to proceed with the department’s advice
– having Hondekloof (a holding company of WC Nickel) and the
department execute and register Hondekloof’s prospecting rights
for a further three years from the date of registration. Hondekloof
proceeded with the latter option and the relevant deed was
notarially executed on 2 May 2013. These rights were intended to
be ceded and transferred to WC Nickel using procedures
provided in terms of section 11 of the MPRDA (paras [32]–[35]).
In the court a quo, Shanduka alleged that the court could not
find on the papers that the application lodged at the regional
manager’s office had been in respect of portion 2 of Nuwefontein
6, and, even if it had, the evidence showed that WC Nickel had
subsequently abandoned such application when it chose to
accept that Hondekloof’s prospecting rights should be registered
and ceded to it (para [36]).
The court a quo declared that Hondekloof’s prospecting rights
had expired and set aside any decisions made by the govern-
ment parties in favour of Hondekloof after that date. The court
also declared that WC Nickel was entitled to be recognised as
the first-in-time applicant for the prospecting rights in terms of
sections 9 and 16 of the MPRDA, rescinding the abovementioned
orders granted in favour of Shanduka (para [37]). Shanduka’s
appeal aimed to reverse the effect of this declaration (para [38]).
The court assumed, in the face of this factual uncertainty, that
WC Nickel had in fact included portion 2 of Nuwefontein 6 in its
application on the basis that the regional manager had dealt with
the matter as if the application had included that portion (para
[43]). This was essentially irrelevant. However, as the court
reasoned that if WC Nickel wanted its application to persist, it had
to challenge the regional manager’s refusal to accept that
application. Otherwise, the refusal of the application would
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remove the application from the queue for consideration – it could
no longer be first-in-time (paras [44]–[47]).
The court reasoned that the time-lines provided in the MPRDA
are aimed at promoting certainty and efficiency (para [49]).
Having failed to exercise its right to appeal within 30 days in
terms of section 96 of the MPRDA, WC Nickel could not have
taken the regional manager’s refusal on judicial review, as it had
failed to exhaust all internal remedies, a requirement for taking
administrative decisions on review in terms of section 7(2) of the
PAJA (para [48]). This was not ‘waiver’, but it did entail a forfeiture
of WC Nickel’s ability to pursue available remedies.
The court cited Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance & others v
The South African National Roads Agency Ltd & others [2013] 4
All SA 639 (SCA) as precedent for the premise that, in the
absence of an extension in terms of section 9 of the PAJA, ‘a court
has no authority to entertain a PAJA-regulated review application
brought outside the 180-day outer limit’ stipulated in section 7(1)
of the PAJA. The court a quo accordingly had no authority to
entertain WC Nickel’s application, which essentially constituted a
review application (para [51]). It was still subject to the time
limitation in the PAJA and no application in terms of section 9 to
extend the period had been lodged (para [52]). The court a quo
should have had regard mero motu to the internal remedy and the
time bar issues. These constituted two independent bases in law
on which Shanduka’s appeal could be upheld (para [54]).
The court held that the decision not to accept WC Nickel’s
application was not based on any antecedent administrative
decision (thus rejecting WC Nickel’s reliance on the dictum in
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others [2004] 3
All SA 1 (SCA) para [31]). The consideration that the prospecting
rights had already been granted did not constitute an antecedent
legal decision – it was merely a fact that the regional manager
was required to take into account in arriving at her decision (para
[58]). By failing to challenge the decision timeously, WC Nickel’s
application became finally disposed. It could not subsequently
have been resuscitated by the determination of the validity or
invalidity of a premise leading to the relevant administrative
decision. Therefore, the argument by counsel was deemed to
have ‘no bearing whatsoever in the given circumstances’ (para
[60]).
Shanduka’s appeal was upheld and WC Nickel’s intervening
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application dismissed (para [63]). Shanduka, therefore, was
deemed to be the first-in-time applicant for the prospecting
rights.
INORDINATE DELAY – A BAR TO THE GRANTING OF INTERIM RELIEF20
Rustenburg Platinum Mines v Minister of Mineral Resources
(unreported) High Court, Gauteng Division case 7883/2007;
56189/2010, dealt with a delayed administrative action review of
decisions made by the Deputy Director-General, Department of
Mineral Resources (the DDG), on the granting or refusal to grant
mineral rights. The main finding of the case is that an inordinate
delay on the part of an applicant to bring an application for
interim interdictory relief pendente lite is fatal to the success of
the application due to its detrimental effect on the administration
of justice and prejudice to the respondents (paras [43]–[47]).
Under Item 8 read with Item 1 of Schedule II to the MPRDA, the
first applicant, Rustenburg Platinum Mines (RPM), became the
holder of an unused old order mining right for specified minerals
over certain properties when the MPRDA came into effect on
1 May 2004 (para [18]). RPM applied to have this converted to a
prospecting right under section 16 of the MPRDA (para [20]). This
was refused by the third respondent, the DDG, because granting
the right would result in the concentration of mineral resources
under the control of the applicant, and would constitute an
exclusionary act (para [21]). RPM lodged an internal appeal
against this decision in terms of section 96 of the MPRDA, which
remains pending after nearly a decade (para [22]).
During this time, the DDG granted prospecting, and then
mining, rights over the property to the fifth respondent, Genorah
Resources (Pty) Ltd (Genorah), and prospecting rights to the
ninth respondent Bauba A Hlabirwa Mining Investments (Pty) Ltd
(Bauba). RPM again launched internal appeals against these
decisions, which are also still pending (paras [23]–[26]). RPM
and the second applicant, RPM’s joint venture partner ARM
Mining Consortium Limited (ARM), approached the court for an
interlocutory application on a semi-urgent basis. However, after
discussions with the Minister, the applicants withdrew the appli-
cation (paras [29] [35]). The application was resurrected three
20 The case discussion of Rustenburg Platinum v MMR was co-authored with
Romi-Jean Martin.
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years later. This was ten years after their application to convert
their old order right had been refused, four years after Genorah
had been granted a mining right, and six years after Bauba had
been granted a prospecting right (para [30]).
RPM and ARM sought to interdict the DDG from granting
Bauba a mining right and to interdict Genorah from exercising
their mining rights, pending the outcome of the main review
application (paras [31] [32]). The main review application sought
to challenge the decisions of the Minister, the Director-General,
the DDG, and the regional manager (the state respondents) (para
[1]). RPM andARM also sought an order declaring that, consider-
ing the DDG’s delay, they had exhausted all internal remedies
and could proceed with review applications in terms of the PAJA
(para [2]).
On the basis of section 96 of the MPRDA, which states that an
appeal does not suspend an administrative decision taken under
the Act, the court confirmed that Genorah and Bauba could act
on the rights granted them in spite of RPM’s appeal. Therefore,
there was no impediment to RPM seeking interim relief while
appealing the decisions under section 96 (para [40]). The court
observed that even though RPM appealed the grant of prospect-
ing rights to Genorah, they did nothing to prevent the DDG from
later granting Genorah a mining right. They launched an interlocu-
tory application but withdrew it which ‘lulled Genorah into a false
sense of security’ that RPM would not challenge the decision
further (para [42]).
The court’s opinion was also that, on the facts, RPM ought to
have been aware of the reasonable possibility that Genorah
would be granted a mining right and that once this was granted, it
would be a ‘game changer’, as Genorah would be obliged to
commence mining under section 19(2)(b) and (c) of the MPRDA
(paras [35]–[37]). However, RPM did nothing to stop Genorah
from engaging in mining activities. They merely lodged an appeal
against the DDG’s decision to grant Genorah a mining right (para
[36]). By the time the current application was brought, Genorah
had already incurred significant expenses by undertaking numer-
ous studies and prospecting activities, securing international
partners, and forming an agreement with Eskom to construct an
electrical substation. They had also committed to a social and
labour plan creating thousands of jobs in the area (para [41]).
In view of the inordinate delays in this matter, the High Court
held that the applications stood to be dismissed (para [46]).
883MINING LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 60 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/23−Mining−Law
Basson J noted that the interdict pendente lite is a special
remedy that should be pursued without delay (para [43]; Juta &
Co Ltd v Legal and Financial Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd 1969 (4) SA
443 (C) 445B–E). Delaying an application for review could be
viewed as acquiescence in the situation by the applicant, so that
the respondent was lured into a false sense of security, causing
‘real inequity’ (para [44]; Botha v White 2004 (3) SA 184 (T) para
[31]). Two reasons were put forward to support the view that
challenges to administrative action must be brought timeously
and pursued diligently to finality. First, it is important to avoid
causing prejudice to respondents. Secondly, it would be contrary
to the administration of justice and the public interest to allow
decisions to be set aside after an unreasonably long period has
elapsed (para [45]; Gqwetha v Transkei Development Corpora-
tion Ltd & others 2006 (2) SA 603 (SCA) paras [22] [23]).
In addition, the court found that the applicants had not met the
requirements for a successful interim interdict (para [47]). It also
evaluated whether the applicants had shown a prima facie right
‘open to some doubt’ (para [49]; Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA
1186 (W) 1189). Considering whether the applicants had a
sufficiently strong prospect of success in their review to set aside
the decision to grant Genorah a mining right, the court opined
that they had to show a sufficiently strong case with at least some
prospects of success in the main application, even if such
prospect was weak (para [51]). For the court, two considerations
dictated against finding even a weak prospect of success. For
one, all that was required to establish Genorah’s claim for the
granting of a mining right under section 22(1) of the MPRDA, read
with regulation 10, was the factual granting of a prospecting right.
Validity of the prospecting right is not a necessary precondition to
apply for a mining right (paras [51] [52]). Secondly, the review
proceedings were most likely outside of the stipulated time limit in
section 7(1) of the PAJA (ie, 180 days after becoming aware of the
decision sought to be reviewed (para [53])). These consider-
ations induced the court to find that there were no prospects of
success in challenging the granting of Genorah’s mining right
(para [55]).
The applicants may have wanted to argue on the basis of the
need for a prospecting right as a factual – rather than legal –
prerequisite for the application for a mining right, in terms of
section 19(1)(b) of the MPRDA. Whether this argument would
have convinced is open to speculation.
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In considering the right to have the granting of Bauba’s
prospecting right reviewed, the court was mindful of the fact that
Bauba was set up by and in the interests of a previously
disadvantaged community. The court acknowledged the MPRDA’s
aim to facilitate equitable access to and sustainable development
of the nation’s mineral resources (paras [57] [58]). The state must
ensure that mineral resources are distributed equally for the
benefit of the disadvantaged and should not be sterilised. The
court also noted the imperative in section 104 of the MPRDA, that
the Minister must grant a prospecting or mining right to a local
community if certain requirements are met (paras [59] [60]).
These are good reasons for granting a prospecting right to
Bauba (para [61]). These considerations had to be weighed up
against the exclusive right of RPM, under the MPRDA Schedule II
items 6(3) and 7(3), to convert their old order right into either a
mining or a prospecting right (AgriSA v Minister for Minerals and
Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para [14]; item 8 of Sch II to the
MPRDA).
For the same considerations as those relating to the 180-day
delay rule (para [56]), the court held that in attempting to interdict
Bauba’s grant, RPM andARM had no prospects of success (para
[62]). What the court failed to consider, was RPM’s exclusive right
to apply for the conversion of its old order rights, until the matter
had been finalised. Because of the outstanding internal appeal,
the matter had not yet been finalised and RPM could have argued
that it still had the exclusive right to apply for the rights in
question. Were this argument to hold, the court’s reasoning
regarding Bauba’s preferential right would fall away and there
would be some prospect of success in reviewing Bauba’s
prospecting right. This should have been sufficient for the prima
facie standard outlined above.
The court’s finding that the applicants had not established the
existence of irreparable harm is questionable. It appears that the
court conflated the question of irreparable harm (paras [63]–[67])
with the balance-of-convenience question (paras [68]–[72]). The
court weighed up the strengths and weaknesses in RPM/ARM’s
case – especially their apparently unconvincing argument of
irreparable harm (paras [63]–[67]) – against the extensive poten-
tial prejudice to the respondents (paras [68]–[70]). This sup-
ported the finding that the requirements for an interim interdict
had not been met, and the interim interdict applications were
refused (para [71]).
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Under section 96(3) of the MPRDA, a review cannot be
launched before exhausting internal remedies. On this point, the
court reasoned that section 6 of the PAJA requires administrative
decisions to be taken within a reasonable time. The DDG’s
ten-year delay in reaching a decision on appeal was sufficient
consideration for the court to find exceptional circumstances
existed to warrant a conclusion that RPM/ARM had exhausted all
internal remedies (paras [102]–[104]). The applicants could,
therefore, proceed with their review application under the PAJA.
The salient insight from this case is that, although the appli-
cants had administratively appealed every decision within the
prescribed time and in accordance with the correct procedure,
the court still expected to be approached concurrently for
interdictory relief. Exhaustion of internal remedies consequently
does not appear to preclude an aggrieved party from turning to
the court process. The court found that the state’s action – or
rather, lack thereof – unacceptable. Even so, this view had no
bearing on the court’s decision to dismiss RPM’s application for
interim interdictory relief. This also implies that an applicant
cannot rely solely on the internal appeal processes in the MPRDA
to protect its interests in particular minerals in a particular
property against competing applicants. Further, it can be argued
that the refusal is only finalised once all internal appeals have
been finalised and, accordingly, RPM still had an exclusive right
to apply for a prospecting right under the transitional arrange-
ments of Schedule II.
However, there are additional considerations. The MPRDA
provides that new applications for mineral rights can fail if the
granting would result in an exclusionary act or in the concentra-
tion of mineral resources under the control of the applicant
(section 17(2)(b)). Although the provision does not specifically
apply to conversions of old order mining or prospecting rights or
unused old order rights, the application for conversion of an
unused old order right into a prospecting right may be refused for
these reasons (see H Mostert Mineral Law Principles and Policies
in Perspective (Juta 2012) 100). This may be inferred from item
8(3) of Schedule II to the MPRDA, which contemplates the refusal
of an application for conversion of an unused old order right into a
prospecting or mining right, most likely because of the MPRDA’s
purpose of promoting equitable access to the nation’s mineral
resources (Mostert ibid 101).
Ultimately, the purposes and objectives of the MPRDA pro-
vided the direction here, both in terms of dismissing the applica-
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tion to interdict the state from granting Bauba, a previously
disadvantaged community, a licence, and in refusing to interdict
Genorah from exercising mining activities after significant
expenses had already been incurred and social and labour plans
had been finalised to the benefit of the community.
DEALING WITH PURE ECONOMIC LOSS PURSUANT TO ERRONEOUS
GRANT OF RIGHTS21
Saamwerk Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources
& another (1098/2015, 206/2016) [2017] ZASCA 56 (19 May
2017) involved a delictual action for pure economic loss instituted
by Saamwerk Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd (the appellant) against the
Minister of the DMR and a company called SA Soutwerke (Pty)
Ltd (the second respondent).
The matter arose from conflicting claims and activities to mine
salt on Vrysoutpan, which was owned by the state. It was
complicated by the switch in the legislative regime dealing with
minerals and petroleum on 1 May 2004. The right to mine salt was
regulated by section 9(1) of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 until it
was repealed and replaced by the MPRDA.
SA Soutwerke had been mining on Vrysoutpan for several
years. Its mining authorisation lapsed in October 1992, and it only
sought a new permit in November 2000 under section 9(1) of the
MineralsAct. Vrysoutpan being state property, ministerial consent
was required for a new mining permit (s 9(2) of the Minerals Act).
This consent was granted in August 2002. The regional director
was authorised to sign the written agreement and consent with
SASoutwerke. The consent agreement was signed on 07 Decem-
ber 2001. The department informed SA Soutwerke in 2003 that a
mining permit would be issued for five years, subject to SA
Soutwerke complying with various requirements. Two subse-
quent letters from the department in 2003 reiterated the mes-
sage. SASoutwerke met all requirements by December 2003 and
expected a five-year mining permit to be issued. Nevertheless, in
April 2004, under the new mineral law framework, the regional
director of the department refused to accept the recommenda-
tion that the mining permit be issued for five years. The director
21 The case discussion of Saamwerk v MMR was co-authored with Geoffrey
Allsop.
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therefore granted the right for a single year – the permit running
until 27 April 2005.
After the expiry of SASoutwerke’s permit, Saamwerk lodged an
application under section 22 of the MPRDA for a mining right in
respect of Vrysoutpan (on 22 August 2005). The department
informed Saamwerk that its application would be granted subject
to the condition that a revised Social and Labour Plan (SLP) be
submitted. The latter was submitted on 6 December 2006, and
the department raised no further objection to the revised SLP.
Saamwerk contended that, had the department executed and
granted the right within a reasonable time – as required by
section 6 of the MPRDA – Saamwerk would have been able to
commence mining by 1 January 2007.
However, complications arose in August 2006, when SA
Soutwerke objected to the department against any mining right
executed in favour of Saamwerk, on the basis that SA Soutwerke
was already the holder of a valid mining right over Vrysoutpan. A
copy of SA Soutwerke’s mining right was produced, the terms of
which allegedly afforded SA Soutwerke a right to mine for an
indefinite period: the mining permit contained no expiry date.
In a second letter to the department in September 2006, SA
Soutwerke claimed to be the lawful owner of a mining right over
Vrysoutpan, that such right amounted to an old order right under
the transitional provisions of the MPRDA and that Saamwerk’s
mining right over Vrysoutpan had been erroneously granted. As
holder of an old order mineral right, SA Soutwerke argued, its
rights would persist for a period of five years. It demanded that
the mining right granted to Saamwerk be suspended immedi-
ately.
In a meeting on 06 December 2006 between the regional
manager and SA Soutwerke it transpired that the regional man-
ager was unable to locate a copy of the mining right application
which appeared in SA Soutwerke’s letter to the department in
2004 and which supported the claim to an indefinite mining right.
Instead, SASoutwerke’s original mining right – which had expired
in 2004 – was produced. SA Soutwerke responded by presenting
the regional manager with a copy of the mining right application
referred to in its 2004 letter. The application, which was undated,
is what SA Soutwerke relied on to contend that its mining right
was indefinite. The regional manager expressed reservations as
to the authenticity of the document presented by SA Soutwerke,
based on discrepancies in various time stamps and the fact there
was no expiry date.
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The matter was referred to the chief director of the DMR for
further investigation, and in turn to the head of legal compliance
who concluded that the document presented by SA Soutwerke
was not authentic as it contained no expiry date. SA Soutwerke
maintained that the document was authentic and that its mining
right subsisted for an indefinite period. The head of legal compli-
ance submitted his report to the chief director indicating that SA
Soutwerke’s mining right had expired.
In March 2007 Saamwerk instituted a High Court application in
the Northern Cape, Kimberly Division before Lacock J seeking a
declaratory order that it was entitled to mine on Vrysoutpan and
that the Minister was obliged to execute Saamwerk’s mining right.
A declaratory order was also sought against SA Soutwerke
declaring their alleged mining right invalid and claiming certain
interdictory relief against SA Soutwerke. Saamwerk succeeded in
its application, but SA Soutwerke sought leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal which suspended Lacock J’s order on
15 December 2009. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal (SA Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd v Saamwerk Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd
[2011] 4 All SA 168 (SCA)).
In the present case, Saamwerk alleged that SA Soutwerke was
party to the creation of a fraudulent mining right, and that it had
relied on that fraudulent right to prevent Saamwerk from mining
salt on a farm called Vrysoutpan. Saamwerk alleged that it had
suffered damages in the form of pure economic loss through the
conduct of the Minister (whether the refusal to execute Saam-
werk’s mining right was negligent or deliberate).
The court dealt with the issues against SA Soutwerke and the
Minister in two separate parts, each of which raised different
questions of law. The answer to each legal issue and the reasons
for it are canvassed below.
In the case against SA Soutwerke, the primary point – which
was undisputed – was that SA Soutwerke clearly had no right to
continue mining on Vrysoutpan after April 2005. Essentially, the
issue was whether Soutwerke was complicit in forging the mining
right it relied on to prevent Saamwerk from commencing opera-
tions. Related to this issue was whether SA Soutwerke had
actually ever received that document. This issue hinged primarily
on an evaluation of the evidence before the court a quo. There, it
had to be determined whether Saamwerk had established that
SA Soutwerke was party to the fraudulent mining right document.
The court had also to consider whether to grant Saamwerk’s
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application to present evidence before the Supreme Court of
Appeal. The final issue was whether SA Soutwerke’s plea of
prescription in response to Saamwerk’s claim had any merit.
The case against the Minister was whether Saamwerk had
established that the conduct was wrongful and therefore action-
able in delict. Saamwerk’s pleadings in this respect were on the
premise that two administrative omissions by the department
(both apparently pleaded in the alternative) were delictually
wrongful. First, it was argued that the department had wrongfully
and with malicious intent refused to execute Saamwerk’s mining
right by the end of December 2006. Alternatively, it was con-
tended that the department had negligently and wrongfully
refused to execute that right and – in so doing – engaged in
conduct that permitted SA Soutwerke to continue to mine unlaw-
fully at Vrysoutpan. The court considered these two allegations
together as ‘two sides of the same coin’ that ‘could conveniently
be taken together’ (para [59]).
Both Saamwerk’s claims failed in the Supreme Court of Appeal.
As for the claim against SA Soutwerke, the Supreme Court of
Appeal found that Saamwerk had failed to discharge the onus of
establishing that SA Soutwerke had been party to a fraudulent
transaction. As for the claim against the Minister, the court
refused to recognise the various administrative omissions – by
the Department – as sufficiently compelling to recognise a claim
for pure economic loss in this instance.
What is important for the mining context, however, is the
manner in which the court approached the question of whether
the department had acted wrongfully in delict. The court explained
(para [60]) that for claims of pure economic loss which are
presumed to be lawful, the applicant must establish that the
causal conduct resulting in pure economic loss is wrongful and
therefore actionable in delict. A judicial value judgment must be
made on whether a pure economic loss claim will be recognised
as wrongful; and such a judgment depends on various policy
considerations, rooted in (and consistent with) the Constitution.
Expanding on the various relevant policy factors in this case, the
court concluded that a sufficiently compelling case had not been
established by Saamwerk to recognise the action of the DMR as
wrongful, and therefore the claim against the Minister was
dismissed.
The Supreme Court of Appeal indicated that an administrative
act or omission causing pure economic loss is not per se
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actionable; but where it is undertaken in bad faith or dishonestly,
the act or omission will generally be wrongful (Telematrix (Pty) Ltd
v Advertising Standards Authority of SA 2006 (1) SA 461 (SCA);
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3)
SA 121 (CC)). Ordinarily, a public law wrong will not necessarily
attract private law remedies ( Steenkamp (above) paras [20]–[22]),
because parties aggrieved by public actions are entitled to
institute public law remedies to address their grievances. In this
respect Saamwerk was entitled to review the refusal of the
Minister to execute the mining right as unlawful administrative
action in terms of section 6(2)(g) of the PAJA. Secondly, Saam-
werk had already sought to obtain legal redress through the
public law remedy of a declaratory order against the Minister and
SASoutwerke, a cause of action which was ultimately successful.
Third, as held above, Saamwerk already had a successful
delictual action against SA Soutwerke in respect of any profits it
might have lost due to its inability to mine at Vrysoutpan. The
court accordingly concluded that there was no good reason to
further extend the law of delict to allow for a further claim against
the Minister (a public official) when a claim already lay against
Soutwerke (a private party).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeal stressed that an
incorrect administrative act or omission is not necessarily never
actionable in the absence of bad faith or dishonesty. However, if
fraud or dishonesty is absent (as in the present matter), that will
be a weighty consideration against a finding of wrongfulness
(para [63]).
Saamwerk sought to argue that the department intentionally
and deliberately decided not to execute Saamwerk’s mining right
and, therefore, that dolus (as opposed to mere negligence) was
present. The court rejected this proposition: intention is only
present if the defendant directed its will at achieving a particular
result, and this could not be established. At best, the department
had acted negligently, but the Supreme Court of Appeal declined
to make a firm finding on the delictual element of fault in the
present matter.
MATTERS INVOLVING TAXATION AND TARIFFS
Only United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service case 74158/2016 GNP
(3 October 2017) is of relevance.
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‘GROSS SALES’ FOR THE PURPOSE OF CALCULATING THE ROYALTY22
In United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for
the South African Revenue Service (above) the applicant sought
declaratory relief regarding the correct interpretation and applica-
tion of section 6(3)(b) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources
Royalty Act 28 of 2008 (the Royalty Act) relevant to the determina-
tion of the applicant’s ‘gross sales’ for the purpose of calculating
the royalty payable under section 3(2) of the Royalty Act. The
dispute centred around the section 6(3)(b) provision for deduct-
ing certain transport, insurance, and handling (TIH) costs from
the calculation of gross sales. The applicant also sought specific
relief in the form of an order from the court that it could omit
certain monetary amounts from the total it was required to pay for
the 2010 and 2011 years of assessment (para [1]).
The SARS opposed the relief on three grounds. First, it argued
that the case should have been brought to the tax court after the
SARS had rendered a decision (not yet taken) for the assess-
ments at issue and, in any event, the applicant had failed to
exhaust its internal remedies provided for in the Tax Administra-
tion Act 28 of 2011. For either of these two reasons, the SARS
alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Secondly, it argued that the court should exercise its discretion
not to consider granting the relief sought. Lastly, it put forward its
interpretation of section 6(3)(b) of the Royalty Act and argued that
its interpretation should be preferred to the applicant’s (para
[15]).
Regarding the SARS’s first argument, Meyer J acknowledged
that ‘tax cases are generally reserved for the exclusive juris-
diction of the tax court in the first instance’, but found that it was
settled law that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear and
determine tax cases turning on legal issues (Metcash Trading Ltd
v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service & another
2000 (1) SA1109 (CC) para [18]). Thus, regarding the declaratory
relief, Meyer J found the court to have jurisdiction as the question
was legal in nature (para [20]). As the case was not a review
under the PAJA, he found that the section 7(2) requirement of
exhausting internal remedies was not relevant for the declaratory
relief sought (para [27]). However, Meyer J found that the court
22 The case discussion of United Manganese v SARS was co-authored with
Joseph Mayson.
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was not competent to grant the specific relief sought, as it
involved a question of fact, there was insufficient evidence before
the court, and the SARS was still seized with the matter at the time
of the hearing; to make such a pronouncement would usurp the
SARS’s function (paras [22]–[26]).
The court rejected the SARS’s second argument that the court
should exercise its discretion not to consider granting the declara-
tory relief sought as the Royalty Act was new, complex legislation,
and there were many different views on interpretations and
applications of the Act. Clarity, in this regard, should be wel-
comed and the court should exercise its discretion to adjudicate
on the declaratory relief sought (para [21]).
Finally, regarding the interpretation of section 6(3)(b) of the
Royalty Act, Meyer J’s point of departure was ‘the language of the
provision itself, read in context and having regard to the purpose
of the provision and the background to the preparation and
production of the document’ (para [29]). The SARS argued that
the applicant could only deduct the TIH costs that were specifi-
cally included in its prices to its customers. If the price was not
determined by TIH costs, disregarding TIH costs would have no
effect on the price and, therefore, on gross sales. Therefore, only
where the price is a function of the TIH costs can the TIH costs be
excluded from the calculation of gross sales. The last leap of
reasoning was not explained in the judgment, but one would
assume that the SARS would argue that the purpose of the
section 6(3)(b) exclusion is to reduce price pressures from the
Royalty Act’s taxation measures and, if the price is unaffected by
TIH costs, there is no direct price pressure from taxing these
costs. The exclusion of such costs would, therefore, not promote
the purpose of the section. Meyer J found the SARS’s interpreta-
tion ‘patently flawed,’ contradicting the ordinary grammatical and
contextual meaning of section 6(2) and 6(3)(b) (para [29]). He
considered the words clear and unambiguous, and held that the
2009 amendment (Tax Laws Amendment Act 17 of 2009) shows
the legislature’s intention to exclude all TIH expenditure after the
metal has reached the condition specified in Schedule 2 (paras
[37] [38]). With the amendments, the section now reads:
For purposes of subsection (2), gross sales is determined without
regard to any expenditure incurred in respect of transport, insurance
and handling of an unrefined mineral resource after that mineral
resource was brought to the condition specified in Schedule 2 for that
mineral resource or any expenditure incurred in respect of transport,
insurance and handling to effect the disposal of that mineral resource.
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The italicised words replaced the words ‘any amount received
or accrued’ in the pre-amendment section. The previous wording
appeared to indicate that only TIH expenditure included in sales
prices to customers could be deducted from ‘gross sales’ (paras
[31]–[36]). However, with the changes, the plain meaning of the
words showed that such expenditure should be excluded from
the calculation of gross sales whether or not the TIH expenditure
was included by the extractor in the calculation of its sale prices
to its customers. The substitution makes it plain that the latter
interpretation was the one intended by the legislature (para [38]).
It follows that the limitation contended for by the SARS is not
expressly provided for in section 6(3)(b) (para [39]).
The test for reading words in by implication, was set out in
Rennie NO v Gordon & another 1988 (1) SA 1 (A) 22E–F: ‘Words
cannot be read into a statute by implication unless the implication
is a necessary one in the sense that without it effect cannot be
given to the statute as it stands.’ Meyer J could find no reason to
imply such limitation as effect could be given to section 6(3)(b)
and the Act as a whole as it stood without the need to imply the
SARS’s limitation (para [39]).
Lastly, Meyer J noted that the purpose of the contemplated
exclusion of TIH costs, as stated by the SARS in its 2008
Explanatory Memorandum, is to avoid penalising the extraction of
minerals ‘that are located far from markets, or an export port
(para [40]).’
Ultimately the court upheld the applicant’s view that it was
entitled to deduct any TIH expenditure incurred after the manga-
nese had been brought to the condition specified in Schedule 2
of the Royalty Act, from the calculation of gross sales (para [41]).
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CONTRACT: MISCELLANEOUS
(AGENCY, CARRIAGE, DEPOSIT, DONATION, LOANS,
PARTNERSHIP, SERVICE AND SURETY)
MM KOEKEMOER*
AGENCY
LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW
There was no legislation or case law affecting this branch of the
law during the period under review.
CARRIAGE
LEGISLATION
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
CARRIAGE BY SEA
The following notices were published in terms of the Merchant
Shipping Act 57 of 1951: the Merchant Shipping (Radio Installa-
tions) Amendment Regulations, 2016 (GN R44 GG 40568 of
23 January 2017); the Maritime Labour Certificate and Declara-
tion of Compliance Regulations, 2017 (GN R534 GG 40893 of
6 June 2017); and the Merchant Shipping (Seafarer Recruitment
and Placement) Regulations, 2017 (GN R986 GG 41108 of
11 September 2017).
The Draft Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy, 2017, in
terms of the Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994, the Merchant
Shipping Act 57 of 1951, and the National Ports Act 12 of 2005,
was published for comment (General Notice 183 GG 40662 of
2 March 2017). A notice concerning the South African Maritime
Safety Authority Act 5 of 1998 was also published, as was the
* B Com (PU for CHE) LLB (PU for CHE) LLM (Pret). Senior Lecturer, Depart-
ment of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of South Africa. Attorney of the
High Court of South Africa. The part of this contribution dealing with ‘Loans’ is
partly based on contributions previously published in 2017 Juta’s Quarterly Review:
Credit Law.
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Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy, 2017 (General Notice
457 GG 40904 of 12 June 2017).
The proposed fees payable in respect of applications and
issuing of rights, permits, and licences in the small-scale fishery
sector under the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 were
published (GN 558 GG 40906 of 9 June 2017).
CARRIAGE BY AIR
A notice was published under the Airports Company Act 44 of
1993, regarding airport charges as from 1 April 2017 (General
Notice 961 GG 40529 of 29 December 2016). Air traffic service
charges as from 1 April 2017 were published under the Air Traffic
and Navigation Services Company Act 45 of 1993 (General
Notice 959 GG 40526 of 30 December 2016). Neither notice was
mentioned in the 2016 Annual Survey as the publication had
already gone to print.
There were also multiple amendments or draft amendments to
the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2011, under the Civil Aviation Act
13 of 2009. These include: Amendment of the Civil Aviation
Regulations, 2011 (GN R68 GG 40581 of 27 January 2017); Draft
amendment of the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2011 (published in
both GN R220 GG 40681 of 13 March 2017 and GN R273
GG 40720 of 24 March 2017); Amendment of the Civil Aviation
Regulations, 2011 (GN R408 GG 40831 of 5 May 2017); Fifteenth
Amendment of the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2017 (GN R409
GG 40831 of 5 May 2017 and, inAfrikaans, in GN R586 GG 40929
of 23 June 2017); Sixteenth Amendment of the Civil Aviation
Regulations, 2017 (GN R432 GG 40846 of 19 May 2017);
Seventeenth Amendment of the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2017
(GN R474 GG 40870 of 29 May 2017); Amendments to the Civil
Aviation Regulations, 2011 for comment appeared in GN R697
GG 40993 of 21 July 2017; GN R775 GG 41023 of 4 August 2017;
GN R1089 GG 41169 of 6 October 2017; and GN R1348
GG 41297 of 4 December 2018); andAmendment of Regulations,
2011 (GN 1423–GN 1425 GG 41322 of 15 December 2017).
A draft of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment Regulations, 2017, was published for comment under
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment Act
4 of 2007 (GN R1422 GG 41322 of 15 December 2017).
The levy on the sale of aviation fuel under the Civil Aviation
Authority Levies Act 41 of 1998 was published (GN R585
GG 40929 23 of June 2017).
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A Proposal for the Amendment of the Mortgaging of Aircraft
Regulations, 2017, in terms of the Convention on the International
Recognition of Rights in Aircraft Act 59 of 1993, was published for
comment (GN R587 GG 40929 of 23 June 2017).
Air traffic service charges under the Air Traffic and Navigation
Services Company Act 45 of 1993 were published (GN 988
GG 41362 of 29 December 2017).
CARRIAGE BY RAIL
The determination of permit fees in terms of the National
Railway Safety Regulator Act 16 of 2002, was published (GN 446
GG 40847 of 19 May 2017).
Draft regulations on infrastructure or activity affecting safe
railway operations, 2017, in terms of the National Railway Safety
Regulator Act 16 of 2002 were published for comment (GN 618
GG 40945 of 30 June 2017); as were draft security matters
regulations, 2017 (GN 617 GG 40945 of 30 June 2017).
CARRIAGE BY ROAD
The Amendment of the National Road Traffic Regulations was
published under the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996
(GN1408 GG 40420 of 11 November 2016). This notice was not
mentioned in the 2016 Annual Survey, as the publication had
already gone to print.
The South African National RoadsAgency Limited and National
Roads Amendment Bill B20 of 2017 was published for comment.
Regulations on colour coding and branding for minibuses and
midi-buses used for minibus taxi-type services were published
under the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009 (Proc R26
GG 41046 of 18 of August 2017).
Two versions of the Draft Transport Appeal Tribunal Amend-
ment Bill were published for comment (GN 947 GG 41082 of
1 September 2017 and GN 1137 GG 41202 of 27 October 2017).
CASE LAW
CARRIAGE BY SEA
Maritime lien for wages of crew abducted by pirates
In Asphalt Venture Windrush Intercontinental SA & another v
UACC Bergshav Tankers AS (556/2015) [2016] ZASCA199, 2017
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(3) SA 1 (SCA), an appeal was launched against the decision in
Windrush Intercontinental SA and another v UACC Bergshav
Tankers AS: The Asphalt Venture 2015 (4) SA 381 (KZD). The
Asphalt Venture was hijacked by Somali pirates and the seven
Indian crewmembers taken hostage. Ransom was paid, but
initially only the vessel was released. At the time of release of the
vessel, the employment period under the employment contracts
for the crew had already ended. However, the crew’s employer,
Concord Worldwide Inc, continued to pay wages to the families of
the abducted crew until Concord ran into financial difficulty. The
wage claims were ceded to the respondent under a settlement
agreement concluded with the families and approved by the
Indian High Court. The vessel was arrested by the respondent,
which resulted in an application for the release of the vessel and
return of the security furnished. The issue to be decided on
appeal was whether, at the time of arrest of the vessel, there was
a maritime lien for wages allowing the ship to be arrested by way
of an in rem arrest under section 3(4)(a) of the Admiralty
Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983. This required a two-
pronged enquiry: determining, on a prima facie basis, the
existence of the claims it sought to enforce against Asphalt
Venture; and whether, given their nature, those claims were
protected by a maritime lien in terms of South African law. A
maritime lien for wages is subject to benefit to the ship of the
crew’s services (para [38]). At the time of the release of the
vessel, the employment period under the employment contracts
with the crew had already ended. Even where the seven sailors
were entitled to recover wages, this was not on the basis of an
entitlement arising from service rendered to the Asphalt Venture.
There was consequently no benefit to the ship, and no maritime
lien existed when the vessel was arrested. The order of the court
a quo was set aside.
Maritime claim: The arrest of associated ship
The facts in MV Nyk Isabel Northern Endeavour Shipping Pte
Ltd v Owners of MV Nyk Isabel & another (972/2015) [2016]
ZASCA 89, [2016] 3 All SA 418 (SCA), 2017 (1) SA 25 which
resulted in the appeal were that the loss of a number of
containers aboard the Northern Endeavour, owned by the appel-
lant, occurred while the vessel was en route from Durban to
Brazil. The appellant blamed the respondent for the loss. The
respondent was a slot-charterer which used a number of the slots
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on board the Northern Endeavour to store its containers. The
appellant argued that the respondent had been negligent when
they stowed the containers on the vessel. When the vessel
arrived in Brazil, cargo underwriters, acting under the right of
subrogation, sued the respondent to recover the losses sus-
tained. However, acting on an indemnity it had concluded with
the appellant, the respondent joined the appellant to the proceed-
ings. The action then resulted in a Brazilian court granting the
claim of the cargo underwriters against the respondent and the
respondent’s indemnity claim against the appellant. Not satisfied
with the outcome in Brazil, the appellant arrested the Nyk Isabel,
an apparent associated ship in an action in rem instituted in the
Durban High Court. The appellant argued that it could recoup the
damages due under the Brazilian judgment from the respondent.
However, in order to arrest the Nyk Isabel, the appellant had to
prove that the respondent had been a slot-charterer of the
Northern Endeavour when the incident took place. This would
mean that the slot-charterer would be deemed to be the owner,
so that the associated-ship arrest could be made under section
3(7)(c). The respondent defended this action and brought a
counterclaim under section 5(2)(b) and (c) of theAct requesting a
matching provision of security by the appellant. The High Court
granted the relief in favour of the respondent, which led to the
current appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
There were three key points of contention. First, whether a
slot-charterer qualifies as a ‘charterer’ for the purposes of section
3(7)(c) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act. The court
held that as a slot-charterer the respondent did indeed qualify as
a charterer (para [27]). It reasoned that the concept of ‘slot-
charterers’ has evolved as result of a commercial need and there
is no clear reason not to include or classify them as ‘charterers’ as
intended by the Act (paras [28] [29]). Therefore, the respondent
was a ‘charterer’ of the Northern Endeavour, section 3(7)(c)
applied to it, and the arrest of the Nyk Isabel was permitted (para
[30]).
The second point was whether a slot-charterer (the respon-
dent) was a party to the action, which the court again answered in
the affirmative. As per rules 8(2) and 10 of the Admiralty Court
Rules, when the respondent entered an appearance to defend
the in rem action instituted against the Nyk Isabel, it ipso facto
became a party to the action (paras [31]-[39]).
The last point the court had to consider was whether the
respondent was entitled to invoke section 5(2)(b) and (c) of the
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Act to obtain a matching provision of security by the appellant. In
affording this type of security, section 5(2)(b) and (c) gives the
courts a broad discretion. This allows a court to balance the
scales, so to speak, between the interests of the claimants and
the defendants (para [45]). However, in order for a court to
exercise its discretion, the party invoking this provision must
show that it has an enforceable claim and that there is a ‘genuine
and reasonable’ need for the security sought (paras [46] [51]
[58]). In the present matter, the respondent had complied with
both these requirements. The Supreme Court of Appeal dis-
missed the appeal and confirmed the order of the court a quo.
For a detailed discussion of this decision, see the chapter
‘Admiralty’.
CARRIAGE BY AIR
There was no case law affecting this branch of the law during
the period under review.
DEPOSIT
LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW
There was no legislation or case law affecting this branch of the
law during the period under review.
DONATION
LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW
There was no legislation or case law affecting this branch of the
law during the period under review.
LOANS
LEGISLATION
The ‘Guideline for the submission of credit information concern-
ing the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, as amended’ was
prepared by the National Credit Regulator and published for
comment (GN 476 GG 40930 of 23 June 2017).
The Amendment of the Regulations relating to Debt Collectors,
2003, was published (GN R1141 GG 41205 of 27 October 2017).
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The National Credit Amendment Bill, 2018, was published for
comment (GN 922 GG 41274 of 24 November 2017). The Bill
aims to amend the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the NCA) by
including the following provisions: to provide for debt interven-
tion; to allow the National Credit Regulator to evaluate and refer
debt intervention applications and the suspension of agreements
considered to be reckless to the National Consumer Tribunal as
part of their enforcement function; to include the consideration of
a referral as a function of the National Consumer Tribunal; to
require a credit provider and a debt counsellor to determine
whether the credit agreement is reckless; to allow that a court
may be able to refer a matter for debt intervention; to provide for
an application for debt intervention and its evaluation in general;
to provide for orders related to debt intervention and rehabilita-
tion in respect of such an order; to enable the Minister to
prescribe a debt intervention method; to make obtaining credit
life insurance mandatory for consumers; to provide for offences
related to debt intervention, prohibited credit practices, reckless
lending, selling, or collecting prescribed debt and the failure to
register as a credit provider; to provide for measures when a
company commits such an offence; to provide for penalties in
relation to the offences created; to provide for the National
Consumer Tribunal to change or rescind an order under certain
circumstances; and to place an obligation on the Minister to
prescribe a financial literacy and budgeting skills programme.
The Draft Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Amendment
Bill, 2016, was published for comment (General Notice 247
GG 40733 of 31 March 2017), as was the Debt Counselling fee
structure concerning the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (General
Notice 705 GG 41100 of 8 September 2017).
The Amendment of the Regulations relating to Debt Collectors,
2003, under the Debt Collectors Act 114 of 1998, was published
(GN R1141 GG 41205 of 27 October 2017).
CASE LAW
CREDIT AGREEMENTS
Duty of a bank in respect of the operation of a business by a third party
who is not a customer
It is common practice to register a general notarial bond over
the movable assets of a retailer as security for the retailer’s
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indebtedness, accessory to a supply agreement signed with a
supplier, such as the Spar Group Ltd (Spar). This was also the
case in Spar Group Ltd v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2017 (1) SA 449
(GP). The bond is intended to secure an obligation which arises
after the supplier has provided goods and/or services on credit to
a retailer. A business, referred to as Umtshingo, conducted three
businesses (Bella Donna Kwik Spar, Bella Donna Tops, and
Sonpark Tops), all of which used the Spar branding. On 8 March
2010, Umtshingo owed Spar R2 539 408,14. This resulted in Spar
launching an application to perfect its security held in terms of a
registered general notarial bond. The application succeeded and
the three businesses were attached and possession given to
Spar. Subsequently, Spar started to run the businesses for its own
profit and loss. As Umtshingo did not agree that the three
businesses should cease to exist, the parties attempted (unsuc-
cessfully) to enter into a short-term agreement to lease the
businesses.
The details of the bank account held at FirstRand Bank (FNB)
by each business entity were relevant and must be distinguished.
Bella Donna Kwik Spar held account 323 in the name of Central
Route with a debit balance of R1 343 422,92 on 8 March 2010.
Bella Donna Tops held account 655 in the name of Umtshingo
(the balance is not provided in the case information). Sonpark
Tops held account 309, also in the name of Umtshingo, with a
debit balance of R292 140,84 on 9 March 2010. Although Spar
requested that the beneficiary accounts be changed to speed-
point deposits (Spar accounts), this did not happen, and these
proceeds continued to be paid into accounts 309, 323 and 655.
FNB applied set-off with credit amounts being paid into accounts
309 and 323 (speed-point credits of R1 300 051,21 paid into
these accounts, together with other funds, resulted in the over-
draft being discharged). The dispute with account 309 related to
amounts which the bank should not have debited against the
account. These included R400 000 debited on 25 June 2010, the
monthly loan-agreement instalment debited during the period
March 2010 to June 2011, and the monthly interest charged by
the bank on the debit balance from time to time and then set-off
with credit amounts paid into this account after the increased
debit balance. The four separate claims instituted by the plaintiff
relating to the three accounts were: claim 1 for R1 343 422,92 on
account 323; claim 2 for R2 039 948,68 on account 655; and two
claims, claim 3 for R158 890,90, and claim 4 for R898 744,92,
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relating to account 309. I deal with the court’s discussion of each
claim separately.
As regards claim 1: Spar averred that the personal rights to
funds deposited into this account vested in Spar and that FNB
was aware of this. The critical question in claim 1 is whether it was
lawful for FNB to use these funds to set-off Central Route’s
indebtedness. The agreement between Spar and Umtshingo was
to use the account to warehouse money which belonged to Spar.
Even though FNB was aware of this arrangement, it was not party
to the agreement. Fourie J confirmed the general rule that a bank
becomes the owner of funds deposited with it (para [44]).
Nevertheless, this apparent ownership does not provide the bank
with ‘an absolute or unqualified right on it to treat the funds as its
own or the credit as the property of its customer’ (para [44],
following the decision in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v
Echo Petroleum CC 2012 (5) SA 283 (SCA) para [28]). After
examining previous case law, the court identified the crux as what
the situation would be where a bank is aware of the agreement to
warehouse the money but is not a party to that an agreement. The
answer was clear from previous case law: in the absence of the
bank actually being a party to the warehousing agreement, it is
not bound by the agreement (Joint Stock Co Varvarinskoye v
Absa Bank Ltd 2008 (4) SA 287 (SCA), where the court held that
the bank would only be bound where it has agreed to act as an
agent to warehouse the money). Further, in Absa Bank Ltd v
Intensive Air (Pty) Ltd 2011 (2) SA 275 (SCA) the court also held
that the bank would only deal with the funds differently if they
were reserved as ‘belonging’ to another as per an agreement with
the bank. In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum
CC (above) at para [31] of that case, the court held that even if
the bank had been informed of the third-party interest in the funds
deposited, it would not have been bound to subordinate its
interests.
The court held that this principle was sound in law. Anything
less could have the devastating consequence of unilaterally
depriving a bank of its ownership of the funds deposited, where it
was not even party to an agreement allowing this deprivation
(para [50]). From the evidence presented, it was clear that the
signatory for Umtshingo was requested to sign a letter changing
the beneficiaries of the credit-card payments to Spar. However,
this letter was never signed. Subsequently, in the absence of
evidence that an agreement had been signed to the effect that
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Umtshingo would warehouse the funds deposited on behalf of
Spar and to which FNB was also a party, the set-off between the
debit and credit entries by FNB was lawful (para [50]).
The foundation for both claims 2 and 3 relied on a breach of a
‘duty of care’ on the part of FNB. As regards claim 2, Spar alleged
that FNB had a ‘duty of care’ to ensure that Spar did not suffer
economic loss caused by allowing Umtshingo to withdraw funds
from account 655. Similarly, with claim 3, Spar alleged that FNB
had a duty of care to ensure that Spar did not suffer economic
loss by allowing Umtshingo to withdraw funds from account 309.
These funds were initially transferred not to be used by Umtsh-
ingo or Central Route, but to warehouse money belonging to
Spar. The answer to the question is found in establishing whether
FNB had a duty to a non-client, in circumstances where it knew
that a third party was the true owner of money deposited into the
account of an FNB client.
This would be a delictual claim for pure economic loss. The
court would have to determine whether a legal duty had been
breached, by determining whether there had been a breach of a
subjective right. The correct question to be asked, therefore, is
whether, in terms of the boni mores or reasonableness criteria,
FNB had a legal duty to prevent pure economic loss to Spar by
taking decisive action (para [59]). FNB would only have a legal
duty if it were reasonably expected of it to take positive steps to
prevent Spar’s economic loss from taking place. In determining
the reasonableness of expecting FNB to act, the court consid-
ered the following: the duty of confidentiality which FNB owed
Umtshingo; the fact that there was no reason to depart from the
general rule that a bank becomes the owner of funds deposited
with it (this even more so as there was clear evidence that
Umtshingo had refused that the speed-point funds be routed to
Spar’s account – paras [63] [64]); and the fact that the public, in
general, would benefit from better safeguarding of their funds in
future. The court dismissed the latter argument because it
incorrectly assumed that Spar, and not the bank, became the
owner of the deposited funds, and because of the implication
such a finding would have for commercial banks. The court
concluded that it was unreasonable to conclude that FNB had a
legal duty in the present matter. Claims 2 and 3 therefore also
failed (para [66]).
In claim 4, Spar paid a credit amount of R898 744,92, which
was intended to be ‘used to warehouse money’ belonging to
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Spar. The court found that this claim had also prescribed and so
did not examine the merits (para [42]). For a discussion of this
case see CJ Nagel & JT Pretorius ‘Ownership and appropriation
of funds deposited in a bank account – Spar Group Ltd v
FirstRand Bank Ltd 2017 (1) SA 449 (GP)’ (2018) 80 THRHR
308–14.
Debt enforcement procedure in the case of surrender of goods: Preliminary
procedures
Two other cases dealt with the preliminary procedures under
the NCA which had to be followed where goods were surren-
dered by a consumer to the credit provider: Baliso v FirstRand
Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank 2016 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), 2017 (1) SA
292 and Edwards v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank 2017 (1) SA
316 (SCA).
In terms of section 127(2), after the consumer has surrendered
the goods to the credit provider, the credit provider has ten days
in which to provide the consumer with a written estimated value of
the goods. According to section 127(3), after receiving the
valuation the consumer needs to decide whether to accept the
valuation or ‘unconditionally withdraw’ the surrender of goods
within ten days of receiving the valuation notice. However, this
option only applies while the consumer was not in default at that
time.
In Baliso v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank (above), the court
had to determine what would constitute ‘adequate delivery’ of this
valuation notice. This was an application for leave to appeal,
which was granted by the Constitutional Court. The court had to
determine whether the respondent’s original particulars of claim
contained the necessary averments in order to sustain an appli-
cation in terms of section 127 of the NCA, and also whether, if the
respondent did not comply with the requirements under section
127(2), the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Ordinary mail (not registered) was used to send the valuation
notice. The High Court found that sending the notice via ordinary
mail complied with the section 127(2) requirements and there
was no reason first to postpone the matter regarding section
130(4)(b) of the NCA. As regards section 130(3), a court can
adjudicate on matters related to sections 127, 129 or 131 ‘only if’
the procedures required under those sections were complied
with (para [58]). Further, as to section 130(4), if there is such
non-compliance, the court must adjourn the matter and make an
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appropriate order setting out the steps the credit provider must
now take before the proceedings can resume. The use of the
words ‘only if’ relates to the jurisdiction of a court adjudicating
such a matter. The Constitutional Court found that a court’s
decision that there was compliance with section 127(2) goes to
the jurisdictional competence of that court. Where the court a quo
held that there had been compliance with section 127(2), it is not
able to go back on its decision (para [68]). The Constitutional
Court relied on two earlier judgments to decide whether there
were exceptions which could be raised against a decision of the
court a quo being final and appealable. In Makhothi v Minister of
Police 1981 (1) SA 69 (A) 72H–73B the court dismissed such an
exception as a special plea since ‘the suit and its order is not
repairable at the final stage’; while in Maize Board v Tiger Oats
Ltd 2002 (5) SA 365 (SCA), the court held that the dismissal of an
exception on the ground that the court does not have jurisdiction
‘constituted a final judgment and as such an exception to the
general principle that the dismissal of an exception is not final’.
The Constitutional Court concluded that a dismissal of an excep-
tion to the jurisdiction of a court was final but appealable (para
[71]).
As the matter was appealable, the Constitutional Court had to
determine whether there had been compliance with the delivery
requirement under section 127(2). The starting point was whether
there was a reason why the delivery requirements for section
127(2) should differ from those for default notices under section
129 of the NCA (para [72]). Default notices under section 129
must be sent by registered mail (para [72]). Section 127(2)
notices must, therefore, also be sent by registered post and not
by ordinary post (para [75]). The court a quo made an error in
finding that there had been compliance with the delivery require-
ment under section 127(2) by sending the notice using ordinary
mail.
In Edwards v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank (above) the
valuation notice under section 127(2) was also sent by ordinary
mail. The Supreme Court of Appeal differed from the conclusion
the Constitutional Court reached (above) on the essential nature
of sending the valuation notice. The Supreme Court of Appeal
held that even though it was advisable to send the valuation
notice using registered mail, this was not what the law required.
Section 127(2) required adequate proof of delivery of the valua-
tion notice to the consumer. Shongwe JA (Tshiqi and Seriti JJA
906 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 13 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/24−Miscellaneous−Contracts
and Makgoka AJA concurring) delivered the majority judgment.
Cachalia JA (Tshiqi JA concurring) delivered a concurring minor-
ity judgment, as there was a need to provide a fuller treatment of
some of the issues at hand.
The facts were that Edwards purchased an Aston Martin
Vantage Coupe and financed the purchase under an instalment
sale agreement. Edwards defaulted under the agreement, and
the bank applied for and was granted summary judgment.
Edwards also applied for leave to appeal against the summary
judgment to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but this application
was refused. The bank repossessed the vehicle after sending a
section 127(2) valuation notice to Edwards’s domicilium citandi et
executandi by ordinary post. The vehicle was then sold at public
auction after the bank had also sent a notice to Edwards in terms
of section 127(5). Edwards contended that he never received the
two notices under section 127(2) and (5) of the NCA. The issue on
appeal was whether the bank had complied with the provisions of
section 127(2) and (5) when they sent the notice using ordinary
post. The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the court a quo
that the conduct of Edwards in designating an address for
delivery of notices in which no street delivery occurred, should be
regarded as unreasonable (para [9]). The Supreme Court of
Appeal referred to the decision in Baliso v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a
Wesbank (above), where the majority relied on the interpretation
in Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 (3) SA 56
(CC) of Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 (5) SA
142 (CC). The interpretation was that in determining what is
meant by ‘adequate delivery’, the decision must be left to the
court in which the proceedings were launched – in this case, the
Supreme Court of Appeal. That court must be satisfied that the
credit provider showed on a balance of probabilities that the
notice had reached the consumer. The Supreme Court of Appeal
referred to the obiter remark by the Constitutional Court in Baliso
v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank (above) that there was no
reason in merit why the notice requirements under section 127(2)
and section 129(1) should be different. However, it appears that
this question was left unanswered by the Constitutional Court.
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that even though failure to
comply with section 127(2) is detrimental for the bank as non-
compliance prevents it from pursuing recovery of damages
by way of the shortfall, the ordinary grammatical meaning must
be attached to the words ‘give the consumer a written notice’
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(para [11]). Therefore, even though it is advisable to send a
valuation notice by registered mail, this is not what is required by
law (para [11]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal also considered the submission
that section 127 should not apply as the vehicle was attached
and not voluntarily surrendered by Edwards. The court held that
section 127(2)–(9) of the NCA would have applied had the credit
agreement not already been cancelled (para [16]). This was the
finding relying on an interpretation of section 131 of the NCA that
requires that section 127(2)–(9) be ‘read with the changes
required by the context’.
In conclusion: the Supreme Court of Appeal held that notice
under section 127(2) and (5) had been duly given to the
consumer, and that Edwards could blame only himself for not
providing a proper address for service of documents. The appeal
was dismissed.
Cachalia JA considered whether section 127 of the NCA
applied in the present circumstances. The purpose of section
127 is to place a consumer in a position to withdraw the
termination notice and resume possession, subject to his or her
not being in default at the time. In this instance, Wesbank had
already cancelled the agreement and Edwards was in arrears
when he received the section 127(2) notice (para [47]). Conse-
quently, no purpose was served by sending the notice, and
clearly, section 127(2) did not apply. Even if section 127(2) were
to apply, Edwards was still required to rebut the inference of
delivery and then prove that his conduct had been reasonable
(para [44]), which he had failed to do.
Cachalia JA then turned to consider section 127(5) of the NCA.
The purpose of section 127(5), read with section 131, is to ensure
that a credit provider accounts appropriately to the consumer
after the sale of the goods. Even if Edwards did not receive this
second notice by post, the minority judgment remarked that as it
was attached to the summons, Edwards had ample time to
pursue available avenues like approaching the National Con-
sumer Tribunal to seek relief under section 128 of the NCA.
However, it appears that Edwards knew there was no merit in
pursuing such a route and used the defence that he had never
received the section 127(5) notice as a delaying tactic to avoid
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paying the shortfall that arose after the vehicle had been sold and
for which he was contractually liable.
Payment by a third party to discharge debt: Payment made through a
fraudulent scheme
In Absa Bank Ltd v Moore 2017 (1) SA 255 (CC) it was found
that payment made by a third party to discharge the debt of a
consumer acting in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme will still be
effective payment to discharge the debt. The credit provider
attempted to appeal this decision before the Constitutional Court,
but the appeal was dismissed.
The facts were that two fraudsters (Busson and Kabini) devised
a scheme by which they managed to defraud many distressed
homeowners, while also causing financial losses for some South
African banks. One of the fraudsters, Kabini, signed a deed of
sale for the purchase of immovable property from a distressed
homeowner, but on the understanding that the homeowner also
sign a second deed of sale in terms of which Kabini immediately
resold the property to the homeowner. The original owners would
then get a cash amount paid to them, the debt with the bank
would be settled, and in return, the original homeowner would
have to pay a reduced monthly instalment to the fraudsters.
However, the resale to the original owner never took place,
although the original owners continued to reside on the property
which they believed had been sold back to them. There was no
evidence regarding the nature of the deeds process involved in
the retransfer to the Moores. Kabini, now being the actual new
owner of the immovable property, approached a bank, some-
times the same bank with which the original owners had bonded
their property, and took out a new mortgage agreement in order
to settle the outstanding debt of the original owners under their
mortgage agreements. Kabini, however, also requested addi-
tional funds and as soon as he received them, disappeared.
Kabini had no intention of servicing the debt and eventually the
banks had to sell the property in execution and evict the original
owner.
The Moores fell victim to this scheme. The High Court set aside
the invalid sale agreements between Kabini and the Moores as
fraudulent and without force. The title to the immovable property
was also restored to the Moores. The Supreme Court agreed with
the court a quo and also held that as the fraudster had no valid
title to the immovable property, the subsequent mortgage bond
registered by Kabini was also invalid.
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The bank accepted all of the above findings, but their submis-
sion related to the cancelled bonds previously registered in
favour of Absa. Absa requested that the bonds be reinstated as
per the High Court order. It contended, firstly, that the bonds had
to be reinstated as the cancellation was linked to a fraudulent
scheme and was, therefore, contra bonos mores. This depends
on whether or not the cancellation was ‘vitiated’ by the fraudulent
scheme. The Constitutional Court held that the fact that Kabini
was a ‘crook’ did not mean that the ‘discharge was ineffectual’
(para [32]). The court remarked that South African law is ‘extraor-
dinarily generous’ in prescribing how payment to discharge debt
can take place (para [33]). The debtor does not need to know the
identity of the person making payment, and even payment into
the account of a fraudster will be effective in transferring owner-
ship of money (para [34]).
In summary: ‘[P]ayment is a bilateral act requiring the coopera-
tion of the payer and the payee – but not the debtor’ (the Moores
in this case) (para [36]). The practical effect was that payment by
Absa under Kabini’s mortgage agreement discharged the Moores’
debt with Absa. The fraud perpetrated by Busson and Kabini can
only invalidate the contracts between the Moores and the fraud-
sters. However, the fraud cannot undo the cancellation of the
Moores’ bonds. Because the principal obligation had been
validly cancelled, the accessory obligation in the form of the
mortgage bond had also been discharged (para [40]).
Absa contended, in the alternative, that the Moores had been
enriched at its expense. Consequently, enrichment law must be
developed to provide a remedy for Absa, depending on whether
theAbsa debt had been discharged with the proceeds of the loan
which Absa extended to Kabini (para [24]). The two questions to
be asked are: were the Moores enriched; and was this at the
expense of Absa? (para [25]). The court answered both ques-
tions in the negative. The cost to the Moores was the new debt
owed to the fraudsters. However, as the contract was tainted by
wrongdoing, the fraudsters would be unable to sue the Moores
(para [47]). Currently, the legal precedent stands that the trustees/
curators of the insolvent estates of Kabini and Busson would be
able to reclaim the benefit received from the Moores, irrespective
of the defence of in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.
However, Absa would still be unable to prove that it had been
impoverished. In effect, what the bank lost when the Moores
stopped being its debtors, Absa replaced with the claim against
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Kabini. This was strengthened by the fact that Absa decided not
to cancel the agreement with Kabini and proceeded to obtain
default judgment against him.
In conclusion: the Constitutional Court could find no reason, in
the patchwork of evidenceAbsa provided, for the development of
enrichment law (para [56]). It remarked in closing that nothing
before it showed an injustice against Absa, which had the
institutional resources to protect itself against fraudsters such as
Kabini. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Debt rearrangement: Amendment of a contractually agreed interest rate
The question before the court in Nedbank Ltd v Jones 2017 (2)
SA 473 (WCC) was whether the interest rate in a debt-rearrange-
ment order may be amended. The court issued a declaratory
order prohibiting a magistrate’s court from amending a contractu-
ally agreed interest rate. A provision in a debt rearrangement
order allowing for amendment was held to be invalid.
The Joneses (the first and second respondents) engaged the
services of a debt counsellor as they were unable to pay their
debts. The debt counsellor determined that the Joneses were
over-indebted and proceeded to apply for a debt restructuring
order in terms of section 86(7)(c) of the NCA. Nedbank had
concluded various credit agreements with the Joneses, and the
debt restructuring would include certain of these agreements.
The original details of the home loan agreement to be restruc-
tured were: a monthly repayment of R10 491 over 336 months
and an initial variable interest rate of 10,9 per cent per annum
(para [5]). The debt counsellor recommended that the interest
rate be fixed at 10,4 per cent and the repayment period left open,
with the instalment reducing to R4 007,06. The order had the
result that the amended instalment was not even sufficient to
service the interest on the loan, and that the debt would not be
paid off in 336 months. Nevertheless, the magistrate proceeded
to grant the order in terms of section 87(1) of the NCA, based on
the recommendation of the debt counsellor in terms of section
86(7)(e)(ii). This order resulted in Nedbank launching an applica-
tion for declaratory relief to the High Court.
Magistrates’ courts are creatures of statute. This means that
they can only exercise jurisdiction conferred on them by legisla-
tion. This court can only issue orders if it is expressly authorised
to do so. Therefore, where the court exceeds such jurisdiction,
the resulting order is null and void (para [16]). In case of an order
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for debt rearrangement, the magistrate’s court must incorporate
the recommendations of the debt counsellor in its order. How-
ever, the debt counsellor’s recommendation must, in the first
instance, meet the requirements of section 86(7)(c)(ii) of the
NCA. This section requires that the debt be restructured in such a
way that it is possible for the consumer to meet its obligations
owed to the credit provider (para [15]). The court relied on the
decision in Nedbank Ltd v Norris 2016 (3) SA 568 (ECP) (paras
[42]-[44] of that case). In Norris, the court held that even though
the interest rate was fixed at 0 per cent, the fixed rate suggested
in that order would also ‘render the debt incapable of ever being
settled’ (para [18]). The court remarked that it was unfortunate
that orders of this nature were far too common in the lower courts
(para [25]).
Further, as the application was brought five years after the
magistrate’s court order, the High Court had to determine whether
review or declaratory relief would be the appropriate remedy in
this instance. It is important for legal certainty to grant declaratory
relief. Declaratory relief is in the interests of all parties subject to
the NCAand of those who must interpret it (para [32]). The court’s
power to issue a declaratory order is contained in section
21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. Interpreting
previous case law, Gamble J held that it is appropriate to grant a
declaratory order where there is a ‘serial misinterpretation’ of a
position clearly defined by a statute, as is the case with the
misinterpretation of sections 86 and 87 of the NCA by debt
counsellors and magistrates (para [30]). The court relied on the
decisions in Ex parte Nell 1963 (1) SA 754 (A) 760A-C and
Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty)
Ltd 2005 (6) SA 205 (SCA) (para [18] of that case). Subsequently,
the order held that as a magistrate’s court does not have
jurisdiction to amend a contractually agreed interest rate, an
order which amends the interest rate under a credit agreement is
null and void, and a rearrangement order which does not meet
the purpose in section 86(7)(c) of the NCA would be ultra vires
the NCA (para [35]).
The question remains how to ‘unscramble this egg’ in practical
terms in cases where this declaratory relief is obtained some time
after the debtors have started repaying a lower instalment under
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a technically null and void magistrate’s court order. This goes to
the nature of a declaratory order as opposed to the review of the
order.
Retrospective effect of section 126B(1)(b): Prescription of debt
In Kaknis v Absa Bank Ltd 2017 (4) SA 17 (SCA), the majority
decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal correctly held that
section 126B(1)(b) does not apply retrospectively to debt already
prescribed before this section came into operation on 13 March
2015. Shongwe JA and Willis JA did not agree with the majority
decision, and both wrote the separate dissenting judgments,
briefly discussed below.
The provision was inserted in the NCA by the National Credit
Amendment Act 19 of 2014 (the National Credit Amendment Act),
and reads as follows:
(b) No person may continue the collection of, or re-activate a debt
under a credit agreement to which this Act applies –
(i) which debt has been extinguished by prescription under the
Prescription Act, 1969 (Act 68 of 1969); and
(ii) where the consumer raises the defence of prescription, or
would reasonably have raised the defence of prescription
had the consumer been aware of such a defence, in response
to a demand, whether as part of legal proceedings or
otherwise.
In Kaknis the two respondents, Absa Bank Ltd (Absa) and MAN
Financial Services SA (Pty) Ltd (MFS), entered into instalment
sale agreements with Kaknis, the appellant. Due to financial
difficulty, the appellant failed to make payments under the
instalment agreements. He successfully obtained a debt re-
arrangement order and managed to make the adjusted payments
to Absa and MFS, but only until 8 July 2011. Then, the claim
against the appellant prescribed under the Prescription Act 68 of
1969 on 8 July 2014, as more than three years had elapsed since
the last payment to reduce his indebtedness had been made
(para [4]). Nevertheless, despite this clear prescription, the
appellant signed an acknowledgement of debt with Absa and
MFS, which stipulated that he agreed to pay the outstanding
amounts and surrender the assets to the respondents. Resulting
from the appellant’s failure to comply with the terms of the
acknowledgement of debt, Absa and MFS brought separate
applications for summary judgment against him.
The appellant contended that had he known that the debt had
already prescribed, he would not have entered into the acknow-
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ledgement of debt at that time. He averred that the provisions of
section 126B(1)(b) of the Prescription Act precluded Absa and
MFS from collecting on a previously prescribed debt which was
revived when the parties concluded the acknowledgement of
debt. The court a quo granted the summary judgments against
the appellant. The court held that the legislature would have
expressly stated it if the section was intended to apply retrospec-
tively. An appeal against this decision was launched to the
Supreme Court of Appeal.
Van der Merwe JA delivered the majority judgment (Mathopo
JA and Nicolls AJA concurring). According to this decision, the
principle is ‘time-honoured but also one of global application’ that
the provisions of a statute do not apply retrospectively (para
[37]). The court referred to judgments where this principle was
approved (see Unitrans Passenger (Pty) Ltd t/a Greyhound
Coach Lines v Chairman, National Transport 1999 (4) SA 1 (SCA)
para [12]; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus
2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA) para [32]; National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Basson 2002 (1) SA 419 (SCA) para [11]; S v
Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para [65]; and Veldman v Director
of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2007 (3) SA
210 (CC) para [26]). There can be no doubt that the legislature
must know the law and so be aware that if section 126B(1)(b)
were allowed to apply retrospectively, this would nullify existing
credit agreements, taking away existing rights from consumers
and credit providers; indeed causing a predicament (para [39]).
The majority disagreed, where Shongwe JA held that the
protection of consumers under this provision includes that the
provision should apply retrospectively and that this in itself is
sufficient reason for the section to apply retrospectively. The
majority held that even though it is the primary objective of the
NCA to protect consumers, this protection must also be balanced
against the rights of credit providers. (para [38]).
Van der Merwe JA also dismissed the argument that the
transitional provisions under Schedule 3 to the NCA, as it
currently reads, allows for the retrospective application of section
126B(1)(b). The majority correctly held that the provisions of
Schedule 3 apply exclusively to agreements which existed before
the NCA came into operation, and have no effect on credit
agreements entered into under the NCA (para [39]). The appeal
was dismissed with costs. What follows is a short discussion of
the dissenting judgments.
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Shongwe JA acknowledged that there is a presumption that
legislation does not apply retrospectively, unless that legislation
provides for such application either expressly or by implication
(para [13]). Nevertheless, he contended that a presumption only
aids in the interpretation of legislation, and that the intention of the
legislature in drafting that statute must be preferred (para [15]).
The presumption will only operate where there is no clear
contrary intention. He continued to state that the intention of the
legislature in enacting section 126B(1)(b) was precisely to pro-
tect naive and vulnerable consumers (para [18]). The objective of
protecting these types of consumer and balancing the rights of
consumers and credit providers is achieved by not allowing a
credit provider to benefit under credit agreements where the debt
has prescribed (para [18]). Shongwe JA further held that if the
provisions of section 126B(1)(b) were not applied retrospectively,
this ‘would be at odds’ with the approach of the Constitutional
Court, which has emphasised the protection of consumers (para
[23]). This trend to protect consumers had already been estab-
lished in previous case law (see Sebola v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd (above); Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd
(above); and Nkata v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 257 (CC)).
Disallowing the retrospective effect of the section would also
result in a distinction being made between the protection to
consumers who entered into credit agreements before and after
the Amendment Act came into operation.
Willis JA decided to prepare additional remarks in support of
Shongwe JA’s judgment. He contended that the principle against
the retrospective operation of law is not absolute (para [29]). He
compared the ‘burden of debt’ to a situation where a higher
penalty would not apply in circumstances in which the additional
burden did not exist when the crime was committed. He then
merely concluded that the court had to decide in favour of the
consumer, relying on certain decisions of the Constitutional
Court, but provided no detailed discussion of the principles
enunciated in these judgments (para [31]).
A subsequent debt compromise agreement also requires compliance with the
NCA
In Man Financial Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Phaphoakane Trans-
port & another 2017 (5) SA 526 (GJ), the second respondent had
previously bound himself as surety and co-principal debtor on
behalf of the first respondent debtor (Phaphoakane Transport) to
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secure debt due to the applicant (Man Financial Services SA (Pty)
Ltd). Man Financial Services and Phaphoakane Transport origi-
nally entered into rental agreements in respect of several trucks.
These agreements did not fall under the NCA and for that reason,
the ancillary surety agreement, too, fell outside of the scope of the
NCA. The rental agreements, were excluded from the application of
the NCAas Phaphoakane Transport was a juristic person as defined
in section 4(1)(a)(i) of the NCA, and the transaction was also a large
agreement as defined in section 9(4), and was therefore also
excluded as allowed in section 4(1)(b) of the NCA (para [4]).
Phaphoakane Transport breached certain provisions of the
rental agreements, resulting in Man Financial Services cancelling
the agreements. Phaphoakane Transport also returned the trucks
which formed the subject matter of the agreements to Man
Financial Services. Subsequent negotiations resulted in the par-
ties concluding a further agreement to facilitate the full and final
settlement of the outstanding debt owed by Phaphoakane Trans-
port. The settlement agreement provided that Phaphoakane
Transport and the second respondent were jointly and severally
liable for debt amounting to R5 million plus additional fees and
interest. The primary subject of disagreement was whether the
settlement agreement was subject to the NCA. Although the
second respondent was a natural person, because the NCA did
not apply to the original main credit agreement, it equally did not
apply to the surety agreement. If the NCA now applied to the new
agreement, Man Financial Services would first have to deliver a
default notice under section 129(1)(a) of the NCA, before it could
start with debt enforcement against the respondents (para [7]).
The court held that the new settlement agreement ended the
prior relationship between the parties. The settlement agreement
was, therefore, ‘a transaction in the legal sense’ in its own right
(para [9]). A subsequent settlement agreement terminated the
parties’ original rights and obligations, unless it was stated to the
contrary in the parties’ compromise (which was not the case in
the present matter). The court correctly followed the decision in
Gollach & Gomperts (1967) (Pty) Ltd v Universal Mills & Produce
Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 914 (A) at 921. As this settlement
agreement would result in the full and final settlement of the
issues between the parties, it constituted a new agreement.
Consequently, the second respondent, a natural person, was no
longer merely a surety, but a co-debtor and the provisions of the
NCA had to apply to the settlement agreement.
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The court distinguished the facts in this case from those in
Ribeiro v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2011 (1) SA 575
(SCA). In Ribeiro the subsequent agreement amounted to an
agreement guaranteeing the principal debtor’s obligations under
the initial loan agreements. This was the intention of the parties
when they entered into the subsequent agreement. This was
clear from the contract relating to the next agreement, which
provided that the new agreement ‘does not constitute a novation
of the initial loan agreements’. The court also held that the agreed
and accepted obligations of the sureties originated in the initial
loan agreements (para [13]). There was no reservation of the
terms of the original agreement in the present matter and for this
reason the court held that the facts were distinguishable from the
facts in Ribeiro (para [13]).
The court concluded that the provisions of the NCA applied to
the new credit agreement. Man Financial Services had, therefore,
to comply with the provisions of section 129 of the NCA and
deliver the default notice to the respondents before instituting an
action against them (para [15]). The first respondent was already
in liquidation when the application was brought. The court
ordered that the second respondent could oppose the enforce-
ment as the plaintiff had failed to comply with section 129 of the
NCA. It is unfortunate that the court was not required to provide a
discussion of the dual application of the NCA exemptions where
one debtor is a natural person and the other a juristic person
under a single credit agreement.
PARTNERSHIP
LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW
There was no legislation or case law affecting this branch of
law during the period under review.
SERVICE
LEGISLATION
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
AUDITORS
A number of board notices were published under the Auditing
Professions Act 26 of 2005. These include: Amendments to the
917MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACTS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 24 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/24−Miscellaneous−Contracts
Code of Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors Respond-
ing to Non-compliance with Laws and Regulations (BN 188
GG 40480 of 9 December 2016); the Mandatory Audit Firm
Rotation in terms of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 for
comment (BN 170 GG 40392 of 1 November 2016 and BN 186
GG 40475 of 6 December 2016); the Rule on Mandatory Audit
Firm Rotation for Auditors of all Public Interest Entities (BN 100
GG 40888 of 5 June 2017); the inspection fees payable to IRBA
(BN 101 GG 40898 of 9 June 2017); theAmendments to the Code
of Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors relating to Cus-
tody of a Client’s Assets (BN 115 GG 40930 of 23 June 2017); the
Registration of Registered Auditors and Candidate Auditors:
Processes and Documents Required (BN 146 GG 41064 of
25 August 2017); and proposed amendments to the Code of
Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors: New Guidance for
Professional Scepticism and Professional Judgment (BN 107
GG 40898 of 9 June 2017).
ATTORNEYS
The Code of Conduct for legal practitioners, candidate legal
practitioners, and juristic entities in terms of the Legal Practice
Act 28 of 2014 was published (GN 81 GG 40610 of 10 February
2017).
Further, the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 was promulgated in
2017 (General Notice 480 GG 40937 of 23 June 2017). Two Bills
to amend this Act were also published: the Legal Practice
Amendment Bill B11A of 2017; and the Legal Practice Amend-
ment Bill B11B of 2017.
CASE LAW
ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES
Removal of an advocate who is not a fit and proper person to practise from
the roll
In General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Jiba and others
[2016] 4 All SA 443 (GP); 2017 (1) SACR 47; 2017 (2) SA 122, one
aspect the court had to decide on was whether the grounds in
question were sufficient to justify striking three members of the
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) – Jiba, Mrwebi and Mzin-
yathi – from the roll of advocates using the three-stage inquiry to
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determining whether the person is no longer a ‘fit and proper
person’. This section only deals with the meaning of a ‘fit and
proper person’ with regard to an application to remove an
advocate from the roll of practising advocates.
The gist of the complaints brought by the General Council of
the Bar of South Africa (GCB) related to the conduct of the
members in dealing with three matters involving the then National
Director of Public Prosecutions, and a matter relating to former
president Jacob Zuma.
Section 7(1)(d) of the Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964
empowers a court to remove an advocate from the roll when he or
she is no longer fit and proper to practise. The test for removal is
three-pronged and includes: whether the impugned conduct of
the advocate has been established; whether the specific indi-
vidual is still fit and proper to practise, considering the nature of
the conduct; and whether, in all the circumstances, the person
should be removed from the roll. The primary consideration is to
protect the public (para [9]). The removal or suspension of a
member of the NPA in terms of section 12 of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (the NPAAct) does not also
result in automatic removal from the roll of advocates, as the
Admission of Advocates Act follows a different process (para
[22]). However, an advocate who has been removed from the roll
no longer satisfies the requirement under section 9 of the NPAAct
that he or she must be able to practise in all courts in the Republic
(paras [20]–[23]).
Legodi J included a detailed discussion of the poor conduct of,
in particular, Jiba, in handling certain matters (including the
prosecution of Richard Mdluli) while employed at the NPA. The
court found that both Jiba and Mrwebi were no longer fit and
proper persons to remain on the roll of advocates (paras [138]
[168] and [176.2.1] as regards Jiba, and para [168] regarding
the removal of Mrwebi). The reasons for the Jiba finding included:
failure to comply with High Court Rule 53 in respect of timely filing
of records regarding the decision to withdraw charges against
Mdluli, while the reasons for the delay were also unreasonable
and indicative of bad faith (paras [110] [114.2.7]); supplying an
incomplete record without providing a proper explanation for its
being incomplete (paras [115] [118]); disobeying a directive from
Ledwaba DJP (para [119]); failure to heed the advice of counsel
briefed to defend her in her capacity as Acting National Director
of Public Prosecutions, and continuing to file affidavits contrary to
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counsel’s advice (para [134.5]); that she, with determination and
against legal advice to the contrary, did everything in her power
to ensure that charges against Mdluli were permanently with-
drawn, regardless of the prima facie evidence against him on
corruption and fraud charges (see paras [135]–[135.9.5]); and
deliberately attempting to mislead the review court by failing to
disclose the fact that the prosecutor, Breytenbach, in the Mdluli
case had sent her a memo asking her to review her decision to
discontinue the Mdluli prosecution, deposing rather that this
matter was never brought to her attention by a person she
‘considered relevant or was obliged to consider relevant’ (para
[136]). Legodi J pointed out that Breytenbach should have been
considered a relevant person as she was the person best placed
to provide Jiba with relevant information concerning the prima
facie evidence against Mdluli (para [136.2.2]).
In relation to Mrwebi, the court’s reasons for finding him no
longer to be a fit and proper person included: lying about a
consultative document he prepared regarding the Mdluli prosecu-
tion (paras [141]–[141.4]); deliberately failing to disclose a memo-
randum and consultative note, stipulating the reasons for
discontinuing prosecution (paras [142]–[143.4.1]); discontinuing
the prosecution of Mdluli, despite a contrary understanding with
Mzinyathi, the third respondent (paras [143]–[146]); presentation
of unsatisfactory evidence during his disciplinary hearing which
rendered him an unreliable and dishonest witness; that he and
Jiba had ignored proper legal advice that a decision to discon-
tinue the prosecution of Mdluli would not stand in court, which
clearly showed that Mrwebi was ‘an untruthful and dishonest
person’ (para [152.3.1]); the refusal to reinstate the charges
against Mdluli, despite prima facie evidence, which constituted a
contravention not only of section 24(3) of the NPA Act, but also
of the rule of law and the Constitution (para [159]); and the
contention in an affidavit that he had decided to withdraw the
charges against Mdluli after consulting with Mzinyathi, which was
‘patently, dishonestly given’ (paras [163]–[164.1]). The court
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to remove the
third respondent from the roll (paras [173]–[174]).
Application for admission and enrolment as an attorney: Applicant with
a criminal conviction
In Ex Parte Mdyogolo 2017 (1) SA 432 (ECG), the applicant
brought an application to be admitted as an attorney. In his
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application, he disclosed that he had committed a robbery but
with a political aim. The Cape Law Society only issued a general
endorsement for the application, but did not take part in the
admission proceedings in court.
The first issue the court considered was whether the applicant
was a ‘fit and proper person’ to be admitted as an attorney under
section 15(1) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. The second issue
related to the approach required from a law society in an
application of this nature.
Concerning the first issue, Plasket J (Beshe J concurring) held
that the applicant was not a ‘fit and proper person’. The applicant
was a member of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA),
the military wing of the PanAfricanist Congress (PAC) (para [12]).
APLA committed robberies in order to raise funds for the PAC.
The applicant was involved in an armed robbery at the BP
Garage in Fort Beaufort on 19 June 1994, ie after ‘liberation’ had
already taken place. Shortly after the robbery, the applicant was
arrested and released on bail. He was rearrested on the same
charge in 1997, and after admitting guilt, was sentenced to a
ten-year prison term. While incarcerated, the applicant applied to
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for amnesty for
his crime. However, as the date of his application (19 June 1997)
was after the TRC’s cut-off date for qualifying actions, he would in
any event not have received amnesty (para [27]). No mention is
made of whether amnesty was refused.
The court had two versions of the events before it, one based
on the applicant’s TRC application; and the other put forward in
the applicant’s affidavit in support of his admission application.
The set of facts included in the TRC application implied that he
was ‘made drunk and taken to Fort Beaufort’ and used as part of
‘an underground operation’ by the South African Police to dis-
credit APLA members (paras [17] [18]). No mention of this
operation was made in the affidavit to the admission application.
In this affidavit, the applicant mentioned that he had committed
the robbery under orders from the ‘High Command of APLA’ (para
[13]). The court concluded that the applicant’s claim ‘that he
committed the robbery in the furtherance of the PAC’s struggle’
was false, and the application lay to be decided on the lie told by
the applicant (para [28]).
A court is required to measure the conduct of an applicant
against the conduct expected of an attorney, taking into consid-
eration that an attorney is required to act with ‘honesty and
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integrity’ (para [29]). In assessing the conduct, a holistic assess-
ment is undertaken, meaning that a criminal conviction alone
should not determine whether or not an applicant can be
admitted (para [31]). However, in most instances conviction of a
crime is an indication that the person should not be admitted
(para [31]). The pressing question here was whether 22 years
after the robbery, the applicant was now a fit and proper person
to be admitted to this honourable profession. The court held that
the applicant persisted in his lie regarding the occurrence of
events and that this showed ‘lack of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness’ – key qualities required of an attorney (para 34]).
Consequently, the court correctly held that the applicant was not
a ‘fit and proper person’, and dismissed the application.
The court also reprimanded the Cape Law Society for not
applying due consideration to the application when it should
have been clear from the papers alone that the crime committed
was after the iconic date of 27 April 1994 (para [38]). From a
reading of the facts, it does appear that the Law Society provided
only a ‘generic’ type of response in support of the admission
application.
Contingency fee agreements
Two cases in the reporting period dealt with aspects of the
Contingency FeesAct 66 of 1997. In Mfengwana v RoadAccident
Fund 2017 (5) SA 445 (ECG) the court had to determine whether
a contingency fee agreement resulting in an attorney receiving 25
per cent of a plaintiff’s award in a motor vehicle accident claim
was in contravention of the Contingency Fees Act. If the agree-
ment was in contravention of the provisions of the Act, it had to be
determined whether it was not possible to sever the invalid
clauses in the agreement. A further consequence of contraven-
tion would be that the attorney would be guilty of misconduct in
the form of overreaching. However, the court did not comment on
the misconduct and sent a copy of the judgment to the relevant
law society for further action.
Mfengwana and the Road Accident Fund (RAF) agreed on a
settlement. The court was asked to make the settlement an order
of the court. After learning that Mfengwana had signed a contin-
gency fee agreement with his attorney of record, Rubushe, the
court requested to see the agreement and also that the affidavits
in terms of section 4(1) and (2) of the Contingency Fees Act be
filed with the court (para [2]). After perusing the contingency fee
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agreement, Plasket J requested an additional affidavit from
Rubushe, as the contingency fee agreement was in conflict with
critical provisions of the Contingency Fees Act.
The court quoted the dictum by Southwood AJA in Price
Waterhouse Coopers Inc & others v National Potato Co-operative
Ltd 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) para [41], which sets out the proper
context to the Act:
The Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (which came into operation on
23 April 1999) provides for two forms of contingency fee agreements
which attorneys and advocates may enter into with their clients. The
first is a no win, no fees agreement (s 2(1)(a)) and the second is an
agreement regarding which the legal practitioner is entitled to fees
higher than the normal fee if the client is successful (s 2(1)(b)). The
second type of agreement is subject to limitations. Higher fees may
not exceed the normal fees of the legal practitioner by more than
100% and in the case of claims sounding in money this fee may not
exceed 25% of the total amount awarded or any amount obtained by
the client in consequence of the proceedings, excluding costs
(s 2(2)). The Act has detailed requirements for the agreement (s 3),
the procedure to be followed when a matter is settled (s 4) and gives
the client a right of review (s 5). The professional controlling bodies
may make rules which they deem necessary to give effect to the Act
(s 6), and the Minister of Justice may make regulations for implement-
ing and monitoring the provisions of the Act (s 7). The clear intention is
that contingency fees be carefully controlled. The Act was enacted to
legitimise contingency fee agreements between legal practitioners
and their clients which would otherwise be prohibited by the common
law. Any contingency fee agreement between such parties which is
not covered by the Act is therefore illegal. What is of significance,
however, is that by permitting no win, no fees agreements the
Legislature has made speculative litigation possible and by permitting
increased fee agreements the Legislature has made it possible for
legal practitioners to receive part of the proceeds of the action.
The contingency fee agreement between Mfengwana and
Rubushe was supposed to fall under the category intended in
section 2(2) mentioned above. Clauses 5 and 6 of the contin-
gency fee agreement dealt with Rubushe’s fee, but as clause 6
merely stated that the fee was calculated according to clause 5,
only clause 5 is quoted below. Clause 5 reads:
TheAttorneys hereby warrants that the normal fees on an attorney and
own client basis perform work in connection with the aforementioned
proceedings are calculated on the following basis: 25% of the total of
damages awarded, (Set out hourly, daily, and or applicable rates)
[sic].
Clause 5 and 6 of the contingency fee agreement conflicted
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with section 2(2) of the Act (para [20]). The ‘25% of the total
amount awarded’ is a reference to a maximum amount, and the
fee charged may be higher than the normal fee, subject to two
limitations. The first limitation is that the fee may not be more than
twice the normal fee of the attorney, which received no mention in
this contingency fee agreement. The second limitation is that
after the first limitation has been applied, the fees may not exceed
25 per cent of damages awarded (para [20]). The court referred
to the quality of the attorney work as leaving much to be desired
(paras [13]-[15]). With this in mind, the court was of the opinion
that a ‘fee’ of 25 percent (R226 222.30 of the R904 889.17
awarded) was ‘grossly disproportionate and amounts to over-
reaching on an outrageous scale’ (para [19]).
Realising that the contingency fee agreement was contrary to
the Act, Rubushe offered to amend the agreement ‘unilaterally
and retrospectively’ by now suggesting an amended calculation
method in his accompanying affidavit. The court was not
impressed by this ‘transparently disingenuous’ affidavit (para
[23]). It held that clauses 5 and 6, being essential terms of the
contingency fee agreement, were in conflict with the Act (para
[24]). As the clauses ‘go to the principal purpose’ of the agree-
ment, they could not be severed, making the entire agreement
invalid (para [25]). Thus, the common law applied, and Rubushe
could claim a reasonable fee for the work he performed. Put
differently: he was only entitled to the fees as taxed or assessed,
but on an attorney and own client scale (para [26]). However, it
must be emphasised that the common law prohibits contingency
fee agreements; consequently, the common law referred to
above relates to the law applicable to the taxation of attorneys’
fees and is not a reference to contingency fee agreements under
the common law.
Even though it has no legal relevance, the special precautions
included as part of the order by Plasket J, and aimed at
protecting the interests of Mfengwana, are noteworthy; for
example, that the Registrar of the court should contact Mfeng-
wana and explain the implications of this judgment to him.
The second reported judgment dealing with contingency fee
agreements, Nash & another v Mostert & others 2017 (4) SA 80
(GP), dealt whether it is possible to conclude a contingency fee
agreement in respect of non-litigious matters on the basis of the
common law. The fees in dispute were earned by one Mostert,
appointed by the Financial Services Board in terms of section 5 of
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the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001, to
act as curator of the Sable Industries Fund. The High Court gave
effect to the appointment of the curator and set out the scope of
his appointment. As regards the curator’s remuneration, he would
be entitled to periodic payment ‘in accordance with the norms of
the attorneys’ profession’ [para [28]). This means that Mostert
was subject to the law governing contingency fee agreements
applicable to attorneys. The discussion under this heading is
limited to the validity of the contingency fee agreement (referred
to in the judgment as the ‘remuneration agreement’).
Tuchten J referred to Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc & others v
National Potato Co-operative Ltd (above), but added South
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development (SAAPIL) 2013 (2) SA
583 (GSJ) and Ronald Bobroff & Partners Inc v De La Guerre
(Bobroff) 2014 (3) SA 134 (CC). These authorities confirmed that
any common-law agreement between a legal practitioner and its
client which provides that the practitioner’s remuneration will
come from the amount recovered on behalf of the client, out of the
proceeds of litigation, is contrary to ‘public policy, unenforceable
and unlawful’ (para [69]). Tuchten J did not agree that the above
cases are authority that contingency fee agreements are allowed
under the common law. He went further and stated that the courts
are yet to decide on this matter (para [71]). The purpose behind
prohibiting contingency fee agreements – particularly when legal
practitioners are involved – is to avoid the potential for a conflict
of interest between the practitioner’s duty towards his or her client
and the personal interest of the legal practitioner arising from the
speculative action he or she undertakes on behalf of the client
(para [76]). Tuchten J is correct that the common theme running
through judgments and commentary on contingency fee agree-
ments of this nature is that with such an agreement ‘tends to
subvert the interests of justice’ (para [79]). In determining whether
these types of agreement are against public policy, it does not
matter whether an agreement actually subverts the interests of
justice, but rather whether it has the tendency to subvert the
interests of justice (para [79]). With this in mind, the court
correctly held that there was no justification for allowing a legal
practitioner to conclude a contingency fee agreement in relation
to non-litigious matters under the common law (para [80]).
Consequently, any contingency fee agreement can only exist
where it complies with the provisions of the Contingency Fees
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Act. The remuneration agreement concluded between the FSB
and Mostert did not comply and was therefore contrary to public
policy and the remuneration agreement was invalid (para [93]).
SURETYSHIP
LEGISLATION
There was no legislation affecting this branch of the law during
the period under review.
CASE LAW
The release of the surety upon prejudice to the surety
In Absa Bank Ltd v Expectra 423 (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 81 (WCC),
the main contention by the defendants was that the delay by the
plaintiff in instituting proceedings against the principal debtor
resulted in prejudice to the sureties, warranting their release from
their respective suretyships.
The three defendants, a limited liability company, Expectra 423
(Pty) Ltd, Mr Pieter le Roux (Le Roux), and Ms Jolene le Roux in
their capacity as trustees for the time being of the Le Roux Family
Trust, and Ms Le Roux in her personal capacity, bound them-
selves as sureties and co-principal debtors in favour of West
Dunes Properties 176 (Pty) Ltd (West Dunes). The sureties bound
themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors in favour of West
Dunes for a loan by the plaintiff to West Dunes. The principal
amount was R6,5 million. West Dunes failed to make fixed
instalments, resulting in the plaintiff being owed R7,2 million by
May 2015. The Le Roux Family Trust sold its shares in and claims
against West Dunes to Kleinevallei Kinder Trust. The intention was
that the purchase price received for the shares would settle the
indebtedness to the plaintiff, but as later emerged, this amount
was insufficient. Regarding the sale of shares agreement, the
Kleinevallei Kinder Trust undertook to take over the liability West
Dunes owed to the plaintiff, and also procure cancellation of the
mortgage bond held by the plaintiff. This notwithstanding, the
Kleinevallei Kinder Trust neither honoured this obligation to the
plaintiff, nor attempted to cancel the mortgage bond held by West
Dunes. An application to liquidate West Dunes was brought, and
the plaintiff, by having been cited in the liquidation application,
received notice of West Dunes’ financial difficulties. Subse-
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quently, it was contended that the plaintiff had actual knowledge
of West Dunes’ financial difficulties.
The court had to decide whether the plaintiff’s delay in taking
steps against West Dunes to foreclose on the mortgage bond
resulted in prejudice to the sureties. This prejudice would make it
possible for the sureties to be released from the surety agree-
ments. The court concluded that even if the defendants had
suffered prejudice, that prejudice would only apply to release the
sureties where it was ‘the result of a breach of some or other legal
duty or obligation owed by the creditor’ to the defendants (para
[42]). The court relied on the principles enunciated in Absa Bank
Ltd v Davidson 2000 (1) SA 1117 (SCA) and Estate Liebenberg v
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1927 AD 502 at 507 to
determine the nature of the legal duty required. The defendants
did not rely on a breach of any terms in the loan agreements.
However, they contended that the plaintiff’s neglecting to take
steps while aware of West Dunes’ financial predicament, if proven
at trial, would be so unreasonable that it could not be seen to fall
within the terms of the loan agreement (para [43]). The court
disagreed. This was seen as an attempt by the defendants to
create an exception to the general rule that our law does not
recognise an unlimited ‘prejudice principle’; and the defendants
neglected to rely on any of the provisions of the loan agreement
or suretyship agreements in their attempt to prove that the
creditor’s conduct was, in fact, unreasonable (para [44]).
The court therefore correctly concluded that the defendants
had failed to establish a bona fide defence which was good in
law, against the summary judgment obtained against them (para
[49]).
Liability of a surety where the principal debtor, a company, is deregistered
In Thomani v Seboka NO & others 2017 (1) SA 51 (GP), the
court had to determine whether a surety could still be sued for
payment of a principal debt previously incurred by a deregis-
tered company.
This was an application for the rescission of judgment and an
order to set aside the sale in execution of immovable property.
The applicants bound themselves as sureties and co-principal
debtors in favour of Abrina 1591 (Pty) Ltd (Abrina). Coinciden-
tally, the same creditor also registered a mortgage bond over the
applicants’ immovable property to secure a personal and sepa-
rate obligation. The creditor now attempted to rely on the wording
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of certain sections in the personal loan agreement to also use the
immovable property as security for obligations under the surety-
ship agreements involving the Abrina debt. This was largely
because it was clear that the obligation against the principal
debtor had prescribed. Clause 4 of the personal home loan
agreement and clause 11 of the suretyship agreement were
relevant. Clause 4 of the personal home loan agreement read:
Continuing covering bond
The bond shall remain in force as continuing covering security for the
capital amount, the interest thereon and the additional amount,
notwithstanding any intermediate settlement, the bond shall be and
remain of full force, virtue and effect as a continuing covering security
and covering bond for each and every sum in which the mortgagor
may now or hereafter become indebted to the bank from any cause
whatsoever to the amount of the capital amount, interest thereon and
the additional amount (emphasis added).
Clause 11 of the suretyship agreement read:
Continuing security
This suretyship shall be a continuing covering security notwithstand-
ing any intermediate settlement of the amount owing and notwithstand-
ing my/our death or legal incapacity until the Bank has received notice
in writing from me/us or my/our executor, trustee or other legal
representative, as the case may be, terminating the same, and until
the amount owing in terms of this suretyship at the date of receipt of
such notice plus interest and costs until date of payment, has been
paid; provided that such notice shall have no force or effect and shall
not terminate this suretyship unless it is accompanied by a copy of a
notice addressed by me/us to the Debtor in terms of which the Debtor
is advised of the termination of this suretyship (emphasis added).
The court needed to determine whether clause 4 of the personal
home loan agreement could be interpreted to include the indebt-
edness as agreed to under the suretyship agreements, more
specifically, clause 11 thereof. The court referred to earlier
decisions on the ancillary nature of a suretyship agreement to the
loan agreement (Barclays National Bank Ltd v Umbogintwini
Land and Investment Co (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) 1985 (4) SA407
(D) 410–11 and Zietsman v Allied Building Society 1989 (3) SA
166 (O) 166C, where ‘enige bedrag wat ingevolge die gemelde
verband betaalbaar mag word’ referred to an amount payable
under the bond, not merely secured by such bond). If the
reference to the exact wording is to be taken, the emphasised
part above in clause 4 relates to the obligatory part of the
mortgage bond, which is the capital and interest, and thereafter
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additional amounts in respect of the mortgage bond. Also, clause
5 of the suretyship agreements specifically limits the obligations
of the sureties to those of Abrina. It reads:
I/We acknowledge and admit that this suretyship is additional to any
security which the Bank currently holds or may hereafter hold in
respect of the obligations of the debtor (Abrina 1591 (Pty) Ltd) and
that this suretyship shall not detract in any way from other security
already furnished by me/us in favour of the Bank, which security shall
remain in force until terminated in writing by the Bank (emphasis
added).
The court correctly concluded that it is trite that the surety’s
liability is accessory to the principal debtor’s debt (para [79]).
Linked to this confirmation of the accessory nature of the surety-
ship, the prescription begins to run against the principal debtor
and the surety simultaneously. Consequently, both claims pre-
scribe at the same time (Jans v Nedcor Bank Ltd 2003 (6) SA 646
(SCA) 471C-G and Kilroe-Daley v Barclays National Bank Ltd
1984 (4) SA 609 (A) 652E). Therefore, if the claim against the
principal debtor has prescribed, so will the claim against the
surety. The court concluded that the registered mortgage bond
linked to the applicant’s personal home loan could not be used as
security for the loan to Abrina (para [105]). Further, the default
judgment was procedurally defective in that the applicants had
been sued prematurely as Abrina had first to be re-registered.
The court also ordered that the sale in execution of the appli-
cants’ immovable property be set aside.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
C J NAGEL*
LEGISLATION
There was no legislation directly affecting this field of the law
during the period under review.
CASE LAW
There were no reported cases on negotiable instruments
during the period under review.
* BA LLB LLD (Pret). Professor of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria.
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PENSION FUNDS LAW
MUTHUNDINNE SIGWADI*
LEGISLATION
There was no significant legislative development pertaining to
the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Pension Funds Act) during
2017. However, it is important to point out the following:
• The Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 16 of 2016
(GG 40563 of 19 January 2017) and Taxation Laws Amend-
ment Act 15 of 2016 (GG 40562 of 19 January 2017) were
promulgated in 2017. These statutes contain certain changes
relevant to the pension fund industry. Section 53 of the Tax
Administration Laws Amendment Act amended section 69 of
the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. It replaces paragraph
(b) in subsection (8). The new paragraph reads as follows:
‘(b) a list of (i) pension funds, pension preservation funds,
provident funds, provident preservation funds and retirement
annuity funds as defined in section 1(1) of the Income Tax
Act’. Section 69 of the Tax Administration Act deals with the
‘secrecy of taxpayer information and general disclosure’.
Section 69(1) provides that ‘a person who is a current or
former SARS official must preserve the secrecy of taxpayer
information and may not disclose taxpayer information to a
person who is not a SARS official’. Section 69(8) contains an
exception to this provision which allows the Commissioner to
publish certain information, such as the list of funds stated
above in the new paragraph 69(8)(b). See the chapter ‘Law of
Taxation’ for a discussion of other developments in tax law.
• The Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (FSR Act) was
promulgated in 2017 (GG 41060 of 22 August 2017). This Act
came into operation on 1 April 2018. It establishes the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority to replace the Financial
Services Board (FSB). It further replaces the FSB Appeal
Board with an independent Financial Services Tribunal in
terms of section 219 of the FSR Act. This Tribunal reconsiders
decisions as defined in the Act and performs other functions
* BProc (Venda) LLB (Pret) LLM (Pret) LLM (Harvard). Associate Professor of
Law and Head of the Centre for Business Law (Unisa); Attorney of the High Court
of South Africa.
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as conferred on it by the Act and specific sector laws. A broad
overview of the structure of the FSR Act is provided in the
chapter ‘Financial Institutions’ in 2016 Annual Survey (379–
94).
NOTICES ISSUED BY THE FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD
(FSB) IN 2017
The following notice was issued by the Deputy Registrar of
Financial Services Providers in 2017:
• Board Notice 51 of 2017 (GG 40785 of 13 April 2017) dealing
with the amendment of the determination of recognised
qualifications for financial services providers and compliance
officers under the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Ser-
vices Act 37 of 2002.
The following notice was issued by the Financial Services
Board in 2017:
• Notice 458 of 2017 (GG 40912 of 12 June 2017) dealing with
the levies on financial institutions. It imposes the levies set out
in the Schedule on financial institutions under section 15A(1A)
of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990.
THE NATIONAL TREASURY (REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA)
The National Treasury released documents and media state-
ments relating to the retirement funds industry for public com-
ment and notification. These include:
• Media Statement: The Minister issued the Final Retirement
Funds Default Regulations to Improve Member Outcomes
(25 August 2017), in which he stated:
The final regulations are meant to improve the outcomes for members
of retirement funds by ensuring that they get good value for their
savings and retire comfortably. The regulations require retirement
funds’ trustee boards to offer a default in fund preservation arrange-
ment to members who leave the services of the participating employer
before retirement, and also a default investment portfolio to contribut-
ing members who do not exercise any choice regarding how their
savings should be invested. For retiring members, a fund should
have an annuity strategy with annuity options, either in-fund or
out-of-fund, and can only ‘default’ retiring members into a particular
annuity product after a member has made a choice.
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• Amendments to the Regulations Issued in terms of Section 36
of the Pension Funds Act, 1956 (Act 24 of 1956), GG 41064 of
25 August 2017 (the Default Regulation). These amendments
came into effect on 1 September 2017.
The documents are available on the National Treasury website
at http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/RetirementReform/
(accessed on 10 July 2018).
CASE LAW
Amendment of pension fund rules and their retrospective implementation
The following two reported judgments by the High Court of the
Gauteng Division, Pretoria, both relate to the amendment of
pension fund rules and their retrospective implementation: Maga-
bane v Municipal Employees Pension Fund (Gauteng Division,
Pretoria Case no 81389/15 (10 April 2017) Mabuse J); and
Municipality Employees Pension Fund & another v Mudau &
another (Gauteng Division, Pretoria, Case no 61555/14 (29 March
2017) Raulinga J).
The Municipal Employees Pension Fund (the Fund) was duly
registered in terms of the provisions of the Pension Funds Act 24
of 1956 (the Act) (Magabane para [1]). The Fund was the
applicant in Mudau and the respondent in Magabane. Magabane
and Mudau were members of the Fund by virtue of their employ-
ment in their respective municipalities. The underlying reason for
Magabane’s application was that the Fund had failed to imple-
ment a determination by the Pension Funds Adjudicator (the
Adjudicator) (para [2]); whereas in Mudau, the application was
brought by the Fund in terms of section 30P of the Pension Funds
Act to review and set aside a decision of the Adjudicator (Mudau
para [2]). Although Magabane and Mudau are two distinct
judgments decided by two different judges, the facts and the
main issues in both cases were almost identical and it is
appropriate to discuss them together.
The question before the courts in both cases was whether an
amendment to the rules of the Fund was operative from the date
on which the Registrar of Pension Funds (the Registrar) approved
and registered it or from the date determined by the Fund (the
effective date) (Magabane paras [3] [6]). Put differently, the
question was whether an amendment rule could be applied
retrospectively to take away or reduce pension benefits that
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accrued to a pension fund member before the amendment had
been approved and registered by the Registrar.
The rule in casu dealt with the calculation of the withdrawal
benefit pursuant to a member’s resignation (Magabane para [8]).
The old rule (pre-amendment) provided that the withdrawal
benefits to be paid to an existing member would be calculated at
a rate of three times the value of contributions made (Magabane
para [9]). The new rule (post-amendment) provided that the
withdrawal benefit would be calculated at a rate of 1,5 times
contributions made (Magadane para [9]).
The new rule was implemented following the recommendations
of the statutory actuaries (Magabane para [1]). The report of the
statutory actuaries had pointed out that a huge share of the loss
of R300 million to the Fund in the 2008 to 2011 financial years was
directly attributable to the old rule (Magabane para [9]).. The
actuarial report warned that if the Fund continued paying out
benefits in accordance with the terms of the old rule, it ran the risk
of being unable to meet its future obligations at some stage,
considering the future service contribution rates (Magabane para
[9]). Consequently, the Fund’s actuaries recommended an imme-
diate reduction in the withdrawal benefits offered by the Fund
(Mudau para [6]). The effect of the new rule was to reduce the
pension benefits payable to members when exiting the fund
(para [1]).
On 22 July 2013 the Fund applied to the Registrar for the
registration of the amendment rule (the new rule) (Magabane
para [8]). The new rule was only approved by the Financial
Services Board (FSB) and registered by the Registrar some eight
months later, on 1 April 2014 (Magabane para [10]; Mudau para
[9]). The Registrar authorised the effective date of 1 April 2013 for
the new rule (Magabane para [10]; Mudau para [40]).
Magabane (para [11]) and Mudau resigned before the registra-
tion of the new rule. In both cases, the parties – the Fund and the
affected member or former member of the Fund – were in
agreement that the Fund was empowered to amend its rules in
terms of section 12 of the Pension Funds Act (Magabane para
[15]). What the parties could not agree on was whether the
amendment rule (the new rule) could be applied retrospectively
to the benefits that accrued before the amendments had been
approved and registered by the Registrar. Put differently, the
question was whether an amendment rule operates from the date
determined by the Fund concerned, or from the date on which the
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Registrar approves and registers it (para [1]). The Fund con-
tended that, according to section 12(4) of the Act, the amend-
ment rule operates from a date determined by the Fund, or if no
such date has been determined, from the date of registration of
the amendment rule (Magabane para [6]).
In both cases, the Fund applied the new rule retrospectively,
and as a result the pension benefits of the fund members
(Magabane and Mudau) were significantly reduced (para [1]).
Magabane and Mudau were paid their withdrawal benefits calcu-
lated in accordance with the provisions of the new rule, ie, the
members’ contributions plus interest multiplied by 1,5 instead of
three (para [1]). Magabane and Mudau were dissatisfied with
their withdrawal benefits and lodged a complaint with the Pension
Funds Adjudicator (the Adjudicator) on the basis that the calcu-
lation of their withdrawal benefits was incorrect (Magabane para
[12]). Their position was that their withdrawal benefits should
have been calculated using the old rule (para [1]).
The Adjudicator issued a determination in favour of Magabane
and Mudau against the Fund (para [1]). She ordered the Fund to
calculate Magabane’s withdrawal benefits in accordance with the
old rule (Magabane para [13]). The Adjudicator’s determinations
in both cases were very clear that the amendment rules could not
operate with retrospective effect to a pension fund member,
because the member’s benefit had already accrued by the time
the amendment rule was registered (Magabane para [13]). The
Adjudicator was of the view that section 12 of the Act does not
empower the Fund to amend its rules with retrospective effect to
an extent that it applies to benefits that have accrued before the
registration of the amendment (para [1]). The Adjudicator had
also solicited the interpretation of the rule amendment from the
Registrar (Magabane para [8]). The Registrar is said to be of the
view that whilst a rule amendment may be approved with
retrospective effect, it cannot be applied before it has been
registered. And even if it is registered with retrospective effect, it
cannot be applied to benefits that accrued to the member before
that amendment has been registered (Magabane para [18]). The
Adjudicator was of the view that because the withdrawal benefits
of both Magabane and Mudau had accrued before the new rule
was approved by the Registrar, the rule could not be applied to
reduce a member’s benefits.
The Magabane and Mudau cases ended up in the High Court.
In both cases, either by way of application (Mudau para [2]) or
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counterclaim (Magabane para [4]), the Fund required the court to
set aside the determination (the order) of the Adjudicator made in
favour of the pension fund members. The Fund, among other
submissions, argued that the Adjudicator’s determinations fell
outside her jurisdiction (Magabane para [4]; Mudau para [4]). In
Magabane, this argument failed because the Fund did not join
the Adjudicator as a party in the proceedings (Magabane para
[1]). The court was of the view that the Adjudicator had a direct
and substantial interest in the proceedings as well as the
determination that the court could ultimately make, in particular,
the counter-application (Magabane para [1]). The court held that
the Adjudicator was an interested party and should have been
joined (para [1]). In Mudau, the Fund had also argued that the
Adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to make the determination as
the complaint did not fall under a ‘complaint’ as defined in the
Pension Funds Act (para [4.1]). The court found that Mudau’s
matter qualified as a complaint and dismissed the jurisdictional
challenge (paras [18] [19]).
It is important to note that even though the High Court was
faced with the same question of law, namely, whether the
amended rules can apply retrospectively even in instances
where they reduce pension benefits that have already accrued to
pension fund members, the High Court came to two different
conclusions. In Magabane, the High Court held that the new rule
applied to the pension fund member and the Fund could reduce
the benefits in the circumstances (Magabane para [22]); whereas
in Mudau the court held that the new rule did not apply and could
not reduce the benefits of the member (para [40]). In Mudau, the
court could not find any ground on which the Adjudicator’s
determination could be set aside (Mudau para [49]). It dismissed
the Fund’s application (Mudau para [49]).
It is crucial that pension funds, pension fund administrators,
pension fund boards, legal practitioners, and pension fund
members have clarity with regard to the correct legal position as
to whether amended pension rules can apply retrospectively
even in instances that take away or reduce pension benefits that
have already accrued to a member. A decision delivered by the
Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court on the matter
will be welcomed in order to provide clarity. Alternatively, a
legislative intervention is necessary in this regard.
It is clear that the question of whether an amendment to the
rules of the Fund is operative from the date on which the Registrar
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approved and registered such an amendment rule, or from the
date determined by the Fund, is not yet settled. In the case of
Magabane, this matter was not fully ventilated before the High
Court judge. Therein, the applicant had only approached the
court to make the determination of the Adjudicator against the
pension fund an order of court (para [2]). In other words, the
Applicant was not there to argue that the determination of the
Adjudicator was correct. See 2011 Annual Survey 1157–61 for a
brief discussion of the amendment of pension fund rules and their
retrospective implementation, albeit in a different context.
Pension funds and the applicability of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act
Mostert v Registrar of Pension Funds & others (07352/2015)
[2016] ZAGPJHC 235 (25 August 2016) was discussed in the
2016 Annual Survey 1119–21. The appellant was granted leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (see Mostert v Registrar
of Pension Funds & others (above). The full judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeal was reported as Mostert NO v Registrar
of Pension Funds & others (986/2016) [2017] ZASCA108 (15 Sep-
tember 2017). The question facing the Supreme Court of Appeal
was whether the court a quo erred in dismissing an application
for review in terms of the Promotion of Administrative JusticeAct 3
of 2000 (the PAJA) on the basis that the proceedings had not
been instituted within the 180-day period prescribed in section
7(1)(b) of the PAJA (para [1]). The court a quo held that it had no
power to entertain the review as the application had not been
instituted within this period (para [3]) and there was also no
application before it to extend the period in terms of section 9.
The appellant contended before the Supreme Court of Appeal, on
a number of grounds, that the court a quo had erred, that the
decision should be set aside, and that the application should be
referred back to the local division for a decision on the merits
(para [4]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal was of the view that the manifest
delay between the promulgation of the regulation and the institu-
tion of the review proceedings – some twelve years – and the
challenge in the respondent’s heads of argument to the court’s
power to entertain the matter, required of the appellant to satisfy
the court that the proceedings were instituted within the period of
180 days referred to in section 7. The appellant could not do so,
nor had it applied for an extension of the period in terms of
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section 9 (para [52]). The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal (para [4]). See the chapter ‘Constitutional Law’ for a
detailed discussion of the PAJA.
Restriction on the extent of participation by local authorities in one
province in funds established in other provinces
Municipal Employees Pension Fund v Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund (Superannuation) & others (562/2015) [2016] ZASCA
139, [2016] 4 ALL SA 761 (SCA) (29 September 2016) was
discussed in the 2016 Annual Survey 1113-16. The appellant
applied for leave to appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order
to the Constitutional Court. The discussion below deals with the
judgment of the Constitutional Court, which is reported as Munici-
pal Employees Pension Fund v Natal Joint Municipality Pension
Fund (Superannuation) & others (CCT260/16) (2017) ZACC 43
(1 December 2017). The facts of this case were thoroughly
canvassed in the 2016 Annual Survey (above) and covered
proceedings in both the High Court and the Supreme Court of
Appeal, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here.
The legislation or regulation central to the issue before the
Constitutional Court dealt with the compulsory association with
and membership in the four KZN Funds (para [35]). It obliged all
local authorities to be associated with the Provident Fund within
six months from the date of becoming a municipal council (para
[35]). The High Court held that all local authorities in KZN were
obliged to associate with the respondents only, and that the
employees of these local authorities were obliged to become
members of the respondents (para [13]). The KZN funds appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court
of Appeal held that the local authorities located within the KZN
province were, in terms of the relevant legislation, obliged to
associate with KZN Funds (para [14]). It noted further that there
was nothing in the Fund legislation and regulations that prohib-
ited a local authority in KZN from associating with a pension fund
in addition to that local authority’s association with the respon-
dents (para [14]). The applicant fund in this matter, the Municipal
Employees Pension Fund (the Fund), was not satisfied with the
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Fund approached
the Constitutional Court for a further relief (para [15]). It argued,
among others things, for the following:
• that leave to appeal should be granted on the basis that the
application implicated constitutional issues (para [16]);
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• that the regulations were unconstitutional because they
exceeded the MEC’s authority in relation to local government
(para [16]);
• that this case affected not only the parties but all other
pension funds that wish to operate in the KZN Municipalities
and their employees (para [16]);
• that the obligation on municipal employees to participate in
specified pension and retirement funds amounted to an
infringement of the right of freedom of association in section
18 of the Constitution;
• that the application raised arguable points of law of general
public importance (para [16]); and
• that the legislation was unconstitutional, but the applicant had
failed to mount a proper challenge in the High Court (para
[45]). The Fund requested the Constitutional Court to uphold
the appeal for a limited purpose of allowing the constitutional
challenges to be properly ventilated and determined by the
High Court (para [19]).
The respondents supported the interpretation of the relevant
legislation adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal (para [19]).
They argued that it was not in the interests of justice to hear the
matter as the applicant had not complied with the rules relating to
the raising of constitutional issues in that they had not been
raised in the High Court (para [20]). They contended that the
Fund was precluded from doing so for the first time in the
Constitutional Court (para [20]).
The majority judgment of the Constitutional Court held that if the
applicant felt strongly about the constitutional issues in question,
it must institute a substantive application in the High Court, cite all
the interested parties, and allow them to respond to the issues
raised (para [46]). The constitutional challenge would then be
fully ventilated and determined by the High Court (para [46]). The
Constitutional Court held that it was not in the interests of justice
to grant leave to appeal (para [46]). It dismissed the application
for leave to appeal with costs (para [48]). The disserting minority
judgment provides a different take on the issues raised in this
case.
Setting aside a determination made by the Pension Funds Adjudicator
In Sentinel Retirement Fund v Hadebe & another, the High
Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria (case no 5647/2017 (12 May
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2017) Mngadi AJ), the applicant was Sentinel Retirement Fund, a
pension fund (the Fund), duly registered in terms of the Pension
Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Act). The first respondent was Ms
Hadebe, an adult female, and the second respondent was the
Pension FundsAdjudicator (theAdjudicator). The Fund sought an
order setting aside a determination in favour of Hadebe by the
Adjudicator (para [2]). Hadebe was a spouse of the deceased
member of the Fund (Mr Hadebe) as well as the appointed
executor of his deceased estate. Mr Hadebe was employed by
Zululand Anthracite Colliery (the company) and was also a
member of the Fund. He died on 31 March 2014, and as a result
of his death certain benefits became payable to qualifying
beneficiaries (para [4]). Ms Hadebe lodged a complaint with the
Adjudicator on the basis that the Fund was delaying payment of
death benefits, and was also not displaying transparency in its
processes for the determination of whom to classify as beneficia-
ries (para [2). The death benefits were still not paid after a period
of two years.
TheAdjudicator was of the view that given the inordinate period
that had passed since the deceased’s death, his beneficiaries
had suffered prejudice in that they had been denied access to
benefits which became available to them on his death (para [7]).
She directed the board of the Fund to complete its investigation
and consider the relevant factors for an equitable distribution of
the death benefits to the deceased’s beneficiaries, without any
further delay (para [7]). The Fund was instructed to complete its
investigation and proceed with the allocation and distribution of
death benefits in terms of section 37C of the Act within eight
weeks, and to furnish the Adjudicator and Hadebe (the complain-
ant) with a section 37C report for the allocation and distribution of
the death benefits within two weeks of finalising the process.
The Fund was not satisfied with the Adjudicator’s order and
approached the High Court in terms of section 30P of the Act,
seeking to set it aside (para [2]). Hadebe and the Adjudicator did
not oppose the Fund’s application (para [2]). The Fund argued
that the Adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to deal with the
complaint because disputes as to the allocation of death benefits
in terms of section 37C of the Act fell outside the Adjudicator’s
jurisdiction (para [9]). The Fund noted that in its research the
issue of the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator in respect of the
distribution of death benefits in terms of section 37C had not
been authoritatively decided (para [14]). The principal challenge
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by the Fund was that the distribution of death benefits is not part
of the administration of a fund (para [14]). The issue before the
court was whether or not a complaint relating to matters envis-
aged in section 37C of the Act falls within the jurisdiction of the
Adjudicator or not (para [15]). The court noted that it was clear
that the board decides whether or not a person was a dependant
of the member, and on payment of a benefit to a beneficiary (para
[18]). The Fund argued that the discretion conferred in terms of
section 37C on its board to distribute death benefits was clearly
not part of the administration of the fund (para [18]).
The court concluded that the distribution of death benefits is
made by the Fund through its board (para [19]). It falls under the
overall administration of the Fund (para [19]). The main object of
the Adjudicator is to investigate any complaints relating to the
administration of the pension fund by its board (para [19]). The
court concluded that when the board deals with matters envis-
aged in section 37C of the Act, it is exercising a function relating
to the administration of the pension fund (para [20]). As a result,
the Adjudicator is authorised and obliged to investigate com-
plaints relating to how the board is carrying out or has carried out
its functions (para [20]). The court held that the Adjudicator had
jurisdiction to deal with the complaint (para [20]). The Fund’s
further argument was that the Adjudicator’s order that the fund
must complete its investigations within eight weeks was unreason-
able in light of the deceased’s complicated personal affairs (para
[21]). It indicated that it became aware of the deceased’s death
on 14 April 2014 from his employer (para [21]). In July 2016, the
Fund was still investigating (para [21]). The court held eight
weeks was a reasonable period in view of the history of the matter
(para [21]). It held that the Fund could not raise its inactivity as a
ground on which to conclude that the period granted was
inadequate, and the Fund could request an extension of the
period from the Adjudicator for good reasons shown (para [52]).
The court held that the order relating to the Fund furnishing a
report to theAdjudicator and Hadebe was to enable theAdjudica-
tor to ensure compliance with the determination as well as to
address the complaint of lack of transparency by the Fund (para
[22]). The court dismissed the application (para [23]). It directed
the Fund to provide the court and Hadebe with its proposed
allocation and distribution of the deceased’s death benefit within
two weeks of taking a decision relating thereto, and to grant the
complainant at least ten days within which to raise objections, if
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any, to the proposed allocation and distribution. Having consid-
ered the objection, if any, the Fund was to proceed with the
allocation and distribution of death benefits (para [23]).
Termination of pension fund membership
Kitshoff v Fedsure Staff Pension Fund & others (597/16) [2017]
ZASCA 31 (28 March 2017) was an appeal against a judgment
and order of the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court,
Johannesburg (Masipa J), in which the court a quo dismissed
with costs an application brought by the appellant (as applicant)
in terms of section 30P of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the
Act), against a determination of the Acting Pension Funds Adjudi-
cation (the Adjudicator) (para [1]).
The first respondent, Fedsure Staff Pension Fund (the Fund),
was a pension fund to which the employer was a contributor as
defined in section 4 of the Act (para [3]). During March 2002,
Investec Employee Benefits (Investec) acquired Fedsure Hold-
ings Limited (Fedsure) (para [3]). Investec notified the employer
and other participants that the Fund would no longer be accept-
ing contributions from the employer with effect from 1 July 2002
((para [3]). The employer accepted this notification and stopped
contributing to the Fund as from 1 July 2002 (para [3]). There-
after, the employer made alternative arrangements to join Wizard
Universal Pension Fund (the WUPF-Sanlam) (para [3]). The
transfer of the benefits from itself to WUPF (the new pension fund)
in terms of section 14(1) of the Act was approved by the Registrar
of Pension Funds (the Registrar) effective from 1 July 2002 (para
[3]). The transfer was approved two years later on the 9 July
2004, with retrospective effect to 1 July 2002 (para [3]).
Kitshoff was retrenched on 30 June 2003, before the approval,
and WUPF paid him a sum of R2 120 153 as his pension benefits
(para [3]). This amount was determined as at the date of transfer
from the Fund to the WUPF (para [3]). He was dissatisfied as
the amount did not include the enhanced pension benefits he
maintained he was entitled to be paid on retrenchment, which
would have increased the amount payable to him by some
R500 000 (para [3]). He then demanded the shortfall of R529 307
from the Fund, alternatively from his employer (para [3]).
The question before the court was whether Kitshoff was entitled
to the enhancement benefits to the amount of R529 307 (para
[1]). The court held that, in terms of rules of former fund, Kitshoff
had no vested right to claim enhanced pension benefits as a
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result of retrenchment, and that his right had ceased on termina-
tion of membership of former fund. There was no enforceable
right effected by retrospective operation of approval. The court held
that there was no basis for Kitshoff’s assertion that the Fund’s
conduct was unlawful (para [12]), and dismissed the appeal.
Validity of an investment consulting agreement
The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund v Tristar
Investments (960/2016) [2017] ZASCA 184 (6 December 2017)
was an appeal from the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court,
Johannesburg (Tsoka J sitting as court of first instance). It
concerned the validity of an investment consulting agreement
(the agreement) concluded between the appellant, Chemical
Industries National Provident Fund (the Fund), and the respon-
dent, Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd (Tristar) (para [1]). The Fund
was a large pension fund whose members were employees in the
chemical industry in South Africa (para [1]). It was managed by a
board of trustees (para [2]). Tristar is an investment consulting
company, whose business is to advise trustees on the manage-
ment of their assets (para [2]). The Fund was governed by a set of
rules in terms of which its management was carried out by 24
trustees, half of whom were appointed by the employers of the
members, and the other half by employee members (para [2]).
The Fund signed the agreement in terms of which Tristar was to
provide investment consulting services for a period of three years
(para [3]). Pursuant to the agreement, Tristar performed its
services for three months, but thereafter the Fund resolved to
withdraw the appointment (para [3]). The Fund contended that
the agreement was invalid because the signatories on behalf of
the Fund had not had the authority to conclude it, and the
agreement was ultra vires the rules of the Fund (para [4]).
The question before the Supreme Court of Appeal was whether
the signatories who signed the agreement on behalf of the
appellant (the Fund) had the necessary authority, and whether
the agreement was ultra vires the rules of the Fund (para [14]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that the Fund’s repre-
sentatives had the authority to sign the agreement on its behalf
(para [34]). It dismissed the appeal with costs (para [35]).
Although the focus of this case was on contractual matters as well
as on the authority of fund representatives (board of trustees) to
represent their pension funds, it provides some lessons for
boards of trustees as to what they can do and not do when
representing their funds.
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PERSONS
TRYNIE BOEZAART*
LEGISLATION
PRIMARY LEGISLATION
The Children’s Amendment Act 17 of 2016 amended the Chil-
dren’s Act 38 of 2005 (the Children’s Act). One of the amendments
provides that an adoption order does not automatically terminate
all parental responsibilities and rights when it is granted in favour
of the spouse or permanent domestic life-partner of that parent
(Children’s Act s 242(2); 2016 Annual Survey 819). The amend-
ments were assented to on 18 January 2017 (GN 42 GG 40564 of
19 January 2017) and the commencement date was 26 January
2018. The same applies to the Children’s Second Amendment Act
18 of 2016, which provides, among other things, for a child to
remain in alternative care beyond the age of eighteen years under
certain circumstances (Children’s Act s 176; 2016 Annual Survey
819). The amendments were assented to on 18 January 2017
(GN 43 GG 40565 of 19 January 2017) and the commencement
date was 26 January 2018.
The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amended
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 to, among other things,
replace the outdated term ‘mental defect’ with the more accept-
able term ‘intellectual disability’, and to provide the courts with a
wider range of options in respect of orders to be issued when
accused persons are by reason of mental illness or intellectual
disability, or for any other reason, not criminally responsible for
the offences with which they are charged (see ss 77 and 78 of the
Act). In addition, the amendments clarify the composition of
the panels provided for in section 79 to conduct enquiries into the
mental condition of accused persons (GN 619 GG 40946 of
29 June 2017).
* BA LLB LLD (UP). Professor of Private Law, University of Pretoria. This material
is based on work supported financially by the National Research Foundation (NRF).
Any opinion, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this mate-
rial are those of the author and therefore the NRF does not accept any liability in
regard thereto.
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SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
The Regulations Regarding the General Control of Human
Bodies, Tissue, Blood Products and Gametes: Amendment were
published (GN 392 GG 40816 of 26 April 2017).
DRAFT LEGISLATION
A Notice of Intent to Introduce a Private Member’s Bill and
Invitation for Comment on the Proposed Content of the Draft
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill has been
published (GG 40970 10 July 2017) and the first version of
the Choice on the Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill
(B 34-2017) followed on 6 December 2017. The main objective of
the draft legislation is apparently to restrict or curtail women’s
access to abortion.
To achieve this main aim, the Bill proposes an amendment to
the definition of ‘gestation period’ in section 1 by adding confirma-
tion thereof by ultrasound examination (clause 1). The starting
point is, therefore, the assumption that ultrasound equipment is
available in all the health facilities that comply with the require-
ments of section 3(1), read with section 3(2) of the Choice on
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 (the Act).
Clause 2 of the Bill amends section 2 of the Act by narrowing
down the circumstances in which a pregnancy may be termi-
nated. It proposes that where continued pregnancy would signifi-
cantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the woman,
and the termination is conducted from the 13th to the 20th week
of gestation, a social worker must also be involved. The under-
lying assumption in this instance is that the services of social
workers will be readily available to low-income families. While the
tenability of this particular circumstance in which pregnancy may
be terminated is debatable, it is likely that requiring the additional
services of a social worker will jeopardise the rights of poor and
vulnerable women. Clause 2 furthermore deletes section 2(1)(c)(iii)
of the Act, which currently allows the termination of pregnancy
after the 20th week if a medical practitioner, after consultation
with another medical practitioner or a registered midwife, is of the
opinion that the continued pregnancy will pose a risk of injury to
the foetus. While the wording of section 2(1)(c)(iii) may be vague
and overly broad, the question remains whether removing it
completely solves the problem.
Clause 3 of the Bill inserts new paragraphs (cA) and (cB) into
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subsection 3(1) (after (c)) of the Act to ensure that the facilities
where termination of pregnancy are performed provide ultra-
sound equipment and counselling services. While the first-
mentioned addition aligns with the amended definition in clause
1, the second addition aligns with clause 4(1), in which the
current non-mandatory counselling is changed to state-provided
mandatory counselling. Clause 4 also inserts a new subsection
(2) into the Act, stipulating information that must be made
available to the pregnant woman. According to the Memorandum
on the Objects of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy
Amendment Bill, 2017, published with the Bill, this information is
‘to assist her in making an informed choice regarding the
termination of her pregnancy and to assist her in giving informed
consent prior to the termination of her pregnancy’ (para 3.4).
Clause 4 also inserts a new subsection (3), mandating that the
counselling services be provided to either the ‘natural guardian,
spouse, legal guardian or curator personae, as the case may be’,
where consent is given on behalf of a woman with severe mental
disabilities or an unconscious woman (referring to s 5(4)(a) and
(b) of the Act).
Clause 5 proposes an amendment to section 5 of the Act by
deleting section 5(5)(b)(iii), which currently allows two medical
practitioners, or a medical practitioner and a registered nurse or
midwife, to consent to the termination of a pregnancy after the
20th week of the gestation period of a severely mentally disabled
woman, or a woman in a continuous unconscious state, if they are
of the opinion that the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of
injury to the foetus. This amendment is thus aligned to the
deletion of section 2(1)(c)(iii) of the Act in clause 2.
Clause 6 repeals the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy
Amendment Act 38 of 2004, which was declared invalid by the
Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of
the National Assembly & others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC), 2006 (12)
BCLR 1399 paras [182] [189] [193]–[195] [198]–[212], because
Parliament failed to comply with the public-involvement require-
ment in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the
Constitution) (see ss 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a)). However, this judg-
ment has already been accommodated in the Choice on Termina-
tion of Pregnancy Amendment Act 1 of 2008, which came into
operation on 18 February 2008.
Clause 7 provides for the short title.
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CASE LAW
AMENDMENT OF A BIRTH REGISTRATION
In KOS & others v Minister of Home Affairs & others 2017 (6) SA
588 (WCC), [2017] 4 All SA 468, the Western Cape High Court
was confronted with the legal challenges people face when
applying to amend their sex description under the Alteration of
Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003 (the ASDSA) that
has been in full effect since 15 March 2004. The judgment (at the
very least) reveals ignorance on the part of government officials,
and inability on the part of the Department of Home Affairs (the
DHA), to provide administrative relief as required by the statute.
The case involved, among others, three applicants – referred to
by the court as KOS, GNC and WJV respectively (or collectively,
the ‘transgendered spouses’) – who had all been born male. All of
them entered into marriages in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of
1961 with female persons, but during the subsistence of those
marriages sought surgical and/or medical intervention to alter
their sex/gender to female. They did this because all three
applicants, from an early age, experienced ‘tormenting gender
dysphoria’ (a psychiatric concept denoting a state of unease or
general dissatisfaction), because their self-awareness was of
being female trapped in a male body, and because transitioning
to acquire the outward or physical characteristics of the other
gender was a means of liberating them from their gender
dysphoria and expressing their self-identification (para [2]). The
spouses of the three transgendered applicants also entered as
applicants, as did an organisation called Gender Dynamix (GDX)
which seeks to promote and defend the rights of transgender and
‘gender non-conforming’ persons (para [26]).
Having successfully undergone the requisite medical proce-
dures, the applicants lodged applications with the Director-
General of the DHA to alter their sex/gender descriptions in the
national birth register, and requested that they be provided with
amended birth certificates (s 27A of the Births and Deaths
Registration Act 51 of 1992). This legal measure is provided for in
the ASDSA (ss 2(1) and 3(1)). The ASDSA also prescribes that a
person whose sex description has been altered is deemed for all
purposes to be a person of the sex description so altered as from
the date of recording of the alteration (s 3(2)). The ASDSA further
provides that rights and obligations that have accrued to or been
acquired by such a person before the alteration of his or her sex
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description are not adversely affected by the alteration (s 3(3)).
The effect is that the recording of a postnuptial sex/gender
change in respect of either or both of the spouses has no effect
on their mutual marital rights and obligations, which would
endure as long as the marriage does. In addition, it has no effect
on the transgendered person’s rights and obligations in respect
of third parties (paras [3] [4]).
As a consequence of an alteration to the birth register, the
altered sex descriptor must be recorded in the national popula-
tion register – in terms of section 5 of the Births and Deaths
Registration Act 51 of 1992 – by means of an amendment of the
person’s sex/gender assignation. This implies that a person who
has transitioned is obliged to apply for a new identity document
that will reflect a reassigned identity number incorporating an
altered gender-related figure code (para [8]). The population
register also provides for the inclusion of particulars relating to a
person’s marriage contained in the relevant marriage register or
other documents relating to the contracting of the marriage, and
‘such other particulars concerning his or her marital status as
may be furnished to the Director-General’ (as provided for in
section 8(e) of the Identification Act 68 of 1997, which contains
the founding provisions of the population register).
The DHA refused the applications for alterations to the birth
register by both KOS and GNC. In the case of WJV, the
department gave effect to the application, but then, of its own
accord, went on to remove the particulars relating to WJV’s
marriage from the population register, and altered the surname of
WJV’s spouse to her maiden name.As a point of interest it may be
mentioned that the applicants’ spouses supported their applica-
tions, were content in their respective marital relationships, and
had no intention of ending their marriages (para [11]).
In the department’s view, the applications by the transgender
spouses (as far as KOS and GNC were concerned) could not be
granted while their marriages remained registered as solemnised
in terms of the Marriage Act. This led to the applicants seeking an
order in the High Court declaring (i) that the department was by
law required to alter a person’s sex/gender description in terms of
theASDSA irrespective of that person’s marital status; and (ii) that
the department’s refusal to process the applications by KOS and
GNC because they were married in terms of the Marriage Act,
and its deregistration of the marriage between WJV and her
spouse, were unlawful and unconstitutional. By way of secondary
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relief, the applicants sought, in the alternative, a declaration that
the ASDSA, and/or the MarriageAct, and/or the Civil Union Act 17
of 2006 is/are inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the
extent that any or all of them fail to allow the alteration of a
person’s sex description and sex status while that person is in a
marriage solemnised under the Marriage Act (para [58]).
Essentially, the DHA’s argument lay in the fact that what was
previously considered to be a heterosexual relationship, solem-
nised as a marriage under the Marriage Act, had been converted
to a same-sex relationship – which can legally be solemnised as
a marriage or civil union in terms of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.
The department’s stance was, therefore, that the marriage entered
into under the Marriage Act must first be dissolved before the
respective applications could be considered. Dissolution of a
marriage can only be effected by death or divorce. In casu, none
of the applicants (including their spouses, who were also cited as
applicants), wished to dissolve their marriages by divorce and, in
any event, were precluded from doing so because the circum-
stances that would legally allow divorce – irretrievable break-
down, mental illness, or continuous unconsciousness – were not
applicable.
The parties in this case were in agreement that only marriages
in which the prospective parties are of opposite sexes can be
solemnised under the Marriage Act. The Civil Union Act is the
vehicle for establishing a marriage or union where the prospec-
tive parties are of the same sex, although the mechanism
contained in the Act is also available to opposite sex parties. The
parties entering into a formalised union under the Civil Union Act
must elect whether it is to be called a ‘marriage’ or a ‘civil
partnership’. Regardless of the designation chosen, the charac-
ter of a union entered into in terms of the Civil Union Act is
indistinguishable in its legal effect and consequences from one
solemnised under the Marriage Act. The implication is that
opposite-sex couples have a choice as to which statute to use in
solemnising a marriage or union, whereas same-sex couples do
not (para [23]).
Evidence was presented to the court relating to practical
challenges facing applicants who wished to make use of the
provisions of the ASDSA. These range from ignorance on the part
of DHA officials of the existence and content of the Act, the
absence of prescribed procedures and forms for the administra-
tion of the Act, a complete lack of response from the department
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when applications were lodged, failure to acknowledge receipt of
important documents, and hostility on the part of DHA officials
towards applicants, to the department’s computer system that
automatically rejects changes to a person’s gender assignation if
that person’s marriage has been solemnised under the Marriage
Act – hence the department’s stance that such a marriage must
first be dissolved (para [27]ff). The latter challenge induced
Binns-Ward J and concur with one of the applicants, GNC, who
stated that she saw ‘no need to get a divorce to satisfy a
computer system’ (para [46]).
The DHA contended that a parallel regime of law governing
the solemnisation of marriages had been introduced following the
adoption of the Civil Union Act, which gave rise to some confu-
sion in the department. Initially, the possibility of amending the
Marriage Act to include the solemnisation of same-sex marriages
had been considered, but after objections from, eg, the religious
sector, it was decided to keep the Marriage Act intact and
applicable only to heterosexual marriages, and to introduce a
parallel system which would allow for the solemnisation of
same-sex marriages or unions (para [63]). In the department’s
view, the legislative framework
does not simultaneously allow for a person married under the Mar-
riage Act who has undergone a sex alteration to have their sex
alteration registered on the system while simultaneously allowing such
a person to remain married under the MarriageAct; this is because the
result of the sex alteration would be that that person would be in a
same sex relationship, which is not permitted under the Marriage Act
(para [67]).
Binns-Ward J pointed out, as also conceded by the respon-
dents, that there is nothing in the ASDSA that expressly or by
implication indicates that a transitioned applicant’s marital status
has any bearing on his or her ability or entitlement to obtain
administrative relief under the provisions of the Act. The aim of
the ASDSA, as articulated in its long title, is to provide for the
alteration of the sex description of certain individuals in certain
circumstances, and the amendment of the Births and Deaths
Registration Act accordingly. The sole criterion for obtaining an
amended birth certificate under the Act is proof, to the reason-
able satisfaction of the Director-General, that an applicant has
altered his or her sex/gender (para [73]). In addition, the Marriage
Act does not contain anything prohibiting a party to a marriage
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duly solemnised in terms of the formula prescribed by section
30(1) from undergoing a sex-change or obtaining an amended
birth certificate in terms of the ASDSA. Binns-Ward J pointed out
that any provision to that effect would, for a number of reasons,
be of very doubtful constitutional validity. In his view, it would go
against the grain of constitutional principles to interpret or apply
express provisions of the Marriage Act in a manner that would
undermine, rather than promote, the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution (para [82]).
In response to the respondent’s argument that the current
prescribed forms and certificates used in the application of the
Marriage Act refer only to ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, Binns-Ward J
stated that nothing would prevent the Minister from amending the
relevant regulations to provide for an appropriate form to cater for
any required amendments to the official records or registers. In
his view (which I whole-heartedly endorse) the Minister cannot
rely on shortcomings in the regulatory record-keeping mecha-
nisms of the Marriage Act to deny transgendered persons their
substantive rights under the ASDSA (para [84]). Moreover, since
the legal consequences of marriages or unions concluded under
either the MarriageAct or the Civil UnionAct are identical, there is
no parallel system of law governing marriage; there is only a
parallel system for the solemnisation of marriages. There is also
no need for a conversion from one type of duly solemnised
marriage to another in order to meet practical difficulties (para
[85]).
Binns-Ward J concluded that the applicants were entitled to the
primary relief for which they had applied. The failure of the
Director-General of the DHO to decide the applications of KOS
and GNC, or his refusal of their applications, amounted to
administrative action within the meaning of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and needed to be chal-
lenged in terms of that Act. This, as well as the late application for
extension of time under that Act, was condoned as the applica-
tion raised important issues that bear materially on the lives of a
sector of South African society and on matters of public adminis-
tration (para [87]). As far as the applicant WJV was concerned,
the judge was not persuaded that the department’s deletion of
the record of the marriage between her and her spouse, and the
subsequent unilateral change of her spouse’s surname back to
her maiden name, amounted to ‘administrative action’, as the
actions were not taken in terms of any law, and therefore fell to be
set aside for being in breach of the doctrine of legality (para [88]).
951THE LAW OF PERSONS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 9 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/27−Persons
In summary, the court granted the following relief:
(i) A declaration that the manner in which the DHAdealt with the
applications of the transgendered spouses was inconsistent
with the Constitution and unlawful in that it infringed the
applicants’ rights to administrative justice, infringed all appli-
cants’ rights to equality and human dignity, and was inconsis-
tent with the state’s obligations in terms of section 7(2) of the
Constitution to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights
under the Bill of Rights.
(ii) A declaration that the Director-General of the DHA is autho-
rised and obliged to determine applications submitted in
terms of the ASDSA by any person whose sexual character-
istics have been altered by medical treatment, or by evolu-
tion through natural development resulting in gender
reassignment, or any person who is intersexed, for the
alteration of the sex description on such person’s birth
certificate, irrespective of the person’s marital status and, in
particular, irrespective of whether that person’s marriage or
civil partnership was solemnised under either the Marriage
Act or the Civil Union Act.
(iii) An order that the transgendered spouses were exempted
from exhausting the internal remedies provided for under the
ASDSA (s 2(4)–(10)).
(iv) A direction to the Director-General to reconsider and, within
30 days of the court order, determine the applications under
the ASDSA construed in the light of the judgment.
(v) A declaration that the deletion, by the department, of the
particulars in the population register in respect of the marriage
between WJV and her spouse was unlawful, and a direction to
the department to reinstate, within 30 days of the court order,
in the record of the particulars of the solemnisation of their
marriage in terms of the Marriage Act.
(vi) A direction to the first respondent to pay the applicants’
costs, including the costs of two counsel.
This case is an example of citizens who are compelled to revert
to the judiciary to assert their fundamental rights (paras [70] [75])
in the face of ignorance, maladministration and confusion, appar-
ently ‘coloured by religious and social prejudice’ (para [69]) in a
government department. In the case of KOS, the DHA in George
refused to accept the application despite KOS having a copy of
the ASDSA available (para [34]). A follow-up email to the Minister
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was not even acknowledged by the addressee’s office (para
[35]). When the application was eventually channelled to the
head office in Pretoria, KOS was informed that the application
could not be processed because she was married and the
computer system would not allow a change to the gender code in
this instance (para [40]). Inappropriate and incorrect suggestions
regarding divorce were made to her (para [41]). This application
was thus effectively refused, or alternatively the Director-General
failed to take a decision as required by the ASDSA (para [42]).
GNS’s application went one step further than that of KOS,
because she managed to obtain a new identity document
reflecting her new christian names and her appearance as a
female, but without changing the sex/gender description to
female. GNS was also advised to obtain a divorce and remarry in
terms of the Civil Union Act, which also meant that her application
was effectively refused (para [46]).
In comparison with the above applications, WJV’s application
progressed much further, although in the process the Roode-
poort office of the DHA deleted its record of the marriage as if it
had never been concluded, and changed WJV’s spouse’s sur-
name back to her maiden name (para [55]). The hardship that all
the individuals involved in the three applications suffered is
detailed in no uncertain terms in this judgment (paras [36] [47]
[55]). Let us hope that this judgment has paved the way for the
proper implementation of the ASDSA – unfortunately fourteen
years after its enactment.
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AGREEMENT
The law governing surrogate motherhood and the status of
the child concerned is extensively dealt with in Chapter 19 of the
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (Trynie Boezaart Law of Persons 6 ed
(2016) 100ff; Jacqueline Heaton The South African Law of
Persons 5 ed (2017) 48ff; see also Lawrence Schäfer Child Law in
South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives (2011)
265ff; Anne Louw ‘Surrogate motherhood’ in Davel & Skelton
(eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act (revision service 4,
2012) ch 19). All the requirements for a valid surrogate mother-
hood agreement are contained in sections 292ff and are often
scrutinised in our courts (AB & another v Minister of Social
Development [2016] ZACC 43, now reported as 2017 (3) SA 570
(CC), 2017 (3) BCLR 267 and discussed in 2016 Annual Survey
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820ff) on the constitutionality of the ‘genetic-link requirement’
(s 294)). One of the very first requirements in section 292 is that
the surrogacy agreement must be confirmed by the High Court
within whose area of jurisdiction the commissioning parent or
parents are domiciled or habitually resident (s 292(1)(e) read with
s 295 of the Children’s Act).
In Ex parte HP & others 2017 (4) SA 528 (GP), also reported as
Ex Parte HPP & others; Ex Parte DME & others [2017] 2 All SA 171
(GP), the Gauteng Division of the High Court was tasked with
considering the confirmation of two surrogate motherhood agree-
ments. Both applications for confirmation involved services ren-
dered by a surrogacy coordinator (or facilitator, the same person
in both applications) who provided surrogacy facilitation services
at a fee, in this case R5 000. Her task as a surrogacy coordinator
was to assist with (i) guiding and advising the surrogate mother;
(ii) referral of the surrogate mother to a clinical psychologist;
(iii) mediation with the surrogate mother during the gestation
period; (iv) if required, managing any dispute resolution; and
(v) in general, overseeing the entire surrogacy process or ‘journey’
(para [7]). At the first hearing of these applications it was decided
that a ruling on these matters may have an impact on the rights of
the surrogacy coordinator and she subsequently filed an affidavit
and was joined as a respondent (para [11]).
In both these applications the following issues arose:
(i) whether the surrogacy facilitation agreements constituted a
transgression of section 301 of the Children’s Act, which
aims to prohibit payment in respect of surrogacy in no
uncertain terms; and
(ii) whether the court could confirm the surrogate motherhood
agreements if it is found that the agreements between the
surrogacy coordinator (the coordinator) and the applicants
were unlawful.
In both applications for confirmation it was pertinently stated
that in the current cases the fee charged by the coordinator did
not include any introduction fee to the surrogate mother (see para
[8] regarding the first application, and para [22] for the second.
However, in both applications the coordinator did in fact intro-
duce HP and JP to the potential surrogate mothers (paras [7]
[22]).) The coordinator argued that she was entitled to choose her
occupation in terms of section 22 of the Constitution, and that
section 301 of the Children’s Act should not deprive her of that
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right. In terms of section 22 of the Constitution every citizen has
the right to choose his or her trade or occupation freely, but the
section also provides that the practice of that occupation or
profession may be regulated by law. In support of her claim as to
the value of her services, the coordinator attached both a
medico-psychological expert opinion and an ethics expert opinion,
seeking to persuade the court that the facilitation agreement
entered into by the parties concerned was morally and ethically
sound and should not be declared unlawful. The medico-
psychological opinion stated that (i) without the coordinator’s
assistance, commissioning parents would have to find a surro-
gate mother themselves; (ii) she briefed the commissioning
parents about medical and legal aspects; (iii) she made sure that
the surrogate mother was medically assessed; (iv) she determined
whether the surrogate mother’s living conditions were amenable to
carrying a pregnancy; and (v) she reminded the surrogate mother
to keep to her medication regime related to the artificial fertilisation
and the pregnancy. In addition, the coordinator stated that she
explained complicated medical reports, debriefed the surrogate
mother after invasive medical procedures, and prepared her
emotionally for these procedures (paras [14]–[18]).
Tolmay J expressed concern that these services rendered by
the coordinator encroached upon the professional fields of
recognised service providers, and that the coordinator’s per-
sonal experience as a surrogate mother did not qualify her to
render such services (para [19]).
Noting that the justification for the prohibition of commercial
surrogacy had been the subject of some debate, and that there
had been calls for the legalisation of commercial surrogacy,
Tolmay J stated that the view commonly held appears to be that
the potential for abuse far outweighs any possible advantage.
She referred to the fact that the prohibition was recognised in
most countries, which implied that legal commercial surrogacy
was the exception rather than the norm. In South African law,
section 301 of the Children’s Act expressly prohibits payment in
respect of surrogate motherhood agreements subject to limited
exceptions only (paras [24]–[27]). These exceptions are (s 301(2))
(a) compensation for expenses that relate directly to the artificial
fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate mother, the birth of
the child and the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood
agreement;
(b) loss of earnings suffered by the surrogate mother as a result of
the surrogate motherhood agreement; or
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(c) insurance to cover the surrogate mother for anything that may
lead to death or disability brought about by the pregnancy.
Section 301(3) excludes services rendered by legal and medi-
cal professionals with a view to the confirmation of a surrogate
motherhood agreement. As far as the involvement of agencies is
concerned, Tolmay J referred to the following passage in the
case of Ex parte WH & others 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) para [66]:
If any agency is involved, full particulars regarding that agency should
be revealed. An affidavit by the agency should also be filed containing
the following –
(a) the business of the agency;
(b) whether any form of payment is paid to or by the agency in regard
of any aspect of the surrogacy;
(c) what exactly the agency’s involvement was regarding the (i)
introduction of the surrogate mother; (ii) how the information
regarding the surrogate mother was obtained by the agency; and
(d) whether the surrogate mother received any compensation at all
from the agency or the commissioning parents.
It was argued on behalf of the coordinator, that the services she
provided were beneficial to all persons involved, and were not
of the kind prohibited by section 301. The premise was that the
purpose of this section could not be aimlessly to criminalise
the provision of paid-for services that relate to surrogate mother-
hood agreements, but rather to avoid payments in money or in
kind to the surrogate mother. In the view of Tolmay J, however,
such an argument loses sight of the fact that surrogacy entails
much more than mere direct payments to surrogate mothers in
that third parties could also be involved and could benefit from
the process in contravention of the law (para [38]). The judge
acknowledged that commissioning parents could find them-
selves in a difficult position when looking for a potential surrogate
and unable to find such a person within their immediate circle. In
her view the solution could well be the establishment of a
regulatory framework which could include a possible database of
potential surrogate mothers. The possibility of abuse could be
eliminated if such a database were properly regulated. In the
meanwhile, however, the only solution was to require that anyone,
including agencies, individuals, or entities, file an affidavit to
inform the court about the payments. The court should then
determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether there has been
compliance with the Children’s Act while bearing in mind that
commercial surrogacy is unlawful, and that only certain expenses
are allowed (para [39]).
956 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 14 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/27−Persons
With regard to the coordinator’s assertion that section 301 of
the Children’s Act limits her right under section 22 of the
Constitution to choose an occupation, Tolmay J found that it was
not her right to exercise a profession that was limited, but her
right to require payment. The limitations contained in section 301
are acceptable in an open and democratic society and are
accordingly justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution
(para [51]). Notwithstanding the possibility that the coordinator
may well have rendered an invaluable service, and despite
appreciation for her assistance to persons going through the
surrogacy process because of her own experience, the judge
found that the expenses she claimed fell foul of the provisions of
section 301, and declared the agreements between her and the
commissioning parents unlawful and unenforceable (para [53]).
The declaration of unlawfulness gave rise to the second
question, namely, whether the surrogate motherhood agreement
(which complied with all the other requirements of the Children’s
Act and guidelines) could be confirmed (para [54]). The appli-
cants relied on the decision in Ex parte MS 2014 (3) SA 415 (GP)
where the court confirmed a surrogate motherhood agreement
after fertilisation, despite the fact that section 296(1)(a) prohibits
fertilisation of a surrogate mother before the surrogacy agree-
ment has been confirmed by a court (para [58]; note, however,
that it is s 296 and not s 298 as stated in that paragraph). The
applicants argued that, as was held in Ex parte MS, contravention
of a provision of the Children’s Act does not preclude a court from
confirming an agreement – not even if the contravention carries a
penal sanction. The court, however, distinguished the MS case
from the applications under discussion as the right of the child to
be conceived in this way was in no way threatened in the present
matter (para [61]).
After considering the principles that have evolved in the law of
contract, Tolmay J concluded that it should be established
whether the unlawful contract had tainted the lawful contract to
such an extent that the lawful contract could not be endorsed.
The judge then referred to case law on the law of contract
indicating that a range of factors must be considered on a
case-by-case basis, including the nature and degree of the
unlawful act, and the way in which it is linked to the lawful
agreement (Gibson v Van der Walt 1952 (1) SA 262 (A) 269G–H
and Richards v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd 1907 TH 24 29). She
decided that the appropriate approach regarding surrogacy
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agreements would be to allow the court a discretion, which
should be exercised keeping in mind the legislative framework
and the ban on commercial surrogacy (para [67]). The judge
thereupon considered the notion that the surrogate mothers in
both applications before the court did not appear to be vulner-
able women who may have been exploited. They were willing to
engage in the surrogacy process on a purely altruistic basis. The
judge also considered the difficulty of finding suitable surrogates,
which may well have been exacerbated by the absence of a
proper regulatory framework for potential surrogate mothers. In
addition, she took into consideration that the coordinator might
have been under the bona fide impression that she was allowed
to enter into agreements with the applicants (para [69]). More-
over, the parties to the applications did not act in a morally
reprehensible manner that could impact on the validity of the
surrogate motherhood agreements (para [70]). Tolmay J noted
that she also considered the very human desire of the applicants
to have children who, through no fault of their own, were unable to
conceive a child themselves. Finally, in exercising her discretion
she confirmed the surrogacy agreements despite the declaration
of unlawfulness of the facilitation agreements (para [71]).
Consequently the court order included a declaration that the
surrogacy facilitation agreements were unlawful and unenforce-
able, but that the surrogate motherhood agreements were con-
firmed. The medical practitioners were authorised to proceed
with the artificial fertilisation procedures (para [72]). In so doing,
this case followed the trend that a surrogate motherhood agree-
ment may be confirmed despite one of the statutory requirements
not having been met (Ex parte MS above). This inevitably raises
many questions and concerns, the first of which has already been
pointed out by Louw in the context of Ex parte MS, namely that
it effectively sanctions a departure from statutory provisions
(Ex parte MS 2014 JDR 0102’ (2014) 1 De Jure 116ff). Ex parte
HP (above) also highlights, and by implication at least also
acknowledges, the role of agencies or surrogacy facilitators in
the process. Tolmay J opined that a regulatory framework should
be established which may include a possible database of
potential surrogate mothers (para [69]). Henceforth, either the
Children’s Act or the regulations should spell out what the
qualifications and the involvement of the facilitators may or may
not entail. In both the applications under discussion, the surro-
gacy coordinator stated very explicitly that she did not charge an
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introduction fee, but from the facts it is evident that she intro-
duced the commissioning parents to the surrogate mother. (Note
the criticism by, eg, M Carnelly ‘Ex parte WH 2011 6 SA 514
(GNP)’ (2012) 45 De Jure 184–85 andALouw ‘Surrogacy in South
Africa: Should we reconsider the current approach?’ (2013) 76
THRHR 576, regarding the courts’ apparent reluctance to deal
with the role of an agency – in this instance in Ex parte WH –
decisively.) Finally, if certain payments in respect of surrogacy
are not prohibited, should the ban on commercial surrogacy not
be reconsidered?
LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CHILD AND HIS OR HER
UNMARRIED PARENTS
Exercise of parental responsibilities and rights
In VN v MD & another 2017 (2) SA 328 (ECG) the Eastern Cape
High Court considered an appeal based on a revised parenting
plan confirmed by the Children’s Court in terms of section 33 of
the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. The parties in this case, who were
unmarried parents sharing parental responsibilities and rights,
had drawn up an initial parenting plan which was made an order
of the Children’s Court. This was followed by revisions to the plan,
ostensibly granting extended access of the father to the child.
The latest parenting plan, as confirmed by the Children’s Court,
became the subject of an appeal by the child’s mother who
opposed the extended access. The child was represented by an
employee of the Legal Aid Board duly appointed in terms of
section 55 of the Children’s Act.
Eksteen J criticised the presiding officer in the Children’s Court
for the inadequate record of proceedings in that court placed
before the High Court. It consisted of only two pages and gave no
indication whether the evidence was oral or not, or whether it had
been given under oath or not. Moreover, it did not reveal the
source of the evidence, or refer to any documentation that might
have been handed in for consideration, or to any reports which
the presiding officer might have considered (para [6]). Most
concerning was the fact that no foundation for the order made
was reflected in the record (paras [7] [8]).
The presiding officer in the Children’s Court was given the
opportunity to advance reasons for the decision and the order
made. Again, Eksteen J found the reasons inadequate (para [9]).
For instance, the magistrate stated that in extending access she
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had relied on the father’s good relationship with the child.
However, no basis for coming to such a conclusion was advanced,
and it did not appear that she had access to any documentary
evidence to support her assertion (para [13]). In addition, the
magistrate stated that she had considered the observations of a
social worker concerning the child’s emotional connection and
comfort with the father, as well as the reasonableness of the
father’s expectations regarding sleep-over contact. To the extent
that the magistrate relied on the reasonableness of the father’s
expectations, Eksteen J considered that to be a misdirection in
circumstances where the observations of the social worker were
made some fourteen months prior to the order made by the
Children’s Court. The court made it clear that the presiding officer
was required to consider the best interests of the child, and not
the expectations of any particular parent, and was prepared to
grant the appeal on that basis (para [15]). The ratio decidendi is
entirely in line with the Children’s Act, which makes it very clear
that a parenting plan must comply with the best-interests-of-the-
child standard (s 33(4)).
The court continued to consider some of the additional grounds
of appeal relating to the interpretation of the Children’s Act and
parenting plans. Parenting plans provide a mechanism for co-
holders of parental responsibilities and rights to reach agreement
on the exercise of their respective responsibilities and rights in
respect of the child (s 33(1)). If co-holders experience difficulties
in exercising their parental responsibilities and rights, court
intervention is not their first option. They must first engage with
one another and ‘seek to agree on a parenting plan’ (s 33(2)). The
Act requires the parties to a parenting plan to seek the assistance
of a family advocate, social worker, or psychologist, or mediation
through a social worker or other suitably qualified person, in
preparing such plan (s 33(5)).
Section 34 contains the formal requirements that a parenting
plan must meet, including the formalities for its amendment. In
this case it appears that the amended parenting plan had been
confirmed by the Children’s Court upon application by the father
alone, whereas section 34(5) requires such an application to be
made by ‘the parties’. Eksteen J noted that on face value this
appears to suggest that an application by one party in the face
of opposition from the other, is impermissible, but pointed to
the judgment in PD v MD 2013 (1) SA 366 (ECP), where that
interpretation was rejected. The judge thus accepted, without
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making any finding in this regard, that the father was entitled to
bring the application for amendment of the parenting plan, and
that the magistrate was empowered to grant an order on the
application of only one parent (para [18]). However, Eksteen J
alluded to another misdirection in the order of the Children’s
Court, where it was concluded that consultation with profession-
als is not a requirement for amendment of parenting plans. While
section 33(5) does not pertinently require that a variation of the
parenting plan must be prepared with the assistance of a family
advocate, social worker, or psychologist, Eksteen J held that on
considering the structure of Part 3 of Chapter 3 of the Children’s
Act, it becomes clear that in pursuing any agreement, including
the amendment of an existing agreement, in respect of the
exercise of parental responsibilities and rights, the parties are
required to consult a family advocate, social worker, or psycholo-
gist who is qualified to provide guidance as to the best interests
of the child, before approaching a court – especially in circum-
stances where a significant period has elapsed since the endorse-
ment of the previous parenting plan, and where the parties have
failed to agree (para [19]).
In granting the appeal by the child’s mother and setting aside
the order of the Children’s Court, the court must be applauded. I
am as convinced as the court that the presiding officer’s order
did not consider the best interests of the child at all, or to the
extent that it should have. I also agree with the interpretation of
section 34(5) in this case and in PD v MD 2013 (1) SA 366 (ECP)
paras [28] [29], and am firmly convinced that the consultation
and/or mediation required by section 33(5) when preparing a
parenting plan should also be followed when amending an
existing plan. The only criticism that may be levelled at the
judgment is that Eksteen J at times referred to parental rights and
responsibilities (eg, in paras [1] [19]), instead of parental respon-
sibilities and rights, while it is widely accepted that the priority
given to responsibilities rather than to rights in that phrase is not
a matter of semantics. It is meaningful and indicative of the shift
from parental rights to children’s rights in South African law.
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PROPERTY LAW (INCLUDING REAL SECURITY): CASE LAW
CG VAN DER MERWE*
JM PIENAAR†
REAL OR PERSONAL RIGHT?
In Bondev Midrand (Pty) Limited v Puling & another and a
related matter [2017] JOL 38971 (SCA) the appellant, Bondev, a
property developer, unsuccessfully sought an order obliging the
respondent to re-transfer to it a piece of land it had earlier
purchased from the appellant. The basis for the claim was that
the respondent had failed to comply with a condition registered
against the title deed obliging the respondent to erect a building
on the property within a prescribed period. The Gauteng High
Court, Pretoria, dismissed the developer’s claim on the basis that
Bondey was seeking to enforce a debt as envisaged in section
11(d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 which had prescribed
and become unenforceable as more than three years had
elapsed since had become due. The Supreme Court of Appeal
granted leave to appeal. The respondents contended that the
claim for re-transfer constituted a ‘debt’ for the purposes of
the PrescriptionAct, but not one envisaged in section 11(a), (b) or
(c) of the Act. They therefore submitted that, in terms of section
11(d) of the Act, the prescriptive period was three years. In
contrast, the developer (appellant) argued that the registered
condition gave rise to a real right (and not merely a personal
right), which did not prescribe within three years.
Leach JA referred in passing to the recently reported case of
Bondev Midrand (Pty) Ltd v Madzhie & others 2017 (4) SA 166
(GP), which the parties’ legal representatives correctly brought to
the attention of the court. In that case the court concluded that a
similar repurchase clause was grossly unfair to a purchaser
intending to build a residential home, that it infringed the constitu-
tional right to adequate housing, and that enforcing it would be
against public policy. The acting judge dealt with various consti-
* BA LLB (UOFS) BA (Hons) BCL (Oxon) LLD (SA). Advocate; Research Fellow,
Department of Private Law and Roman Law, University of Stellenbosch; Emeritus
Professor of Civil Law, School of Law, University of Aberdeen.
†B Iuris (Cum Laude) LLB LLM LLD (North-West University). Professor of Law,
University of Stellenbosch; Extraordinary Professor, North-West University.
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tutional issues and stated, amongst others, that the clause was
grossly unreasonable towards a purchaser who wished to pursue
the suburban dream incrementally, and that a repurchase clause
is ‘not central to the business of a developer or the operations of a
homeowners association,’ before concluding that enforcement of
the present type of repurchase clause should be refused (paras
[7] [8]). Leach JA correctly pointed out that the applicant in that
case wished to abandon an application for default judgment and
all that was required was the court’s consent. Leach JA found that
this was not an instance that required a formal judgment, let alone
one in respect of constitutional issues that had not been raised or
canvassed in the papers and in respect of which interested
parties had neither been forewarned nor heard. Consequently, it
was inappropriate for the court in Madzhie to have reached the
conclusion that it did in regard to the constitutionality and lack of
enforceability of the repurchase clause. Leach also found that it
was extremely unfortunate that the Registrar of Deeds now
viewed the judgment in Madzhie as binding and, consequently,
refused to register deeds containing such clauses which are
relatively common and are regularly registered at the instance of
developers and local authorities (paras [7]–[11]).
Returning to the question of whether the claim for re-transfer
constituted a debt capable of prescribing or a real right, Leach
JA explained that the condition in question consisted of two
clauses. The first obliged the transferee or its successors in title
to erect a dwelling on the property within a period of eighteen
months. The second provided that in the event of a dwelling not
being erected within that period, the appellant was entitled, but
not obliged, to have the property re-transferred to it against a
return of the purchase price (para [12]). As the first clause
reflected an intention to bind not only the transferee but also its
successors in title, it resulted in an encumbrance upon the
exercise of the owner’s rights of ownership of its land and,
therefore, gave rise to a real right – Willow Waters Homeowners
Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO & others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA)
(paras [16] [22]) and the authorities there cited (para [13]). On
the other hand, the right of the appellant to claim re-transfer of the
property against repayment of the original purchase price, as set
out in the second clause, did not amount to such an encum-
brance. This is a right which can only be enforced by a particular
person, the appellant, against a determined individual, and does
not bind third parties, which is the hallmark of a personal right
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which the appellant could exercise at its sole discretion. Standing
alone, that clause would not have carved out a portion of the
respondents’ dominium and would, therefore, be regarded as
creating a personal right (para [14]).
On the authority of, amongst others, British South Africa
Company v Bulawayo Municipality 1919 AD 84 93 and Lorentz v
Melle & others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049, Leach JA then pointed
out that although only real rights and not personal rights should
be registered against a title deed, the fact that a personal right is
registered does not, in itself, convert that right into a real right.
Leach JA then dealt with the appellant’s contention, with
reliance on Cape Explosive Works Ltd & another v Denel (Pty) Ltd
& others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA), that although the second clause
appeared to create a personal right, it was so inextricably linked
to the first clause – which clearly created a real right – that the two
clauses should be read together as creating a real right capable
of registration (para [15]–[17]). Leach JA explained that Denel’s
right under condition 2 to give notice to the transferor, Capex, that
the property was no longer being used for the specified purpose
provided, in Cape Explosive Works, a mechanism by which
terminate the restriction upon the rights of ownership. Conse-
quently, either Capex would repurchase the property, or, if Capex
was not inclined to do so, Denel would retain its ownership free of
the restriction. The encumbrance on the land created by condi-
tion 1 could only continue until Denel gave Capex a notice under
condition 2. Therefore, the restriction on ownership in condition 1
was inseparably bound up with condition 2 (para [18]).
By contrast, Leach JA found that the burden created by the first
clause in the present case – ie, the obligation to build a dwelling
on the property – was binding on the transferee (the respondent)
and its successors in title. The respondent had no right under the
second clause to bring that restriction to an end. Clause two
provided only that in the event of a failure to build a dwelling in the
time provided, the developer (appellant), as the transferor, could
recover the land against the payment of the purchase price if it so
wished. This was akin to providing the appellant with an option to
purchase which, on the authority of Barnhoorn NO v Duvenhage
& others 1964 (2) SA 486 (A) 494F–H, essentially constituted a
personal right. However, as the developer (appellant) was not
obliged to demand or claim re-transfer of the land, and the
obligation to build would remain extant so long as the respon-
dents retained their ownership, the restriction on ownership
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created by clause 1 remained binding and would not be termi-
nated should the appellant elect not to seek re-transfer. The two
clauses read together, therefore, did not constitute ‘a composite
whole’ restricting the respondents’ use of the property. Therefore,
the second clause, under which the developer (appellant) could
choose to claim re-transfer of the property, created no more than
a personal right akin to an option to purchase which was not
inseparably bound up with the first clause (paras [19] [20]).
In conclusion, Leach JA dealt with whether the debt which was
the subject of the claim in terms of the second clause had
prescribed. He found that it appeared to be settled that even on a
narrow meaning, a ‘debt’ includes the right to claim the return of
property. The court therefore concluded that, in the light of its
finding that the second clause of the condition did indeed create
no more than a personal right, the appellant’s claim in each case
had been correctly dismissed by the court a quo on the basis of
prescription (paras [21] [22]).
In Mokone v Tassos Properties CC & another 2017 (5) SA 456
(CC) it was held that for a right of pre-emption in a renewable
lease agreement to be extended, it was unnecessary for a written
extension of the lease to comply with the formalities prescribed in
section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. The court
reasoned that the formalities laid down by the Alienation of Land
Act applied only to alienations of land as defined in the Act. In the
case of a right of pre-emption, an alienation, as defined, occurs
only when that right is exercised and a sale comes into being.
Merely affording someone that right was simply not an alienation
in the form of a sale, exchange, or donation (paras [47] [48]).
With regard to the fundamental nature of a right of pre-emption,
the Constitutional Court remarked (para [61]):
The holder may simply make a signed written offer to purchase. If the
grantor accepts the offer in writing under signature, a sale that meets
the formalities will come into being. If she or he does not, the holder of
the right may seek a declarator by a court that she or he is entitled to
the exercise of the right and a mandamus requiring the grantor to
accept the offer in writing. If the relief is warranted, it must be granted
(para [54]).
See also the conclusion reached by the Constitutional Court
after considering the view expressed in Hirschowitz v Moolman
1985 (3) SA 739 (A) as to the effect of the Oryx mechanism
adopted in Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx &
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Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) and Lubbe’s
reaction in 1985 Annual Survey 140–1:
We must not give on a silver platter and on formalistic, technical
grounds an easy way out to a grantor of a right of pre-emption who
wants to resile from a bargain concluded with her or his eyes wide
open. This is not making light of what the Alienation of Land Act seeks
to achieve. It is about averting abuse and injustice. After all, our
interpretation needs to be restrictive on the reach of the formalities
required by theAct. Of course, where an alienation of land must fail for
non-compliance with the formalities, so be it. The Act exists for a
reason.
POSSESSION
Mandament of van spolie
In Residents of Setjwetla Informal Settlement v Johannesburg
City 2017 (2) SA 516 (GJ) the applicants had built shacks on land
belonging to Johannesburg City (respondent – the City). The City
claimed that an illegal land invasion had taken place and
demolished the shacks without a court order. The applicants
claimed that they had been living in the shacks when they were
demolished, and were entitled to protection under the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of LandAct 19 of
1998 (the PIE Act). The City contended that the shacks were
half-built and unoccupied when demolished. Given the dispute
over the facts, the court enquired whether even on the City’s
version, a court order was nonetheless required. The court issued
a rule nisi calling upon the City to show cause why an interdict
should not be confirmed.
On the return day it was held that while the applicants had, by
starting with construction, unlawfully acquired possession of the
City’s land sufficient to constitute spoliation, the subsequent
demolition constituted unlawful self-help by the City; the PIE Act
was not applicable because the shacks had not yet been
completed or occupied (paras [13] [14]). In confirming the rule
nisi, the court stated that local authorities should not be permit-
ted, without court sanction, to move in with heavy equipment
whenever people moved onto their land (para [19]).
Crucial passages in the judgment are the following (paras
[13]–[18]):
In my view the conduct concerned was unlawful as being self-help.
What had occurred, in effect, is that the applicants had unlawfully
acquired possession of the shack sites. In doing so, they had
966 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 6 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/28−Property−Case−Law
unlawfully dispossessed the respondent of possession of those sites.
Their conduct thus amounted to spoliation, and they were obliged,
before all else, to restore possession of the sites to the respondent.
At that stage, that is before the shacks had been completed and had
been occupied, the provisions of PIE were not yet applicable. The
respondent was therefore not yet obliged to follow the prerequisites
laid down. But that does not mean that the applicants had not yet
acquired sufficient possession so as to constitute unlawful spoliation.
On the respondent’s version, they had commenced constructing
shacks on the respondent’s land, implying that they had driven poles
into the ground; perhaps wrapped corrugated-iron sheets around
some of those; perhaps fixed roofing material on top of those. That
implies further that they actually moved around on the land, at least in
the areas of those sites, while they were busy with their construction
endeavours. It also implies that their own movable assets were affixed
with a measure of permanence, at least to such measure that it could
afford effective protection against the elements.
In a sense, the respondent found itself between the proverbial rock
and a hard place in this regard. If there were not sufficient presence
on behalf of the applicants to constitute possession, there was
probably not enough to demolish; if the shacks had reached such a
state of completion that they could be (and therefore likely were)
occupied, PIE applied. Therefore, since the respondent did in fact
demolish, then, unless the respondent would concede that PIE
applied (which it did not), there was enough of possession on the part
of the applicants to constitute spoliation for purposes of the manda-
ment van spolie.
Some reflection on the underlying rationale for the mandament
underscores the point. It is to prevent self-help; to foster respect for
the rule of law; and to encourage the establishment and maintenance
of a regulated society.
If local authorities were permitted to move in with heavy engineering
equipment, without first obtaining court sanction, whenever people
moved onto their land, that encourages conduct which in our society
with its history is reminiscent of a time best forgotten.
In Jigger Properties CC v Maynard NO & others 2017 (4) SA
569 (KZP), the deed of sale in terms of which the appellant
(J Prop) purchased an exclusive-use area in a sectional title
scheme, acknowledged an agreement between the seller and a
third party (a trust represented by the first three respondents)
entitling the trust to access to the property for the purpose of
servicing underground storage tanks. The fourth respondent was
a close corporation (the CC) which took over the trust’s business
during 2010, the same year in which J Prop acquired the
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property. The CC’s right of access to the tanks was governed by a
lease agreement with the trust.
During February 2012, J Prop suggested (for the first time) that
the trust and/or the CC pay a market-related rental of R3 000 per
month for access to the tanks, and by April 2013 threatened to
deny any of the respondents access in the absence of payment.
The respondents countered that unless J Prop withdrew this
threat and confirmed that it would not interfere with their right of
access to the tanks, they would approach the High Court for
appropriate relief. Not having received the response demanded,
the respondents brought an urgent application for spoliatory
relief. They contended that their right of access amounted to a
quasi-possession in the form of a right of servitude, demonstrated
by the actual use of that servitude; and that J Prop’s threats
amounted to dispossession thereof. J Prop, in a separate case,
brought an application for a declaratory order that no servitude or
other right of access existed in favour of the respondents in
respect of the exclusive-use area, and for an order prohibiting the
respondents from accessing it without its permission. This
attracted a counter-application by the respondents in which they,
in turn, sought an order declaring that they had rights of access in
terms of an unregistered servitude.
The High Court granted a mandament van spolie in favour of
the respondents and dismissed J Prop’s application for a declara-
tory order. In this case, consisting of appeals against both
decisions heard together by the full bench, the main issues were:
(a) whether the respondents’ access to the exclusive use area
amounted to a quasi-possession which was deserving of protec-
tion by means of a mandament van spolie; and (b) whether a threat
of spoliation amounted to an act of spoliation entitling a party to
relief by way of a mandament van spolie.
With regard to (a), the court found that the respondents’ right to
access the tanks flowed from a contractual arrangement between
the parties spanning a number of years. This right which the trust
and the CC were exercising, and which J Prop threatened to
stop, in fact merely amounted to a right of access. The trust and
the CC neither occupied the premises, nor did they exercise any
physical control over it. The respondents’ access to the premises
was for a specific purpose: to service and maintain their tanks
from time to time. None of this could be achieved without
the cooperation of the appellant, which owned unit 16 and the
exclusive area attached to it.
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The court explained that ATM Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Olkru
Handelaars CC & another 2009 (4) SA 337 (SCA) emphasised
that instances where quasi-possession has been protected by a
spoliation order have almost invariably dealt with the rights to use
property, for example, servitudes or the purported exercise of
servitudes. The court then found that a claim to a servitutal right
would only apply in a sectional scheme such as this, in terms of
either the rules (s 27A) or their registration in the deeds office
(s 29). The court pointed out that neither of these considerations
applied in the present case as no such rights of access to the
tanks on the exclusive-use area had been conferred on any of
the respondents in terms of the rules, and neither were such
rights registered in the deeds office. The absence of a clearly
recognised and registered servitutal right in favour of the trust
strengthened the view that its claim to a right of access flowed
from an agreement concluded between the trust and the CC. At
no stage had the CC granted, nor had it ever been requested to
grant, a servitude in favour of the trust over the exclusive-use
area.
The court stated that it is well-established that mere personal
rights are not protected by the mandament and that protection by
a spoliation order only warrants protection of rights to use or
occupy property, or incidents of occupation. As their right of
access was the consequence of an agreement and not an
incident of actual possession, their claim amounted to nothing
more than a claim for specific performance of their contractual
rights. Consequently, the court held that the enforcement of such
a claim was not permissible by way of a mandament van spolie
(paras [18] [21]–[23]).
At this point it must be noted that if a servitude of access were
to have been established in terms of the rules of the scheme, it
would likewise not result in a real right in favour of the trust or the
CC. It had been established that the rules of a sectional titles
scheme rest on a contractual relationship between the owners of
the scheme. It is also difficult to identify the type of servitude that
would otherwise be registered. It would not be a praedial
servitude as it would not be created in favour of a neighbouring
plot of land. It would have amounted to a type of irregular
servitude in favour of the trust and later the CC.
With regard to (b), the court pointed out that there were
fundamental differences between the mandament van spolie,
which was aimed at the recovery of lost possession, and a final
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interdict to prohibit a threatened spoliation or dispossession. In
the unreported judgment by Boruchowitz J in Outdoor Network
Ltd v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa GJ 26064/2013
(30 May 2013) (para [25]), it was pointed out that the mandament
van spolie could not be invoked to prohibit a threatened spolia-
tion – it was only available to a de facto possessor who had been
despoiled. While possessory remedies to prevent a threatened
spoliation were available in Roman-Dutch law, namely the manda-
ment van complainte and the mandament van maintenue, these
had not been imported into South African law. Thus an essential
requirement to qualify for spoliatory relief is that there must have
been a spoliation, consisting of a ‘wrongful deprivation of anoth-
er’s right of possession’. Without an actual and wrongful depriva-
tion of their purported right of possession, the spoliatory relief
sought was not warranted from the outset. Consequently, the
relief sought through a mandament van spolie was not available
in the instance of a mere threat of dispossession (paras [14] [24]
[25]).
OWNERSHIP
Obligation of landowner in respect of fire burning on his or her land
In MTO Forestry (Pty) Ltd v Swart NO 2017 (5) SA 76 (SCA) the
court held that a landowner’s duty to control or extinguish a fire
burning on its land is not absolute. Rather, all that is required is
that the landowner take steps to avoid the fire spreading that are
reasonable in the circumstances. A reasonable landowner is,
therefore, not obliged to ensure that in all circumstances a fire on
his or her property will not spread beyond its boundaries. If he or
she takes reasonable steps and the fire nevertheless spreads, he
or she cannot be held liable for negligence simply because
additional steps could have been taken.
Obligation of landowner in respect of structures erected on land
In City of Johannesburg v Friedshelf 1120 (Pty) Ltd (2016/
44430) [2017] ZAGPJHC 1 (3 January 2017) the court held that
where an activity or structure located on property causes a nuisance
or danger to others, it is, in terms of South African common law,
the responsibility of the owner to stop the nuisance or remove
the danger, irrespective of who on the property might have been
responsible.
Effect of statutory power to lay pipeline across private land
In Rand Water Board v Big Cedar 22 (Pty) Ltd [2017] 1 All SA
698 (SCA), the Rand Water Board had laid underground pipe-
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lines over certain property before the respondent became owner
of that property. The respondent was unaware of the existence of
the pipelines when it acquired the property. During the course
of the following year, the Rand Water Board informed the respon-
dent of the pipelines and suggested that a servitude be regis-
tered over the property in accordance with its standard terms and
conditions. However, as the parties could not agree on the
amount of compensation payable by the Rand Water Board to
the respondent, attempts to register a servitude failed.
The respondent subsequently launched an action against the
Rand Water Board advancing two claims. The first claim was
characterised as a vindicatory claim on the ground that the
pipelines had been constructed, installed, and were being used
by the appellant without the consent or permission of the respon-
dent, and without any servitude or other limited real right having
been registered. The respondent alleged further that the Rand
Water Board refused to remove the pipelines and thereby pre-
vented the respondent from having the unhindered enjoyment of
its property. On that basis the respondent sought an order that
the appellant remove the pipelines, alternatively that it register a
servitude in respect of that portion of the property, or take transfer
of that land against payment of the amount of R6,6 million.
The respondent’s second claim was that the presence of the
pipelines constituted an infringement of its fundamental right to
property. The respondent contended that the Rand Water Board
was entitled either to expropriate the relevant portion of the
property or to burden the land with a servitude, against the
payment of compensation, but had failed to do so. The respon-
dent accordingly alleged that its rights had been infringed, as
a result of which the Rand Water Board had been unjustifiably
enriched and had benefited at its expense. The respondent
sought an order for payment of a reasonable rental, alternatively
compensation in an amount of R38 500 per month. Failing this,
it sought payment of that amount by way of constitutional
damages.
The court indicated that shortly after the second pipeline had
been laid on the property, the Water ServicesAct 108 of 1997 had
repealed the previous Act with effect from 19 December 1997.
The 1997 Act contained provisions directed at the transition of
various water boards, including the Rand Water Board. The key
provisions were contained in section 84(4) and (6). The effect of
section 84(6) was that, if laying the two pipelines was lawful when
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it was done, it remained lawful after the Water Services Act came
into operation, provided that it was something that was permitted
in terms of the 1997 Act (paras [8]–[11]).
The court found that there was no dispute that the section
empowered the Rand Water Board to lay both pipelines – the
laying of the pipelines was lawful in terms of section 24(j) of
the Act. Section 24(j)(i) provided that before entering upon
property to lay a pipeline, the Board was obliged to give the
owner of the property at least seven clear days’ notice of its
intentions. The respondent submitted that the evidence showed
that no such notice had been given and, therefore, that the
appellant’s actions had been unlawful from the outset. The court
did not agree that the assumed failure to comply with the said
requirement rendered appellant’s actions in laying the pipelines
unlawful and unauthorised by section 24(j), on two grounds.
Firstly, that case was not pleaded, as the respondent pleaded
that the Board had placed the pipelines on the property and used
them for its own purposes without the consent or permission of
the respondent, and without any servitude or other limited real
right being registered over the property (para [14]).
In the second claim it was averred that that conduct infringed
respondent’s rights to the exclusive use of its property. The Board
pleaded that it was entitled to keep, repair, and maintain the
pipelines and to enter upon respondent’s property for such
purposes, and that no servitude was required to enable it to
exercise its rights and obligations in that regard (para [15]).
There was no replication to that plea as required of the respon-
dent. In terms of Uniform Rule 25(2), the respondent had to
contend that the Board in truth purported to act in terms of that
power in constructing the pipelines, or challenge the validity of
the exercise. It needed that power on the ground of a failure to
comply with the statutory requirements for its exercise; it needed
to replicate and identify the point as an issue in the litigation. By
not raising this point, the respondent had failed to alert the
appellant to the issue, and prevented it from responding properly
to it. Therefore, it was not open to the respondent to rely upon the
relevant point on appeal (para [20]).
The substantive reason for rejecting the respondent’s argument
was that on a proper interpretation of section 24(j)(i), a failure to
comply with the notice provision did not render the laying of the
pipelines unlawful (para [22]). Consequently, the Board had acted
lawfully in installing the two pipelines. The conclusion that the
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appellant had acted lawfully disposed of both the claim for
removal of the pipelines and the cross-appeal. The appeal was
upheld and order of the High Court replaced with one dismissing
the respondent’s claim.
In the course of his judgment Wallis JA explained (para [23]):
The clear purpose of the requirement that notice be given to the owner
of a property before entering upon the property and undertaking work,
is to enable the owner to engage with Rand Water over the impact that
the work of laying the pipeline will have upon the owner’s activities. It
also affords the owner an opportunity to make arrangements to ensure
that its own activities are disturbed as little as possible by the
proposed work upon its property. But the period of notice is short, so
that planning for any extensive work, such as the laying of the two
pipelines in this case, and the decision to undertake that work, would
have occurred and been finalised long before the notification to the
owner. That means that the notice’s purpose was not to enable the
owner to dissuade Rand Water from laying the pipeline, or in any
significant degree to cause it to alter its plans. It was rather to ensure
that when workmen come on site to undertake the laying of the
pipeline inconvenience to the owner would be minimised and the
owner would be given an opportunity to, for example, move stock or
goods away from the working area and take other steps to protect its
own property. There is nothing in this to suggest that a failure to give
notice to the owner invalidates the act of laying the pipeline.
With regard to the alternative order – to register a servitude
over the property in respect of the two pipelines, and that Rand
Water pay it R6,6 million as compensation – the court pointed out
that the exercise of powers in terms of section 24(j) was a very
different matter from exercising rights in terms of a registered
servitude in that an element of indeterminacy arises from the
exercise of a power to enter property and lay a pipeline. This is
largely absent from a registered servitude. In the former case
there is scope for dispute as to the extent to which the property
owner may undertake works in the immediate vicinity of the
pipeline. How close to the pipeline may the owner erect a
building or install other services, such as electricity cables or
sewage pipes? May the owner allow vehicles to cross the
pipeline or mine under the pipeline? May the surface be used for
agricultural purposes and, if so, what constraints are to apply?
Once a servitude has been registered its terms will ordinarily
dispose of these questions. All of these issues were dealt with in a
draft deed of servitude that was part of the record explaining
Rand Water’s willingness to offer some compensation to the
respondent in return for its consent to the registration of a
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servitude in this case. The compensation was payable in return
for securing certainty in regard to the respective rights of the
parties (para [29]). Consequently, accepting that Rand Water
was entitled to exercise a power of expropriation in order to
secure servitutal rights in relation to the pipelines, there was
nothing in the Act that required it to do so before constructing the
pipelines. Its statutory right differed from any right it would
acquire from a registered servitude (para [31]).
With regard to the claim for constitutional damages, the court
found that such a claim would need to rest on the provisions of
section 25 of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to property.
Its operation is triggered either by an expropriation or by a
deprivation of property. These could only have occurred when the
pipelines were constructed; in the present case they took place
before the pipelines were constructed (para [34]).
Rights of property owner when faced with large and historic municipal
utility bills
Argent Industrial Investment (Pty) Ltd v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan
Municipality 2017 (3) SA 146 (GJ) is an important acknow-
ledgment of rights of the owner of immovable property when
faced with large and historic municipal utility bills. In this instance,
the owner received and paid water bills based on an estimated
reading over a period of some 51,5 years. When the municipality
subsequently took an actual reading, it emerged that the actual
and estimated consumption differed, and the owner was billed for
an additional R1,1 million. The court held that the charges older
than three years had prescribed, and that the municipality had
erred in arguing that prescription only commenced running once
the owner was billed.
Unauthorised use of single residential property as guesthouse
The dispute in Du Toit NO & others v Coenoe 90 CC & others
(1584/2017) [2017] ZAFSHC 126 (2 August 2017) relates to the
running of a guesthouse in a suburb in Bethlehem in the Free
State. The action was brought by neighbours in the street, after
incidents of noise and disruption originating from conduct of
guests of the Pandora’s Guest House. The neighbours argued
that the use of the property as a guest house or place of
accommodation was in contravention of both the title conditions
and the Bethlehem Town Planning Scheme. They therefore sought
an order interdicting the property owner from continuing with the
illegal use of the property.
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The court held that the neighbours were owners and/or resi-
dents in the same street as the Pandora’s Guest House where the
contravention of the municipal zoning provisions occurred. The
owners therefore had the necessary locus standi to approach the
court. The court further found that the fact that the incidents
complained of were disputed was not in itself sufficient for a court
to grant an interim interdict without further evidence being led. In
this context, the court also found it relevant that the guesthouse
had been in operation for quite some time and the neighbours
had shown no urgency in bringing the application to stop it
operating. However, the court found that no proof had been
offered to the court of the apparent permission granted to
Pandora’s Guest House, and that the informal authority alleged
could not replace the formal authority envisaged by the relevant
ordinances and regulations for a departure from the rights of use
applicable to the property. Consent or special use as a guest-
house can be granted only after the correct procedure has been
followed. This entails, in particular, that proper notices be given to
the property owners in the vicinity of the guesthouse, and
published in the local newspaper. Until the circumstances have
been considered and permission granted, the guesthouse on the
property is being run illegally. Consequently, the court held that
the requirements for an interdict had been met and granted an
order in favour of the neighbours.
TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Abstract theory of transfer
In Jacobs NO & others v Salut La Vie Estate (Pty) Ltd; In re:
Salut La Vie Estate (Pty) Ltd v Jacobs NO & others (1146/2016)
[2017] ZANCHC 11 (10 February 2017), Salut La Vie (SLV)
entered into an agreement of sale in respect of certain portions of
agricultural land still to be subdivided. When the Vryburg deeds
registry refused to pass transfer as the consent of the Minister of
Agriculture was required for the subdivision and sale of the land
in terms of the Subdivision of Agricultural LandAct 70 of 1970, the
trust entered into an addendum agreement signed by only two of
the three trustees. In terms of the addendum, SVL and the trust
agreed to transfer the entire property into the name of the trust for
the purchase price set out in the main agreement, subject to the
trust re-transferring the portion which did not initially form part of
the object of the earlier agreement of sale to SLV on demand and
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at no consideration. It was presumably foreseen by the parties
that such re-transfer would take place once ministerial consent to
the registration and transfer had been obtained. The property
was transferred to the trust in May 2010.
When the trust failed to re-transfer the designated remainder to
SLV, SLV approached the court for a declaratory order contend-
ing, amongst other things, that the addendum was null and void
as it was not signed by all three trustees. The trust noted an
exception to SLV’s claim on the basis that the allegations did not
support a cause of action for the re-transfer of the property. In
essence, the trust argued that it could not be said that the transfer
was void, despite the invalidity of the addendum. The trust
contended that South African law requires ownership of immov-
ably property to pass in terms of the abstract theory: (a) delivery
which is effected by registration of transfer in a deeds registry;
coupled with (b) a ‘real agreement’ showing consensus between
the parties for the transfer of ownership in the property from one
to the other. If these two requirements have been met, a defect
in the underlying agreement – such as non-compliance with the
provisions of section 2(1) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land
Act – does not affect the validity of the transfer of ownership to a
bona fide purchaser and the property cannot be vindicated.
The court held that to succeed with an exception to a claim, an
excipient must show that on every reasonable interpretation of
the claimant’s particulars of claim, no cause of action is dis-
closed. In other words, the trust had to show that the case as
pleaded by SLV could not succeed on a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the facts.
The court found that as one of the trustees had not signed the
addendum, the trust had not been properly represented and this
constituted a formal defect in the underlying agreement and
non-compliance with section 2(1) of the Subdivision of Agricul-
tural Land Act, which resulted in the land not having been
alienated. The court further found that as the trust, as purchaser,
had not performed in full under the addendum, section 28(2) of
the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act did not apply and, in
terms of this addendum, the underlying agreement could not be
deemed valid. As, on the other hand, SLV had performed its
obligations, section 28(1) could apply to it and entitle it to recover
from the trust that which it had performed in terms of the
underlying agreement (including the addendum). The court
consequently concluded that if the exception is considered, it
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cannot not be said that on every interpretation which the particu-
lars of claim could reasonably bear, no cause of action had been
disclosed.
With regard to the application of the abstract theory, the court
reasoned that the absence of the third trustee’s signature was not
merely a case of the underlying agreement being void ab initio
and the real agreement remaining in existence. The court found
that it could be, as argued by SLV, that the absence of the
signature was not a mere formality but struck at the heart of
the transaction by impacting on the ability of the trust to be bound
by the addendum. In the absence of a joint decision by all the
trustees, there could never have been an expression of intent by
the trust to enter into an agreement and to accept transfer in the
circumstances. There could, therefore, be no real agreement as
consensus was lacking. The court concluded that on every
interpretation of the particulars of claim, it could not be said that a
cause of action had not been disclosed and dismissed the
exception.
Transfer of property in double sale: Doctrine of notice
In Anthony & another v Japies & others (17614/2016) [2017]
ZAWCHC 92 Mr and Mrs Japies sold their immovable property to
Mr and Mrs Anthony in June 2016 subject to the purchase price
being paid within ten working days of signature. The purchasers
paid the purchase price into the trust account of the con-
veyancing firm (BN Attorneys) within this period. Shortly there-
after, in July 2016, the Japies entered into a second agreement of
sale in respect of the same property with a Mr and Mrs Lodewyk,
without the knowledge of the Anthonys. In August 2016, the
conveyancing attorney appointed for the second sale (VT Attor-
neys) advised the estate agent of its appointment to attend to
the transfer. This appeared to have been communicated to the
attorney of the first purchasers and, on the same day, BN
Attorneys requested an undertaking from VT Attorneys that the
latter would not proceed with transfer pending a claim for specific
performance in terms of the first agreement.
Nonetheless, in September 2016, VT Attorneys advised BN
Attorneys that they were proceeding with transfer on specific
instructions to do so by the sellers, the Japies. VT Attorneys
indicated that in their opinion the first sale agreement had lapsed
as the purchase price had not been not paid as required by the
contract. The (second) purchasers were apprised of the risks.
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There was no allegation by the sellers that the first purchasers
had breached the agreement, and neither had they issued a
letter of demand to the first purchasers. Transfer was effected in
the name of the second purchasers on 30 September 2016.
On 4 October 2016, unaware that the property had already been
transferred, the first purchasers issued the present application
seeking to interdict the transfer of the property to the second
purchasers, and to compel the seller to transfer the property
to them.The sellers did not file an answering affidavit, and an (interim)
order was granted interdicting the transfer of the property, and a
return date set by which the sellers had to show why they should not
be ordered to comply with the provisions of the first agreement.
The sellers then filed an affidavit stating that the interim
interdict should not be made final as the property had already
been transferred and registered to a third party. The main issue
faced by the court was whether the Anthonys, the first purchasers,
were entitled to an order for transfer of the property to them.
The court explained that the matter concerned a ‘double sale’
and the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure (he who is
earlier in time, is stronger in law) had to be considered in relation
to the competing rights of the two sets of purchasers. In accor-
dance with the maxim, transfer of the property to the Lodewyks
was no bar to the claim of the first purchasers for transfer of the
property. In Bowring NO v Vrededorp Properties CC 2007 (5) SA
391 SCA (paras [15]–[18]) it was held that there is no reason in
principle why a first purchaser should not be allowed to claim
transfer of the property directly from a second purchaser who
acquired the property while aware of the first sale. However, it is
well-established in South African case law that in order to do this,
the first purchaser would have to show that the second purchaser
foresaw the possibility of the first purchaser’s prior right, but
persisted with the sale. In this scenario, the court found on the
authority of Meridian Bay Restaurant (Pty) Ltd & others v Mitchell
NO 2011 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (paras [18] [19]), that it was not
necessary for the first purchaser to prove fraud or mala fides on
the part of the second purchaser; it sufficed to establish that
the second purchaser subjectively foresaw the possibility of the
existence of the first purchaser’s personal right, but proceeded
with the acquisition regardless (paras [22]–[24]).
The first purchasers contended that when, during 2017, the
existence of the present court application was made known to
the second purchasers, the latter did not indicate that they would
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oppose the matter in any way, which indicated, so the first
purchasers argued, that they had known about the first agree-
ment (para [25]).
The court held that it was open to the second purchasers to file
an affidavit in this matter to the effect that they had had no
knowledge of the first agreement, but that they would not oppose
the application and would abide by the court’s decision (this
would have shielded them from costs). If they in fact had not
known of the first agreement, they would have had an unassail-
able claim. By not responding at all, they allowed the (unfortu-
nate) inference to be drawn that they had in fact known of the first
agreement. In these circumstances, it appeared that they indeed
had knowledge of the first agreement and could therefore not
escape the consequences flowing from proceeding with the
transfer (para [26]).
Rates clearance certificate under section 118(3) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 33 of 2000
In two recent cases the constitutionality of section 118(3) of the
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 was
scrutinised. In Jordaan & another v Tshwane City & another, and
four similar cases 2017 (2) SA 295 (GP), the North Gauteng High
Court, Pretoria, declared the statutory charge on property in
terms of section 118(3) of the Act unconstitutional to the extent
that the charge survived the transfer of ownership to an owner
who was not a debtor of the municipality with regard to debts
incurred prior to transfer.
In terms of section 118(1) of the Act, the municipality must
certify that all amounts, such as rates and municipal service
charges, have been paid before the Registrar of Deeds may pass
transfer. In this case, five applications were heard together, in
which all the applicants had taken transfer of property in respect
of which so-called ‘historical debts’ – ie, debts incurred before the
two-year period envisaged by section 118(1) – were owing. The
municipalities concerned argued that they were entitled to demand
that all historical debts be paid before entering into service
agreements with new owners on the ground that historical debts,
being ‘a charge upon the property’ as contemplated in section
118(3) of the Act, survived transfer of ownership and so were
enforceable against new owners and their successors in title
(para [8]).The main issue was the constitutionality of section
118(3), more particularly whether section 118(3) permitted arbi-
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trary deprivation of property contrary to section 25(1) of the
Constitution.
With regard to whether section 118(3) constituted a depriva-
tion, the court pointed out that the section is a security provision
without a time limit, and therefore operates irrespective of who the
present owner was. Consequently, reliance on section 118(3)
would entitle a municipality to perfect its security (subject to
compliance with its own bylaws) by obtaining a court order,
selling the property in execution, and applying the proceeds to
pay off the historical debt. This meant that section 118(3) could
result in a loss of ownership for new or subsequent owners and,
consequently, a loss of the ability to use, enjoy, or exploit the
property. Even in the absence of actual loss, the mere existence
of such a drastic remedy constituted a severe limitation of a new
owner’s property rights in terms of section 25(1) and so a
deprivation for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution
(paras [9] [10] [23] [24]).
With regard to whether the deprivation was arbitrary, the court
explained that a deprivation of property is arbitrary when the law
concerned does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation
in question. Sufficient reason would, inter alia, depend on the
extent and purpose of the deprivation. As the perfection of
section 118(3) security could result in the complete and perma-
nent removal or loss of ownership, the court held that the
deprivation was substantial. The legislative purpose of section
118(3) was to provide security for the payment of outstanding
municipal charges, not to authorise expropriation. This purpose
could be achieved whilst the property was still registered in the
name of the current owner without extending it to new or
subsequent owners who had no connection with any of the
historical debts. However, the present wording of section 118(3)
indiscriminately extends the purpose of deprivation far beyond
what is necessary. No matter how important the legislative
objective, it could not be justified to force property owners to pay
the municipal debts of their predecessors in title, or to forfeit their
ownership if they refused to do so. The new or subsequent owner
was neither a debtor of the municipality with regard to historical
debts, nor was he or she in a position to prevent the accumulation
of historical debts before transfer was effected. In the absence of
any such relevant relationship between the purpose of the
deprivation and the person whose property was affected, namely
the new or subsequent owner, the court found that no sufficient
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reason existed for section 118(3) to deprive new or subsequent
owners (other than the current owner before transfer takes place)
of their title in the property concerned. The deprivation with
regard to new or subsequent owners was therefore arbitrary for
purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution (paras [20] [25]–[26],
[32] [36] [38]–[39]).
The court then considered whether the deprivation or limitation
was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
as contemplated in section 36 of the Constitution. The court found
that the findings that section 118(3) constituted a deprivation, that
no sufficient reason existed for such deprivation, and that it was
arbitrary with regard to new or subsequent owners of the property
concerned, were sufficient also to conclude that this deprivation
or limitation was not reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society (para [44]).
Finally, the court held that the appropriate order would be to
declare section 118(3) constitutionally invalid to the extent only
that the security provision – the ‘charge upon the property’ –
survived transfer of ownership into the name of a new or
subsequent owner who was not a debtor of the municipality with
regard to debts incurred prior to transfer (para [103]). The court
dealt separately with the applications against the City of Tshwane
and the Ekurhuleni Municipality (paras [46]–[99]).
In Chantelle Jordaan & others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality & others 2017 (6) SA 287 (CC), [2017] ZACC 31 the
metropolitan municipalities of Tshwane and Ekurhuleni brought
an application in the Constitutional Court to appeal the North
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, decision in Jordaan v City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality; New Ventures Consulting &
Services (Pty) Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality;
Livanos v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality; Oak Plant Rentals
(Pty) Ltd v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2017 (2) SA 295
(GP). The Constitutional Court held that municipalities cannot
hold a new property owner liable for a previous owner’s historical
municipal debt. This ruling gives relief to home and business
owners who have been saddled with years of historical municipal
debt – some dating back twenty years – and have been denied
municipal services until the debt has been paid. The outstanding
debt includes water, electricity, and rates and taxes charges
associated with a property unit. In the majority judgment, Justice
Cameron found that upon transfer of property, a new owner was
not liable for old municipal debt. The Constitutional Court upheld
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the ruling by the High Court that liability for the old municipal debt
rests with the previous owner.
The matter came before the High Court after the City of
Tshwane and Ekurhuleni municipalities suspended, or refused to
contract for the supply of, municipal services to the applicants’
properties. This was on the basis that the applicants, who were
relatively recent transferees of municipal properties, owed the
municipalities for municipal services rendered to these properties
before transfer. In other words, the municipalities required these
new owners to pay historical municipal debts. The applicants
complained that they faced darkness, having no electricity, and
many other inhumane conditions because they had bought
property in respect of which the previous owners had failed to
meet their obligations to the municipality – and against whom the
municipality had failed to enforce its rights in fulfilment of its
constitutional obligations.
We have seen in the discussion of the previous case, that the
High Court found section 118(3) constitutionally invalid, but only
to the extent that it has the effect of transferring municipal debts
incurred before transfer to new or subsequent owners. The High
Court held this to be an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms
of section 25 of the Constitution. It found that new owners of
property are not liable for municipal debts incurred by previous
owners. Therefore, municipalities may not sell the property in
execution to recover the debt or refuse to supply municipal
services on the basis of outstanding historical debts.
In considering whether to confirm the High Court’s declaration
of constitutional invalidity, the Constitutional Court had to deter-
mine whether the provision, properly interpreted, in fact meant
that when a new owner takes transfer of a property, the property
remains burdened by the debts a previous owner incurred. If the
provision is capable of an interpretation that does not impose
constitutionally invalid consequences, the High Court’s declara-
tion of constitutional invalidity would be unnecessary.
Before the Constitutional Court, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni and now
eThekwini municipality, which was admitted as amicus curiae,
contended that a proper construction of section 118(3) was that
the charges survive transfer. They argued that for municipalities
properly to fulfil their constitutional duties of service delivery in
the greater good, they needed extraordinary debt collecting
measures. This meant burdening new owners with the responsi-
bility for historical debts. Both in the High Court and in the
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Constitutional Court, the Minister of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs also presented argument in support of the
municipalities’ stand.
The municipalities, however, conceded that nothing prevented
them from enforcing their claims for historical debts against those
who had incurred them, namely the previous owners. The munici-
palities conceded further that their powers included interdicting
any impending transfer to a new owner by obtaining an interdict
against the old, indebted owner, until the debts were paid.
Also admitted as amici curiae were the social housing organi-
sation, TUHF Ltd (the TUHF), the Banking Association of South
Africa (the BASA), an association of 32 member banks, and the
Johannesburg Attorneys Association (the JAA). The TUHF and
the BASA associated themselves with the applicants in challeng-
ing the meaning the municipalities ascribed to section 118(3).
They advanced further arguments including that section 118(3)
permitted arbitrary deprivation of not only the new owner’s
property rights, but of real security rights the new owner con-
ferred on any mortgage creditor who extended a fresh loan on the
security of the property post-transfer. The JAA focused on a
conveyancer’s duties and ethical position should the court hold
that the section 118(3) right survives transfer (paras [13] [14]).
In a unanimous judgment, written by Cameron J, the Constitu-
tional Court weighed the historical (paras [16]–[27]), linguistic,
and common-law (paras [28]–[43]) factors bearing on how the
provision should be understood. Justice Cameron concluded
(paras [29] [30]):
The case law indicates that, without an express enactment conferring
preference above other holders of real rights in the property, the
embargo over property transfers until arrear rates are paid gives
the municipality no preference above registered rights holders in the
property. The cases also show that, enacted on its own, a legislatively
created ‘charge upon the property’ means no more than that a debt
may be recovered by execution upon the property. There is thus no
magic in the word ‘charge’, and no abstruse technical meaning
associated with it. The Supreme Court of Appeal [City of Johannes-
burg v Kaplan NO [2006] ZASCA 39, 2006 (5) SA 10 (SCA)] has
explained, illuminatingly, that the word ‘charge’ in section 118(3)
means no more than that any amount due for municipal debts that
have not prescribed is secured by the property and that, after an order
of court has been obtained, the property may be sold in execution and
the proceeds applied to pay those debts [Kaplan para 29].
This points to the conclusion that a mere enactment, without
more, that a claim for a specified debt is a ‘charge’ upon
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immovable property does not make the charge transmissible. It
therefore does not endure beyond transfer and the creditor’s
claim is not enforceable against successors in title. This does not
mean the charge is ineffective or illusory. There is reason enough
for its enactment even without transmissibility. It is this: the
‘charge’ helps municipalities elude the constrictions of the Rules
of Court that would otherwise need to be complied with in order to
render the property executable. In other words, the charge allows
municipalities to by-pass at least some debt collection enforce-
ment procedures. It renders the property immediately and expe-
ditiously executable, subject to an order of court. In this way, it
gives the preference teeth.
Having considered the common-law background which culmi-
nated in the promulgation of section 118(3), Cameron J explained
(para [39]):
Against this background, what is notable about section 118(3) is that
the legislature did not require that the charge be either registered or
noted on the register of deeds. Textually, there is no indication that the
right given to municipalities has third-party effect: no provision is
made to fulfil the publicity requirement central to the functioning of
limited real rights. It stands alone, isolated and unsupported, without
foundation or undergirding and with no express words carrying any
suggestion that it is transmissible.
Cameron J concluded (paras [42] [43]):
Were there no Constitution, one would thus conclude, on the wording
of section 118(3) alone, that the unregistered charge it creates is
enforceable against the property only so long as the original owner
holds title. The absence of any requirement that the charge be
publicly formalised is a strong interpretative indicator that the limited
real right section 118(3) creates is defeasible on transfer of ownership.
In the case of the charge contemplated in section 118(3), the statute
is evidence only of the existence of potential debt on the property.
There is no indication as to the value of that debt. Registration of the
charge would provide that detail. Even where a covering mortgage
bond is registered, the amount of which may fluctuate over time, the
bond to be effective must include a fixed amount beyond which future
debts shall not be secured. So the legislated fact of the charge, alone,
does not render the requirement of registration or formalisation
redundant. That remains necessary to fulfil the publicity purpose by
providing details of the charge.
Turning to the Constitution, Cameron J summarised the three
municipalities’ contention that the constitutional setting points to
the conclusion that the charge indeed survives transfer and thus
burdens new owners (paras [45]–[50]) and held (para [51]):
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These arguments are not without force. The notion that owning
property comes with burdens for the public good is not outlandish.
This Court has increasingly emphasised the constitutional limitations
on private property as well as the constitutional vision that property
utilisation must conduce to the public good. So the notion that a new
owner may be burdened by historical debt relating to the property
should not be treated as landing from planet Pluto.
He then elucidated the richer picture by the full constitutional
context as follows (paras [53] [54] [56]):
Start with this: as the Minister rightly noted, historical debts exist only
because municipalities have not recovered them. This while the
statute expressly obliges every municipality to collect ‘all money that is
due and payable to it’ . . . and to implement a credit control and debt
collection policy . . .
[A] municipality has a duty to send out regular accounts, develop a
culture of payment, disconnect the supply of electricity and water in
appropriate circumstances, and take appropriate steps to collect
amounts due. In addition, for the sake of service delivery, it is
imperative that municipalities do everything reasonable to reduce
amounts owing.
And the statute does indeed provide a full-plated panoply of mecha-
nisms enabling efficient debt recovery in the cause of collecting
publicly vital revenue. Here the parts of section 118(3) that are
uncontested are integral. These are the charge on the property
against the existing owner, and the municipality’s preference over
registered mortgagees. During argument the municipalities con-
ceded, correctly, that the provision enables them to enforce the
charge against the existing owner up to the moment of transfer – and
to do so above and before any registered mortgagees. And they were
constrained to concede, also correctly, where there are unpaid
municipal debts, that the charge enables them to slam the legal brake
on any impending transfer by obtaining an interdict against transfer.
In this way, all outstanding debt can be recovered, as a charge
against the property, before transfer. Neat. This power does not
improve with age. It is no jot or tittle better after transfer than before. So
why wait? If transfer nowise strengthens a municipality’s position, why
not act pre-transfer? The municipalities and the Minister had no
answer. Indeed, during oral argument, Tshwane conceded perforce
and rightly that, should the Court find municipalities have ample power
to recover outstanding debt from current owners, there would be little
justification for making the charge survive.
Cameron J then explained that the imposition of historical
debts on a new owner constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
property on the part of the new owner as well as on the interests
of bondholders (paras [60] [61]):
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Does this happen if the charge takes effect in the hands of a new
owner to satisfy debts incurred during a preceding owner’s title? As
the applicants compellingly contended, the new owner’s property
could be sold in execution to satisfy the charge. And, if the historical
debts are big enough, the new owner could be left with very little – or
even, where the debt exceeds the value of the property, with nothing.
The municipalities were constrained to concede that the historical
debt could be so big as to extinguish the new owner’s entire interest in
the property.
The same applies to the bond-holder, who advances money to the
new owner to finance the transfer, but finds that its security, carefully
calculated on the value of the property before transfer, becomes
useless afterwards. The effect of allowing the charge to take effect
post-transfer is thus to substantially interfere with or limit the trans-
feree’s ownership as well as the mortgagee’s real right of security.
He therefore concluded that if a charge under section 118(3)
survives transfer, there could be a significant deprivation of
property (para [68]).
In finding that the deprivation of property was arbitrary,
Cameron J explained that it was intrinsically arbitrary to impose
responsibility for payment of a debt on a property owner who
has no connection with it, and who had no control at all over
the property or those occupying the property when the debt
was incurred (para [73]). The imposition of unprescribed debts
without historical limit on a new owner of municipal property
would constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property, irrespective
of whether the new owner acquired title at a sale in execution, by
regular deed of sale, or by other means (paras [74] [75]).
To follow the instruction in section 39(2) of the Constitution to
promote the spirit, purport, and object of the Bill of Rights when
interpreting legislation, Cameron J concluded (para [77]):
To avoid unjustified arbitrariness in violation of section 25(1) of the Bill
of Rights, we must thus interpret section 118(3) of the Act so that the
charge it imposes does not survive transfer. Far from the provision
being merely capable of this interpretation, it is from historical,
linguistic and common law perspectives the overwhelmingly persua-
sive interpretation.
The court held that because section 118(3) can properly and
reasonably be interpreted without constitutional objection, it was
unnecessary to confirm the High Court’s declaration of invalidity.
For clarity, however, the court granted the applicants a declara-
tion that the charge does not survive transfer (para [78]). At
paragraph [81.3] the order reads as follows:
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It is declared that, upon transfer of a property, a new owner is not
liable for debts arising before transfer from the charge upon the
property under section 118(3) of the Local Government: Municipal
Systems Act 32 of 2000.
As this represents a victory in substance for the applicants, the
court held that the municipalities and the Minister should pay
the applicants’ costs, including the costs of two counsel.
Rates payable on sale and transfer of immovable property
In Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality v Amber Mountain Invest-
ments 3 (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 272 (SCA), the court was called
upon to determine whether, following upon the sale of immovable
property, the property owner was liable to pay the total rates on
the property determined for the financial year, or only the rates
calculated until the property was transferred. The outcome of the
appeal turned on the interpretation of various provisions of
the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004
(the Rates Act), the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32
of 2000 (the Systems Act) and the Local Government: Municipal
Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (the Finance Act).
Amber Mountain Investments (AMI) was the previous owner of
immovable property, having sold the property to a third party. In
terms of section 118 of the Systems Act, before transfer of the
property could take place, AMI required a rates clearance
certificate from the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. The munici-
pality’s financial year commenced on 1 July in a year and ended
on 30 June the following year. The municipality required payment
of rates until the end of its financial year, being 30 June 2010, as a
condition for furnishing the certificate, and presented the respon-
dent with an account for the sum of R2 281 014,68. AMI paid the
amount, under protest, in order to obtain the certificate. At the
time of payment, AMI’s actual indebtedness to the municipality
was R1 214 482,68. Regarding the payment made under protest
as an over-payment, AMI sought to be reimbursed in court
proceedings against the municipality.
The court a quo found that AMI was only obliged to pay rates
on the property until the date of its transfer – 25 February 2010 –
as it would be unjust for the municipality to claim rates from the
respondent when it was no longer the owner of the property. The
court ordered that the municipality repay the amount of
R1 066 532, including interest, to the respondent.
In the present appeal the court found that the original power to
levy rates is regulated by national legislation in the form of the
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Rates Act. The municipality contended that sections 12 and 13(1)
of the Act made it plain that an owner’s obligation was to pay one
annual property rate, and that this liability arose and was fixed on
the first day of the municipality’s financial year. Accordingly, it
argued that once its financial year commenced, AMI became
liable to pay the rates fixed for that financial year, and therefore
the municipality was entitled to withhold the rates clearance
certificate until it had received payment of rates for the full
financial year. The court found that it was clear from the relevant
provisions of the Rates Act and the Finance Act that the levying of
rates is an integral part of a municipality’s annual budgetary
process. The approval of the budget goes hand in hand with the
determination of rates, as the revenue from rates is essential to
fund budgeted expenditure. It is for this reason that the property
rate is determined for each financial year. It is only once the rate
has been determined that a municipality can estimate its income
for the financial year and prepare its budget in accordance with
that projected income (paras [9] [10] [12]).
The main issue in this case was at what point property rates are
payable. The court held that the Rates Act distinguished between
what is ‘due’ and what is ‘due and payable’. In terms of section
13, the rates became payable (in the sense of the obligation to
pay arising at that stage) ‘as from the start of a financial year’.
Sections 26, 27 and 28 deal with the method and time of payment
of rates, the furnishing of accounts, and the recovery of arrear
rates from tenants and occupiers. The import of these sections is
that the rate may be recovered either on a monthly basis or
annually, subject to an election by the owner. In respect of both
payment options, it is the municipality that determines the date by
which payment must be made. It is the responsibility of the
municipality to produce a statement reflecting the amount due in
respect of rates and the date on which the amount is payable.
Section 28(1) is of particular significance. Once the municipality
has determined the amount due and the date on which such
amount is payable and the owner fails to make payment on the due
date, the municipality may recover the amount due from the tenant
or occupier of the property.
Section 28(1) does not entitle a municipality to recover the rate
levied for the financial year from the tenant or occupier. In terms
of section 27 of the Rates Act, payment of the rates are subject to
the happening of an event, namely, the municipality’s determina-
tion of the amount to be paid and the date by which payment
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must be made. A property owner’s obligation in respect of
property rates arises at the start of the financial year when the
municipality determines the rates. The words ‘payable as from’ in
section 13(1)(a) had to be interpreted to mean that the rates are
payable within the period of the financial year, and not on 1 July
as contended by the municipality, and ‘payable’ must be inter-
preted narrowly to mean that the rates were fixed for the financial
year, but not that they were also payable at the same time. Put
differently, a portion of the debt in respect of rates becomes due
from time to time. Consequently, the court held that the munici-
pality’s argument, that the determination of an annual property
rate was indicative of an intention that a single sum for the entire
year was payable at the start of each financial year, could not be
sustained (paras [13] [16] [17] [19] [20]).
As to whether the municipality was entitled to withhold the rates
clearance certificate until it had received payment of rates for that
financial year, the court held that section 118(1) only applies to
payment of debts preceding the date of application by two years
and does not include future municipal debts. Therefore, the
municipality’s policy to include debts incurred after application
has been made was inconsistent with section 118(1) and there-
fore ultra vires and void. The legislator intended to limit the period
in section 118(1) to the two years preceding the date of applica-
tion for the certificate. Section 3 of the Rates Act empowers a
municipality to adopt a rates policy that is ‘consistent’ with the
Act. Insofar as the municipality’s rates policy included the
settlement of debts incurred after the date of application for a
clearance certificate, it was inconsistent with section 118(1) and
therefore ultra vires and void. The relevant provisions of the Rates
Act, the Finance Act, and the Systems Act read together, con-
firmed AMI’s contention that the municipality was not entitled to
withhold the property rates clearance certificate until it had
received payment of the property rates for the entire financial
year. Such property rates became payable (but not due) from the
start of the financial year. The appeal was therefore dismissed
(paras [22]–[28]).
PROTECTION OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AND EVICTION
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
Rights of occupiers
Various crucial judgments were handed down by the Constitu-
tional Court under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of
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1997 (the ESTA). The first judgment, Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4)
SA 341 (CC), is in many respects noteworthy. Unlike previous
judgments where the link between tenure security, security of
home and hearth, and human dignity were only hinted at, this
judgment highlighted unequivocally the link between redress –
based on historical imbalances, access to housing and tenure
security, and human dignity (see para [2] specifically). The
judgment is further particularly accessible in that it includes a
judgment by one of the judges in both Afrikaans and English. This
also highlights the potential impact of the decision on landowners
and land occupiers alike. The decision handed down effectively
consists of five separate judgments. The majority judgment was
handed down by Madlanga J (with Cameron, Froneman, and
Khampepe JJ, and Mbha and Musi AJJ concurring). Judge
Froneman provided a further judgment in both Afrikaans (paras
[72]–[108]) and English (paras [109]–[144]), with Cameron J
concurring. That judgment was followed by a further separate
judgment by Cameron J, a still further judgment by Jafta J (with
Nkabinde ACJ concurring), and a final, separate judgment by
Zondo J. The judgment is also characterised by large sections
dealing specifically with contextualisation. While the judgment is
rather lengthy, it is exceptionally detailed and offers an excellent
backdrop for current land-related issues with which the country
continues to grapple.
The facts were briefly the following (paras [4]–[10]). The
applicant, Ms Daniels, had been in occupation of the land in
question for sixteen years as an occupier for purposes of the
ESTA. That entailed that she had consent to occupy, that she was
not a labour tenant, and that her monthly income did not exceed
the required amount (at the time of the judgment, R5 000). She
therefore fitted the profile of the category of dweller the Act aimed
to protect, namely, a vulnerable member of society, usually of low
income, previously exploited, and who may still be at risk of
exploitation. The first respondent was the person in charge of the
property as manager of the farm for the second respondent,
the landowner. In 2014 the applicant’s electricity supply was cut
and the door to her home was tampered with. She lodged various
applications, all successfully, with the local magistrate’s court.
Although the required maintenance work was performed by the
first respondent, Daniels wanted to effect further improvements to
the property, including levelling the floors, paving part of the
outside area, and the installation of various items and amenities.
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The latter entailed an indoor water supply, a wash basin, a
second window, and a ceiling. The respondents conceded that,
as these were basic human amenities, as opposed to luxurious
improvements, the dwelling failed to meet the standards required
for human dignity (para [7]). In her communication to the respon-
dents, Daniels indicated specifically that she would carry the
costs of the improvements. She received no response and went
ahead with the improvements. She was thereafter informed by
letter to stop all activities as (a) the respondents had not
consented to the improvements; and (b) no building plans had
been submitted, resulting in the improvements being unlawful.
Her reply that she relied on sections 5 (providing for fundamental
rights for owners and occupiers) and 6 (dealing with the rights
and duties of occupiers) of the Act was unsuccessful in local
court proceedings on the basis that an occupier does not have
the right to effect improvements. A subsequent application to the
Land Claims Court also failed. Both the Land Claims Court and
the Supreme Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, resulting in
the present application in the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court had to decide (a) whether the ESTA
affords an occupier the right to make improvements to his or her
dwelling; (b) if so, whether the consent of the owner is required
for such improvements; and (c) if consent is not required,
whether an occupier can effect improvements in total disregard
of an owner’s wishes (para [11]).
In dealing with the right to make improvements, the point of
departure was that the ESTA was drafted in light of section 25(6)
of the Constitution so as to ensure tenure that was legally secure
(or comparable redress). The Act was necessary in light of the
background of racially-based land control and access in South
Africa, in particular where vulnerable sectors of society are
concerned (see paras [14]–[22] of the judgment for a general
historical background and Pienaar JM Land Reform (Juta 2014)
133–6 where the links between control of labour, control of natural
resources, the exploitation of franchise, and the links with land
control are specifically highlighted). Sections 5 and 6 of the ESTA
must be approached and interpreted in this context. Given that
occupiers enjoyed certain fundamental rights, including the right
to human dignity (para [26]), section 6 specifically provides that
an occupier has the right to reside on and use the land in issue.
Arguably, living in deplorable conditions would not qualify as
‘residing’ on the relevant property. Instead, the right to reside had
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to be consonant with the fundamental rights contained in sec-
tion 5 (which the respondents wholly ignored), especially the right
to human dignity. This was not limited to a roof over one’s head:
‘But it is about more than just that. It is about occupation that
conduces to human dignity and the other fundamental rights
itemised in section 5’ (para [31]). Accordingly, the court held that
effecting improvements meant bringing the dwelling up to a
standard suitable for human habitation. In that regard context is
critical, including the purpose for which the ESTA was enacted,
as well as section 39(2) of the Constitution. Denial of the right
asserted by Daniels could, therefore, inadvertently result in what
would effectively amount to eviction of the occupiers (para [32]).
In the context of ‘reside’ and ‘tenure security’ it thus means that
the dwelling must be habitable (para [33]):
If you deny an occupier the right to make improvements to the
dwelling, you take away its habitability. And if you take away the habit-
ability, that may lead to her or his departure. That in turn may take
away the very essence of an occupier’s way of life. Most aspects of
people’s lives are often ordered around where they live.
The respondents averred that if the court concluded that an
occupier had a right to effect improvements, it would place a
positive duty on the landowner to ensure an occupier’s enjoyment
of the section 25(6) right (para [37]). Because section 13 of the
Act provides for the payment of compensation regarding improve-
ments, the respondents argued that the landowner would be
required to finance the improvements on the basis of a positive
duty resting on him or her to ensure that the occupier lived under
conditions conducive to human dignity. However, being private
parties, no such positive duty ought to be placed on landowners.
The court underlined that whether private persons would be
bound by positive duties depended on a number of factors,
including the nature of the right, the history behind the right, the
objective of the particular right, the best manner in which that
objective could be achieved, the potential of invasion of that right
by persons other than the state or organs of state, and whether
letting private parties ‘off the hook’ would not lead to negating the
particular rights in question (para [39]). However, as a point of
departure, it would be unreasonable to require the exact same
obligations under the Bill of Rights from private parties as those
placed on the state (para [40]). If a positive duty was indeed
placed on the landowner, it was an important factor to consider,
but still only one factor (para [41]). On the other hand, in light of
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Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC), this does
not mean that under no circumstances would the Bill of Rights
impose a positive obligation on private persons: ‘In sum, this
court has not held that under no circumstances may private
persons bear positive obligations under the Bill of Rights’ (empha-
sis added – para [48]).
And further (para [49]):
By its very nature, the duty imposed by the right to security of tenure,
in both the negative and positive form, does rest on private persons.
People requiring protection under ESTA more often than not live on
land owned by private persons.
Accordingly, the real question was: what was the extent of an
occupier’s constitutional entitlement as expounded in the ESTA?
Did it go so far as to create an entitlement to improvements with
the effect of imposing a positive obligation on land owners? In this
context, the positive obligation related to the possibility of an
order for compensation upon the eviction of the occupier (para
[50]). Whether an owner will be ordered to pay compensation
depends on a variety of considerations, including the need of the
occupier to improve his or her living conditions and elevate them
to the level that accords with human dignity (para [51]). In other
words: when set agains the right to dignity, the possibility of
payment of compensation paled in comparison. The crux of the
matter was the following: the mere fact that there was a possibility
that the landowner might have to pay compensation could not
automatically mean that the occupier ought to be satisfied with
the state of her living conditions. Clearly this could not be the
case (para [52]). Furthermore, the payment of compensation to a
departing tenant was also possible at common law (para [55]).
The possibility of payment of compensation could thus not be the
deciding factor in circumstances like these. The conclusion was
reached that Daniels was indeed entitled to effect the proposed
amendments. In fact, this flowed ‘naturally’ from a proper interpre-
tation of ‘what Parliament itself has said’ (para [67]).
Having dispensed with the first point, the second issue was
whether the owner had to consent to the improvements. It
was highlighted that an owner has various options at his or her
disposal. For example, an owner could accept that a dwelling
was not fit for human habitation but could still not be open to
effecting improvements. In these instances a simple refusal by
the landowner would render the occupier’s right to secure tenure
(linked to human dignity) nugatory. This right of the occupier was
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‘primarily sourced from the Constitution itself’ (para [59]). Clearly,
the landowner’s consent could not be a prerequisite for effecting
improvements that would bring a dwelling in line with a standard
that conformed to human dignity (para [60]).
Could an occupier effect improvements in total disregard of the
owner? This issue, the third dealt with by the court, highlighted
that the landowner also has certain rights, as underlined in
section 5 of the ESTA (para [61]). Although consent of the
landowner was not necessary (not a prerequisite), as explained
above, meaningful engagement with an owner or person in
charge remained necessary (para [62]). The court set out the
possible methodology to be followed (para [64]): It started with
the occupier first approaching the landowner and raising the
issue of improvements. Various options would then arguably
arise: (a) the landowner could consent; (b) the landowner could
withhold consent; (c) the extent of the improvements could be
contested; (d) the improvements could compromise the structure
to the detriment of the owner; or (e) the parties could agree that,
when evicted, compensation would be paid for improvements.
Accordingly, although various forms of engagement could take
place with varying results, the point of departure remains that the
existence of the occupier’s right is not dependent on the owner’s
consent (para [64]). If the engagement resulted in a stalemate,
the court had to address the matter. At no point could the
occupier resort to self-help (para [65]).
Having regard to the reasoning above and the conclusions
reached, the final part of the majority judgment dealt with the
appropriate relief. Of critical importance was relief in a form that
recognised the existence of Daniels’s right. Apart from stating this
right, how it was to be dealt with and acknowledged in practice
was critical. To that end the order was handed down that the
applicant was entitled to make specific improvements, which
were listed as follow: levelling floors, paving part of the outside
area, installing water supply inside the dwelling, a wash basin, a
second window, and a ceiling. A meaningful engagement order
was also handed down in relation to specific items, including the
arrival and departure times of the builders; their movement on
the farm; and the need for and approval of building plans in
respect of the improvements set out above. If no agreement
could be reached within a month, either party could approach the
magistrate’s court for appropriate relief.
The majority judgment was followed by the Froneman judgment
in Afrikaans and English. The Afrikaans version is a poignant,
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beautifully written judgment that underscores and acknowledges
the injustice of the past, in general, but also specifically with
regard to farmland, rural areas, and the class and racial distinc-
tions that evolved in these arenas. It was in this context that
human dignity was crucial. This judgment further highlighted the
place and role of the property concept in South Africa, and
the necessity to re-think and re-conceptualise ownership in light
of prevailing needs and demands. In sum, the judgment argued
that human dignity had to be restored in much the same format as
that in which the poor-white problem had been addressed (and
alleviated) by the previous apartheid government. In this endeav-
our the concept of ownership was instrumental (para [70]). The
Froneman judgment is, therefore, a further embodiment of the
need for redress and human dignity and does not adjust the legal
findings formulated in the majority judgment set out above.
The Cameron judgment likewise concurred with the legal
findings of the majority judgment, but with some reservation
regarding the historical reflection and its comprehensiveness.
That was the case because both the former two judgments were
only partial reflections of what had occurred: ‘they are neither
impartial nor complete’ (para [148]). While Cameron J warned
against judges writing history, he also concurred in the findings
(para [153]).
The judgment of Jafta J also agreed with the main thrust of the
majority judgment, save for the finding that a positive duty was
placed on the landowner, as explained above. Instead, he found
that section 8(2) of the Constitution ensures that some of the
rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights are enforceable against the
state (vertical), and others against private persons (horizontal
application) (para [157]). Whether the right was indeed horizon-
tally or vertically enforced stood to be determined by two factors:
(a) the nature of the right; and (b) the duty it imposed (para
[158]). However, there was no provision that expressly imposed a
positive obligation on a private person in the Bill of Rights (para
[162]). In this regard the Jafta judgment differed from the main
judgment’s stance that section 25(6) of the Constitution imposes
a positive duty on private parties (para [163]). He underlined that
persons or communities who do not have secure tenure are
entitled thereto, and if that is not possible, then to comparable
redress. However, there is no duty on private parties, as such, to
ensure that this happens. Apart from the specific wording in
section 25(6), he also highlighted that it was part of the property
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clause that began by safeguarding property rights (para [167]).
The positive obligation to address injustices in relation to loss of
tenure or possession rests on the state alone. Enforcing a positive
obligation against a private person would raise a spectrum of
practical difficulties, including how the private person was to be
identified and what exactly he or she was required to do to fulfil
the obligation, as well as what the implications would be if the
obligation were not discharged (para [171]). Accordingly, this
judgment was directly in conflict with the finding in City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Proper-
ties 39 (Pty) Ltd (2012 (2) SA 104 (CC)), which imposed a direct
and positive obligation on a private person (para [177]). The fact
that the owners had to accommodate the unlawful occupiers for a
few months was not based on any positive duties imposed by a
constitutional right. Instead, it amounted to a prohibition restraining
the landowner from removing the occupiers from property before a
date determined by the court (which was just and equitable in the
circumstances – para [183]). The scenario applicable to the Blue
Moonlight case was thus not the same as the present instance
where an occupier wished to effect improvements to her home.
This line of argument was proceeded with further in relation to
socio-economic rights generally, which, likewise, do not impose
positive duties on private parties (para [186]ff).
Having concluded that here was no positive duty on the
landowner, Jafta J turned to the ESTA and found that instead of a
positive duty, there was in fact a negative obligation on the
landowner to refrain from interfering in the exercise of her rights
by Daniels (para [193]). Phrased differently: the respondents
were under an obligation to refrain from conduct that interfered
with the exercise by Daniels of her right to reside on the farm in
question. That meant that the right, properly construed under the
ESTA, included effecting improvements that were necessary to
make the dwelling suitable for human habitation. By preventing
her from effecting the necessary improvements, the landowner
effectively interfered with her right to reside on the property. This
had nothing to do with gaining access to land, providing which
was the duty of the state alone under section 25(6) of the
Constitution (para [195]). The ESTA only arises after access to
land has already been gained. Accordingly, the Act safeguards
her residence by prescribing the conditions under which her
rights may be terminated: ‘But where a private person has
voluntarily permitted an individual to reside on his or her property,
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everyone including the state has a negative obligation not to
interfere with the exercise of that right of residence, unless the
interference is justified by law which passes constitutional muster’
(para [197]). Central to security of tenure which the Act sought to
promote, was the consent of the landowner to reside on and use
the land (para [201]). As there had indeed been interference with
Daniels’s right to reside on the property, this judgment ultimately
also supported the order handed down.
Judge Zondo drafted the final judgment in which the legal
question was formulated as follows: did the landowner have the
right to prevent an occupier defined under the ESTA from
effecting improvements to his or her dwelling which would enable
him or her to live in the dwelling under conditions that did not
violate his or her right to human dignity? (para [209]). He
confirmed that an occupier has a right to effect such improve-
ments – tied to human dignity – without the landowner’s consent.
The basis of that finding was in section 5 of the ESTA, which sets
out the various rights of occupiers, including the right to human
dignity (para [212]). The rights of landowners were, however,
listed in section 6. Accordingly, when considerations of justice
and equity were taken into account and a balance was struck
between the rights of the applicant and those of the respondents,
there could only be one answer to the question: the improve-
ments were basic, they would not prejudice the landowner, and
would – on the other hand – mean a great deal to the applicant
and her family. Thus, on balance the answer had to be that the
applicant had the right to effect the improvements. However,
having the right did not mean that she could do whatever she
wanted – she would have to engage with the landowner regard-
ing the logistical implications. The order handed down in the main
judgment was thus also supported.
Despite five different judgments, a single order was handed
down. All of the individual judgments confirmed the right of the
applicant to effect these specific improvements. The main judg-
ment reached the conclusion that the applicant, as occupier and
on the basis of human dignity, had the right to effect the
improvements – also because there was a positive duty on
the landowner to ensure access to land and ultimately secure
tenure. The Froneman and Cameron judgments did not alter
these findings, save to the extent that the Froneman judgment
emphasised the necessity of changing the role, function, and con-
cept of ownership in SouthAfrican law in general, and specifically
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in light of the need for redress and acknowledgement of the
wrongs of the past. This dimension is crucial and was, notably,
neither highlighted in the main judgment, nor commented on in
the subsequent judgments. The Cameron judgment warned
against the incompleteness and built-in bias in the reporting and
writing of history and pointed out that, until what had occurred in
South Africa was reckoned with in full, history would linger – also
in judicial fora and courts. While supporting the order handed
down as there was specific interference with Daniels in exercis-
ing her right to reside, that judgment denied any positive duty
placed on private landowners to broaden access to land or
secure tenure. Instead, from the point of departure that human
dignity was tied to tenure, a negative duty was placed on the
landowner not to interfere with the exercise of the right set out and
framed in legislation. The final judgment by Zondo J called for the
balancing of rights and duties of landowners and occupiers, and
finding the balance in that process. Given the specific improve-
ments, as well as the surrounding circumstances, the court
concluded that Daniels must have the right to effect improve-
ments.
The decision means that Daniels may improve the state of her
dwelling considerably and, once she has done so, she will be
living in conditions suitable for human habitation. She will indeed
have redeemed her human dignity. That is the case because
tenure security is inextricably bound to human dignity. While the
result cannot be faulted, the implications of the decision for
landowners appears somewhat vague and unclear. Is there a
positive duty on landowners to secure access to land and
guarantee tenure security? Is that the case because of the
Constitution – generally, and section 25(5) and (6) specifically –
or is it tied to the changed role and function of ownership in
modern South African law? Or is that duty possibly the result of a
balancing act? Perhaps the reasoning lies at another level: is
there not perhaps a negative obligation on all landowners not to
interfere with rights, and specifically those set out in legislation?
The facts here are important: the improvements were not luxuri-
ous and Daniels opted to pay for them herself. The logistics with
respect to the actual work being conducted on the farm and to
the dwelling and the coming and going of workers would be
worked out by the relevant parties. What would be the case if the
improvements were not so basic and if Daniels refused to stand
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in for the expenses – would that have made any difference to the
duties of the parties respectively?
Suitable alternative accommodation
The second critically important judgment handed down by the
Constitutional Court in relation to occupiers under the ESTA was
Baron & others v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 (5) SA329 (CC). The facts
were briefly the following. The magistrate’s court granted an
eviction order against the appellants from privately-owned land
under the ESTA. The order was confirmed on automatic review by
the Land Claims Court under section 19(3) of the ESTA. In the
present application to the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal,
there were two issues: (a) whether the eviction was just and
equitable; and (b) what it meant when occupiers were granted
‘suitable alternative accommodation’ under certain circum-
stances (para [2]). Underlying these issues was the further
question of whether section 10 of the ESTA, read with sections 25
and 26 of the Constitution, had been complied with (para [4]). Of
the seven applicants, four were section 10 occupiers, meaning
they were already in occupation when the Act was published for
comment in 1997; one became an occupier at a later stage
(thereby falling under s 11 of ESTA) but had since died and his
family had voluntarily moved away. The owners operated a brick
manufacturing business and were the applicants’ former employ-
ers. The applicants were entitled to reside in housing units on the
farm for the duration of their employment (paras [8]–[12]). During
the period 2006–2011, pursuant to disciplinary enquiries pre-
mised on misconduct, their employment was terminated. Despite
their employment and housing rights being linked, and following
their dismissal, the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth applicants
remained on in the housing units. In 2013 eviction proceedings
were instituted, at which time the City indicated that no suitable
alternative accommodation was available due to long waiting
lists. In 2014 an eviction order was indeed granted, on the basis
that it was just and equitable, allowing eight months for the
occupiers to vacate the premises.
Pretorius AJ approached the matter by first setting out the
constitutional and legislative frameworks, starting with sections
25 and 26 of the Constitution (para [10]). The point of departure
was that section 25(1) – which protects against arbitrary depriva-
tion – ought also to apply to the rights of occupiers, not only to
those of landowners (para [10]:
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For ESTA occupiers to enjoy a strong form of secure tenure, as
envisaged by the Constitution, we must recognise that ESTA occupi-
ers enjoy rights and entitlements over the land they occupy, and that
these rights and entitlement are every bit as worthy of protection as
those of private landowners.
However, on the subsidiarity principle, legislation crafted to
deal with the rights of occupiers, and not the Constitution itself,
had to be relied on – hence the ESTA (para [11]). The ESTA sets
out the relevant rights and duties of the parties, dealt with in detail
in the Daniels case (above), as well as the procedural require-
ments regarding termination of rights and subsequent eviction. At
the magistrate’s court level the possible disruption an eviction
order could cause, especially in relation to the school-going
children, was specifically raised (para [13]). In response, the City
indicated that temporary accommodation consisting of corru-
gated iron structures might be available in the Delft Temporary
Area (Blikkiesdorp). The occupiers objected in that they found
the move from a brick house to a corrugated iron house problem-
atic. At that stage the two reports submitted by the City indicated
that no alternative accommodation was available. Having regard
to all the factors, including that the occupiers had been in
occupation for many years without rendering service, that the
business required the housing for its employees, as well as the
comments in the probation officer’s report, the court concluded
that the granting of the eviction order was just and equitable
(para [14]).
In the automatic review process under section 19(3) of the
ESTA, the eviction order was confirmed by the Land Claims Court
(para [15]). The Land Claims Court also considered the fact that
since being dismissed the occupiers had paid neither rent nor
electricity during their occupation, and the need for the owner to
house his own employees, coupled with the corresponding
hardship it caused the owner and employees. With regard to the
issue of suitable alternative accommodation, the Land Claims
Court highlighted that, while important, it remained but one factor
only. It further found that the duty to supply housing rested on the
state and not on private citizens (para [17]). As the employer had
been shouldering the responsibility of providing housing for many
years, and as it had been detrimental to the business and its
employees, the appeal could not succeed (para [20]).
The Constitutional Court pointed out that the above conclusion
was reached with reference to, among other things, the PIE Act,
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whereas the relevant legislation was the ESTA (para [20]).
Different pieces of legislation existed, with different purposes,
meaning that the particular balance to be struck in the various
legislative measures may also be different. (See, for example, the
Fischer case discussed below in the context of the PIE Act.)
While various issues were identified by the Constitutional Court
in paragraph [28], at the hearing the parties agreed that the only
issue to be dealt was the question of suitable alternative accom-
modation. In this regard the court focussed firstly on the City’s
constitutional obligations (para [30]ff). In February 2017 the City
indicated that five housing units could be made available in
Wolverivier, and that the applicants had to indicate whether this
offer was acceptable. The offer was turned down by the appli-
cants due to the distance to and from the children’s school, and
because the buildings were constructed of corrugated cladding
(para [31]). The court was called on to make a value judgement
as to what would be just and equitable, including the distance to
and from amenities. However, the issue of hardship was not
raised. Although the housing units were emergency units only,
they had fitted toilets and basins, and were of better quality than
the housing previously offered in Delft (para [33]). At the hearing
the respondents (landowners) offered to provide school transport
for the children.
The duties of the landowner are dealt with specifically in para-
graphs [35]–[49]. In this context the earlier judgment in Daniels
(above) formed the point of departure, namely that the ESTA can,
under certain circumstances, place a positive obligation on a
private landowner. However, that in itself does not mean that private
landowners carried all or the same duties as the state. Of critical
importance was the recognition that landownership entailed certain
duties and obligations, which differed from duties and obligations
which rested on private landowners in the pre-constitutional con-
text. It was accordingly highlighted by the applicants that the
landowners, as commercially able private landowners, were obliged
to assist the applicants to obtain suitable accommodation.
Whether the landowner had a duty to provide accommodation
also relates to the horizontal application of the Constitution. The
real question, however, was (para [36])
. . . whether, within the relevant constitutional and statutory context, a
greater ‘give’ is required from certain parties. Any ‘give’ must be in line
with the Constitution. This Court has long recognised that complex
constitutional matters cannot be approached in a binary, all-or-nothing
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fashion, but the result is often found on a continuum that reflects the
variations in the respective weight of the relevant consideration.
The ESTA is silent on who or what must supply suitable
alternative accommodation. In this particular case the state was a
party to the proceedings, it participated and engaged meaning-
fully, but was still unable to provide suitable alternative accommo-
dation. Within the context of section 10(2) of the ESTA, where an
occupier has been evicted without a breakdown in relationship, it
could be expected of the landowner to assist in providing
suitable alternative accommodation. This, however, had to be a
contextual enquiry, having regard to all the relevant circum-
stances (para [37]).
As all the requirements of the ESTA had been complied with,
the only outstanding matter was the suitable alternative accom-
modation and the obligations of the City and landowners, respec-
tively. The obligation of the landowner was pointed out in the very
limited scope that section 10(2) of the ESTA set out. The duties of
the City, on the other hand, were located in section 26(2) of the
Constitution, and were also linked to its available resources. The
two offers made by the City – the Delft and the Wolwerivier
developments – had both been rejected. The question was,
therefore, whether the City had an obligation to continue offering
accommodation until the applicants were satisfied (para [40]). In
addressing this issue the court referred to case law dealing with
the PIE Act, and stated the role of the PIE Act to be that ‘it cannot
be expected of the first respondent to accommodate the appli-
cants indefinitely when an offer of alternative accommodation has
been made by the City’ (para [43]). The reference to the PIEAct is
interesting, given the earlier statement by the court alerting the
parties that different legislative measures were in play and that
the balancing of rights may differ accordingly. With further
reference to Molusi v Voges 2016 (3) SA 370 (CC), where the
Constitution was identified as the starting point in the enquiry,
the court reached the conclusion that a constitutional duty clearly
rested on the City to provide suitable alternative accommodation
where occupiers were legally evicted and rendered homeless
(para [46]). That duty could not be avoided by the submission of
reports indicating that housing was unavailable.
As in the Daniels case, it was also highlighted that both
occupiers and landowners have rights and duties. Here the court
emphasised that the occupiers had enjoyed free accommodation
since 2012, that the landowner had consequently enjoyed only
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restricted property rights for the relevant period and could not, in
fairness, be expected to continue granting free accommodation
while its own employees were being disadvantaged in the
process. In light of all the relevant circumstances, the court was
satisfied that the occupiers had to be evicted so as to provide
accommodation for the current employees (para [49]).
On the basis that the City’s duty to provide housing was one of
progressive realisation, the court accepted that the housing units
at Wolwerivier qualified as suitable alternative accommodation
which the City could provide within its available resources (para
[50]). Eviction could thus not be avoided indefinitely by refusing
the accommodation on offer. The remaining concerns regarding
the children’s schooling had been addressed by the respon-
dents’ offer to provide transport. The eviction order was therefore
granted and a just and equitable date for the eviction was set at
three months from the date of the judgment. Although leave to
appeal was granted, the appeal failed.
Judge Zondo provided a qualified concurring judgment in which
he declined to express a view on the duties of the landowner as
that was not necessary in order to reach the conclusion. It is
unclear, however, on what alternate basis he would have founded
the judgment.
The Daniels judgment (above) has provided a valuable context
for occupiers and their housing needs. This judgment again
highlighted that a contextual approach is imperative in deciding
these complex matters. In this regard the judgment is welcomed.
However, given that the approach is contextual, one would have
expected more guidelines, especially concerning when precisely
what duties would be expected of the private landowner. Whereas
duties other than those attaching to landowners in the pre-
constitution context are expected, what specific factors need to
be considered? Are these general considerations, or do they
arise only where section 10(2) of the ESTA is involved? In this
instance, the financial and business dimensions of the enterprise
were specifically underscored. What would be the case if the
landowners operated a small-scale family-owned farm, for
example?
Eviction and probation reports
In Magubane v Twin City Developers (Pty) Ltd [2017] ZASCA
65 (30 May 2017), the issue was whether the failure of the Land
Claims Court to consider a probation report, as provided for in
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section 9(3) of the ESTA, was fatal to the granting of the eviction
order. The appellants and their families had been in occupation of
the farm belonging to the respondents since 1975 and 1980
respectively. At the time of the eviction proceedings the appel-
lants had not been in the employ of the landowners and their right
of residence had been terminated by the respondents on 2 July
2013 under section 10 of the ESTA (paras [1]–[4]). As the
relationship between the parties had also broken down irretriev-
ably, the court ordered the eviction of the appellants within a
specified timeframe, the removal of their livestock, and the
payment of certain amounts to the occupier families to assist in
their relocation. The only relevant issue on appeal was the
probation report provided for in section 9(3) of the Act, which was
not considered when the above order was handed down. The
probation report was necessary as it reflected the rights and
interests of the parties in light of a possible eviction. The report
was requested on 27 February 2015 and the hearing took place
from 20 November 2015. As these reports are notoriously difficult
to secure, it is not uncommon for courts to request the report but
to proceed without it. An unreasonably long delay in the hearing
and finalisation of the matter on the basis that the report was
outstanding would be detrimental to the parties involved. Accord-
ingly, in the absence of a probation report – once it has been
requested – the proceedings could continue (see JM Pienaar
Land Reform (Juta 2014) 735–49 for an exposition of the case law
developments in this arena). However, in the present instance the
report was in fact available, but the judge was unaware of this
and the proceedings were concluded in its absence. Did the
failure of the Land Claims Court to consider the probation report
in its deliberations constitute a material irregularity which justified
the setting aside of the eviction order and the remittal of the
matter to the court? (para [7]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the failure of the court
to consider the probation report before making its finding consti-
tuted a material misdirection which necessitated interference.
The purpose of the report was important and ought, therefore, to
have been considered before judgment was handed down (para
9]).
Following the conclusion above, the question was whether the
matter should be remitted to the Land Claims Court, or whether
the Supreme Court of Appeal could rather consider the report
before it (para [10]). The court per Fourie AJA (with Ponnan,
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Mbha, Dambuza and Van der Merwe JJA concurring) considered
the Supreme Court of Appeal to be in as good a position as the
Land Claims Court to consider the contents of the probation
report in light of the relevant facts and circumstances (para [11]).
That would also prevent any further delay. In the present instance
the report was detailed and provided ample information regard-
ing the possible impact the eviction could have on the relevant
rights of the parties and their extended families, including the rights
of school-going children (para [13]). Counsel for the appellants
agreed that, had the report been available at the hearing and had
it been considered by the Land Claims Court, nothing in addition
to the present content could have been submitted that would
have shed more light on the facts and circumstances. Further-
more, counsel for the appellants was unable to advance any
reason as to why the content of the report justified the Supreme
Court of Appeal’s interference with the order already handed
down. In other words: had the report been taken into account by
the Land Claims Court the same result would have been reached.
The content of the report therefore did not warrant interference
concerning the actual order handed down. The appeal was thus
dismissed (para [15]). However, the date for eviction and evacu-
ation was extended and the money payments were increased to
R100 000 per family to assist in the relocation. The eviction order
was thus confirmed.
The judgment highlights the distinction between (a) requesting a
probation report and proceeding when the delay is unreasonable
and the report is not available to the court; and (b) requesting and
receiving the probation report but not considering it in the
adjudication process. Whereas the former is possible, given
the delays and the interests of the relevant parties, the latter
cannot happen: the purpose of the probation report is too
important to ignore when it is indeed available.
Appeal against confirmation of eviction order following automatic review
Goosen v The Mont Chevaux Trust (148/2015) [2017] ZASCA
89 (6 June 2017) provided further guidelines regarding appeals
against the Land Claims Court confirming the magistrate court’s
eviction order, and the duties of the local authority with regard to
emergency housing. Whereas the initial concern was to which
court the appeal lay where the Land Claims Court confirmed an
eviction order on automatic review under section 19(3) of the
ESTA, alluded to above, the route to follow had in the meantime
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been addressed by the Constitutional Court in Snyders v De
Jager 2017 (5) BCLR 614 (CC), 2017 (3) SA 545 (see 2016
Annual Survey 51–9). The Wellington magistrate’s court granted
an eviction order against the seventeen appellants under the
ESTA on 31 March 2014. The eviction order was confirmed by the
Land Claims Court on automatic review. The issue on appeal was
whether the Land Claims Court had been correct in confirming
the eviction order (para [6]).
The background facts were set out in detail in the judgment
(paras [7]–[13]). The property was initially purchased for use as a
high-care thoroughbred stud facility. However, a number of
cottages on the property were occupied by various persons,
none of whom was employed on the farm. After taking occupation
of the farm, an urgent eviction application was applied for and
granted. For some unknown reason, the eviction order was never
executed and was thereafter neither confirmed nor set aside
(para [8]). New purchasers were interested in the property.
During purchase negotiations while visiting the farm and on
noticing the occupants residing on the land, the prospective
purchasers were assured that an agreement had been reached
between the former owners, the occupants, and the local author-
ity in terms of which the occupiers would be relocated. The
agreement entailed that the former owner would purchase Wendy
Houses, and the municipality would make land available where
the Wendy Houses would be erected. The trust – the respondent
in the present appeal – therefore went ahead and purchased the
property.
However, the municipality failed to honour the agreement,
stating that no land was available for relocation and that building
plans had not been submitted for the Wendy Houses (para [10]).
Immediately after taking possession of the farm, the new owners’
occupation was challenged by the conduct of the occupants, all
detailed in the judgment (paras [11]–[12]). In short: the occu-
pants made it impossible for the new owners to utilise their
property, to put it to the use they intended, and made their living
conditions unbearable. Conduct included threatening the occupi-
ers, damaging property, excessive littering, continuous theft of
electricity cabling, etcetera. In effect, the farm had a living,
thriving informal settlement on its doorstep, which had a detrimen-
tal impact on all activities on the farm – even to the extent that the
new owners were held prisoner in their own home, unable to
venture out.
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As mentioned, the eviction application was successful and was
later confirmed by the Land Claims Court. It was against that
confirmation that the appeal was lodged. In the Snyders judg-
ment it was confirmed that the Land Claims Court has wide
powers to assess the appropriateness or otherwise of an eviction
order (para [16]). The section 19(3) automatic review under the
ESTA was not the same as an appeal. In any appeal, including in
the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court dealing with the appeal is
subject to all limitations applicable to appeals (para [17]). For
example, an appeal is limited solely to the grounds of appeal and
can only be decided on the trial record. That meant that the
appeal would only succeed if the Supreme Court of Appeal was
convinced that the Land Claims Court was wrong in its delibera-
tions, taking into account the nature of an automatic review which
was conducted in that court (para [17]).
Interestingly, a probation report was again at issue. In the
present matter, despite various notices and requests, no proba-
tion report had been received when the court ruled on the
eviction application. However, as the report had not been raised
in the application for leave to appeal, it was impermissible to raise
it at the appeal stage. (In any event, requesting the report and
waiting an unreasonable time would not prevent the court from
proceeding with the matter in the absence of the report, as
explained above in the Magubane case.)
Questioning the confirmation was linked to the ground of
appeal that the trust had provided insufficient evidence of the
termination of the appellants’ rights of residence in accordance
with section 8 of the ESTA (para [20]). The rights of residence had
in fact been terminated by the predecessor in title. The notices
were furthermore in order, save for the seventeenth appellant who
moved on to the farm at a later stage (para [22]). Overall, the
question to be decided was whether section 9(2)(d) of the ESTA
had been complied with. The issue was that the trust itself had not
given notice to the appellants as required. On the basis that the
Land Claims Court had found that the appellants were fully aware
of their rights even before the trust became the owner (as an
eviction process against them had already taken place), the Land
Claims Court – as High Court – had the inherent power to waive
strict compliance with the notice provision and to condone the
non-compliance with the ESTA in this regard (para [25]). As a
creature of statute the Land Claims Court was, however, not free
to waive any and all statutory provisions at will. Instead, the test
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was whether the object of the peremptory statutory provisions
had been achieved even though, strictly speaking, the formalities
had not been complied with (para [26]). In light of the time that
had passed, the Supreme Court of Appeal was satisfied that the
purpose of the provisions of section 9(2)(d) had indeed been
achieved (para [28]).
Section 10 of the ESTA was also relevant as it was the specific
mechanism used to effect the eviction. In this respect the Supreme
Court of Appeal confirmed that the relevant provisions had to be
complied with in relation to each appellant individually (para [29]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal was satisfied that the conduct of the
appellants was intimidating and hostile, and that the incidents
alluded to above were unprovoked. In these circumstances the
granting of an eviction order was warranted. The Land Claims
Court could thus not be faulted for concluding that the conduct of
the appellants justified an eviction order (para [30]).
The enquiry did not stop there. The execution of the eviction
order would render the occupants homeless. As they were in any
event living in deplorable conditions, the municipality had a
constitutional duty to provide them with emergency accommoda-
tion (para [31]). At issue was not permanent housing which could
result in the occupants jumping the queue, but temporary emer-
gency housing only (para [34]).
The appeal was partially successful. The eviction order in the
Wellington magistrate’s court was confirmed for the first to
sixteenth appellants, but not for the seventeenth appellant. The
execution of the order was suspended for a period of 90 days.
The Drakenstein Municipality was ordered to provide the first to
sixteenth appellants with temporary emergency accommodation
within 75 days of the date of the appeal order.
Apart from providing guidelines regarding appeals and reviews
respectively, as set out above, the judgment highlighted the
desperate need for housing in the Drakenstein area. The conduct
of the occupants indicated the lengths to which persons will go to
ensure or ‘protect’ their access to housing, even if the housing is
sub-standard and sub-human. In this judgment it is notable that
the local authority was ordered to provide emergency housing
within a set time. The local authority was thus not called on to
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indicate what steps it would take to provide accommodation. It
was ordered actually to provide the accommodation itself.
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act
19 of 1998
Occupiers of Erven 87 & 88 Berea v CF de Wet CCT 108/16)
[2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017) deals with the implications of an
ostensible eviction by consent (agreement) and the duties of the
court in these instances. The crux of the matter was whether,
where there is purportedly an eviction by consent, the court is
absolved from the obligation to consider all relevant circum-
stances. A closely allied question is whether an eviction order can
be rescinded at the instance of the occupiers who have purport-
edly consented to it.
In this case a number of occupants (47 women, 114 men and
23 children) lived in a building which was purchased for develop-
mental purposes. Pursuant to the sale, the respondents’ attor-
neys served letters on the applicants – by affixing them to the
main doors of the building – notifying them of the termination of
their rights of residence (para [6]). A few months later the initial
notices under the PIE Act were served. This led to certain
members of the community approaching a ward committee
member – Ngubane – for assistance. At the eviction application,
four applicants (the appearer applicants), Ngubane, and the
respondents’ legal representatives were present. The applicants
were not legally represented. At an earlier meeting, the four
appearer applicants had been mandated to have the application
postponed. However, at the hearing a draft order was presented
which Ngubane confirmed. The draft order was thereafter made
an order of court. After realising that no postponement had been
granted, but rather that an eviction had been effected ‘by
agreement’, the applicants sought legal representation. After
successive failures in both the High Court and the Supreme Court
of Appeal regarding rescinding the eviction order, the Constitu-
tional Court was approached.
The applicants contended that, firstly, there had been no actual
consent between the parties when the draft order was made an
order of court. Secondly, even if consent could be established, it
was not legally valid. Thirdly, the applicants submitted that, even
if the consent was legally valid, the court was under constitutional
and statutory duties to satisfy itself that the eviction would,
nevertheless, be just and equitable after considering all the
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relevant factors. Lastly, the applicants submitted that the eviction
order fell to be rescinded in terms of rule 42 of the Uniform Rules
of Court or the common law (para [13]). The respondents averred
the following: there was no clear evidence that the applicants
would be rendered homeless following the eviction order; a
prolonged legal battle would have a detrimental impact on the
owner and plans for development; and there was furthermore no
real defence before the court which could prevent the granting of
an eviction order (paras [14] [15]). Regarding the merits of the
matter, the issues to be dealt with were listed as follows:
the duties of a court when faced with a purported eviction by
consent; how the High Court had approached its duties; the
joinder of the local authority; a valid defence under the PIE Act;
rescission, remedy and, finally, costs (para [18]).
An order of court may be rescinded either under rule 42 of the
Uniform Rules of Court or in terms of the common law. Accord-
ingly, in this regard the issues were whether there had been real
consent, constituting a waiver, and whether there had been a
mandate to consent. The fact that the applicants were not legally
represented was important. The four appearer applicants only
had one mandate when they attended the application proceed-
ings, namely to secure a postponement in order to secure legal
representation (para [28]). At the initial stage of the proceedings,
it was thus quite possible that the following factors could have
influenced the initial High Court’s findings: there was a delegation
of the applicants in the court (the four appearer applicants);
proper service had been effected as authorised by the court; the
appearer applicants engaged with the legal representatives of
the respondents; the identities of the other applicants were
unknown; and it appeared that the applicants had no valid
defence on the merits of the case (para [29]).
As they were not legally represented, and as they had not fully
understood their rights, they could have, factually, consented to
the order. Was factual consent by the appearer applicants also
legally effective? For consent to be legally effective it must have
been given freely and voluntarily, with full awareness of the rights
being waived and thus constitute informed consent (para [32]).
A waiver would include considering the following specific rights:
(a) an eviction only after a court has considered all relevant
factors; (b) the joinder of the local authority and the production by
it of a report regarding the need and availability of alternative
accommodation; (c) a just and equitable date under the PIE Act;
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and (d) temporary alternative accommodation in the event that
the eviction would render them homeless (para [33]). It was not
disputed that the applicants had not been informed of any of
these rights. However, the factual consent was not informed
consent and, therefore, their consent was not legally valid (para
[33]). In this light it was therefore unnecessary also to consider
whether these rights were in fact capable of waiver. That conclu-
sion was not only linked to the four applicants who were present
in court, but to all of the applicants, as they could not (without
mandate), and in fact did not (were not informed), consent on
behalf of all of the applicants (para [35]). Accordingly, no valid,
legally enforceable consent had been given when the eviction
order was granted against them (para [38]).
In these instances the duties of the court flow from the
protection of the rights of the residents, which are also inextrica-
bly linked to the issue of whether informed consent and waiver
occurred (para [39]). The starting point was section 26(3) of the
Constitution, which confirmed that eviction orders could only be
granted by a court and only after all relevant circumstances had
been considered (para [40]ff). The PIE Act was drafted in light
of section 26(3), which enjoins courts to ‘probe and investigate
the surrounding circumstances’ further (para [43]). The PIE Act
could, therefore, not be applied passively. Integral in the process
and the inquiry that the court had to undertake was to be
informed of all relevant circumstances in each case in order to
ensure that the eviction was indeed just and equitable. If the
eviction were indeed to be granted, then the date and relevant
conditions had also to be determined (para [46]). The PIE Act
urges courts to go beyond the consideration of the lawfulness or
otherwise of the occupiers’ actions only. It requires the court to
take an active role (para [47]). Ultimately, courts can only grant
eviction orders once they are satisfied that it would be just and
equitable to do so, and this can only occur when all the relevant
information has been before the court so that the relevant
circumstances could be considered (para [48]). Two issues were
thus intertwined: relevant information; and justice and equity.
The High Court, when considering the draft order, mistakenly
considered that issuing the order would be the end of its
involvement. In other words: the court took a passive approach to
the eviction and the proceedings, and incorrectly regarded its
duty as having ended once the parties ‘consented’ (para [53]).
Although the court was faced with a purported agreement, this
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alone did not absolve it from its duties. Whether an eviction ought
to be granted was not the prerogative of the parties; it was the
court that had to decide this. Therefore, a court is not absolved
from actively engaging with relevant circumstances where the
parties purport to consent (para [54]). The court accepted
the consent without conducting an enquiry into its validity and/or
legal effectiveness. It furthermore failed to acknowledge that it
had to play an active part in the proceedings, and had to probe
the matters as it was statutorily enjoined to do (para [55]).
The following application to rescind the eviction order and how
that was dealt with was likewise problematic. In that application
the court relied on the fact that the parties were legally repre-
sented when the eviction order was granted. As was clear in the
Constitutional Court proceedings, the applicants were in fact not
represented. The court misdirected itself as to the facts, and
again failed to appreciate its proactive role (para [56]). The issue
of homelessness was also before the court but was entirely
ignored (para [57]).
The question of joinder of the local authority was dealt with in
detail by the court (paras [58]ff). With reference to the judgment
in Blue Moonlight, coupled with section 4(7) of the PIE Act, the
court highlighted that a local authority had the duty to provide
temporary emergency accommodation to all persons facing
eviction if the result rendered them homeless. In other words:
where no suitable alternative accommodation is available, tempo-
rary emergency housing must be provided. In this light suitable
alternative accommodation could be a relevant circumstance
that had to be considered by the court. A court would not be able
to consider such a factor in isolation and without the necessary
information. To that end, where there was a risk of homelessness,
the local authority had to be joined (para [61]). On the basis of a
purported consent, that had not occurred.
Whether a valid defence could be raised was dealt with next
(see especially para [65]). Here the court accorded ‘valid defence’
the broadest scope possible. That was the case because the
court found that where it was unjust or inequitable to evict,
the unlawful occupiers would therefore have a defence and the
eviction order could thus not be granted. In this light the absence
of justice and equity automatically constituted a valid defence.
The enquiry was clearly not limited to the lawfulness or not of the
occupation (para [65]).
Given the arguments above and the conclusions reached, the
question was further probed of whether a court was precluded
1012 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 52 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/28−Property−Case−Law
from making a settlement agreement an order of court where that
order would result in eviction (para [66]). The fact that a settle-
ment had been reached, could, however, be one of the factors to
be considered by the court in its overall enquiry. This would then
furthermore mean that the court would have to establish that the
parties freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of their rights,
agreed to the eviction. That in itself does not mean the end of the
enquiry – the court would also have to consider the risk of
homelessness and the possibility of joining the local authority.
Clearly, merely entering into an agreement does not automatically
guarantee that an eviction order will be granted. An agreement is,
therefore, only one of the factors to be considered, albeit an
important one, which also initiates a further enquiry as to the
result of the eviction and whether homelessness would ensue.
The tasks of courts confronted with eviction applications are
therefore multi-dimensional and complex.
The remaining issue to be dealt with was whether, having
regard to what had transpired, the eviction order ought to be
rescinded. In this context both rule 42 and the common law were
taken into account. Essentially an order can be rescinded when it
has been granted in error (para [68]). As mentioned, the High
Court failed to discharge its duty to inquire into the relevant
circumstances. This resulted in the court being unaware of
essential issues of fact when it granted the order – for example,
that some 180 occupiers were not present, and that there had
been no mandate to enter into an agreement (para [69]). As the
eviction order was thus granted in error, rule 42 provided a basis
for its rescission (para [70]). As for the appearer applicants who
were present during the proceedings, iustus error was a ground
at common law for the rescission and allowed the court a fairly
wide discretion (para [71]). The basis on which the eviction order
was granted against those who were present at the proceedings
was that they had validly consented thereto. As that was not the
case, the eviction order had been granted against them in error.
Once an error has been established, a judgment reached by way
of consent can be set aside (para [74]).
The application for rescission was also bona fide. If uncon-
tested, the eviction order would render them homeless. In these
circumstances it was not unreasonable for them to bring the
rescission application (para [76]). All the applicants also had
valid defences to the eviction, namely (a) the non-joinder of the
local authority; and (b) the violation of their rights under section
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26(3) and the PIE Act. Therefore, the applicants presented a
coherent case which satisfied the requirements of good and
sufficient cause for iustus error, constituting a good case for the
rescission (paras [76]–[78]).
In considering a suitable remedy, the court took the circum-
stances of both the landowner and the occupiers into account.
The landowner had invested considerable funds in the project,
had been in court for various proceedings, and had to rely on pro
bono work for the most recent proceedings (para [80]). The effect
of the PIE Act was highlighted as suspending, for an interim
period only, some entitlements of owners and not expropriating
them. Although expediency was the ideal, issues of suitable
alternative accommodation and homelessness still had to be
dealt with. As the local authority was not joined in the proceed-
ings, all information was as yet still not before the court. To that
end, the court decided to remit the matter to the High Court with
an express provision that the matter be dealt with on an expe-
dited basis. The local authority was joined mero motu (para [82]).
When exactly ought local authorities be joined? The local
authority has to be joined as it is in the perfect position to report
on the availability of suitable alternative accommodation. How-
ever, it may only be necessary to consider that issue once all the
necessary information is before the court. It would probably be
better to join local authorities right from the outset, on the basis
that they are able to provide the necessary information that the
court would need in order to determine whether the granting of
the application would be just and equitable, on the one hand, and
whether suitable alternative accommodation is required, on the
other. Nevertheless, the judgment is welcomed as it clarifies the
specific duties of courts when faced with eviction applications –
in general, but also in instances where the parties enter into an
agreement or settlement that is then made an order of court. The
important feature is that, irrespective of the fact that an agree-
ment had been entered into, courts remain integral in the
process. Ultimately, the agreements must be solid; there cannot
be any risks relating to homelessness or other considerations that
would render the result unjust and inequitable.
Respective rights and duties of relevant parties in eviction matters
Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X (case no 9443/14);
Stock v The Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156,
418, 3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape RD (case no
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11705/15); and Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v Persons
whose identities are to the applicant unknown and who unlawfully
occupy remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town (case no 14422/
14) is an important High Court judgment that brought some form
of closure to unlawful occupation of land and housing issues that
had been dragging on for many years. Essentially, three cases
were dealt with in this all-encompassing judgment. While the
cases may be distinguished on the particular facts, the common
thread was the plight of the landless and homeless and the dire
need to access housing on the one hand, and the frustration of
landowners who are caught in the middle, on the other.
The crux of the matter was identified succinctly in the first
paragraph of the judgment, namely: what does one do with
60 000 people when neither the owner of the land on which they
reside, nor the local authority in whose jurisdiction they live, can
or want to accommodate them? (para [1]). In attempting to
answer the question, Fortuin J first provided a historical back-
ground (paras [3]–[5]), starting with the commencement of the
Black Land Act 27 of 1913. Despite a new constitutional dispen-
sation and a magnitude of legislative measures and a body of
case law, the pertinent question remained as to whether the
situation has improved. Phrased differently: how was it possible
that access to land and a corresponding access to housing
have remained a dilemma? (See JM Pienaar ‘ ‘‘Unlawful occupier’’
in perspective: History, legislation and case law’ in H Mostert &
MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe
(LexisNexis 2011) 317–38 for an analysis of some of the consider-
ations as to why unlawful land occupation has remained preva-
lent in the constitutional dispensation.)
Following on the historical background was an exposition of
applicable legal aspects in which the statutory and constitutional
framework was set out (paras [8]–[18]). This included relevant
sections of the Constitution (ss 7(2), 25, 26 and 38), the Housing
Act 107 of 1997, Chapter 13 of the National Housing Code, and
the National Housing Programmes. Of critical importance was the
contention that the rights of owners – section 25 rights – and
the rights of unlawful occupiers – section 26 rights – were
continually being violated by the state (para [9]).
The statutory and constitutional frameworks were succeeded
by an overview of case law and the most important developments
in that regard (paras [19]ff). The point of departure here was the
ratio of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (1997 (3) SA 768
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(CC)) that required that appropriate relief had to be forged so as
to be effective relief. (See, for a detailed study of what constitutes
effective relief where unlawful occupation and eviction are con-
cerned, T Kotzé Effective relief regarding residential property
following a failure to execute an eviction order (2016) LLM thesis
Stellenbosch University.) Included in the spectrum of appropriate
relief were constitutional damages and expropriation (paras
[26]–[53]), with special reference to the well-known case law of
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery
(Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) and City of Johannesburg Metropoli-
tan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2)
SA 104 (CC).
In light of the constitutional and case law contextualisation, the
factual background for each of the three cases was set out in
detail in template format (see paras [78]–[80]). It was underlined
that the Fischer property belonged to an elderly female who had
inherited the immovable property from her husband. The property
was her sole investment. While she immediately alerted the
authorities to the unlawful occupation as soon as it happened,
and despite eviction proceedings, over years the unlawful occu-
pation continued and also increased. The relief sought was
fourfold: a declaration that the City of Cape Town, the National
Minister of Housing, and the Provincial Minister of Housing, had
violated Mrs Fischer’s constitutional right to property; an order
that the City purchase the relevant property at a price to be
determined; and an order that the National and Provincial authori-
ties provide the necessary funds to purchase or alternatively to
evict the occupiers.
The Stock factual background was as follows: over a period of
some 40 years, various parcels of land were acquired for different
purposes by the Stock family (paras [81]–[85]). From 2013 on
large-scale occupation of Stock properties took place. With the
assistance of the South African Police further attempted occupa-
tions were fended off. The relief sought was similar to that in the
Fischer application, except that additional relief was also sought
against the Provincial Minister of Community Safety on the basis
that the right to property had been violated as the authorities had
failed to protect the property.
In the third application, Coppermoon acquired the relevant
property in 2007, after which it was mortgaged to Nedbank and
rezoned for industrial purposes and a business park (paras [85]
[86]). Unlawful occupation of land started occurring in August
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2014, and eviction proceedings were initiated shortly thereafter,
but were postponed repeatedly. Again, the relief sought was
similar to that sought in the two applications above. In addition, it
was stipulated that the relevant purchase price was to be
determined by an arbitrator, and that it was to be based on
market value at the time of the arbitration. Various other forms of
relief were also sought in the alternative.
Essentially, in all of the cases the issue to be decided was
whether the constitutional rights of the landowners had in fact
been violated, and what was to be done in that regard. In other
words: how could that violation, if it had occurred, be redressed?
In all three applications the purchase price of the relevant
property was sought, as well as the necessary funding for such
purchase.
The respondents’ case in relation to each of the three applica-
tions was set out in paragraphs [87]ff. As a point of departure in
the Fischer case, the first respondents, the unlawful occupiers,
highlighted that the burden of providing housing should rest on
the state and not on private individuals (para [87]). In this context,
historical, social, and economic factors should also be taken into
account. The unlawful occupiers had been evicted previously,
and they had been moving from one area to another with no help
offered by the City (para [88]). In light of all of these consider-
ations, it was clear, as argued on behalf of the occupiers, that an
eviction of this scale could not be carried out humanely, and was,
therefore, not a feasible option (para [90]). It was also pointed out
that there had been no noteworthy, meaningful engagement,
thereby contributing to the increase in unlawful occupation. In the
Coppermoon case the unlawful occupiers underlined that their
occupation was a matter of necessity, and that if evicted they
would be rendered homeless (para [102]). Neither rental housing
nor emergency housing was possible as there was a huge
backlog, and the City had already indicated that no emergency
housing was available (para [103]). Executing an eviction order in
these circumstances would be practically impossible. In response
to the state’s argument that the invasion had been both planned
and violent, the occupiers contended that there was no ongoing
violence and again highlighted that the invasion had been an act
of desperation (para [106]).
The second respondent, the City of Cape Town (the City),
contended, with regard to all three applications (paras [113]ff),
that as regards the buyout (purchase) option, the City argued
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against it on two grounds: (a) it was legally unsustainable on the
facts; and (b) it was an impermissible infringement of the
separation of powers doctrine (para [114]). It was argued that the
City could not be forced to enter into a purchase contract. Even
though the City was empowered to purchase, it could not be
placed under a duty to do so. Furthermore, the buyout option was
not ‘just and equitable relief’ under section 4 of the PIE Act, inter
alia, because the occupiers were already on a waiting list, the
relevant parcels of land were earmarked to be used for transport
corridors, the land was not suitable for human settlement, and
necessary services could not be installed there (para [116]).
Regarding the Stock and Coppermoon applications, the relief
was opposed on three grounds: (a) it did not flow from the causes
of action pleaded; (b) it was not legally sustainable; and (c) it was
not appropriate (para [117]). Furthermore, the power to expropri-
ate was not tied to the duty to exercise it. The same reasons for
not buying the land also applied in relation to not wanting to
expropriate it. As there was no duty to expropriate, there was no
actionable cause (para [190]).
The response of the Ministers of Police – National and Provin-
cial – in relation to the Stock application regarding the averment
that they had violated their constitutional duty to protect the
applicants’ property, was as follows (para [125]): the land was
vulnerable to occupation due to its location; and it was vacant,
unimproved and readily accessible as there was no perimeter
fencing or clear markings (paras [129] [133]). Despite these
factors, coupled with the fact that the applicants could have
secured their properties in a number of ways, the South African
Police were doing their best to patrol the area and be vigilant
(para [139]).
With regard to the relief sought against the relevant Ministers of
Housing and Development, it was submitted that they would
abide the outcome of the eviction order, but raised some ques-
tions regarding alternative accommodation (para [144]). It was
underlined that no accurate information or data was available,
resulting in requesting the court to order the unlawful occupiers to
make such information available to the City. With regard to
alternative accommodation, it was highlighted that the circum-
stances under which the unlawful occupation occurred were
relevant and had to be taken into account (para [147]). These
included that unlawful occupation was accompanied by extreme
lawlessness, and that the landowners had not acted with the
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required degree of urgency in protecting their property. In these
circumstances, it was argued, the state could not be directed to
provide immediate alternative accommodation. This consider-
ation was also relevant in relation to the buyout, expropriation,
and damages claim (para [147]). Regarding the purchase option,
it was argued that such an order would not be competent as it
would breach the principle of separation of powers. The land was
also not suitable for human habitation (para [152]). As to expro-
priation, it was underlined that that issue had specifically been
left open in the Modderklip case. In any event, it was argued that
such an order would also violate the separation of powers
doctrine (para [153]). Essentially, the main argument was that the
premise that the state has an immediate and unqualified obliga-
tion to provide alternative housing once it is clear that the
occupiers would be rendered homeless is simply incorrect (para
[155]). Dealing with the issue of alternative accommodation, the
following factors had also to be taken into account (para [155]):
the obligations of private owners to protect their property; the
condition of the property; the fact that the properties were
unfenced; that interdicts were either not obtained at all, or only
after a considerable period; that private security was only
employed at high risk periods or not at all; and the circumstances
under which the properties were occupied, in some instances
with extreme violence.
Given the detailed background and exposition of relevant
legislation, the Constitution, case law, and factual frameworks,
the discussion continued in paragraphs [160]–[195]. Expanding
on the ratio in Fose, alluded to above, Fortuin J highlighted that, if
necessary, courts were obliged to forge new and creative rem-
edies. Forming part of the necessary background were the
historical, social and economic circumstances, as well as the
desperate conditions in which these communities were forced to
live. The court was satisfied that the state had breached its duty in
terms of sections 7(2), 25 and 26 of the Constitution (para [162]).
All three applications dealt with destitute people and with the
slow reaction by local authorities (para [163]). Furthermore, large
numbers of occupiers were involved and the City had indicated
very clearly that it could not provide alternative accommodation.
Despite the lengthy appeals and background information, the
court had not been given a satisfactory reason why, rather than
moving so large a number of people, the occupied land could not
simply be acquired (para [167]).
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The court was convinced that the only reasonable course of
action was for the occupiers to stay where they were, thereby
enforcing their section 26 rights. However, the real question was
how that could be achieved without contravening the section 25
rights of the applicants; also, how this solution could be achieved
without overstepping the boundaries of the separation of powers
doctrine (para [167]).
Overall, the court had a problem with the reasonableness of the
City’s responses and its interpretation of relevant plans and
policies. This included that the placing of the occupiers on the
waiting list was unreasonable as it was unclear what this meant
on a practical level (para [168]). The response that accommodat-
ing the unlawful occupiers would disrupt existing efforts to
provide housing was also deemed unreasonable, as a reason-
able response necessitated flexibility (para [169]). The current
temporary relocation area used by the City was furthermore close
to the relevant areas. The responsibility to provide temporary or
emergency housing would thus always remain. In addition, the
portion of land earmarked for transport purposes did not belong
to the City and would, in principle, have first to be acquired and
then rezoned. While a distinction could be drawn between the
Fischer application on the one hand (para [180]) and the other
two applications on the other, the relief in respect of all the
occupiers should be the same (para [175]).
Ms Fischer had to be assisted as speedily as possible so as to
enable her to enjoy her constitutional right to property during the
last years of her life (para [180]). It was highlighted specifically
that (a) the duty to respect section 26 rights rests on all three
spheres of government and that they must cooperate (para
[185]); (b) the City had a duty to plan pro-actively (para [186]);
(c) there was no suitable alternative land available; and (d) the
peculiar circumstances constituted an emergency housing situa-
tion (para [187]). In these circumstances the purchase of prop-
erty was allowed where no alternative land was available. Under
the relevant policies, this includes the acquisition of privately
owned land. The policies also provided guidelines as to how the
purchase price had to be determined (para [187]). In contrast to
the Grootboom scenario (Government of the Republic of South
Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)), it was not an unconsti-
tutional policy that was at stake, but rather a municipality which
had failed to give effect to the constitutional rights of both the
applicant and the occupiers by not invoking the remedies in
the policies at their disposal (para [191]).
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In light of the above, the following orders were handed down.
As regards the Fischer application, it was found that both the City
and the National and Provincial Ministers had infringed Fischer’s
constitutional right to property in terms of section 25 of the
Constitution (para [196]). The City was ordered to enter into good
faith negotiations to purchase Fischer’s property within one
month of the order. The third and fourth respondents were
ordered to provide the City with the necessary funds to purchase
the property should such funds fall outside of the City’s budget.
Failing this, the City was ordered to report back to the court within
a set timeframe. The eviction application was dismissed (para
[200]).
The Stock and Coppermoon orders were very similar; both
found that the landowners’ constitutional right to property had
been infringed, as had the section 26 rights of the occupiers. In
both cases the City was ordered to enter into good faith negotia-
tions to purchase the relevant property within two months of the
order (paras [205] and [213] respectively). Likewise, failure to
reach agreements would result in a report back to court within
two months of the order, explaining whether expropriation had
been considered, and if not, why not (paras [206] [214]). The
necessary funds had to be made available by the relevant
authorities to effect the purchases, where relevant (paras [207]
[215]). In both instances the eviction order was also dismissed.
This is a crucial judgment even though much of the judgment is
not new, despite the judgment being extremely lengthy and
detailed. It is not new because the existing relevant constitutional
and statutory frameworks are well-known, and had been referred
to in relevant case law many times before. Similarly, the exposi-
tion of case law in the context of housing rights and responsibili-
ties is not really new and the challenges are well-known and often
commented on in decisions. However, what is unique about this
judgment – and what makes it a very valuable and useful one – is
its particular presentation consisting of the relevant back-
grounds, its case-law dimensions, and the very detailed factual
exposition in template format. When the specific sequence of
events is set out in detail, the frustration of the parties involved
and their sheer desperation come to the fore in a very striking
manner. When one is faced with a multitude of failings on such a
large scale, the plight of the parties is paramount and the need
for redress critical. The decision does not shy away from laying
down duties and responsibilities and identifying underlying issues.
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However, while the finding seems to be the only real solution to
the three scenarios set out here, providing emergency housing
remains only that: emergency housing. What about permanency?
To what extent will the plight of these communities be alleviated
and dealt with in an all-encompassing fashion? Is the provision of
emergency housing, at an interim level, really appropriate and
effective relief?
Temporary accommodation and the exercise of basic human rights
Dladla v City of Johannesburg (case no CCT 124/16 [2017]
ZACC 42 (1 December 2017) entailed an application for leave to
appeal against an order of the Supreme Court of Appeal handed
down in City of Johannesburg v Dladla 2016 (6) SA 377 (SCA).
(See 2016 Annual Survey 63–65.)
The matter has a very long and complicated litigation history,
not all of which will be relayed here (see paras [15]–[23] for
background). Two specific house rules of the relevant ‘managed-
care-facility’, which emanated from a previous alternative accom-
modation order, were at stake here: the so-called lockout and
family separation rules. The former entailed that occupants of the
shelter had to vacate the premises from 8h00 until 17h30 and
were thus locked out of the facility for the duration of the day. The
latter, the separation rule, meant that heterosexual couples were
not allowed to stay in the same dormitory as their partners and
were thus separated from their families. This also meant that the
bulk of childcare and responsibility was genderised in that
women and children up to a certain age resided together. Not
only did the separation rule split families and disrupt family life, it
also perpetuated gender stereotypes. While the Supreme Court
of Appeal found that the specific rules infringed the applicants’
constitutional rights to dignity, freedom, security of person, as
well as their right to privacy, it held that these infringements were
reasonable (para [23]) in that the shelter was not a permanent
home, but constituted temporary accommodation and the appli-
cants could not claim to have the same rights as they would have
in their homes. Such an approach also ensured the safety
and protection of the occupiers and discouraged an attitude of
dependence.
In the present appeal the applicants submitted that the City
had not complied with the foundational Moonlight order as the
measures adopted were inconsistent with the right of access to
adequate housing provided for in section 26 of the Constitution.
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They further submitted that their rights to dignity, freedom,
security of the person, and privacy were infringed by the lockout
and family separation rules. It was submitted that such a limitation
was not, as had been concluded by the Supreme Court, justified,
as the house rules were not introduced pursuant to a law of
general application as required by section 36 of the Constitution
(para [26]). In response, the City emphasised that the alternative
accommodation provided constituted ‘temporary’ housing which
had to be reasonable under section 26 (para [27]).
The majority judgment was handed down by Mhlantla J
(Mogoeng CJ, Nkabinda ADCJ, Mojapelo AJ, Pretorius AJ and
Zondo J concurring), with Cameron, Jafta and Madlanga JJ all
writing separate concurring judgments, but with different empha-
ses on the interpretation of sections 26 and 36 respectively. In
order to consider whether the City had indeed complied with the
Blue Moonlight order, the court revisited the original order in
paragraph [37] and further. The order was not detailed and
merely stated that ‘the City was to provide the occupiers with
temporary accommodation in a location as near as possible to
the area where the property is situated on or before 1 April 2012’
(para [37]). Judge Mhlantla found this to mean that the City had to
provide temporary accommodation in accordance with the gen-
eral legal standards applicable to the provision of temporary
accommodation (para [39]). In this context the order did not limit
any rights in question, including rights to dignity, privacy, free-
dom, and security. Any person, anywhere, had these rights,
which the Constitution bestowed. The mere fact that the shelter
did not constitute a home in the everyday sense of the word did
not mean that applicants were not entitled to the protection of
these rights (paras [43] [44]). The right to dignity furthermore
entailed the right to family life. The Constitutional Court was thus
satisfied that the house rules were in breach of the Constitution
(para [51]).
A rather technical approach was followed with regard to
whether the limitation of the applicants’ rights by the impugned
rules was justified (see paras [52]ff). In this context the ‘law of
general application’ was a threshold requirement. The rules were
not authorised by a law of general application. As the City had
failed to prove that the limitations flowing from the application of
the rules were reasonable and justifiable in an open and demo-
cratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom, as
required in section 36, the appeal had to succeed.
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While the Cameron judgment concurred with the finding
(supported by Froneman, Khampepe, and Madlanga JJ save as
regards paras [93]–[100]) that the rules were not constitutionally
valid, it differed in the way in which the conclusion was reached.
Whereas in the first judgment, the majority, set out above,
concluded that the rules did not concern a measure the City took
under section 26 of the Constitution to realise the rights of access
to housing progressively, the Cameron judgment argued that the
rules could not be separated from the provision of housing. This
meant that temporary accommodation entailed the provision of
housing and everything connected thereto, including the rules.
Section 26(2) therefore had an impact on both the provision of
housing and the house rules (para [57]). This was important, as
the original order did not set out how the temporary housing had
to be provided or what it had to comply with, as it was very
general and rather vague (para [58]). In light of section 26(2), the
question was therefore whether the measures, including the rules
set out by the shelter, were reasonable. This meant that it
necessarily had to go further than a mere technicality as to
whether the limitations flowed from a law of general application
(para [60]). If that was the focus, it would deflect attention from
the real issue that arose when measures taken in progressive
realisation of social and economic rights were assessed for
reasonableness (para [63]). The test was thus not whether the
limitations flowed from a law of general application, but whether
the limitations were reasonable.
Whether the temporary housing constituted a section 26 mea-
sure was explored in paragraphs [64]ff and answered in the
affirmative (para [68]). Accordingly, where the government pro-
vided temporary housing in fulfilment of a court order, section
26(2) and its reasonableness criterion governed the way in which
it did so. In agreement with the reasons put forward in the majority
judgment, the Cameron judgment concluded that the house rules
were not reasonable (para [79]).
While the third judgment handed down by Jafta J (with
Mojapelo J concurring and Mogoeng CJ concurring in part)
confirmed the unconstitutionality finding of the house rules, it
disagreed with the second judgment to the extent that house
rules amounted to a measure contemplated in section 26(2).
The approach that dignity entailed a right to family life, and that
the house rules as interpreted and applied in these shelters
conflicted with the fundamental rights identified above, cannot be
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faulted. Pertinent to the present matter is the fact that the shelter
was the only manner in which the individual or family’s right to
access to adequate housing could be realised. Phrased differ-
ently: for the person involved the shelter is the only home he or
she knows – that is his or her home. In this context, no difference,
as regards substance, is made between temporary and perma-
nent housing and accommodation. What does this mean for local
authorities or NGO’s providing and operating accommodation
and ‘managed-care-facilities’? Arguably, realising the full spec-
trum of rights is challenging, given extant capacity, facilities, and
budgeting.
SECTIONAL TITLES
In Body Corporate of Empire Gardens v Sithole & another 2017
(4) SA 161 (SCA) the body corporate obtained two default
judgments against the Sithole sisters who co-owned a section in
the sectional title scheme for non-payment of their proportionate
share of their levies. In order to satisfy the judgments, their
movable assets were attached and sold at auction, but they
realised too little to satisfy the judgments (para [4]). The body
corporate then obtained a warrant of execution against their
immovable property, and the unit was attached and sold at
auction. The sale had, however, to be abandoned as the second
respondent (Nedbank), which held a mortgage bond registered
in its favour over the unit, did not accept the sale price. The body
corporate then launched an application for the Sithole sisters’
compulsory sequestration. The court a quo dismissed the appli-
cation by the body corporate on the basis that such an order
would only benefit the body corporate and not the general body
of creditors as required by section 10(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act
34 of 1936.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the body corporate
argued that bodies corporate do not merely act to protect their
own financial interests but have a statutory obligation to protect
the interests of all the members who are prejudiced when a single
member fails to pay his or her arrear levies. On this ground a
deviation from the trite principle of concursus creditorum was
justified so that it would not be necessary for bodies corporate to
prove actual or prospective pecuniary benefit to the general body
of creditors. The Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that the
purpose and effect of the sequestration process are to bring
about a convergence of the claims in an insolvent estate to
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ensure that it is wound up in an orderly fashion, that the creditors
are treated equally, and that once a sequestration order is made,
a concursus creditorum comes into being with the effect that the
rights of the creditors as a group are preferred to the rights of an
individual creditor (para [9]). The Supreme Court of Appeal
consequently held that there was no basis for distinguishing
between bodies corporate and other creditors. Consequently, a
body corporate applying for the compulsory sequestration of its
members is required to prove that the order of sequestration
sought will be to the advantage of the general body of creditors,
as contemplated in section 10(c) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
(para [13]).
The crux of the decision is contained in the following passages:
The fundamental problem with the proposition is that the difficulty
experienced by bodies corporate in collecting arrear levies is not a
novel one. It is part of a ‘socio-economic problem’. (See Body
Corporate of Geovy Villa v Sheriff, Pretoria Central Magistrate’s Court,
and Another 2003 (1) SA 69 (T) at 73 paras 6 – 7; Barnard NO v
Regspersoon van Aminie en ’n Ander 2001 (3) SA 973 (SCA) at 981D –
F. Since 1986 the legislature has effected several amendments to the
Sectional Titles Act but has not deemed it fit to accord bodies
corporate any other preferential treatment beyond that provided
through the provisions of s 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act
and s 89(1) of the Insolvency Act. Section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) provides
that a sectional title unit cannot be transferred to the name of a new
owner unless a clearance certificate is obtained from the body
corporate and provision is made for the payment of all arrear
contributions. In terms of s 89(1) of the Insolvency Act, outstanding
levies due to the body corporate are treated as being part of the cost
of realisation. (See Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building
and Another 1996 (1) SA 131 (A) at 140A – D; First Rand Bank Ltd v
Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 (3) SA 362 (SCA) para [27].)
This court cannot usurp the functions of the legislature and grant the
immunity from the Insolvency Act now being sought. There is thus no
basis to make the distinction between bodies corporate and other
creditors (paras [12]–[13]).
Demolition of part of sectional title building
The issue in the appeal in Serengeti Rise Industries (Pty) Ltd &
another v Aboobaker NO & others 2017 (6) SA 581 (SCA) was
whether a demolition order granted by the KwaZulu-Natal Divi-
sion of the High Court, Durban, was valid. The first appellant,
Serengeti, acquired the property in 2009. In August 2010 the
municipality approved the first building plans in terms of which
Serengeti was to build a four-storey residential apartment devel-
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opment on the property. At that time the property was zoned
general residential 1 (GR1) in terms of the Durban Town Planning
Scheme Regulations. On 12 December 2011, whilst construction
under the 2010 building plans was under way, the municipality
approved an application by Serengeti for rezoning of the property
from GR1 to a general residential 5 (GR5) zone. The rezoning was
approved despite written objections from the third, fifth, and sixth
respondents (para [4]). The respondents contended that the
approval of the rezoning application and deviation plans was in
conflict with the municipality’s policy, which provided that only
buildings that conformed to GR1 and GR2 zoning would be
allowed in the Berea-Musgrave area of the municipality. They
asserted that the process which preceded the approvals had
been unfair as they had not been given proper notification thereof
(para [6]).
Although the order was based on the finding that the eThekwini
Municipality’s rezoning and subsequent deviation plan approvals
in respect of the appellants’ building were invalid, the High Court
made no order to that effect but ordered only that the develop-
ment on the property that exceeded GR1 zoning be demolished.
The High Court’s approach was that it was bound by the legality
doctrine to order that the part of the structure that was illegal be
demolished (paras [9] [10]). (2004 Annual Survey 992–3.)
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the demolition order
was unsustainable for the following reasons. First, the court had
granted a remedy of a consequential nature without granting the
primary relief sought. The primary relief sought was the setting-
aside of the approvals of the municipality’s rezoning and devia-
tion plan, which formed the basis for the consequential relief
sought. Until these approvals were set aside they remained valid
(para [12]). Second, the order lacked clarity. The order read that
only the portion of the building that ‘exceeds GR1 zoning’must be
demolished. Apart from there being no description of such
portion, no evidence was led as to whether the structural integrity
of the building could survive the partial demolition. Apparently,
the order could only be executed by the demolition of the entire
building, which meant that the court had not duly considered
the constitutional proportionality of the remedy in question (para
[13]). Third, the High Court mistakenly found that it was com-
pelled by the legality doctrine to issue the demolition order that it
had; in considering the appropriate order, it failed to exercise its
discretion to grant a just and equitable remedy in accordance
with the circumstances of the case (paras [15] [19]).
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During the course of the judgment the court distinguished the
decision in Lester v Ndlambe Municipality & another 2015 (6) SA
283 (SCA), [2014] 1All SA 402. In Lester the building in respect of
which the High Court had issued a demolition order had been
constructed without any approved building plans. The demolition
order was sought by the municipality in terms of section 21 of the
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of
1977, which empowers a magistrate, on application by a local
authority or the Minister, to authorise such local authority or
Minister to demolish a building if the magistrate is satisfied that its
construction does not comply with the provisions of that Act. The
court concluded that Lester must in future be read in the light of
the subsequent judgment of Supreme Court of Appeal in BSB
International (Pty) Ltd v Readam South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4)
SA 83 (SCA).
The crux of the decision is contained in the following passage:
Remedies provided for under s 8 of PAJA and under common law
must be construed as giving effect to and promoting constitutional
rights. Sections 38 and 172 of the Constitution enjoin courts to grant
case-appropriate remedies. The principle is that
‘invalidity under the Constitution, as was the case with voidness
under the common law, is a relative concept. It is, firstly, subject (in
the administrative-law context) to a determination by the court
whether a ground of review is present. Secondly (in the event that a
ground of review is present) a court has to determine what the
consequences of such determination are. A finding that the action in
question is invalid (because a ground of review is present) will not
necessarily mean that the action is to be set aside or declared
invalid with retrospective effect or even at all. Especially in the case
of delegated legislation which authorises administrative action, a
retrospective declaratory order of invalidity could have extremely
disruptive effects (especially where a number of actions had
already been taken in terms of such legislation).
This passage summarises the views expressed by JR de Ville
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003)
331.
PROPERTY ESTATES: HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
Road rules and limitation on movement of domestic employees in estate
managed by a homeowners’ association
Singh & another v Mount Edgecombe Country Club Estate
Management Association Two (RF) (NPC) & others (AR575/2016)
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[2017] ZAKZPHC 48 (17 November 2017) deals with an attack on
the validity of certain rules of a homeowners’ association (the
HOA). The rules became binding on owners when they bought
properties in the estate. The sale agreements, in each instance,
provide that on purchasing a property in the estate, the pur-
chaser acknowledges that there is an HOA in existence of which
he or she will become a member, and that there are ‘estate rules’
with which he or she must comply.
The rules in question are the rules of the Mount Edgecombe
Country Club Estate, a gated complex consisting of in excess of
890 ownership and sectional title residential units, together with
extensive common property consisting of open areas, dams,
ponds, rivulets, water features, community facilities, roads, and
other infrastructure. The common facilities on the estate include a
golf course, clubhouse, and a function venue. The estate also
provides facilities for various sporting activities, including squash,
tennis, fishing, and bowls. The estate has gated access points
controlled by guards and is serviced by a network of roads
situated on erven registered in the name of the HOA (paras
[6]–[8]).
Singh’s daughter was fined for contravening the rules relating
to speeding on the roads in the estate, and the management
withdrew Singh’s (and his family’s) biometric access facility to the
estate as the fine remained unpaid. Further altercations arose
between Singh and the HOA regarding prescribed times that
domestic personnel were allowed to enter and leave the estate. In
this regard, the rules provided that domestic personnel had to
make use of dedicated minibus transport, provided by the HOA,
and could not generally use the roads in the estate; their access
was restricted to between 6am and 6pm, and they could only
‘walk on the estate between the residence where they were
working that day and their gate of exit’.
The matter was first heard in the Pietermaritzburg High Court
(the court a quo). That court held, amongst other things, that the
contractual nature of the relationship between the HOAand Singh
(and other owners) was determinative of the dispute – basically,
that having purchased a property in the estate and agreed to be
bound by the rules of the association, Singh must consider
himself bound thereby and act accordingly; and that, on the face
of it, the rules were not invalid. Concerning the limitations on the
movement of domestic employees in the estate, the court held
that these rules were not unreasonable, taking into account the
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security aims of the estate management (paras [11] [12]; 2016
Annual Survey 77-81). Singh appealed the matter and argued
that the estate should not be allowed to issue speeding fines to
motorists driving in the estate as it did not have the authority to do
so under the Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996. He also contended that
the rules relating to the movement of domestic personnel were
inappropriate.
The full court reasoned that the issues raised in this judgment
invoke the demarcation of public and private law and its impact, if
any, on the regime of certain conduct rules that exist in the HOA
estate. The roads, although owned by the HOA, were according
to the court ‘public roads’ as defined in the National Road Traffic
Act 93 of 1996 (the NRTA). This meant that certain public law
consequences followed which gainsaid the argument that the
application of the rules were confined to the contractual relation-
ship between the parties only. The court explained that inherent in
the concept of a public road was that the public had access to it
and that the regulatory regime was a statutory one, as prescribed
by the NRTA.
Chapter IX of the NRTA contains various provisions bearing on
the road rules as formulated and implemented by the HOA. In
fact, only the Minister of Transport, or someone authorised by him
or her, has the power to regulate any aspect of public roads. The
court emphasised that in the context of this matter it was
significant that section 57(6) of the NRTA obliged private bodies
(such as the HOA) to seek permission for regulating traffic on and
access to public roads from the MEC and/or the municipality
concerned. As it was common cause that in the present matter,
the HOA had at no stage applied for such permission, the court
held that this failure rendered both the rules and the contractual
arrangement with its members illegal (paras [27] [30]). Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the rules relating to traffic
control within the estate were against public policy because they
were in direct conflict with the relevant provisions of the NRTA;
that the HOA and its members could not contract out of the
obligations imposed by legislation and the NRTA in this instance;
and that a contractual arrangement could not remedy such an
illegality (paras [35] [36]).
The court held that the rules limiting or restricting the domestic
employees’ access to the public roads also had to be rejected as
invalid insofar as it appeared that domestic employees were not
free to traverse the public roads in the estate save in the limited
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manner provided by the HOA’s rules. From a constitutional point
of view, their rights in this regard were severely restricted. The
restrictions placed on domestic employees with regard to their
movements on the roads in the estate, flowed from a miscon-
ceived notion on the part of the HOA that it was entitled to
exercise usurped control over the public roads in the estate
through its conduct rules. To the extent that these rules restricted
the rights of domestic employees freely to be on and traverse
public roads in the estate, they were unreasonable and unlawful
(para [43]).
Review of refusal to grant a licence to construct homes
In Long Beach Home Owners Association v Department of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (South Africa) 2017 JDR 1613
(SCA), the owners of seven properties located within a forest,
represented by the appellant, Long Beach Home Owners Asso-
ciation, wished to construct homes on their properties. Before
doing so, they had to to obtain a licence in terms of section 7(4) of
the National Forests Act 84 of 1998 from the first respondent, the
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the executive
head of which is the second respondent, the Minister of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fisheries. The licence would permit the appli-
cants to carry out prohibited activities in a natural forest despite
the fact that natural forests may not be destroyed save in
exceptional circumstances.
When the application for the requisite licence was refused by
the Department, the appellant launched an application before the
Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Kollapen J), seeking
the review and setting aside of the first decision by the Depart-
ment and replacing it with the grant of the requisite licence to the
appellant. The court found that the rigid adherence to policy in
reaching the decision amounted to an improper exercise of the
discretion. It set aside the order of the court a quo and replaced it
with an order that the refusal be reviewed and set aside.
SHARE BLOCKS
In Off-beat Holiday Club & another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa
Shareblock Ltd & others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC), the applicants, both
timeshare clubs, were minority shareholders in the first respon-
dent (Shareblock), a company operating holiday resorts. In 2008
the applicants commenced a High Court application for declara-
tory relief under section 252 of the previous Companies Act 61 of
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1973. They claimed that the third respondent (Harri), the control-
ling mind and principal shareholder of Shareblock, had, during
1998 and 1999, improperly amended Shareblock’s articles to
allow the allocation of shares in a timeshare development, and
then allocated such shares in an unfair manner. They sought an
order declaring the amended articles invalid, that the shares had
been improperly issued, and that the holders of those shares
were barred from voting on them. The issue was whether the
applicants’ section 252 claim had prescribed.
The High Court held that the claim had prescribed as it was a
‘debt’ as intended in sections 11 and 12 of the Prescription Act,
and the applicants had been aware of their cause of action for
many years. The court rejected the argument that the causes of
action amounted to continuing wrongs. In an appeal the Supreme
Court of Appeal attached a wide meaning to the term ‘debt’ and
endorsed the High Court’s view that the section 252 debts had
prescribed. In the present application, also for leave to appeal,
the applicants argued that the Constitutional Court’s decision in
Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) (2016 (6) BCLR
709, [2016] ZACC 13, required that a narrow meaning be
ascribed to ‘debt’: it could be either a claim for the payment of
money, or a claim for the delivery of something. Since their claim
under section 252 was neither, it had not prescribed. In the
alternative, the applicants argued that their claim constituted a
continuing wrong that could not prescribe. The respondents
argued that the applicants’ claim was a debt because it sought
the alteration of Shareblock’s articles, that is, the performance of
an obligation as ordinarily understood.
On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Mhlantla J upheld the
appeal for the majority on the ground that the plain text of section
252 gave the court a broad discretion to grant equitable relief
(para [28]). Until the court made a determination under section
252, neither party could discharge its obligations to the other
because neither would be aware of their existence or extent (para
[30]). A claim had to be correctly characterised before a decision
on the applicability of the Prescription Act could be made (para
[34]). As the applicants’ claim, being one for declaratory relief,
was not a debt as defined in Makate, it was incapable of
prescription (paras [31]–[34] [48]). The judge ordered that the
order of the Supreme Court of Appeal be replaced with an order
declaring that a section 252 claim was not a debt under the
Prescription Act, and remitted the matter to the High Court (paras
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[36] [56]). Froneman and Madlanga JJ concurred in part, for
different reasons.
GROUP HOUSING: EXTENSION OF DWELLING CAUSING LOSS OF VIEW
AND REDUCTION IN VALUE
See Gerstle & others v Cape Town City & others 2017 (1) SA 11
(WCC), discussed in 2016 Annual Survey 81–3.
OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ROAD
In Escherich & another v De Waal & others 2017 (6) SA 257
(WCC) the first and second applicants and the first respondent
owned neighbouring plots in the George/Sedgefield area. A road,
Seaview Drive East, passed through the area, giving access to
the first applicant’s property before proceeding through the first
respondent’s property, and continuing through other land to
the second applicant’s property. The present matter arose when
the first respondent, without building plan approval, erected two
structures on the road within his property, which completely
obstructed the road. He also erected a gate across the road
where it entered his property with the result that no one could use
Seaview Drive East from the point where it entered his property
without his consent, and, even if they were to do so, they would
be unable to proceed any further than the structures. Persons
wishing to access the second applicant’s property had to make
use of a detour that the first respondent had built through his
property.
Apart from the loss of physical access to the second appli-
cant’s property via Seaview Drive East, the applicants com-
plained that the location of the detour meant that their rights to
privacy were impaired, and that a plantation belonging to the first
applicant was placed at risk of fire. The applicants consequently
brought an application in the High Court to restore access to
Seaview Drive East, seeking an order directing the first respon-
dent to demolish the structures erected, clear the road of other
obstructions, and remove the gate.
The first respondent countered that Seaview Drive East was
not, as the applicants insisted, a public road, and that nothing
prevented him from acting in the manner he had. Consequently,
the court had to decide on the legal status of the road and,
depending on this, whether the first respondent was entitled to
obstruct it by erecting a gate and structures. The first respondent
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also challenged the applicants’ locus standi. He argued that by
virtue of section 21 of the National Building Regulations and
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 and section 127(1) of the
Divisional Councils Ordinance 18 of 1976, respectively, only a
local authority (with jurisdiction) had locus standi to approach
a court to seek the demolition of unauthorised structures or the
removal of an encroachment on a public road.
Having found that that Seaview Drive East was a public road
which in terms of section 121 of the Divisional Councils Ordi-
nance 18 of 1976 vested in the relevant local authority, the court
held that the first respondent had no right unilaterally to close or
obstruct the road simply to suit his own convenience, since to do
so was to abrogate entirely the public character of the road. The
fact that he had established a detour and offered to register
servitudes of way did not advance his case as these arrange-
ments were temporary and could be disavowed by subsequent
owners of the first respondent’s property. Moreover, the first
respondent had not followed the established procedure for
changing the location of a public street (paras [23] [24], [27]–[31]).
The court further held that the applicants had locus standi to
pursue the relief they sought under common law on the basis of
(a) their general interest in maintaining the system of public
streets on the estate and avoiding unilateral changes (except by
lawful procedures); and (b) their direct interest in the encroach-
ment due to its impact on their rights (paras [36]–[42]). As the first
respondent had unlawfully obstructed Seaview Drive East, the
court finally ordered him to restore access by demolishing the
structures in question and clearing the street so that it might
again be used as a road (paras [43]–[46]).
LAND REFORM-RELATED MATTERS
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
Expropriation and labour tenancy claims
Uys v Msiza ((1222/2016) [2017] ZASCA130) is an appeal from
the Land Claims Court against the amount of compensation
determined following the expropriation of a portion of land
pursuant to a successful labour tenant land claim under section
23(1) of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. On the
basis that the respondent’s father initially, and subsequently
Msiza himself, complied with all the requirements of labour
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tenancy legislation, a labour tenant claim, as provided for under
Chapter 3 of the Act, was lodged in 1996 (see paras [3]–[8] for
background). Following due process, the owners were notified,
there were various negotiations, and the property was sold to the
trust, the current owner, in 2000. The trust was aware of the
presence of the Msiza family and that a labour tenancy claim had
been lodged when it purchased the land. In 2004 an award of
land was made to Msiza by the Land Claims Court, after which
the parties attempted to reach an agreement regarding the
amount of compensation to be paid to the trust. Unable to resolve
the matter, Msiza lodged an application to refer the matter to the
Land Claims Court. The Land Claims Court determined an
amount of R1,5 million. That was the order on appeal in the
present matter.
Navsa ADP set out the relevant statutory background (para
[9]), referred to previous Constitutional Court judgments (eg,
Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC)), but
ultimately highlighted that the amount of compensation agreed
on or decided upon had to adhere to the standards of justice and
equity (para [109]). In this regard it had also to reflect an
equitable balance between the interests of the public and of
those affected by expropriation. Ultimately, the standards are set
out in section 25(3) of the Constitution and included, amongst
other factors, the market value of property. The current Expropria-
tionAct 63 of 1975, however, does not specifically require that the
amount of compensation must meet the peremptory standards of
the Constitution.
Because market value is usually the one factor capable of
objective determination, it is generally the convenient starting-
point in the assessment of what constituted just and equitable
compensation (para [12]). Once that has been determined, other
factors are taken into account, adjusting market value either
upwards or downwards – the so-called ‘two-stage approach’
(para [12]). The court underlined that the approach had to be
applied with care and in line with all the factors set out in section
25(3) of the Constitution (para [13]).
At issue in the present case was whether the relevant property
also had residential development potential, which would affect
the valuation. If it had developmental potential, the value would
be R4,36 million. However, if it was considered in its present state
as agricultural land, the value would be R1,8 million (para [14]).
Accordingly, the latter estimation already took into account the
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land claim lodged by the Msiza-family (para [15]). Worded
differently: there was a known impediment to the property’s
development potential when it was purchased which had a direct
bearing on the price that a willing buyer in the trust’s position
would have been prepared to pay for the property (para [19]).
The Pointe Gourde-principle entails that compensation for the
compulsory acquisition of land cannot include an increase in
value which is entirely due to the scheme of the underlying
acquisition (para [18]). This principle does not apply where the
owner who buys the land knows of the impediment and the land is
subsequently expropriated (para [20]). The Pointe Gourde-
principle, therefore, did not apply to the present case as the trust
bought the land knowing of the Msiza-claim. On that basis the
market value was not R4,36 million, but R1,8 million (para [21]).
Although the Land Claims Court was hesitant to apply the
two-stage approach, it did so, and after estimating the market
value, adjusted it downwards to R1,5 million citing various
reasons, including the disproportionate chasm between the
amount paid by the trust and the market value it sought to claim;
that the trust had made no significant investment in the land; that
the use of the land had not changed since it was bought; that
there was a land claim against the property when it was pur-
chased; and that in 2004 the land had been awarded, but not yet
transferred, to the Msiza family (para [23]). In considering the
reasons listed above, NavsaADP found that the value of land had
increased since the trust bought the property (para [24]), so
rejecting the disproportionate chasm alluded to by the Land
Claims Court. Essentially, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that
all of the reasons listed above for the downward adjustment of the
value by the Land Claims Court, had already been taken into
account when the valuers estimated the market value to be
R1,8 million (para [25]). In this light the court was satisfied that
there was no justification for stigmatising the trust’s claim as
‘extravagant’ (para [26]). Furthermore, the state was willing to pay
R1,8 million. Overall, the Supreme Court of Appeal found there
was no justification for the deduction of R300 000 by the Land
Claims Court (para [27]). Accordingly, R1,8 million was deemed
to be just and equitable to compensate the landowner for the land
lost in concluding the labour tenant claim.
The judgment is unsatisfactory as it in essence confirms that
just and equitable compensation continues to be based princi-
pally on market value. That is the case because the initial market
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value estimated by the valuers, taking into account all relevant
factors, was R1,8 million and that was the exact same amount the
Supreme Court of Appeal considered just and equitable. The
judgment does not unpack all the factors listed in section 25(3) of
the Constitution. Where, how, and to what extent did the above
amount reflect an equitable balance between the interests of the
public and of those affected by the expropriation? The fact that
the state was willing to pay the R1,8 million should not be a factor
at all. Instead, how the R1,8 million was arrived at, should be the
main focus. The analysis was not sufficiently deep to consider,
overall, whether the market value of R1,8 million was, in the final
analysis, the correct amount to be awarded. If market value is to
be the constant standard against which compensation for all
expropriations related to land reform are to be measured, the
process will be very expensive and ultimately unsustainable.
Below market value is acceptable, guided by and calculated in
terms of a consideration of all the factors listed in section 25(3) of
the Constitution.
Labour tenants and a special master
Despite the dawning of the new constitutional dispensation,
rural dwellers remain vulnerable and exposed to exploitation.
Various legislative measures within the context of land reform
have been developed to deal with aspects of vulnerability. Within
the context of farmworkers generally, the ESTA was promulgated,
of which certain elements of eviction and the procedural and
substantive requirements embodied therein are referred to
and discussed above. As regards labour tenancy, the Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 was promulgated specifi-
cally to redress tenure insecurity and broaden access to land in
certain rural areas. A labour tenant – a specific category of rural
dweller for whom particular requirements are set out in the Act –
has general protection against eviction, but, more importantly,
can also lodge a labour tenant claim. Under Chapter III of theAct,
labour tenants who meet the requirements can claim a parcel of
land (s 16), as well as corresponding rights to enable the
effective utilisation of the land (s 17). When the process is
completed successfully, both redistribution and tenure reform
objectives will have been achieved. There will have been redistri-
bution, as the land belonging to the (white) landowner will have
been subdivided and a portion transferred to the former labour
tenant. Likewise, tenure reform will have been achieved, as the
former labour tenant is now a landowner in his or her own right.
1037PROPERTY LAW (INCLUDING REAL SECURITY): CASE LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 77 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/28−Property−Case−Law
Unfortunately, the lodging of claims and their corresponding
processing have not gone according to plan and massive
backlogs have developed, with extremely negative conse-
quences for landowners and labour tenants alike. It is in this
context that Mwelase & others v Director-General for the Depart-
ment of Rural Development and Land Reform & others 2017 (4)
SA 422 (LCC) was handed down. The background is as follows.
The applicants had, to no avail, previously approached the
respondent and the relevant Department numerous times to
secure statistics regarding the number of labour tenant claims
finalised since the promulgation of the Act (para [5]). The
Department acknowledged, in a report, a massive backlog and
indicated an estimated period of 24 months for the collation of
outstanding information regarding Chapter 3 applications. This
state of affairs prompted the applicants to lodge the present
application in 2013 for the appointment of a Special Master to
process labour tenancy claims (para [6]). The application was
not supported by the respondents. While a general understand-
ing was reached on some supervisory role for the Land Claims
Court in processing the claims, the appointment of a Special
Master was resisted.
Part A of the notice of motion sought relief in respect of the first
to fourth applicants’ claims for awards of land owned by the third
respondent, the Hiltonian Society. Part B sought systemic relief
for the processing of all outstanding labour tenant applications
that had been lodged. The respondents agreed to Part A of the
application, which was referred to the Land Claims Court for
determination. Systemic relief sought under Part B of the applica-
tion has come before the Land Claims Court numerous times
before and its content has changed over time. Initially, court
supervision was requested, followed by a preference for the
appointment of a Special Master. As mentioned, the latter was
opposed by the respondent.
The application was based on various grounds, including that
the Department was failing in the process; that it had been
approached to refer section 16 applications to the Land Claims
Court, which had never occurred; that the process was in
shambles, as information had been lost; and that in certain
instances, the applications would have to be re-submitted from
scratch (para [9]). The application was supported by various
affidavits, including petitions from hundreds of labour tenants.
The latest figures, released by the Department in August 2016,
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indicated that 10 914 claims under section 16 remained unsettled.
It was argued that the Department was guilty of a persistent
failure properly to process applications, and in this light a
structural interdict was initially sought against the Department.
That interdict would have required the Department to provide
statistics of the current status of all labour tenants’ claims and to
report regularly on its progress.
The Department filed a response in March 2014 indicating that
(a) it was not required to process all claims as some labour
tenants would be better served if their claims were dealt with in
the restitution programme; and (b) full details regarding outstand-
ing claims would be published by mid-2104 (para [10]). The latter
information was never published, leading to further litigation,
resulting in the so-called Collation Order of 31 March 2015 (paras
[11] [12]). In these documents the Department acknowledged
that the processing of labour tenants’ claims had not gone
according to plan and stated that, despite the undertaking that
statistics would be available in 2014, the collation process could
in fact take between one and two years to complete. In KwaZulu-
Natal, for example, the whole process would have to be revisited.
This development led to the applicants simultaneously seeking
court supervision for the completion of the process, as well as for
the appointment of a Special Master (para [13]). The latter was
also needed due to the scale and nature of the problem.
Returning to court in June 2015, the Department agreed to a
detailed court supervision order along the lines the applicants
had initially sought, culminating in a court order that the respon-
dent intended to comply with the Act and that progress reports
would be filed every three months (para [14]).
Again reports were not filed on time or regularly as agreed, with
the result that during the March 2016 hearing all parties were in
agreement that court supervision would be necessary (para
[16]). At this time it was clear that the Department was unable to
file reports on time, to comply with their own timelines generally,
or to provide accurate information. Overall the supervision order
had not been complied with and subsequent reports had not
included updated plans. Apart from these shortcomings, it was
still unclear at what stage complete, reliable information would be
available to all parties. In their documents the applicants alluded
to incompetence, intransigence, and lack of attention, calling for
the appointment of a specific person to manage and monitor the
process – a Special Master (para [17]).
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In order to consider the possible appointment of a Special
Master, the court, per Ncube AJ, first set out the nature and
functions of such a person (paras [19]–[24]). Such an appoint-
ment would have to be an independent person with the main
function of assisting the court in processing and adjudicating on
labour tenant claims in the manner prescribed by the court. The
powers would be limited and carried out under supervision of the
court. Such a person would thus be providing additional resources
to the court. Special skills and qualifications would be required,
similar to those required of a court-appointed amicus curiae.
Such appointments are quite widespread in the United States
and India, and comparative research could, therefore, also be of
value here (para [22]). Important characteristics would include
independence, diligence, managerial experience, an ability to
mediate disputes, to work with both parties, and experience in
land-related matters (para [23]). In practice such a person could
be a senior advocate, a retired judge, or a retired civil servant
with experience in land-related matters.
Time was also of the essence. Estimating that it would take one
day to solve and settle a labour claim, this meant that it would
take 24 years to complete the whole process and finalise all
claims – without any obstacles or delays. As delays were sure to
occur, it could mean that labour tenants would wait decades and
might well die before their claims could be settled – having
regard to the fact that the majority of labour tenants had already
been waiting for two decades for their claims to be dealt with.
While the magnitude of the task was understood, the respondents
still contested the appointment of a Special Master. It was argued
that it would not expedite the process and would not accelerate
or improve the finalisation of these claims (para [26]). The claims
would still have to be dealt with judicially, which meant more
judicial resources, not a Special Master.
For the process to work effectively the first respondent also had
to function at full capacity. The Director-General’s role in manag-
ing and processing claims was likewise crucial. Simply referring
thousands of claims to the court would overwhelm the court. It
was thus imperative that a strategy be put in place as to how
thousands of claims would be processed and finalised. In this
process the Land Claims Court would also play a critical role.
Currently, only one permanent judge was appointed, with a
number of acting judges. Under these conditions, a Special
Master would contribute greatly to much-needed continuity (para
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[28]). Linked to the above difficulties were further issues of lost
applications (and no protocol to deal with lost applications), poor
record-keeping in certain provinces, and the inability to stick to
timelines and meet deadlines (para [29]). The appointment of a
Special Master would assist in all of these shortcomings and
difficulties.
A further objection noted against the appointment of a Special
Master was that it would introduce external persons into the
Department’s command line functions and would cause delays
(para [31]).
In light of the dismal performance of the Department and the
problems experienced, as set out in the judgment and discussed
above, the court was not swayed by any of the objections raised
against the appointment of a Special Master. Experience has also
shown that a structural interdict or a supervisory role for the court
would be inadequate. The supervisory role of the court would
inevitably embody a long, extended process, would take many
years to complete, and would drain the court’s time and the
resources of the Department (para [33]).
In light of all of these considerations, the appointment of a
Special Master was not only desirable, but urgent. The appoint-
ment would also contribute to effective relief for a special
category of persons, namely labour tenants, and would be
aligned with the Constitution as it would contribute to realising
labour tenants’ rights (paras [34]–[36]). To that end an order was
handed down in terms of which a ‘Special Master of Labour
Tenants’ was provided for. The process of appointing such a
person would start on 30 January 2017. A detailed exposition of
the process together with the requirements and timelines were
set out in the court order (para [38]).
The decision to start the process of appointing a Special
Master to regulate and monitor the processing of ‘labour tenants’
claims is welcomed. The appointment itself will add gravity to the
process, underline the importance of dealing with claims expedi-
tiously, and highlight the government’s commitment to land
reform objectives. As is clear from the judgment, the mere
appointment of such a person is not a silver bullet that will solve
all problems; the backlog remains massive and merely collating
the information and determining the status quo of labour tenancy
claims will be both challenging and time-consuming. But the
process must start and must be as coordinated and streamlined
as possible. This is where this Special Master, with sufficient
capacity and resources, comes into the picture.
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LAND USE PLANNING
Restrictive conditions
Ex Parte Whitfield & similar matters 2017 (5) SA161 (ECP) dealt
with the removal of restrictive conditions within the new paradigm
of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of
2013 (the SPLUMA) and the role and function of the court in this
regard. The judgment dealt with seven similar issues where
applicants sought the removal or amendment of certain restric-
tive conditions of title incorporated in the title deeds of their
respective properties. These conditions placed a restriction on
the current and successive title holders. This meant that the
restrictions also conferred rights upon holders of title to other
properties, in that relationships were defined, including the
enforcement of such conditions (para [4]). In the light of this
restrictive conditions may not be removed, suspended or altered
except with consent of all the parties whose rights and interests
they regulate. The court therefore did not have inherent power to
amend, suspend, or repeal the conditions (paras [4] [7]). Instead,
the court did no more than enquire into and establish that the
rights of the relevant title holders to amend, waive, or abandon
had been properly exercised. Once it had been satisfied in this
regard, the court issued a declaratory which authorised the
Registrar of Deeds to effect an appropriate endorsement of the
title deeds in accordance with the provisions of the Deeds
Registries Act (para [10]). The question the court had to deal with
was whether the provisions of the SPLUMAhad in any way limited
the court’s authority to give effect to the exercise by interested
parties of their rights to waive, amend, or vary their rights (para
[11]).
The background to the SPLUMA and the reasons for its
enactment were set out in the judgment in paragraphs [12]–[18].
Not only did the SPLUMA rationalise planning and land use
measures, it also introduced important innovations in this context,
specifically at municipal planning level (para [15]). This was done
by providing for the establishment of municipal planning tribunals
and the alignment of administrative decision-making in relation to
the removal or variation of restrictive conditions in relation to
spatial planning and land use management (para [17]). The Act
thus located the decision-making process in relation to restrictive
conditions in the municipal sphere. A municipal planning tribunal
was now empowered to decide one or more applications in
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relation to land, including applications for the removal, amend-
ment, or suspension of restrictive conditions of title (para [19]).
Section 42 sets out the relevant factors in relation to such
applications. However, there is no specific requirement in the
SPLUMA that parties whose rights are affected by the removal or
variation of a restrictive condition of title must consent to such
removal or variation. Goosen J confirmed that this meant that the
basis for the removal or amendment of a condition of title was
essentially the same as that applied in any other land develop-
ment application (para [22]). However, conditions of title are dealt
with further in sections 45(6) and 47. While no prior consent of
relevant property title holders is required, these sections provide
that the municipality could consent in certain instances and that
the removal, amendment or suspension had to be effected in
accordance with section 25 of the Constitution, with due regard to
the respective rights of all those affected. Applications had,
furthermore, to have been lodged in the prescribed manner (see
paras [23] [24]). The procedure and format of applications were
dealt with in detail in the Regulations, specifically in regulations
14 and 15. Under these regulations municipalities were free to set
out relevant procedures and timelines and to appoint relevant
officials specifically to deal with these duties. In the absence of
such appointment, applications for the removal or amendment of
restrictive conditions would be dealt with by the municipal
planning tribunal.
The SPLUMA does not deal with the removal, variation, or
suspension of a restrictive condition pursuant to a court order
(para [26]). Accordingly, there is no provision establishing the
circumstances in which such a court order may be made.
Instead, the SPLUMAestablishes a new administrative procedure
for the removal of restrictive conditions by placing the authority in
the hands of the municipal planning tribunal or designated
municipal official (para [28]). In light of the fact that SPLUMA
does not specifically address the ambit of the court’s authority,
Goosen J opined that this mitigated against a finding that the
court’s authority had in any way been altered (para [29]).
Restrictive conditions, in light of sections 42 and 47 of SPLUMA,
could, in accordance with section 25 of the Constitution, be
removed or amended with the consent of the municipal planning
tribunal. What was the effect of these provisions on the court?
Various questions emerged: Did these sections preclude a court
from authorising the removal of a restrictive condition without the
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consent of the municipal planning tribunal? Phrased differently:
does the court have a discretion to remove such a condition, or is
the court obliged to do so once the tribunal has consented
thereto? Must the consent of the tribunal be obtained before a
court can grant a declaratory order authorising such removal?
Given the point of departure that courts do not have inherent
power to amend or suspend restrictive conditions, the court
confirmed the following at paragraph [40]: a court’s power to
grant an order authorising the removal or amendment of a
restrictive condition of title, upon proof that all interest parties
have consented thereto, is not affected by the provisions of the
SPLUMA. In each instance it is still necessary to establish that all
interested parties have indeed consented thereto.
The court emphasised that, contrary to many applications that
deemed restrictive conditions to be ‘quaint, somewhat old-
fashioned devices which preclude ‘‘modern’’ approaches to land
development and that they serve little or no purpose’ (para [46]),
restrictive conditions had substance, that they operated to the
benefit of the public, and were integral in preserving the essential
character of a township. These kinds of restriction could, there-
fore, not simply be deleted. In this light, as well as against
the background set out above regarding the role of the court, the
court proceeded to deal with each of the seven applications
before it. In short, in the first application (paras [42]–[60]) the
correct authority that had to grant consent had not been
approached; while in the second (paras [61]–[66]), the incorrect
legislative measure was relied on, namely the Removal of Restric-
tions Act 84 of 1967, which had been repealed by the SPLUMA.
The first two applications were consequently refused. The third
application (paras [67]–[71]) was likewise refused as it in essence
embodied a rezoning application. The fourth application (paras
[72]–[77]) had been incorrectly lodged by the legal representa-
tive in her personal capacity – a fatal flaw which also resulted in a
dismissal. In the fifth application (paras [78]–[82]) a rule nisi was
confirmed; and in the sixth (paras [83]–[84]), the application was
granted. The final application (paras [85]–[89]) was successful in
relation to three restrictive conditions, of which notice had been
given to relevant property owners who had consented to the
removal.
The judgment is very useful as it confirms the value of
restrictive conditions as planning tools, as well as the necessity of
following specific procedures to amend or remove such condi-
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tions. The SPLUMA has made the process of considering plan-
ning developments that may be connected to the removal or
amendment of restrictive conditions more streamlined in that the
application can be approached holistically. This still means that
conditions cannot be removed or amended without the neces-
sary consent. Although the courts do not have inherent power to
remove or amend such conditions, they still have a role to play in
that they must ensure that the correct procedures have indeed
been followed and that the necessary consent – including the
consent of the municipality – has been granted. The seven
applications dealt with here indicate clearly that there is still
uncertainty regarding the procedure to follow on the one hand,
and the relevant legislative measures, on the other. Lodging an
application in terms of the now repealed Removal of Restrictive
Conditions Act is indicative of the fact that many practitioners are
not abreast of new developments.
SPECIAL NOTARIAL BOND: EXTINCTION BY PRESCRIPTION
Factaprops 1052 CC & another v Land and Agricultural Devel-
opment Bank of South Africa 2017 (4) SA 495 (SCA) deals with
the period required for the extinction of a special notarial bond by
prescription. In confirming the decision of the High Court in Land
and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa t/a The Land
Bank v Factaprops 1052 CC & another 2016 (2) SA 477 (GP)
(2016 Annual Survey 89–90), the Supreme Court of Appeal found
that the phrase ‘mortgage bond’ in section 11(a)(i) of the Prescrip-
tion Act 68 of 1969, given the language of the section, the context
in which it appears, its purpose, and the history of the Prescrip-
tion Act, has a wide meaning and includes a ‘special notarial
bond’ in terms of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act
57 of 1993. Therefore, the period of prescription applicable to a
debt secured by a special notarial bond is 30 years (paras
[17]–[22]).
An interesting argument in favour of a wider interpretation is the
following (para [21]):
Thirdly, ch 3 of the Prescription Act, in which s 11(a)(i) is located,
concerns prescription of debts, and one of the philosophical justifica-
tions for prescription is that it relieves a debtor from having to defend a
claim long after the event. Differently stated, prescription is about
proof of debts and the purpose of theAct is to protect a debtor against
claims that he may be unable to defend due to lack of evidence
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caused by the passage of time. Therefore, longer periods of prescrip-
tion are justified where transactions are matters of public record as is
the case with special notarial bonds. The purpose of the Prescription
Act thus provides a strong indication that the wider meaning of
‘mortgage bond’ was intended.
It should be noted that the wider meaning of ‘mortgage’ is also
espoused by Loubser Extinctive Prescription (1996) 37–8.
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION
Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988
Maimela v Maimela & others (case no 13282/16 High Court
Gauteng Division (24August 2017)) confirmed that the process of
conversion under the Conversion of Certain Rights into Lease-
hold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988 is not an automatic process,
but that it presupposes an investigation into the relevant facts in
order to establish whether, in what format, and to which benefi-
ciary such a conversion should take place. The applicant’s and
the first respondent’s mother (deceased) were residential permit
holders under regulation 7 of Chapter 2 of the Regulations
Governing the Control and Supervision of an Urban Black Resi-
dential Area and Relevant Matters, GN 1036 of 14 June 1968. In
1995 the deceased was invited to apply for ownership of the
relevant property, but she died before the application had been
finalised. In 1995 the first and second respondents were issued
with a lodger’s permit under regulation 20 of the above Regula-
tions and they continued to reside on the property with their
children. In 2014 the applicant became aware that the first and
second respondents held a title deed to the property of the
deceased. The applicant sought a declaratory order to cancel
the names registered in the title deed of the property on the basis
that it was a family home and that the required process had not
been complied with.
The aim of the Conversion Act was to formalise and confer
leasehold or full ownership upon beneficiaries (para [8]). Under
section 8, an inquiry had to be conducted prior to the rights of
leasehold or ownership being granted. The Conversion Act
furthermore had to be read with section 24A and 24B of the
Gauteng Housing Act 6 of 1998, in terms of which a duty was
placed on the MEC to conduct an inquiry in disputed cases to
determine the lawful beneficiaries (para [10]). With reference to
Shai v Makena Family 2013 JDR 0608 (GNP) and Nzimande v
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Nzimande 2005 (1) SA 83 (W) concerning section 2 of the
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991, the court was
satisfied that ‘it was not intended to automatically convert rights
held under R1036 regulations to more effective common-law
rights of leasehold or ownership without considering the avail-
ability, or lack thereof of new houses in the area, the need for
family members’ occupation rights to be recognised and pro-
tected and the need not to increase homelessness but to
decrease it in the defined area’ (para [12]). Accordingly, before
properties could be transferred, the MEC had to determine who
the lawful beneficiaries were by using appropriate mechanisms in
making the determination (para [13]). In this light the title deed
was cancelled and the relevant authorities were ordered to
ensure that an enquiry was conducted in respect of the relevant
erf.
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983
Persons entering into lease agreements for grazing do not fall
under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 as they
do not meet the requirements for ‘occupier’ under the Act. In
Adendorffs Boerderye (Pty) Ltd v Shabalala (case no 997/15 SCA
(29 March 2017)), the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that
the landowner and the land user were both responsible for the
preservation of land for pasture and its rehabilitation and not only
the landowner. The case dealt with an appeal against an order
handed down by the Land Claims Court in terms of which the
landowner had to relocate the cattle belonging to the respon-
dents, and to provide alternative pasture. Not only was the ESTA
not applicable, the Land Claims Court also granted orders which
had not been sought and in terms of which the parties were not
accorded the opportunity to file further affidavits or present
arguments before the orders were granted. ‘Pure’ grazing agree-
ments were dealt with under the Conservation of Agricultural
Resources Act 43 of 1983 and not the ESTA. The appeal was
successful and the removal order was confirmed.
National Building Regulations of 1990
In Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v Beekmans NO &
others 2017 (4) SA 623 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal had
to pronounce on the meaning of certain terms in the National
Building Regulations of 1990 promulgated in terms of section
17(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Stan-
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dards Act 103 of 1977. The appellant had obtained authorisation
from the City of Cape Town to erect, as a temporary building, a
cellular communications base station. In an application for a review
and setting aside of the City Council’s authorisation, a trust con-
tended that given the nature of the base station, it ought not to have
been approved as a temporary building.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court had to
pronounce on the meaning of ‘provisional authorisation’ as used
in regulation A23(1) and (6) of the National Building Regulations.
The court held that it meant temporary authorisation (paras [10]
[13]). The court then had to decide on the requirements for a
building to be classified as a ‘temporary building’. The court held
that the requirements were those expressly listed in the regula-
tion’s definition of ‘temporary building’, as well as an implicit
requirement that, in nature and purpose (objectively assessed),
the building was temporary (see paras [10] [17] [18] [26]). A
‘temporary building’ is defined as ‘any building that is so declared
by the owner and that is being used or is to be used for a
specified purpose for a specified limited period of time, but does
not include a builder’s shed’. Therefore, a temporary building is a
building that is not a permanent one, and whether a building is
permanent or temporary is ordinarily determined by its objective
nature, characteristics, and purpose (para [14]). The court found
that upon an objective consideration of the nature and purpose of
the base station, it was not a temporary building (para [17]). The
Supreme Court of Appeal continued that the definition of ‘tempo-
rary building’ and regulation A23 must be read with regulation
A1(7), which contains two important considerations. First, it
provides that before granting provisional authority in terms of
regulation A23, the local authority must, inter alia, assess the
building in relation to its intended use and expected life. This
clearly requires an objective assessment. Second, it indicates the
type of building that should be regarded as temporary, such as
an exhibition stall (reg A1(7)(b)) or a building for experimental,
demonstration, testing, or assessment purposes in terms of
regulation A1(7)(c)) (para [25]).
The court concluded that it was necessarily implicit in the
regulations that an objective assessment of the nature and
purpose of a building must determine whether it is a temporary
building or not. Consequently, the court a quo correctly con-
cluded that the City materially erred in regarding the base station
as a temporary building, and the appeal had to be dismissed.
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The court advised that as the judgment of the court a quo
suggested, MTN could apply to the City for approval of the
building plans of the base station in terms of section 4 of the Act
(paras [26] [27]).
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013
See the discussion of Ex parte Whitfield & similar matters 2017
(5) SA 161 (ECP) under ‘Removal of restrictive conditions’ above.
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PROPERTY LAW (INCLUDING REAL SECURITY):
LEGISLATION
CG VAN DER MERWE*
JM PIENAAR†
DEEDS AND REGISTRIES
During the course of 2017 two bills relating to deeds and
registries were published for comment: the Deeds Registries
Amendment Bill of 2017 (GG 41041 of 15 August 2017), aimed at
amending the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; and the Elec-
tronic Deeds Registration Systems Bill (B35-2017, GG 41308 of
7 December 2017), aimed at introducing a new electronic deeds
registration system for the country.
At an overarching level, the Deeds Registries Amendment Bill
of 2017 has the following objectives: to introduce less cumber-
some procedures so as to streamline all relevant processes
overall; to be more in line with gender developments and address
gender-related discrepancies; to address specific shortcomings
in extant processes and practices; to address lacunae; and
finally, to create greater uniformity amongst similar or related
processes and practices. Accordingly, the amendments are all
technical and relate to how processes are approached and dealt
with in theory and practice. In this process a large number of
sections stand to be amended and adjusted.
Gender matters are addressed in various clauses, for example,
in clause 1 of the Bill, where ‘chairman’ is replaced with ‘chair-
person’. Similar adjustments are encountered in clause 3(b)–(c),
(f) and (g) in relation to section 9 of the principal Act, which deals
with the establishment of the Deeds Registries Regulations
Board.
Clause 2 seeks to amend section 3 of the Act, which deals with
the duties of the Registrar of Deeds. Despite providing in the
existing section 3(1)(i) of the Act that the Registrar must register
waivers of preference in respect of registered real rights in land in
* LLB (UOFS) BA (Hons) BCL (Oxon) LLD (SA). Advocate; Research Fellow
Department of Private Law and Roman Law, University of Stellenbosch; Emeritus
Professor of Civil Law, School of Law, University of Aberdeen.
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University of Stellenbosch; Extraordinary Professor, North-West University.
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favour of mortgages, the provision does not provide for such
registration (eg, usufruct) in favour of leases. The amended
version will now also provide for leases. Currently, provision is
made for the registration of copies of powers of attorney in more
than one deeds registry. However, problems emerge with the
continued use of such powers of attorney which have been
cancelled in one deeds registry, but not in the deeds registry in
which the copy was registered. This practice enabled fraudulent
transactions to take place. The amendments to section 3(1)(u),
set out in clause 2(b), aim to rectify this position by not requiring
further copies, but by providing for the registration of powers of
attorney whereby the agents they name are authorised to act
generally for the principals granting such powers, or to carry out
a series of acts or transactions.
Clause 3 sets out the duties of the members of the Deeds
Registries Regulations Board established under section 9 of the
principal Act. This clarity is required as no duties are set out in the
current formulation of section 9(1). Another lacuna which requires
attention relates to when a member dies or vacates his or her
office during the currency of his or her term. This is now
addressed in clause 3(e) by inserting sections 9(3B) and 9(3C),
which allow the Minister to fill the vacancy for the unexpired
portion of the relevant term. A further amendment to section 9 of
the Act was required as the existing formulation provides for the
Board to make regulations, whereas this is the duty of the
Minister. That position is rectified by clauses 3(h)–(j), amending
sections 9(8) and 9(10). The same correction is made by clause 4
of the Bill with regard to section 10, which lists matters on which
regulations may be made, and specifically to section 10(1),
where the Board is again replaced by the Minister.
Despite calling for the lodging of diagrams in duplicate where
state land is concerned, only a single diagram is required in
practice. That position is now correctly reflected by the amend-
ment of section 18(3) by clause 5.
Clause 6 amends section 34 of the principal Act by providing
for the registration of real rights (eg, usufruct) over undivided
shares in land. This was necessary because, despite section
34(1) providing that a person may not transfer, hypothecate, or
lease only a part of his or her undivided share in land unless a
certificate of registered title is obtained for his or her share, the
section did not provide for a certificate of registered title to be
obtained where a person wished to register a real right over the
undivided share in land. Section 34(1) is amended accordingly.
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Clause 7 amends section 57 of the Act, which provides for the
substitution of a debtor in respect of a bond. Section 57(1)
provides that where the owner of land which is hypothecated
under a registered mortgage bond transfers the whole of the land
hypothecated under the bond to another person, the Registrar
may register the transfer and substitute the transferee for the
transferor as debtor in respect of the bond. There is, however, no
uniformity in the deeds registries with regard to the implementa-
tion of section 57, as certain deeds registries allow the substitu-
tion of bonds over shares in hypothecated land. The proposed
amendment to section 57(1), as contained in clause 7, aims to
create uniformity in this regard so as to clarify that a reference to
the whole of the land excludes reference to a share in the land.
Section 62 provides for the registration of notarial bonds.
Currently, section 62(1) provides for the registration of a notarial
bond in more than one deeds registry where the debtor resides
and carries on business in areas where different deeds registries
operate. Such a notarial bond must then be registered in the area
where the debtor resides, as well as in every deeds registry area
in which the debtor carries on business. As this section and
section 62(5) are currently formulated with respect to the time
periods relevant for the registration in the respective successive
deeds registries, the ambiguity leads to notarial bonds being
registered after the expiry date of the prescribed time period as
the provisions are differently interpreted. The proposed amend-
ment to section 62(5), set out in clause 8, aims to provide clarity
as to how the respective dates are to be calculated.
Section 99 of the principal Act deals with liability and exemp-
tion from liability for acts and omissions by the deeds registries’
staff. It provides that no act or omission by any Registrar or officer
employed at the deeds registry renders the government or such
staff member liable for damage sustained by any person as a
consequence of the act or omission. The section further provides
that if the act or omission is mala fide, or if the Registrar or officer
has not exercised reasonable care and diligence in carrying out
his or her duties, they shall be liable for damage caused. A
Registrar or officer guilty of such an act or omission shall be liable
to make good any loss or damage to the government which has
been caused mala fide. Clause 9 aims to amend section 99 by
seeking to provide for the Registrar or official to also be liable in
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instances where they have failed to exercise reasonable care or
diligence in performing their duties.
Electronic deeds
The Electronic Deeds Registration Systems Bill [B35-2017] was
introduced on 7 December 2017 (GG 41308 of 7 December
2017). Various considerations underlie the introduction of the Bill.
While the integrity of the deeds registries system and security of
title are integral to the South African system, the envisaged
increase in the number of transactions, coupled with the need to
link these developments to the Cadastral Information System so
as to improve the efficiency and accuracy of the deeds system,
necessitated development and adjustment. This developmental
thrust is also tied to the demand for decentralising services and
the need to consolidate and rationalise the diversified registration
services resulting from legislative measures of the previous
political dispensation. Any development in this arena must still
provide flexibility and allow for the registration of other possible
forms of tenure that may be introduced in lieu of the land reform
programme. At present, apart from the extant electronic system
by which the electronic land register is maintained, the prepara-
tion of documents, their lodging by the conveyancer, and their
processing by the Registrar, all take place manually. In view of
this a variety of needs and demands necessitated a fresh look at
the deeds registries system.
This is where the Electronic Deeds Registration System (e-DRS),
as provided for by the 2017 Bill, enters the picture. The system
aims to provide for the effective registration of large volumes of
deeds; improve turnaround times; provide country-wide access
to deeds registration services; improve accuracy of examination
and registration; make information available to the public; and
introduce security features that include confidentiality, non-
repudiation, integrity and availability.
Following the definitions in clause 1 of the Bill, clause 2
provides for the development, establishment, and maintenance
of the e-DRS by the Chief Registrar of Deeds. He or she is
empowered to issue practice and procedure directives dealing
with, amongst other things, the functional requirements of the
new system, its technical specifications, and its operation.
The validity of deeds and documents is addressed in clause 3.
In this regard, any deed or document generated, registered, and
executed electronically is the only original and valid record.
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Likewise, documents, or any other executed deed scanned or
otherwise incorporated into the e-DRS by electronic means, is
also for all purposes deemed to be the only original and valid
record. There should, therefore, be no discrepancies between
paper-based documents that have been scanned and incorpo-
rated, and new electronically created documents.
The project is a massive one with obvious financial implications
for the state. However, the main source of funding is from the fees
charged by the various deeds registries for the registration of
deeds and the sale of deeds registration information, as provided
for in section 84 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937.
Clause 1 provides for relevant definitions; clause 2 deals with
the development, establishment, and maintenance of the system;
clause 3 provides for the validity of deeds and documents; and
clause 4 for authorised users. The latter requires that all users
authorised by the regulations must be registered in the manner
and format provided for by the Chief Registrar of Deeds. Clause 5
provides that the Minister may, on the recommendation of the
Regulations Board under section 6 of the main Act, make
regulations relating to proceedings for the electronic lodging of
deeds and registries; for electronic record storage; for the
manner of identification of persons who prepare, execute, lodge,
and register any relevant deed or document; the manner in which
electronic payment of fees may be introduced; the process and
manner of accessing the electronic deeds registration system for
information purposes; the authorisation of users; and any other
matter relevant to the e-DRS.
Clause 6 is pivotal, as it provides for transitional provisions.
Clause 6(1) confirms that the Act does not affect the validity of
any registrations effected prior to its coming into operation.
Accordingly, the Registrar must continue with the registration,
execution, and filing of deeds and documents as prescribed by
the Deeds RegistriesAct of 1937 and the Sectional TitlesAct 95 of
1986, until the electronic deeds registration system or related
regulations are in place. After this date, the registration, execu-
tion, and filing procedures in terms of the Deeds Registries and
Sectional Titles Acts, will be discontinued in respect of all deeds,
documents, and deeds registries (cl 6(2)). In the meantime,
conveyancers, notaries, and statutory officers must likewise
continue with their preparation and lodging of relevant docu-
ments until the electronic systems are in place (cl 6(3)). Further-
more, any deed or document electronically executed or registered
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shall be deemed to have been executed and registered in the
presence of the Registrar by the owner or by a conveyancer
authorised by a power of attorney. However, despite the envis-
aged discontinuation of document- or paper-based systems, the
Chief Registrar may still issue directives for the continuation of the
manual preparation, lodging, registration, execution, and filing of
deeds and documents for a period determined by the Chief
Registrar (cl 6(4)).
It is thus envisaged that the extant document-based system
that is processed and managed manually is to be replaced as a
whole, although the underlying considerations, motivations, and
objectives of the deeds registry system remain unchanged.
SURVEYING
The South African Council for the Quantity Surveying Profes-
sion constituted a disciplinary tribunal in terms of sections 30, 31
and 32 of the Quantity Surveying Profession Act 49 of 2000
(Board Notice 16 GG 40660 of 3 March 2017). The Council is a
statutory body that regulates the quantity surveying profession in
accordance with the Act. The disciplinary tribunal must consist of
at least one person who specialises in the field relating to the
charge that was lodged; a professional who has appropriate
experience; and a person qualified in law who has the necessary
experience.
SECTIONAL TITLES AMENDMENT REGULATIONS, 2017
GENERAL
The separation of the provisions of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of
1986 dealing with registration and survey matters from those that
apply to governance and administration, the consolidation of the
latter provisions in the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act
8 of 2011, and the retention of the provisions on surveying and
registration in the Sectional Titles Act, necessitated changes in
the Sectional Titles Regulations.
Definitions and certificate required for conversion of rental buildings into
sectional title schemes
The Sectional Titles Regulations promulgated in 1988 (GN R664
of 8 April 1988), as amended by the insertion of the definition of
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Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (the STSMA)
in regulation 1, were amended in 2017 (GN R427 GG 40842 of
12 May 2017). Regulation 4 deals with the certificate contemplated
in section 4(3)(a)(ii) of the Sectional Titles Act to be furnished by
the developer on the conversion of a rental building into a sectional
titles scheme. In terms of regulation 4(i)(v) the certificate must
indicate all other costs in respect of the common property which
are normally recovered from the owners of units as contemplated
in section 3(1)(a) of the STSMA instead of section 37(1)(a) of the
Sectional Titles Act.
Documents that must accompany submission of sectional plan of extension
of the scheme by the Surveyor-General
Regulation 6, dealing with the documents which must accom-
pany the submission of the draft sectional plan to the Surveyor-
General for approval, is amended by the addition of, if applicable,
a certificate from a land surveyor or an architect stating that the
sectional plan of extension of the scheme in terms of section
25(1) complies with the section 25(2) plan filed in the deeds
registry. In the event of a reservation by the developer for the
extension of the scheme in terms of section 25(2), the application
for the registration of the sectional plan must, in addition to the
usual documents referred to in section 11(3), be accompanied by
a plan to scale of the building or buildings on which the following
items are indicated: the part of the common property affected by
the reservation; the height and coverage of all buildings; the
entrances and exits to the land; the building restriction areas, if
any; the parking areas; and the typical elevation treatment of all
buildings. It must further be accompanied by a plan to scale
showing the manner in which the building or buildings are to be
divided into a section or sections and exclusive use areas, or the
manner in which the common property is to be made subject to
the rights of exclusive use areas only; a schedule indicating the
estimated participation quotas of all the sections in the scheme
after such section or sections have been added to the scheme;
particulars of any substantial difference between the materials to
be used in the construction of the building or buildings and those
used in the construction of the existing building or buildings; the
certificate of real right which is to be issued in terms of section
12(1)(e); and such other documents and particulars as may
be prescribed (Sectional Titles Act s 25(2)(a)–(b), (c)–(d), (f)
and (g)).This places a strict obligation on the architect or land
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surveyor concerned to check that these documents have been
prepared in a diligent manner, as serious problems have arisen in
practice as to the exact nature and scope of the exact right
reserved by the developer in respect of future extension of the
scheme.
Documents in the sectional title register that must be endorsed with a deeds
registry date
Regulation 13, dealing with sectional title registers in terms of
section 12(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act, is amended by the
substitution of subregulation (4A). The subregulation indicates
the documents that must be endorsed with a deeds registry date
endorsement, being the date on which they are lodged. These
include the documents, notices, and correspondence referred to
in subregulations 4(a) and (c), namely some of the documents
referred to in section 11(3) of the Sectional Titles Act, including
the registries copy of the sectional plan; a schedule certified by a
conveyancer setting out the servitudes and conditions of title
burdening or benefiting the land and other registrable conditions
imposed by the developer; a certificate by the Chief Ombud
stating that the rules contemplated in section 10 of the STSMA
have been approved; and correspondence relating to the scheme
as a whole. In addition, any certificates, plans, schedules, and
other documents relating to the scheme as a whole, filed in a
sectional title file, must, on lodging, be endorsed with a deeds
registry date endorsement.
Certificate of real right for extension of the scheme
Regulation 14, dealing with the certificates of real rights
referred to in section 12(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act, is
amended by the substitution of subregulation (2). It provides that
the certificate of real right contemplated in section 25(6) of the
Sectional Titles Act, obtained by the body corporate for extending
the sectional titles scheme, must be in the form of Form A in
Annexure 1, and must be accompanied by the written consent of
all members of the body corporate and of the mortgagees of all
units in the scheme, as contemplated in section 5(1)(b) of the
STSMA.
Registration of transfer of ownership and other rights in respect of parts of
the scheme building
Regulation 16, relating to the registration of transfer of owner-
ship and registration of other rights in respect of parts of
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buildings, is amended by the substitution of subregulation 1.
Subregulation 16(1)(a) provides that concurrently with the estab-
lishment of the body corporate, the Registrar must issue a
certificate in the form of Form W inAnnexure 1. This subregulation
is subject to the proviso that the Registrar may, on application by
a body corporate in respect of which a certificate has not been
issued prior to 1 June 1981, issue such certificate, in the form of
Form W, after the date of establishment of the body corporate.
Subregulation 16(1)(b) requires that a draft certificate in the form
of Form W must be prepared by the conveyancer and lodged in
triplicate with the Registrar. Thereafter the original certificate must
be delivered to the Chief Ombud, one copy must be filed in the
sectional title file, and the remaining copy delivered to the
conveyancer. Subregulation 16(1)(c) stipulates that once a certifi-
cate has been issued, no further similar certificate may be issued
in respect of the building concerned. However, if required, the
Registrar may issue a certified copy of the deeds registry copy of
the certificate or a certificate of replacement. Subregulation
16(1)(d) deals with these replacements. The original certificate of
replacement and one of the copies thereof must be delivered to
the conveyancer, and the other copy must be filed in the sectional
title file.
New regulation of provisions pertaining to the rules of a sectional titles
scheme
The most important amendment to the Sectional Titles Regula-
tions concerns the deletion of regulation 30 dealing with the rules
of sectional titles schemes – a matter relating to the management
of the scheme. Although regulation 30 is deleted, parts thereof
have been re-enacted in regulation 6 of the Sectional Titles
Schemes Management Regulations of 7 October 2016 (the
STSMR) (GN R 1231 GG 40335 of 7 October 2016). Subregula-
tions 30(2), (3) and (4) of the Sectional Titles Regulations are
re-enacted in their entirety in subregulations 6(4), (5) and (6) of
the STSMR.
Subregulation 6(4) provides that if the schedule referred to in
section 11(3)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act contains a condition
restricting the transfer of a unit without the consent of an
association, the constitution of which stipulates that all members
of the body corporate of the development scheme of which the
unit forms part must be members, and which assigns the
functions and powers of the body corporate to the association,
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the developer may, when submitting an application for the
opening of a sectional title register, substitute any management
rule contained in Annexure 1 to the STSMR. Subregulation 6(5)
provides that if, at the commencement of the Act, the members of
a body corporate are all members of an association whose
constitution binds its members to assign the functions and
powers of the body corporate to that association, the manage-
ment rules contained in Annexure 1 do not apply. Subregulation
6(6) provides that the management rules set out in Annexure 1
may be added to, amended, or repealed by a unanimous
resolution of the body corporate. This is subject to the proviso
that no such addition, amendment, or repeal may adopted until
such time as there are owners, other than the developer, of at
least 30 per cent of the units in the scheme, save in the case of a
body corporate established in a scheme approved under the
Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971.
Subregulation 30(1) of the Sectional Titles Regulations is
replaced by subregulation 6(3) of the STSMR. In terms of
subregulation 30(1) of the Sectional Titles Regulations, when
submitting an application for the opening of a sectional title
register, the developer was not entitled to substitute, amend, or
withdraw a long list of management rules, whereas in terms of
subregulation 6(3) of the STSMR, the developer is entitled to
amend only a few management rules and to add management
rules that are not inconsistent with any management rule of
Annexure 1. The management rules that may be changed involve
the rules dealing with the number of trustees; the nomination,
election, and replacement of trustees; the reimbursement of
trustees; and the chairperson at trustee meetings (STSMR reg
6(3), Annexure 1 rules 5(2) and (3), rule 7, rule 8(1) and (2), and
rule 12).
Subregulation 30(5) of the Sectional Titles Regulations is
replaced by subregulation 6(2) of the STSMR. Subregulation 6(2)
provides that for the purposes of section 10(2)(a) and (b) of the
STSMA, dealing with the management and conduct rules of the
scheme, the management rules are as they appear in Annexure 1
(instead of Annexure 8), and the conduct rules are as they appear
in Annexure 2 (instead of Annexure 9).
Subegulations 30(6) and (7) are important subregulations
deleted in 2017 as the matter is regulated completely differently
in the STSMR and the Ombud Service Regulations, both promul-
gated and implemented on 7 October 2016. Subregulation 30(6)
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provided that the notification referred to in section 35(5) of the
Sectional Titles Act had to be in the form set out in Form V of
Annexure 1. Section 35(5)(a) provided that in case of the
substitution, addition, amendment, or repeal of management and
conduct rules, the body corporate had to lodge a notification of
such occurrence in the prescribed form (Form V of Annexure 1)
with the Registrar. Importantly, section 35(5)(b) stated that the
Registrar was not to be involved in the enforcement or application
of the rules as contemplated, and was not required to examine or
note any substitution, addition, amendment, or repeal thereof
against any certificate or other document. Section 35(5)(c) further
provided that any such substitution, addition, amendment, or
repeal came into operation on the date of filing of the notification
referred to above. Subregulation 30(6) provided, ex abudanti
cautela, that the body corporate had to notify the Registrar of any
addition to, amendment of, or repeal of conduct rules as contem-
plated in section 35(2)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act in the form set
out in Form V of Annexure 1.
In terms of section 4(1)(c) and (d) of the Community Schemes
Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011, which came into operation on
7 October 2017, the ombud service has the following important
functions: to regulate, monitor, and control the quality of scheme
governance documentation; and to take custody of, preserve,
and provide access electronically or by other means to scheme
governance documentation. This led to the repeal of section 35 of
the Sectional Titles Act, regulation 30 of the Sectional Titles
Regulations, and the deletion of Form V, which dealt with the
notification of a change in the management or conduct rules
under the repealed section 35(5). It also led to the introduction of
a completely new regulation of the substitution, addition, amend-
ment, and repeal of management and conduct rules by entrust-
ing the monitoring of scheme rules to the ombud service in terms
of the STSMA of 2011 and the STSMR, both of which also came
into operation on 7 October 2017.
Section 10(5)(a) of the STSMA provides that in the event that
the management or conduct rules are substituted, added to,
amended, or repealed, the developer or the body corporate must
lodge a notification of such substitution, addition, amendment or
repeal in the prescribed form with the chief ombud. Section
10(5)(b) continues that the chief ombud must examine any
proposed substitution, addition, amendment, or repeal referred
to above, and must not approve it for filing unless he or she is
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satisfied that it is reasonable and appropriate. On approval for
filing, the chief ombud, in terms of section 10(5)(c), must issue a
certificate to that effect. Under section 10(5)(d), such substitu-
tion, addition, amendment, or repeal of rules comes into opera-
tion on the date on which it is issued, or on the opening of the
sectional title register for the scheme, whichever is the latest. In
terms of subregulation 5(2) of the STSMR, the notification by the
developer or the body corporate to the chief ombud in terms of
section 10(5)(a) of the STSMA concerning the amendment of the
management or conduct rules, must be substantially in accor-
dance with Form B of Annexure 3.
Destruction of or damage to scheme buildings
Regulation 31, which deals with the destruction of or damage
to the scheme building and transfer of interest, is amended to
give effect to the provisions of the STSMA on destruction of or
damage to the scheme building. Therefore, subregulation 31(1)
provides that in case of damage or deemed destruction of a
scheme building in terms of section 17 of the STSMA and the
authorisation of a scheme under section 17(3)(a), the body must
notify the Registrar in the form of Form X of Annexure 1 of the
STSMR. Subregulation 31(3) is substituted to provide that the
Registrar must give effect to the requirements of section 17(3)(a)(ii)
of the STSMA by making an appropriate endorsement on the
relevant deeds. Subregulation 31(4) is amended to provide that
the Registrar must advise the Surveyor-General and the local
authority of any registration pursuant to section 17 of the STSMA
accompanied by the original sectional plan and a copy thereof
respectively.
Application of Arbitration Act 42 of 1965
Regulation 39 provided that the provisions of the Arbitration Act
42 of 1965 must, in so far as those provisions could be applied
mutatis mutandis with reference to arbitration proceedings, also
apply under the Sectional Titles Act. The reason for this is that the
arbitration proceedings provided inAnnexure 8 rule 71 of the Sec-
tional Titles Regulations have not been re-enacted in Annexure 1
of the STSMR of 7 October 2017.
Examinations of preparation of draft sectional plans
Regulation 43, relating to the examination in connection with
the preparation of draft sectional plans, is amended to add the
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provisions of the STSMA to the syllabus for the examination
(subreg 43(1)(b)); to provide for one person nominated by the
South African Geomatics Council (in place of the Council for
Professional Land Surveyors and Technical Surveyors) to the
Sectional Titles Examination Committee (subreg 43(2)(b)); and to
change the function of the Sectional Titles Examinations Commit-
tee to making arrangements with the South African Geomatics
Council and the South African Council for Architects regarding
the date, time, place, fees, and other matters incidental to
conducting the examination (subreg 43(7)(b)).
Amendment of the Annexure 1 forms
The most important amendments in the forms of Annexure 1
concern references to the provisions of the STSMA instead of to
the provisions of the Sectional Titles Act, where applicable. Thus,
the headings of Form W and X are replaced by the following new
headings: Certificate of establishment of the body corporate in
terms of section 2(1) of the STSMA (replacing s 36(1) of the
Sectional Titles Act), and Notification in terms of section 17(9) of
the STSMA (replacing reg 31(1) under the Sectional Titles Regu-
lations) respectively. In the text of Form X the reference to section
48(1) of the Sectional Titles Act is replaced by a reference to
section 17(1) of the STSMA. In Form Y, concerning the notification
under section 49(1) of the Sectional Titles Act, the reference to
section 48 of the Sectional Titles Act is replaced by references
to section 17, 17(1)(b) and 17(3)(a) of the STSMA.
Another important amendment is the deletion of Form V which
dealt with the notification of a change in the management or
conduct rules under the repealed section 35(5) of the Sectional
Titles Act. This is as a result of the transfer of the monitoring and
management of conduct rules to the ombud service.
Other amendments to the forms of Annexure 1 concern, in the
main, changes to the footnotes to the forms. In a few forms a new
footnote is added to omit the options which will no longer apply –
for example, in Form C dealing with certificates of registered
sectional title issued under section 12(1)(d) or 25(11)(c) of the
Sectional Titles Act. The footnotes under Form P, dealing with the
certificate of sectional title under section 22(5) of the Sectional
Titles Act, and Form Q, dealing with the certificate of registered
sectional title under section 23(5) of the Sectional Titles Act, are
amended to provide that the types and number of the sectional
title deeds under which the particular certificates are held must
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be inserted. A footnote to Form Y concerning the notification
under section 49(1) of the Sectional Titles Act advises as to the
deletion of copies of documents which are not applicable.
Finally, the footnotes to several forms in Annexure 1 to the
Sectional Titles Regulations are amendedwith regard to the descrip-
tion of the location of the land and the scheme buildings. The
footnotes advise that the description of the land as indicated on the
sectional title plan must be followed instead of stating the name of
the town, suburb, local authority, or farm. See, for example, Form C,
dealing with certificates of registered sectional title issued under
section 12(1)(d) or 25(11)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act, and Form D,
relating to the sectional title file and indicating the place where the
building is situated.
Replacement of Annexures 8 and 9 to the Sectional Titles Regulations
One of the most important amendments to the Sectional Titles
Regulations is the replacement of Annexures 8 and 9. Annexure 8
to the Sectional Titles Regulations, dealing with management
rules in terms of the Sectional Titles Act, is replaced by an almost
completely new set of management rules in Annexure 1 of the
STSMR. Annexure 9 to the Sectional Titles Regulations is also
repealed and replaced by a consolidated set of conduct rules in
Annexure 2 to the STSMR.
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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
HENNIE STRYDOM*
TREATIES
Some sixty treaties and memoranda of understanding (MOUs)
were concluded in the year under review. Following customary
practice, the list includes the usual template-type instruments
with broadly formulated terms and objectives of questionable
relevance. As far as bilateral treaties and MOUs are concerned,
the selection below places the emphasis on arrangements with
other African countries and BRICS partners. In the multilateral
treaty area the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is of
specific relevance.
BILATERAL TREATIES
Angola
By agreement, signed on 24 November 2017, South Africa and
Angola established a Bi-national Commission to seek ways and
means for enhancing cooperation between the parties in various
government sectors, and between the private and public sectors
in the two countries. On entry into force in accordance with the
states’ domestic requirements, the agreement will end the Joint
Commission of Cooperation established by agreement between
the parties on 20 November 2000.
On the same date, the parties also concluded an agreement
on mutual administrative assistance in customs matters with the
aim of: ensuring compliance with customs law; preventing,
investigating and repressing customs offences; and ensuring
the facilitation of the international trade supply chain. Mutual
assistance between the parties does not include the recovery in
the requested party of customs duties, taxes, and other charges
incurred in the territory of the requesting party, and also does not
give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain,
suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of
a request. To ensure effective implementation of the agreement,
* BJuris LLB LLM (UFS) LLD (UNISA). Professor in Public International Law,
National Research Foundation Chair in International Law, University of Johannes-
burg.
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the parties undertake to exchange all available information that
may be of assistance (art 4), and to maintain special surveillance,
in accordance with domestic law, over the movement, storage,
and transport of goods and contraband in violation of customs
laws (art 10).
The parties also concluded an MOU on 24 November 2017 on
cooperation in the field of the environment. This MOU envisages
the establishment in the respective countries of cooperation
programmes in areas such as geographical information systems,
environmental mapping, impact assessments, biodiversity and
wildlife conservation, management of protected areas, oceans
and coastal management, waste management, and climate
change.
Belgium
On 26 January 2017, South Africa and Belgium entered into an
MOU on cooperation in the field of science and technology. The
objectives of the MOU are to promote the development of joint
scientific and technological solutions in support of the develop-
ment agendas of the two countries, and to promote the emer-
gence of scientific, technological, and innovative research in
support of creating knowledge for mutual benefit. This is to be
achieved through the exchange of scientists and other specialists
and scholars, the exchange of scientific and technical information,
the organisation of bilateral seminars, workshops, and training
courses, joint research projects, and any other form of cooperation
mutually agreed upon.
Botswana
An MOU on rhino conservation and management was con-
cluded between South Africa and Botswana on 9 July 2017. The
common goal of the parties is to conserve their rhino populations
for prosperity, to increase both the black and white rhino popula-
tions, and to ensure their safety and security. It should be pointed
out that the black rhino is critically endangered, while the white
rhino in South Africa and Swaziland may, according to the
species’ CITES conservation status, become extinct unless trade
is subject to strict regulation. It is also common cause that
poaching activities in South and Southern Africa pose a serious
threat to rhino populations in the region.
In this light, the parties have agreed to cooperate by establishing,
supplementing, and maintaining populations of black and white
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rhino in their respective countries; building capacity in the
management of rhinos pertaining to security, veterinary matters,
monitoring and research; establishing bilateral custodianship for
the animals; and exchanging information on illegal trade in rhino
specimens, security, and management. This latter undertaking is
to take place within the framework of the 1999 Southern African
Development Community’s (SADC) Protocol on Wildlife Conserva-
tion and Law Enforcement.
Chad
South Africa and Chad concluded an MOU on 8 October 2017
to facilitate cooperation in the field of biodiversity conservation
and management. A wide range of multilateral environmental
agreements are recognised by the parties as providing content to
their cooperative objectives under the MOU, in addition to their
respective national laws. These are the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the 1971 Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, the 1994
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and any
other relevant multilateral environmental agreement. The imple-
mentation of these instruments is, therefore, also listed as a
priority area for cooperation between the parties.
The parties also concluded a second MOU on the same date
on the re-introduction of the black rhino to the Republic of Chad.
The translocation of black rhinos under the MOU will be done,
inter alia, in accordance with CITES requirements and a bilateral
custodianship arrangement to be developed in terms of the
MOU.
A bilateral air services agreement was concluded between the
parties on 20 January 2017 in furtherance of the 1988 Yamous-
soukro Declaration on a New African Air Transport Policy and the
1999 Declaration Concerning the Liberalisation of Access to Air
Transport Markets in Africa. In essence the agreement provides
for the reciprocal granting of certain rights to enable designated
airlines in either party to establish and operate international air
services on the routes specified in the Annex to the agreement.
Designated airlines will also be entitled to fair and equitable
treatment and equal opportunity in the operation of an agreed
service. A contracting party is, therefore, under an obligation to
eliminate all forms of discrimination and all unfair competitive or
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predatory practices adversely affecting the competitive position
of a designated airline of the other party.
China
Cooperation between South Africa and China appears to be
growing exponentially. On 24 April 2017 the two countries con-
cluded an MOU on cooperation in the field of cultural industries
aimed at the performing and visual arts, animation and games,
new media, cultural heritage products, creative design, and
digital content creation, among other cultural activities. Enter-
prises in these areas will be encouraged to develop cultural
cooperation, jointly to develop cultural products, and to under-
take mutual professional training in the field of cultural industries.
The establishment of joint research centers was the subject
of a separate MOU concluded on the same date with the aim of
creating long-term and stable partnerships between research
institutes in the respective countries; to facilitate high-level joint
research; to encourage technology transfer; and to promote
the development of related industries. The implementation of the
MOU is entrusted to a Joint Working Group to be established
under the framework of the China-South Africa Joint Committee
on Science and Technology Cooperation. The parties also agreed
on a pilot project under the MOU in the form of a joint research
centre in the field of development and utilisation of mineral
resources, which was intended to commence in 2017.
A bilateral agreement between the parties was also concluded
on the same date to further cooperation in the field of higher
education and training. The objective is to expand direct education
and training relations between the parties’ respective higher educa-
tion and training institutions by exchanging staff and researchers,
academics, experts, and students. Joint research projects and
study visits are also envisaged. Under the agreement, the Chinese
government has undertaken to provide the South African Depart-
ment of Higher Education and Training with 30 fully-funded scholar-
ships per year which will include tuition fees, accommodation, a
basic living allowance, textbooks, and medical insurance.
The parties concluded a further agreement on cooperation in
the field of radio and television broadcasting. The scope of
cooperation will include news coverage, documentaries, televi-
sion drama, film, and animation. As China is not known for its
championship of media freedom, it is not clear whether the
cooperation with it will be restricted to technical exchange and
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cooperation, or whether state management of news content will
also fall within the scope of the agreement.
To provide for the inspection, quarantine, and veterinary health
requirements for frozen beef exported from South Africa to China,
the parties concluded a protocol on 24 February 2017 which
requires the South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries to provide its Chinese counterpart with information on the
regulation, production, veterinary inspection, storage, packaging,
and export of frozen beef to China. This includes information on
animal diseases, environmental pollutants, verification of the ban-
ning of feeding ruminants food containing prohibited components,
and food safety requirements. Under the protocol it is also
required that the export of frozen beef will be handled only by
export establishments registered with the Certification andAccredi-
tation Administration of the People’s Republic of China.
On the same date the parties also concluded an MOU on entry
and exit animal inspection and quarantine. The cooperation
under the MOU relates to the implementation of the WTO
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Agreement, animal inspection, quarantine laws, regu-
lations and standards, and major animal diseases.
European Union
The EU (acting through the European Commission) and South
Africa concluded a financing agreement on 24April 2017 in support
of economic growth and employment creation through small, micro,
and medium enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa. In terms of the
agreement the EU undertakes to finance the programme to the sum
of EUR 52,245,800. The specific objectives are: (1) to improve the
competitiveness of SMMEs and their ability to meet procurement
requirements; (2) to improve access to finance; and (3) to improve
the regulatory and administrative environment for SMMEs. Through
these actions it is expected that the programme will contribute to the
government’s targets of reducing the official unemployment figure
from the current 26 per cent to fourteen per cent by 2020. The areas
earmarked for support include agribusiness, infrastructure, mining,
and green industries.
As far as objectives and results are concerned, the agreement
claims that the programme is aligned with the United Nations
(UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular
with Goal 8 (the promotion of sustained, inclusive, and sustain-
able economic growth, full and productive employment, and
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decent work for all); Goal 5 (the achievement of gender equality);
Goal 10 (the reduction of inequality within and among countries);
and Goal 13 (urgent action for the combating of climate change
and its impacts).
On 24 July 2017 the European Commission and South Africa
also signed a financing agreement for improving South Africa’s
legislature oversight programme. This initiative is taken in response
to the findings in the National Development Plan – Vision 2030,
that parliamentary accountability is weak and that Parliament is
failing to fulfil its most basic oversight role. The funding and
development programme provided for in the agreement is aligned
with the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goal 16 which aims
to build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all
levels of government. The specific objectives of the programme,
for which EUR 10,000,000 is made available, are to strengthen
the capacity of the legislative sector to exercise oversight over
the executive; devise means and mechanisms to ensure public
involvement in legislative processes; strengthen cooperative
governance; and improve knowledge, skills, systems, and pro-
cesses in the legislative sector.
Ghana
Ghana and South Africa concluded an MOU on 24 March 2017
on cooperation in the field of environmental management and
natural resources and conservation. The objectives of the MOU
include the exchange of views, information, and technical sup-
port relating to environmental legislation and policies aimed at
the implementation of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity,
the World Heritage Convention, and the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Also
covered are eco-tourism, protection of the coastal and marine
environment, pollution control, management of protected areas,
and implementation of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Develop-
ment.
Hungary
An MOU on cooperation in the field of water and sanitation was
concluded between Hungary and South Africa on 23 May 2017.
All aspects of water management and the utilisation of water
resources relating to the following are covered by the MOU:
waste water management; drinking water supply; water manage-
ment and climate change management; transboundary water
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management; groundwater management; mitigation of mining
pollution; water governance; water-related education; and capac-
ity building and institutional development. The implementation of
the MOU will be the responsibility of a Joint Water Resources
Steering Committee which will meet at intervals agreed upon by
the parties.
Namibia
SouthAfrica and Namibia concluded an MOU on the 7 Septem-
ber 2017 to facilitate cooperation between the countries in the
field of information and communication technologies. The MOU is
intended to bring about a closer working relationship between
technical institutions, government, business, education, and other
organisations in the Information and Communications Technology
(ICT) sector. Areas identified for strategic cooperation are wide-
ranging and include policy development, infrastructure develop-
ment, exchange of information, management of radio frequencies
and roaming services, development of e-government initiatives,
digital programme development, joint investment, and equipment
manufacturing. The establishment of an ICT Working Committee
is foreseen in the MOU which will review the progress of
cooperative activities under the MOU. The implementation of the
activities listed in the MOU is dependent on the allocation of
funds by the parties.
New Development Bank Africa
The Bank and South Africa entered into an agreement on
25 October 2017 for the hosting of the Bank’s regional centre in
Johannesburg, South Africa. The South African government will
be responsible for providing and furnishing, free of charge,
suitable premises for the Bank’s African regional centre which will
have the independence and freedom of action available to other
international organisations operating in South Africa.
The Bank, its property, funds, and assets, wherever located,
will be immune from every form of legal process except: (a) to the
extent that the Bank has expressly waived immunity in a particu-
lar case in accordance with article 36 of the Bank’s Articles of
Agreement; (b) in respect of a civil action in South Africa arising
from the Bank’s powers to raise funds, to guarantee obligations,
or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities; (c) in
respect of a civil action brought by a third party for damages
arising from an accident caused by a vehicle belonging to the
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Bank or operated on its behalf; (d) in respect of the enforcement
of an arbitration award made against the bank; or (e) in respect of
any counter-claim directly connected with court proceedings
initiated by the Bank.
The Bank’s property also enjoys immunity from all forms of
seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of final
judgment against it. Property, funds, and assets of the Bank are
also immune from seizure, search, requisition, foreclosure, confis-
cation, expropriation, and any other form of interference whether
by executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative action. The
South African government, or any entity or person directly or
indirectly acting for or deriving claims from the government, is
also interdicted from bringing any action against the Bank. Under
the agreement the Director-General and staff of the Bank’s
regional centre are entitled to the same immunities accorded
officials in diplomatic missions.
Since the immunities under the agreement are conferred in
the interest of the Bank and not for the personal benefit of
the individual employees, the Bank is entitled to waive any of the
privileges, immunities, and exemptions where such a waiver is
appropriate and in the best interests of the Bank, and when the
privilege, immunity or exemption would impede the course of
justice. The Bank is also duty-bound under the agreement to
cooperate with the South African government to facilitate the
proper administration of justice, the observance of the laws of the
Republic, and to prevent any abuse of the immunities and
privileges granted in the agreement. The Bank has further
undertaken to prevent its premises from being used as a refuge
for fugitives from justice, or for persons subject to extradition, or
persons seeking to avoid legal proceedings under the laws of
South Africa.
Niger
South Africa and Niger concluded a defence cooperation
agreement on 25 October 2017. Notably, according to the Global
Fire Power Index, of the 136 countries assessed for military
strength and capability, Niger occupies the 109th place and
South Africa the 33rd place. Given this disparity, Niger stands to
benefit more from the agreement in areas such as the training
of military personnel, the acquisition of military equipment, and
the sharing of technical knowledge which are the three most
meaningful objectives of the agreement. However, if one takes
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into account that the United States’ troop contingent and military
advisers in Niger have steadily grown since 2013 to assist Niger
in countering the ISIS and Al Qaeda threat in the Sahel (with
the help of hunter/killer drones), it is not certain what value the
agreement with South Africa will add.
Pakistan
Defence and industrial cooperation in defence are the subjects
of an MOU between South Africa and Pakistan concluded on
27 March 2017. The areas of cooperation include military training,
joint exercises, the acquisition and transfer of defence-related
technologies, defence research, procurement of defence equip-
ment, industrial cooperation between companies and govern-
ment entities in respect of defence and related equipment, and
the joint development of conventional weapons systems.
The sending party will exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction in
respect of offences committed by members of its armed forces or
civilian personnel in the territory of the receiving party, and
undertakes to prosecute the offenders in conformity with its
national laws. The sending party is required to inform the
receiving party of the outcome of the proceedings taken against
the offenders.
As far as civil claims are concerned, each party undertakes to
waive any claim it may have against the other party for injury –
excluding loss of limbs or death – suffered by its military
personnel if caused by the acts or omissions of the other party in
the performance of official duties in connection with the MOU.
Injuries resulting in loss of limbs or death will be dealt with under
a separate protocol or arrangement. All third-party claims arising
from any act or omission by the sending party in the performance
of official duties in connection with the MOU will be settled by the
receiving party in accordance with its domestic laws.
In the case of claims by third parties arising from acts or
omissions of either party’s military or civilian personnel not done
in the performance of official duties, these will be settled by
reasonable and just compensation by the legally responsible
individual under the national laws of the parties.
Russia
Cyber security has become a matter of international concern.
To address the concerns over the threats posed by the use and
abuse of information technologies, South Africa and Russia
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concluded an agreement on 4 September 2017 on cooperation in
the field of international information security. In the preamble
mention is made of threats that derive from the use of technolo-
gies in the civil and military fields which are inconsistent with the
objectives of ensuring international peace and security, or under-
mine the sovereignty and security of states, interfere in their
domestic affairs, undermine citizens’ rights, and destabilise
domestic political and socio-economic situations. Also reiterated
in the preamble are the applicability of the principles of state
sovereignty to a state’s use of information and communication
technologies, and a state’s jurisdiction over information infrastruc-
ture and public policies relating to the information and telecom-
munication network and security.
The main international information security threats identified in
the agreement include: the use of information and communica-
tion technologies for committing acts of aggression aimed at
violating the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of
states; the causing of economic damage; facilitating terrorist
activities; the commission of crime; the incitement of inter-ethnic,
inter-racial, and inter-confessional violence; and the dissemina-
tion of information harmful to socio-political and socio-economic
systems.
The agreement also provides for a principled framework for
cooperation between the parties. This is based on the accep-
tance by the parties of the principles and rules of international
law, of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the
peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, non-use of force or
threat of force, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Tanzania
On 11 May 2017, South Africa and Tanzania concluded an
MOU on cooperation in the field of biodiversity conservation and
management. The MOU affirms the obligations of the parties
under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, and notes the global challenge posed by illegal
wildlife poaching and trafficking. The areas singled out for
cooperation include biodiversity management, sustainable use of
biodiversity, the enforcement of multi-lateral environmental agree-
ments, biodiversity law enforcement, protected areas manage-
ment, and research and exchange of information.
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On the same day, the parties also concluded an MOU on
cooperation in transport-related matters. In essence, the envis-
aged cooperation is aimed at assisting Tanzania, through private
sector involvement, to develop the country’s transport sector
infrastructure in certain designated areas in Tanzania. This will
include identifying and sensitising South African organisations/
companies with the technical and financial capacity to implement
projects in partnership with their Tanzanian counterparts, and to
establish joint ventures. The transport industries earmarked in the
MOU are civil aviation, merchant shipping, land transport, trans-
port services, and road traffic management.
UNESCO
The purpose of the agreement concluded between South
Africa and UNESCO on 31 January 2017 is to designate the
African World Heritage Fund as a category 2 centre, the function-
ing of which South Africa has agreed to take responsibility for
under the agreement. Category 2 centres are capacity- building
institutions in the regions or countries where they are located, and
are legally not part of UNESCO but associated with it through
formal arrangements. They are directly funded by member states
in the regions where they are established.
Article 4 of the agreement makes it clear that the fund will be a
legal entity, independent of UNESCO, and will enjoy the func-
tional autonomy under South African law to conclude contracts,
institute legal proceedings, acquire and dispose of property, and
acquire the necessary means to fulfil its mandate. The Fund’s
mission is to strengthen the implementation of the 1972 World
Heritage Convention in African state parties by promoting their
understanding and implementation of the decisions and recom-
mendations of the World Heritage Committee for the benefit of
World Heritage properties on the African continent. As such, the
Fund must assist African state parties to: prepare and update
their national inventories, tentative lists, and nomination dossiers;
compile integrated management plans for the management of
their World Heritage properties; comply with their obligations
under the World Heritage Convention; and establish a network of
African expertise and partners for the improvement of African
World Heritage. This will include assistance in the strengthening
of human-resource capacity; legal, policy, and institutional frame-
works; and heritage protection, conservation, and management
in conflict, post-conflict, and natural disaster situations.
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The Fund is overseen by a Governing Board comprising a
representative of the government, five members representing the
five African Union regions, a representative of the Director-
General of UNESCO, a representative of the African Union, and
the South African permanent delegate to UNESCO. In addition to
these members, who have voting rights, the Board also includes
observers with no voting rights.
In terms of the agreement, the South African government
undertakes, inter alia, to make the necessary infrastructure for the
Fund’s accommodation available, mobilise resources, provide
administrative staff, and to seek, together with African state
parties, technical and financial support for the Fund’s projects
that are not funded by its annual budget.
Zimbabwe
South Africa concluded two agreements and four MOUs with
Zimbabwe in 2017.
The agreements deal with the cross-border coordination of
frequency spectrum and with health matters respectively. The
frequency spectrum agreement was concluded on 3 October
2017 and aims at coordination between the countries on cross-
border spillage of existing frequencies; new digital broadcasting
transmissions; interference between analogue broadcasting trans-
missions; assignments in broadcasting and telecommunication
services; and the sharing of information on the deployment of
new services alongside broadcasting and telecommunication
services. In the case of harmful interference, the parties under-
took to cooperate in the detection and elimination of the interfer-
ence and to exercise goodwill and mutual assistance in eliminating
harmful interference.
The health matters agreement, concluded on 29 August 2017,
seeks to facilitate cooperation between the parties in the follow-
ing areas: health systems management; human resource devel-
opment; prevention, control and management of communicable
and non-communicable diseases and conditions; specialised
medical care; laboratory services; regulation of pharmaceuticals,
family, child health and nutrition; research and development;
traditional medicine; and emergency situations.
The four MOUs deal respectively with cooperation in employ-
ment and labour, environment and conservation, energy, and
information and communication technologies. The employment
and labour MOU, concluded on 6 April 2017, contemplates
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greater cooperation between the parties in respect of dispute
resolution, labour-law reform, labour inspection, employment
services, social security, occupational safety and health, and
labour-migration management.
The environment and conservation MOU, concluded on 3 Octo-
ber 2017, aims at reducing environmental degradation and seeks
to promote cooperation between the parties in the following
areas: biodiversity conservation; protected areas and wildlife
management; sustainable use of natural resources; alien and
invasive-species management; desertification; veld-fire manage-
ment; climate change; waste management and pollution control;
environmental management; and compliance and enforcement.
The energy MOU, concluded on the same day as the one
above, lists renewable energy, electricity, energy efficiency, and
hydrocarbons as areas in respect of which the parties will
promote cooperation. A technical committee and working groups
will be responsible for facilitating the implementation of the MOU.
The information and communications technology MOU, con-
cluded on the same date, foresees a closer working relationship
between the parties and between their technical, regulatory,
research, education, and other organisations in the ICT sector.
Common interest areas are: policy formulation and implementa-
tion; project implementation; exchange of information; manage-
ment of radio frequency spectra; digital programme development;
capacity building; investment and business partnerships; and
infrastructure development. An ICT working committee will be
established by the parties to review progress with cooperative
activities under the MOU.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
On 20 September 2017, the long-awaited Treaty on the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons was signed in New York, 49 years after
the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
South Africa also signed on this day and there are currently
59 signatories and ten state parties. The treaty will enter into force
90 days after the 50th ratification.
In terms of article 1, state parties undertake ‘never under any
circumstances’ to: (a) develop, test, produce, manufacture, or
otherwise acquire, possess, or stockpile nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; (b) transfer to any recipient, nuclear
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weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the control over
such weapons or devices; (c) receive the transfer of or control
over such weapons or devices; (d) use or threaten to use such
weapons or devices; (e) assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any prohibited activity under the treaty;
(f) seek or receive any assistance, in any form, from anyone to
engage in a prohibited activity; and (g) allow any stationing,
installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other
explosive devices in their territory or at any place under their
jurisdiction or control.
State parties also have a duty to submit declarations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations on their prior possession
of nuclear weapons, devices, and programmes, and their elimina-
tion. This also applies to nuclear weapons and devices in their
possession or under their control following their ratification of the
treaty. The subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons and
programmes, or the conversion of all nuclear-related facilities,
must take place under international verification by an authority to
be designated by the parties. The elimination and conversion
must take place as soon as possible, but not later than a deadline
to be determined at the first meeting of the parties and in
accordance to a plan submitted by the state party and approved
by a subsequent meeting of the state parties or review confer-
ence.
In cases where individuals under a state party’s jurisdiction
have been affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, that
state party will be responsible for the provision of medical care,
rehabilitation, and psychological support in accordance with
applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. In
the case of environmental damage, the state party responsible
must take the necessary measures for the rehabilitation of the
affected areas.
Article 7 provides for international cooperation and assistance
in giving effect to the treaty. It places an obligation on state
parties to cooperate with one another to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the treaty, and determines further that each state party
‘shall have the right to seek and receive assistance from other
states parties’. By the same token, state parties having the
necessary technical, material, and financial resources must
assist other state parties affected by the use or testing of nuclear
weapons.
The implementation of the treaty is overseen by a meeting of
the parties (art 8) which includes the adoption of measures for the
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verified, time-bound, and irreversible elimination of nuclear-
weapon programmes. A review conference for assessing the
progress made with the implementation of the treaty will take
place after a period of five years following the entry into force of
the treaty. Further review conferences will take place at six-year
intervals.
SADC Protocols on Extradition and on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters
By agreement, the SADC members and parties to the above
Protocols have effected minor amendments to the Protocols. In
both instances the SADC Committee of Ministers of Justice/
Attorneys-General are designated to oversee the implementation
of the two Protocols in terms of their mandates under the 2000
SADC Protocol on Legal Affairs.
IBSA Fund
On 17 October 2017, South Africa, Brazil, and India concluded
an agreement on the establishment of a fund (the IBSA Fund) for
the alleviation of poverty and hunger. Through this initiative the
parties intend to fund projects involving South-South cooperation
for the benefit of populations of developing countries. The Fund’s
capital will consist of annual contributions made by the parties of
at least US$ 1 million per party per annum.
LEGISLATION
International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017
This Act repeals the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral AwardsAct 40 of 1977, and provides for the incorporation
into South African law of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985. It also
gives effect to South Africa’s obligations under the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(1958), and facilitates the use of arbitration in international
commercial disputes and the recognition and enforcement of
certain arbitration agreements and awards (s 3).Arbitration agree-
ments and awards covered by this Act are excluded from the
operation of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, save for purposes of
Chapter 3 of the International Arbitration Act (IAA), which deals
with the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements
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and foreign arbitral awards (s 4). The IAA is binding on public
bodies and applies to any international commercial arbitration in
terms of an arbitration agreement to which a public body is party,
but does not apply to the settlement of disputes between an
investor and the government in terms of section 13 of the
Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 (s 5).
Under the IAA, international commercial arbitration applies to
any international commercial dispute the parties have elected
to submit to arbitration under an arbitration agreement, unless the
dispute is not capable of determination by arbitration under any
law of the Republic, or the agreement is contrary to public policy.
Arbitration may not be excluded solely on the ground that by law
a court or tribunal has jurisdiction to determine a matter falling
within the terms of an arbitration agreement (s 7).
CASE LAW
Earthlife Africa & another v The Ministry of Energy & others [2017]
ZAWCHC 50, [2017] 3 All SA 187 (WCC), 2017 (5) SA 227
(WCC)
In this matter the steps taken by the South African government
between 2013 and 2016 in furtherance of its nuclear power
procurement programme were the subject of litigation in the High
Court on two grounds. The first concerns legal challenges to two
separate determinations made by the Minister of Energy in 2013
and 2016, respectively, under section 34 of the Electricity Regu-
lation Act 4 of 2006. The second involves the tabling in Parliament
of three bilateral agreements South Africa has concluded with
foreign states relating to nuclear cooperation. Only the latter will
be dealt with here as the former largely involves administrative-
law issues.
The court’s ruling on the tabling of the bilateral agreement with
Russia is highly relevant in view of the questions it raises
concerning the separation of powers under section 231 of the
Constitution, which determines the role of the executive and
the legislature, respectively, with regard to the treaty-making
process, and whether the courts may decide on the correct
process for tabling international agreements under section 231 of
the Constitution. Of specific relevance is section 231(2) and (3).
Under the former, to bind the state, a treaty negotiated and
signed by the executive must be approved by resolution in both
Houses of Parliament. Under section 231(3), parliamentary
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approval under section 231(2) is not required in the case of an
international agreement of a technical, administrative, or execu-
tive nature, or an agreement that does not require either ratifica-
tion or accession. The only requirement in such instances is that
the agreement be tabled in both Houses of Parliament ‘within a
reasonable time’.
In casu, the government tabled the Russian agreement under
section 231(3) and it is the constitutionality of this decision that
the applicants challenged, arguing that as the Russian agreement
contained binding commitments (as opposed to the agreements
with the US and South Korea) in relation to nuclear procurement, it
should have been tabled under section 231(2) in order to give
Parliament the opportunity to consider whether or not to approve
the agreement (paras [80]-[82]).
In seeking a ruling from the court on the constitutionality of the
government’s conduct concerning the signature, approval, and
tabling of the Russian agreement, the court was not asked to rule
on the international-law validity of the agreement (as the govern-
ment alleged and to which it objected on the basis of the principle
of the separation of powers), but on the constitutionality and
lawfulness of the relevant government decisions (para [90]). The
court’s point of departure, therefore, was that, as the conclusion
and tabling of the agreement involved the exercise of public
power, the government’s conduct in this instance – as in all cases
involving the exercise of public power – is justiciable and can be
tested for lawfulness and rationality (para [103]). To undertake a
review of this kind, and to determine under which provision the
agreement should have been tabled, the court considered it not
only permissible to have regard to the nature and content of the
agreement, but that it was in fact its duty to do so (paras [104]
[105]).
The court’s ensuing enquiry into the nature and content of the
agreement provided strong evidence that the tone and content
of the provisions, the degree of specificity, the frequent use of
peremptory language, and the parties’ commitments to key
elements of an agreement with far-reaching consequences,
suggested a firm legal commitment to enter into a binding
agreement in relation to the procurement of new nuclear reactor
plants. The combined effect of these factors suggested that what
the parties had in mind was not the kind of routine agreement that
could fall under the exceptions listed in section 231(3) (paras
[106]–[111]). What strengthened the court’s hand in this assess-
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ment was an explanatory memorandum by the senior State Law
Advisor submitted to the Minister and the President, in which it
was stated that the agreement fell within section 231(2) of the
Constitution, and that parliamentary approval was therefore
required. Why the government dismissed this advice emerged
during the course of the proceedings, when counsel for the
respondents placed on record that the Minister had acted as she
had because she considered the advice of the State Law Advisor
wrong. However, no explanation was given to justify the Minister’s
rejection of the advice, or her subsequent decision rather to
proceed with the matter under section 231(3) (para [115]).
Given these facts, the court ruled against a classification of the
agreement as one that falls within the ambit of section 231(3): its
nature and ramifications, the court found, are such that parliamen-
tary scrutiny under section 231(2) is required. This rendered the
Minister’s decision to table the agreement under section 231(3),
‘at the very least, irrational’ (para [116]). But potentially more
damning, is the court’s very next statement, that ‘[a]t best
the Minister appears to have either failed to apply her mind to the
requirements of sec 231(2) in relation to the contents of the
Russian IGA or at worst to have deliberately bypassed its provi-
sions for an ulterior and unlawful purpose’ (para [116]).
Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and
Cooperation & others (Council for the Advancement of the South African
Constitution Intervening) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53, 2017 (3) SA 212
(GP), [2017] 2 All SA 123 (GP), 2017 (1) SACR 623 (GP)
At the heart of the dispute in this matter is South Africa’s
withdrawal from the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court which the country ratified on 27 November 2000,
followed by the enactment by Parliament in 2002, of the Implemen-
tation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act
27 of 2002. On 19 October 2016, the national executive took a
decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, a move that had at
its heart South Africa’s failure to arrest President Al Bashir of
Sudan during an official visit to South Africa for Rome Statute
crimes, and its subsequent fruitless attempts to convince the
courts – including the International Criminal Court – that its failure
to comply with the country’s Rome Statute obligations was legally
justified (see Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2015 (2) SA 1
(GP); Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others
1081PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 19 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/30−Public−International−Law
v The Southern Africa Litigation Centre 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA);
and Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the
non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for
the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09
(6 July 2017)).
On the day of the executive’s decision to withdraw from the
Rome Statute, the Minister of International Relations deposited a
notice of withdrawal with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations as required by article 127 of the Rome Statute. This
meant that the withdrawal would take effect one year after receipt
of the notification. Following this notification, the Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development informed both Houses
of Parliament of the cabinet’s decision and of his intention to table
a Bill in Parliament, repealing the Implementation Act. It is this
sequence of events that formed the basis of the applicant’s
litigation in the High Court in which it sought orders declaring
unconstitutional and invalid: (a) the notice of withdrawal; and
(b) the underlying cabinet decision to withdraw from the Rome
Statute. It also requested that the respondents be directed to
revoke the notice of withdrawal and to take reasonable steps to
terminate the withdrawal process. This challenge was premised
on the following grounds:
(a) The notice of withdrawal should have been preceded by
parliamentary approval.
(b) Repeal of the Implementation Act was required before the
delivery of the notice of withdrawal to the United Nations.
(c) The delivery of the notice of withdrawal without prior consul-
tation with Parliament was procedurally irrational.
(d) Withdrawal from the Rome Statute breaches the state’s
obligations in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution.
The ground under (a) raises a question as to the sequence of
the steps the government must follow to withdraw from a treaty –
a matter the Constitution leaves unregulated. Section 231(1) and
(2) of the Constitution subjects the conclusion of treaties to a
two-phase process in terms of which the negotiation and signa-
ture of a treaty by the executive are followed by parliamentary
approval before the treaty binds the Republic internationally. At
the domestic level, this process is concluded when the treaty is
enacted into law by parliamentary legislation under section
231(4). Hence, the applicant argued that in the case of with-
drawal, the process must be reversed and Parliament must first
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approve withdrawal from a treaty before the executive may
deliver a notice of withdrawal. In essence, the respondents’
counter-argument was that as the conclusion of treaties is by
definition an executive function, both the conclusion and with-
drawal from treaties fall within the province of the executive.
A requirement to interpret section 231 differently should not be
lightly implied or read into the Constitution.
The court found it unnecessary to deal with the substantial
irregularity under (d), leaving the procedural and rationality
issues relating to Parliament’s prior involvement as the sole
concern here. At the centre of the dispute between the parties lies
section 231 of the Constitution.
The constitutional guidelines through which the court
approached the matter were: firstly, that the exercise of all public
power, including an executive act, must accord with the Constitu-
tion; and, secondly, Parliament’s responsibility is to make laws,
and when doing so to exercise its judgment as to the appropriate
route to follow (paras [44] [45]). The reading of section 231 which
the court then followed was that, on a proper construction, a
notice of withdrawal is the equivalent of ratification in the sense
that a notice of withdrawal ‘has concrete legal effects in interna-
tional law, as it terminates treaty obligations’ (para [47]). And
since prior parliamentary approval is required before SouthAfrica
may deposit its instruments of ratification with the United Nations,
not to require it for a reversal of the process would constitute a
‘glaring difficulty’ (para [51]). At this point, the court also relied on
the separation-of-powers principle to justify its inference that
Parliament retains the power to determine whether or not to
remain bound to an international agreement, with the result that it
would be constitutionally untenable to adopt a construction that
would allow the executive to terminate the agreement unilaterally
(paras [51] [53]). In other words, as, by virtue of section 231, the
executive lacks the power to bind South Africa to an agreement,
‘it must ordinarily go to Parliament . . . to get authority to do what
the executive does not already have authority to do’ (para [55]).
The court considered the rationality argument in connection
with the executive’s explanation that the Rome Statute impedes
its role in diplomatic and peace-keeping efforts on the African
continent in that, as a party to the Rome Statute, South Africa is
required to arrest sitting heads of state who are subject to an
arrest warrant, when present in its territory. Therefore, by with-
drawing from the Rome Statute, South Africa would be free to
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perform its peace-keeping role and to protect such leaders by
affording them immunity. But, as the court pointed out, since
South Africa’s obligation to arrest fugitives from justice for Rome
Statute crimes also derives independently from the Implementa-
tion Act, the government would be bound to comply while the Act
remains in force. This would cause South Africa to remain bound
by its international obligations domestically, while internationally it
is no longer a party to the Rome Statute (paras [65] [66]).
The government’s argument in this regard was that this anomaly
does not arise in view of the fact that in terms of article 127 of the
Rome Statute, a notice of withdrawal only becomes effective one
year after the date of withdrawal, and that by then the Implemen-
tation Act would have been repealed in light of the executive
having requested Parliament to attend to the matter urgently
(para [67]). This request the court found impermissible in itself, as
it has the potential to undermine Parliament’s authority as master
of its own processes as the principal legislative organ of the state
which cannot be dictated to by the executive to meet the
executive’s own deadlines (para [67]). This issue, coupled with
the executive’s failure to justify the urgency of a withdrawal from
the Rome Statute, resulted in the court concluding that the
lodging of the notice of withdrawal by the executive without first
consulting Parliament had been procedurally irrational (para
[70]). It therefore follows that
on a construction of s 231 of the Constitution, . . . prior parliamentary
approval and the repeal of the Implementation Act are required before
the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute is delivered by the
national executive to the United Nations. Also, that the delivery of the
notice of withdrawal was procedurally irrational. These are processed-
based grounds, as they relate to the procedure by which the notice of
withdrawal was prepared and handled (para [71]).
The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic & The Polisario Front v The
Owner and Charterers of the MV ‘NM Cherry Blossom’ & others [2017]
ZAECPEHC 31, 2017 (5) SA 105 (ECP), [2018] 1 All SA 593
(ECP)
Since the 1975 annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco, a
former Spanish colony, the territory has been the subject of a
long-running territorial dispute between Morocco and the indig-
enous Saharawi people. In 1976, the Polisario Front (the PF), an
indigenous independence movement, proclaimed the Saharawi
Arab Democratic Republic (the SADR). This resulted in a sixteen-
year-long guerilla war with Moroccan forces, which ended in
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1991 with a UN-brokered ceasefire. But the promise of full
independence for the territory is yet to materialise, despite the
SADR having been recognised by various states and having
been admitted to membership of the African Union. South Africa
recognises both the SADR and Morocco.
The SADR and the PF entered the above matter as applicants
on 1 May 2017, when the motor vessel NM Cherry Blossom
docked to take on bunkers in the port of Coega, near Port
Elizabeth. Aboard the Cherry Blossom was a cargo of phosphate
mined in the northern part of Western Sahara, and destined for
New Zealand, where the buyer, a fertilizer manufacturing com-
pany, had its business. By means of an ex parte application, the
applicants sought an order interdicting and restraining the respon-
dents from removing the cargo from the jurisdiction of the court in
Algoa Bay, pending the determination of the applicants’ action for
delivery and possession of the cargo, unless they were furnished
with suitable security for their claim. The order granted by the
court operated as an interim order with immediate effect pending
the return date of the rule nisi. However, as a result both of the
novelty of the matter and of the complexity of the international law
issues, the Acting Judge President decided that a full bench
should hear the matter on the return date. This was the matter
under review.
In essence, the case for the applicants was that the phosphate
on board the Cherry Blossom formed part of the natural resources
of Western Sahara belonged to its people, and that the two
Moroccan mining companies – OCP and Phosboucraa (respon-
dents 4 and 5) – that were involved in the mining and sale of the
phosphate had misappropriated and sold it without a right to do
so. On the other hand, the two respondent companies based
their claim to having mined and sold the phosphate on Moroccan
law, in terms of which they were incorporated and performed their
activities. They also raised two further defences: that in terms of
the common-law act of state doctrine, the dispute was not
justiciable; and that in terms of the Foreign State Immunity Act 87
of 1981, the court was precluded from deciding the matter
because it involved the laws of a foreign state.
As the central issue in this matter concerned the ownership to
the cargo, and consequently, whether the applicants had estab-
lished a prima facie right to the cargo for purposes of the
interdict, the court turned to international law. It stated that ‘rules
of international law . . . have determined the status of Western
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Sahara, the status of Morocco in relation to Western Sahara, the
ownership of Western Sahara’s natural resources and the condi-
tions under which they may be exploited’ (para [32]). In the first
part of its analysis in this regard, the court invoked the UN Charter
provisions on decolonisation (art 73), as well as the UN General
Assembly’s well-known resolutions on decolonisation (GA res
1514 (XV) of 14 Dec 1960), and on Western Sahara’s right to
self-determination (GA res 2229 (XXI) 20 Dec 1966), among other
considerations, to confirm that the Western Sahara’s right to
self-determination is firmly established in the practice of the
United Nations (paras [34]-[36] [39]). Two further developments
clarified for the court the relationship between Morocco and
Western Sahara and the issue of ownership over natural resources.
The first was the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion
on Western Sahara (1975 ICJ Reports 12), which made it clear
that Morocco had no legitimate claim to sovereignty over Western
Sahara; the second, the legal opinion of the then UN Under-
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Hans Corell, to the effect that
only where resource exploitation activities in non-self-governing
territories are conducted for the benefit of the peoples of those
territories, on their behalf, or in consultation with their representa-
tives, will they be regarded as compatible with the UN Charter
(paras [37] [38] and [44] [45). Relying on this, and General
Assembly resolutions on the rights of peoples of non-self-
governing territories to the enjoyment of their natural resources,
the court concluded as follows (para [47]):
[T]he UN has developed a legal framework setting conditions in terms
of which natural resources may lawfully be exploited. In essence,
following the Corell opinion, administering powers may only allow the
exploitation of natural resources on behalf of the peoples of a territory
if to do so will be for the benefit of the peoples of that territory or in
consultation with their representatives.
Fulfilment of these conditions turned out to be a crucial element
in the court’s assessment of whether the applicants had estab-
lished a prima facie case in their application for an interim
interdict. As the court reiterated, an applicant for this kind of relief
is required to establish four elements: (a) a prima facie right,
which may be open to some doubt; (b) the potential suffering of
irreparable harm if the interdict is not granted; (c) a balance of
convenience in favour of granting the interdict; and (d) the
absence of any other satisfactory remedy (para [49]). As to who
enjoyed the prima facie right, the test the court applied to (a) did
1086 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2017)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 24 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/30−Public−International−Law
not arise as the respondent companies had not claimed to have
mined the phosphate with the consent of the people of the
territory. The mining operation was also not for their benefit as
most of the Sahrawi population lived to the east of the mining
area, or in refugee camps in Algeria. Those who benefitted were
more likely Moroccan settlers in the area (para [48]). In view of
the respondent companies’ weak and disputed claims, the court
ruled in favour of the applicants as having established a prima
facie right to ownership of the phosphate which they asserted on
behalf of the people of the Western Sahara (para [51]). As the
other elements in (b) to (d) are not relevant for current purposes,
what remained were the non-justiciability defences raised by the
respondent companies in respect of the act of state doctrine and
the principle of state immunity.
It is trite that the act of state doctrine – which, as a domestic
rule of law, has its origin in English law – renders the sovereign
acts of a foreign state non-justiciable before a national court,
even if the national court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction. There
are, however, exceptions, such as when the act in question
involves gross human rights violations, or constitutes a clear
violation of international law (see J Crawford Brownlie’s Principles
of Public International Law (2012) 75 76). State immunity, on the
other hand, is a rule of international law, and a successful claim to
it will exclude a domestic court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a
matter before it.
Several factors are relevant in this regard. The first is that the
mining area where the phosphate was extracted is situated
outside the international borders of Morocco, and in an area over
which Morocco exercises only de facto administrative control, but
where its laws apply. Secondly, the respondent companies
claimed title to the phosphate on the basis that it had been
lawfully mined in accordance with Moroccan law which regulates
the exploitation of minerals in non-self-governing territories. Thirdly,
they claimed to conduct their activities as incorporated legal
entities wholly separate from the state of Morocco, while fourthly,
no legal right or interest in the phosphate had been asserted on
behalf of the state of Morocco. Finally, Morocco was not a party to
the proceedings.
These facts constitute serious obstacles to a successful claim
to state immunity, a matter the court chose to deal with first. The
approach followed by the respondent companies was that the
legal rights and interests of Morocco had been impleaded by
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virtue of the fact that, in hearing the matter, the court would be
required to adjudicate on the validity of the law under which the
respondent companies claimed a right to the phosphate. In
support, they invoked the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, which provides as
follows in its article 6(2):
A proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered to have
been instituted against another State if that other State:
(a) is named as a party to that proceeding; or
(b) is not named as a party to the proceeding but the proceeding in
effect seeks to affect the property, rights, interests or activities of
that other State.
This provision was recently considered by the United Kingdom
Supreme Court in the case of Belhaj & others v Straw & others;
Rhamatula v Minister of Defence & others [2017] UKSC 3
(17 January 2017), and it was to this case that the court turned for
guidance on the correct interpretation of article 6(2)(b). In Belhaj
the UK Supreme Court, per Lord Sumption, regarded the Conven-
tion on Jurisdictional Immunities as ‘an authoritative statement of
customary international law’, notwithstanding the fact that it has
not yet entered into force (para [194]). As to the scope of the final
words in article 6(2)(b), the judge followed a restrictive interpreta-
tion in holding that they related ‘wholly to actions involving the
seizure or attachment of public properties belonging to a foreign
state or in its possession or control’ – a formulation the court took
from the 1991 commentary on article 6 by the International Law
Commission (para [195]). In following a similarly restrictive
approach, Lord Mance endorsed an interpretation in terms of
which ‘interests’ should be limited to claims for which there is
some legal foundation, as opposed to some political or moral
concern of the state in the proceedings (para [26]).
Following this approach, the High Court in Saharawi dismissed
the claim to state immunity by concluding as follows (paras [83]
[84]):
Morocco is not a party to the proceedings. It is accordingly not bound
by any finding or judgment to be made in relation to the issues
between the parties. It has no proprietary interest in the matter which
the SADR and the PF seek to prosecute by way of the vindicatory
action. . . . A finding by a domestic forum that OCP’s and Phosbou-
craa’s exploitation of minerals in the Western Sahara does not comply
with the UN Framework and is illegal also can have no effect upon the
legal rights of Morocco. It is after all OCP’s and Phosboucraa’s case
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that they conduct their activities as incorporated legal entities wholly
separate from the state of Morocco.
In explaining its response to the respondent companies’ act of
state defence, the court again referred to the Belhaj case (para
[95]). There, Lord Sumption (para [200]) said the following:
Unlike state immunity, act of state is not a personal but a subject
matter immunity. It proceeds from the same premise as state immu-
nity, namely mutual respect for the equality of sovereign states. But it
is wholly the creation of common law. Although international law
requires states to respect the immunity of other states from their
domestic jurisdiction, it does not require them to apply any particular
limitation on their subject matter jurisdiction in litigation to which
foreign states are not parties and in which they are not indirectly
impleaded. The foreign act of state doctrine is at best permitted by
international law. It is not based upon it.
Therefore, where the High Court, as a domestic court in this
instance, is called upon to exercise restraint, or to refrain from
adjudicating a matter in respect of which it could ordinarily
exercise jurisdiction, the scope and application of the principle of
restraint is a matter to be determined under domestic law. It is,
therefore, bound to apply the Constitution as the supreme law of
the land and to give effect to the fundamental rights therein, in
particular the right of access to courts in section 34, in determin-
ing whether to decline adjudication in a matter involving the act of
a foreign state. In such circumstances, the court will require
clarity as to the issues to be determined (paras [96] [97]). Thus,
as it was not entirely clear what the act of a foreign state on which
the respondents relied was, which could render the matter
non-justiciable, the court found no need to express itself on the
nature or ambit of the act of state doctrine. It concluded that this
was a matter to be decided in due course by the forum hearing
the vindicatory action. For the moment, the court was only
concerned with the fact that the applicants had met the require-
ments for the interdict and were therefore entitled to the remedy
sought (paras [101]-[107]).
Hidden between the pages of this case is an interesting irony
relating to the constitutive source of a legal title. In the ICJ’s
advisory opinion on Western Sahara referred to earlier, Morocco
formulated its claim to ‘legal ties’ with Western Sahara at the time
of the territory’s colonisation by Spain (1884), as being based on
the uninterrupted and uncontested public display of sovereignty
over the territory (Western Sahara Advisory Opinion above paras
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[90] [91]). In doing so, it invoked the decision of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland (PCIJ Series A/B No 53). In this matter, the PCIJ ruled
that a claim to sovereignty based upon a ‘continued display of
authority’ (45ff) involves two elements, each of which must be
shown to exist: (a) the intention and will to act as a sovereign; and
(b) some actual exercise or display of such authority. Using these
criteria, the court in Western Sahara determined that what is of
decisive importance regarding Morocco’s claim is not ‘indirect
inferences drawn from events in past history but evidence
directly relating to effective display of authority in Western
Sahara’ at the material time and immediately prior to that (para
[93]). On this basis, the court concluded that the material placed
before the court and examined by it did not show that Morocco
displayed ‘effective and exclusive State activity in Western Sahara’
(para [107]).
The irony is that it is now the SADR which is not in a position to
show ‘effective and exclusive State activity’ in the territory; eighty
per cent of the area claimed falls under the control of Morocco
and is administered in accordance with Moroccan laws. There-
fore, while the SADR and its people may have a legitimate claim
to Western Sahara and its natural resources based on the
political self-determination doctrine underlying the United Nations’
decolonisation process, the actual (de facto and de jure) exer-
cise of governmental authority remains the missing constitutive
element for independent SADR statehood. The incomplete nature
of the state-formation project through the exercise of political
self-determination is recognised in the SADR’s own constitution,
where the preamble notes the resolve of the Saharawi people ‘to
continue to struggle for the recovery of the sovereignty of the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic . . . over the entire national
territory and achievement of total independence.’
This situation is reminiscent of South Africa’s de facto control
over SWA/Namibia, and the enforcement of its laws in that
territory, even after the revocation of South Africa’s mandate by
the UN General Assembly on 27 October 1966 in resolution 2145
(XXI); the subsequent declaration by the Security Council in
resolution 264 (1969) that the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia was unlawful; and the 1971 Advisory Opinion of the
ICJ that the Mandate for South West Africa had been lawfully
terminated (Legal Consequences for State of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) not-
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withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971 ICJ
Rep 16).
At issue in both the above instances are the legal conse-
quences of the laws of a possessor of the power of administration
and legislation over a territory, based on the de facto (and/or de
jure), but politically disputed, control over the territory. In Saharawi,
the High Court has implied that the respondent companies’
reliance on Moroccan law for their claim to legal title to the
phosphate, and that their mining operations were lawful in
accordance with that law, could be the necessary issue the trial
court may be called upon to adjudicate in the vindicatory action.
By the same token, the court concluded, the question of compli-
ance with the UN framework regulating the exploitation of mineral
resources in a non-self-governing territory could ‘be the central
issue for adjudication’ (para [97]).
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SENTENCING
ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
No legislation directly affecting this branch of the law was
adopted during the period under review.
CASE LAW
SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
AMENDMENT ACT 105 OF 1997
In 1997, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was
passed in reaction to a public outcry for harsher sentences for
convicted offenders, and in an attempt to send a clear message
to offenders that ‘crime does not pay’. The Act came into
operation on 1 May 1998 and is still in effect today, even though it
was enacted as a temporary measure at that time.
Ensuring that the charges correctly reflect the relevant provision(s) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
The applicant in Ndlovu v S 2017 (2) SACR 305 (CC) grievously
assaulted and raped the complainant but was only charged with
rape: ‘unlawfully and intentionally having sexual intercourse with
a female without her consent ‘‘read with the provisions of [s]ec-
tion 51(2) of the Criminal LawAmendment Act 105 of 1997’’ ’ (para
[5]). This charge was put to the applicant at the commencement
of the trial and the magistrate informed him at this stage that if he
was convicted on this charge, the court would be bound to
impose a minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment if he
was a first offender (para [6]). This was indeed the first error in the
trial and sentencing of the applicant as section 51(2) of the Act
prescribes a minimum sentence of ten, not fifteen, years’ impris-
onment for a first offender who is convicted of rape. Provision is,
however, made in section 51(2) of the Act for a maximum term of
fifteen years’ imprisonment.
* BA LLB (Stell) CML (UNISA) LLD (Stell) BMus (UNISA) Hons BMus (UNISA).
Assistant Professor at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong.
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During the course of the trial, a great deal of evidence was led
regarding the violent nature of the attack on and rape of the
complainant and, upon finding the applicant ‘guilty as charged’,
the magistrate proceeded to sentence the applicant to life
imprisonment in terms of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, despite the applicant having been
charged with rape read with section 51(2) of the Act (paras
[6]–[8]). Section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997 prescribes a minimum sentence of life imprisonment on a
conviction of rape as contemplated in section 3 of the Criminal
Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) AmendmentAct 32 of
2007, where the rape also involves the infliction of grievous bodily
harm on the complainant. The magistrate stated as follows during
sentencing (para [8] of the Constitutional Court judgment):
Coming to the nature of the offence that the accused [has] been
convicted of, the offence of rape falls within the [ambit] of the minimum
sentence act whereby the court is obliged to impose a life imprison-
ment as it involves infliction of bodily harm. The court can only deviate
from the prescribed [minimum] sentence only if there are substantial
and compelling circumstances. The defence left everything in the
hands of the court regarding deviation from the prescribed minimum
sentence. . .
Therefore the court finds that there are no substantial and compel-
ling circumstances that may allow the court to deviate from the
prescribed minimum sentence.
The applicant subsequently appealed against both his convic-
tion and sentence on the ground that his right to a fair trial had
been infringed by the reference in the charge sheet to an
incorrect provision in the Minimum SentencingAct (para [10]). On
appeal to the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria (Ndlovu v S
[2011] ZAGPPHC 223), Sapire and Bam AJJ did not agree, and
concluded (para [11] of the Constitutional Court judgment):
It cannot be said that the mere fact that the wrong section of the Act
was initially and repeatedly used in any way prejudiced the appellant
as far as the sentence is concerned.
Judges Sapire and Bam explained that the provisions of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 were clear, and that
the imposition of a life sentence was appropriate under the
circumstances of this case. It was also noted that the applicant
was legally represented at all times during the trial and that
nothing could have changed the outcome of his case at trial or
during sentencing (paras [11] [12] of the Constitutional Court
judgment).
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The Supreme Court of Appeal (Ndlovu v S [2014] ZASCA 149
(SCA)) agreed with this finding and held that there was no factual
foundation to support the applicant’s argument that the error in
the charge sheet had resulted in an infringement of his right to a
fair trial (paras [13] and [14] of the SCA judgment and paras [14]
and [15] of the Constitutional Court judgment).
This notwithstanding, Justice Khampepe, writing for the Consti-
tutional Court, noted that neither the High Court nor the Supreme
Court of Appeal had considered whether the trial court, which
was a regional court, had the necessary jurisdiction to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment (para [17]). This was relevant to the
applicant’s appeal, as a regional court is a creature of statute and
its general sentencing jurisdiction is limited to that prescribed in
relevant statutes (para [19]). In terms of the provisions of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, therefore, the trial
court would only have had the power to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment if the applicant had been convicted of an offence
referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 (para [42]). This was not the
case here as the pronouncement of the trial court that the
applicant was found ‘guilty as charged’ was unambiguous; it was
a conviction of rape read with section 51(2) of the Act (ie, Part III
of Schedule 2), which attracts a maximum term of fifteen years’
imprisonment (paras [43]–[45]). And, while a defective or incom-
plete charge can under certain circumstances be remedied by
evidence under section 88 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977, the charge against the applicant in the instant case was
found to be complete and not defective; ‘[q]uite simply, the
charge was not rape involving the infliction of grievous bodily
harm and evidence alone could not make it so’ (para [45]).
Therefore, having found that the regional court did not have the
jurisdiction to sentence the applicant in terms of section 51(1) of
the Criminal LawAmendmentAct 105 of 1997, Justice Khampepe
found it unnecessary to deal with the fair trial question and
substituted the term of life imprisonment with a term of fifteen
years’ imprisonment (paras [47] [59]).
Particularly important about this judgment are the following
comments made by Justice Khampepe. He held that this case
was an example where ‘the state’s remissness had failed the
complainant and society’ (para [54]). In emphasising the consti-
tutional duty of courts as the ‘gate-keepers of justice’, he held that
the magistrate in this case should have been alert to the
discrepancy in the evidence being led and the charge against
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the applicant as formulated in the charge sheet. This was clearly
a case of rape read with section 51(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, and not section 51(2) of the same
Act (para [55]). The magistrate should, therefore, have seen,
before judgment, to the charge against the applicant being
amended in terms of section 86 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977 (para [56]). Likewise, the National Prosecuting Authority
is assigned with the constitutional duty to exercise its prosecuto-
rial duties on behalf of the people of South Africa, and it is
‘incumbent upon prosecutors to discharge this duty diligently
and competently’ (para [58]). The prosecutor in the instant case
had access to the J88 form in which the injuries sustained by the
complainant were fully described, and Justice Khampepe
observed:
It boggles the mind why the proper charge of rape read with the
provisions of section 51(1) of the Minimum Sentencing Act was not
preferred. This can only be explained as remissness on the part of the
prosecutor that, further, should have been corrected by the Court. This
error is acutely unfortunate – victims of crime rely on prosecutors
performing their functions properly. The failings of the prosecutor are
directly to blame for the outcome in this matter (para [58]).
Also see S v Mokgalaka 2017 (2) SACR 159 (GJ), S v Setshedi
2017 (1) SACR 504 (GP) and S v Tshoga 2017 (1) SACR 420
(SCA).
While it is important that an accused person be informed of the
applicability of the provisions of the Criminal LawAmendment Act
105 of 1977, and that the charge sheet correctly reflects the
alleged offences charged, note must also be taken of the dicta in
Director of Public Prosecutions: Gauteng Division, Pretoria v
Moabi 2017 (2) SACR 384 (SCA), where the Supreme Court of
Appeal held that intention to do grievous bodily harm is not an
element of rape which the state must prove for the conviction and
sentence to fall within the provisions of Part I(c) of Schedule 2 of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (para [14]).
Molemela AJA and Dambuza JA for the Supreme Court of Appeal
explained that ‘the test for ascertaining whether grievous bodily
harm has been inflicted is factual and objective. The correct
approach to that enquiry necessitates a holistic consideration of
all objective factors pertaining to the incident, with a view to
ascertaining whether bodily injuries were inflicted and whether
they are of a serious nature’ (para [14]). Thus, by importing the
intention of the respondent into the enquiry, the High Court in this
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case committed an error of law as ‘intent’ is irrelevant in the
determination of whether grievous bodily harm was inflicted on a
complainant in the rape envisaged in Part I(c) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (para [15]). Rather, the question to
be answered is whether, as a matter of fact, the victim of such a
rape sustained grievous bodily harm (para [15]). (Also see
Palmer v S (979/2016) [2017] ZASCA 107 (13 September 2017).)
In Molisalife v S (A217/2016) [2017] ZAFSHC 48 (16 March
2017), Musi AJP for the High Court Free State Division, Bloemfon-
tein, reiterated that
[a]n incident of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, committed
with a single intention, is to be regarded as essentially the crime of
theft, with the housebreaking as a factor that tends to aggravate the
seriousness of the offence and therefore the severity of the sentence.
So too should the housebreaking with the intent to commit a crime be
seen as an aggravating factor when it is coupled with robbery with
aggravating circumstances (paras [7] [8] quoting from S v Maunye
2002 (1) SACR 266 (T) at 277F–278B).
In the presence of such aggravating circumstances, such a
conviction would trigger the prescribed minimum sentence of
fifteen years’ imprisonment for a first offender as per section
51(2)(a)(i) read with Part II of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997.
Determining whether the victim was raped more than once and/or whether
repeated acts of penetration constitute one or many separate acts of rape for
the purpose of Part I of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997
In Ncombo v S 2017 (2) SACR 683 (ECG) it was held that Part I
of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
applies where the victim has been raped more than once by the
accused. Courts and prosecutors must therefore determine
whether repeated acts of penetration constitute one or many
separate acts of rape for the purpose of correctly charging and
ultimately sentencing an offender (see, eg, S v Tladi 2013 (2)
SACR 287 (SCA) and S v Maxibaniso 2015 (2) SACR 553 (ECP)).
Judge Borchers in S v Blaauw 1999 (2) SACR 295 (W) explained
as follows:
Mere and repeated acts of penetration cannot without more, in my
mind, be equated with repeated and separate acts of rape. A rapist
who in the course of raping his victim withdraws his penis, positions
the victim’s body differently and then again penetrates her, will not, in
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my view, have committed rape twice. This is what I believe occurred
when the accused became dissatisfied with the position he had
adopted when he stood the complainant against a tree. By causing
her to lie on the ground and penetrating her again after she had done
so, the accused was completing the act of rape he had commenced
when they both stood against the tree. He was not committing another
separate act of rape.
Each case must be determined on its own facts. As a general rule
the more closely connected the separate acts of penetration are in
terms of time (ie the intervals between them) and place, the less likely
a court will be to find that a series of separate rapes has occurred. But
where the accused has ejaculated and withdrawn his penis from the
victim, if he again penetrates here thereafter, it should, in my view, be
inferred that he has formed the intent to rape her again, even if the
second rape takes place soon after the first and at the same place
(300a-d).
In the case of Ncombo v S 2017 (2) SACR 683 (ECG) the
evidence supported a finding that the complainant had been
raped twice by the appellant, and the prescribed minimum
sentence in terms of section 51(1), as read with Part I of Schedule
2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, therefore
applied, requiring that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed
unless substantial and compelling circumstances justified the
imposition of a lesser term (paras [15] [16]).
Also see Bogatsu v S (A100/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 79
(27 March 2017).
The role of previous convictions in sentencing under the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
In Manopole v S (A203/2016) [2017] ZAFSHC 44 (16 March
2017) an anomaly in Part I of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was pointed out: Where an accused
rapes more than one complainant, that accused is not at risk of
being sentenced to life imprisonment in a Regional Court if he has
no previous convictions for rape. However, where that same
accused rapes the same complainant more than once, a mini-
mum prescribed term of life imprisonment will apply (S v Maho-
motsa 2002 (2) SACR 435 (SCA) and Ngcobo and others v S
(AR759/14) [2016] ZAKZPHC 26 (3 March 2016)).
The appellant in this case was convicted of housebreaking with
the intent to rob and robbery with aggravating circumstances
(count 1) as well as two counts of rape (counts 2 and 3). He was
sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment on each of these counts
and the trial court ordered for the sentences on the first two
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counts to run concurrently (para [1]). The two counts of rape in
this case related to two separate incidents (one in April 2014 and
the other in June 2014), involving two complainants (paras [2]
[3]).
Musi AJP for the High Court Free State Division, Bloemfontein,
explained that it is only after a trial court has convicted an
accused of rape that a court can have regard to such a previous
conviction triggering the prescribed minimum sentence of life
imprisonment (para [16]). Part I of Schedule II provides as
follows:
Rape as contemplated in section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007 –
(a) when committed –
. . .
(iii) by a person who has been convicted of two or more offences
of rape or compelled rape, but has not yet been sentenced in
respect of such convictions; . . .
The appellant in this case had no previous conviction of rape
and in the absence of evidence that the rape in count 2 involved
the infliction of grievous bodily harm, the correct classification of
the rape was rather one as contemplated in Part III of Schedule 2
of the Act. The applicable minimum sentence for a first offender
was therefore ten years’ imprisonment (para [10]). Musi AJP
added that in order for a rape to be classified as one involving the
infliction of grievous bodily harm, the state must prove that the
complainant sustained a serious injury (para [10]; S v Rabako
2010 (1) SACR 310 (O)). With regard to the rape in count 3, and
as was indicated above,
[i]t is only after the trial court has convicted an accused person that it
may have regard to that person’s previous convictions. [And], [i]t is
only then that the State can prove that the accused has already been
convicted of two or more rapes but not yet sentenced for such rapes.
There must therefore be two or more other convictions at the time of
the last conviction or convictions. . . .[Thus], [a]n adult accused who
rapes the same adult complainant two or more times is exposed to the
minimum sentence of life imprisonment whilst an adult accused who
rapes two or more adult complainants once, and is convicted and
sentenced during the same trial for all the rapes, is not exposed to
such sentence (para [16]).
Also see Magabara v S (A800/2015) [2017] ZAGPPHC 117
(21 March 2017), Mahlangu v S (A392/16) [2017] ZAGPPHC 589
(15 September 2017) and Jacobs v S (A02/2017) [2017] ZAGP-
PHC 725 (3 May 2017). In the latter case, involving the determina-
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tion of an appropriate sentence on a charge of robbery with
aggravating circumstances, Meyer J and Ngobeni AJ for the High
Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria, quoted as follows [para 8] from
the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in S v Mokela 2012 (1)
SACR 431 (SCA) at para [6]):
It is a clear requirement of s 51(2)(a)(ii) that, for the appellant to attract
a minimum sentence of imprisonment of not less than 20 years, the
state had to prove that he is a second offender of robbery with
aggravating circumstances. This is a jurisdictional requirement neces-
sary to trigger s 51(2)(a)(ii). All that the state proved in this case is that
the appellant had previous convictions, amongst others, for rape,
robbery, theft, assault and escaping from lawful custody. In terms of
s 51(2)(a)(ii) it is not sufficient that the appellant has a previous
conviction for robbery. The conviction must be robbery with aggravat-
ing circumstances. Robbery and robbery with aggravating circum-
stances are two different offences calling for different sentences.
Entering on the record any and all causes, in the form of substantial and
compelling circumstances, to depart from a prescribed minimum sentence
Judges Lekale and Mhlambi for the High Court Free State
Division, Bloemfontein, in Mokhobo v S (A32/2017) [2017] ZAF-
SHC 104 (15 June 2017) reminded that in the event that a
sentencing court finds cause, in the form of substantial and
compelling circumstances, to deviate from a prescribed mini-
mum sentence, such a court is then required to enter the
substantial and compelling circumstances it found to exist on the
record (para [7]). This is particularly important when a sentencing
decision is taken on appeal, and the appeal court is tasked with
determining whether the trial court exercised its sentencing
discretion in a just and fair manner (paras [9] [10]).
The jurisdiction of lower courts to pass a sentence that falls within the
purview of section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1977
In S v Makwala (B391/2016) [2017] ZALMPPHC 9 (22 May
2017), Kganyago J for the High Court Limpopo Division, Pole-
kwane, held that ‘there is nothing preventing the lower courts in
trying matters of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm on
a person under the age of sixteen years. It is only at the
sentencing stage that the proceedings will be stopped, and
the accused committed to the regional court having jurisdiction
to sentence him/her accordingly’ (para [13]). This is because
the prescribed minimum sentence upon conviction, in terms of
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section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997,
falls outside the scope of lower courts’ sentencing jurisdiction.
However, such cases can be committed to the Regional Court for
sentencing in terms of section 116(1)(a) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act 51 of 1977 (paras [11] [12]).
Also see Van Wyk v S (A88/2017) [2017] ZAGPPHC 560
(31 July 2017).
What constitute substantive and compelling circumstances justifying a
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence?
The respondent in Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v
MG 2017 (2) SACR 132 (SCA) was arraigned on three counts of
rape in contravention of section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, using
a child for child pornography in contravention of section 20(1) of
the Act, exposing, displaying or causing the exposure or display-
ing of child pornography in contravention of section 19(a) of the
Act, sexual grooming of children in contravention of section
18(2)(a) of the Act, and possession of a film or publication
containing child pornography in contravention of section 27(1)(a)(i)
of the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996 (para [2]). The
complainant in this case was under the age of twelve years at the
time of the alleged offences, and was the child of the woman to
whom the respondent was married (para [3]). On conclusion of
the trial, the respondent was convicted of all counts save that of
sexual grooming of children. The three rape counts each attracted
a term of life imprisonment as the regional magistrate found that
there were no substantial and compelling circumstances present,
and the remaining counts were treated as one for the purpose of
sentence, and a term of ten years’ imprisonment imposed. The
regional magistrate also directed that the respondent’s particu-
lars be recorded in the sexual offences register in accordance
with section 50(2)(a) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (paras [5] [6]).
The respondent appealed against both his convictions and the
sentences imposed. On appeal, Preller J and Kganyago AJ for
the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria, confirmed the
convictions save for two of the three rape counts which had not,
based on the complainant’s own testimony and the medical
report submitted, been proved beyond a reasonable doubt (para
[8]). The convictions on two of the three rape counts were
consequently set aside and replaced with two convictions of
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sexual assault in contravention of section 5(1) of the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007 (para [8]). With regard to the sentence on the rape
conviction Judges Preller and Kganyago for the Gauteng Division
of the High Court remarked as follows (paras [10] [11]):
The first thing that struck me about the evidence of the complainant’s
mother was that she never mentioned finding any indication of distress
or trauma about the incidents on the part of the victim when she asked
her about what the appellant had done to her. She testified in chief that
she had asked her child whether the appellant had touched her
inappropriately, which she confirmed. . . .In her evidence the complain-
ant stated that she participated in these activities with the appellant
because he had told her that there would be trouble if she did not do
as he told her. It is not clear on her evidence that she acted out of fear
or that the threat was repeated on any subsequent occasion. It is in
any event not her version that there was any form of compulsion on
every occasion. Apart from the alleged threat there is no indication in
her evidence of how she felt about the incidents – no expression of
fear, disgust, embarrassment or any other negative emotion. That also
appears from the two photographs in the exhibits on which her facial
expression can be seen and which show no sign of fear, anguish,
embarrassment, disgust or any other negative emotion. Based on the
above evidence there is a strong suspicion that the victim was not an
unwilling participant in the events. I am fully aware that she was at the
time only ten years old and that the absence or otherwise of her
consent is irrelevant as an element of the commission of the offence. It
must, however, be an important factor in considering an appropriate
sentence.
Therefore, the judges regarded the imputed consent of a
twelve-year-old girl a mitigating factor in relation to a sentence on
a count of rape (para [13]). They held as follows (para [14]):
The personal circumstances of the appellant, the fact that he is a first
offender who spent 18 months in custody awaiting trial, the nature of
his offence and the limited effect that it had on the complainant and
the serious consequences that his offence already had for himself,
cumulatively constitute substantial and compelling circumstances
that justify the imposition of a lesser sentence.
They proceeded to impose a sentence of ten years’ imprison-
ment on the respondent, treating all counts as one for the
purpose of sentence. They further suspended five years of the
sentence on the usual conditions (para [14]).
The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently appealed
against the sentence, contending that in imposing sentence,
Preller J and Kganyago AJ had wrongly taken into account their
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own inferences that the complainant had consented to the sexual
acts in question (para [17]). The legal question before the
Supreme Court of Appeal was, therefore, whether the High Court
had ‘erred in law in imputing consent by conduct and/or acquies-
cence to the commission of the offences, by a child below the
age of twelve and in its consideration thereof as an important
factor in mitigation of sentence’ (para [19]). It was argued on
behalf of the state that section 57(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 states
that a child under the age of twelve years is not capable of
consenting to a sexual act, and that the High Court, in taking the
‘consent’ or ‘acquiescence’ of the complainant into consideration
in imposing sentence, had undermined the clear and unambigu-
ous provisions of the Act. It was also submitted that it is ‘illogical
to find that the complainant’s supposed ‘‘willing participation’’ in
sexual acts could ever be a mitigating factor when it came to the
question of sentence’ (paras [20] [21]). The respondent, in turn,
argued that the nature of the sentence imposed could never be a
question of law decided in favour of the convicted person, and
that the Director of Public Prosecutions could consequently not
bring an appeal against the sentence based on a question of law
(paras [22] [23]).
Petse JA, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, held that there could be no doubt that the judges of the
High Court had imputed consent to the complainant and had then
taken it into consideration in imposing a sentence on the respon-
dent (para [28]). This was a clear error of law and was therefore
appealable under section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977. It was also held that the High Court judges had overempha-
sised the respondent’s personal circumstances at the expense of
the gravity of the crimes and the interests of society, including
those of the complainant, and that they had lost sight of the
despicable nature of the crime (paras [31] [32]). Petse JA found
that the interests of justice dictate that the sentence imposed by
the High Court be set aside and the case was remitted back to
that court for sentencing (para [36]).
Also see S v Amerika 2017 (1) SACR 532 (WCC) in which
Henney J for the High Court Western Cape Division, Cape Town,
held that the complainant, in what could be described as ‘a
spousal abuse case’, indicating that she did not wish to pursue
prosecution, does not constitute a substantive and compelling
circumstance or mitigating factor justifying a deviation from the
prescribed minimum sentence. He explained (paras [21] [22]):
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Given the unique and somewhat unusual circumstances of this case
an argument may therefore be made out that, due to the situation in
which the victim found herself, in firstly deciding not to lay a criminal
complaint against the perpetrator, secondly by having forgiven the
perpetrator, and by subsequently having resumed the relationship
with the perpetrator, that such conduct may serve as a mitigating
factor or a consideration to conclude whether there are substantial
and compelling circumstances to deviate from the prescribed sen-
tence. Would it be in the interests of justice to do so, where the victim
acted in such a manner due to the abuse that she had been subjected
to? In my view, I do not think it can be regarded as a mitigating factor
or as a consideration to conclude whether there are substantive and
compelling circumstances to deviate from the prescribed sentence.
This would clearly send out the wrong message and would be
contrary to the values of the Constitution. It would furthermore
undermine the dignity and humanity of abused women in this country.
It would send out the message that men who make themselves guilty
of spousal abuse or partner abuse by raping their partners will escape
the full might of the law. In my view, rape committed in the context of
an abusive relationship, should be regarded as an aggravating factor
in the consideration of an appropriate sentence.
Also see S v MD & another (2) 2017 (1) SACR 654 (ECB).
COMPENSATION AS A CONDITION OF A SUSPENDED SENTENCE
Both applicants in Stow v Regional Magistrate, PE, NO &
others, Meyer v Cooney NO & others [2017] 2 All SA 300 (ECG),
2017 (2) SACR 96 were given suspended sentences with com-
pensation to be paid on a monthly basis to recover the money
owed as a condition of the suspension. Such compensation as a
condition of suspension usually serves three purposes: ‘to keep
the offender out of prison, to assist the offender to realise the
consequences of her actions, and to compensate the victim for
her loss’ (para [24]; S v Tshondeni 1971 (4) SA 79 (T)).
However, having failed to adhere to the monthly repayment
scheme set by the trial courts, the suspended sentences of the
two applicants were put into operation in terms of section
297(9)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The
applicants subsequently applied under Rule 53 of the Uniform
Rules for the review and setting aside of the relevant orders by
the first respondents on the basis that the first respondents had
failed to exercise their discretion judicially (para [3]).
Of the judicial discretion to order that a suspended sentence
be put into operation, the following was said in Callaghan v
Klackers NO & another 1975 (2) SA 258 (E) 259G–H:
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In terms of sec. 352(6)(b) of Act 56 of 1955 the magistrate has a
discretion to make an order further suspending such a sentence for
good and sufficient reasons. In considering whether to apply the
conditions of the suspended sentence or not, therefore, the magis-
trate is called upon to exercise his discretion in a judicial manner, after
hearing argument and considering all the aspects of the case as they
affect the applicant and as they affect the community. This discretion
must be a judicial discretion; and this Court will not lightly interfere with
the exercise of that discretion on review, unless it is of the view that
that discretion was so badly exercised as to amount to a gross
irregularity – in other words, that it was a grossly unreasonable
exercise of the discretion.
Against this background, Roberson J for the High Court
Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, considered the unique
facts and circumstances of each of the applicants’ cases. With
regard to the first applicant it was noted that he pleaded guilty to
and was convicted of 32 counts of having contravened section
58(d) read with sections 1, 28(1) and 28(2) of the Value-Added
Tax Act 89 of 1991, in that he had failed to pay over to the South
African Revenue Service (the SARS) value-added tax (VAT) which
had been collected. The first applicant was hereupon sentenced
to five years’ imprisonment wholly suspended for five years on
condition that he be not convicted of a similar offence during the
period of suspension and that he repay a sum of R513 606,77 to
the SARS by way of monthly payments until the full amount has
been extinguished (para [5]). It is noteworthy that the first
respondent, before sentencing the first applicant (in June 2011),
had asked him directly whether he would be able to meet the
payments and also warned him that if he failed to do so, ‘he could
not come back and say that he was never in a position to meet the
payments’. To this, the first applicant replied that it was ‘going to
be extremely difficult but obviously I have to meet it. I have got no
alternative but to meet it’ (para [6]).
The first applicant subsequently returned to court in November
2011 on his own initiative, as he did not have the financial means
to comply with the condition of suspension (para [8]). The
monthly payments were thereupon reduced and the first appli-
cant was warned that further rearrangement of the condition of
suspension would not easily be entertained (para [10]). In June
2013 the state applied for and was granted an order for the
suspended sentence of the first applicant, who was again unable
to meet any of his financial commitments, to be put into operation
(para [11]).
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In reviewing the decision of the first respondent to activate the
first applicant’s suspended sentence, Roberson J for the High
Court Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, noted that while an
explicit reference was not made to the wording of section 297(7)
of the Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977, it was nonetheless clear
that the first respondent considered all the circumstances pre-
sented to him, and that he made his decision after accepting the
fact that there was no prospect of the first applicant making
further payments to the SARS. There was, for this reason, also no
longer any reason for the sentence to be suspended further (para
[22]). Moreover, the first applicant’s poor financial situation was
but one factor which the first respondent took into account in the
exercise of the court’s discretion. And with regard to this,
Roberson J explained that the first respondent was indeed
entitled in the exercise of his discretion and in considering all the
relevant circumstances, not to accord the first applicant’s lack of
means significant weight (para [26]).
The second applicant in this case was convicted of having
contravened section 11(1) read with section 11(2) of the Banks
Act 94 of 1990, and, having entered into a plea and sentence
agreement with the state in terms of section 105A of the Criminal
ProcedureAct 51 of 1977, was sentenced to a fine of R100 000 or
400 days’ imprisonment and five years’ imprisonment wholly
suspended for five years on condition that he be not convicted of
a similar offence in the period under suspension and that he
repay the investors over a period of five years in monthly
instalments as set out in a schedule. The second applicant was
sentenced in April 2006 and the repayment period was set to
commence in June 2006 (paras [29]–[32]).
However, in September 2009 the second applicant was arrested
for having breached the condition of suspension relating to the
repayment of his investors (para [34]). The applicant testified that
he had sold his business in September 2007, but that the deal
struck with the purchasers was ultimately not a lucrative one, and
while he did not have the intention of prejudicing those whom he
had a priority to repay, he unfortunately found himself in a
situation where he was financially unable to do so (paras
[35]–[42]). In considering whether to activate the suspended
sentence the first respondent considered that the second appli-
cant had taken a conscious decision to sell his business despite
his obligation to the state, and despite having entered into a plea
and sentence agreement which required that he compensate the
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investors. The first respondent also found that by selling the
business the second applicant had placed himself in a position
different from the one he had presented to the court at the time
when the plea and sentence agreement was made, and that the
second applicant had for this reason been reckless towards the
state and his investors and reckless in relation to the suspended
sentence (para [45]). The first respondent did not, therefore,
accept that the failure on the part of the second applicant to
comply with the condition of suspension was through circum-
stances beyond his control, and accordingly ordered that the
suspended sentence be put into operation (para [45]).
Also here, Roberson J found no fault on the part of the first
respondent in activating the suspended sentence. He empha-
sised that the continued operation of the second applicant’s
business was indeed foundational to the plea and sentence
agreement, and that the first respondent had properly and fairly
considered all the circumstances within the framework of the
provisions of section 297(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 in coming to the conclusion that the second applicant had
acted recklessly and that the failure to meet the condition of
suspension was not through circumstances beyond his control
(para [50]).
In addition to challenging the activation of their suspended
sentences, the two applications in Stow v Regional Magistrate,
PE NO & others, Meyer v Cooney NO & others (above), also
applied for an order declaring section 297(1)(b), read with
section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977,
unconstitutional. The basis of this constitutional challenge was
threefold. First, it was argued that there is no statutory require-
ment to determine whether an accused person has the necessary
financial resources to fulfil the compensation order. According to
the applicants, therefore, this may result in a person being
discriminated against because he or she is poor (para [54]). The
second ground of the constitutional challenge was that there are
no legislative requirements for determining either when compen-
sation as a condition of suspension should be imposed, or when
an order in terms of section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977 should be made. Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 provides for an award of compensation to be
ordered upon conviction, where the offence has caused damage
or the loss of property to another (para [60]). Such a compensa-
tion award, therefore, holds no threat of imprisonment because a
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person cannot be imprisoned for a civil debt (para [61]). And
third, it was argued on behalf of the applicants that there was no
provision for recognition to be given to partial fulfilment of a
condition of compensation. For example, both applicants in this
case had partly repaid their dues, yet, the first respondents were
bound to put the whole of the suspended sentences into opera-
tion, without taking into consideration the repayments that had
been made. This, according to the applicants, resulted in unfair-
ness (para [68]).
As with the two applicants’ challenges to the activation of their
suspended sentences Judge Roberson also dismissed their
challenge on the constitutionality of section 297(1)(b) read with
section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
He held that sentencing courts have a wide discretion in deciding
on a just and appropriate sentence, and this includes a wide
range of conditions that may be imposed when suspending the
whole or part of a sentence (para [55]). Specifically with regard to
compensation as a condition of a suspended sentence, it was
held that fairness and justice remain paramount and that compen-
sation as a condition would not be appropriate where the
compensation ordered is beyond the means of the accused so
that he does not get the intended benefit of a suspended
sentence (para [57]; S v Jackson 1976 (1) SA 437 (A)). The judge
explained as follows (paras [58] [59]):
It is therefore in my view not inherent in the power to impose such a
condition that a violation of any of the constitutional rights mentioned
would as a matter of course result. Considered in the light of the
discretion of a sentencing court, the guiding principles for deciding on
an appropriate condition of suspension, and the safeguard of an
appeal or a review, I do not regard this provision as unconstitutional.
Such a condition is a very valuable one, when one considers its
purpose and,. . .its compatibility with the idea of restorative justice. In
my view, if it was not available as a condition of suspension, an aspect
of sentencing which would benefit both accused, victim, and society
would be lost.
With regard to compensation as a condition of suspension and
a compensation award in terms of section 300 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, Roberson J held that the former was a
‘flexible condition which can be adapted to a person’s means
and the length of time it will take to make full restitution’, while the
latter
is a convenient means of recovering a debt without having to institute
a civil action. The order will be made for the full amount determined as
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compensation for the damage or loss and would be executable for the
full amount. Section 300 can [furthermore] only be utilised if the victim
or the State applies for such an order. The victim can renounce the
order, which impacts on the effectiveness of the order, whereas
compensation as a condition of suspension remains the prerogative of
the court and will serve a more meaningful purpose in the sentencing
process (para [64]).
It was therefore clear that the award of compensation under
section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is only
available in limited circumstances and generally lacks the flexibil-
ity of compensation as a condition of suspension (para [64]).
Finally, Roberson J emphasised that a suspended sentence is
not automatically put into operation when a breach occurs:
There must be a hearing where the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard on why the sentence should be further suspended. A breach
of a condition of compensation will be considered like any other
breach and any number of factors could be taken into account in
determining whether the breach was through circumstances beyond
the accused’s control or whether there are good and sufficient
reasons to suspend the sentence further (para [65]).
Likewise, partial fulfilment of a condition of compensation can
indeed be taken into account ‘as good and sufficient reason for
suspending the sentence further, perhaps on further conditions
or deletion of the condition, depending on all the circumstances,
including the reason for not paying the full amount of compensa-
tion’ (para [69]). Judge Roberson explained:
Failure to pay anything more may well be through circumstances
beyond the accused’s control, which will be taken into account in the
exercise of the court’s discretion. There could be a variety of circum-
stances. An accused may have paid a large portion or a small portion
of the compensation. His failure to pay the full amount could be in bad
faith or wilful so that it may be appropriate for him to serve the
sentence. The seriousness of the offence and the appropriateness of
the sentence are other factors. All the factors would have to be
considered as a whole, in the exercise of the court’s discretion (para
[69]).
In addition to all these safeguards, it must be observed that it
always remains open to an accused person to seek relief on
review where the discretion to impose compensation as a condi-
tion of a suspended sentence, or to activate such a sentence, is
unfair, unreasonable, or unjust.
Also see S v Masemola (CM433/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 259
(6 June 2017), in which De Vos J for the High Court Gauteng
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Division, Pretoria, restated the general principles regarding com-
pensation as a condition of suspension (para [3], with reference
to S v Tshondeni; S v Vilakazi 1971 (4) SA 79 (T)):
1. The first aim of a condition of suspension is to keep the convicted
person out of prison. The court must guard against a sentence
which is too light in the circumstances or which becomes too
harsh because of the condition.
2. The second aim is to have the convicted person realise more
clearly the consequences of his or her irresponsible conduct.
3. The third aim is to compensate the victim for any injury suffered
by him or her. The court must guard against the idea that the
convicted person pays a fine to the complainant.
4. The court must ensure that the criminal trial does not degenerate
into a dispute about quantum. Nevertheless the accused must be
aware that the court is busy investigating the extent of the
damage caused by his or her offence and must be given the
opportunity to attempt to influence the court’s determination
thereof by means of questions or evidence.
5. The determination of damages takes place after conviction. In
this enquiry medical costs and loss of income are in issue, as well
as an amount for pain and suffering, which lies within the court’s
discretion. Other patrimonial loss which the victim suffered can
also be taken into account.
6. The amount is not limited to the magistrate’s jurisdiction regarding
fines (R v Fourie and another 1947) (3) SA 468 (C)). There are
indeed limitations in terms of section 300, but they are not
applicable here.
7. The ability of the convicted person to pay must be kept in mind.
For that reason payment in instalments can be ordered. It is in
order to award an amount which is smaller than the true damage,
simply because the accused cannot reasonably pay a larger
amount and would consequently have to go to prison, with the
result that the complainant would get nothing.
8. Although the amount for pain and suffering is discretionary, the
record must indicate the basis on which it was calculated. If it
appears that the accused and the complainant agreed on an
amount, there is no problem, and the sentence can be sus-
pended on condition that the accused honour his or her undertak-
ing within a determined time.
9. It is in order for the court to make only an order, without imposing
a fine or other sentence, that the accused pay the victim
compensation under threat of a suspended sentence.
EVIDENCE ON SENTENCE
Section 274 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides
as follows:
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(1) A court may, before passing sentence, receive such evidence as
it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the proper sentence to be
passed.
(2) The accused may address the court on any evidence received
under subsection (1), as well as on the matter of the sentence,
and thereafter the prosecution may likewise address the court.
Of this provision, Judge Beshe J for the Eastern Cape Division,
Grahamstown, in S v Thetha 2017 (2) SACR 363 (ECG) explained
that while it may be worded in terms of the sentencing court
having a discretion to allow parties to address it on sentence, it
has in fact become
a salutary judicial practice. . .over many years, in terms thereof courts
have accepted this to be a right which an accused can insist on and
must be allowed to exercise. This is in line with the principle of a fair
trial. It is therefore irregular for a sentencing officer to continue to
sentence an accused person, without having offered the accused an
opportunity to address the court (para [6] quoting from S v Mokela
2012 (1) SACR 431 (SCA) para [14]).
With regard to the manner in which parties ought to be invited
to address the court on sentence, Beshe J explained that parties
must first lead evidence in both mitigation and aggravation of
sentence, before any party will be allowed to address the court
on the appropriate sentence to be imposed (para [5]; S v LM
2015 (1) SACR 422 (ECG) para [7]). Moreover, the invitation to
address the court on sentence must be clear and unambiguous,
especially where the accused is unrepresented (para [7]).
Also see S v Masango 2017 (1) SACR 571 (GP).
PAROLE
Parole refers to a period during which an offender serving a
term of imprisonment at a correctional centre is conditionally
released to serve the remaining part of his or her sentence in the
community, under certain conditions and under the supervision
and control of the Department of Correctional Services. The
Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Stander 2012 (1) SACR 537
(SCA) emphasised that any decision about parole remains
exclusively within the domain of the Department of Correctional
Services (para [8]).
Fixing a non-parole period in terms of section 276B of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
Section 276B(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
provides for a sentencing court, having imposed a term of
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imprisonment for a period of two years or longer, to also fix a
period as part of the sentence during which that offender shall not
be placed on parole. This period is generally referred to as a
‘non-parole period’ and may not exceed two thirds of the term of
imprisonment imposed, or twenty-five years, whichever is the
shorter. Prior to the enactment of this provision, a decision about
parole fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Correctional Services, but with the enactment of section 276B, a
sentencing court now has the power to make a ‘ ‘‘predictive
judgment’’ as to the likely behaviour of the convicted person in
the future, . . . on the basis of the facts available to the sentencing
court at the time of sentence’ (S v Ntozini & another 2017 (2)
SACR 448 (ECG) para [13]). The Supreme Court of Appeal in S v
Stander 2012 (1) SACR 537 (SCA) described section 276B as an
‘unusual provision’ and stated that (paras [12] [13])
despite the fact that s 276B grants courts the power to venture onto
the terrain traditionally reserved for the executive, it remains generally
desirable for a court not to exercise that power. . . .the Department,
and not a sentencing court, is far better suited to make decisions
about the release of a prisoner on parole and. . .it remains desirable to
respect the principle of the separation of powers in this regard.
Therefore, an order in terms of section 276B(1) should only be
made in exceptional circumstances, and only when the sentenc-
ing court is in possession of facts that would, ‘after the imposition
of sentence, continue to result in a negative outcome for any
decision to be made concerning parole’ (S v Ntozini & another
2017 (2) SACR 448 (ECG) para [15]; S v Stander 2012 (1) SACR
537 (SCA) para [16]). Moreover, before imposing a non-parole
period, the sentencing court is also obliged to give prior notice to
both the state and the accused, and to allow both the opportunity
to address the court on whether such a non-parole period ought
to be imposed (S v Ntozini & another 2017 (2) SACR 448 (ECG)
para [16]).
The two accused in S v Ntozini & another 2017 (2) SACR 448
(ECG) were convicted in terms of their pleas. The first accused
pleaded guilty to housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, and
the second accused pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property.
The first accused was thereupon sentenced to three years’
imprisonment and it was further ordered that he ‘serve his
sentence at Cradock prison and that he be assessed of the said
prison (sic) and be enrolled for the courses offered by the said
institution – eg woodwork/plumbing etc for the duration of his
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sentence’ (para [3]). The second accused, in turn, was sen-
tenced to two years’ imprisonment and it was further ordered that
he ‘serve his sentence term at Cradock prison and that he be
enrolled skills/trade courses (sic) offered by Cradock prison for
the duration of his sentence’ (para [3]). These sentences were
reconsidered by Beard AJ of the High Court Eastern Cape
Division, Grahamstown, on special review in terms of section
304(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
Beard AJ noted that while these sentences did not expressly
mention section 276B(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977, nor did they contain the term ‘non-parole period’, stating
that the accused be enrolled in various courses offered by the
prison for the duration of their sentences indeed had the effect of
a non-parole period being imposed (para [17]). This much was
also evident from the magistrate’s judgment on sentence, as she
explained to the first accused that he would not be eligible for
parole until he had completed the requisite courses: ‘. . .he is not
legible (sic) for parole, not yet because of the Court order, up until
he is done with the skills or trades that he has to be assessed for’
(para [17]). Yet the magistrate gave no indication that this was her
intention before imposing the non-parole periods, and she also
did not invite the parties to make submissions on the issue (para
[18]). The state furthermore had not requested that such a
non-parole period be fixed (para [18]). Beard AJ therefore found
that the magistrate had not only exceeded the maximum non-
parole period as set out in section 276B(1)(b) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 – namely two-thirds of the term of
imprisonment – but had also been guilty of a misdirection by
failing to provide the parties with an opportunity to make submis-
sions thereon (para [19]).
The judge also criticised the sentences imposed for directing
the executive as to where the accused ought to be serving their
sentences, and also as to the courses they had to complete
before being eligible for release. On this, Beard AJ (para [20])
referred to what Harms JA said in S v Mhlakaza & another 1997
(1) SACR 515 (SCA) 521h-i:
. . . sentencing jurisdiction is statutory and courts are bound to limit
themselves to performing their duties within the scope of that juris-
diction. Apart from the fact that courts are not entitled to prescribe to
the executive branch of government as to how. . .convicted persons
should be detained . . . courts should also refrain from attempts,
overtly or covertly, to usurp the functions of the executive by imposing
sentences that would otherwise have been inappropriate.
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Judge Beard emphasised that there is no provision in the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 or other legislation which
permits a court to direct where a convicted person should serve
out his or her sentence, and that there is also no statutory
provision permitting such a court to order that an accused person
be enrolled in skills transfer courses whilst serving the term of his
or her imprisonment. These functions, he held, ‘fall exclusively
within the purview of the executive’ (para [21]). The sentences
and the further orders to the sentences were consequently set
aside and replaced with a sentence of one year’s imprisonment,
seven months of which were suspended for a period of three
years on the usual conditions for the first accused; and for the
second accused, a term of eight months’ imprisonment, four
months and six days of which were suspended for a period of
three years on the usual conditions (para [31]).
Also see Ndlovu v S (925/2016) [2017] ZASCA 26 (27 March
2017) and Klassen v S 2017 (2) SACR 119 (SCA). In the latter
case the Supreme Court of Appeal noted that ‘the power of a trial
court to act under section 276B should be sparingly exercised,
and then only after holding an inquiry as to the desirability of such
an order and hearing argument on the issue. . . .Indeed the
necessity of adopting such a procedure is so trite that it is
surprising, to say the least, that this issue has recently had to be
dealt with by this court on several occasions. . .’ (para [11]).
The relevant legislative and policy framework for decisions regarding
placement on parole of offenders serving life imprisonment
Makgoka J for the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria, in
Qaqa v Minister of Correctional Services & another (83547/2016)
[2017] ZAGPPHC 917 (4 July 2017) gave the following exposition
of the legislative and policy framework within which decisions
regarding the placement of offenders on parole are made (para
[6]):
The Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (the 1998 Act) and the
relevant policies provide the following in respect of prisoners serving
life imprisonment:
(a) A case management committee comprising of correctional offi-
cials in each prison, assess and interview longer-term offenders
at regular intervals and submit reports to the Correctional Super-
vision and Parole Boards (Parole Boards) regarding possible
placement of offenders on parole and the conditions of such
placement;
(b) The Parole Board, established under s 74 of the 1998 Act, are
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appointed by the Minister. They consider the reports of the case
management committees and make recommendations to the
Minister on the placing on parole of offenders serving a sentence
of life imprisonment;
(c) The Minister does not act directly on the recommendation of the
Parole Boards. The Act requires that the parole board make
recommendations to the National Council, established under
s 83. The National Council comprises among others, two judges,
a regional magistrate, Director or Deputy Director of Public
Prosecutions, and persons with special knowledge of the correc-
tional system;
(d) After considering the recommendation of the Parole Board,
together with the relevant record of proceedings, the National
Council may recommend to the Minister that parole be granted to
an offender serving a sentence of life imprisonment.
(e) If the Minister does not approve the recommendation of the
National Council, and decides to refuse to place an offender on
parole, he may act in terms of s 78(2) of the 1998 Act, in terms of
which he [may] make recommendations in respect of ‘treatment,
care, development and support’ of the offender which may
contribute to improving the likelihood of future placement on
parole or day parole.
(f) Parole decisions for prisoners serving sentences of life imprison-
ment prior to the coming into effect of the 1998Act, must be made
on the basis of the policies and guidelines applicable at the time
they were sentences and in accordance with the repealed
Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 (the 1959 Act). The policy
guidelines are contained in the ‘Parole Manual’ issued by the
Commissioner of Correctional Services.
Also see Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Walus
2017 (2) SACR 473 (SCA) and Naidu v Minister of Correctional
Services 2017 (2) SACR 14 (WCC). At issue in the latter case was
a claim for damages against the Minister of Correctional Services
for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff after she was severely
assaulted by a prisoner who had been released on parole by the
Parole Board. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the
attack on her by the released prisoner was a direct result of his
negligent release on parole, and that the defendant, being
responsible for the prisoner’s release on parole, was liable for the
injuries she had suffered (paras [1] [2]). The defendant denied all
liability and further submitted that even if it were to be found that
the defendant had been negligent in releasing the prisoner on
parole, such negligence was not causally connected to the harm
that the plaintiff ultimately suffered (para [4]).
The prisoner in this case assaulted the plaintiff whilst he was on
parole from Brandvlei Prison. His criminal profile revealed a long
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list of previous convictions dating back to 1980, and the most
recent offences and sentences (2004) for which he was granted
parole in 2010, just before his attack on the plaintiff, included
convictions of theft, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm,
assault, and contravening the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of
1968 (paras [6]–[8]). For his most recent offences and sentences
the prisoner had been considered for parole during 2007 but was
not recommended for placement (para [11]). Noteworthy is that
the prisoner thereafter contravened a number of provisions of the
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 before his release on
parole in 2010. For example, in August 2008, the prisoner was
found to have contravened section 23(1)(g) of theAct – an inmate
conductiing himself indecently by word, act or gesture. In Septem-
ber 2008 he was found to have contravened section 23(1)(m) of
the Act for being in possession of an unauthorised article, and in
December 2008, he was found to have once again contravened
section 23(1)(m) of the Act in that he was in possession of dagga
(paras [11]–[13]). In December 2008 the prisoner attended a
three-day life skills programme, and in March 2009 the unit
manager of the prison indicated that the prisoner had ‘adjusted
well in the prison system but he can give better full cooperation’
(paras [13] [14]). The case management committee of the
Brandvlei Correctional Centre nonetheless recommended to the
Parole Board on 28 April 2009 that the prisoner be released on
parole after having served two thirds of his sentence (para [15]).
The Strand Magistrate’s Court was notified of the prisoner’s
Parole Board hearing and the magistrate raised no objection to it
or to the prisoner being released on parole (para [15]). The
Parole Board subsequently approved the prisoner’s placement
on parole on the recommendation of the case management
committee and after the prisoner had served nine-and-a-half-
years of his sentence (para [16]).
An expert witness testifying on behalf of the plaintiff submitted
that the Parole Board had the necessary tools to assess the
existence and extent of rehabilitation, and the chance of recidi-
vism of inmates, and that the board receives reports from
professionals and has the authority to call experts to inform board
hearings (para [22]). Yet this witness also testified that ‘the
decision to release or not to release on parole. . .had become a
logistical consideration rather than an enquiry into rehabilitation
and readiness to be released into society’ (para [22]). With
regard to the three-day life skills programme attended by the
1115SENTENCING
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 25 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/31−Sentencing
prisoner, the expert witness stated that it is impossible to rehabili-
tate a person with a background like that of the prisoner in this
case after only a few days of group sessions. The expert witness
submitted that ‘[t]he yardstick applied by the defendant . . . was
whether an inmate had attended a programme, not how much
impact the programme had on an inmate’ (para [23]).
The witnesses for the defence testified that in arriving at the
decision to release the prisoner on parole, ‘the board had
weighed up both the negatives and positives pertaining to him. It
had taken cognisance of his many previous convictions, the fact
that he had committed an offence whilst out on parole in 1997 and
that he had been charged with three disciplinary offences during
his time in prison’ (para [32]). Also taken into consideration were
positive reports on the prisoner compiled by a social worker and
the unit manager (para [32]). One of the defendant witnesses
also indicated that ‘it was possible in all cases for offenders to
commit crimes once released. A person who had committed a
crime whilst out on parole could. . .be considered again for
parole’ (para [33]). He further stated that were it not for this
prisoner’s profile and disciplinary offences, he would have been
released on parole after having served a third of his sentence
(para [38]).
Judge Meer for the Western Cape Division, Cape Town,
emphasised, with reference to Van Vuren v Minister of Correc-
tional Services 2012 (1) SACR 103 (CC), that the case manage-
ment committee of a correctional facility has a mandatory duty to
provide relevant information and reports to the Parole Board for
the purpose of parole hearings (para [46]; s 42 of the Correc-
tional Services Act 111 of 1998). Section 42 reads:
Case Management Committee
(1) At each Correctional Centre there must be one or more Case
Management Committtees composed of correctional officials as
prescribed by regulation.
(2) The Case Management Committee must –
(a) ensure that each sentenced offender has been assessed,
and that for sentenced offenders serving more than 24
months there is a plan specified in section 38(1A);
(b) interview, at regular intervals, each sentenced offender sen-
tenced to more than 24 months, review the plan for such
offenders and the progress made and, if necessary, amend
such plan;
(c) make preliminary arrangements, in consultation with the
Head of Community corrections for possible placement of a
sentenced offender under community corrections;
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(d) submit a report, together with the relevant documents, to the
Correctional Supervision and Parole Board regarding –
(i) the offence or offences for which the sentenced offender
is serving a term of incarceration together with the
judgment on the merits and any remarks made by the
court in question at the time of the imposition of sentence
if made available to the Department;
(ii) the previous criminal record of such offender;
(iii) the conduct, disciplinary record, adaptation, training,
aptitude, industry, physical and mental state of such
offender;
(iv) the likelihood of a relapse into crime, the risk posed to
the community and the manner in which this risk can be
reduced;
(v) the assessment results and the progress with regard to
the correctional sentence plan contemplated in section
38;
(vi) the possible placement of an offender under correc-
tional supervision in terms of a sentence provided for in
section 276(1)(i) or 287(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure
Act, or in terms of the conversion of such an offender’s
sentence into correctional supervision under section
276(3)(ii) or 287(4)(b) of the said Act, and the conditions
for such placement;
(vii) a certified copy of the offender’s identity document and,
in the case of a foreign national, a report from the
Department of Home Affairs on the residential status of
such offender;
(ix) the possible placement under correctional supervision
or release of an offender who has been declared a
dangerous criminal, in terms of section 286B(4)(b) of the
Criminal Procedure Act; and
(x) such other matters as the Correctional Supervision and
Parole Board may request; and
(e) submit a report as contemplated in paragraph (d) to the
National Commissioner in respect of any sentenced offender
sentenced to incarcertation of 24 months or less.
(3) A sentenced offender must be informed of the contents of the
report submitted by the Case Management Committee to the
Correctional Supervision and Parole Board or the National Com-
missioner and be afforded the opportunity to submit written
representations to the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board
or National Commissioner, as the case may be.
Moreover, in terms of section 131 of the Correctional Services
Act 111 of 1998, the state will be liable for delicts committed by
persons subject to community corrections like parole (para [47]).
It was evident in this case that the case management commit-
tee had not complied with its mandatory statutory duty in placing
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before the Parole Board crucial reports with regard to the
prisoner’s parole application: no reports were submitted in terms
of section 42(2)(d)(iii), (iv) and (v) detailing the prisoner’s mental
state, his likelihood of relapsing into crime, the risk posed to the
community, how this risk could be reduced, and the assessment
results and progress with regard to the prisoner’s correctional
sentence plan as contemplated in section 38 of the Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998. There was also no evidence as to the
existence of a sentence plan for the prisoner in this case (para
[48]).
Judge Meer consequently found that both the case manage-
ment committee and the Parole Board had failed to comply with
their obligations under the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998,
and emphasised that decisions of this kind taken by parole
boards without all the prescribed information being available, are
arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside for that reason
alone (para [48]; CV v Minister of Correctional Services 2012
ZAGPPHC 342, 30 November 2012 para [12]; Lebotsa v Minister
of Correctional Services 2010 (1) SACR 379 (GNP) para [22]).
The plaintiff’s claim was consequently upheld as it was found that
in the absence of the requisite evidence, the Parole Board ought
to have taken reasonable steps to guard against the foreseeable
harm of the prisoner’s release on parole by refusing his parole
application. Failure to do so, it was held, is an act of negligence
(para [53]).
PLEA AND SENTENCE AGREEMENTS
The primary objective of a plea and sentence agreement is to
lighten the burden of both the accused and the state – while the
state is spared the time and expense of a lengthy criminal trial,
the accused will face less serious implications with regard to the
charges brought against him or her, and/or the gravity of the
sentence imposed.
Authorisation to enter into a plea and sentence agreement on behalf of the
state
The appellant in Knight v S 2017 (2) SACR 583 (GP) was
arraigned before a regional magistrate’s court on five charges of
kidnapping, two counts of rape, sexual assault, and assault with
the intent do to grievous bodily harm. The appellant subsequently
entered into a plea and sentencing agreement with the state in
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terms of section 105Aof the Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977, in
which it was agreed that he would plead guilty to five counts
which would be taken together for the purpose of sentence, and
that he be sentenced to life imprisonment and be declared unfit
to own a firearm (paras [1]–[3]). In exercising his automatic right
of appeal in terms of section 10 of the Judicial Matters Amend-
ment Act 42 of 2013, the appellant submitted that there had been
non-compliance with the provisions of section 105A(1)(a) of the
Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977. He argued that the prosecutor
had not been not authorised to enter into the plea and sentence
agreement on behalf of the state (para [6]), and that the court had
failed to comply with section 105A(8), which makes it peremptory
for the court to convict the accused of the offence(s) charged,
and then sentence him as per the sentence agreement (para [9]).
The respondent conceded that the plea and sentence agreement
did not indicate the necessary authority of the National Director of
Public Prosecutions, and that a perusal of the transcribed record
also reflected that the trial court had not pronounced a guilty
verdict but merely proceeded with the sentencing of the appel-
lant (para [12]).
Baqwa J for the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria,
described this case as presenting ‘a worst case scenario’ and
accordingly set aside the sentence and remitted the matter back
to the trial court to start de novo (paras [18] [24]). Judge Baqwa
emphasised that the necessary authorisation by the National
Director of Public Prosecutions and/or his/her delegate(s) must
be presented at trial and in terms of the provisions of section 105
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (para [15]). And with
regard to the court a quo having failed to pronounce on the
conviction of the appellant, he stated that without a conviction
there can be no sentence and that this was a fatal irregularity
(para [18]).
Meaningful representations by a complainant or victim in terms of section
105A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
The applicant in Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch & others
2017 (1) SACR 209 (CC) appealed against a judgment of the
Western Cape Division of the High Court dismissing an appeal
from the Stellenbosch Magistrates’ Court against the conviction
and sentence of the fourth respondent on a count of culpable
homicide.
The fourth respondent was charged with two counts of cul-
pable homicide arising from a motor vehicle accident in which the
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applicant’s son had died. The fourth respondent admitted that
she had been negligent and also agreed in a plea and sentence
agreement in terms of the provisions of section 105A of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, to a sentence of eighteen
months’ correctional supervision in terms of section 276(1)(h) of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 subject to certain condi-
tions. The fourth respondent was then sentenced to a fine of
R10 000 or twelve months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for a
period of three years on condition that she not be convicted of
culpable homicide during the period of suspension. The appli-
cant voiced his objections to this plea and sentence agreement
on numerous occasions (paras [9] [10]). Unhappy with the
outcome, he applied to the Western Cape Division of the High
Court for the conviction and sentence to be set aside (para [14]).
However, the High Court dismissed the application, stating that
the applicant lacked standing to have the plea and sentence
agreement set aside, and that the magistrate had correctly
declined to exercise his discretion under section 105A(7)(b)(i)(bb)
on whether to hear the applicant’s evidence or victim-impact
statement (paras [14]–[17]). In the judgment handed down by the
Western Cape High Court it was emphasised that the applicant
had been given far more extensive opportunity than most victims
to participate in the proceedings against the fourth respondent,
and that a victim was furthermore not a party to a criminal
proceeding and had no automatic right to present evidence
(paras [16] [18]).
In the Constitutional Court, the provisions of the Victims’
Charter, adopted in terms of section 234 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996, were considered. Section 2 of the
Charter confers a general ‘right to offer information during the
criminal investigation and trial’ and it allows for victims to ‘partici-
pate (if necessary and where possible) in criminal justice proceed-
ings, by attending. . .the trial [and] sentencing proceedings’. It is
also stated that victims may ‘where appropriate, make a state-
ment to the court or give evidence during the sentencing
proceedings to bring the impact of the crime to the court’s
attention’ (para [25]). It is, therefore, clear that these victim rights
under the Victims’ Charter are not absolute, and the Charter
confers ‘neither standing, nor an unqualified right to give evi-
dence or hand up papers, nor a right to be heard on demand’
(para [26]). Moreover, a victim’s right to participate in criminal
proceedings in relation to a plea and sentence agreement must
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also be considered in terms of section 105A of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In this regard it has been held that a
prosecutor is obliged to give the victim an opportunity to make
representations, but the prosecutor is not obliged to agree with
the victim (para [28]).
The application for leave to appeal by the applicant was
consequently dismissed as the Constitutional Court agreed with
the trial court and the Western Cape Division of the High Court
that the applicant’s rights as a victim had been duly addressed
through the extensive participation he had been afforded by the
prosecutor throughout the duration of the prosecution (para [29]).
PROVOCATION AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN SENTENCING
The appellant in Ramolefi v S (A330/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC
340 (10 November 2017) was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment in terms of section 51 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. On appeal against his
sentence, it was argued on the appellant’s behalf that the trial
court should have found the presence of substantial and compel-
ling circumstances justifying a deviation from the prescribed
sentence (para [4]). This submission was based on the fact that
the deceased had severely provoked the appellant on the day of
his death by assaulting him for no reason. The appellant immedi-
ately reacted to this provocation by stabbing the deceased, and
when the deceased ran away, the appellant followed and stabbed
him again (paras [9]–[11]). There was also some history to this
surprise attack by the deceased; the deceased and the appellant
knew one another as the deceased was a co-worker of, and had
been in an adulterous relationship with, the appellant’s wife (para
[15]).
With regard to whether provocation can be considered as
mitigating factor Molahlehi J, writing for the majority of the High
Court Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, referred to what
Judge Plasket said in S v Ndzima 2010 (2) SACR 501 (ECG):
While it is a feature of provocation as a mitigatory factor that the
criminal act that resulted from it is usually committed immediately after
the provocative act, the extent to which it is mitigatory depends,
essentially, on whether the accused’s loss of control as a result of his
or her anger would be regarded by an ordinary reasonable person –
‘ ’n gewone redelike mens’ – as an excusable human reaction in the
circumstances. In this matter, a reasonable person would baulk at the
suggestion that the appellant’s acts of executing his incapacitated
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victims were understandable in the circumstances, even though he
was justifiably and understandably angry at having been assaulted
and, no doubt, fearful when he fired the first shots. That he was
provoked, and that the provocation was severe, is not in dispute. That
the anger evoked by the provocation led him to shoot the deceased
who was running away is also understandable. But then to execute
both of the deceased, when he ought to have been able to reflect on
what he had done and to realise that he was no longer in any danger,
cannot be regarded as an excusable human reaction to the provoca-
tion.
Regard was also had to the dicta in S v Mnisi 2009 (2) SACR
227 (SCA), where it was held that ‘[w]hether an accused acted
with diminished responsibility must be determined in the light of
all the evidence, expert or otherwise. There is no obligation upon
an accused to adduce expert evidence. His ipse dixit may suffice
provided that a proper factual foundation is laid which gives rise
to the reasonable possibility that he so acted’ (para [26], quoting
from S v Mnisi 2009 (2) SACR 227 (SCA) para [5]):
The fact that an accused acted in a fit of rage or temper is in itself not
mitigatory. Loss of temper is a common occurrence and society
expects its members to keep their emotions sufficiently in check to
avoid harming others. What matters for the purposes of sentence are
the circumstances that give rise to the lack of restraint and self-
control.
With regard to the instant case of the appellant, Judge Molahl-
ehi, writing for the majority of the High Court Gauteng Local
Division, Johannesburg, found that the trial court had indeed not
afforded weight to the issue of provocation as a mitigating factor
in sentencing the appellant to the prescribed minimum term of
fifteen years’ imprisonment (para [27]). Judge Molahlehi explained:
Here the appellant was acting in circumstances of extreme provoca-
tion. The deceased was his assailant, and his wife’s former lover. He
had at one instance found the two in a compromising situation. This
was two years before the fatal incident. Then, the appellant acted with
remarkable restraint. It is not difficult to understand then that now,
despite the past, when the deceased attacked him, the appellant
should have lost his control over his emotions, and acted completely
irrationally.
These circumstances should not have been ignored when assess-
ing the degree and the extent of the provocation by the deceased
when he attacked the appellant for no apparent reason on that fatal
day (paras [28] [29]).
Therefore, while the appeal court agreed that the first stabbing
of the deceased by the appellant was in self-defence and in
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reaction to the unsolicited attack by the deceased, the second
stabbing which occurred after the deceased had run away and
the appellant hsd pursued him, was found to have taken place ‘in
the context of utmost and severest provocation by the deceased.
It is not surprising and cannot be said to be unreasonable for the
appellant to have acted in the manner he did’ (para [30]). The
appeal against the sentence was consequently upheld and the
sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment was set aside and
substituted with a term of five years’ imprisonment wholly sus-
pended for a period of five years on the usual conditions (para
[36]).
INCREASING SENTENCE ON APPEAL
The appellant in Joubert v S [2017] ZASCA 3, 2017 (1) SACR
497, was convicted on twenty counts of fraud and sentenced to
seven years’ imprisonment wholly suspended on certain condi-
tions for a period of five years. In appealing against his convic-
tion, leave was erroneously granted for the appellant to appeal
against both his conviction and sentence. The appeal court
subsequently dismissed the appeal against conviction, and
increased the appellant’s sentence to seven years’ imprisonment
of which four years were conditionally suspended for a period of
five years (para [1]). At issue before the Supreme Court of Appeal
was whether the appellant’s right to a fair trial had been infringed
due to the failure of the appeal court to give the appellant prior
notice of the court’s intention to consider increasing the sentence
(para [1]; S v Bogaards 2013 (1) SACR 1 (CC)).
Counsel for the respondent sought to cure the appeal court’s
failure to furnish prior notice to the appellant of its intention to
increase the sentence by arguing that the state had given notice
to the appellant and his attorneys, when his initial appeal was
granted, that the state would seek an increase in the sentence on
appeal (paras [2] [7]). This argument, according to Majiedt JA
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, was not
tenable as the procedure adopted by the state was itself fatally
irregular. Where the state seeks to appeal against a sentence
imposed by a lower court when an accused person lodges an
appeal against conviction and/or sentence, the state must first
obtain leave to cross-appeal (para [7]; S v Nabolisa 2013 (2)
SACR 221 (CC)). Judge Majiedt held that ‘it is inconceivable that
one fatal irregularity can be called into aid to cure another
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irregularity’ (para [7]). And, while not every irregularity necessarily
infringes the right of an appellant to a fair trial, the appellant in this
case was found to have indeed suffered material prejudice
(paras [8] [9]). Majiedt JA explained (para [10]):
An accused person who has been given notice by an appellate court
that it intends to increase the sentence imposed by the trial court has
the option of withdrawing the appeal, with the leave of the appellate
court. This practice, together with the requirement of prior notice to an
accused person by the appellate court balances the appellant’s right
to a fair trial and the court’s duty to ensure that the sentence is
appropriate and, where necessary, to increase an inappropriate
sentence. In the present instance, the appellant had not been
afforded the opportunity to consider such a course of action.
The sentence was consequently set aside and the matter
remitted to the Regional Court on the basis that the trial court was
best placed to determine an appropriate sentence (para [12]).
Also see DPP v Plekenpol (333/17) [2017] ZASCA 151
(21 November 2017).
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SENTENCE WARRANTING INTERFERENCE
In Zimila v S (1179/16) [2017] ZASCA 55 (18 May 2017), the
Supreme Court of Appeal considered the cumulative effect of the
sentences imposed on the appellant. The appellant was con-
victed on 21 counts relating to multiple robberies with aggravat-
ing circumstances, including attempted murder, and the unlawful
possession of a firearm in contravention of the provisions of the
Arms and Ammunitions Act 75 of 1969 (para [1]). These offences
were committed on various occasions with the appellant acting
as part of a group and using the same modus operandi, and a
term of 77 years’ imprisonment was ultimately imposed by the trial
court. An appeal against sentence to the Gauteng Division of the
High Court, Pretoria, was partly successful in that it was upheld in
respect of certain charges and the effective sentence was
reduced to 53 years’ imprisonment (para [1]). However, the
Supreme Court of Appeal found that none of the charges against
the appellant individually warranted a sentence of life imprison-
ment, but that the effective sentence imposed was tantamount to
removing the appellant permanently from society (para [7]). The
Supreme Court of Appeal also noted that a term of 53 years’
imprisonment has the potential of being more onerous than life
imprisonment, as section 73(6) of the Correctional Services Act
111 of 1998 provides for a person sentenced to life imprisonment
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to be eligible for consideration for release on parole after having
served 25 years in prison (para [7]). Taking into account the
cumulative effect of the sentences imposed, the Supreme Court
of Appeal upheld the appeal against sentence and replaced the
sentence with an effective term of 35 years’ imprisonment (para
[12]). This effective term was reached by ordering that certain of
the sentences imposed run concurrently.
NOTEWORTHY SPECIFIC SENTENCES
Determining a suitable sentence has been described as the
most difficult part of a criminal proceeding. Not only does the
sentencing stage of the criminal proceeding involve the interpre-
tation and application of general principles of sentencing and
specific statutory prescriptions, but the judicial officer is also
required to undertake a value judgment; weighing contradictory
factors and opposing interests. The punishment must further be
particularised and tailor-made so as to ensure that justice is
served for the accused and the complainant(s) in that particular
case, and that it also serves the interests of the public generally. A
number of interesting judgments during the period under review
relating to specific sentencing options and related considerations
are discussed below.
An appropriate sentence for environmental offences
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Els v S 2017 (2) SACR 622
(SCA) considered an appeal with regard to what would constitute
an appropriate sentence for contraventions of the Limpopo
Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003.
The appellant in this case was a game consultant manager and
was charged with seven counts of having contravened provisions
of the Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003.
Counts 1 to 4 related to the unlawful, wrongful, and intentional
hunting of a specially protected wild animal by darting or
immobilising the animals by any means or method and for trophy
purposes, without a valid permit. And counts 5 to 7 related to the
unlawful purchase, possession, and conveyance of the horns of
specially protected wild animals without a valid permit (para [1]).
The state withdrew counts 1 to 4, and the appellant pleaded
guilty to counts 5 to 7 and was sentenced to an effective term of
eight years’ imprisonment and a compensatory fine of R100 000
per month payable to the National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit
over a period of ten months for purposes of investigating rhino-
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related matters (para [3]). On appeal, the Gauteng Division of the
High Court, Pretoria, set aside the compensatory fine of R100 000
per month for a period of ten months but confirmed the effective
term of eight years’ imprisonment (para [4]).
Saldulker JA, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, considered the statement made by the appellant in terms
of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and
specifically the circumstances relating to the illegal purchase,
possession, and conveying of the rhino horns, to which his
convictions on counts 5 to 7 related (paras [5] [6]). In mitigation of
sentence the appellant submitted that he was 39 years old and
that his career as a game catcher and game management
consultant had come to an end due to his convictions. He had no
intention of selling the rhino horns illegally and stated that his
intention was to collect the rhino horns hoping that when the trade
in rhino horns was legalised, he would be able to sell the horns at
a profit (para [8]). He further submitted that the dehorning of the
rhinos was done with the necessary care provided by the
manager of the Maremani Nature Reserve, and that none of the
rhinos dehorned were injured or killed during the dehorning
process. It was, therefore, the appellant’s submission that his
conduct was to be distinguished from that of the illegal hunting of
rhinos (para [8]). The appellant further submitted that he had not
derived any benefit from the horns found in his possession and
that he was remorseful and had cooperated with the police
investigation (para [8]).
In sentencing the appellant, the trial court took into account
wide-ranging aspects linked to the current rhino-poaching crises.
The trial judge also made mention of many offences related to the
killing of rhinos and the unlawful smuggling of their horns for
which the appellant was not indicted. Mention was also made of
unknown and unconfirmed media reports and a television pro-
gramme dealing with poaching and illegal hunting. The trial judge
tended to rely on his ‘general knowledge’ of the illegal hunting of
rhinos in the Kruger National Park where prostitutes were being
‘rented’ to shoot rhinos without any evidence being tendered to
prove this ‘general knowledge’ (para [10]). Judge Saldulker
described these observations on the part of the trial judge in
sentencing the appellant as ‘improper and untenable’ (para [10]).
Moreover, the trial judge also misdirected himself by finding that
the appellant had been a participant in relation to the charges on
counts 1 to 4, which had been withdrawn against the appellant
and could, therefore, not be considered in sentencing (para [11]).
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Given that the appellant in this matter was not part of a
smuggling network and the offences to which he had pleaded
guilty were distinguishable from those related to poaching, an
effective term of four years’ imprisonment was ultimately imposed
(paras [16] [21]).
An appropriate sentence for convictions relating to child pornography and
the sexual exploitation of children
The respondent in S v AR 2017 (2) SACR 402 (WCC) pleaded
guilty and was convicted of 2 130 counts relating to child
pornography and the sexual exploitation of children in contraven-
tion of provisions of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 and the Films and
Publications Act 65 of 1996.
The magistrate, in imposing an effective term of eight years’
imprisonment wholly suspended for five years on the usual
conditions, took all 2 130 counts together for the purpose of
sentence, and found that there were substantial and compelling
circumstances to justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than
the prescribed minimum (para [2]). In coming to this conclusion
the magistrate emphasised the personal circumstances of the
respondent, in that he was married with two minor children and
held a senior position at his work (para [19]). The respondent,
furthermore, produced and used the child pornographic material
for his own sexual gratification, did not have sexual intercourse
with the children, and also did not reproduce the material for
financial gain (paras [20]–[26]). It also transpired from the victim
assessment reports compiled by probation officers that the
complainants in this matter were generally unaware of what had
happened and had apparently not suffered serious physical or
psychological harm (para [33]).
The expert witness testifying for the respondent was of the view
that he was not a paedophile as there was no evidence of
grooming or any sexual encounters with his victims, which was
apparently a precondition for a diagnosis of paedophilia (para
[33]). The expert witness also indicated that ‘the respondent was
a low risk for violent sexual offences due to the following factors:
his intellect, intimacy with his wife, fixed employment, middle
class lifestyle, no substance dependencies or personality disor-
ders, his insight of the offences committed and the remorse
shown. . .’ (para [27]). And she was of the view that the respon-
dent’s particular child pornographic addiction coupled with his
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stress-induced environment could be successfully managed on a
permanent basis with an appropriate community-based sentence
subject to certain suspensive conditions (para [29]).
The expert witness testifying for the state, however, disagreed
completely with the opinion expressed by the respondent’s
expert witness. According to the state’s witness, the extensive
use of pornography depicting prepubescent children was a
useful diagnostic indicator of paedophilic disorder (para [31]).
With reference to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-5) released in 2013, she also explained that the
contention that a person be classified as a paedophile only if
there was physical sexual contact with a child was incorrect and
inconsistent with the diagnostic criteria set out in the DSM-5 (para
[32]).
In considering whether the sentence imposed was too lenient,
inappropriate, and disproportionate to the crimes committed, the
interests of society, and the personal circumstances of the
respondent (para [3]), Judges Le Grange and Weinkove for the
High Court Western Cape Division, Cape Town, agreed with the
submission made by the state. The judges explained that the fact
that the complainants were unaware of the nature of the sexual
assault that took place upon their person purely because they
were asleep can hardly be regarded as a factor that diminishes
the seriousness of the offence (para [37]. They also criticised the
magistrate for intimating that one of the victims seemed ‘a willing
participant sometimes edging the accused on to take these
pictures of herself’ (para [38]). This they described as incongru-
ous of the magistrate to suggest, given that the complainant was
a minor at that time (para [38]):
She was prepubescent, fully trusted the respondent and could have
hardly appreciated the full psychological impact of her actions at the
time. Common sense dictates that the respondent must have over a
period of time created a false sense of security and trust with [the
complainant]. The respondent’s behaviour in this regard can hardly
be described as less serious. In fact the opposite of this is more
accurate. It was this false sense of trust, if not grooming, which
allowed [the complainant] to participate and not speak out.
With regard to the interests of society, Judges Le Grange and
Weinkove also found that the magistrate had understated the
seriousness of the offences and the interests of society by not
attaching sufficient weight to the bulk of child pornographic
material that the respondent had produced and accumulated
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over a number of years (para [39]). Of this the judges said the
following (para [39]):
Each image of child pornography in whatever form is and remains a
crime scene. In the present instance the respondent also physically
abused some of his victims whilst asleep. He was calculating and
manipulative. He exploited his victims when they were at their most
vulnerable. To suggest that he is not a danger to society is, simply,
misguided. Moreover, the grouping together of all the counts for the
purpose of sentence in this instance was also undesirable. Here a
number of offences were committed where the elements of the crime
to be proven cannot be regarded as closely connected. Our higher
courts have repeatedly warned of the undesirability to take convic-
tions in respect of divergent counts together for the purpose of
sentence.
It is also noteworthy that the judges remarked that the expert
witness testifying on behalf of the respondent focused primarily
on the respondent’s personal circumstances and admitted that
she did not view the pornographic material prior to compiling her
report (para [47]).
The sentence imposed was consequently set aside and
replaced with a term of ten years’ imprisonment, of which two
years were conditionally suspended under the usual conditions
(para [52]; S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP); S v Kleinhans
2014 (2) SACR 575 (WCC); S v Stevens 2007 JDR 0637 (E)).
Judges Le Grange and Weinkove explained that the sentencing
process of an offender convicted of sexual offences like those in
this matter cannot only be directed at establishing whether the
offender can be rehabilitated through a non-custodial sentence.
That is merely one of the purposes of sentencing. The serious-
ness of the offences committed and the interests of the commu-
nity cannot be understated (para [48]; S v Stevens 2007 JDR
0637 (E)). They held that ‘[a] non-custodial sentence [in this
instance], would. . . unduly focus on the rehabilitation of the
respondent and would lessen the retribution and prevention
elements of sentence, to the extent that it would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute’ (para [50]).
Long-term imprisonment for young offenders
The appellant in S v Bruintjies 2017 (1) SACR 553 (WCC) was
sixteen years old when he embarked on a shooting spree in a
tavern which had refused him entry. He was subsequently
charged and convicted of murder, two counts of attempted
murder, one count of possession of an unlicensed firearm, and
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one count of possession of ammunition (para [1]). In reviewing
the effective term of nineteen years’ imprisonment imposed by
the trial court, Judge Savage, writing for the majority of the High
Court Western Cape, Cape Town, emphasised that imprisonment
of young offenders is, in terms of section 69(1)(e) of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008, ‘a measure of last resort’ and must be for
the shortest possible time necessary (para [13]; S v N 2008 (2)
SACR 135 (SCA)). Thus, while the appellant’s crimes were indeed
serious and brazen, and his uncooperative stance during the trial
left his motive for the shooting unexplained, and also whether he
had accomplices and who they were, the court nonetheless
needed to consider the sentencing options as set out in sections
72 to 76 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, and comply with the
provisions of section 77(5) of the Act, which requires that the
number of days that the child offender has spent in prison or at a
child and youth care centre prior to sentence, also be taken into
consideration when a term of imprisonment is imposed (para
[15]).
Savage J held that ‘an effective sentence of nineteen years’
imprisonment for a first offender who was sixteen years old at the
date of the commission of the offences’ was ‘startlingly inappro-
priate’ (para [27]). Even for adult offenders, the judge noted,
inordinately long periods of imprisonment have not been
embraced by South African courts (para [28]; S v Skenjana 1985
(3) SA 51 (A) 55C–D). The sentence was consequently set aside
and replaced with an effective term of thirteen years’ imprison-
ment (para [34]).
Also see S v Mabitle 2017 (1) SACR 325 (NWM).
Compensation and an appropriate sentence on a conviction of rape
The appellant in S v Seedat 2017 (1) SACR 141 (SCA) was
convicted of rape and first sentenced to seven years’ imprison-
ment. This sentence was set aside by the High Court Gauteng
Division, Pretoria, and replaced with an order that the appellant
pay the complainant a sum of R100 000. This was in answer to the
complainant having indicated that she would rather the appellant
compensate her than just go to prison (S v Seedat 2015 (2) SACR
612 (GP)). The Direction of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng, then
sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal
against the sentence imposed on the basis that the sentence was
incompetent and invalid.
The Supreme Court of Appeal again considered the request by
the complainant for the appellant to compensate her by way of a
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cash amount and also a Toyota vehicle (paras [12]–[16]). It was
noted that it was indeed ‘very rare’ for a complainant in a rape
case to request that a lenient sentence be imposed on an
accused in exchange for financial compensation (para [26]). This
request could also not be construed so as to raise doubt about
the appellant’s guilt, as it had been found that the evidence
clearly showed that the complainant had not sought to blackmail
the appellant, nor was there any indication that she had fabri-
cated the rape allegation (paras [26] [27]).
The state, in its appeal against the sentence imposed, argued
that, in justifying its decision to replace the sentence imposed by
the trial court with the compensation order, the High Court had
placed reliance on and then conflated the provisions of section
297(1) and(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Section
297(1) applies to persons convicted of an offence other than an
offence in respect of which any law prescribes a minimum
punishment; while section 297(4) applies to persons convicted of
an offence in respect of which the law prescribes a minimum
punishment. Section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) furthermore permits a court
that convicts a person for an offence other than an offence in
respect of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment, to
postpone the passing of the sentence for a period not exceeding
five years, and to release the person concerned on one or more
conditions, including compensation. Section 297(4), on the other
hand, permits a court that convicts a person of an offence for
which any law prescribes a minimum sentence to impose that
sentence in its discretion, but to order that the operation of a part
of the sentence be suspended for a period not exceeding five
years on any condition referred to in paragraph (a) of section
297(1) (para [33]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the state’s submis-
sion. Section 297(1) was not available as a sentencing option in
this matter, as it ‘specifically prohibits postponement of a sen-
tence where a person has been convicted of an offence in
respect of which the law prescribes a minimum sentence. In any
event, section 297(1) does not provide for suspension but for
postponement of sentence’ (para [35]). Section 297(4) was,
however, available to the High Court as it had already accepted
that there were substantial and compelling circumstances that
justified a deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence.
‘However, in order for that sentence to be competent, the court
would have to impose a sentence for a specific term of imprison-
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ment’ (para [36]). Part of the specific term of imprisonment can
then be suspended for a period not exceeding five years on any
condition, including compensation (para [36]). What the High
Court did in this case was to state that the sentencing of the
appellant was suspended for a period of five years, and in doing
so, the court failed to impose a specific sentence or a specific
term of imprisonment (para [36]). The sentence imposed by the
High Court was, therefore, not competent in terms of section 297
of the Act as ‘there is no provision in law permitting a court to so
suspend the sentencing of an accused’ (para [36]). The sentence
was also not competent as section 297(4) requires that part of the
sentence may be suspended and not the whole sentence, ‘[s]o
even if the court sought to impose a suspended sentence, it
could not suspend the whole sentence’ (para [37]).
In reconsidering the sentence afresh, the Supreme Court of
Appeal referenced Director of Public Prosecutions, North Gauteng
v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA), where it was held that
restorative justice principles can be appropriate to consider in
specific cases, but not for ‘serious offences which evoke pro-
found feelings of outrage and revulsion amongst law-abiding and
right-thinking members of society’ (para [38], quoting from Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2)
SACR 567 (SCA) para [20]). Thus, while the complainant in this
matter may have though it would be appropriate rather to make
the appellant pay monetary compensation, the views of the
complainant were not the only factor to be taken into account
(para [39]). A further matter that had to be taken into consider-
ation was that the appellant had already paid an amount of
R15 000 to the complainant, and that the complainant would
probably not be able to return this amount if it were reclaimed
from her as a result of the sentence being set aside (para [42]).
‘The state urged the court to take this into account when
considering sentence as a factor that indicates the willingness on
the part of the appellant to comply with what he thought was a
competent court order and, if possible, to reduce sentence
accordingly’ (para [42]). In this regard, Tshiqi JA, writing for the
majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, held that ‘[w]hilst I am in
no way endorsing the award of compensation for such a serious
offence, I agree with the state that his willingness to comply with
what he thought to be a competent court order is to be taken into
account in his favour’ (para [43]). The accused was subsequently
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment (para [43]).
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INORDINATE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING A SENTENCE
The applicant in Arendse v Magistrate, Wynberg & others 2017
(1) SACR 403 (WCC) was convicted in the district magistrate’s
court at Wynberg on 18April 2000, of having contravened section
5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. On
11 March 2003 the applicant was sentenced to an effective three
years’ imprisonment, and this sentence was later confirmed by
the Supreme Court of Appeal on 11 September 2006 (paras [3]
[7]). From the date of his conviction to the date of his sentence in
2003, the applicant spent a total of fourteen months in custody
pending the outcome of a review to determine whether he was to
be sentenced by the district magistrate or in the regional court
(para [8]). This was the only period the applicant ever spent in
custody in relation to his conviction (para [8]).
A Notice to Surrender was only issued by the appeals clerk at
the Wynberg Magistrate’s Court and served on the applicant on
21 January 2015, in terms of which the applicant was instructed
to surrender himself on 12 February 2015 to commence serving
his sentence (para [12]). The applicant failed to surrender himself
and his legal representative informed the first respondent that the
applicant was suffering ill-health and requested a stay of any
warrant sought (para [12]). The applicant later abandoned his
medical ground for opposing the issuing of a warrant, and then
sought an order that he was deemed to have served a sentence
of imprisonment imposed upon him by the Wynberg magistrate,
or alternatively, any other order that the High Court Western Cape
Division, Cape Town, considered just and equitable (para [1]).
The applicant based his application for relief on ‘the delay in
putting the sentence into operation and on the basis that his
constitutional rights to a fair trial, to dignity, freedom and the
security of his person and not to be punished or treated in a cruel
and inhuman or degrading way would be infringed should the
relief not be granted’ (para [3]).
The applicant further submitted that the delay was not due to
any inertia on his part, but was rather caused ‘by the ‘‘organs of
state’’ responsible for the proper administration of justice’ (para
[17]). It was specifically stated, for example, that the applicant’s
attorney, William Booth, received a deposit from the applicant
after the outcome of his appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
to take the matter to the Constitutional Court. Yet, when the
applicant was served with the Notice to Surrender, it transpired
that the matter had never been ‘listed’ with the Constitutional
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Court (para [16]). It is also noteworthy that the applicant contin-
ued to abide by his bail conditions throughout this time, and
continued to, for example, report twice weekly to the South
African Police in Worcester (para [16]).
The Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, on the other hand,
opposed the relief sought, arguing that the court had no juris-
diction to hear the application and that the application was ‘in
effect a belated appeal by the applicant to the incorrect court’
(para [19]). This is because the relief sought would necessarily
imply an interference with the sentence already confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, and the application therefore would
have the same effect as an appeal against the sentence imposed
(para [24]). Moreover, no affidavit from the applicant’s former
attorney, William Booth, was forthcoming regarding ‘what was
done to pursue any appeal to the Constitutional Court nor was
there any proof that the said attorney had been given the required
financial instructions to pursue the appeal’ (para [19]). It was also
submitted that the applicant had not followed up on the matter
with any state office (para [20]).
Judge Bozalek of the High Court Western Cape Division, Cape
Town, held that the court indeed had jurisdiction to consider the
application as section 169(1) read with section 172(1)(b) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, ‘bestows wide powers on the
High Court to determine constitutional matters which are not in
the sole province of the Constitutional Court’ and this present
application was found to fall within these parameters (para [26]).
It was also held that the applicant expressly disavowed any direct
challenge to his conviction and sentence, nor did he seek to have
his sentence declared null and void; rather the applicant brought
a challenge based on constitutional grounds external to the
merits of the conviction and sentence (paras [26] [27]).
As to whether any delay between the dismissal of the appli-
cant’s appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal and his being
called upon to surrender himself, involved an infringement of his
constitutional rights, Judge Bozalek considered the nature of the
prejudice suffered by the applicant, the nature of the case, and
finally, the systemic delay (paras [28]–[32]; Sanderson v Attorney-
General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC)). First, it was held
that the period from the applicant’s arrest to the date on which his
appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, could not
be taken into account as this delay would already have been
considered by the Supreme Court of Appeal when it confirmed
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the applicant’s sentence in September 2006, and the delay could
in any event be attributed to the applicant himself for pursuing the
appeals (para [33]). With regard to the period of eight years and
three months that had passed since the applicant’s sentence was
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Notice to
Surrender having been issued, the applicant’s argument sug-
gested that the blame rested solely on his attorney who had failed
to take the necessary steps, as well as the organs of state who
had failed to notify him at a much earlier stage that he was
required to surrender himself and serve his sentence (para [34]).
With regard to the attorney’s role in this delay, an assistant to
William Booth testified that the applicant had been informed of
the dismissal of his appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and
that he would have to surrender himself to serve his sentence.
The assistant also testified that the instruction and payment by
the applicant to take the matter further to the Constitutional Court
had been accepted (para [36]). However, the assistant indicated
that despite numerous attempts made between 2006 and Novem-
ber 2008 to contact the applicant with a view of having him pay
the further outstanding deposit required, the applicant either did
not respond to the requests, or made promises which he then
failed to honour (paras [36] [37]). The applicant’s wife and sister,
who testified on his behalf, denied most of these submissions
(para [38]). The assistant to William Booth added further that
‘even if his firm had failed in its duty. . .which he did not concede,
the applicant was an officer in the Department of Correctional
Services [prior to his arrest and conviction] and was [therefore]
familiar with the procedures which apply when appeals against
conviction or sentence had been exhausted’ (para [37]). Ulti-
mately, therefore, with regard to the role of the applicant’s
attorney in this delay, no proof of payment addressing the
contradictions and disputes in the versions submitted by the
applicant and his previous attorney, had been furnished, and no
affidavit from his former attorney dealing with the question of
financial instructions and the initiation of the appeal to the
Constitutional Court, had been received (para [39]). Likewise, no
explanation had been given by the relevant officials as to the
delay in issuing the Notice of Surrender on the application (para
[40]).
Judge Bozalek nonetheless held that
. . . a person in the position of the applicant who for some reason does
not receive a notice calling upon him to serve his sentence cannot
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simply close his or her eyes to this omission and proceed to blithely
ignore the sentence hanging over his or her head as if it did not exist.
At some point, depending upon the circumstances, such a person is
under an obligation to make reasonable inquiries as to what has
transpired in his or her appeal. At the very least, in the absence of
making such an inquiry/ies such a person cannot lay claim to some
advantage or some relief at a later stage and thereby seek to benefit
from his or her own wilful neglect or passivity (paras [44]–[48]; S v
Mthembu 2010 (1) SACR 619 (CC); S v Malgas 2013 (2) SACR 343
(SCA)).
With regard to the applicant’s personal circumstances and the
particularities of this case, Judge Bozalek also held that ‘. . .some-
one in the position of the applicant can hardly delay serving his
sentence for an extended period and then, without more, seek to
rely on his changed personal circumstances to avoid serving his
sentence’ (para [53]). These personal factors, it was held, can
rather be raised in an application for parole once the applicant
has started serving his sentence (para [53]). Thus, having found
that the applicant had failed to establish any actionable infringe-
ment of his constitutional rights, the application was dismissed
(para [64]).
However, Judge Bozalek also highlighted two areas of concern
that ‘should enjoy the attention of certain authorities’ (para [67]).
First, the failure of administrative officials to monitor appeals
initiated and the issuing of notices to surrender must be more
carefully administered, and protocols and procedures must be
put in place to ensure that such extraordinary delays as in the
present case are avoided (para [67]). Secondly, he requested
that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Cape Law Society for
its consideration and appropriate action regarding the role that
the applicant’s former attorney played in this delay (para [68]). In
both instances the facts had not yet been established but the
circumstances were found to deserve further action by the
relevant authorities (para [68]).
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SUCCESSION (INCLUDING ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATES)
M J DE WAAL*
LEGISLATION
LAW OF SUCCESSION
There was no legislation during the review period directly
affecting the law of succession.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
Section 6 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017
amended section 103(1) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of
1965 by inserting paragraphs (eA) and (eB). Paragraph (eA)
empowers the relevant Minister to make regulations prescribing
which persons, including juristic persons, are prohibited from
liquidating or distributing a deceased estate. For its part, para-
graph (eB) empowers the Minister to prescribe any exemptions,
which may be permanent, or to the extent specified in each case,
from the prohibition contemplated in paragraph (eA). The Judicial
Matters Amendment Act commenced on 2 August 2017.
In addition, Government Notice 1161 of 3 November 2017
amended certain provisions in Schedule 2 (tariff of Master’s fees)
in the regulations made under section 103(1) of the Administra-
tion of Estates Act. These amendments took effect on 1 January
2018.
CASE LAW
LAW OF SUCCESSION
The applicability of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 to parties
living under African customary law
The judgment in Cele & others v Cele & others (8488/2015)
[2017] ZAKZDHC 2 (9 January 2017) is, in my opinion, worth
* BCom LLB LLM LLD (Stellenbosch). Professor in the Department of Private
Law, Faculty of Law, Stellenbosch University. This chapter is based on research
supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa (Grant
Number 90788). Any opinion, finding, and conclusion or recommendation expressed
in this chapter is that of the author and the NRF accepts no liability in this regard.
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mentioning only for one issue. Cele concerned the division of two
deceased estates in terms of what was assumed by the court to
be the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (the
Intestate SuccessionAct), which came into operation on 18 March
1988. In my view, the court was correct in deciding that under the
facts of both estates, the application of the Intestate Succession
Act would have resulted in the surviving spouse in each instance
inheriting the entire estate of the first-dying spouse. Nor is it
controversial, in my view and as the court decided, that the
Intestate Succession Act was indeed applicable to the distribu-
tion of the estate of the second party, who died in March 2001.
What I do regard as controversial, however, is the court’s
assumption that the Act was also applicable to the distribution of
the estate of the first party, who died in April 1991.
In order to explain this view, it is necessary to give a brief
background. The parties to the first marriage (of which the
first-dying spouse died in April 1991) were married in community
of property in terms of section 22(6) of the then applicable Black
Administration Act 38 of 1927 (the Black Administration Act). It
can, therefore, safely be assumed that they lived under custom-
ary law, and that their intestate succession position was also
regulated by the Black Administration Act, as determined by the
then applicable section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act.
However, as is by now common knowledge, parts of the custom-
ary law of intestate succession, as well as section 1(4)(b) of the
Intestate Succession Act, were declared unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court in Bhe & others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha &
others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (see also ‘Freedom of testation and
its possible limitations’ below). The Constitutional Court filled the
lacuna by declaring that the Intestate Succession Act would
apply to the distribution of all intestate estates in South Africa
(which Act must now be read with the Reform of the Customary
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of
2009). However, regarding the retrospectivity of the court’s order,
Langa DCJ declared in Bhe:
To sum up, the declaration of invalidity must be made retrospective to
27 April 1994. It must however not apply to any completed transfer of
ownership to an heir who had no notice of a challenge to the legal
validity of the statutory provisions and the customary-law rule in
question. Furthermore, anything done pursuant to the winding-up of
an estate in terms of the Act, other than the identification of heirs in a
manner inconsistent with this judgment, shall not be invalidated by the
order of invalidity in respect of s 23 of the Act and its regulations (para
[129]).
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It will be recalled that the court in Cele decided that the
Intestate Succession Act also applied to the distribution of the
estate of the first party, who died in April 1991. That death, of
course, predated the applicable order by exactly three years. It
is, therefore, not clear on what ground the court based its
decision regarding the application of the Intestate Succession
Act to those facts. In my view, the law under the BlackAdministra-
tion Act and the customary law of succession were then still
applicable, and the distribution of the deceased estate should
have taken place in terms of that law. Whether such distribution
would have differed from that under the Intestate Succession Act
is difficult to determine and not really the point for present
purposes. Nevertheless, that does not detract from the general
importance of the correct determination of the applicable law in
cases such as this (see also 2014 Annual Survey 954–6).
Freedom of testation and its possible limitations
The principle of freedom of testation lies at the heart of the law
of testate succession. It is also clear that, important as the
principle is, it is not an unlimited freedom. However, it is some-
times difficult to establish exactly where the limit lies. This is even
more so in the constitutional era, where the right to freedom of
testation may come into conflict with constitutional rights, and
chief among them, the right to equality. The past number of years
have seen various judgments (some of which are referred to
below) in which our courts have grappled with this dilemma. All
these judgments concerned testamentary charitable trusts with
what can be termed a ‘public dimension’. The central question in
all of them was whether certain restrictions based on race,
gender, or religion (or a combination of these) imposed on the
potential recipients of bursaries could be deleted by a court.
However, to date there had been no judgment dealing with a
direct (so-called ‘out-and-out’) disinheritance in a purely ‘private’
will, based on one of the grounds mentioned. Therefore, it came
as somewhat of a surprise that the current review period saw two
such judgments, delivered within two months of each other in the
same division of the High Court and with basically the same
outcome. This discussion will focus first and primarily on the later
of these judgments, namely, King & others NNO v De Jager &
others 2017 (6) SA 527 (WCC). The earlier judgment in Harper
& others v Crawford NO & others (9581/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC
78 (30 June 2017) (now reported as 2018 (1) SA 589 (WCC)) will
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only be referred to briefly in the course of and after the discussion
of King.
King concerned a will executed in 1902, in which the testator
and his spouse (the testators) among other things bequeathed
their immovable property (including quite a number of farms) to
their four sons and two daughters. This bequest was made
subject to a fideicommissum, the application and interpretation of
which gave rise to the dispute between the parties. The clause in
the will (cl 7) containing the fideicommissum stipulation was
in Dutch, was extremely convoluted, and comprised nearly a full
page (see para [19] for the agreed translation in English).
However, its gist was that on the death of the testators’ six
children, the properties were to devolve upon
said children’s sons and following the death of the said grandsons
again and in turn to their sons, in such a way that, in the case of the
death of any son or son’s son who does not leave a male descendant,
his share/portion will fall away on the same conditions as above and
therefore pass to his brothers or their sons in their place and in the
case of the death of a grandson without any brothers, to the other Fidei
Commissaire [sic] heirs from the lineage of the sons of the appearers
by representation . . . (para [19]).
Clause 7 thus constituted a fideicommissum multiplex (although
the court did not use this term) with the testators’ children as the
fiduciaries, their grandsons as the first fideicommissaries, and
their great-grandsons as the second fideicommissaries (regarding
the fideicommissum multiplex, see also 2013 Annual Survey
993–4; 2014 Annual Survey 962–3).
The issue in King related to one of the testators’ grandsons
(the deceased), thus one of the first fideicommissaries. When
the deceased died, he was survived only by five daughters (the
second to sixth applicants, the first applicant being the co-
executor of the deceased’s estate). Based on the then accepted
interpretation of the will, these daughters – being female – could
not inherit as the second (and final) fideicommissaries. This gave
rise to their application to have the will amended by the deletion
of the stipulation limiting the fideicommissary heirs solely to male
descendants. The sons of one of the deceased’s brothers (the
first to third respondents) opposed the application. They argued
that, on a correct interpretation of the will, the deceased’s
fideicommissary property should devolve on them as the sons of
one of the deceased’s predeceased brothers. However, to com-
plicate matters even further, there was also a third set of
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claimants. These were the sons of the second to sixth applicants
(the fourth to eighth respondents) who argued that, should their
mothers’ application not be successful, the fideicommissary
property should devolve on them as the next (the fourth) genera-
tion of male descendants.
The applicants based their case for the proposed amendment
on the contention that clause 7 of the will discriminated unfairly
against women by limiting the fideicommissary heirs to male
descendants. They sought a declaration of the offending provi-
sions in the will as invalid, and the amendment of the will based
on both the common law and a direct application of section 9 –
the equality clause – of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). More particularly, they argued that
even before the new constitutional dispensation, a testator’s
freedom of testation was limited where provisions in a will were
found to be contrary to public policy. They further argued that the
common law has developed extensively since 1902 when the will
was made, in particular ‘as a result of the values which have been
adopted in the Constitution, with the result that a testator’s
freedom of testation is limited to the extent that provisions in a will
amount to unfair discrimination’ (para [21]).
The court’s point of departure in assessing this argument was a
quotation of the so-called ‘golden rule’ for the interpretation of
wills, formulated by Innes ACJ in the famous old case of
Robertson v Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503 507:
Now the golden rule for the interpretation of testaments is to ascertain
the wishes of the testator from the language used. And when these
wishes are ascertained the Court is bound to give effect to them,
unless we are prevented by some rule of law from doing so (King para
[28]).
As the court noted, however, the principle of freedom of
testation as encapsulated in this dictum was never completely
unrestricted. Even before the new constitutional dispensation,
there were notable restrictions derived from both the common law
and legislation. In addition, the introduction of the constitutional
dispensation ‘and the importance which it gives to the concept of
equality has, potentially at least, set the scene for a re-evaluation
of the primacy hitherto given to the principle of freedom of
testation’ (para [28]).
In order to illustrate this, the court proceeded to analyse four
cases dealing with testamentary trusts (establishing bursary
schemes) that have come before the courts under the new
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constitutional dispensation. In three of these cases, the courts
deleted racial, gender, or religious restrictions (or a combination
of these) attached to the granting of bursaries (Minister of
Education & another v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO & another 2006 (4) SA
205 (C), 2006 Annual Survey 490–2; Curators, Emma Smith
Educational Fund v University of KwaZulu-Natal & others 2010 (6)
SA 518 (SCA), 2010 Annual Survey 1193–8; and In re: Heyden-
rych Testamentary Trust & others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC), 2011
Annual Survey 1064–5). In the fourth case, Ex parte BOE Trust Ltd
NO & others 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC), the court did not order the
deletion of the racial restriction, but not on the basis indicated by
the court in King. According to Bozalek J in King, the court in BOE
Trust declined to do so because it held ‘that the provisions in
question were not contrary to public policy . . .’ (para [33]). It must
be noted, however, that this view of the court in BOE Trust was
clearly only an obiter remark. The reason why it did not order the
deletion of the contested provision was that the failure of the
bursary scheme in question resulted in a number of substitute
beneficiaries receiving the payments from the trust (see 2009
Annual Survey 1065–70).
Nevertheless, these cases bring into focus the pertinent ques-
tion in King, namely, ‘to what extent challenges to testamentary
dispositions based on the right to equality (and in particular, not
to be unfairly discriminated against) will be recognised outside
the area of charitable testamentary trust having a public nature’
(para [38]). King did not involve a charitable testamentary trust
with a public nature containing provisions discriminating against
one or more sectors of society, but was rather a case of a direct
disinheritance of certain descendants in a private will (see also
Harper para [30]). Further, the issue in King had to be distin-
guished from that which confronted the court in Bhe & others v
Magistrate, Khayelitsha & others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (see ‘The
applicability of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 to parties
living under African customary law’ above). In Bhe, the Constitu-
tional Court (among other things) declared as unconstitutional the
system of male primogeniture, which generally prevented women
from inheriting family property. The contested provision in the will
in King did not concern a ‘system’ or ‘practice’ as listed in section
8 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimina-
tion Act 4 of 2000, but rather a ‘one-off, private testamentary
disposition’ in a specific will (para [53]; see also Harper para
[29]). Should different considerations therefore apply in a matter
such as that in King?
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The court pointed out that, apart from the judgment in Harper
(see below), this is not a question that has yet been addressed
directly in any other SouthAfrican case. Therefore, it sought some
guidance in academic literature where the issue has been
discussed and in which four considerations have been empha-
sised as to why a direct (‘out-and-out’) disinheritance should be
treated differently, and should in principle be permitted.
The court found itself in general agreement with these consid-
erations. The first consideration is that an opposite conclusion
would reduce the concept of freedom of testation to a fiction, and
would render any constitutional protection of the right to freedom
of testation meaningless (see here also the court’s reference
(para [55]) to In re BOE Trust Ltd & others NNO 2013 (3) SA 236
(SCA), in which the Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that the
right to freedom of testation finds constitutional recognition in
both s 10 (the right to dignity) and s 25 (the right to property) of
the Constitution). Secondly, nobody has a fundamental right to
inherit. The exclusion of a person as beneficiary does not result in
an encroachment upon, or a taking away of, an existing right. Or,
as Bozalek J pointed out, ‘the right to equality and the hope or
expectation of inheriting should not be conflated’ (para [63]).
Thirdly, a testator should, within the limits set by social and
economic considerations, be free to institute beneficiaries of his
or her own choice. Again, the court agreed, and specifically
noted that ‘autonomy in this respect is an important part of what
gives substance to the right to human dignity’ (para [65]). Finally,
an opposite conclusion would lead to virtually insurmountable
practical difficulties, particularly as regards where the lines
should be drawn and what the appropriate remedy should be.
The court added two further considerations. First, limiting
freedom of testation in this context would ‘also inevitably create
uncertainty in the minds of some testators as to whether their
testamentary dispositions will be fully executed or not, in itself an
inherently unsatisfactory situation’ (para [67]). Secondly, in cer-
tain instances the result of a court intervening could lead to an
arbitrary outcome (a consideration really linking with the fourth
one mentioned above). For instance, in the present matter, a
decision granting the required relief to the second to sixth
applicants would ‘favour them over many other female (and male)
descendants of the testators’ (para [68]).
The applicants’ reliance on the constitutionally protected status
of the right to equality, which competed with the testators’ right to
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freedom of testation and therefore had to be weighed and
balanced against it, led to the next stage in the enquiry (see
paras [71] [72] and Harksen v Lane NO & others 1998 (1) SA 300
(CC)). That is whether the contested provision in clause 7 of the
will could be justified under the limitation clause in section 36 of
the Constitution (see also Harper para [33]). After a thorough
analysis (paras [72]–[79]), Bozalek J concluded:
For all these reasons I consider that, even if it [is] assumed in favour
of the female descendants of the testators that they notionally have
a right to be treated equally with the male descendants in the
exercise by the testators of their freedom of testation, the limitation on
the second to sixth applicants’ rights to equality in the form of the
discrimination against them effected by clause 7 of the will is
reasonable and justifiable, particularly given the importance accorded
to the right to freedom of testation. The direct constitutional challenge
to the disputed provisions of the will must therefore fail. Nor am I
persuaded, for similar reasons, that the disputed provisions of clause
7 are against public policy. In the particular circumstances of this
matter, I do not consider that the general public would regard that the
testators’ decision to impose the fideicommissary condition discrimi-
nating against female descendants as so unreasonable and offensive
that such provisions must be considered as offending against public
policy (paras [80] [81]).
The outcome was, therefore, that the applicants had failed to
make out a case for the primary relief sought. This outcome
forced the court to engage with the alternative argument advanced
on behalf of the fourth to eighth respondents: that on a proper
interpretation of clause 7 of the will, the deceased’s grandsons
had to be substituted (in the place of their mothers) as fidei-
commmissary heirs to the property. As this is a separate issue
relating to the interpretation of wills, it is dealt with below under
‘Interpretation of wills’.
The judgment in Harper is wide-ranging, and touches on a
variety of issues. But for present purposes, it is important, in the
main, because the court was confronted with the same basic
issue confronting the court in King. However, there are two
differences between the cases that must be noted immediately.
The first concerns the facts. Harper did not deal with a gender
issue, but with whether adopted children could be excluded as
the beneficiaries of a particular trust. The second concerns the
nature of the instrument containing the contested provisions.
While King dealt with provisions contained in a will, the document
in Harper was termed a ‘trust deed’. Despite the fact that King
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refers to this trust as a ‘testamentary trust’ (para [39] of King),
there are strong indications in Harper that it was in fact an inter
vivos trust (see, eg, paras [2] [18] [26] and [34]). This is
problematic, because the court in Harper applied a number
of arguments developed in the context of wills and freedom of
testation to this (apparently inter vivos) trust. However, that being
said, this does not detract from the importance of the judgment
as providing further support for the stance taken in King. In
particular, the court in Harper also termed as ‘persuasive’ the four
considerations raised as to why freedom of testation should
trump the right to equality in the context of a direct disinheritance
in a private will (para [33]). The application that the words
‘children’, ‘descendants’, ‘issue’ and ‘legal descendants’ used in
the trust deed included the first applicant’s adopted children was
thus unsuccessful. The alternative application to have the trust
deed amended in terms of section 13 of The Trust Property
Control Act 57 of 1988 also failed. (See also the comments on the
interpretation of the trust deed in Harper below under ‘Interpreta-
tion of wills’.)
Validity of wills: The use of expert evidence in cases of allegedly forged
wills and compliance with testamentary formalities
This chapter for the previous review period contains a detailed
analysis of judgments involving the use of expert evidence in the
contexts of two different succession issues (see 2016 Annual
Survey 961ff). One judgment focused on expert medical evi-
dence as to a deceased testator’s testamentary capacity, while
the other considered the evidence of a handwriting expert where
it was alleged that signatures on a contested will had been
forged. The current review period saw another judgment falling in
the first category (Assumption & another v Reid & others (3328/
2015) [2017] ZAECPEHC 21 (22 February 2017)), and four
judgments falling in the second category (Twine & another v
Naidoo & another (38940/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 288 (16 October
2017) (now reported as [2018] 1 All SA 297 (GJ)); Karani v Karani
NO & others (02266/2014) [2017] ZAGPJHC 318 (20 October
2017) (now reported as [2018] 1 All SA 156 (GJ)); Naude & others
v Naude & another (4349/2014) [2017] ZAECGHC 26 (9 March
2017); and Mduzulwana v Mduzulwana & others (1470/2017)
[2017] ZAECMHC 7 (26 May 2017)). In light of the comprehen-
sive treatment of the issue in the 2016 Annual Survey, the
exercise will not be repeated here. However, it is worth pointing
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out that Twine, in particular, appears to be a significant judgment
in this respect. The main reason, among other things, is that the
judgment contains a list with further analyses of no fewer than 21
‘principles with regard to expert witnesses’ (as Vally J termed it –
see para [18(a)–(u)]).
In both Twine and Karani, the contentious issue was indeed
whether or not the signatures in question were forgeries. How-
ever, as it turned out, the contested wills in both cases were in
any event invalid as they did not comply with certain of the formal
requirements set out in section 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953
(the Wills Act). In Twine, the two witnesses signed the document
and left before the testator had signed. This amounted to
non-compliance with section 2(1)(a)(ii) of the Wills Act, which
stipulates that the testator must make or acknowledge his or her
signature in the presence of two or more competent witnesses.
And in Karani, the second witness did not sign the document in
the presence of the testator and the first witness, but only some
time later. This amounted to non-compliance with section 2(1)(a)(iii)
of the Wills Act, which stipulates that the two competent wit-
nesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
In other words, the formality issue in Karani was simple and
straightforward. It is, therefore, rather unfortunate that the court
went further and made two very basic mistakes regarding
testamentary formalities. The first was that it got one aspect of the
burden of proof wrong. While the court was correct in asserting
that the plaintiff (who alleged that the signature was a forgery)
bore the onus of proving this, it was not correct in asserting that
the second and third defendants (who were the beneficiaries in
the contested will) bore the onus of proving that the document
complied with the testamentary formalities (para [15]). There is a
presumption that a will which appears valid on the face of it (as
the contested will in this case did) is in fact valid; and the burden
of proving the opposite rests on the person who alleges this (in
this case the plaintiff: see, eg, MM Corbett, Gys Hofmeyr & Ellison
Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 89;
MJ de Waal & MC Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession 5 ed
(2015) 87–8; 2011 Annual Survey 1035; 2013 Annual Survey 985;
2014 Annual Survey 956; 2015 Annual Survey 1074; and see also
s 4 of the Wills Act). This presumption covers both the formal
validity of the will (ie, its compliance with the formal execution
requirements in s 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act) and the capacity of the
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testator and the witnesses (2014 Annual Survey 956; 2015 Annual
Survey 1074). The second mistake was that the court asserted
that, apart from signing the last page of a will, the witnesses must
also sign the other pages (para [30]; note that this paragraph
number should probably be [31]). This is not correct. Section
2(1)(a)(iv) of the Wills Act stipulates that where a will consists of
more than one page, only the testator need sign the pages other
than the last page. This makes it clear that the witnesses need
only sign the last page (or, of course, that page where the will
consists of only one page).
Section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953: Acceptance of a document as a
will despite non-compliance with formal requirements
Section 2(3) of the Wills Act concerns the power of a court to
order the acceptance of a document as a will, despite the fact
that it fails to comply with the formal requirements for a will as set
out in section 2(1)(a) of the Act. As observed before, section 2(3)
has by now become a regular theme in this chapter. It is,
therefore, unnecessary once again to repeat the section’s struc-
ture and requirements (see, eg, 2013 Annual Survey 987; 2014
Annual Survey 957–8; 2015 Annual Survey 1075–83; 2016 Annual
Survey 965-71).In addition, the few cases for the review period in
which section 2(3) did feature were quite uncomplicated as
regards its application.
The will in Pillay v Master of the High Court, Durban & another
(5663/2016) [2017] ZAKZDHC (26 April 2017) was signed by the
testatrix using her thumbprint. The will was properly witnessed,
and each page also contained the signature of a commissioner of
oaths as required by section 2(1)(a)(v) of the Wills Act in
instances where a will is signed by making a ‘mark’ (such as a
thumbprint). However, the will lodged with the Master lacked a
certificate by the commissioner of oaths in question, certifying
that ‘he has satisfied himself as to the identity of the testator and
that the will so signed is the will of the testator’. It was, therefore,
not surprising that the Master rejected the will. Pillay was an
application to have the will accepted in terms of section 2(3). The
commissioner then attempted to rectify the matter by submitting
the required certificate. However, the Master rejected this certifi-
cate, asserting, quite correctly, that it was not attached to the will
‘as soon as possible’ after either the execution of the will or the
death of the testator. The facts showed that the will had been
executed in September 2006 and that the testatrix died in
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January 2009. The late submission of the certificate occurred
only in May 2015.
In my view Pillay is a textbook example of the type of case for
which section 2(3) was intended. The application of the section in
such a scenario would prevent a will from being rejected (and the
testator’s testamentary wishes being frustrated) owing solely to
non-compliance with one of the formal requirements by an official
such as a commissioner of oaths. This is also how the court in
Pillay viewed the matter. After having satisfied itself of the
plausibility of the explanation for the long delay, the court
concluded that the requirements for the application of section
2(3) had been satisfied, and that it could order the Master to
accept the document as the testatrix’s will in terms of the section.
In fact, Chetty J pointedly observed that the mistake by the
commissioner of oaths in this matter ‘should not be allowed to
override the testamentary intention of the deceased’ (para [19]).
In two further cases the section 2(3) applications were unsuc-
cessful for very simple reasons. In Helmie & another v Ruiters &
others (3634/2015) [2017] ZAECPEHC 13 (14 February 2017),
the court was convinced that the contested document was a
forgery and it therefore refused to condone it under section 2(3).
And in Tole v Master of the High Court of South Africa & others
(2070/2015) [2017] ZAECMHC 22 (29 June 2017), owing to ‘a
drought of information regarding the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the purported will’ (para [23]), the court ordered
the matter to be referred for the hearing of oral evidence before it
was prepared to rule on the application. (Regarding s 2(3), see
also the remarks in two of the judgments referred to above under
‘Validity of wills: The use of expert evidence in cases of allegedly
forged wills and compliance with testamentary formalities’: Karani
v Karani NO & others (para [31]) and Naude & others v Naude &
another (paras [109]-[111].)
Section 2(3) was also applied in Shusha & another v Master of
the High Court & others (2404/2015) [2017] ZAECMHC 17 (7 May
2017). This is a peculiar case, however, in that the judgment
contains no exposition of the nature of the formal deficiencies
regarding the document in question, apart from noting that it did
not comply ‘with some of the formalities prescribed by the Wills
Act 7 of 1953’ (para [4]). More importantly, it also contains no
clear reasons as to why section 2(3) could find application (see
only the cryptic remarks in para [15]). In other words, there was
no attempt to apply the various requirements for a section 2(3)
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condonation order to this particular set of facts. Of course, this is
highly problematic, as section 2(3) does not find automatic
application – its requirements must be proved in every particular
set of circumstances. It is clear from the judgment, however, that
the court placed a high premium on the deceased’s freedom of
testation and the importance of giving effect to his testamentary
wishes. This is apparently the reason why the court condoned the
very long delay in bringing the application, and why it refused
(quite correctly in my view) to afford any validity to an alleged
agreement between the potential heirs to the effect that the
deceased’s estate should rather have been distributed in terms
of the law of intestate succession. However, important as the
principle of freedom of testation is, it cannot override the clear
and mandatory statutory requirements for the application of
section 2(3).
Capacity to inherit of someone who has taken part in the execution process
of a will
Section 4A(1) of the Wills Act stipulates that, among other
things, any person who attests and signs a will as a witness is
disqualified from receiving any benefit under that will. It is
important to note that the effect of the section is not that the will is
rendered invalid; the provision only disqualifies the witness from
receiving the benefit bequeathed. However, this disqualification
is subject to a number of exceptions in section 4A(2). Relevant for
present purposes is the exception provided for in section 4A(2)(a),
which provides that a court may declare the person disqualified
in terms of section 4A(1) competent to receive the benefit
bequeathed ‘if the court is satisfied that that person or his spouse
did not defraud or unduly influence the testator in the execution of
the will’.
Section 4A has not featured very often in court judgments (but
see, eg, Theron & another v Master of the High Court [2001] 3 All
SA 507 (NC) and, especially, the leading judgment in Blom &
another v Brown & others [2011] 3 All SA 223 (SCA) and the
discussion of Blom in 2011 Annual Survey 1047–50). It is,
therefore, a pity that, owing to a procedural issue, the court in
Ex parte Pretorius (Franklin as Intervening Party) [2017] 2 All SA
558 (WCC) did not get the opportunity to apply the provision to
the facts of the case. In Pretorius, in her last will the testatrix
bequeathed certain benefits (including her house and motor
vehicle) to the applicant – a friend of many years. But he was also
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one of the witnesses to the will. In terms of section 4A(1) of the
Wills Act, the applicant was thus disqualified from receiving these
benefits. Not surprisingly, he then applied for a court order in
terms of section 4A(2)(a) declaring him competent to receive the
bequeathed assets
The problem, however, was that he brought the application ex
parte by way of motion proceedings. The court decided that this
was inappropriate in a matter such as this where the question of
whether or not the applicant had unduly influenced the testatrix
was put in the spotlight by the intervening party. This was a
seriously disputed issue and it could not be resolved on the
papers. Moreover, the applicant ‘did not seek the referral of
the matter to oral evidence, even when the disputes of fact
become [sic] patently clear to him after the opposing papers had
been filed and he had been given an opportunity in the agreed
court-ordered timetable to do so’ (para [45]). Thus, given the ‘fun-
damental disputes of facts on the papers and with the applicant
having failed to make out a case for the relief claimed’ on the
papers (para [46]), the court dismissed the application with
costs.
The extension of the meaning of ‘spouse’ in section 2C(1) of the Wills Act
7 of 1953
Moosa NO & others v Harnaker & others (400/2017) [2017]
ZAWCHC 97 (14 September 2017) (now reported as Moosa NO &
others v Harneker & others 2017 (6) SA 425 (WCC)) concerned
an unopposed application in which the ‘crisp legal issue’ (para
[1]) was whether, in terms of section 9 of the Constitution (the
equality clause), the provisions of section 2C(1) of the Wills Act
can be extended to protect surviving spouses in polygynous
Muslim marriages. Despite the ‘crispness’ of this legal issue, the
outcome of the application in Moosa constituted yet another step
in the long journey of broadening the scope of the concept
‘spouse’ in our law of succession in order to bring it in line with the
norms of our constitutional era.
The facts in Moosa were quite simple. The deceased (the
testator) lived according to Muslim law in a polygynous relation-
ship with two spouses. His marriage to the second applicant was
formalised in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (the Marriage
Act), but his marriage to the third applicant was never so
formalised and was concluded only in terms of Muslim law and
rites. On the deceased’s death, his two spouses and the nine
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children born of the two marriages became entitled to his assets.
However, in terms of section 2C(1) of the Wills Act, the nine
children renounced their right to inherit in favour of the two
surviving spouses. Section 2C(1) provides the following:
If any descendant of a testator, excluding a minor or a mentally ill
descendant, who, together with the surviving spouse of the testator, is
entitled to a benefit in terms of a will renounces his right to receive
such benefit, such benefit shall vest in the surviving spouse.
However, the twelfth respondent (the Registrar of Deeds)
refused to register the immovable property in the name of the
third applicant as well. He contended that only the second
applicant, to whom the testator was married in terms of the
Marriage Act, qualified as a ‘spouse’ in terms of this section.
According to him, the third applicant, to whom the testator was
married in terms of Muslim law and rites and with whom he lived
in a polygynous relationship, did not qualify. The applicants then
sought relief which, according to the court, was ‘wide in form and
substance’ (para [15]), but which in fact boiled down to an
application for an order rectifying the unfair treatment of the third
applicant and directing the twelfth respondent also to register the
immovable property in her name.
In his judgment Le Grange J pointed out that section 2C(1) of
the Wills Act was inserted into the Act by the Law of Succession
Amendment Act 43 of 1992. It dated back to the pre-constitution
era and the restricted meaning of the word ‘spouse’ contended
for by the twelfth respondent could consequently not ‘entirely be
disregarded’ (para [24]). However, this raised the central ques-
tion of whether such a restricted interpretation would violate the
equality provision in section 9 of the Constitution. It was not
difficult to conclude that it would do exactly that. With reference to
the judgments of the Constitutional Court in Daniels v Campbell
NO & others 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) and Hassam v Jacobs NO &
others 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC), and on the basis of a comparison
between the potentially different treatment of different groups of
spouses (para [28]), Le Grange J found that the differentiation
contended for amounted to unfair discrimination that was in
breach of section 9(3) of the Constitution. He further found that
such differentiation bore no rational connection to a legitimate
government purpose, and that it was ‘no longer accepted and
sustainable in our society that is based on democratic values,
social justice and fundamental human rights as enshrined in our
Constitution’ (para [30]).
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It followed that the exclusion of widows in polygynous Muslim
marriages from the protection of section 2C(1) of the Wills Act is
‘constitutionally unacceptable and unjust as the provision affords
a widow in a civil monogamous marriage some benefits but
denies the same to a widow in a Muslim polygynous marriage’
(para [33]). The court proposed as the appropriate remedy that
the following words be read in at the end of section 2C(1):
For purposes of this sub-section, a ‘surviving spouse’ includes every
husband and wife of a de facto monogamous and polygynous Muslim
marriage solemnised under the religion of Islam.
The application succeeded and the court made no order as to
costs.
(Note that the declaration of constitutional invalidity in Moosa
was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Moosa NO & others
v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & others (CCT251/
2017) [2018] ZACC 19 (29 June 2018). The latter judgment will be
discussed in the 2018 Annual Survey.)
Interpretation of wills
As indicated in the discussion of King NO & others v De Jager
& others (see ‘Freedom of testation and its possible limitations’
above), the applicants had failed to make out a case that the will
in question should be amended by the deletion of the stipulation
limiting the fideicommissary heirs to male descendants only. This
outcome forced the court to engage with the alternative argument
advanced, namely that on a proper interpretation of clause 7 of
the will, the deceased’s grandsons (the fourth to eighth respon-
dents) had to be substituted in the place of their mothers as
fideicommissary heirs to the property.
The interpretation contended for centred around the words ‘a
male descendant’ (original Afrikaans: ‘manlike nakomelinge’) in
the first sub-provision of clause 7, which read in translation: ‘. . .
in the case of the death of any son or son’s son who does not
leave a male descendant, his share/portion will fall away on the
same conditions as above and therefore pass to his brothers or
their sons in their place . . .’ (para [84]). The argument was that
the use of the words ‘manlike nakomelinge’ instead of ‘seun’
(son), was a clear indication that the testators had a different and
wider category of persons in mind than only a ‘son’ in the strict
sense, namely any male descendant. On this interpretation the
words ‘manlike nakomelinge’ (male descendants) had to include
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the deceased’s more remote descendants (such as his grand-
sons, the fourth to eighth respondents) and not only the genera-
tion after the deceased (such as the sons he never had).
In his analysis of this argument, Bozalek J relied principally on
one of the central tenets of the interpretation of wills. This is that in
interpreting a will one must first ask if there is a so-called
‘dominant clause’ and, if there is, effect must as far as possible be
given to it. In King, there clearly was such a dominant clause and
all the sub-provisions (including the one quoted above) were
subject to it. This dominant clause made it clear that it was the
testators’ intention that the fideicommissary property end up in
the hands of either their grandsons (such as the deceased) or
great-grandsons (such as the sons of the deceased’s brother, the
first to third respondents), as the case may be. For this reason,
the court found that the applicants had also failed to make out a
case for the alternative relief sought. Because of the special
circumstances of this case, the court concluded that ‘the most
appropriate result would be that all parties pay their own costs’
(para [109]) – in effect meaning that there was no order as to
costs.
Of course, an issue of interpretation was also central to the
dispute in Harper & others v Crawford NO & others (see above
under ‘Freedom of testation and its possible limitations’). There
the question was whether the words ‘children’, ‘descendants’,
‘issue’ and ‘legal descendants’ used in the trust deed (note again
that it probably was not a testamentary trust, and thus not a will)
included the first applicant’s adopted children. Based on a very
comprehensive interpretation exercise, the court concluded that
they did not. In reaching this conclusion, Dlodlo J attached
particular importance to the surrounding circumstances known to
the donor at the time of the creation of the trust (always an
important consideration in the interpretation of wills), and to the
judgment of the then Appellate Division in Cohen NO v Roetz NO
& others 1992 (1) SA 629 (A). In Cohen, by which the court in
Harper considered itself bound, the Appellate Division found
in very similar factual circumstances, that words such as those at
issue in Harper did not include adopted children.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
Locus standi of an heir to apply for retransfer to estate of immovable
estate asset
In July & others v Mbuqe & others (2522/2013) [2017] ZAEC-
MHC 1 (9 February 2017), the applicants applied, among other
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things, for an order directing the retransfer of a certain immovable
asset to the deceased estate of the late Eunice Mbuqe (the
deceased). They alleged that the executor of the deceased’s
estate wound up the estate based on the misrepresentation that
he was the deceased’s only heir. Because of this misrepresenta-
tion, the immovable asset was transferred to the executor as his
personal property, and after that to a number of subsequent
purchasers. The applicants further alleged that, in fact, their late
mother (the executor’s sister) was also an heir and that they (as
their mother’s heirs) had an interest in the retransfer of the
immovable asset to the deceased estate.
However, the eleventh respondent (Standard Bank, which was
the holder of two mortgage bonds over the asset) raised a point in
limine contesting the applicants’ locus standi to bring the applica-
tion. The bank argued that the relief sought (for the retransfer of
the asset) was of a vindicatory nature and could, as a matter of
law, only be claimed by the duly appointed executor of the
deceased’s estate (see also below under ‘Application for rescis-
sion of default judgment granted against deceased estate and for
retransfer to estate of immovable estate asset sold in execution’).
This point in limine was the only one that the court had to decide.
As its point of departure, the court in July stated the general
rule ‘that an executor is the only person who can represent the
estate of a deceased person’ (para [6(b)(i)]). However, there is an
exception to this rule as originally formulated in the old English
case of Beningfield v Baxter (1886) 12 AC 167 (PC). This
exception entails that, if an executor cannot act on behalf of the
estate because his or her own conduct is at issue, another person
with a beneficial interest in the deceased estate can so act. This
so-called ‘Beningfield exception’ was also received into South
African law in the context of the law of trusts (see Gross & others v
Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) and, eg, 2015 Annual Survey 1066–7).
In July, it was common cause that the alleged misconduct was
that of the executor. Thus, applying the Beningfield exception
and referring to Corbett CJ’s formulation in Gross, Dawood J
concluded that it would have been ‘too cumbersome a process
upon the aggrieved beneficiaries to first sue for the removal of the
executor and the appointment of a new executor as a precursor
to possible action being taken by the new executor for the
recovery of the estate assets in the circumstances of this case’
(para [7(a)(iii)]). This meant that the applicants did have the
required locus standi and the point in limine was dismissed with
costs.
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There can certainly be no problem with the court’s application
of the Beningfield exception in this case if one accepts the factual
basis on which it was done. However, there is one complication:
the executor in question had already died when the application
was made. In other words, this was not really a case where the
applicants first had ‘to sue for the removal of the executor and the
appointment of a new executor as a precursor to possible action
being taken by the new executor’ (see above; but note that the
applicants did ask that the appointment of the deceased execu-
tor be ‘set aside’ – para [1(i)]). However, because the court had to
decide only the point in limine concerning locus standi, its
approach was perhaps understandable as the most practical
under the circumstances.
Application for rescission of default judgment granted against deceased
estate and for retransfer to estate of immovable estate asset sold in
execution
The facts in Kenene NO v Invela Financial Corporation (Pty) Ltd
& others [2017] 3 All SA 725 (ECG) were quite complicated, not
least because the immovable estate asset, initially sold in execu-
tion, subsequently went through both a number of further sales on
the open market and subsequent transfers, until it was eventually
registered in the name of the sixth respondent. Kenene con-
cerned an appeal by the executor of the deceased estate against
the dismissal by the magistrate’s court of an application to have a
default judgment against the deceased estate rescinded, and the
sale in execution of the immovable estate asset declared void.
Because the application was also one for the retransfer of the
immovable asset to the deceased estate, it in effect constituted a
vindicatory action. To this extent the judgment is, of course, also
of interest in the context of the law of property (see, eg, the
observation of Revelas J in connection with the abstract theory of
transfer of ownership applicable in South African law (para [19]),
and also above under ‘Locus standi of an heir to apply for
retransfer to estate of immovable estate asset’).
However, for purposes of the administration of estates, Kenene
is of interest for two main reasons. The first is that the court
emphasised the distinction between the powers of a so-called
‘Master’s representative’ appointed in terms of section 18 of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (the Administration of
Estates Act), and an executor who has been issued with formal
letters of executorship by the Master. In Kenene, the settlement
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agreement which led to the default judgment was authorised by
the Master’s representative (the second respondent), at a time
when an executor (the appellant) had already received her letters
of executorship. The effect was that the settlement agreement
was not properly authorised and, therefore, invalid (para [15]).
The second reason why Kenene is of interest is because the court
once again stressed that a sale in execution of an estate asset in
contravention of section 30 of the Administration of Estates Act –
that is, without the authorisation of the High Court – is invalid (see
also Gounder v ABSA Bank Ltd & another 2008 (3) SA 25 (N) and
2008 Annual Survey 1099–1101). This is exactly what happened
in Kunene, and the sale in execution was consequently also
invalid. The court further stressed that this result follows despite
the provision in section 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of
1944 (paras [24] [27]).
The appeal was consequently successful, and the appellant
obtained the orders she had initially sought in the magistrate’s
court. However, the court refused to order costs against the first,
sixth, and further respondents.
Nature of appeal under section 35(10) of the Administration of Estates
Act 66 of 1965
In Friedrich & others v Smit NO & others 2017 (4) SA144 (SCA),
the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine two issues. The
first was the nature of the appeal given by section 35(10) of the
Administration of Estates Act; and the second was whether the
surviving spouse in question had proved that she needed
maintenance in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act 27 of 1990. For purposes of this chapter, only the first issue is
relevant (but for the background to this appeal and the reasons
why the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the spouse had
not proved that she needed maintenance, see the discussion of
the judgment of the full court in 2015 Annual Survey 1092–4 and
paras [15]–[21] of Friedrich).
Regarding the nature of the appeal given by section 35(1)),
Tshiqi JA stated:
Both the trial court and the full court erred in their approach to the
matter. The power conferred by s 35(10) of the Estates Act on the court
is . . . an appeal in the wide sense in that ‘the court can consider the
matter afresh and may make any order it deems fit’. (See Meyer v Iscor
Pension Fund 2003 (2) SA 715 (SCA) ([2003] 1 All SA 40) at 725I.) The
decision of the master referring the matter to court for the determination
of quantum did not mean that the court was confined to the determina-
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tion of the quantum. It had to apply its mind to the matter afresh. Once it
was found that Mrs Friedrich did not lead any evidence to show that she
was entitled to reasonable maintenance, that should have been the end
of the matter (para [14]).
Consequently, the appeal succeeded with costs.
Removal of executor
The issue of the removal of an executor from his or her position
has either been discussed in detail or at least referred to in this
chapter in all successive recent editions of the Annual Survey
(see 2011 Annual Survey 1053–5; 2012 Annual Survey 846–8;
2013 Annual Survey 996; 2014 Annual Survey 964–5; 2015
Annual Survey 1095–6; 2016 Annual Survey 974-5). One further
judgment during the review period, in which the removal of an
executor has featured, is therefore only mentioned here with a
brief explanation of its outcome.
Tung’ande & others v Tung’ande & others (67369/2015) [2017]
ZAGPPHC 49 (14 February 2017) concerned an opposed appli-
cation for the removal of the first respondent as executrix of a
deceased estate, as well as for the removal of the second
respondent (the executrix’s appointed agent). The executrix was
the surviving spouse of the deceased and the stepmother of the
applicants.
The applicants applied for the removal of the first respondent in
terms of section 54(1)(a)(v) of the Administration of Estates Act.
This provision states that a court may remove an executor from
office ‘if for any other reasons the Court is satisfied that it is
undesirable that he should act as executor of the estate con-
cerned’. The application for removal in this case was based on
two grounds. First, the applicants alleged that the first respon-
dent had accepted an offer from her daughter for the purchase of
an immovable asset of the estate, thus indicating a conflict
of interests. Secondly, they alleged that the first respondent had
failed on request to furnish them with information regarding both
the value of the estate and the estate’s creditors.
The court dismissed both these grounds for removal. Regard-
ing the sale of the immovable asset, the court pointed out that,
because the proposed sale was to a child of the executor, section
49(1) of theAdministration of EstatesAct was applicable. In terms
of this provision, any such sale would be void ‘unless it has been
consented to or is confirmed by the Master or the Court’. In
Tung’ande, the Master had not yet consented to or confirmed the
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sale. Consequently, it was void and could technically not have
been accepted by the first respondent. According to the court,
the application for removal on this ground was thus ‘premature’
(para [12]). It considered the application for removal on the
second ground, too, as ‘premature’ (para [15]). This was because
the applicants had not indicated whether they had sought and
failed to obtain the information in question from the Master’s
office, where it should have been lodged. (Regarding the general
conduct expected of an executor and the importance of s 26(1)
of the Administration of Estates Act in this respect, see also
Friedman NO v Master of the High Court Polokwane & others
(2464/2017) [2017] ZALMPPHC 37 (14 November 2017).)
The application for removal of the executor was therefore
dismissed with costs.
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TAX LAW
TRACY GUTUZA*
LEGISLATION
In order to comply with the requirements of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, tax legislation is divided into
provisions regulating money Bills requiring the application of
section 77 of the Constitution, and the framework applicable to
ordinary Bills dealing with tax administration. A number of amend-
ments were brought about by the Tax Administration Laws
Amendment Act 16 of 2016 (GG 40563 of 18 January 2018),
which came into effect from 19 January 2017 unless indicated
otherwise; the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of
Revenue Laws Act 13 of 2016 (GG 40560 of 19 January 2017);
the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016 (GG 40562 of
18 January 2017); and finally, the Rates and Monetary Amounts
and Amendment of Revenue Laws (Administration) Act 14 of 2016
(GG 40561 of 18 January 2017), which came into operation from
19 January 2017 unless otherwise indicated. In addition to amend-
ing certain provisions to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, the
Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (the VAT Act), the Tax Administra-
tion Act 28 of 2011, and the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964,
these amendments serve to clarify existing provisions.
INCOME TAX: INDIVIDUALS
The Income Tax Act
A number of amendments dealing with the taxation of indivi-
duals were included in the amending provisions to the Income
Tax Act. They are discussed on below.
Interest-free or low-interest loans
A new anti-tax avoidance provision in the form of section 7C
has been introduced to deal with the avoidance of estate duty
and donations tax when an individual transfers wealth through an
interest-free loan, or a loan having a low interest rate. Section 7C
* BSocSci LLB (UCT) BA(Hons) LLM (UNISA) LLM (London) PhD (UCT).
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town.
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applies when a low-interest or interest-free loan is made by a
natural person or company in which a natural person together
with connected person/s holds at least twenty per cent of the
shares. When such a loan is made, the interest-free or low-
interest loan is treated as an annual ongoing donation. Certain
trusts and loans are excluded from the ambit of section 7C. The
trusts excluded are special trusts, public benefit organisation
trusts, and vesting trusts. The excluded loans include loans used
to fund the acquisition of a primary residence, a loan subject to
the transfer pricing rules in section 31 of the Income Tax Act, a
loan to a trust in terms of the Sharia provisions as envisaged in
section 24JA of the Income Tax Act, and a loan made by a
company to a shareholder by virtue of his or her shareholding
(s 64E(4) of the Income Tax Act).
Employee-based share-incentive schemes
Sections 8C and 8CA of the Income Tax Act have been
amended to prevent dividend-stripping schemes in employee
share-incentive schemes. The amendments provide that where
shares held by employees in an employee-based share-incentive
scheme are liquidated, and the amount received by an employee
qualifies as dividend income, that amount must be treated as
remuneration in the hands of the employee. Section 10(1)(k),
which exempts dividend income from income tax, has been
amended specifically to exclude these dividends from the exemp-
tion.
Pension, provident, and retirement funds
The changes to the tax treatment of pension, provident, and
retirement funds comprise refinements to the tax treatment of
these funds.
Section 10(1)(gC)(ii) of the Income Tax Act has been amended
to remove the exemption for a lump sum, pension, or annuity
where the retirement fund is located within South Africa but the
relevant services have been rendered outside the Republic.
However, where a resident transfers retirement assets from a
foreign retirement fund to a local retirement fund, the benefits will
remain exempt from tax. This amendment came into effect on
1 March 2017.
The definition of ‘retirement annuity fund’ in section 1 of the
Income Tax Act has been amended to provide for the withdrawal
of a lump sum from a retirement annuity fund on emigration, and
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for recognition of the emigration by the South African Reserve
Bank. This change became effective on 1 March 2016.
Section 11(k) was introduced in order to allow for the roll-over
of excess retirement fund contributions before 1 March 2016. The
provision allows for deductions in respect of contributions made
to all retirement funds to be set off against passive income.
However, the passive income does not include capital gains. This
amendment also became effective on 1 March 2016.
Section 9(2)(i), which provides that the source of lump sum and
annuity payments from pension and provident funds is from a
source outside South Africa if the amounts were received in
relation to services rendered outside South Africa, has been
amended. The new provision clarifies that this does not apply to
lump sums or annuities received from retirement annuity funds.
The amendment became operational as from 1 March 2017.
Paragraph 12D of the Seventh Schedule to the Income Tax Act
has been amended. This section deals with the valuation of the
taxable fringe benefit for retirement fund contributions where the
retirement fund has a defined benefit. The amended provision
clarifies that the ‘retirement funding income’ includes fringe
benefits, and that both contributions made by the fund, and on
behalf of employees, must be taken into account.
Bursaries and scholarships, learnerships, and employment tax incentives
In order to incentivise support for education and skills develop-
ment, amendments have been made to the allowances for
bursaries and scholarships, learnerships, and employment tax
incentives.
The monetary limit for granting an employee an allowance
when assisting his or her relative through a scholarship or bursary
has been amended by increasing the remuneration for a qualify-
ing employees to R400 000. Moreover, the monetary limits for
exempt bursaries and scholarships has been increased from
R30 000 to R40 000 (s 10(1)(q) became effective from 1 March
2016 and applies in respect of years of assessment commencing
on or after that date).
Section 12H, dealing with deductions in terms of the learner-
ship tax incentive, was amended by, among other things, linking
the allowable deduction to the National Qualifications Framework
level of the qualification (effective from 1 October 2016).
The employment tax incentive in terms of the Employment Tax
Incentive Act 26 of 2013 was extended until 28 February 2019,
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and an annual cap of R20 million was placed on the claim
allowed for each employer.
INCOME TAX: BUSINESS
Anumber of amendments have been made to the tax treatment
of hybrid instruments and tax incentive provisions. The amend-
ments applicable to hybrid instruments aim to prevent certain tax
avoidance practices, whereas the new tax incentive provisions
aim to provide tax relief in terms of government policy.
As for the tax treatment of hybrid instruments, sections 8F and
8FA were amended to provide for the treatment of double
non-taxation where the borrower is not a South African taxpayer.
The amendment limits the reclassification of ‘interest’ as ‘divi-
dend’ where the issuer is a resident company, or a non-resident
with the interest attributable to a permanent establishment located
in South Africa, or is a controlled foreign company with the
interest taken into account in terms of section 9D. This amend-
ment became effective on 24 February 2016.
Section 8F was amended to exclude from its application
subordination agreements concluded between connected par-
ties. The section also does not apply in instances where the
auditors have so requested, and if the assets of the company are
less than its liabilities. This provision is effective as from 1 January
2016.
Sections 8E and 8EA, which deal with debt-like hybrid instru-
ments, were expanded by the amendment of the definitions of
‘hybrid equity instrument’ and ‘preference share’. These defini-
tions now include any right or interest where the value of the right
or interest is determined directly or indirectly by the underlying
share that is either an equity share or a share other than an equity
share. This provision became effective on 1 May 2011. The
effective date of section 8E was backdated to 1 April 2012.
Section 22 and paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule, which
deal with the transfer of collateral arrangements, were amended
by extending the period within which the identical share or
security must be returned from twelve to twenty-four months. This
was done by means of an amendment to the definition of
‘collateral arrangement’ in section 1 of the Securities Transfer Tax
Act 25 of 2007 by including listed government bonds as instru-
ments for security lending and collateral arrangements (effective
from 1 January 2017).
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Amendments to provisions dealing with tax incentives and
relief for certain types of business include:
• the expansion of the ambit of section 12E, which deals with
the taxation of small business corporations, to include per-
sonal liability companies;
• the amendment of section 13quat, dealing with urban devel-
opment zones, to allow municipalities to apply for the urban
development zones incentives;
• the insertion of section 12U to provide an accelerated capital
allowance for infrastructure used in producing renewable
energy.
The section 12J venture capital regime was refined by an
amendment to the ‘connected parties’ requirement. Further tax
relief has been provided for infrastructural spending by mining
companies (s 36). Provision has also been made for tax relief in
land-reform initiatives by exempting such initiatives from dona-
tions and capital gains tax (s 56, paras 64A and 64D of the Eighth
Schedule to the Income Tax Act). Section 11D, which provides
incentives for research and development, has been amended by
allowing for the re-opening of assessments in certain circum-
stances.
INCOME TAX: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The tax treatment of the short-term insurance business was
amended in order to align it with changes to the long-term
insurance industry and the implementation of the Solvency
Assessment and Management Framework (s 29A). Similarly,
amendments have been made to align the tax treatment of the
audited annual financial statement of short-term insurance inves-
tor contracts (s 28(3)).
A number of amendments were made to the tax treatment of
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). This was done by amend-
ment of section 25BB, which sets out the tax treatment of REITs,
and other relevant sections. Equity shares in a REIT or a
‘controlled company’ as defined in section 25BB were excluded
from the provisions deeming amounts received from the disposal
of shares to be of a capital nature, to remove any conflict in the
interaction of sections 9C and 25BB (proviso added to s 9C(5)
with effect from 1 January 2016). Furthermore, the definition of
‘rental income’ in section 25BB(1) has been amended to include
qualifying distributions, dividends, and foreign dividends as a
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result of its exclusion from section 9C, and to take into account
any amount recovered or recouped in respect of allowances
previously obtained (effective from 1 January 2016).
INCOME TAX: INTERNATIONAL
The amendments affecting cross-border transactions mainly
relate to the cross-border treatment of collective investment
schemes in the controlled foreign company provisions, and
withholding tax on interest.
Section 9D, which brings the income of controlled foreign
companies into the South African tax net, was amended by
exempting collective investment vehicles from its application,
and by adjusting the comparable tax exemption for controlled
foreign companies.
Various amendments have been made to the withholding tax
on interest provisions (ss 50D, 50E, 50F and 50G). Section 50D
has been amended to exclude multilateral development financial
institutions from the withholding tax on interest. These institutions
include the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the African Import and Export Bank,
the European Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank.
Section 50G has been amended to provide for refunds from the
withholding of the interest, including where the interest sub-
sequently becomes irrecoverable. Section 24I, dealing with
exchanges difference, was also amended to take bad debts into
account.
Despite only being introduced in 2013, sections 51A to 51H,
which dealt with the withholding tax on service fees, have been
repealed. As from 1 January 2017, the payment of service fees
from a SouthAfrican resident to a non-resident is regulated by the
Reportable Arrangements in the Tax Administration Act 28 of
2011.
VALUE-ADDED TAX
The main amendments concerning value-added tax (VAT) were
effected by changes to the definition of ‘second-hand goods’,
allowing municipal entities to account for VAT under certain
circumstances and to provide for a VAT exemption where imported
goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged through natural disasters.
The definition of ‘second-hand goods’ in the VAT Act was
amended to extend the deduction of the notional input tax credit
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for the sale of goods containing gold, provided that the goods are
‘acquired for the sole purpose of supplying those goods in the
same or substantially the same state to another person’ (definition
of ‘second-hand goods’ in s 1 of the VAT Act, with effect from
1 January 2017).
The amendment with respect to municipalities aligned the VAT
treatment of municipal entities to that of public authorities and
municipalities by allowing municipal entities to account for VAT on
the payment, not receipt basis if the amount exceeds R100 000
(s 15(2)(a)(iv) of the VAT Act with effect from 1 April 2017).
Schedule 1 to the VAT Act was amended to align the VAT Act
with Schedule 4 to the Customs and Excise Act by exempting
from VAT goods which after being imported are held in a bonded
warehouse and have not entered SouthAfrica for home consump-
tion, and are lost, destroyed or damaged, either through natural
disasters or in circumstances that the Commissioner deems
exceptional.
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
A general anti-tax avoidance provision was inserted in the
Customs and Excise Act (s 119B).
TAX ADMINISTRATION
A number of changes were made in order to ‘enhance the
independence of the Tax Ombud’. (See Memorandum on the
Objects of Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2016.)
In particular see:
(a) the tenure of the Tax Ombud was amended to a five-year
term with the possibility of a renewal (s 14(1) of the Tax
Administration Act amended by s 49 of the Tax Administra-
tion Laws Amendment Act);
(b) the ability of the Tax Ombud to appoint staff was increased
and the budget of the Tax Ombud to be approved by the
Minister of Finance (s 15(1) and (4) amended by ss 49 and
50(b) of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act);
(c) the expansion of the mandate of the Ombud to include
reviews, at the request of the Minister of Finance, or with the
approval of the Minister if on the initiative of the Tax Ombud,
of any ‘systemic or emerging issue related to a service
matter, or the application of the provisions of the [Tax
Administration] Act or procedural or administrative provi-
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sions of the [Tax Administration] Act’ (s 16(1) amended by
s 51 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act);
(d) the provision of reasons by either the South African Revenue
Service (the SARS) or the taxpayer in the event that the
Ombud’s recommendations are not accepted by the relevant
party (s 20(2) amended by s 52 of the Tax Administration
Laws Amendment Act).
Other amendments to the Tax Administration Act include limit-
ing the ability of the SARS to reopen an assessment with respect
to reaching finality (s 100 of the Tax Administration Act amended
by s 56 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act) and the
possible extension of the period for objection to an assessment
when there are exceptional circumstances for a delay in lodging
an objection (s 104 amended by s 57 of the Tax Administration
Laws Amendment Act).
The understatement penalty provisions have been amended to
clarify that such penalties apply in the event of an ‘impermissible
arrangement’ in terms of the general anti-tax avoidance rule
(GAAR) in the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act and other GAAR
provisions. The clarification was effected by the introduction of
definitions of the concepts ‘impermissible avoidance arrange-
ment’ and ‘repeat case’ in section 221 of the Tax Administration
Act, and by amending the definition of ‘understatement’ to
include ‘impermissible avoidance arrangement’ in the Tax Admin-
istration Act.
Further amendments to the Tax Administration Act include the
amendment to the definition of a ‘SARS practitioner’ in section 1
of the TaxAdministrationAct to exclude external legal representa-
tives who act with a degree of independence (amendment by s 4
of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act).
Disclosure of income tax status
Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, read together with section
69(8) of the Tax Administration Act, has been amended to allow
the Financial Services Board to disclose the income tax approval
status of pension funds, preservation funds, provident funds,
provident preservation funds, and retirement annuity funds to a
third party and to publish the details of such funds on the FSB
website.
Notification by Commissioner that a category of persons are provisional
tax payers
To deal with the collection of taxes from foreign employees of
multinationals who are temporarily seconded to South Africa,
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remain on home country payroll, and for whom there is no
employees’ withholding tax obligation, the definition of ‘provi-
sional taxpayer’ in paragraph 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the
Income Tax Act was amended. These people would now qualify
as provisional taxpayers.
Relief from submitting a return
Section 64K of the Income Tax Act, which provides for the
payment and recovery of the withholding tax on dividends, has
been amended to relieve recipients of dividends which are
exempt from the withholding tax on dividends, from submitting a
return.
Remuneration for the purposes of PAYE
The definition of ‘remuneration’ in paragraph 1 of the Fourth
Schedule, which is used to determine the amounts deducted or
withheld by employers (PAYE) and for provisional taxpayers, was
broadened to include dividend income received by directors and
employees from certain restricted equity instruments, and which
is not exempt from Income Tax.
Section 7B, which provides for the timing of accrual and
non-acurral of variable remuneration, resulted in the repeal of
paragraph 11C of the Fourth Schedule. The variable income of
directors is regulated by section 7B.
CASE LAW
VOLUME 79 OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TAX CASE REPORTS
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
Income tax: Capital/revenue
In CSARS v Marula Platinum Mines Ltd 79 SATC 127, the
Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide on two issues: whether
the extraction of mineral ore from the underground rock and the
subsequent processing of the mineral ore to a mineral-bearing
concentrate is a ‘manufacturing process’; and whether the min-
eral ore and subsequent concentrate qualifies as ‘trading stock’
as envisaged in sections 1 and 23F(2) of the Income Tax Act.
The taxpayer’s mining operations comprised two phases. First,
the extraction of the mineral ore from the underground rock and
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bringing it to the surface; and second, a process to derive
mineral-bearing concentrate in powder form. The taxpayer sold
the concentrate, but not the mineral ore, to a fellow subsidiary.
The price of the concentrate was made dependent on the ruling
market prices. Payment was made five months later.
In its tax returns for the relevant years of assessment, the
taxpayer deferred, in terms of section 24M of the Income Tax Act,
the inclusion of the price of the concentrate in its gross income to
the following year of assessment. Furthermore, the taxpayer
claimed the expenditure incurred in respect of the sales of the
concentrate, under section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act, in the
year in which it had been incurred, and not in the year of
assessment in which the price of the concentrate was included in
its gross income. The Commissioner’s view was that the taxpayer
had correctly excluded the unquantified sales of concentrate
under section 24M, but invoked the provisions of section 23F(2)
to disallow a percentage of the claimed section 11(a) deductions.
Section 23F(2) provides that expenditure relating to the acquisi-
tion of ‘trading stock’, which is generally deductible, must be
disregarded to the extent that any amounts relating to the
disposal of that trading stock did not accrue during the year of
assessment in which the expenditure had been incurred. The
taxpayer submitted that the expenditure it had incurred related to
mining activities, and not to the production, manufacturing,
purchase, or acquisition of trading stock. Accordingly, the tax-
payer argued, these deductions could not be recouped under
section 23F(2).
Relying on Richards Bay Iron and Titanium (Pty) Ltd & another
v CIR [1995] ZASCA 81, 1996 (1) SA 311 (A), in which ‘trading
stock’ was analysed, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the
purpose of mining the ore was to manufacture the concentrate.
The fact that it was not intended to be disposed of in the state in
which it was mined, is legally irrelevant in view of the purpose for
which it had been mined (paras [16]–[19]). Applying Richards
Bay (above), the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that as the ore
was intended to be used for the purpose of manufacturing the
concentrate, it constituted ‘trading stock’ (para [20]). Relying on
Richards Bay and Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Services v Foskor (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 45, the Supreme Court
of Appeal agreed with the finding of the Tax Court that the
concentrate qualified as ‘trading stock’, and that the process of
converting the mineral ore into mineral-bearing concentrate was
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a processes of manufacture within the meaning of the definition of
‘trading stock’ in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. The Supreme
Court of Appeal concluded that both the mineral-bearing ore
extraction and the concentrate qualified as ‘trading stock’.Accord-
ingly, the Commissioner was entitled to invoke the provisions of
section 23F(2) of the Income TaxAct by delaying the deduction of
section 11(a) expenses until the year of assessment in which the
corresponding income was to be taxed.
Capital gains tax
The appeal to be decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
New Adventure Shelf 122 (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 79 SATC 233
concerned the imposition of capital gains tax on the proceeds of
the sale of an asset where the sale is cancelled before the
proceeds have been paid in full, the unpaid balance forfeited,
and the asset returned to the seller.
During the 2007 tax year, the taxpayer had sold immovable
property and the resultant capital gain was taken into account
in determining the taxpayer’s tax liability for the 2007 year of
assessment. However, only a portion of the purchase price was
actually paid. The sale had been cancelled by agreement several
years later, and the property returned to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer retained the payments made as damages for breach of
contract. Given that the capital gain had in effect been reversed,
the taxpayer requested that the Commissioner withdraw and
reduce the assessment for 2007. The request was refused. In
the court a quo the taxpayer sought review of the decision of the
Commissioner without success.
On appeal, the first hurdle faced by the taxpayer was section
81(1) of the Tax Administration Act, which provides that an
objection to an assessment must be made within three years of
the assessment, after which the assessment becomes final and
conclusive. The taxpayer contended that, based on paragraph
35 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act read with
paragraphs 3 and 25 of the Eighth Schedule, section 81(1) did
not apply to capital gains tax. It was argued that the determina-
tion of capital gains tax was not an annual event and that
matching requires a re-determination of the capital gains tax
(para [17]).
The court indicated a number of difficulties with the taxpayer’s
argument. First, the assessment of tax is an annual event.
Moreover, the taxpayer’s interpretation of paragraph 35(3) of the
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Eighth Schedule was inconsistent with the overall scheme of
paragraph 35 in requiring a redetermination at a later date. The
court noted further that paragraphs 3, 4 and 25 of the Eighth
Schedule did not support the taxpayer’s argument (paras
[18]–[26]). The court indicated that even though it may seem
unfair, ‘[p]ayment of tax is what the law prescribes’ and ‘tax laws
are not always regarded as ‘‘fair’’ ’ (para [28]). The court accord-
ingly held that ‘the cancellation of the sale did not entitle the
taxpayer to have his tax liability for the 2007 year re-assessed’
(ibid).
Value-added tax
In XO Africa Safaris CC v CSARS 79 SATC 1, the taxpayer
assembled tour packages for foreign tour operators (FTOs) – ie,
the supplying of services under the VAT Act. The pivotal question
was whether the supply was zero rated in terms of section
11(2)(l), or subject to the standard rate of value-added tax in
terms of section 7(1) of the VAT Act.
The taxpayer argued for the zero rating for the following
reasons. It did not directly supply or render the local services
directly to the FTO or to its customers. In addition, it did not have
a direct relationship with the customers and it was not what one
would call a ‘local service’.
Based on the evidence presented, the court disagreed. The
taxpayer provided goods and services, not directly to the FTOs,
but to persons who were in South Africa at the time that the goods
and services were provided. In the result, the supply of the
services attracted VAT at the standard rate.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in CSARS v Marshall
NO & others 79 SATC 49, was required to decide whether
aero-medical services supplied by the taxpayer to provincial
health departments were zero rated for the purposes of VAT.
The taxpayers were the trustees of the South African Red Cross
Air Mercy Service Trust (the Trust), a non-profit organisation and
an approved public benefit organisation (PBO) in terms of section
30 of the Income Tax Act. The PBO status meant that the receipts
and accruals of the Trust were exempt from income tax in terms of
section 10(1)(cN) of the Income Tax Act. The Trust was also
registered as a VAT vendor in terms of the VAT Act. For rendering
a ‘comprehensive aero-medical service’ to various provincial
government health departments, the taxpayer received a fee
paid in terms of a schedule of tariffs.
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On 30 October 2012 the taxpayer applied to the Commissioner
for a binding private VAT ruling that the fee it received qualified for
a VAT zero rating in terms of section 11(2)(n) read with section
8(5) of the VATAct, on the basis that it was a ‘welfare organisation’
as defined in section 1 of the VAT Act and was, as such, a
‘designated entity’ (as defined in section 1 of the VAT Act), and it
rendered services to the provincial health departments in that
capacity. The taxpayer contended that the services it supplied
were ‘deemed services’ under section 8(5) of the VAT Act which
qualified to be zero rated in terms of section 11(2)(n) (para [6]).
The Commissioner’s view was that the services were ‘actual’ not
‘deemed’ services, and accordingly fell outside the ambit of
section 8(5) of the VAT Act (para [7]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the supply of goods
and services by the taxpayer to the provincial health department
constituted ‘performance’ in terms of the written agreement, and
the payments received were fees charged in terms of the tariff set
out in the agreement with the provincial health departments (para
[26]). The court agreed with the Commissioner that it is only
where a payment cannot be linked to any performance that it
becomes necessary to ‘deem’ it to be provided in terms of section
8(5) (para [26]). The court further stated that the legislature must
have intended to distinguish the ‘payment’ contemplated in
section 8(5), from ‘consideration’ defined in section 1, and must
have intended that the former would be an unrequited payment
such as a grant, subsidy, or donation to a designated entity (para
[27]). The court’s analysis of the terms ‘grant’ and ‘donation’, as
defined in section 1 of the VATAct, identified the common feature
between these terms as the absence of a (commensurate) direct
benefit (para [30]). The court also referred to Interpretation Note
39 (issued by the SARS on 8 February 2013) which sets out the
VAT treatment of public authorities prior to and after April 2005. It
stated that these Interpretation Notes, though not binding on the
courts or a taxpayer, constitute persuasive explanations in rela-
tion to the interpretation and application of the statutory provision
in question (paras [31]–[33]). While stating that the deeming
provision applies to an imagined and not actual supply of goods
and services and that zero rating applies where payment is not
linked to an actual supply of goods and services, the court also
considered the substantial incentive given to PBOs and said that
‘[t]here is no conceivable reason why, where PBO’s engage in
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commercial activities they should be treated differently from other
commercial entities’ (para [34]).
Customs and excise
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in CSARS v Van der Merwe NO
& others 79 SATC 283, considered the interaction between the
provisions of the Customs and Excise Act and the VAT Act, on
the one hand, and those of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 on the
other, and whether equipment could be released from the
customs warehouse without the payment of the relevant customs
duty and VAT, on the other hand.
The taxpayer company, having been wound up because it was
insolvent, had prior to its winding-up purchased equipment on
hire purchase. On insolvency, the equipment became the prop-
erty of the taxpayer through the application of section 84(1) of the
Insolvency Act. The financiers obtained a hypothec over the
equipment. The equipment, together with other equipment owned
outright by the taxpayer, had been sent to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (the DRC) for operations in that country. In
the ordinary course of events, on the return of the items to South
Africa the taxpayer would have had to pay customs duty and VAT
in terms of section 39(1) of the CustomsAct and section 7(1)(b) of
the VATAct respectively, before the equipment could be released
from the relevant customs warehouse.
On the subsequent return of the equipment, the liquidators
argued that the equipment should be released without payment
of the taxes, so as to allow them to take possession of it in
accordance with section 391 of the 1973 Companies Act, and
section 61 read with section 83(3) of the Insolvency Act. By
contrast, the SARS argued that the equipment could not be
released without the payment of customs duty and VAT.
The court, in balancing the policy of the fiscal purposes, the
protection of local manufacturers on one hand, and on the other,
the scope and purpose of provisions relating to the winding-up of
companies unable to pay their debts, stated that the provisions of
the Customs Act apply in the normal course of events but when a
taxpayer is insolvent, the provisions of the InsolvencyAct must be
considered (para [20]). The court stated that ‘[i]t could not have
been the intention of the legislature that assets of an insolvent
estate, in respect of which other creditors also have real rights,
should be dealt with completely outside the machinery of insol-
vency Act’ (para [48]). Accordingly, it was concluded that the
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Customs Act and VAT Act did not prevent the release of the
equipment to the liquidators without the liquidators first having to
pay customs duty and VAT.
HIGH COURTS
Value-Added Tax (VAT)
The Gauteng Local Division in Masango v Road Accident Fund
79 SATC 295 had to determine whether an attorney could charge
25 per cent of the capital amount recovered for his client from the
Road Accident Fund, and secondly, whether fourteen per cent
VAT could be added to this contingency fee.
The plaintiff client and his attorney had entered into a contin-
gency fee agreement which provided for a fee of 25 per cent of
the amount awarded to the client with VAT charged on this
amount. The validity of the contingency fee agreement was
questioned on the basis of its non-compliance with the require-
ments of the Contingency FeesAct 66 of 1997 (the CFA). The CFA
provides that non-compliance with its requirements renders a
contingency agreement invalid. The reason for the potential
invalidity, in this instance, arose from the levying of VAT on the
award amount.
In resolving the dispute, the court stated that the CFA distin-
guishes between two contingency fee arrangements: the suc-
cess fee payable in the event that the client is successful; and the
no-fee payable in the event that the client is not successful. The
success fee is subject to limitations in the CFS. In setting out the
limitations of the success fee, the court stated that the success
fee is the attorney’s normal fee increased by the agreed percent-
age (paras [11]–[18]) which may not be more that 100 per cent of
the normal fee. The success fee may not exceed 25 per cent of
the total amount awarded to the client (para [19]). The court
accordingly held that the agreement providing for a fee of 25 per
cent of the award was unlawful and invalid (paras [19]–[25]).
In considering the VAT issue, the court referred to the judgment
in Mofokeng v Road Accident Fund [2012] JOL 29301 (GSJ). In
Mofokeng it was held that an attorney could only recover ‘out-of-
pocket’ expenses above and beyond the 25 per cent cap (para
[50]). The court explained that VAT is not an ‘out-of-pocket
expense’ for purposes of the facts under consideration, and that
VAT should not generally be treated as a cost to the vendor (para
[51]). Accordingly, the court concluded that VAT was not recover-
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able above the 25 per cent cap imposed by section 2(2) of the
CFA, and that the contingency agreement was invalid as it sought
to authorise the plaintiff’s attorney to recover VAT above the limit
imposed by section 2(2) of the CFA (paras [52] [53]). The court
accordingly found that the contingency fee agreement was
invalid on both grounds.
Tax administration
Nondabula v CSARS & another 79 SATC 333 concerned an
application by a taxpayer for an interdict in the Eastern Cape
Local Division of the High Court, among other things, to prevent
the use of the provisions of section 179 of the Tax Administration
Act pending the final determination of its objection to an addi-
tional income tax assessment.
The Commissioner had issued income tax assessments to the
taxpayer for the 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 financial years, and
the taxpayer had paid the relevant amounts owing. A further
assessment was issued by the Commissioner in a letter dated
29 September 2016, indicating that the taxpayer had failed to pay
certain amounts and requiring payment to be made within ten
days, failing which further action would be taken. The letter did
not indicate how the outstanding amounts had been determined.
After the taxpayer’s objection had been received, the Commis-
sioner responded by, among other things relating to technicali-
ties, disallowing the taxpayer’s objection.
In considering the matter, the court indicated that the Commis-
sioner is a creature of statute, which is governed by and operates
within its empowering statutes (para [11]). In considering section
92 of the Income Tax Act, which provides the circumstances
under which an additional assessment may be issued, the court
noted that issuing of an additional assessment requires compli-
ance with sections 95 and 96 of the Tax Administration Act (paras
[15] [19]). Section 95 provides for an additional, reduced or
jeopardy assessment where a taxpayer fails to submit a return, or
submits incorrect or inadequate returns or information. Section 96
requires the Commissioner to issue a notice and a statement of
the grounds for the assessment. The court found that on the facts
of the case, the Commissioner had failed fully to comply with
section 96. In the letter no date for payment of the assessed
amount was reflected, there was no summary provided of the
procedures for lodging an objection to the assessment, and the
letter did not include a statement of the grounds on which the
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assessment had been based (para [20]). The court also found
that the Commissioner had neglected to provide an explanation
for the non-compliance with section 96 (para [20]).
The court stated that the failure to comply with section 96, and
the subsequent application of the provisions of section 179(1),
which allows the SARS to recover money due to the taxpayer from
a third party who holds or owes the taxpayer money and which
results in effectively closing down the taxpayer’s business, was
not only unlawful but a ‘complete disregard of the doctrine of
legality which is a requirement of the rule of law in a constitutional
democracy’ (para [22]).
Customs and excise
Encarnaçäo NO & another v CSARS 79 SATC 247 dealt with
whether certain cigarettes imported into South Africa in 2009
qualified for full rebate of customs duty in terms of Schedule 4 to
the Customs and Excise Act.
The two applicants were the trustees of the Da Encarnaçäo
Trust, the taxpayer. The taxpayer was a registered importer of
goods and a licensee of a customs bonded warehouse. In terms
of the Customs and Excise Act, imported cigarettes must be
stored in a bonded warehouse with the payment of customs duty
and VAT deferred until the cigarettes are removed from the
warehouse for home consumption. The taxpayer in this instance
did not use its own warehouse for the storage of the imported
cigarettes. Instead, it used All Trans Logistics CC (All Trans), a
licensed customs clearing agent, to act as its clearing agent in
the importation of its cigarettes. During an armed robbery at the
All Trans warehouse, the cigarettes imported by the taxpayer
were stolen together with other imported items.
The taxpayer contended that the robbery qualified as a vis
maior entitling it to a full rebate of excise duty on the stolen
cigarettes. The taxpayer relied on the wording of the Rebate item
412.09 in Schedule 4 to the Customs and Excise Act, which
provides for a full rebate of customs duty, among other things, if
goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged in circumstances of vis
maior. This rebate may be claimed if the event occurs while the
goods are in a customs and excise warehouse, provided that
there has been no payment of compensation for the customs duty
or the loss, the destruction or damage is not due to any
negligence or fraud on the part of the person liable for the duty,
and the goods had not entered into consumption (para [22]).
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The parties agreed that armed robbery can be a vis maior for
the purposes of the rebate, and that the facts of this case
supported vis maior in the form of armed robbery.
TAX COURTS
Gross income
In ITC 1888 79 SATC 23, the Cape Town Tax Court had to
consider whether, on the application of sections 20(1) and 103(2)
and (4) of the Income Tax Act, the two changes in the taxpayer’s
shareholding were for the purpose of using the assessed loss or
had commercial substance.
In the first change, the shares in the taxpayer were sold by DX
Ltd (Australia) – a 100 per cent shareholder of the taxpayer – to
JK (Pty) Ltd, a member of the Y Group. JK had purchased the
taxpayer’s call centre business and, on the taxpayer settling
certain legal disputes, JK exercised an option to purchase the
taxpayer’s shares.
The second change in the taxpayer’s shareholding was the
sale of its shares from JK to MM Investments (Pty) Ltd, nominated
by Mr A, the owner of the H Group of companies. Before the
purchase, A had undertaken a due diligence exercise which
indicated that the taxpayer had ceased trading after year-end;
had an assessed loss; and that there was a risk that the SARS
could apply section 103(2) of the Income TaxAct and disallow the
assessed loss.
The court considered the causal link between the change in the
first shareholding and the set-off of the assessed loss by the
taxpayer during the second change in shareholding (paras
[82]–[98]). Based on its interpretation of the evidence, the court
stated that when JK exercised its option to acquire the shares, it
could not have contemplated that selling the shares to new
shareholders at a later date would result in the use of the
assessed loss, as negotiations for the second purchase of the
shares had not yet begun. The court held that the taxpayer had
discharged the onus of showing that the sole or main purpose for
the change in shareholding had not been to acquire the company
to utilise its assessed loss (para [99]).
In ITC 1890 79 SATC 62, the Cape Town Tax Court had to
consider whether the taxpayer was entitled to claim a deductible
allowance for future expenditure in terms of section 24C of the
Income TaxAct. The Commissioner had disallowed the deduction
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on the basis that section 24C had been incorrectly applied, and
in addition, levied an understatement penalty on the taxpayer.
The taxpayer, a private company which managed and adminis-
tered retirement villages and their frail care centres, acquired four
such villages and centres in 2006. On acquisition, the taxpayer
became a party to the original contracts with the purchasers of
the units in these villages and centres. In terms of the contracts
between the original seller and first purchasers of the units in
these villages, the taxpayer became entitled to an amount
equivalent to 40 per cent of the enhancement value of the unit
(the enhancement) when the unit was sold by the original
purchaser, and also became contractually obliged to incur future
expenditure on behalf of the subsequent purchaser. The taxpayer
accordingly applied section 24C and deducted an allowance for
the future expenditure.
The Commissioner, on the basis that section 24C was not
applicable, disallowed the deduction. It was of the view that the
enhancement accrued to the taxpayer in terms of the original
contract, and the taxpayer did not have future expenditure as
contemplated in section 24C in relation to the enhancement
income.
Addressing the purpose of section 24C, the court stated that it
provided relief for a taxpayer who received an advance payment
– ie, income – in year one and incurred deductible expenditure
under that contract in a subsequent year (para [13]). Absent
section 24C, the income would be taxed in year one without any
deduction for future expenditure, with the section seeking to
place the taxpayer in the position as if the income and expendi-
ture had occurred in the same tax year (para [13]). Applying
section 24C to the facts, the court considered the link between
the two contracts. The court noted that for section 24C to apply to
the first contract between the original seller and first purchaser
and the subsequent sale by the first purchaser – now the seller –
to the second purchaser, the two contracts had to be so
inextricably linked that they could be interpreted as a whole
(paras [15]–[22]). On its interpretation of the contracts, the court
held that the two contracts were not so linked. Therefore, the right
to the enhancement income arose from the first contract, with its
calculation deferred until the unit was again sold by the second
contract. Consequently, the second contract was merely a trigger
(paras [28]–[35]). The court also stated that section 24C required
that the expenditure follow, not precede, the receipt of income
(para [30]).
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With respect to the understatement penalty imposed on the
taxpayer in terms of section 222 of the Tax Administration Act, the
court interpreted a bona fide inadvertent error as being an
innocent misstatement by a taxpayer on his or her return,
resulting in an understatement, while acting in good faith and
without the intention to deceive (para [45]).
Th decision of the Port Elizabeth Tax Court in ITC 1893 79 SATC
159 concerned the question of whether the compensation received
by the taxpayer under the Productive Asset Allowance Scheme
(the PAA) was ‘revenue’ or ‘capital’ in terms of the definition of
‘gross income’ (s 1 of the Income Tax Act).
The PAA was a rebate certificate which reduced the amount of
import duty payable on the import of motor vehicles, and having
qualified for this rebate, the taxpayer initially included the PAA
rebate in its ‘gross income’. However, after the SARS issued
Interpretation Note 59 in December 2010 dealing with the taxabil-
ity of government grants, the taxpayer treated the rebate as
receipts of a capital nature and accordingly did not include the
rebates in its ‘gross income’.
While recognising that the rebates from the PAA certificates
were a grant, the court, applying relevant case law (Burmah
Steamship Company Ltd v The Commissioner of Inland Revenue
1931 SC 156), took the view that the rebate was not used to fill the
capital ‘hole’, but to fill the income ‘hole’ as the reduced payment
of customs duty related to the taxpayer’s ‘gross income’ (paras
[20]–[23]). Therefore, the rebates granted as a result of the PAA
certificates were not of a capital nature, but fell within the
taxpayer’s ‘gross income’ in terms of section 1 of the Income Tax
Act.
The decision of the Johannesburg Tax Court in ITC 1894 79
SATC 167 dealt with the taxation of fringe benefits in the form
of services provided by tax consultancies to the taxpayer’s
employees.
The taxpayer, ABC (Pty) Ltd, part of an international group
which required its employees to work in foreign countries for
certain periods, agreed to take responsibility for the payment of
the employees’ tax of the expatriate employees seconded to
South Africa. To protect the interests of the group, the taxpayer
arranged for certain identified tax consultancy firms to render tax
advice to these expatriate employees with the taxpayer paying
the tax consultancy firms.
The SARS took the view that the payments to tax consultancy
firms were taxable fringe benefits in terms of para (i) of the
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definition of ‘gross income’ read with paragraphs 2(e) and 2(h) of
the Seventh Schedule to the Income Tax Act. This was based on
the employees receiving a benefit paid for by their employers.
The taxpayer argued that the employees did not receive benefits
or advantages as a result of the payment within the meaning of
‘gross income’, and alternatively, that the payment did not fall
within the categories of taxable benefits identified in paragraphs
2(e) or (h) of the Seventh Schedule to the Income Tax Act.
The court agreed with the view of the SARS that as a result of
the contractual arrangement between the taxpayer and the
expatriate employees, the latter became entitled to the services
of a tax consultant free of charge, that this service had a
monetary value, and that it thus fell within ‘gross income’ (paras
[31]–[42]). In determining whether the fee fell within the fringe
benefits provisions of the Seventh Schedule, the court stated that
the fees were for the employees’ private use, namely to comply
with the individual tax obligations of the employees vis-à-vis the
SARS, and accordingly were a taxable benefit in terms of
paragraph 2(e) of the Seventh Schedule (paras [39]–[44]).
The issue decided in the Cape Town Tax Court in ITC 1895 79
SATC 179 was whether interest incurred on a residential home
loan account was paid to earn interest income on a credit amount
on the taxpayer’s director’s loan account, such that the interest
paid on the home loan account was incurred in the production of
interest income on the taxpayer’s director’s loan account.
The taxpayer’s contract of employment required a working
capital contribution in the form of a director’s loan account. Tn
terms of the agreement, the taxpayer would not be permitted to
withdraw the outstanding balance of the loan until resignation.
During 2005, the taxpayer purchased a property, secured by a
mortgage bond with an access bond facility, which enabled
access to available funds in the home loan account. The taxpayer
paid the capital borrowed and drew on the facility to fund his
expenses. He used the interest earned on the loan account,
which was taxable income in his hands, to pay the interest on the
home loan account.
The taxpayer, applying section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act,
deducted the interest payable to the bank on the basis that it was
an expense incurred in the production of the interest income. In
support of the ‘close connection’ requirement between the inter-
est expense and the interest income, the taxpayer contended
that the retention by his employer of the amounts owing under the
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loan account resulted in his inability to repay an equivalent
amount on the home loan account, and further that this resulted in
a larger interest expense on the home loan account as compared
to having the amount in credit to his loan account available to
him. The taxpayer relied on Practice Note 31 (issued by the SARS
on 3 October 1994), in terms of which the Commissioner permits
the deduction of the interest incurred on monies borrowed in the
production of interest income, and limits the interest expenditure
to the amount of the interest income earned.
The court held that the taxpayer had failed to prove that the
purpose and the effect of the acquisition of the loan account was
the production of interest income. Moreover, he had failed to
show that the interest incurred on the home loan account was
sufficiently close to the interest income earned on the loan
account to justify a conclusion that the interest so incurred was
incurred in the production of interest income (para [25]). In other
words, the taxpayer had failed to discharge the onus resting on
him.
The Cape Town Tax Court in ITC 1896 79 SATC 191 first had to
determine whether ‘dividend rights’ should be included in the
taxpayer’s gross income, and secondly, whether in the event that
the amounts are included in ‘gross income’, the SARS was
precluded from issuing an additional assessment in accordance
with the ‘practice generally prevailing’ as at the date of the
original assessments as envisaged in section 79(1)(iii) of the
Income Tax Act.
The dividend rights were ceded by Z to the taxpayer in the
2008 and 2009 years of assessment, and the SARS argued for
the inclusion of the value of the dividend rights in ‘gross income’
on the basis that it was interest accruing to the taxpayer in terms
of section 24J(3) of the Income Tax Act, alternatively that it
should, in any event, be included in the ‘gross income’ of the
taxpayer. The SARS further argued that the contractual restriction
on the taxpayer’s entitlement to dispose of the dividend right was
not a condition preventing an accrual of the dividend right, and
that the right was of a revenue nature and was not subject to any
exemption.
The court distinguished between the dividend right and the
dividends themselves, and stated that the taxpayer’s argument
was supported by the SARS’s practice over many years of not
including such rights in gross income, by the inclusion of the
proviso (ee) to section 10(1)(k)(i) which disallowed the anteced-
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ent cession of dividends for tax purposes, by rulings of CSARS,
and by the relevant explanatory memoranda setting out the
purpose of proviso (ee) (para [63]). Taking into account that the
dividend right in question was contingent on identifying the
shareholder entitled to the dividend, that a dividend right disap-
pears when the dividend accrues, that the conditional dividend
right had no value apart from the subsequent dividend, applying
a face value to the dividend right in this context is uncommercial
and incorrect. In considering the double taxation and the recog-
nition of two separate accruals of gross income where only one
commercial accrual exists, the court indicated was ‘plainly insen-
sible and un-businesslike and gives rise to absurd conse-
quences’ (para [63.3]) The court referred to Commissioner for
Inland Revenue v Delfos 1933AD 242 where it was stated that the
same amount should not be taxed twice in the hands of the same
taxpayer, and distinguished CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance
(Pty) Ltd & others 69 SATC 205 on the basis that it dealt with two
separate accruals, namely, the right to use money interest-free,
and interest on the money obtained interest-free (para [64]). The
court concluded that entitlement to a contingent right does not
give rise to an accrual for the purposes of ‘gross income’ (para
[65]). With respect to the inclusion under section 24J, the court
stated that only an amount unconditionally receivable can trigger
an inclusion in gross income in terms of section 24J(3) on the
basis that it embodies an amount receivable (para [66]).
In ITC 1900 79 SATC 341, the Cape Town Tax Court had to
determine whether the purchase price of immovable property
should be included in the ‘gross income’ of the taxpayer in the
2013 tax year, even though the taxpayer only received payment
against transfer of the properties to the purchasers in the 2014
tax year.
The taxpayer had entered into a number of agreements for the
sale of immovable property, and save for one transaction, the
relevant conditions and contingencies were met before 31 March
2013. Accordingly, the proceeds of these transactions accrued to
the taxpayer and were accordingly included in the taxpayer’s
gross income in the 2013 tax year. The conditions of the one
agreement were only met in April 2013 on receipt of a required
certificate issued by the City of Cape Town.
Although the proceeds of this one agreement only accrued in
2014, the Commissioner disputed the 2014 accrual by placing
reliance on section 24(1) of the Income Tax, which deals with
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‘credit agreements and debtors allowances’. While the taxpayer
argued that section 24(1) only applied to ‘credit agreements’ and
not to the current transactions, the court agreed with the Commis-
sioner that it was bound by the construction of section 24(1) in
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Silverglen Investments (Pty) Ltd
1969 (1) SA 365 (A). In Silverglen Investments it was held that
section 24 applies to a provision in a cash sale, in which transfer
of the property occurred against payment of the purchase price
(para [29]).
Value-added tax
ITC 1889 79 SATC 39 was an appeal, heard in the Cape Town
Tax Court, of an assessment issued for a VAT liability with the
legal issue being whether the crediting of a loan is payment of full
consideration in terms of section 22(3) of the VAT Act.
KL (Pty) Ltd was the sole shareholder of the taxpayer. By
agreement, KL funded the taxpayer’s cash flow by inter-company
shareholder loans to avoid external finance for business funding.
While developing residential units on land owned by the taxpayer,
KL issued a tax invoice in terms of section 15 of the VATAct to the
taxpayer for the taxable supply, inclusive of VAT, of a portion of
the development. The taxpayer paid for the taxable supply by
crediting KL’s loan account, and claimed an input tax deduction
in respect of the VAT. Upon receipt of the payment of the input tax
from the SARS, the taxpayer paid it to KL by way of a cash
payment, and KL then used the cash to pay its output tax to the
SARS in the same amount. The remaining liability due to KL was
credited to the loan account of KL in the taxpayer’s books.
After an audit conducted four years after the invoice had been
issued, the SARS raised that the taxpayer had not paid for the
service within the twelve-month period after the expiry of the tax
period in which the input tax had been claimed as required by the
provisions of section 22(3) of the VAT Act.
Applying the commercial transaction principle as espoused in
CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 341 (SCA), the
court stated that the legitimacy of the commercial transaction,
that is, the funding arrangement between the taxpayer and KL as
group companies, could not be called into question (paras
[15]–[17]). By crediting the loan account, the taxpayer’s liability to
KL changed from being a current liability to being a long-term
liability, with the dispute turning on whether the change to a
long-term liability complied with section 22(3)(b) insofar as it
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‘paid the full consideration in respect of such supply’ (paras [18]
[19]). The court considered the undisputed evidence that the
purpose of the loan was to discharge the invoice debt and that
there had been a conversion of a liability under an invoice to a
liability under a loan. The court then considered the purpose of
section 22(3). It took into account the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 1996, which stated that the
aim of the provision was to rectify the position in relation to
irrecoverable debts insofar as a vendor who accounts for VAT on
an invoice basis and writes off a bad debt is entitled to an input
tax deduction equal to the tax fraction of the irrecoverable
amount written off (para [25]). The court stated that it was ‘the
prejudice to the fiscus which motivated the amendments and not
the current circumstances as there was no deliberate manipula-
tion in creating a bad debt with a view to creating a tax benefit
either by the taxpayer or KL’ (para [125]).
The issue in ITC 1897 79 SATC 224 centred on whether the
taxpayer qualified for an input tax deduction in respect of the
acquisition of a vehicle on the application of section 17 of the VAT
Act. The taxpayer, a close corporation carrying on business in the
courier industry, had claimed the input tax on the basis that the
vehicle had been acquired for purposes of making taxable
supplies.
The SARS had disallowed the input claim applying section
17(2)(c), read together with the section 1 definition of a ‘motor
car’, to the effect that a deduction of input tax is not permitted for
the acquisition of a motor car, subject to certain exceptions. In
particular, section 17(2) lists non-permissible input deductions as
including ‘any motor car supplied to or imported by the vendor’
subject to exceptions such as where the motor car is acquired
exclusively for the purpose of making a taxable supply of that
motor car in the ordinary course of an enterprise which continu-
ously or regularly supplies motor cars, and where a motor car is
acquired by such vendor for demonstration purposes, or for
temporary use. The effect of section 17(2)(c) is that, in general,
input tax is not deductible in respect of the VAT incurred by
vendors on the acquisition of a ‘motor car’ as defined in section 1
of the VAT Act.
In deciding whether the taxpayer’s vehicle was not constructed
or converted wholly or mainly for the carriage of passengers, the
court found that the taxpayer had failed to provide the necessary
evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed (paras [17]
[18]).
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The Cape Town Tax Court in ITC 1892 79 SATC 105 had to
consider whether the delivery of food orders by the taxpayer, who
carried on business as a fast-foods delivery business, was a
service supplied by it for consideration in the course or further-
ance of its enterprise as envisaged in the VAT Act (s 7(1)(a)).
The taxpayer’s business modus operandi was to contract with
fast-food outlets and takeaway restaurants (outlets) to advertise
their menus in its catalogue and take orders from customers
based on the catalogue. The taxpayer was paid a fee on a
commission basis, for soliciting and executing orders from the
participating outlets based on the orders placed by customers.
The commission was in effect consideration received by the
taxpayer for a service supplied by it to the participating restau-
rants, with VAT accounted for by the taxpayer on the commis-
sions. A separate service supplied by the taxpayer to customers
was the collection and delivery of the food. The taxpayer argued
that the service of collecting and delivering the order was done
by independent drivers, and accordingly, not a supply made by it
as contemplated in section 7(1)(a) of the VAT Act. The Commis-
sioner argued that the taxpayer’s business includes the delivery
of the order which required the use of drivers.
The court, in deciding the matter, considered whether the
drivers were employees or independent contractors was irrel-
evant to the dispute (para [16]). It also considered whether there
was a mark-up or profit irrelevant (para [33]). The court consid-
ered the ‘economic reality’ of the taxpayer’s business which
required the delivery of the food order to the customer, and that if
it were not for its delivery-service component, the taxpayer’s
business would not be viable (para [34]). It accordingly held that
the delivery service was a service in terms of section 7(1)(a) of
the VAT Act, and that output tax was payable by the taxpayer on
the delivery charges.
Capital gains
In an appeal against a decision of the Commissioner, heard in
the Cape Town Tax Court (ITC 1898 79 SATC 266), the court had
to decide whether to disregard an assessed loss, bad debt, and
expenses of the taxpayer and impose a 75 per cent understate-
ment penalty on the taxpayer.
Through a series of transactions, the proceeds from the sale of
shares on behalf of the taxpayer, a trust, and M, were transferred
to a Dutch bank account held in the name of N Trading Ltd. It
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subsequently transpired that an amount, which should have been
paid to the taxpayer trust, had been transferred from the Dutch
bank account, allegedly fraudulently.
As the taxpayer had a capital gains tax liability from the
proceeds of the sale of the shares, the issue in dispute was
whether the removal of the funds through the transfer from the
Dutch bank account qualified as a deduction from the proceeds
for the purpose of paragraph 35(3)(c) of the Eighth Schedule to
the Income Tax Act. Paragraph 35(3)(c) provides for a deduction
from the proceeds of a disposal when there is a ‘cancellation,
termination or variation of an agreement or due to the prescription
or waiver of a claim or release from an obligation or any other
event during that tax year’. In particular, the provision applies to
proceeds that ‘accrue’ to as opposed to being ‘received by’ the
taxpayer.
The court interpreted the purpose of paragraph 35(3) as
providing a deduction where the proceeds, although accruing to
the taxpayer, have not been paid and the payment provisions for
the proceeds are varied, extinguished, waived, or cancelled
(para [51]). In considering the alleged fraud and embezzlement
that resulted in the proceeds being removed from the control and
beneficial use of the taxpayer, the court stated that this was not
an event covered by paragraph 35(3)(c) as the proceeds had
already been received by the taxpayer (para [52]).
The taxpayer had originally been given an option to purchase
the shares, which it had now sold, resulting in the second issue in
dispute, namely, whether paragraph 20(1)(c)(ix) or paragraph 18
of the Eighth Schedule would apply to the cost of the conversion
of the share options into shares.
The taxpayer’s view was that it should be included in the base
cost of the shares, while the SARS felt that it fell within the capital
loss provisions. If there has been the exercise of an option, then
paragraph 20(1)(c)(ix) of the Eighth Schedule provides that the
base cost of an asset acquired by a person is the sum of amounts
actually incurred as expenditure directly related to the acquisition
or disposal of that asset, and includes expenditure incurred in
acquiring an option where the asset was acquired or disposed of
by the exercise of an option (subject to the exclusion of certain
options). If there had been a cancellation of the shares, as
opposed to the exercise of an option, paragraph 18 would apply,
which provides that a capital loss must be disregarded where a
person who is entitled to exercise an option, among other things,
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abandons that option, allows the option to expire, or disposes of it
other than by its exercise. On the evidence, the court held that
there had been a conversion of the share options to shares, and
accordingly, paragraph 20 rather than paragraph 18 of the Eighth
Schedule should apply. In the result, the share options were
included in the base cost of the shares that had been disposed of
(paras [60]–[61]).
The third issue in dispute was the percentage of the understate-
ment penalty. The SARS sought to increase the understatement
penalty from 75–150 per cent on the basis of intentional tax
evasion, despite not initially having raised this in the Notice of
Assessment and Statement of Grounds of Assessment. The court
stated that the SARS is not entitled to increase its claim for an
understatement penalty without giving due notice (para [64]).
Based on the testimony of the taxpayer, the court concluded that
there had been no intentional tax evasion. Nevertheless, the
taxpayer had failed to take reasonable care in the completion and
submission of the tax returns, and the court applied a 50 per cent
understatement penalty (paras [74]–[77]).
Tax administration
In a decision of the Port Elizabeth Tax Court, ITC 1899 79 SATC
315, the taxpayer disputed the imposition of an understatement
penalty on the basis of non-compliance with the provisions of the
Tax Administration Act. The court held that as the penalty had
been imposed in terms of paragraph 20(1) of the Fourth Schedule
to the Income Tax Act read together with Chapter 15 of the Tax
Administration Act, and the taxpayer had been notified under the
Income TaxAct before the TaxAdministration Act came into force,
the provisions of the Tax Administration Act did not apply (para
[29]). Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the penalty
confirmed.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v M
Fowler 79 SATC 355, decided in the United Kingdom, concerned
the application of articles 7 and 14 of the treaty entered into
between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Island for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
Gains GG 24335 of 31 January 2003 (the Treaty). The tax issue in
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dispute was whether the income of Mr Fowler, a tax resident of
SouthAfrica, arising from diving engagements in the UK Continen-
tal Shelf waters during the 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 tax years,
had to be treated as income falling within the ambit of article 7 of
the Treaty (dealing with business profits), or within article 14
(dealing with income from employment). The income would fall
within the ambit of article 7 if Fowler was self-employed, and
within article 14 if he was employed. In reaching its decision, the
court considered the application of article 3(1) and (2) (paras
[13]–[17]) of the Treaty, and the application of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (the Vienna Convention)
(paras [18] [19]). Article 3(2) provides that where a term is not
defined in a treaty, the domestic-law meaning applies ‘unless the
context otherwise requires’. The court stated that the latter phrase
applied where ‘. . . the definition supplied by Article 3(2) results in
an outcome that is either not sensible or not reasonable’ (para
[34]). In deciding which article to apply, the court referred to the
distinction, in both the Republic of South Africa and the United
Kingdom, between income derived from a contract of employ-
ment or service, and income derived from a contract for services
(para [37]). The court considered that the term ‘employment’ was
not defined in the Treaty (para [41]) and accordingly, the mean-
ing of ‘employment’ in the domestic law in terms of article 3(2),
English law, had to be considered (para [43]). Based on the
meaning of ‘employment’ in the English legislation, the court
accepted the argument of the Revenue authority that Fowler was
employed and not self-employed, and accordingly, found that his
income fell within the ambit of article 14 of the Treaty (para [77]).
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TRUSTS
M J DE WAAL*
LEGISLATION
Two regulations made under section 24 of the Trust Property
Control Act 57 of 1988 were substituted during the review period.
They are regulation 2 (dealing with fees payable on the lodging
of trust instruments) and regulation 3 (dealing with fees payable
for the making and certifying of copies of documents): see
Government Notice 1162 in Government Gazette 41224 of
3 November 2017. These substituted regulations took effect on
1 January 2018.
The Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 is
relevant in the context of the law of trusts as it regulates collective
investment schemes (formerly and still popularly known as ‘unit
trusts’, which were regulated by the now repealed Unit Trusts
Control Act 54 of 1981). Section 290 of the Financial Sector
Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (which commenced on 1 April 2018)
contains – with reference to Schedule 4 – a list of the sections of
the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act that are inserted,
amended, or repealed. The affected sections of the latter Act are:
sections 1A and 1B (inserted); sections 1, 15(1), 15A, 63, 66,
99(1), 112, 114 and 115 (amended); and sections 7, 14, 15B, 18,
22, 23 and 24 (repealed).
CASE LAW
LAW OF TRUSTS
Trust capacity: A sub-minimum of trustees cannot bind the trust
In the seminal judgment, Land and Agricultural Bank of South
Africa v Parker & others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), the Supreme Court
ofAppeal distinguished between two fundamental trust-law issues:
‘trust capacity’; and ‘trustee authority’. Both these issues featured
* BCom LLB LLM LLD (Stellenbosch). Professor in the Department of Private
Law, Faculty of Law, Stellenbosch University. This chapter is based on research
supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa (Grant
Number 90788). Any opinion, finding, and conclusion or recommendation expressed
in this chapter is that of the author and the NRF accepts no liability in this regard.
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in judgments delivered during the review period. Vogel NO v
Melamed & others (35494/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 127 (5 April
2017) concerned the first issue of ‘trust capacity’ (and for the
judgment dealing with ‘trustee authority’, see below under ‘Trustee
authority: The ‘‘joint action’’ rule and application of the normal
principles of the law of agency’). In Parker, Cameron JA formu-
lated arguably the most central aspect of ‘trust capacity’ in the
following words:
It follows that a provision requiring that a specified minimum number
of trustees must hold office is a capacity-defining condition. It lays
down a prerequisite that must be fulfilled before the trust estate can be
bound. When fewer trustees than the number specified are in office,
the trust suffers from an incapacity that precludes action on its behalf
(para [12] and see also 2015 Annual Survey 1053–4 and the refer-
ences there).
It is unnecessary to relate the facts of Vogel in any detail. In
short, it entailed an application for two orders: one to compel the
first respondent to transfer funds held in a bank account under
his control to another bank account under the control of the
applicant; and the other, to compel the first respondent to provide
‘an accounting relating to transactions’ in the bank account in
which he held the funds. The applicant and the first respondent
were the first trustees of a trust created pursuant to divorce
proceedings between the second and the third respondents.
However, the Master subsequently removed the first respondent
as trustee in terms of section 20(2)(e) of the Trust Property Control
Act 57 of 1988. This left the applicant as the trust’s only trustee at
the time of the application. Despite his removal as trustee, the first
respondent nevertheless retained the funds of the trust in the
bank account under his control.
The problem for the applicant was that the trust deed in question
stipulated that at all times there had to be no fewer than two
trustees in office. The trust deed also stipulated that in the event
of the number of trustees falling below this minimum, the remaining
trustee could appoint an additional trustee. This the applicant did
upon the first respondent’s removal from office. However, this new
appointee resigned as trustee shortly afterwards – again leaving
the applicant as the only trustee. It is, therefore, not surprising that
the first respondent relied on the ‘trust capacity’ issue as formu-
lated in Parker, arguing that the applicant alone lacked the
capacity to bring the application.
Of course, the court in Vogel accepted the premise of the ‘trust
capacity’ argument advanced by the first respondent. Neverthe-
1189TRUSTS
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 17 PAGE: 3 SESS: 13 OUTPUT: Fri Jun 7 13:07:36 2019
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey17/34−Trusts
less, it emphasised an important qualification that applied in this
particular case. This qualification, again with reference to Parker
as authority, is that ‘in any given case, the specific provisions of a
Trust Deed are to be considered’ (para [31] and see also para
[10] of Parker). In Vogel, the trust deed also contained the
following provision:
. . . if the number of acting trustees is less than the prescribed number,
the remaining trustee or trustees, as the case may be, shall be entitled
to exercise the powers of the other trustees for the maintenance and
administration of the trust fund until another trustee has been appointed
(para [32.1] with the court’s emphasis).
Properly construed (see especially paras [34]-[36]), this provi-
sion meant that the applicant did not lack the capacity to bring
the present application; or, as Bham AJ explained further:
He [the applicant] is not seeking to bind the Trust in any manner. He is
merely seeking to give effect to his obligation to maintain and
administer the funds of the Trust by seeking a transfer of those funds
into the Investec bank account (para [37]).
I am in complete agreement with this interpretation. Not only did
it give effect to the principle of the overriding authority of the trust
deed in question, but it also took full cognisance of the practicali-
ties of the particular situation. It is also significant to note that the
court also granted the second order sought, although in a more
limited form than initially requested (para [47.2]). The application
consequently succeeded and the court ordered the first and the
third respondents (who also opposed the application) to pay
the costs on an attorney-and-client scale.
Trustee authority: The ‘joint-action’ rule and application of the normal
principles of the law of agency
This chapter in the Annual Survey bears testimony to the
frequency with which our courts are confronted with the second
issue mentioned above – that of ‘trustee authority’, and especially
how it links with the effect of non-compliance with the so-called
‘joint-action’ rule in the administration of trusts (see above under
‘Trust capacity: A sub-minimum of trustees cannot bind the trust’
and also, eg, the discussions in 2010 Annual Survey 1198–1200;
2011 Annual Survey 1065–69; 2012 Annual Survey 850–2; 2013
Annual Survey 999–1002; 2014 Annual Survey 967–71; 2015
Annual Survey 1053–56; 2016 Annual Survey 1002-07). The
current review period is indeed no exception. It would, therefore,
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be useful to reiterate that in Land and Agricultural Bank of South
Africa v Parker (above), Cameron JA explained that this ‘funda-
mental rule’ entails ‘that in the absence of contrary provision in the
trust deed the trustees must act jointly if the trust estate is to be
bound by their acts’ (para [15]; see also Moraitis Investments
(Pty) Ltd & others v Montic Dairy (Pty) Ltd 2017 (5) SA 508 (SCA)
para [23], where Wallis JA described this rule as ‘trite’; Jackson v
Standard Cawood & others (3945/2016) [2017] ZALMPPHC 20
(18 August 2017) para [9.10]; and the judgment of the Competi-
tionAppeal Court in Pistorius NO & others v Competition Commis-
sion of South Africa (148/CAC/Nov16) [2017] ZACAC 4
(10 October 2017)). However, it has also been pointed out (see,
eg, 2012 Annual Survey 851) that strict compliance with the
joint-action rule can at times cause practical difficulties. One way
of alleviating these difficulties is the inclusion in a trust deed of a
provision allowing trustee decisions to be taken by a majority vote
among the trustees. Another possibility is that trustees can use
the normal principles of the law of agency in this context. As
Harms JA observed in Nieuwoudt & another NNO v Vrystaat
Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA), the trustees ‘may
expressly or impliedly authorise someone to act on their behalf
and that person may be one of the trustees’ (para [23]).
The usefulness, but also the limits, of the latter mechanism
were again illustrated in Costa NO v Arvum Exports (969/2016)
[2017] ZASCA 113 (21 September 2017).
To the extent that it touched upon the law of trusts, Costa
concerned the validity of two business agreements concluded by
one of the three trustees (Costa) of a certain trust. The respon-
dent contended that these agreements bound the trust; but the
appellant (one of the other two trustees and the widow of Costa
who had been murdered) contended that they did not. Both the
court of first instance and the full court found for the respondent.
These courts found that Costa had the actual authority to
conclude the agreements on behalf of the trust, or that, in the
alternative, he had at least the ostensible authority to do so. The
appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal that
formulated the ‘principal question’ as being ‘whether Mr Costa
had authority, on behalf of all the trustees, to enter into [the] two
agreements . . .’ (para [2]).
With reference to Vrystaat Mielies, the Supreme Court of
Appeal accepted as its point of departure that ‘it is permissible
for trustees to authorise one of them to act on their behalf’ (para
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[18]). In this matter the trust deed stipulated that, unless other-
wise provided, trustee decisions could be taken by a majority of
trustees present at a trustee meeting, but also that a written
resolution signed by all the trustees would have the same effect
as a decision taken by a majority of the trustees at a meeting
(para [18]). In Costa, the three trustees had in fact signed a
resolution stating that Costa ‘in his capacity as trustee of the Klein
Botrivier Trust 852/2007 is hereby appointed and authorized to
sign the necessary documentation’ (para [19] original emphasis).
There was, therefore, no doubt that all three trustees had signed
the resolution on which the respondent relied. But, as Lewis JA
phrased it, the question was ‘what meaning it bore’ (para [18]).
This question called upon the court to interpret the contested
resolution. On the plain wording of the resolution, it empowered
Costa ‘to sign the necessary documentation’. However, that
raised the next question: documentation necessary for what?
Because the resolution itself did not answer this question (the
meaning of the words were ‘obscure’), the court found it neces-
sary to look at the context in which the resolution had been taken
(para [23]). And that context was the decision to purchase a farm
for the trust. The trustees, having resolved to purchase and take
transfer of the farm, then authorised Costa ‘to sign all documenta-
tion necessary for that purchase’ (para [24]). The other trustees
did not give him the authority to conclude further business
agreements with other parties. To this conclusion, Lewis JA
added the following more general observation:
The conclusion of business contracts, as opposed to the day-to-day
administration of a trust, is not something that trustees may delegate
to a person. They must decide what contracts to conclude (para [24]).
This observation may be too broadly formulated. In my view,
everything will depend on the wording of the trust deed in
question. But there is no reason in principle why the trustees
cannot, in terms of the normal principles of the law of agency,
authorise one of their number to conclude business agreements
binding the trust (see also Moraitis Investments (Pty) Ltd & others
v Montic Dairy (Pty) Ltd above para [23]).
Be that as it may, there were also other indications that Costa
had not been so authorised, and that he had in fact contracted in
his personal capacity. For example, the trust was not a business
trust; its sole function was to hold the farm (regarding the use of
business trusts in general, see Cargill RSA (Pty) Ltd v Bibbey NO
& others/Thunderflax 52 (Pty) Ltd (341/2017) [2017] ZAFSHC 132
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(24 August 2017)). Costa’s financial records also revealed that all
contractual payments were made to his personal account and
that he had not paid them over to the trust. Based on these and
other indications (see paras [26]-[31]), the court therefore con-
cluded that Costa did not have actual authority to conclude the
business agreements in question.
Both the court of first instance and the full court found that if
actual authority had not been given, there was at least ostensible
authority. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not agree
with the court of first instance that the other party could have
reasonably relied on the ‘vague resolution’ passed some two
years before the conclusion of the agreements (para [33]). For its
part, the full court apparently found that Costa had himself made
the representation that he had been duly authorised. The prob-
lem with this finding is that Costa was only the agent and not the
principal. Only if the remaining trustees had represented to
the other contract party (by their words or conduct) that Costa
had been duly authorised, could ostensible authority possibly
have been found. However, the other contract party did not show
any conduct on their part that could lead to such a conclusion.
After also having rejected the respondent’s reliance on both
the allegation of the abuse of the trust (see paras [36]-[38] and
‘The abuse of a trust and ‘‘sham’’ trusts: Circumstances warranting
a court ‘‘to go behind’’ the trust’ below) and certain provisions of
the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 (an issue not relevant
here), the court concluded that the appeal should succeed with
costs.
The abuse of a trust and ‘sham’ trusts: Circumstances warranting a court
‘to go behind’ the trust
As already observed in this chapter in recent Annual Surveys
(see, eg, 2014 Annual Survey 971; 2015 Annual Survey 1061),
probably the most contentious issue in the South African law of
trusts over the past number of years has been the question as
to how courts should deal with instances of the possible abuse
of the trust institution. A typical example of such abuse (see,
eg, 2012 Annual Survey 853; 2014 Annual Survey 971) would be
where a person (often simultaneously a founder, trustee, and
beneficiary of the particular trust) could try to ‘hide’ assets in
a trust from claimants in divorce or insolvency proceedings. The
question then arises whether such trust assets can be used
(or taken into account) for the satisfaction of these private claims,
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or whether other remedies could be crafted to address the
negative consequences of such abuse. The topicality of the issue
is well illustrated by the discussion of numerous judgments in
recent Annual Surveys (see 2009 Annual Survey 1070–2; 2010
Annual Survey 1198–1202; 2011 Annual Survey 1070–2; 2012
Annual Survey 853–5; 2014 Annual Survey 971 – 6; 2015 Annual
Survey 1061–2). Against this background, and for purposes of
the current review period, it would, therefore, only be necessary
to comment briefly on the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) (also reported as
Mills v Mills [2017] 2 All SA 364 (SCA)); and see also Costa NO v
Arvum Exports paras [36]-[38] above under ‘Trustee authority:
The ‘‘joint-action’’ rule and application of the normal principles of
the law of agency’.
In the words of Swain JA, it would have been ‘no exaggeration’
to describe the relationship between the appellant and the
respondent in REM as ‘tumultuous’ – illustrated by the fact that by
the time of the judgment they had already been married and
divorced three times (para [1]). Much of the judgment focused on
the interpretation of section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Matrimonial Property
Act 88 of 1984 and of certain provisions of the antenuptial
contract concluded between the parties, issues that are not
relevant for purposes of this chapter. However, it also concerned
whether assets held in certain trusts could be taken into account
in order to calculate the respondent’s accrual claim in terms of
the Matrimonial Property Act against the appellant – in other
words, whether the court could ‘go behind the trust form’ or, put
differently, could ‘pierce the veneer of the trust’ (para [17]).
Regarding this latter issue, two general remarks on the REM
judgment are warranted.
The first remark concerns a theoretical point, but one with
significant practical ramifications. In REM, the court once again
stressed the importance of the distinction between a ‘sham’ trust,
and the issue of ‘going behind the trust form’ (para [17]; and see
also Van Zyl & another NNO v Kaye NO & others 2014 (4) SA 452
(WCC); WT & others v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA); 2014 Annual
Survey 972; 2015 Annual Survey 1062). If a trust is found to be a
‘sham’, there is no trust and thus nothing to ‘go behind’. The
respondent’s claim in REM that the appellant used the trusts in
question as his ‘alter ego’ necessarily involved the acceptance of
the valid existence of these trusts (para [17]).
The second remark concerns the issue of locus standi to
institute a claim for ‘going behind’ a trust. It may be recalled that
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in WT, the Supreme Court of Appeal took a very narrow view in
this regard. In order to found a claim, the court said, the claimant
must be either a ‘defined beneficiary of the trust’, or must have
‘transacted with the trust as a third party’ (para [32] of WT; 2015
Annual Survey 1062). In the absence of either of these grounds,
the trustee of a trust would have no fiduciary duty towards the
claimant (this was in fact one of the reasons why the appeal in WT
succeeded). This narrow view has been rightly criticised in my
view (see, eg, Iain Matthys Shipley ‘Trust assets and the dissolu-
tion of a marriage: A practical look at invalid trusts, sham trusts,
and piercing the veneers of trusts/going behind the trust form’
(2016) 28 SA Merc LJ 508 526–8; A van der Linde ‘Whether trust
assets form part of the joint estate of parties married in commu-
nity of property: Comments on ‘‘piercing of the veneer’’ of a trust
in divorce proceedings’ (2016) 79 THRHR 165 173). It is, there-
fore, to be welcomed that the Supreme Court of Appeal took a
different stance in REM. There it held that breach by the trustee of
his or her fiduciary duties in the administration of the trust, is not
the ‘determining factor’. Rather, a claim would lie against the trust
or the trustee ‘on the basis that the unconscionable abuse of the
trust form by the trustee, in his or her administration of the trust,
through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose prejudices the
enforcement of the obligation owed to the third party, or a spouse’
(para [20]). Using a flexible test such as this would certainly
better serve justice than the closed-list approach advanced in
WT (see also Shipley (2016) 28 SA Merc LJ 527-8).
Regarding the respondent’s claim that the assets of the trusts
be taken into account in determining her accrual claim, the court
in REM concluded that
. . . the evidence did not prove that he [the appellant] transferred
personal assets to these trusts and dealt with them as if they were
assets of these trusts, with the fraudulent or dishonest purpose of
avoiding his obligation to properly account to the respondent for the
accrual of his estate. In addition, it was not established that the
transfer of assets to these trusts by the appellant was simulated with
the object of cloaking them with the form and appearance of assets of
the trusts, whilst in reality retaining ownership. The assets of these
trusts are accordingly not to be taken into account in determining the
accrual of the appellant’s estate (para [20]).
The respondent had limited success in other respects, how-
ever, and the appeal succeeded partly with the respondent being
ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
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UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT
HELEN SCOTT*
LEGISLATION
No legislation affecting this branch of the law was enacted
during the period under review.
CASE LAW
SUBROGATION TO EXTINGUISHED RIGHTS AS A RESPONSE TO
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT
Application by bank for subrogation to rights arising from a mortgage
bond previously held by it over the respondent’s property and extinguished
by a third party using funds fraudulently obtained from it
In Absa Bank Ltd v Moore & another 2017 (1) SA 255 (CC),
2017 (2) BCLR 131, Mr and Mrs Moore, the respondents, owned
a home over which Absa Bank, the applicant, held five mortgage
bonds. These bonds – totalling R145 000 in all – were discharged
in the course of a fraudulent scheme operated by one Brusson
(the Brusson scam) in which the Moores had become involved.
Property owners in financial distress were loaned money against
which their homes were to serve as security. Under the scheme,
participants were assured that they would not lose ownership in
their homes, or rather, would do so only temporarily. To this end,
the Moores signed an offer to purchase their property for
R686 000 (the name of the purchaser or ‘investor’, Kabini, was
subsequently inserted); a deed of sale in terms of which the
property was sold back to them for R648 000; and a ‘Memoran-
dum of Agreement’ between Brusson, the Moores, and Kabini
that regulated their tripartite agreement. The Moores must neces-
sarily also have signed a power of attorney. In terms of the offer to
purchase, bond finance of R480 000 was to be procured from a
registered financial institution. The brochure provided to partici-
pants in the scheme furnishes further details of this aspect of the
* BA (Hon) LLB (Cape Town) MA BCL MPhil DPhil (Oxon). Tutorial Fellow,
Lady Margaret Hall and Professor of Private Law, University of Oxford; Honorary
Research Associate in the Department of Private Law at the University of Cape Town.
Grateful thanks to Douglas Scott and Leo Boonzaier for their help in unravelling the
complexities of Absa v Moore.
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transaction: ‘The Brusson investor applies for a mortgage loan
from a financial institution to cover the cost of the initial trans-
action, and in so doing, makes funds available to the client.
Brusson in turn debits its client. Brusson guarantees the monthly
instalment to the financial institution’ (para [17] of Moore &
another v Sheriff for the District of Vereeniging & others (HC)
26 September 2014 (case 22082/13). According to the deed of
sale, the Moores were to pay the purchase price of R648 000 by
means of minimum monthly instalments of R7 579, the first
instalment being due on the transfer of the property into the
seller’s name (HC para [15]).
In due course, the property was transferred and registered in
the name of Kabini; simultaneously, the Registrar of Deeds
caused a mortgage bond of R480 000 to be registered over the
property in favour of Absa; also simultaneously, the five mortgage
bonds previously registered over the property were cancelled
(HC para [20]). In addition, R157 651 was paid into the Moores’
bank account. They were told by Brusson that they would have to
pay a monthly instalment of R6 907 over a three-year period.
Consequently, the parties’ transaction appeared to operate as
follows: the Moores owed a total amount of R648 000; the
R480 00 bond procured by Kabini was to be paid off through
monthly instalments of R7 579 provided by the Moores via
Brusson (presumably over a period of many years), while repay-
ment of the R157 561 cash loan would take place in instalments
of R6 907 over a shorter period. (The High Court judgment
suggests that the R7 579 payments corresponded to the entire
notional sale price of R648 000 (HC para [15.3]). However, it
seems rather that these payments were intended to correspond
exactly to the R480 000 bond: see HC para [17].)
Again, the Moores were apparently under the impression that
they had retained ownership of their home (paras [9] and [30] of
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal reported as Absa
Bank Ltd v Moore & another [2015] ZASCA 171 and CC para [5];
compare HC para [43], where Chohan AJ expresses reasonable
doubts about this proposition). In fact, the transaction set out in
the brochure provided to participants appears to envisage a
separation between genuine title, which would remain with the
participant, and formal title, which would pass to the investor –
see paragraph [17] of the High Court judgment. In any event, the
scam appears to have functioned precisely by enabling the
‘investor’, Kabini, to obtain apparent title to the property and
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thereby acquire a significant bank loan secured against it. There
is no suggestion in any of the three judgments that the Moores
were ever called upon to make any of the R7 579 payments to
Brusson required to service that secured loan; certainly, Kabini
quickly fell behind in his repayments to the Bank, and within two
years of the granting of the loan, the Bank obtained default
judgment against him. But that was irrelevant to the operation of
the scheme; the balance of the proceeds of the R480 000
mortgage bond had presumably been appropriated by Kabini
and Brusson (CC para [6]); monthly repayments on the R157 561
cash loan were essentially ‘extra’ (CC para [11]); and it was of no
concern to the fraudsters that the Bank in due course took steps
to repossess the property. At this point the Moores became aware
of the purported transfer of ownership to Kabini, interdicted the
sale in execution, and instituted proceedings to recover their
home. It happened that the bank from which Kabini had obtained
the R480 000 mortgage bond was alsoAbsa Bank – ie, the holder
of the five original mortgage bonds over the Moores’ home.
Before the High Court, an order was granted declaring the
Brusson agreements invalid and setting them aside. In particular,
the purported transfer of the Moores’ property to Kabini was held
to have been simulated and therefore of no force and effect (HC
paras [44]–[49]); and the mortgage bond registered by Kabini in
favour of Absa on the strength of that purported transfer was
declared invalid and set aside (HC paras [50]–[59]). A condition
was, however, imposed on the restitution of the property to the
Moores, in that it was ordered that the Moores’ original mortgage
bonds in favour of Absa be reinstated (HC paras [60]–[62]). The
High Court also held that the Moores should be obliged to restore
to the Bank the amount of the cash loan they had received from
Brusson (R157 561) minus any repayments made (HC para [63]).
On appeal by the Bank to the Supreme Court of Appeal (Lewis
JA, Ponnan, Pillay and Saldulker JJA, and Van der Merwe AJA
concurring) the various findings of invalidity were upheld – in
particular, the purported transfer of the Moores’ home to Kabini
was held to have been without effect (applying Legator McKenna
Inc & another v Shea & others 2010 (1) SA35 (SCA) and Nedbank
Ltd v Mendelow & another NNO 2013 (6) SA 130 (SCA)), as was
the mortgage bond registered at his instance, although Lewis JA
found the transactions to have been fraudulently induced rather
than simulated (SCA para [26]). However, the condition imposed
by the High Court was lifted: the Moores’ home was to be
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returned to them unencumbered. Absa then sought leave to
appeal to the Constitutional Court on this last point only.
Leave to appeal was refused. Absa advanced two arguments
as to why the five original mortgage bonds over the Moores’
property should be reinstated. It was argued, first, that the
cancellation of the Moores’ bonds was integral to the fraudulent
scheme as a whole, along with the Moores’ sale of their property
to Kabini, the registration of the property in his name, and the
registration of Kabini’s new bond over the property. The Moores’
bond had to be cancelled in order to induce the Bank to accept
Kabini’s title to the property as security, and for it to accept him as
bond debtor in the place of the Moores. The entire scheme was a
fraud, and each part of it was equally bad; it was impossible to
pick out any ‘pure pieces from the tangle’ and preserve them
intact. If the Moores were found to have retained ownership of
their house, then it followed that the Bank’s secured debt against
them also remained valid: ‘Fraud . . . unravels all’ (see generally
CC paras [16]–[19]).
This argument was rejected. It depended, said Cameron J,
delivering the unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court, on
the proposition that the agreements under which the discharge
and cancellation of the bonds occurred were vitiated by the
Brusson fraud, and hence that payment of the Moores’ debt was
ineffective. But the evidence submitted by the Bank in support of
this proposition was ‘patchy’ at best (CC para [25]). It was not
possible to determine from it how exactly Kabini had accom-
plished the fraud, or how the Moores’ bond debt had been
discharged (CC para [27]). Moreover, even if it were assumed in
the Bank’s favour that it was indeed Kabini who had paid the
Moores’ bond debt in execution of the fraud, this did not mean
that his payment was without effect. As a bilateral act, payment
requires the cooperation of the payer and payee, while the
discharge of a debt required a debt-extinguishing agreement
between the debtor (or a party acting in her name) and creditor
(Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Co Ltd 2012 (6) SA 569
(SCA) para [18] cited at CC para [32]). But, in contrast to some
other legal systems, South African law permitted a debt to
be paid without either the consent or knowledge of the debtor
(CC para [33]). Furthermore, even a deposit into the account of a
fraudster was effective in transferring ownership in the money
(Trustees, Estate Whitehead v Dumas & another 2013 (3) SA 331
(SCA) paras [13]–[15] [23] and [24], cited at CC para [34]). In
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fact, payment of a thief’s own debts using stolen funds extin-
guished those debts, provided the third-party creditor accepted
payment in good faith (Lombard para [18] cited at CC para [35]).
Funds paid out in this way could, therefore, not be recovered by
the victim of the theft. This was true even where the debt paid by
the thief was not his or her own (Commissioner of Inland Revenue
v Visser 1959 (1) SA452 (A) cited at CC para [35]). It followed that
Kabini’s payment to Absa was sufficient to discharge the Moores’
bond debts even in the absence of their cooperation, and even if
payment was made in fraud on the Bank using funds that the
Bank itself had provided (CC para [37]). Indeed, Cameron J
ventured, this would have been true even if the Moores had
colluded with Kabini (CC para [37] n23). As the victims of fraud,
the Moores had a choice whether or not to avoid their loan
agreement with Brusson, but it remained valid until they chose to
rescind it. Still less could the Bank, a third party, ‘disregard the
loan agreement because of Brusson’s fraud’ (CC para [39]). ‘The
maxim is not a flame-thrower, withering all within its reach’ (ibid).
It followed that the fraud perpetrated by Brusson did not unravel
the cancellation of the Moores’ bonds: the bonds were accessory
to the main debt owed to the Bank, and that debt had been validly
cancelled (CC para [40]).
In light of that conclusion, Cameron J turned to the second,
alternative argument advanced by the Bank. This was that the
cancellation of the Moores’ bonds, if valid, had resulted in their
being enriched at the Bank’s expense, and that the appropriate
remedy in order to reverse such unjustified enrichment was to
reinstate those bonds in the Bank’s favour. Here the Bank drew
on the common-law doctrine of restitutionary subrogation. Critical
to this argument was the proposition that the Moores’ debt to the
Bank had been discharged using the proceeds of the loan made
by the Bank to Kabini. The Bank had lent the money to Kabini on
the basis that the loan was secured against the property. It never
intended to expose itself to unsecured debt. Accordingly, it was
argued, the Bank, in its role as lender to Kabini, should be put into
the shoes of the creditor of the secured debt which its loan to him
was used to discharge: namely, itself, in its role as lender to the
Moores. The Bank cited several English cases (Brocklesby v
Temperance Permanent Building Society [1895] AC 173 (HL);
Butler v Rice [1910] 2 Ch 277; and Ghana Commercial Bank v
Chandiram [1960] AC 732 (PC)) in support of this proposition.
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Cameron J also referred (CC para [42] n28) to §57 of the
American Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment (ALI 2011).
Again, this argument was rejected. Cameron J gave three
reasons for this. First, he said, the argument depended on
disaggregating the capacities in which the Bank acted in the
transactions: first, as lender to the Moores; and second, as lender
to Kabini. This argument proceeded from a notional core case in
which the first lender had been a different bank, the second
lender then being subrogated to the position of the first. But this
core case created ‘an insuperable problem’ for the applicant. If
the first and second lenders were in fact different banks, on what
terms and conditions would the court be able to impose a new
bond in the second lender’s favour? In such a case the court
would have to create an entirely new contract between the
second lender and the debtor, but it was difficult to imagine what
the terms of such a contract would be. ‘Must the court exercise a
general equitable jurisdiction to determine these contractual
terms itself?’ (CC para [43]). The Supreme Court of Appeal had
been entirely correct to conclude that the court ‘cannot make a
contract between the Bank and the Moores’ (SCApara [42], cited
by Cameron J CC para [44]).
Second, the Bank’s argument supposed that the Moores had
been enriched at the Bank’s expense. But this was by no means
clear: the release of the Moores’ property from the bonds over it
was not gratuitous but rather came at the cost of their new debt to
Brusson (CC para [45]). It was argued in reply by the Bank that
the Moores were not bound by that debt, as the loan was (at its
strongest) voidable at their instance for fraud (CC para [46]). The
answer to this argument was that the Moores might nevertheless
be liable to the trustees of either Brusson’s or Kabini’s insolvency
(depending on who had discharged the Moores’ debt) in unjusti-
fied enrichment – the relaxation of the par delictum rule, as per
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537, would give rise to a restitutionary
claim against them, as recently permitted by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in Afrisure CC v Watson NO & another 2009 (2) SA 127
(SCA) para [47]). And even if this argument were unsuccessful,
the Bank faced a further and – for Cameron J – insuperable
obstacle, namely that it had not been impoverished: it retained its
claim against Kabini in respect of the money advanced to him
(R480 000 plus interest). Indeed, the Bank had obtained default
judgment against him in that respect, showing that it had elected
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to uphold this contractual claim. The fact that this claim might well
be worth nothing in practice, owing to the insolvency of both
Kabini and Brussson, did not alter the position: ‘the extant claim
and the judgment enforcing it insuperably impede the Bank’s
assertion that the fraud impoverished it to the benefit of the
Moores’ (CC para [49]).
Third, even if the Moores had been enriched, ‘the Bank’s
threadbare patchwork of evidence disables its case’ (CC para
[52]). Although the Bank alleged that it was Kabini who had paid
this debt rather than Brusson, from an undetermined source, and
that he had done so with its money, this claim was speculative.
Admittedly, ‘it doesn’t seem unlikely’ that Kabini used the R480 000
his fraud extracted from the Bank to pay R157 651 to the Moores,
R145 000 to the Bank to settle the Moores’ mortgage debt, and
R168 000 to Brusson (CC para [54] n37). However, the Bank had
advanced no evidence in support of this proposition. In the
absence of such evidence the Bank’s contention that an enrich-
ment claim should be developed to restore it to the security it had
previously enjoyed over the Moores’ property could not be
sustained.
Cameron J closed the substantive portion of his judgment with
the following remarks:
Beneath these contentions lies the Bank’s complaint that the Moores
received an unmerited windfall at its expense. It is true that the Moores
are better off now than before the fraud, and that the Bank, having lost
its secured loan to the Moores, now has only an unsecured claim
against Mr Kabini, who is probably good for nothing. But the Moores
justly defend that this is not their fault. Their bond debt to the Bank was
discharged because the Bank decided to take Mr Kabini, whom it
thought now owned the property, as its debtor in their stead. It was the
bank that decided to grant a loan to Mr Kabini. We don’t know what
background checks it did, or could have done, on him. We know
nothing about the conveyancing attorney whom it employed, and who
accepted all the documents at face value. The discharge of the
Moores’ debt was not subject to a condition that Mr Kabini would
prove a worthy debtor. And, on the facts before us, there is no basis to
develop our law so as to impose one. In the way things have turned
out. . .the outcome is not unjust. The Bank, which enjoyed the institu-
tional resources and power to protect itself against the fraudulent
scheme, but didn’t do so, has to suffer the loss its loan to Mr Kabini
caused to it (CC paras [56] [57]).
In my view this this decision represents a missed opportunity.
In an uncodified civilian system like South Africa’s, one who
brings an unjustified enrichment claim in respect of money stolen
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or fraudulently obtained out of a bank account receives only very
limited protection against the insolvency of the thief or fraudster:
her claim enjoys no priority over that of other creditors, and she
cannot pursue the funds into the hands of third parties; lacking
any persisting right of ownership capable of vindication, the
victim of such theft or fraud can rely only on a personal remedy,
typically available only against the wrongdoer herself. This limited
diet of remedies seems unsatisfactory, especially given the very
high prevalence of financial crime in contemporary South Africa.
One strategy for dealing with such cases – first raised by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in First National Bank of South Africa
Ltd v Perry NO 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA), and further developed in
Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marnitz NO (Stand 186 Aeroport
(Pty) Ltd Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA) – is to deny the
holder of stolen funds in a bank account any right to those funds
as against the bank at which the account in question is held.
According to this analysis, the bank itself is held to be enriched
by receipt of funds held to the account of the thief, rendering it a
potential defendant to an unjustified enrichment claim by the
victim of the theft. In at least one decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal (the Nissan case itself), this has afforded the original
holder of the funds significant protection against the thief’s
insolvency. The utility of this strategy is limited, however, by the
rule (accepted in Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Co Ltd
2012 (6) SA 569 (SCA)) that a payment made to a good-faith,
third-party creditor of the thief by the thief herself can be retained
by that creditor – in the Lombard case itself, the defendant banks
in their roles as both mortgagees and unsecured lenders to the
thief – as having validly satisfied the thief’s debt. (The Lombard
case is cited to this effect in CC para 32 n10. It is unclear to this
author that the finding of successful discharge by the thief of a
good-faith, third-party’s claim in Lombard supports the same
conclusion where the debt in question has been discharged by a
fraudster in pursuance of her fraud.) It appears, further, that the
Nissan rule is limited to cases of theft, although it is arguable that
the fraud at issue in the case under discussion here (and indeed
in the original decision in Perry above) was of a more fundamen-
tal kind than the fraudulent misrepresentation at issue in Trustees,
Estate Whitehead v Dumas & another 2013 (3) SA 331 (SCA),
where the Nissan rule was disapplied. Finally, it is difficult to say
precisely what the doctrinal basis of this body of cases is:
whether the victim’s claim against the bank, although a personal
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one, amounts to a species of substitute vindicatio arising from the
invasion of her original property rights in the money, which might
be susceptible to further elaboration along principled lines, or
whether it is founded rather on a specific policy of affording
protection against insolvency to the victims of theft in certain
clearly defined circumstances. At the very least, the evolution of
this body of cases demonstrates that the South African law of
unjustified enrichment is not averse to providing such protection.
Thus it seems that the strategy boldly employed by counsel for
the Bank in this case – to attempt to introduce into South African
law the common-law doctrine of restitutionary subrogation – was
not without foundation: it was, after all, likewise an attempt to
secure for the victim of serious fraud protection against insol-
vency; not only that of the fraudsters Kabini and Brusson, but also
that of the Moores themselves. Subrogation in English law
enables the claimant to obtain the benefit of the extinguished
rights of another as against a third party. The Bank, in its role as
unsecured lender to Kabini, was seeking to be subrogated to its
own (now extinguished) secured claim against the Moores, by
virtue of the fact that the Moores’ bond had been discharged
using the proceeds of the loan fraudulently procured from it by
Kabini. A similar argument could conceivably have been run by
the victim of theft in the Lombard case, ie, that it should be
subrogated to the banks’ extinguished rights over the thief’s
immovable property.
Whatever the merits of this argument in the case at hand, the
short shrift afforded it by Cameron J suggests that the South
African courts are unlikely in future to embrace either restitution-
ary subrogation in particular or proprietary restitution in general
as a response to unjustified enrichment (cf the limited scope of
the subrogation doctrine in contemporary South African law in,
eg, Jacques du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified
Enrichment (Juta Cape Town (2012) 324–7). In assessing the
Bank’s subrogation argument, Cameron J uncritically accepted
the remarks of Lewis JA at paragraph [42] of the Supreme Court
of Appeal judgment, to the effect that, ‘this court cannot make a
contract between the Bank and the Moores. We cannot order that
the Moores pay an amount that they did not owe to the Bank, nor
that they register a bond over their property in favour of the Bank.
There is no longer any contractual nexus between these parties.
The court a quo simply did not have the power to make a contract
for the parties.’ This modest assessment of its own powers is
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highly uncharacteristic of the Constitutional Court. On the other
hand, it must be admitted that several of the other concerns
raised by Cameron J in this context – his objection that such a
remedy would permit the Bank to evade or distort the ‘enrich-
ment’ and ‘impoverishment’ requirements by leapfrogging over
the fraudsters, Kabini and Brusson, to reach the Moores – echo
contemporary English debate regarding the ‘at the expense of’
requirement, and in particular, academic criticism directed at the
wide understanding of that requirement adopted by the majority
of the Supreme Court in Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd
[2015] UKSC 66; see, eg, Robert Stevens ‘The unjust enrichment
disaster’ 2018 134 Law Quarterly Review 574.
Finally, it is not clear to this author that Cameron J’s analysis of
the facts is correct in every respect. In particular, it is not clear
which debt he is referring to when he says at paragraph [45] that
the release of the Moores’ property from the original bonds over it
was not gratuitous but rather came at the cost of their ‘new debt’
to Brusson. The monthly R6 907 repayments made by the Moores
to Brusson appear to have related only to the R157 651 cash
loan; again, it does not appear that any repayments in respect of
the R480 000 mortgage bond obtained by Kabini fromAbsa were
ever made by the Moores, nor that such repayments were even
genuinely contemplated. The discharge of the Moores’ original
mortgage debt may have been effective, but the network of
transactions in pursuance of which it was effected, and in
particular the purported obligation on the part of the Moores to
pay off the R480 000 bond debt (in instalments of R7 579 per
month), was surely a sham. Thus, it is hard to see how this
notional debt (owed by the Moores to Brusson) could work to
block the Bank’s claim against the Moores by negating the
‘enrichment’ element. In fact, as Cameron J implicitly acknow-
ledges at paragraph [47], any enrichment claim arising in respect
of the R145 000 used to discharge the Moores’ original mortgage
bonds – whether available to Brusson, Kabini, or their trustees on
insolvency – would have been one arising from the payment of
another’s debt: the extended action modelled on the actio
negotiorum gestorum contraria (see, eg, Du Plessis Unjustified
Enrichment ch 10) rather than the condictio ob turpem vel
iniustam causam (claim in respect of money or property trans-
ferred under an illegal agreement) at issue in the Afrisure case
referred to by Cameron J. In other words, any such claim arose
from the fact of the payment itself, not from the network of
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contractual obligations – whether valid, voidable or void – con-
structed by the Brusson scheme. On the other hand, it does seem
overwhelmingly likely that the R480 000 obtained by Kabini
through his fraud on the Bank was indeed used to discharge the
original bonds over the Moores’ property; in other words, that it
was Kabini who paid the Moores’ debt, and that he paid it using
funds fraudulently obtained from the Bank. Taking these points
together, it seems highly artificial to separate the two transactions
– the loan of R480 000 by Absa to Kabini, and the discharge of
the Moores’ original bond debt – in such a way as to immunise the
Moores against the Bank’s enrichment claim. In effect, it was
Absa that discharged the Moores’ debt, Kabini acted merely as a
conduit. The Moores were indeed enriched at the Bank’s expense.
Therefore, it may be that the outcome in this case is better
understood as an expression of social justice than private-law
doctrine. As the paragraph quoted above suggests, at bottom the
Court took the view that the equities favoured the Moores: that the
Bank, a big corporate player, ought to have been more careful in
lending money to Kabini, and that the Bank, being in a far better
position to protect itself against the fraudulent scheme than the
Moores, ought to suffer the loss thus caused. Yet the difficulties
with this line of reasoning are obvious. First, it is not clear what the
legal (or moral) relevance of fault on the part of the plaintiff is to a
claim in unjustified enrichment. The mere fact that the Bank could
have been more careful (if indeed that is so) should not affect the
availability of an enrichment claim in principle. The mortgage
bond by means of which the Bank sought to secure the loan
showed beyond doubt that it had not taken the risk of Kabini’s
insolvency. Second, many victims of financial crime are, of
course, not banks or other large corporations, but rather small
companies (as in the Lombard case) or individuals (as in the
Whitehead case). It seems unfortunate that this opportunity to
develop the law in favour of the victims of theft and fraud – by
adopting at least some aspects of the English doctrine of
proprietary restitution, perhaps in reliance on the right to property
entrenched in section 25 of the Constitution – was missed.
Perhaps in the next case, when the equities are reversed, the
court may be persuaded to intervene. (See again, Lombard, as
discussed by Danie Visser ‘Unjustified enrichment in the context
of the fraudulent manipulation of bank accounts: Principle, prag-
matism, and equality before law’ in Visser C & Pretorius J (eds)
Essays in Honour of Frans Malan (LexisNexis South Africa
Durban 2014) 359.
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